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Coordinating for Results.Pdf Collaborating Across Boundaries Series Coordinating for Results Lessons from a Case Study of Interagency Coordination in Afghanistan Andrea Strimling Yodsampa Tufts University Collaborating Across Boundaries Series 2013 Coordinating for Results: Lessons from a Case Study of Interagency Coordination in Afghanistan Andrea Strimling Yodsampa Tufts University COORDINATING FOR RESULTS: LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN www.businessofgovernment.org Table of Contents Foreword . 4 Executive Summary . 6 Introduction . 8 What is Coordination? . .. 8 What are Coordinated Results? Distinguishing Process and Results . 8 What are the Challenges to Coordination? . 9 Why Focus on Organizational Systems and Processes? . 9 Case Study Identifies Systems and Processes Necessary for Coordinated Results . 10 Case Study: U.S. Civil-Military Coordination in Afghanistan, 2001–2009 . 12 Phase I: Early Coordination Failures (Fall 2001–Summer 2003) . 12 Phase II: Co-Location at the Embassy (Fall 2003–Summer 2005) . .. 15 Phase III: Changes at the Embassy (Summer 2005–Spring 2007) . .. 22 Phase IV: New Joint Analysis and Planning Processes (Spring 2007– Spring 2009) . .. 26 Findings and Recommendations . 32 Findings: Systems and Processes to Enhance Coordination . 32 Recommendations to Enhance Interagency Coordination . 35 About the Author . 38 Key Contact Information . 39 3 COORDINATING FOR RESULTS: LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN IBM Center for The Business of Government Foreword On behalf of the IBM Center for The Business of Government, we are pleased to present this report, Coordinating for Results: Lessons from a Case Study of Interagency Coordination in Afghanistan, by Andrea Strimling Yodsampa . Over the past decade, the IBM Center has sponsored research on various facets of cross-agency and cross-sector collaboration . This report focuses on a close relative—interagency coordina- tion . The differences are important, and public managers have to understand the distinctions and whether collaboration or coordination is most appropriate to use . Daniel J . Chenok Dr . Yodsampa notes that collaboration implies co-equal relation- ships among agencies, whose participants jointly combine staff and resources to pursue a common objective . She distinguishes this from coordination, which occurs when agencies are not co- equal, may pursue different goals, and intend to maintain sepa- rate and distinct organizations with clearly defined boundaries and resources . In developing this report, the author analyzed the interactions between U .S . civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009 . She drew on many confidential and candid interviews with key players, including ambassadors and gener- als, to identify the challenges and successes of coordination between their institutions . Kevin Green Dr . Yodsampa vividly describes examples of successful coordina- tion on initiatives such as school and road construction and the 2004 Afghan national elections . These initiatives succeeded when the civilian and military institutions leveraged their joint funding sources and networks to achieve common goals . But she also observes instances where the lack of coordination resulted in the two institutions duplicating each other’s effort, or at worst, inadvertently undermining the other’s activities or goals . 4 COORDINATING FOR RESULTS: LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN www.businessofgovernment.org Dr . Yodsampa offers real-world examples of strategies that improve interagency coordination . She focuses on key elements for leaders to consider in coordinating across agencies, which helps to inform one of the key research questions that the IBM Center has posed around shared leadership as part of our cur- rent call for proposals . We hope that federal executives find the lessons and recom- mendations in this report useful when they undertake coordina- tion efforts with other agencies . Daniel J . Chenok Kevin Green Executive Director Vice President, Defense and Intelligence IBM Center for The Business of Government IBM Federal chenokd @ us .ibm .com kpgreen @ us .ibm .com 5 COORDINATING FOR RESULTS: LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN IBM Center for The Business of Government Executive Summary Interagency coordination is an essential ele- ment of effective public leadership . Few Recommendations to Enhance agencies have the funding, expertise, or Interagency Coordination influence to achieve their goals single-hand- edly . Moreover, complex problems require • Co-locate and convene interagency teams . interdisciplinary—and hence interagency— • Ensure regular, structured opportunities solutions . To succeed, public executives and for information sharing and joint analysis managers must leverage the financial, and planning . human, and organizational resources of mul- • Designate experienced facilitators . tiple agencies . This requires coordination . • Delegate decision-making authority to the field, provide professional incentives Coordination, however, is easier said than to coordinate, and hold people account- done . Agencies differ in their goals, priori- able for results . ties, and cultures . They compete for • Articulate shared goals and priorities . resources and turf . And they have different interests and concerns relative to coordina- • Pay attention to individual personalities and team dynamics when building inter- tion itself . Coordination also takes time and agency teams . money; coordination processes must com- pete for resources with other mission needs and priorities . Compounding these chal- lenges, executives and managers rarely have line authority over agencies and individuals with whom they must coordinate . In the face of these challenges, how can executives and managers deliver consistent coordi- nated results? Those who have led or served on interagency teams often argue that coordina- tion is driven by personalities and relationships . Personalities and relationships do matter, of course . Public executives and managers must pay careful attention to the composition of inter- agency teams . But they must not stop there . Attitudes and relationships are deeply affected by organizational factors . Therefore, public executives and managers must institutionalize systems and processes that foster the attitudes, relationships, and behaviors conducive to coordination . This report identifies the organizational systems and processes necessary to deliver consistent coordinated results . It is based on a case study of U .S . stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009 1. The case study illuminates concrete examples of suc- cessful coordination amidst extensive coordination failures . It then identifies the organizational systems and processes that made those successes possible . 1. The report is based on “No One in Charge: A New Theory of Coordination and an Analysis of US Civil-Military Coordination in Afghanistan 2001–2009,” (PhD diss., Tufts University, 2011), available at http://gradworks.umi.com/3465447.pdf. 6 COORDINATING FOR RESULTS: LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN www.businessofgovernment.org While the Afghan context was unique in many respects, the agencies on the ground faced many of the same challenges domestic agencies face in attempting to coordinate . The lessons about interagency coordination therefore are broadly relevant . By employing the strategies out- lined in this report, public executives and managers can strengthen interagency coordination, enhancing effectiveness and efficiency . 7 COORDINATING FOR RESULTS: LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN IBM Center for The Business of Government Introduction What is Coordination? Coordination is defined by Merriam Webster as the “harmonious functioning of parts for effec- tive results .” Interagency coordination differs from collaboration and integration as follows . • Collaboration: When agencies collaborate, they retain their independence but work side by side toward a shared goal . • Integration: When agencies integrate, they transform their efforts or structures into a new, integrated whole . • Coordination: Coordination can be understood as falling midway on the spectrum between collaboration and integration . When agencies coordinate, they maintain their organizational autonomy and independence of action, but align resources, capabilities, strategies, and implementation in support of shared goals . This report focuses on coordination . It presents examples of effective coordination and identi- fies the organizational systems and processes necessary to achieve it . What are Coordinated Results? Distinguishing Process and Results Coordination processes absorb time, effort, and other resources . They only merit this invest- ment if they deliver results . However, prior research has tended to conflate coordination pro- cesses and the results of those processes, often using the term “coordination” to refer to both and providing little guidance about how to identify or measure results . This report distinguishes between coordination processes and the results of those processes . It identifies two types of coordinated results and two types of coordination failures . Types of Coordinated Results Effective coordination processes yield coordinated results . There are two types of coordinated results: complementarity and synergy . • Complementarity
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