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Spinoza, Science and Scripture Spinoza, Science and Scripture The Theological-Political Treatise and its relation to the scientific revolution Norbert Vogel Master Thesis Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam Department of Philosophy, Chair History of Philosophy Supervisor: Prof. Dr. L. van Bunge Advisor : Dr. A.W. Prins Student nr: 184314 Number of words: 49.330 May 2017 1 CONTENTS Abstract 4 Introduction 5 Chapter 1 DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD 8 A change in world view The mythical view on reality The decline of authority Transition to a scientific world view Characteristics of the new scientific method 2 SPINOZA, SCIENCE, AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 15 Philosophy, science, scholarship Neglect of Spinoza’s participation in science Spinoza as natural philosopher Spinoza as a citizen of Henry Oldenburg’s “Republic of Letters” Spinoza as advocate of the scientific attitude The tension between science and religion Interreligious tensions and Spinoza’s strategies for relief 3 NATURALISM 22 Spinoza’s naturalism: some clarifying introductory notes Preconditions and program of Spinoza’s naturalism Naturalism and the Book of Nature 4 PROPHETS AND PROPHECY 27 Prophets and prophecy as seen by tradition Maimonides on prophets and prophecy Questioning prophetic truth: Hobbes and Spinoza Explaining prophecy: Spinoza’s naturalistic approach 2 CONTENTS (continued) 5 MIRACLES 37 Miracles as seen by tradition Attempts to naturalize miracles ‘The common people call unusual works of nature miracles’ ‘And the sun stood still’ 6 DESACRALIZATION OF SCRIPTURE 45 Historical criticism and its application to the Bible The promise and agony of historical criticism Traditional biblical interpreters and their discontents Questioning the truth and reliability of Scripture Principles of Spinoza’s biblical research Naturalizing Scripture Naturalism leads to irrelevance of biblical authority The “divinity” of Scripture 7 CRITICAL VOICES 61 A book forged in hell A critical view on Spinoza’s earliest critics Opinions on atheism: Pierre Bayle and Bernard Nieuwentijt Modern critics of Spinoza’s biblical criticism Is Spinoza’s political philosophy exceptional? 8 A MODERN EVALUATION 72 How to judge Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise? Critical view on Scripture’s naturalism Critical view on Scripture’s moral message Historical importance of the TTP Relevance of the TTP today BIBLIOGRAPHY 79 3 Spinoza, Science and Scripture The Theological-Political Treatise and its relation to the scientific revolution Abstract In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Spinoza undertakes the most ambitious attempt of his time to demythologize the Bible. He rigorously applies methods of historical and critical analysis and arrives at a radical break with the past. His for that time unique approach is, that he rejects the hitherto universally accepted assumption that Scripture ultimately must be of divine origin. Spinoza not only argues that the Bible is a collection of books of human fabrication. He also denies the supernatural character of prophecy and of miracles, and he rejects the idea of the eternal election of the Jewish people. By depriving the Bible of its divine status, Spinoza also undermines clerical authority. For if the Bible does not contain divinely revealed absolute truths, the pretension of theologians, preachers and rabbis that they have privileged access to these truths loses its foundation. As a consequence, they can no longer claim a privileged right to direct the behaviour of individuals and of governments. Of course, such a radical break with the past does not come as a bolt out of the blue. In this thesis, it is argued that Spinoza’s ideas fit into a broader pattern of change in early modern thought. Some essential preconditions had to be fulfilled to make Spinoza’s undertaking possible at all. An intellectual change in “mindset” took place during the 16th and 17th century. It consisted of a decline in the force of traditional authorities, together with an increase in confidence in the power of reasoning and experience. The voyages of discovery, the Protestant Reformation and the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th century were of vital importance in bringing about these changes. Spinoza’s TTP should be seen against the background of this fundamental change in outlook in 17th century Europe. In this thesis, it is also stressed that the theological part of the TTP represents a much more important contribution to this change in views than the political part. It is argued that Spinoza’s involvement in science and his indebtedness to the new scientific attitude of his time are often virtually ignored. This is the more regrettable, because Spinoza’s way of interpreting the Bible is strongly rooted in the new view on science that arose during the scientific revolution. By applying scientific methods to the Bible, Spinoza more than anyone else may be seen as the originator of a revolution in the human sciences. Whereas the revolution in the natural sciences removed man from the centre of the physical universe, the revolution in the humanities deprived him of his self-image as the ultimate purpose of the world and of history. In this sense, Spinoza heralded the end of anthropocentrism. Apart from being born out of science, Spinoza’s TTP also fits into the pre-existing traditions of biblical interpretation, both in medieval Jewish thought and in recent Protestantism. Unique as Spinoza’s approach to the Bible may be, there is also room for critique. The arguments Spinoza uses to support his naturalism and to prove his historical view on Scripture are critically evaluated. Spinoza’s claim that his conclusions are exclusively based on a careful reading of Scripture itself is questioned. Finally, an evaluation is given both of the historical importance and of the present-day relevance of the TTP. 4 INTRODUCTION Why did Spinoza actually write his Theological-Political Treatise(TTP)? A commonly heard answer is that his main goal was to demonstrate that freedom of philosophizing can be allowed in a free republic and that it is even beneficial to do so. One might think that there is much to say in favour of such a view. After all, the subtitle of the TTP states that it is “containing several discourses which demonstrate that freedom to philosophize may not only be allowed without danger to piety and the stability of the republic but cannot be refused without destroying the peace of the republic and piety itself”. A letter, written to Henry Oldenburg (around October 1, 1665), corresponding secretary of the Royal Society in London, seems to confirm this impression: I am now writing a treatise on my views regarding Scripture. The reasons that move me to do so are these: 1. The prejudices of theologians. For I know that these are the main obstacles which prevent men from giving their minds to philosophy. So I apply myself to exposing such prejudices and removing them from the minds of sensible people. 2. The opinion of me held by the common people, who constantly accuse me of atheism. I am driven to avert this accusation, too, as far as I can. 3. The freedom to philosophise and to say what we think. This I want to vindicate completely, for here it is in every way suppressed by the excessive authority and egotism of preachers.1 However, as I will argue in this thesis, this is only a small part of Spinoza’s project. Both the subtitle of the Treatise and the letter to Oldenburg may put us on the wrong track. Spinoza’s statements are more revealing by what they leave out than by what they express. To be sure, it cannot be denied that the Treatise contains “several discourses” defending freedom to philosophize. However, the TTP is sailing under false colours. For when reading it, one is struck by the fact that from the 20 chapters, no less than 15 of them are not devoted to politics at all, but to the interpretation of Scripture. Moreover, from the remaining five chapters, two are about the ancient Hebrew state. Only one single chapter, namely the last one, is devoted to freedom to philosophize. But in essence, the larger part of the TTP is indeed “a treatise on my views regarding Scripture”. The central issue is the interpretation - or better: demythologization - of Scripture. That issue is – perhaps wisely - left out from the subtitle and from the letter to Oldenburg. If Spinoza had been completely honest, he would have added that this treatise also contained many other discourses which demonstrate that prophets and prophecies are not divinely inspired, that the Hebrews are not a people that has been chosen for all eternity, that the laws of Moses are irrelevant for our time, that Scripture is a work of human fabrication, that the books of the Bible are not written by the prophets to whom they are traditionally attributed, and that supernatural events (miracles) do not exist at all. From this short summary one could derive that the TTP serves a much more comprehensive purpose than only a political one. For it addresses much more issues than would be necessary to support his political views. As I will argue, from the way Spinoza is undermining biblical authority and from the topics he treats it may easily be derived, that it not only attacks clerical authority, but foremost and in the first place exposes a completely new view on the nature of the world (one without supernatural events), on the origin of Scripture (a work of human authorship) and on the status of morality (autonomous instead of heteronomous). Only secondarily, it addresses political issues, and in this respect one may easily discover that it is not only directed against Calvinist orthodoxy, but also against rabbinical authority. This is quite understandable, for after all, challenging rabbinical authority was the main reason for Spinoza’s excommunication by the Portuguese Jewish community in 1656.
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