Preferences for Moral Vs. Immoral Traits in Others Are Conditional

Preferences for moral vs. immoral traits in others are conditional

David E. Melnikoffa,1 and April H. Baileya

aDepartment of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520

Edited by Susan T. Fiske, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved December 11, 2017 (received for review August 24, 2017) The preference for morality in others is regarded as a dominant “positive morality traits are always positive in person percep- factor in person perception. Moral traits are thought to foster liking, tion, and negative morality traits are always negative” (p. 1274). and immoral traits are thought to foster disliking, irrespective of the This idea is called the “morality dominance hypothesis.” context in which they are embedded. We report the results of four Existing data strongly support the morality dominance hypothe- studies that oppose this view. Using both explicit and implicit sis. The preference for morality vs. immorality in others emerges as measures, we found that the preference for morality vs. immorality early as 3 mo of age (13–15) and persists throughout the lifespan. in others is conditional on the evaluator’s current goals. Specifically, Among adults, morality trumps other trait dimensions in deter- when immorality was conducive to participants’ current goals, the mining our evaluations of others (6, 10, 16, 17). For instance, preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others was eliminated or studies have shown that people prefer morality vs. immorality in reversed. The preferences for mercifulness vs. mercilessness (exper- others regardless of the target’s sociability or competence (16, 17). iment 1), honesty vs. dishonesty (experiment 2), sexual fidelity vs. These studies found that people like moral, unsociable targets more infidelity (experiment 3), and altruism vs. selfishness (experiment 4) than immoral, sociable targets and that people like moral, in- were all found to be conditional. These findings oppose the con- competent targets more than immoral, competent targets. Also, sensus view that people have a dominant preference for moral vs. people self-report that they value trustworthiness (a prototypical immoral traits in others. Our findings also speak to nativist and morality trait) in others irrespective of contextual factors such as empiricist theories of social preferences and the stability of the the current task, goal, or function of the target person (5). “social contract” underlying productive human societies. Even in work documenting the rejection of moral actors, a phe- nomenon called “do-gooder derogation,” participants have main- morality | evaluation | motivation | goals | implicit tained their preference for morality vs. immorality in others (18). These studies found that, when people report disliking a (seemingly) ur preference for moral vs. immoral character traits in moral target person, they do not perceive the target person as moral. Oothers is a catalyst for productive human society. Positive Instead, they reconstrue the target person’s actions in a negative light regard for morality fosters phenomena such as reciprocal altruism, to justify a negative evaluation, as if they are unable to dislike encouraging cooperation for the greater good (1–3). Negative someone for being moral. In fact, dating back to Asch’s foundational regard for immorality promotes phenomena such as punishment, work (11), we are not aware of a single study in which participants discouraging destructive behaviors such as cheating, stealing, and have failed to prefer morality vs. immorality in others. freeriding (1–3). Thus, by rewarding morality and by punishing immorality, our preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others Morality vs. Goal-Conduciveness enforces our social contract. Thus, for our social contract to be Although the morality dominance hypothesis has substantial binding and stable, our preference for morality vs. immorality in support, one of its core assumptions has not been tested: If the others must be a dominant factor in person perception. It is therefore critical to determine if the effect of morality traits on Significance liking is dominant, as prevailing theories stipulate (4–10), or is conditional and therefore circumscribed and unstable. This is the It is commonly argued that humans have a dominant prefer- question we sought to answer in the present research. ence for morality traits vs. immorality traits in others—that is, The Morality Dominance Hypothesis irrespective of the surrounding context, morality fosters liking, and immorality fosters disliking. The results of four experi- The distinction between conditional and dominant factors in ments oppose this view by showing that situational goals can person perception dates back to Asch (11). Conditional factors eliminate and even reverse the preference for morality vs. are those that can be positive or negative depending on the immorality in others. These findings suggest that our prefer- context in which they are embedded; they include competency ence for morality vs. immorality is conditional on the demands traits, such as intelligent, skilled, and adept, and sociability traits, of our current goals and cannot be attributed solely to innate, such as charming, playful, and polite. The traits skilled and “hardwired” links or personal learning experiences. They also charming, for example, are positive in a humanitarian trying to suggest that immoral people sometimes win public adoration, raise money for people in need but are negative in a crook trying and the power that comes with it, not in spite of but precisely to cheat people out of their retirement savings. In other words, because of their immorality. the valence of competency and sociability traits is conditional on the surrounding context (4, 6, 8, 10–12). Author contributions: D.E.M. designed research; D.E.M. performed research; D.E.M. ana- Unlike conditional factors in person perception, dominant lyzed data; and D.E.M. and A.H.B. wrote the paper. factors are positive or negative regardless of the context in which The authors declare no conflict of interest. they are embedded. Morality traits are thought to be dominant. This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. According to this view, moral traits such as merciful, honest, Published under the PNAS license. faithful, and altruistic are perceived as positive, and immoral Data deposition: Complete materials, syntax, and anonymized data files are available traits such as merciless, dishonest, unfaithful, and selfish are online at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/hg7m9/). perceived as negative, and these evaluations persist irrespective 1To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: [email protected]. of the surrounding context. Many researchers have expressed This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10. this idea (4–10), but Landy et al. (6) state it most plainly: 1073/pnas.1714945115/-/DCSupplemental.

E592–E600 | PNAS | Published online January 8, 2018 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1714945115 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 valence of morality traits is not conditional on the surrounding they would select one of two target people to be a member of the PNAS PLUS context, then people ought to prefer morality vs. immorality in jury. From the defense attorney’s perspective, the most goal- others irrespective of their current motivational state. For instance, conducive target person was the one most likely to support a mercifulness ought to promote liking even when mercilessness is not-guilty verdict. From the prosecuting attorneys’ perspective, more conducive to the evaluator’s currently active goals. the most goal-conducive target person was the one most likely to Direct tests of such predictions are lacking but essential, as the support a guilty verdict. demands of our current goals can influence our evaluations; we Next, we manipulated mercifulness: Participants saw two target tend to like stimuli that we appraise as advancing our goals and people, and we described one target person as merciful and the dislike stimuli that we appraise and hindering our goals (19–23). other as merciless. The only other difference between the two For instance, we like food when we are hungry but not when we targets was that one was depicted using a purple avatar, and the are nauseous, we like flight delays when we are late but not when other was depicted using an orange avatar; we counterbalanced we are on time, and we like snow when we are skiing but not when which avatar was described as merciful and which was described we are driving. The valence of these stimuli is conditional on goal- as merciless (see Supporting Information, Section 1.1 for full pro- conduciveness, which raises the question: Is the valence of mo- cedural details). (We included counterbalancing variables in all rality traits in others conditional on goal-conduciveness as well? analyses across experiments. Counterbalancing had no effect on The answer to this question is unclear, as some preferences are any of the outcomes reported here.) conditional on the demands of our current goals, while others We expected that all participants, regardless of motivational are not (20, 24, 25). Situational goals shape evaluations of food, context, would perceive mercifulness as positively related to flight delays, and snow, but they have little to no effect on moral character (16). To confirm this prediction, we asked par- preferences for sweet smells over sour smells, moderate tem- ticipants to provide character ratings of both jurors. Specifically, peratures over extreme temperatures, healthy skin over infected participants rated both jurors on morality, warmth (a central skin, and so forth. Our current goals might alter the degree to character dimension comprising sociability and morality) (16, 17, which we prefer things such as sweet smells, moderate temper- 32), and desirability as a close friend. [People value morality in atures, and healthy skin, but not whether we prefer them. close friends. Thus, participants ought to rate the target they The dominant nature of such preferences stems from the fact perceive to be more moral as the more desirable close friend, that likes and dislikes are shaped not only by contextual factors regardless of their current feelings toward the targets in the such as currently active goals but also by past experience (20, 21, context of the criminal trial (32).] In each experiment, we also – “ ” 24 27). Indeed, preferences can be hardwired by evolutionary had participants rate the targets’ competence (see Supporting pressures or stored in memory via conditioning and other learning Information, Sections 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1 for further details) and processes. Accordingly, we often feel positively toward stimuli that confirmed that effects on liking could not be attributed to vari- usually make us feel good but are bad for us currently, as when ation in perceived competence. As predicted, the results of all dieters are tempted by chocolate cake. Likewise, we often feel three character ratings indicate that both attorneys perceived negatively toward stimuli that usually make us feel bad but are mercifulness as positively related to moral character (Fig. 1; see good for us currently, as when dieters find raw vegetables un- Supporting Information, Section 1.2 for complete analyses). appetizing. Thus, the morality dominance hypothesis is plausible; We also expected that defense attorneys (who must secure a if our preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is rooted in – not-guilty verdict) would perceive mercifulness as positively re- past experience, as prominent theorists have argued (28 31), then lated to goal-conduciveness, whereas prosecuting attorneys (who it may not be conditional on the demands of our current goals. must secure a guilty verdict) would perceive mercifulness as To summarize, the consensus view is that morality traits are negatively related to goal-conduciveness. Consistent with this dominant factors in person perception; that is, moral traits foster prediction, defense attorneys selected the merciful juror 96% of liking, and immoral traits foster disliking, irrespective of context. the time (different from chance, χ2 = 62.91, P < 0.001), whereas However, this claim assumes that the valence of morality traits in prosecuting attorneys selected the merciful juror only 6% of the others is not conditional on the demands of our currently active time (different from chance, χ2 = 59.31, P < 0.001). goals. This assumption is plausible, but it has never been tested To summarize thus far, both attorneys perceived mercifulness directly. We report the results of four such tests below. as positively related to moral character, but only defense attorneys Experiment 1: Mercifulness perceived mercifulness as positively related to goal-conduciveness. We assessed participants’ evaluations of two target people: one with a moral character trait (merciful) and one with an immoral character trait (merciless) (16). Participants encountered the target people in one of two motivational contexts: one in which ’

the moral trait merciful was conducive to participants current COGNITIVE SCIENCES PSYCHOLOGICAL AND goal, and one in which the immoral trait merciless was conducive to participants’ current goal. If the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is dominant, then participants should like the moral target more than the immoral target, regardless of motivational context. However, if the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our current goals, then this preference should emerge only when the moral trait is more goal-conducive than the immoral trait. Participants began the study by learning that they would play one of two roles in a (fictional) criminal trial. The role to which participants were assigned constituted our manipulation of motivational context. Some participants learned that they would be the defense attorney and that their goal was to secure a not-guilty Fig. 1. Perceived morality, perceived warmth, and desire for friendship as a verdict from the jury. Other participants were told that they function of mercifulness (merciful vs. merciless) and motivational context would be the prosecuting attorney and that their goal was to (defense vs. prosecution). Error bars represent 95% CIs. All simple main ef- secure a guilty verdict from the jury. We told all participants that fects of mercifulness are significant at P < 0.001.

Melnikoff and Bailey PNAS | Published online January 8, 2018 | E593 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 This allows a critical test of the morality dominance hypothesis. If the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is dominant, then all participants, regardless of motivational context, should like the merciful (moral) juror more than the merciless (immoral) juror. However, if the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our current goals, then only defense attorneys should like the merciful (moral) juror more than the merciless (immoral) juror, and this preference should be eliminated or reversed among prosecuting attorneys. To test these competing predictions, we assessed the valence of participants’ explicit and implicit liking of the two jurors. The explicit measure was a pair of feelings thermometers; we asked participants to indicate how warm their feelings were toward the two jurors. The implicit measure was an implicit association test (IAT) (33). The IAT taps the extent to which participants au- tomatically associate the two jurors with positive vs. negative Fig. 3. Implicit preference for the merciful juror vs. the merciless juror as a valence. We included the IAT because it is relatively immune to function of motivational context (defense vs. prosecution). Positive scores demand effects; past research has shown that participants are indicate greater liking for the merciful vs. the merciless juror; negative scores unable to fake their attitudes on the IAT unless they are pro- indicate greater liking for the merciless vs. the merciful juror. Error bars vided a specific strategy (34, 35). Thus, if the results of the IAT represent 95% CIs. parallel the results of the feelings thermometers, experimenter demand can be ruled out as an alternative explanation. We also representing participants’ preference for the merciful vs. the mer- wanted to ensure that any effects on explicit and implicit liking were ciless juror. Positive scores indicateapreferenceforthemerciful not caused by variance in character ratings (morality, warmth, over the merciless juror, and negative scores indicate a preference competence, and so forth). Thus, in each study, we subtracted the for the merciless over the merciful juror. IAT scores were greater moral target’s character ratings from the immoral target’scharacter among defense attorneys [M = 0.25, 95% CI (0.18, 0.31)] than ratings and included each difference score as a covariate in analyses among prosecuting attorneys [M = −0.04, 95% CI (−0.11, 0.03)], 2 of liking (excluding these covariates had no meaningful effect F(1, 291) = 35.37, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.108. Defense attorneys pre- on any results). ferred the merciful juror over the merciless juror, t(291) = 7.72, P < With regards to the explicit liking, we found a mercifulness × 0.001, while prosecuting attorneys showed a nonsignificant prefer- motivational context interaction, F(1, 291) = 172.91, P < 0.001, ence for the merciless juror over the merciful juror, t(291) = 1.18, η 2 = p 0.37 (Fig. 2). Defense attorneys liked the merciful juror P = 0.119. Thus, the implicit preference for moral vs. immoral traits [mean (M) = 8.24, 95% CI (7.87, 8.61)] more than the merciless in others was eliminated when the immoral trait was more con- juror [M = 2.22, 95% CI (1.83, 2.61)], F(1, 291) = 273.89, P < ducive to participants’ current goal (Fig. 3). η 2 = 0.001, p 0.485. Conversely, prosecuting attorneys liked the Together, these findings suggest that the preference for moral merciless juror [M = 5.82, 95% CI (5.41, 6.24)] more than the vs. immoral traits in others can be eliminated and even reversed. merciful juror [M = 4.63, 95% CI (4.23, 5.03)], F(1, 291) = 9.42, Specifically, we found that the preference for mercifulness vs. 2 P = 0.002, ηp = 0.031. This finding suggests that, contrary to the mercilessness in others was conditional on the demands of par- consensus in the literature, the preference for moral vs. immoral ticipants’ current goals. Mercifulness was perceived as positively traits in others is conditional; the moral trait mercifulness had a related to moral character across conditions, but it promoted positive effect on liking only when it was conducive to the par- liking only among participants who perceived it as positively ticipant’s current goal. When mercifulness was not conducive to related to goal-conduciveness. That we found this pattern of the participant’s current goal, its effect on liking was reversed, results on explicit and implicit measures of liking rules out ex- and mercifulness had a negative effect on liking. perimenter demand as an alternative explanation. On the whole, The IAT results corroborate these findings. Using the improved these results oppose the notion that the effect of morality traits algorithm of Greenwald et al. (36), we computed an IAT score on liking is dominant. On the contrary, it seems that the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our current goals. Experiment 2: Trustworthiness One might argue that, although the preference for mercifulness in others is conditional, preferences for traits that are more central to moral character are not. Thus, in our second experiment, we explored participants’ preference for the most paradigmatic of all morality traits: trustworthiness. In Anderson’s (37) classic ratings of 555 personality traits, the two most likable traits were sincere (#1) and honest (#2), while the most disliked traits were liar (#555) and phony (#554). Also, people self- report that they value trustworthiness in others regardless of the specific task, goal, or function of the target person (5). Thus, manipulating trustworthiness allows an especially strong test of the hypothesis that the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our current goals. As in experiment 1, we assessed participants’ evaluations of Fig. 2. Explicit liking as a function of mercifulness (merciful vs. merciless) two target people: one with a moral character trait (honest), and and motivational context (defense vs. prosecution). Higher scores corre- one with an immoral character trait (dishonest). Participants spond to greater liking. Error bars represent 95% CIs. encountered the target people in one of two motivational contexts,

E594 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1714945115 Melnikoff and Bailey Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 one in which the moral trait was conducive to the participant’s PNAS PLUS current goal, and one in which the immoral trait was conducive to the participant’s current goal. Experiment 2 began with participants learning that they would play a game involving a battle of counterintelligence. All participants were told that players would choose a spy, whose job it would be to carry out counterintelligence operations against an opponent. In one motivational context, we told participants that they would choose their own spy. Thus, participants in this condition had to choose the most effective spy. In another motivational context, we told participants that they would choose their opponent’s spy. Thus, participants in this condition had to sabotage the opposition by choosing the least effective spy. All participants were instructed to choose between two spies: agent Mu and agent Eta. One was described as honest (“feels guilty and ashamed about deceiving others; is extremely un- comfortable about lying to achieve a goal”), and the other was described as dishonest (“has no issue with deceiving others; will ” Fig. 5. Explicit liking of spies as a function of honesty (honest vs. dishonest) not hesitate to lie to achieve a goal ) (see Supporting Informa- ’ tion, Section 2.1 for full procedural details). and motivational context (own spy vs. opponent s spy). Higher scores correspond to greater liking. Error bars represent 95% CIs. We predicted that, regardless of motivational context, participants would perceive honesty to be positively related to moral character. To confirm this prediction, we asked participants to To summarize thus far, participants in both motivational con- provide character ratings of both spies on the same three di- texts perceived honesty as positively related to moral character, mensions as in experiment 1 (morality, warmth, and desirability but only participants who chose their opponent’s spy perceived as a close friend). In addition, we asked participants to rate how honesty to be positively related to goal-conduciveness. If the similar they would like to be to the two spies [previous work preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is dominant, shows that people highly value moral character in themselves then all participants, regardless of motivational context, should (38)]. As predicted, the results of all four measures indicate that like the honest (moral) spy more than the dishonest (immoral) participants in both motivational contexts perceived honesty to spy. However, if the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in be positively related to moral character (Fig. 4 and see Sup- others is conditional on the demands of our current goals, then the porting Information, Section 2.2 for full analyses). only participants who had to pick their opponent’s spy should like We also predicted that participants who had to choose their the honest (moral) spy more than the dishonest (immoral) spy, ’ opponent s spy would perceive honesty as positively related to and this preference should be eliminated or reversed among par- goal-conduciveness, while participants who had to choose their ticipants who had to pick their own spy. own spy would perceive honesty as negatively related to goal- We tested these predictions using the same explicit and implicit conduciveness. Consistent with this prediction, participants who measures of liking as in experiment 1. With regards to explicit chose their opponent’s spy chose the honest spy 84% of the time × 2 liking, we found an honesty motivational context interaction, (different from chance, χ = 59.15, P < 0.001), whereas partici- 2 F(1, 338) = 46.23, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.12. Among participants who pants who chose their own spy chose the honest spy only 9% of had to pick their opponent’s spy, the honest spy [M = 5.61, 95% χ2 = < the time (different from chance, 81.48, P 0.001). CI (5.2, 6.01)] was liked more than the dishonest spy [M = 2 4.12, 95% CI (3.72, 4.53)], F(1, 338) = 18.46, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.052. Conversely, among participants who had to pick their own spy, the honest spy [M = 5.16, 95% CI (4.78, 5.54)] was liked less than the dishonest spy [M = 6.9, 95% CI (6.52, 7.28)], F(1, 2 338) = 29.29, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.08 (Fig. 5). The IAT results corroborate these findings. The implicit preference for the honest spy over the dishonest spy was greater among participants who had to pick their opponent’s spy [M = 0.13, 95% CI (0.06, 0.19)] than among participants who chose their own spy [M = −0.12, 95% CI (−0.18, −0.06)], F(1, 338) = COGNITIVE SCIENCES 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 31.42, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.085 (Fig. 6). Among participants who had to pick their opponent’s spy, there was a preference for the honest spy over the dishonest spy, t(338) = 3.9, P < 0.001. Conversely, among participants who pick their own spy, there was an implicit preference for the dishonest spy over the honest spy, t(338) = 4.13, P < 0.001. Thus, the implicit preference for honesty vs. dishonesty in others was reversed when dishonesty was more conducive to the participant’s current goal. These findings replicate and extend the results of experiment 1. Specifically, we found that the preference for honesty in others was conditional on the demands of participants’ current goals. Honesty was perceived as positively related to moral character Fig. 4. Perceived morality, perceived warmth, desire for friendship, and across conditions, but it promoted liking among participants only desire for similarity as a function of honesty (honest vs. dishonest) and in the condition in which honesty was goal-conducive. Again, we motivational context (own spy vs. opponent’s spy). Error bars represent 95% found this pattern of results for explicit and implicit liking, ruling CIs. All simple main effects of honesty are significant at P < 0.001. out experimenter demand as an alternative explanation. Thus,

Melnikoff and Bailey PNAS | Published online January 8, 2018 | E595 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 the preference for even the most paradigmatic of all morality traits, trustworthiness, appears to be conditional on the demands of our current goals. Experiment 3: Fidelity Participants may have little prior experience evaluating jurors and spies, which raises the question: Are preferences for moral traits conditional in more familiar domains? We addressed this question in the context of relationships, a highly familiar domain relevant to morality, with the majority of Americans agreeing that sexual infidelity is immoral (39), a view codified in religious doctrines as well. Moreover, the moral importance of sexual fidelity may be particularly important for women. Sexual pro- miscuity is more strongly proscribed for women than men (40), which likely has evolutionary roots. Among animals with internal fertilization, males are vulnerable to cuckoldry, that is, to caring for young produced by their mates but sired by their rivals. As a result, biparental males have evolved numerous anticuckoldry tactics. A proponent of the morality dominance hypothesis might predict that one such tactic is a dominant preference for fidelity over infidelity in women. By favoring fidelity in women across Fig. 7. Perceived morality and warmth as a function of fidelity (fidelitous vs. infidelitious), gender (male vs. female), and relationship status (committed contexts, men would minimize their chances of investing re- ’ vs. uncommitted). Error bars represent 95% CIs. All simple main effects of sources in their rivals offspring. fidelity are significant at P < 0.001. Alternatively, but in line with experiments 1 and 2, men’s preference for fidelity in women might be conditional on their current goals. On this alternative account, men motivated to to initiate a new romantic relationship with a female target should initiate a romantic relationship might cease to like fidelity in be higher among uncommitted male participants than among married women, since fidelitous married women are unavailable committed male participants and all female participants. Thus, if and therefore nonconducive to relationship initiation. In exper- the preference for morality traits in others is conditional on rel- iment 3 we pit these alternative predictions against each other. atively chronic relationship initiation goals, then any preference Rather than induce situational goals by manipulating task for the fidelitous target over the infidelitous target should be demands as in experiments 1 and 2, we explored the effects of eliminated or reversed specifically among uncommitted men. the relatively chronic relationship initiation goals that partici- Participants began the study by completing an individual dif- pants brought with them to the experimental setting (see Sup- ference measure of relationship status and then proceeded to view porting Information, Section 3.1 for full procedural details). screenshots taken from two real websites: a wedding-planning Specifically, we recruited white, heterosexual men and women, website (https://www.theknot.com) and an online dating service for assessed whether they were in a committed romantic relation- people seeking extramarital affairs (https://www.ashleymadison. ship, and then measured their evaluations of two white, hetero- com). The screenshot taken from theknot.com showed a fidel- sexual female targets, one fidelitous and one infidelitous. Given itous woman’s post in a community chat room, which included that uncommitted people are more motivated than committed the following statement: “I have to give a shoutout to Josh, the people to initiate new romantic relationships (41), the motivation love of my life! He’s the only man I ever dated—we met in middle school—and I cannot imagine myself with anyone else. I simply cannot wait to spend the rest of my life with this perfect man!” The screenshot taken from ashleymadison.com showed an infidelitous woman’s dating profile. Her “status” specified, “Married Female Seeking Males” and included the following information: “Looking for a serious romance. Hot dates leading to sexy fun every weekend. Able & willing to travel. Must be available on weekends, open to anything, discreet, fulfill sexual fantasies my husband can’t.” The contents of both profiles are real, but we changed the users’ names, photographs, and other identifying information to maintain their anonymity. The photos were counterbalanced across conditions. To confirm that fidelity is perceived as being related to morality, we collected character ratings of morality and warmth. Participants perceived the fidelitous woman as more moral, F(1, 2 341) = 1,166.81, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.774, and warm, F(1, 341) = 2 528.81, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.608, than the infidelitous woman, regardless of participant’s gender and relationship status (Fig. 7 and see Supporting Information, Section 3.3 for complete analyses). These results allow a valid test of the morality dominance hypothesis. If the preference for fidelity in others is dominant, Fig. 6. Implicit preference for the honest over the dishonest spy as a function of motivational context (own spy vs. opponent’s spy). Positive then participants should prefer the fidelitous woman to the scores indicate greater liking for the honest spy vs. the dishonest spy; neg- infidelitous woman regardless of gender and relationship status. ative scores indicate greater liking for the dishonest spy vs. the honest spy. However, if our preference for fidelity in others is conditional on Error bars represent 95% CIs. the demands of our current goals, then the preference for the

E596 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1714945115 Melnikoff and Bailey Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 fidelitous woman over the infidelitous woman should be elimi- PNAS PLUS nated or reversed among uncommitted men, since fidelity in married women is not conducive to relationship initiation. As in experiments 1 and 2, we measured explicit liking using feelings thermometers. However, we changed the implicit measure from the IAT to the affect misattribute procedure (AMP) (42) to generalize our findings to another implicit measure. The AMP, like the IAT, taps the extent to which participants auto- matically associate the two women with positive vs. negative valence (see Supporting Information, Section 3.2 for details). With regards to explicit liking, we found a fidelity × gender × 2 relationship status interaction, F(1, 335) = 9.29, P = 0.002, ηp = 0.027 (Fig. 8). Specifically, women had a preference for the fidelitous target [M = 6.56, 95% CI (6.29, 6.83)] over the infidelitous target [M = 1.41, 95% CI (1.12, 1.7)], F(1, 355) = 849.92, 2 P < 0.001, ηp = 0.717, that was unqualified by relationship 2 status, F(1, 335) = 0.12, P = 0.729, ηp = 0.001. Men, on the other hand, had a fidelity × relationship status interaction, F(1, 335) = Fig. 9. Implicit preference for the fidelitous target over the infidelitous 2 target as a function of gender (male vs. female) and relationship status 17.99, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.091. Committed men had a strong = (committed vs. uncommitted). Positive scores indicate preferences for the preference for the fidelitous target [M 8.13, 95% CI (7.62, fidelitous target over the infidelitous target; negative scores indicate pref- 8.63)] over the infidelitous target [M = 3.28, 95% CI (2.75, erences for the infidelitous target over the fidelitous target. Error bars 2 3.82)], F(1, 335) = 217.22, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.393, whereas un- represent 95% CIs. committed men had a relatively weak preference for the fidelitous target [M = 6.87, 95% CI (6.37, 7.38)] over the infideltious target [M = 3.98, 95% CI (3.44, 4.51)], F(1, 335) = 78.44, P < positively related to perceived moral character across conditions, 2 but its positive effect on liking was attenuated among uncom- 0.001, ηp = 0.19. These results are in line with the morality dominance hypothesis, as fidelity was positively related to liking mitted men, for whom a married woman’s infidelity is most likely among both men and women regardless of relationship status. to be perceived as goal-conducive. Although uncommitted men The pattern of implicit liking paints a different picture (Fig. 9). maintained an explicit preference for fidelity over infidelity, their Specifically, we found a gender × relationship status interaction, implicit preference was eliminated in the direction of favoring 2 infidelity. It is possible that the patterns of implicit and explicit F(1, 335) = 4.98, P = 0.026, ηp = 0.015. Women had a preference for the fidelitous target over the infidelitous target [M = attitude change diverged because uncommitted men did not 0.07, 95% CI (0.03, 0.11)], t(335) = 3.61, P < 0.001, that was want to admit to preferring the infidelitous woman. Alterna- unqualified by relationship status, F(1, 335) = 0.15, P = 0.703, tively, the implicit and explicit measures may have tapped two 2 different but genuine evaluative responses toward the target ηp < 0.001. Conversely, men had a preference for the fidelitous target over the infideltious target that was qualified by re- women. In either event, heterosexual men did not have a dom- 2 inant preference for fidelity in women, providing additional ev- lationship status, F(1, 335) = 9.58, P = 0.002, ηp = 0.028. Whereas committed men implicitly liked the fidelitous target idence against the morality dominance hypothesis. = more than the infidelitous target [M 0.13, 95% CI (0.06, 0.21)], Experiment 4: Altruism t(335) = 3.51, P < 0.001, uncommitted men showed no prefer- — ence, and the effect was in the opposite direction [M = −0.03, The traits we have explored thus far mercifulness, trustwor- — 95% CI (−0.11, 0.04)], t(335) = 0.83, P = 0.41. thiness, and fidelity have clear, long-term benefits for the self, These findings provide further support for the idea that but their large-scale influences on society are less well under- preferences for morality traits in others are conditional on the stood than that of another morality trait: altruism. Altruism is a demands of our current goals. Fidelity in a married woman was key ingredient in the evolution of cooperation, which benefits society as a whole (1, 43). Indeed, we all benefit in the long run from people who pay personal costs to reward fairness and punish selfishness; by enforcing cooperation, altruists make our future interactions more fruitful. Thus, a question of great theoretical and practical importance is whether the preference for altruism in others is dominant, as it bears on the stability of COGNITIVE SCIENCES large-scale cooperation. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND Why would preferences for altruism in others not be dominant? The answer is that altruism is not always in our immediate self-interest. When we act unfairly, altruistic third parties pose an immediate threat. Thus, if the valence of morality traits in others is conditional on our current goals, our preference for altruists should be eliminated when we could be punished for an unfair act. Alternatively, if our preference for morality traits in others is dominant, we should prefer altruists even when altruism would result in our being punished. We sought to disambiguate these competing predictions in experiment 4 (see Supporting In- formation, Section 4.1 for full procedural details). Fig. 8. Explicit liking as a function of fidelity (fidelitous vs. infidelitous), The experiment began with a dictator game. First, participants gender (male vs. female), and relationship status (committed vs. un- allocated $1.00 between themselves and another participant. We committed). Higher scores correspond to greater liking. Error bars represent labeled participants who gave less than half to the other partici- 95% CIs. pant as “unfair” and everyone else as “fair.” Next, participants

Melnikoff and Bailey PNAS | Published online January 8, 2018 | E597 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 learned that the allocation decision that they had just made would be evaluated by a third party. We explained that the third party could do one of three things: (i)pay10centsto punish the participant by eliminating the participant’s earnings; (ii) pay 10 cents to reward the participant by doubling the participant’s earnings; or (iii) pay nothing, leaving the participant with the money the participant had kept in the first place. We told participants that they would pick one of two people to be the third party: an altruist, who stated “I’d definitely pay money to punish selfishness and reward fairness” or a nonaltruist, who stated “I’d never pay to punish someone unless I’m the one getting screwed over ... It’s not my job to in- centivize fairness, and I won’t waste money trying.” We wanted to ensure that any differences between fair and unfair participants’ evaluations of the third parties could not be attributed solely to individual differences between fair and unfair people. To this end, we randomly assigned half our participants “ ” Fig. 11. Explicit liking as a function of altruism (altruistic vs. nonaltruistic), to an exempt condition after introducing them to the altruist allocation decision (fair vs. unfair), and exemption status (exempt vs. non- and the nonaltruist. Exempt participants learned that they were exempt). Higher scores correspond to greater liking. Error bars represent exempt from evaluation, so the third party could not punish or 95% CIs. reward them for their allocation decision. Thus, for exempt participants, the third parties were motivationally irrelevant. Conversely, nonexempt participants received no additional in- be goal-conducive, whereas unfair participants perceived the formation and thus fully expected that their allocation decision nonaltruist to be goal-conducive. would be evaluated by the third party of their choosing. To summarize thus far, all participants perceived altruism as At this point, fair and unfair participants had met an altruistic positively related to moral character, but only fair participants per- and a nonaltruistic third party, and half of our participants were ceived altruism to be positively related to goal-conduciveness. This exempt from evaluation, making the third parties motivationally allows another test of the morality dominance hypothesis. If the irrelevant. We then asked all participants to rate the altruist and preference for altruism in others is dominant, then all participants, nonaltruist in terms of morality and warmth. Unsurprisingly, regardless of allocation decision and exemption status, should like participants perceived altruism to be positively related to moral the altruist more than the nonaltruist. Conversely, if the preference character regardless of their allocation decision and exemption for altruism is conditional on the demands of our current goals, then status (Fig. 10 and see Supporting Information, Section 4.2 for full the preference for altruism should be eliminated or reversed among analyses). Moreover, among nonexempt participants, those who nonexempt participants who made an unfair allocation decision. were fair chose the altruist 84% of the time (different from As in experiments 1 and 2, we assessed explicit liking with chance, χ2 = 43.56, P < 0.001), and those who were unfair chose feelings thermometers and implicit liking with an IAT. With the altruist only 24% of the time (different from chance, χ2 = regards to explicit liking, we found an altruism × allocation 23.51, P < 0.001). Thus, fair participants perceived the altruist to decision × exemption status interaction, F(1, 360) = 5.38, P = 2 0.021, ηp = 0.015 (Fig. 11). Specifically, the altruism × allocation decision interaction was stronger among nonexempt participants, 2 F(1, 360) = 51, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.221, than among exempt 2 participants, F(1, 360) = 21.22, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.107. Among nonexempt participants, those who were fair liked the altruistic

Fig. 12. Implicit preference for altruist vs. nonaltruist as a function of al- Fig. 10. Perceived morality and warmth as a function of altruism (altruistic location decision (fair vs. unfair) and exemption status (exempt vs. non- vs. nonaltruistic), exemption status (exempt vs. nonexempt), and allocation exempt). Positive scores indicate greater liking for altruist vs. nonaltruist; decision (fair vs. unfair). Error bars represent 95% CIs. All simple main effects negative scores indicate greater liking for nonaltruist vs. altruist. Error bars of altruism are significant at P < 0.001. represent 95% CIs.

E598 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1714945115 Melnikoff and Bailey Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 target [M = 8.25, 95% CI (7.79, 8.71)] more than the non- once (experiment 3) and reversed three times (experiments 1, 2, PNAS PLUS altruistic target [M = 4.91, 95% CI (4.44, 5.37)], F(1, 360) = 75.78, and 4). The implicit preference for morality was eliminated three 2 P < 0.001, ηp = 0.174, whereas those who were unfair liked the times (experiments 1, 3, and 4) and reversed once (experiment 2). altruistic target [M = 5.7, 95% CI (5.23, 6.17)] less than the These data oppose the morality dominance hypothesis and add the nonaltruistic target [M = 6.68, 95% CI (6.2, 7.15)], F(1, 360) = study of moral character to the emerging view of social cognition 2 6.15, P = 0.014, ηp = 0.017. We did not observe this reversal as being fundamentally plastic (44). Specifically, they show that the among exempt participants. Among exempt participants, those activation of innate and/or overlearned associations does not tell who were fair liked the altruistic target [M = 8.04, 95% CI (7.56, the full story of how moral character shapes evaluation. The online 8.52)] more than the nonaltruistic target [M = 4.66, 95% CI appraisal of goal-conduciveness appears to be a key processing 2 (4.18, 5.14)], F(1, 360) = 72.06, P < 0.001, ηp = 0.164; those who component capable of eliminating or reversing the well-documented were unfair had a weaker but still significant preference for the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others. altruistic target [M = 7.16, 95% CI (6.7, 7.62)] than for the The present findings have practical implications as well. How nonaltruistic target [M = 6.31, 95% CI (5.85, 6.78)], F(1, 360) = people value mercy, honesty, fidelity, and altruism fundamentally 2 4.83, P = 0.029, ηp = 0.013. shape how societies function. Attitudes toward mercy have far- The IAT corroborated these findings (Fig. 12). With regards ranging legal ramifications, from prison reform to capital pun- to implicit preferences for the altruistic target over the non- ishment; attitudes toward honesty impact whether people will altruistic target, we found an allocation decision × exemption associate with those they can trust, from personal friends to 2 status interaction, F(1, 360) = 3.87, P = 0.05, ηp = 0.011. Ex- elected officials; attitudes toward fidelity have been at the root of empt participants had a preference for the altruistic target over horrific human rights violations, such as state-sanctioned stoning the nonaltruistic target [M = 0.10, 95% CI (0.03, 0.17)], t(360) = of women who have committed adultery; and attitudes toward 2.97, P = 0.003, that was unqualified by allocation decision, F(1, altruism can determine whether large-scale cooperation prolifer- 2 360) = 0.27, P = 0.603, ηp = 0.001. Conversely, among nonexempt ates or collapses. That these attitudes can shift in lockstep with participants, those who were fair [M = 0.25, 95% CI (0.16, 0.34)] momentary changes in our needs and interests is at once worri- preferred the altruistic target more than participants who were some and encouraging, as it suggests the dual possibilities of rapid unfair [M = 0.03, 95% CI (−0.07, 0.12)], F(1, 360) = 10.46, P = decline and forward progress in societal functioning. 2 0.001, ηp = 0.028. Moreover, nonexempt participants preferred Relatedly, the present findings point to a means by which the altruistic target over the nonaltruistic target if they were immoral people rise to positions of power and influence. It is fair, t(360) = 5.27, P < 0.001, but not if they were unfair, tempting to believe that immoral people can earn the public’s t(360) = 0.55, P = 0.583. These findings provide further support adoration, and the power that comes with it, only by perpetu- for the idea that the preference for morality traits in others is ating the illusion of being moral. However, the present experi- conditional. Among participants to whom an altruistic third ments suggest that immoral people may win popular support party posed an imminent threat (i.e., those who made an unfair precisely because of their immorality, rather than despite it or allocation decision and were nonexempt from evaluation), the out of ignorance. A person’s most wicked trait, it seems, might explicit preference for altruism in a third party was reversed, sometimes be their most appealing. and the implicit preference was eliminated. To summarize, the results of four studies suggest that the valence of morality traits in others is conditional. Specifically, the Discussion preference for morality vs. immorality in others can be elimi- The present findings suggest that the preference for moral vs. nated or reversed when one’s current goals are best served by an immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our immoral person. These results provide insights into the processes current goals. Across four studies, using both explicit and implicit underlying the evaluation of morality traits and have potentially measures, we found that when morality was goal-conducive, far-reaching societal implications. moral traits increased liking, but when immorality was goal- Yale University’s Institutional Review Board approved the conducive, the preference for moral traits was eliminated or re- experiments in this paper. Participants provided consent at the versed. All told, the explicit preference for morality was attenuated beginning of each study.

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E600 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1714945115 Melnikoff and Bailey Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021