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Using US Leverage in Iraq, Afghanistan

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Using US Leverage in Iraq, Afghanistan C O R P O R A T I O N STEPHEN WATTS, JEFFREY MARTINI, JASON H. CAMPBELL, MARK TOUKAN, INHYOK KWON Securing Gains in Fragile States Using U.S. Leverage in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA250-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0543-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: U.S. Department of Defense. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Preventing the Reconstitution of Defeated Insurgents in the Middle East and Beyond, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U. S. Army. The purpose of the project was to contribute to the Army’s understanding of actions necessary to turn military gains against violent extremist organizations into durable change. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementa- tion guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government. iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary ..........................................................................xv Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Research Questions and Contribution .......................................... 3 Research Approach ................................................................. 6 CHAPTER TWO Debates About Using Leverage to Secure Gains ............................ 9 The Challenge of Securing Gains ...............................................10 The Role of External Actors in Incentivizing Inclusion and Capacity- Building .......................................................................17 A Framework for Understanding Leverage ................................... 23 Research Design .................................................................. 38 Conclusion ........................................................................ 43 CHAPTER THREE Iraq: U.S. Efforts at Influence in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve ..............................................45 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003–2011 ......................................... 46 Operation Inherent Resolve, 2014–Present .................................. 101 Conclusion ....................................................................... 127 v vi Securing Gains in Fragile States CHAPTER FOUR Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts at Influence in Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel ....... 129 Background ...................................................................... 129 Influence Event 1: The Bonn Conference, 2001 ............................ 134 Influence Event 2: The Abrogation of Early Cease-Fire Agreements Between Karzai and Taliban Leadership, 2001 ........................ 144 Influence Event 3: Marshall Mohammed Qasim Fahim and Initial Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Army, 2002–2003 ......... 152 Influence Event 4: Confronting Regional Warlords, 2003–2004 ......... 160 Influence Event 5: Afghanistan Presidential Election, 2009 ............... 169 Influence Event 6: The Formation and Sustainment of the Afghan Local Police, 2010–Present ............................................... 179 Influence Event 7: U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks and the Opening of the Taliban Political Commission Office, 2010–2013 ..................... 187 Influence Event 8: Countering Corruption and the Push to Replace Ahmed Wali Karzai as Head of the Kandahar Provincial Council, 2006–2010 .................................................................. 196 Influence Event 9: The 2014 Election and Formation of the National Unity Government .............................................. 206 Conclusion ....................................................................... 215 CHAPTER FIVE Synthesis of Findings from Iraq and Afghanistan ....................... 219 Interest Alignment and Strategic Choice ..................................... 222 Conditions for Effective Leverage ............................................. 227 Success and Failure of U.S. Influence Attempts ............................. 232 Conclusion ....................................................................... 236 CHAPTER SIX Cross-National Comparison of Foreign Influence on Inclusion and Conflict Recurrence ................................................ 241 Statistical Research Design and Data ......................................... 242 Statistical Results ................................................................ 254 Conclusion ....................................................................... 267 Contents vii CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................... 269 Begin with Reasonable Expectations about the Meaning of “Consolidating Gains”..................................................... 270 Focus U.S. Leverage on Critical Objectives .................................. 272 Clearly and Consistently Communicate U.S. Demands ................... 273 Develop Frameworks and Capabilities for Monitoring Partner Compliance ................................................................. 275 Carefully Select Sanctions for Noncompliance and Inducements for Cooperation ............................................................ 276 APPENDIXES A. Technical Background for Qualitative Analysis ..................... 279 B. Technical Background for Quantitative Analysis .................... 285 Abbreviations ................................................................... 335 References ....................................................................... 339 Figures S.1. Short-Term Outcomes of U.S. Leverage Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan .................................................. xviii S.2. Long-Term Outcomes of U.S. Leverage Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan .................................................. xviii 2.1. Durability of Peace and Risk of War Recurrence in Postconflict Countries ..............................................11 3.1. U.S. Troops in Iraq and Influence Events ........................47 5.1. Partner Preferences on Inclusion and Institutionalized Capacity-Building ................................................. 223 5.2. Uses of Leverage in Instances of Interest Misalignment ...... 227 5.3. Short-Term Success of Influence Attempts ..................... 234 5.4. Long-Term Success of Influence Attempts ...................... 235 6.1. Effect of OECD Intervention History on the Probability That a Group Is Politically Included in a Postconflict Government ......................................... 257 6.2. Effect of Aid from Former OECD Interveners on the Probability That a Group Is Politically Included in a Postconflict Government ......................................... 259 6.3. Effect of Aid from OECD Interveners on Conflict Recurrence .......................................................... 263 6.4. Effect of Arms Transfers from OECD Interveners on Conflict Recurrence ............................................... 264 B.1. Effect of OECD Intervention History on Probability a Group is Politically Included in Postconflict Governments .. 300 B.2. Effect of Aid from Former OECD Interveners on Probability a Group is Politically Included in Postconflict Governments ......................................................
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