1 UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE AND HUMAN SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PhD PROGRAMME Adriana Toledo Piza The Buddhist Concept of Selflessness According to Je Tsongkhapa São Paulo 2018 2 Adriana Toledo Piza The Buddhist Concept of Selflessness According to Je Tsongkhapa This thesis is presented at the PhD program on Philosophy of the School of Philosophy, Literature and Human Sciences of the University of São Paulo for obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the supervision of Prof. PhD João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter São Paulo 2018 3 Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere appreciation, first of all, to my doctoral advisor, Prof. PhD João Vergílio Gallerani Cutter, for his earnest inspiriting and constructive critiques, as well as for his constant support in all possible manners to my endeavors throughout the whole doctorate program. I also wish to express my very deep gratitude to Ven. Gonsar Tulku Rinpoche, Director and principal Professor at the Center for Higher Tibetan Studies Rabten Choeling, in Switzerland, and to Prof. PhD Wilhelm Essler, from the Department of Philosophy of the Goethe University Frankfurt, in Germany, for having guided me through the vastness and depths of Buddhist philosophy, as well as for their valuable advices and assistance to my efforts for carrying out an academical research on this subject. I am particularly grateful to Marina Simen and Peter Caccivio for their precious financial support, which enabled me to attend lectures and courses both at the Goethe University Frankfurt, in Germany, and at the Center for Higher Tibetan Studies Rabten Choeling, in Switzerland, during the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. I also wish to thank Fernanda Toledo Piza, Gisele Barroco, Rosie Mehoudar, Leo Lang, Max Kauffman, Sueli Arcocha, Rosangela Amato, Geisa dos Santos, Nicole Arndt, Ramona Pou Bruch, Eden Lamdark, Hsia Cheng Pei and Ulas Gergin for the help provided in many different ways. Finally, special thanks must also be given to CAPES, for the funding of four years of full dedication to the PhD program. 4 Abstract This doctoral research has the purpose of articulating a consistent presentation of the Buddhist concept of selflessness as explained by the great Tibetan Buddhist scholar Tsongkhapa (Tibet, 1357–1419), who composed some major philosophical masterpieces about this key Buddhist conception based on Nāgārjuna´s (India, ca 150–250 CE) famous Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). Tsongkhapa presents himself as a follower of Nāgārjuna, that is, as a proponent of the 'Middle Way' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa) Buddhist philosophical school. As our study of the first treatise in which he presents his view on selflessness advanced, we realized that it was necessary to dedicate part of our research to the analysis of the epistemological theory that substantiates his explanation of selflessness, since his approach to the subject is based on the use of what he calls 'rational analysis' and 'inferential knowledge'. Therefore, a preliminary part of our thesis is dedicated to the clarification of Tsongkhapa´s conceptions of rational analysis and inferential knowledge, which are based primarily on the theory of 'valid cognition' (pramāna, tshad ma) elaborated centuries earlier by the great Indian scholar Dharmakīrti (6th and 7th centuries CE). The next stage of our research was guided by the following questions: since, for Tsongkhapa, not possessing a self means the same as not possessing a nature (svabhāva, rang zhin), a concept upon which Dharmakīrti´s explanation of inferential knowledge is based, how does Tsongkhapa combine his presentation of selflessness with Dharmakīrti´s epistemology without generating internal contradictions in his system? We have concluded that, in Tsongkhapa´s presentation, of selflessness as united with causation, that is, as one implying the other due to the introduction of the key distinction between 'inherent nature' and 'mere nature', there is no contradiction between his epistemological use of inferences based on the notion of mere natures (recognized as conventional) and his final ontological assertion that phenomena lack inherent natures. Key-words: Buddhist Philosophy, Madhyamaka, inference, dependent-origination, selflessness. 5 O Conceito Budista de 'Anatma' (Ausência de Identidade) Segundo Je Tsongkhapa Resumo A presente pesquisa de doutoramento tem por finalidade articular uma apresentação consistente do conceito budista de anatma (ausência de identidade) segundo a explicação do grande pensador tibetano Tsongkhapa (Tibete, 1357–1419), que compôs relevantes obras filosóficas sobre esse conceito budista fundamental, baseadas no famoso tratado Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK) de Nāgārjuna. Tsongkhapa se apresenta como um seguidor de Nāgārjuna, ou seja, como um proponente da escola de filosofia budista 'Caminho do Meio' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa). À medida em que nosso estudo do primeiro tratado em que ele articula sua visão da noção de anatma (ausência de identidade) se desenvolvia, percebemos que seria necessário dedicar parte de nossa pesquisa à análise da teoria epistemológica que fundamenta sua explicação da 'ausência de identidade' (dos fenômenos), visto que sua abordagem baseia-se na utilização do que ele chama de 'análise racional' e 'conhecimento por inferência'. Dessa forma, a primeira parte de nossa tese é dedicada à compreensão das noções de 'análise racional' e 'conhecimento por inferência' usadas por Tsongkhapa, que se baseiam principalmente na teoria sobre as 'cognições válidas' (pramāna, tshad ma), elaborada séculos antes pelo grande pensador indiano Dharmakīrti (6th and 7th centuries CE). A etapa seguinte de nosso trabalho teve como fio-condutor a seguinte questão: visto que, para Tsongkhapa, a ausência de identidade (anatma, dak me) significa o mesmo que não ser dotado de uma 'natureza' (svabhāva, rang zhin), conceito sobre o qual a explicação de Dharmakīrti do conhecimento por inferência se baseia, como Tsongkhapa elabora conceitualmente a articulação da epistemologia de Dharmakīrti com sua explicação da ausência de identidade dos fenômenos sem gerar contradições internas em seu sistema? Concluímos que, na apresentação de Tsongkhapa, em que a noção de causalidade passa a implicar a de 'ausência de identidade' devido à introdução da distinção essencial entre 'natureza inerente' e 'mera natureza', não há contradição entre seu uso epistemológico de inferências baseadas na noção de 'meras naturezas' (reconhecidas como convencionais) e sua afirmação ontológica final da ausência de natureza inerente nos fenômenos. Palavras-chave: filosofia budista, Madhyamaka, inferência, origem-dependente, ausência de identidade. 6 Table of Contents Part One: Introduction a) General Historical Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy 9 b) Madhyamaka in Tibet 16 c) Je Tsongkhapa 17 Part Two: Je Tsongkhapa´s Philosophical Background Chapter I – Introduction 21 Chapter II – General Buddhist Ontology 32 Chapter III – Dharmakīrti´s Ontology 35 Chapter IV – Dharmakīrti´s Epistemology 44 Part Three: The Buddhist View of Selflessness According to Je Tsongkhapa Chapter I - Introduction: a – The Import of the Oral Lineage 68 b – The Translation 69 7 c - Written Register of the Oral Lineage 69 d – Priorities of our Presentation 70 Chapter II - Basic Introductory Notions 72 Chapter III - Tsongkhapa´s Presentation of V ipaśyanā: a - Why it is Necessary to Practice Vipaśyanā 79 b - How to Establish the View of Emptiness 87 b' – The Stages of Entering into Reality 87 b'' – The Actual Establishing of Reality 93 The Need of Identifying Properly the Object of Negation 93 The Overly Broad Misconception of the Object of Negation 96 Mere Nature 120 The Overly Limited Misconception of the Object of Negation 126 The Actual Object of Negation 129 Applying the Rational Analysis to Negate Inherent Nature 132 Conclusion 141 References 147 8 Part One: General Historical Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy 9 Before we start with our attempt to describe and discuss some of the key concepts of what is nowadays generally known as 'Buddhist philosophy', it is important to draw the reader´s attention to some of the characteristics which constitute relevant differences between this field of intelectual inquiry and the tradition of philosophical investigation and composition of masterpieces that originated in Ancient Greece and developed throughout Europe. The main author which our description of Buddhist philosophy focus upon was born in Tibet during the fifteenth century and was a Buddhist monk. His philosophical writings were composed in the context of a certain tradition whose main features should be depicted here before directly approaching his philosophy. As Georges Dreyfus asserts, we should characterize Hindu and Tibetan philosophy as a 'commentarial philosophical tradition' (DREYFUS, 1997, p. 2). Dreyfus´s expression has a precise meaning: the philosophical inquiry developed by such authors is entirely based on the commentaries that they compose about the great masterpieces of specific Indian sources which are considered by them as authoritative. Therefore, the study of a Tibetan author like Tsongkhapa, who is the main focus of our research, requires at least some basic familiarity with the main ideas contained in those Indian Buddhist treatises upon which his writings are entirely based. However, instead of composing their texts inspired by a critical view of their predecessors´ ideas, which is the case with many Western philosophers starting with Aristotle, Buddhist authors