Duplicities and Integrations of the Personality of St. Augustine
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The Seven Deadly Sins Part Four - Sloth & Gluttony
The Seven Deadly Sins Part Four - Sloth & Gluttony James 1:13-15 God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone; but each one is tempted when, by his own evil desire, he is dragged away and enticed. Then, after desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin; and sin, when it is full-grown, gives birth to death. 1 Peter 2:24 He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness… Sloth is a deadly sin that must die! 1 Timothy 5:13 …they get into the habit of being idle and going about from house to house. And not only do they become idlers, but also gossips and busybodies, saying things they ought not to. Ezekiel 16:49 Your sister Sodom's sins were pride, laziness, and too much food, while the poor and needy suffered outside her door. Sloth does not just mean being lazy on the job. Matthew 25:26 “His master replied, ‘You wicked, lazy servant!’” 1 Timothy 5:8 If anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially for his immediate family, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever. Sloth puts us in partnership with the devil. Proverbs 18:9 One who is slack in his work is brother to one who destroys. Matthew 12:30 “He who is not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me scatters.” God considers hard work a virtue. 1 Thessalonians 4:11-12 Make it your ambition to lead a quiet life, to mind your own business and to work with your hands, just as we told you, so that your daily life may win the respect of outsiders and so that you will not be dependent on anybody. -
A Confucian Defense of Shame: Morality, Self-Cultivation, and the Dangers of Shamelessness
religions Article Article Article A ConfucianA Confucian Defense Defense of Shame: of Shame: Morality, Morality, Self-Cultivation, Self-Cultivation, A Confucian Defense of Shame: Morality, Self-Cultivation, and theand Dangers the Dangers of Shamelessness of Shamelessness and the Dangers of Shamelessness Mark BerksonMark Berkson Mark Berkson Department of Religion,Department Hamline of Religion, University, Hamline St. Paul, University, MN 55104, St. USA;Paul, [email protected] 55104, USA; [email protected] Department of Religion, Hamline University, St. Paul, MN 55104, USA; [email protected] Abstract: ManyAbstract: philosophers Many and philosophers scholars in and the scholars West have in the a negative West have view a negative of shame. view In muchof shame. In much of Abstract: Many philosophers and scholars in the West have a negative view of shame.of post-classical In much ofpost-classical Western ethical Western thought, ethical shame thought, is compared shame is negativelycompared negatively with guilt, with as shame guilt, isas shame is asso- post-classical Western ethical thought, shame is compared negatively with guilt, asassociated shame is asso- withciated the “outer”, with the how “outer”, one appears how one before appears others before (and othe thusrs is (and merely thus a is matter merely of a “face”), matter of “face”), and ciated with the “outer”, how one appears before others (and thus is merely a matterand of “face”), guilt is and associatedguilt is associated with the “inner”with the realm “inner” of therealm conscience of the conscience and soul. and Anthropologists soul. Anthropologists and and philoso- guilt is associated with the “inner” realm of the conscience and soul. -
Life with Augustine
Life with Augustine ...a course in his spirit and guidance for daily living By Edmond A. Maher ii Life with Augustine © 2002 Augustinian Press Australia Sydney, Australia. Acknowledgements: The author wishes to acknowledge and thank the following people: ► the Augustinian Province of Our Mother of Good Counsel, Australia, for support- ing this project, with special mention of Pat Fahey osa, Kevin Burman osa, Pat Codd osa and Peter Jones osa ► Laurence Mooney osa for assistance in editing ► Michael Morahan osa for formatting this 2nd Edition ► John Coles, Peter Gagan, Dr. Frank McGrath fms (Brisbane CEO), Benet Fonck ofm, Peter Keogh sfo for sharing their vast experience in adult education ► John Rotelle osa, for granting us permission to use his English translation of Tarcisius van Bavel’s work Augustine (full bibliography within) and for his scholarly advice Megan Atkins for her formatting suggestions in the 1st Edition, that have carried over into this the 2nd ► those generous people who have completed the 1st Edition and suggested valuable improvements, especially Kath Neehouse and friends at Villanova College, Brisbane Foreword 1 Dear Participant Saint Augustine of Hippo is a figure in our history who has appealed to the curiosity and imagination of many generations. He is well known for being both sinner and saint, for being a bishop yet also a fellow pilgrim on the journey to God. One of the most popular and attractive persons across many centuries, his influence on the church has continued to our current day. He is also renowned for his influ- ence in philosophy and psychology and even (in an indirect way) art, music and architecture. -
Critique of Plato's Conception of Morality with Reference to the Teachers' Expected Examination Integrity in Kenya
A CRITIQUE OF PLATO’S CONCEPTION OF MORALITY WITH REFERENCE TO THE TEACHERS’ EXPECTED EXAMINATION INTEGRITY IN KENYA EDWARD MAINA ANDAFU A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 2019 DECLARATION This thesis is my original work and it has not been presented for any award of a Degree or Diploma in any other University. ……………………………… ……………………… Edward Maina Andafu Date REG. No. E84/52028/2017 This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University Supervisors. Signature………………….. Date ……………………. Dr Atieno Kili K’Odhiambo Senior Lecturer in Philosophy of Education Department of Educational Foundations University of Nairobi Signature…………………… Date ……………………. Professor Samson Okuro Gunga Professor of Philosophy of Education Department of Educational Foundations University of Nairobi II DEDICATION This work is dedicated to all the members of my immediate family: my wife Dorcus Ofuyo, my sons, Lewis Andafu and Wesley Andafu, for their everlasting love; also to my late father Julius Andafu, and my late mother Ketry Andafu, who always had confidence in me. III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I hereby acknowledge the following for their immense contribution to my work. My first thanks go to my very able supervisors, Dr Atieno Kili K’Odhiambo and Professor Samson Okuro Gunga who have mentored me through this work. I thank members of the Department of Educational Foundations, University of Nairobi whose positive criticism put me on the right track in pursuit of my studies. I am grateful to Dr Wycliffe Amukowa (Machakos University) for his moral and intellectual support towards the accomplishment of this work. -
Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2014 Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Bradley Taylor University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Taylor, Bradley, "Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy" (2014). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1468. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Abstract ABSTRACT HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT'S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Bradley M. Taylor Dr. Paul Guyer This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant's ethics. Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant's moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant's account of human moral agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law. -
In Defense of the Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Grace By
In Defense of the Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Grace by Laban Omondi Agisa Submitted to the faculty of the School of Theology of the University of the South in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Sacred Theology January 2020 Sewanee, Tennessee Approved ____________________________ _______________ Adviser Date ____________________________ _______________ Second Adviser Date 2 DECLARATION I declare that this is my original work and has not been presented in any other institution for consideration of any certification. This work has been complemented by sources duly acknowledged and cited using Chicago Manual Style. Signature Date 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT My study of theology was initiated in 2009 by the then Provost of St. Stephens Cathedral, Nairobi, the late Ven. Canon John Ndung’u who was a great encouragement to me. This was further made possible through my bishop the Rt. Rev. Joel Waweru and the Rev. Geoffrey Okapisi who were sources of inspiration. My studies at Carlile College (Church Army Africa) and St. Paul’s University laid a strong theological foundation and I appreciate among others the influence of the Rev. Dr. John Kiboi who introduced me to Philosophy, Systematic Theology, Ethics, and African Christian Theology that eventually became the foundation for my studies at the University of the South. I also appreciate the encouragement of my lecturers Mrs. Tabitha Waweru and Dr. Scholarstica Githinji during my Study of Education at Kenya Technical Trainers College and at Daystar University respectively. My interest in this topic came as a result of many sittings with two professors at the University of the South, Dr. -
Gluttony William I
University of Michigan Law School University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository Articles Faculty Scholarship 1997 Gluttony William I. Miller University of Michigan Law School, [email protected] Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/697 Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Miller, William I. "Gluttony." Representations 60 (1997): 92-112. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WILLIAM IAN MILLER Gluttony Amongthem all, whocan descry A vicemore mean than Gluttony? Of anygroveling slave ofsense, Notone can claimso smallpretense To thatindulgence which the wise Allowto human frailties As theinglorious, beastly sinner, Whoseonly object is-a dinner. -WWm.Combe 1815' GLUTTONY DOES NOT HAVE THE GRANDEUR OF PRIDE, the often brilliantstrategic meanness of envyand avarice,the gloryof wrath.It does man- age to gain some small allure byits associationwith lust, its sexy siblingsin of the flesh. Yet there is somethingirrevocably unseemly about gluttony,vulgar and lowbrow,self-indulgent in a swinishway. Gluttony is not the stuffof tragedyor epic. Imagine Hamlet too fat to take revenge or Homer making his topic the gluttonyof Achilles rather than his wrath.2With gluttony,compare pride and anger,sins thatmark the grand action of revenge,sins thatcan be emblematized by tigers,lions, eagles, and hawks,rather than by pigs and (dare I say it) humans. -
The Seven Deadly Sins
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS "The lesson writ in red since first time ran, A hunter hunting down the beast in man; That till the chasing out of its last vice, The flesh was fashioned but for sacrifice." GEORGE MEREDITH xenrht IDas h<mtmi(# Snjferbta, /mJ/i S—^5^T\ ~t{?H placcOjjfltKeo dmti mmtsi^/a mi/'i. s* / PRIDE. (After Goltziits.) [Frontispiece. THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS BY FREDERICK ROGERS A. H. BULLEN 47, GREAT RUSSELL STREET, LONDON, W.C. I907 TO ARTHUR C. HAYWARD WITH WHOM I HAVE READ MANY BOOKS AND FROM WHOM I HAVE HAD MUCH FRIENDSHIP I DEDICATE THESE PAGES CONTENTS INTRODUCTION LIST OF SINS AND VIRTUES WORKS OF MERCY, SPIRITUAL GIFTS, AND PENITENTIAL PSALMS PAGE CHAPTER I. THE SINS AND THE CHURCH 1 CHAPTER II. THE SINS AND RELIGIOUS DRAMA - 11 CHAPTER III. THE SINS AND SOCIAL REVOLT - r 29 CHAPTER IV. THE SINS IN COMMON LIFE - 44 CHAPTER V. THE SINS AND THE REFORMATION - - 62 CHAPTER VI. THE SINS AND THE ELIZABETHANS - - 74 CHAPTER VII. EXEUNT THE SINS ----- - 98 ILLUSTRATIONS PRIDE (after Goltzws) . FRONTISPIECE TO FACE PAGE PRIDE (after De Vos) . 8 LECHERY „ . 18 ENVY „ • 32 WRATH „ . 42 COVETOUSNESS „ . 58 GLUTTONY „ .70 SLOTH „ . 80 WRATH (after Peter Brueghil) . : . 88 AVARICE „ . IOO INTRODUCTION HE business of literature is the presentation Tof life, all true literature resolves itself into that. No presentation of life is complete without its sins, and every master of literary art has known it, from the poet King of Israel to Robert Browning. The imagination of the Middle Ages, in many ways more virile and expansive than our own, had a strong grasp of this fact, and realised that it is the sense of fault or error that lies at the root of every forward movement, that there is no real progress unless it is accompanied by a sense of sin. -
The Evolution of the Seven Deadly Sins: from God to the Simpsons
96 Journal of Popular Culture sin. A lot. As early Christian doctrine repeatedly points out, the seven deadly sins are so deeply rooted in our fallen human nature, that not only are they almost completely unavoidable, but like a proverbial bag of The Evolution of the Seven Deadly Sins: potato chips, we can never seem to limit ourselves to just one. With this ideology, modern society agrees. However, with regard to the individual From God to the Simpsons and social effects of the consequences of these sins, we do not. The deadly sins of seven were identified, revised, and revised again Lisa Frank in the heads and classrooms of reportedly celibate monks as moral and philosophical lessons taught in an effort to arm men and women against I can personally attest that the seven deadly sins are still very much the temptations of sin and vice in the battle for their souls. These teach- with us. Today, I have committed each of them, several more than once, ings were quickly reflected in the literature, theater, art, and music of before my lunch hour even began. Here is my schedule of sin (judge me that time and throughout the centuries to follow. Today, they remain pop- if you will): ular motifs in those media, as well as having made the natural progres- sion into film and television. Every day and every hour, acts of gluttony, 7:00 - I pressed the snooze button three times before dragging myself out of lust, covetousness, envy, pride, wrath, and sloth are portrayed on televi- bed. -
Love As a Moral Emotion* J. David Velleman
Love as a Moral Emotion* J. David Velleman INTRODUCTION Love and morality are generally assumed to differ in spirit. The moral point of view is impartial and favors no particular individual, whereas favoring someone in particular seems like the very essence of love. Love and morality are therefore thought to place con¯icting demands on our attention, requiring us to look at things differently, whether or not they ultimately require us to do different things.1 The question is supposed to be whether a person can do justice to both perspectives. Some philosophers think that one or the other per- * The theme of this article was suggested to me by Harry Frankfurt's ``Autonomy, Necessity, and Love'' (in Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne, ed. Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf- Peter Horstmann [Klett-Cotta, 1994], pp. 433± 47). I ®rst attempted to state the theme in a paper entitled ``Frankfurt on Love and Duty,'' written for a conference organized by RuÈdi- ger Bittner in the spring of 1996, at the Zentrum fuÈr interdiziplinaÈre Forschung, in Biele- feld, Germany. Some of that paper is reproduced here. Also contained here is material from a commentary on Henry S. Richardson's Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); my commentary was presented at a session of the So- ciety for Informal Logic at the 1995 meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division. Earlier versions of this article were read to the philosophy depart- ments at Arizona State University; Harvard; Princeton; University of California, Los Ange- les; University College London; and to a discussion group that meets at Oriel College, Ox- ford, under the auspices of David Charles. -
Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People Lynn A
Number 38 December 2010 Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People Lynn A. Stout EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ow can we get people to behave themselves? H Experts often assume that humans are selfish creatures who respond only to punishments and rewards, and who can’t be trusted to do a good job or refrain from lying, cheating and stealing unless Recent Issues in Governance Studies given the right “incentives.” Yet “The Age of Leverage” every day we see people behaving (November 2010) ethically and unselfishly—few of “Beyond Additionality in Cap- us mug the elderly or steal the and-Trade Offset Policy” paper from our neighbor's yard, © Fry Design (July 2010) and many of us help strangers. We nevertheless overlook the good aspects of our “The Senate Syndrome” own natures and fixate on the bad things people do and how we can stop them. (June 2010) This focus on bad behavior obscures the reality, and importance, of goodness, leading us to neglect the crucial role our better impulses could play in shaping “Can a Polarized American Party System Be “Healthy”? society. Evidence from behavioral science and experimental gaming (April 2010) demonstrates that unselfish prosocial behavior (sacrificing to follow ethical rules, or to help or avoid harming others) is far more common and important than “Broken Politics” (March 2010) generally recognized. Under the right conditions, the vast majority of people act as if they have a conscience that causes them to act ethically and look out for others’ interests. To view previous papers, visit: www.brookings.edu/governance/Issues- This paper unpacks how these empirical findings can be used to develop a in-Governance-Studies.aspx “Jekyll/Hyde” model of how human behavior shifts predictably from purely selfish to prosocial, depending on certain social cues. -
Modern Moral Conscience
Modern Moral Conscience Tom O’Shea Forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies Abstract: This article challenges the individualism and neutrality of modern moral conscience. It looks to the history of the concept to excavate an older tradition that takes conscience to be social and morally responsive, while arguing that dominant contemporary justifications of conscience in terms of integrity are inadequate without reintroducing these social and moral traits. This prompts a rethinking of the nature and value of conscience: first, by demonstrating that a morally-responsive conscience is neither a contradiction in terms nor a political absurdity; second, by suggesting how a morally-responsive conscience can be informed by the social world without being a mere proxy for social power or moribund tradition. 1. The idea of conscience underwent a gradual hollowing out during modernity. Our now- dominant conceptions of conscience have sundered it from both social relationships and ethical truths which outrun each individual’s convictions. We have yet to properly reckon with the implications of this shift towards an egocentric and normatively neutral understanding of conscience. My aim is to excavate an older tradition without these two traits and to ask what we may have lost by leaving it behind. While this will reveal a challenge to modern moral conscience, there remain formidable obstacles to returning to earlier understandings of it. I shall outline a social and normative conception of conscience which learns the lessons of this earlier tradition while showing how it must nevertheless adapt to modern conditions. What then is conscience? Among our oldest moral concepts – recognisable as early as the Greek playwrights of the 5th century BCE – it has long been understood as the self’s awareness of the moral dimension of its conduct (Sorabji 2014, 15).1 Conscience consists in a consciousness of moral demands upon the particular individual in their own specific circumstances rather than a merely abstract knowledge of right and wrong.