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Pärttyli Rinne Kant on Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte

Im Auftrag der Kant-Gesellschaft herausgegeben von Manfred Baum, Bernd Dörflinger und Heiner F. Klemme Band 196 Pärttyli Rinne Kant on Love funding provided by the University of Helsinki

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© 2020 Pärttyli Rinne, published by Walter Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com Acknowledgments

This book is basedonthe PhDthesis Iwroteatthe University of St Andrews be- tween 2013 and 2016.These years wereamong the best of my life, and not only because of my research topic. Never before had Iexperiencedsuch asense of community and belongingasIdid at the St Andrews De- partment. Iamgrateful to my supervisor,Professor Jens Timmermann, for all his ad- . He provided me with the torch Iheld onto in seeking my waythrough the beautiful labyrinth of loveinKant.Because of Professor Timmermann, I was never completelyinthe dark. Iamthankful for our discussions, for his care- ful criticism, and for his and benevolence. Ialso wish to thankmysec- ond supervisors, Professors and Sarah Broadie. Professor Baron’s earlyfeedback significantlyimproved my writing,and it makes me happy to of all I’ve learned from Professor Broadie about loveinancient philosophy, and tacitlyabout wisdom in general. Iwant to thankmyKantian peers in St Andrews for all their practical help, and for our endless informal exchanges, which are so important when one is for- mulating and trying out one’sideas: Stefano Lo Re, LeonardRandall, and Martin Sticker.Icherish our . Ialso thank all my fellow graduatestu- dents, as well as St Andrews Philosophystaff, for together creatingasmall, vi- brant havenwith auniqueatmosphere so conducive to profound . I not be wistful, but Iwill always carry St Andrews Philosophyinmyheart. Ispent the spring of 2016 at the Humboldt University of Berlin, finalising my thesis, and Iamgrateful to my host,Professor Thomas Schmidt,for his hospital- ity and helpful comments on my research. Ihavealsohad the opportunity to dis- cuss topics related to my work at various seminars, workshops and international conferences,and at the annual review sessions and the final oral examination at St Andrews.Ithank the following people, who have clearly had an influenceon this study:Martin Brecher,Alix Cohen, Rowan Cruft,LiFan, John Haldane, Rae Langton (external examiner), Kate Moran, BarbaraSattler (internal examiner), Dieter Schönecker, Leslie Stevenson, Michael Walschots, and Günter Zöller. Iamgrateful to the St Andrews &StirlingGraduateProgramme in Philoso- phyfor its financial support.Ialsowish to thank Johanna Wange, Project Editor at De Gruyter,Carolyn Benson (languagepolishing), and Florian Ruppenstein (Production Editor)for kindlyhelping to preparethe manuscript for publication. Finally, Ithank my family: my lovelywife Noraand our amazing twin sons Aarni and Aale. It is difficult for me to enumerate my gratitude to Nora. She is the spring of most of what is in my life. Iamgrateful for her tirelesssupport

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. VI Acknowledgments duringthe time it took me to write the book,for her sheer , and for the fact that we are together. The loveIreceive from her and the twins is beyond measure. Contents

Introduction 1

 Self-Love 18 . Animal Mechanical Self-Love 20 . The Middle Level of Self-Love 33 . Self-Loveand the Highest Good 48 . Self-LovePersists on Three Levels 55

 Sexual Love 57 . Sexual Love and Love of Beauty 60 . Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 68 .. Narrow Sexual Love 69 .. Broad Sexual Love 71 .. The TeleologyofSexual Love 77

 Love of God 84 . Love forGod 86 . God’sLove 95 .. The End Account 96 .. The Ground Account 100 . Is Love of God Self-Love? 105 . The Ascent of Love of God 108

 Love of Neighbour 110 . The General Division Prior to The of Morals 112 . Love of NeighbourinTheMetaphysics of Morals 123 .. On the Feeling of Love 124 .. On Practical Love 130 . The Feeling-Action-Cultivation Account 141

 Love in 145 . Love in Friendship Prior to TheMetaphysics of Morals 146 . Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals 153 .. Identifying the Love at Issue 154 .. CanWeBracket Love from Friendship? 158 . Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’sAscent Towardthe Moral Community 162 VIII Contents

Conclusion 167

Appendix: ExplanatoryNote on Fig. 8 174

Bibliography 176

Index of 183

Subject Index 185 Introduction

I

This work presents the first systematic, exegetical,and comprehensive studyof the of love in the philosophyofImmanuel Kant.Loveisoftenconsidered to be among the most importantyet perplexing of all phenomena, and Kant is generallythought to be among the greatest in the Western tradition. Ithus find it remarkable that Kant’sviews on lovehavenot previously been investigated in much depth, or with an outlook on the waythe concept of lovefigures and operateswithin his philosophyasawhole. My research will show that loveisactuallyimportant to Kant’sphilosophy, at anyrate alot more important than commonlyassumed. It maycome as asur- prise to see how often Kant thinksabout love, how much he writesabout it,and that he holds various philosophical views about it.Inparticular,anunderstand- ing of how the concept of lovefunctions in Kant’spractical philosophyisneces- sary for an overall understanding of his ethical project.Eventhough we might think otherwise at first glance, loveplays an integralrole in Kant’sconception of human life. Loveisacomplex and multifaceted concept,and Kant’sphilosophicalideas on loveyield no exceptiontothis fact.Not onlyare these ideas important for un- derstandingKant,Ialso think that his views on love are interesting as such. What the views are and how they fit together is the topic of the present volume. If one is generallyopen to learning from Kant,this book willhopefullyshow that it is also possible to learn from what he thought about love. The natureofmywork is mostlyinterpretative,and in particular Iwill formulate two exegetical claims, which mark the coreofthe study. First,Ihold that in Kant we can detect agen- eral divisionoflove,accordingtowhich loveingeneral divides into loveofbe- nevolence [Liebe des Wohlwollens]and loveofdelight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. The general division of loveinKant is akey for understanding loveinKant.Sec- ond, Ihold thatbyidentifying various aspects of loveinKant,such as self-love, sexual love, loveofGod, loveofneighbour,and loveinfriendship, and by study- ing the various thingshesaysabout the different aspects of love, we can detect an ascentoflove from the strongest impulses of to the highestide- als of morallydeservedhappiness.Itisthese twoclaims thatwillbeclarified and defendedduringthe course of the work.

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 2 Introduction

II

There are of course for the lacuna in previous research. In general, the studyofKant’smoral philosophyorethics, broadlyconstrued, has tendedtoem- phasise the foundations of moral philosophyasarticulated in the Groundworkof the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical . Traditionally, fewer resources have been directed to research on Kant’slastmajor contribution to moralphilosophy, TheMetaphysics of Morals,wherelovefigures much more prominentlythaninthe Groundwork or the Critique of . In the anglophone research community,the tendencytogiveless weight to TheMeta- physics of Morals can also be at least partiallyexplained by the fact that areli- able, completetranslation of the entirework has onlybeen made available in recent decades. The emphasis on the Groundwork in relation to TheMetaphysics of Morals has tended to yield apicture of a ‘cold’ Kant,apicture of aphilosopher who emphasises over everythingelse and is wary of, if not outright hostile towards, emotionsoraffectivedispositions as part of the moral life. When Ihavediscussed my project with non-Kantian academic philosophers, Ihaveoftenbeen metwith surprise: ‘Love in Kant?Oh, Ididn’tknow that Kant said anything at all about love! If he did, surelyitmust have been some kind of antithesis of love thathewas really after…’ And so on. Within the community of academic philosophers in general, Kant’sviews on loveare clearlynot well known. Within the circle of scholars workingonKant’sethics, however,this kind of picture no longer obtains, and as more attention has been giventothe ‘Doctrine of ’ in TheMetaphysics of Morals and to Kant’santhropological works,wenow have amuch fuller,more balanced, and more comprehensive pic- ture of the emotional life of the Kantian moralagent.Wenow know that the role of the ‘natural’,sensory-aestheticpart of the human cognitive apparatus as re- lated to ‘pure practical reason’ or ‘freedom’ (to use Kant’sown dualism) is much morecomplex and nuanced than commonlyassumedbythosenot all that familiar with Kant’sethics. Thanks to the work of Kantian empha- sising or defending the importance of emotive elements in Kant’smoral philos- ophy, what we have been witnessinginthe lastthirty years or so is the emer- gence of a ‘nicer’ Kant,whose overall take on moral philosophyis‘kinder’, ‘warmer’,ormore humane thanwhat readingmerelythe Groundwork might imply. My work represents this ‘warmer’ school of Kantian . However,even my kind of approach might appear too ‘cold’ for those who wish to ground ethics or moral norms in emotive , and pleasure, empathyor‘warm- heartedness’,instinctive benevolence, or the feeling of love. The account of loveinKant that Iseek is meant to be true to the foundations of Kant’smoral II 3 thoughtand to the letterofhis text,sothat the picture Iprovide will be not only defensible but also exegetically balanced and accurate.For instance, even in the context of the ‘nice’ Kant presented here, the feelingoflovecan never be the ob- jective foundation of . The foundation is pure practical reason and re- spect for the morallaw. Iwon’tbetalking much about what Kant could or should have thought about the problem of love; rather,Iwill systematicallyreconstruct the positions he did hold. My aim is to arrive at ageneral outline of the concept of loveasit figures in my chosen targetsystem, or in other words, in the propositional nat- ural language ‘data ’ Iwish to analyse. That is, Iwill be investigating how the word ‘love’ [Liebe]takes on different functions and meaningswhen it ap- pears in various contexts within the philosophical writingsofKant. This kind of approach has its limitations, to be sure, and Iamnot out to claim that Kant’sconceptions of lovesimplysprang from pure reason in ahistor- ical vacuum. In the tradition of , investigations into lovedate back to the Presocratic . In particular,the notion of in ’s has had an immenseeffect on subsequent European philosophy and . The connection between the concept of loveand the notionofthe highest good,which we will continue to see in Kant,originates from Plato. Be- sides Plato, another decisive factor contributing to how it was possible for some- one to conceptualise lovein18th-century Prussia is the Christian , and es- pecially the teachings of Jesusasthey werepreserved in the .Itis not much of an exaggeration to assert that from adecidedlyhistoricalperspec- tive,one cannot understand the context in which Kant writes about lovewithout acknowledging the existenceofatleast two historical documents: the Symposi- um and the Sermononthe Mount. It would be possible, and highlyinteresting,Ithink, to trace the historical genealogyofthe concept of lovefrom PlatotoKant,toconsider the parallels and continuities between, for instance, the waylovefigures in ’sand Kant’sconceptions of friendship, to analyse the extent to which Kant’sconcep- tualisations of loveare indebtedto, say, Augustine or Aquinas, or to his moreim- mediate predecessors like the British moralists, or Leibniz, Wolff, or Baumgarten, or indeed to his Pietist upbringing. Iwould be especiallyinclined to point out (and this maybeobvious to some) that the link between loveand the highest good is common to both and ,thatthis link is sustained through the Middle Ages in the Scholastic fusion of Plato, Aristotle, and Jesus, that it remains clearlyvisible in the British sentimentalists like Hutcheson, and that it influences Kant’sconstruction of the regulative ideality of his ethical system as awhole. But this kind of historical, culturaland comparative approach is beyond the scope of my study. 4 Introduction

The concept of love is scattered throughout Kant’smassive corpus,and Iwill have enough work on my hands in just getting the exegesis right.Likewise, Iwill not enter the ‘post-Kantian’ domain and interpret my results in the light of later strandsofGerman ;nor will Iuse my findingstoengagewith contem- porary discussions in the philosophyoflove. Although Ibelievethat the ap- proach and the general framework developed in this book can laterbereworked and used to formulate acontemporary, post-Kantian philosophyoflove, this is not my aim here. This studyisvery much Kant immanent. As Imentioned above, Kant’sconception of lovehas not been investigated comprehensivelyorindetail in the literature to date. Thisisnot to saythat there aren’tany discussions of this topic, however.Since akey component of my argument concerns the novelty of my claims, Ifeel obliged to sayatleast something about how lovehas previouslybeen analysed and discussed in the studyofKant.Therefore, Iwill now offer some general reflections on the state of previous research, and in doing this, Iwill refertoindividual accounts only insofar as they are particularlyrepresentative of the points Iwish to make. The Kant-Bibliographie 1945–1990 (Malter/Ruffing 1999), which aims to pres- ent acomprehensive bibliography of Kant-related academic writingsfrom the pe- riod between the aforementioned years, lists some 9000 titles, 5titles of which contain the word ‘love’ or ‘Liebe’.From this one can plausiblygeneralise that from 1945to1990 the ‘loveratio’ in Kant scholarship was approximately1/ 1800.Thingshavechanged in this regard, and in the last couple of decades in particular, research on love in Kant has grown to the point where at least one or two new papers on the topic are published each year.However,the total num- ber of research articles in the field stillonlyamounts to agood handful. There is no danger of drowninginthe secondary literature. Ithink it is possible to divide the existingresearch roughlyinto three cate- gories. First,thereare thoseaccounts that engage with aspecific aspect of love or discuss lovewithin aparticularwork by Kant.These accounts yield partial ,and when the discussions are sufficientlydetailed and wellargued, they greatlypromote our understanding of loveinKant.Most of the research on loveinKant belongsmoreorless to this .Examples of the first kind of approach include works by Marcia Baron (2009;2013), Melissa Fahmy(2009; 2010), and Dieter Schönecker (2010;2013), wherethe focus is the ‘Doctrine of Vir- tue’ of TheMetaphysics of Morals or neighbourly lovemore generally. Second, there are accounts that mention ‘love’ in the title but do not actuallyprovide an interpretation (in anysignificant detail) of what Kant had to sayabout the is- sues the title refers to (e.g. Miller1985; Vanden Auweele 2014). Third, thereare accounts that at least ostensiblyaim to provide amoregeneral outlook on the concept of loveinKant,orsomehow claim or attempt to articulate general prop- III 5 ositions about loveinKant (e.g. Streich 1924;Moors 2007;Schönecker 2010; Grenberg2014). It is this third category thatisactuallythe most interesting for the purposes of my work, since what Iamafter here is preciselyamore general account of this kind. However,none of these previous discussions is anything close to abook-length monograph (the closest is Streich (1924)). They are not even articles dedicated solely to this issue, but rather propositions within pa- pers, which pursue various general aims. Idonot wish to come across as blam- ing these authors, nor am Isuggesting thatthey should have done otherwise. What Iamsayingisthat regarding the concept of loveinKant,the lacuna in the research is real.

III

Besides beinggenerallyexegetical in the sense thatIinterpret rather thaneval- uate, my approach has some other features that are worth highlighting.When I analyse the concept of lovebyinvestigating how the word ‘love’ appears in var- ious propositional structures within agiven text or set of texts, Ianalyticallydi- vide the concept of loveinto different aspects, accordingtohow the word ‘love’ appears in different contexts. Forexample, aparticularlyhighnumber of refer- ences to ‘love’ occur in contextswhereKant is speakingabout the ‘self’ or ‘one’s own ’, ‘sexuality’, ‘God’, ‘neighbours’ or ‘other human ’,and ‘friendship’.Analysed in these terms,the concept of lovewill consist at least of the aspectsof‘self-love’, ‘sexual love’, ‘loveofGod’, ‘love of neighbour’, and ‘loveinfriendship’.Naturally, the interrelationships between the aspects are also very important. The aspects must be organised into awhole as rationally as possible. Just how this is to be accomplished, however,isimpossible to say without first becomingwellacquainted with the object of study. It is by compar- ing the aspectswith each other thatageneral structure of the targetconcept can be approached. In this way, the concept is marked out by the instancesofthe wordinthe light of the aspects thathavebeen identified, but in contrast with the mere word, the concept comprises amorecomprehensive propositional do- main,which includes all the aspects (or the proposition sets the aspects consist of). The comparative arrangement of the aspects should reveal the possiblereg- ularities or invariances between aspects, so that these invariances can then be said to belong genericallytothe concept.Assuch, dividing the concept of loveinto different sorts of loveisofcourse nothing new (cf. e.g. Fromm 1957; Lewis 1963), but the divisions are not self-evident,and the particular wayI make these divisions is novel in the studyofKant. 6 Introduction

To clarify my approach further,Ithink my investigation into the concept of loveinKant must be called quasi-inductive. Idonot claim to be analysingevery possibleaspect of love, let alone every single instance of the word ‘love’ in Kant’scorpus.Iam after arelatively robust yetmanageableaccount of the con- cept of love, and Ithereforelimit the construction of the framework to thoseas- pects that figure most prominentlyinKant’sphilosophy. While the method is in- ductive in the sense that Igather textual data and make generalisations basedon sample populations of the word ‘love’,myresults are neither certain nor abso- lutelynecessary.What Iwillsay is merelythat my division of the concept of loveinKant is one possible, plausible, or viable wayofsetting up aframework of , and that while my results remain incompleteand hopefullysubject to criticism, this studyisnevertheless the first comprehensive approximation of what the concept of loveinKant’sphilosophymight looklike. To return to the basic claims made at the beginning of this introduction: what is the general division of loveinKant?Asnoted above, Iidentify five (or six) particularlyimportant aspects of lovetobediscussed in the study: self- love, sexual love(and loveofbeauty), loveofGod, love of neighbour,and loveinfriendship. Thislist is not exhaustiveand could be constructed otherwise, but these aspectsdoexist in Kant’swritings, and within this framework of as- pects Kant consistentlyusesorimpliesadivision between twogeneric kinds of love: loveofbenevolence [Liebedes Wohlwollens]and loveofdelight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. These twoloves appear regularly. In general, loveofbenevo- lence in Kant is goodwillthat is directed to the well- of its object. It can be weak or active,but the wishful or actively sought end of all instancesofloveof benevolence is that thingsgowell for the object,nomatter how minimal one’s interest in the well-beingofthe object actuallyis. Loveofdelight,onthe other hand, is apleasure taken in the physical or moral , or even the sheer existence,ofthe object. It does not carry an aim or an interest in the same way that loveofbenevolence does. Rather,itisareactionoraresponsetoanencoun- ter with the object of loveand its qualities. It is primarilyafeelingaroused by the object in conjunction with the cognitive faculties or capacities of the agent. In different contexts, love of benevolence and loveofdelight will vary ac- cording to their objectsand the aspectsoflovetowhich they relate, so that they acquire somewhat different meaningsand different functions depending on the aspect in question. However,Ihave found onlyone direct reference to ageneral division of loveinKant’spublished works,and the existenceofthe di- vision must be shown and systematicallyreconstructed with various sources for each of the individual aspects. The direct remark is contained in the first part of Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason,whereKant discusses the origin of and,moreprecisely, its relation to self-love. Kant refers to ageneral division III 7 of loveinalengthyfootnote: ‘Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACEN- TIAE), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.’ (R,6:45.22–25)¹ In the spe- cific context of self-love, the general division of lovebasicallymeans that we want thingstogowellfor ourselves(loveofbenevolence), and thatweare pleased(loveofdelight) when thingsdowork out well for us (overall self-love is more complicated than this, and Idiscuss the complexity of the general divi- sion of self-loveinch. 1.2).The remark in the Religion also asserts that both love of benevolence and loveofdelight ‘must be rational’.Itisnot entirelyclear what this means, and whether the ‘must’ [müssen]should be understood as or as part of the description of the in question. It is alsonot clear whether the that Kant is talking about here is meant to applytoloveofbenev- olence and love of delight generallyormerely(or specifically) in the context of self-love. We know from the passageitself and from several places elsewhere that Kant allows for the existenceofinclination-based loveofbenevolence and pathological loveofdelight (see e.g. ch. 4.1). It is thereforeclear that the phrase ‘must be rational’ cannot be taken to mean ‘must be based on reason’. In the specific context of self-love, the rationalityofloveofbenevolence for one-

 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt,sokann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollensund des Wohlgefallens (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheiltwerden, und beide müssen (wie sich von selbst versteht) vernünftigsein.’ It is difficulttofind asatisfyingtranslation that captures the parallelism, apparent in the German language, of the twobasic forms of love. The lovethat is benevolenceis, at its basis,willingwell. It is commonlytranslated as ‘good will’, ‘benevolence’, or ‘well-wishing’.Onlythe last,Ibelieve, is implausible as ageneral strategy, sinceKant often explicitlydistinguishes between practical loveofbenevolenceand mere wishing[wünschen]. The translation of Liebe des Wohlgefallens is trickier. Wohlgefallen consists of the adverbial conjunc- tion Wohl (‘well’), the prefix ge, which implies conjoiningorlinkingtogether,and the verb fallen. So literally, it signifies somethinglike ‘fall together well’.The verb gefallen as such means to please or to delight, and Wohlgefallen is indeed sometimes translated as ‘well-pleasedness’. This is quitepossible as atranslation,but it suggests satisfaction in an outcome, and while Kant sometimes uses Wohlgefallen this way, thereisalso in Kant an underlyingsense of Wohl- gefallen-loveasanimmediatesensory impulse of positive attraction, bettercapturedbythe Eng- lish word ‘delight’ than ‘well-pleased’.The English term ‘good pleasure’ has abiblical back- ground and is also plausible, but like ‘well-pleased’ it perhaps obscures some of the immediateness and the attractive pull of Wohlgefallen. The English ‘well-liking’ (which is also used by some translators) is unwarranted,Ithink, for it actuallymeans somethinglike ‘good physical condition’. Wohlgefallen is sometimestranslatedas‘satisfaction’,sometimes as ‘liking’, and other times as ‘approbation’.Inthe interest of remaining technicallyconsistent,Iuse ‘love of benevolence’ and ‘loveofdelight’ in this studybecause Ithink that overall they best capture what Kant is talkingabout,evenatthe expenseofthe linguistic parallelism. My solution is nat- urallyopen to criticism. 8 Introduction self means that the inclination-based loveofbenevolence for oneself includes the successful long-term use of instrumental reasoning, i.e. it is rational as pru- dence. Rationalloveofdelight for oneself, on the otherhand, means either tak- ing pleasure in one’sown or akind of self- thatisbased on one’srespect for the moral (in the last casethe loveofdelight for oneself would be basedonreason) (R,6:45fn.; see ch.1.2). However,ifweinterpret the words ‘must be rational’ as referringtoloveofbenevolenceand loveofdelight more generally, beyond the context of self-love, we maynote that Kant never talks of mere non-rational animality in terms of the general division of love, and his usageofthe terms seems to be limited to the context of rational beings. In this sense, loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight always imply reason,even when atoken of benevolence or delight is pathological or based on inclination (ch. 1). This meansthat for Kant,loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight appear in rational creatures, entangled in their rational capacities.Someloves are de- rivedfrom pure practical reason, like practical loveofneighbour as the duty to be benevolent and beneficent to others (ch. 4). Similarly, loveofGod is an idea derived from moral reason (ch.3). It is also the case that Kant’sethical writ- ingsinvolveademand for cultivation,which ethicallymeans the conscious striv- ing to make one’scognitive apparatus more fit for what morality demands. This includes making use of one’sfeelingsofloveinthe service of moral reason, and in this general sense the ‘must be rational’ can be interpreted as involving ade- mand to cultivatenatural feelingsofloveofbenevolence and loveofdelight in order to improveoneself morally(seeesp. ch. 4.2; ch. 5). Even though Kant’spublishedworks contain onlyone direct referenceto love’sbeing ‘generally’, ‘as such’,or‘all-in-all’ [überhaupt]divided into loveof benevolence and loveofdelight,his usage of the terms of the division runs from the earlyHerder lectures on ethics (1762 – 64) up to the late Metaphysics of Morals (1797) (seech. 4). Thefirst time the general division of lovecomes up explicitlyinKant’scorpus is in the Collins notes on ethics, where ‘all love’ [alle Liebe]isdivided into loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight (LE, 27:417.19 – 30).² There, the specific context is loveofneighbour. With respect to neighbourlylove, in the 1780s Kant also uses the distinctionbetween patholog- ical and practical love, which is especiallyfamiliar to readersofthe Groundwork

 Because the manuscript of these notesisdated1784/85,itisoften thought that they arerough- ly contemporaneous with the Groundworkofthe Metaphysics of Morals. However,asthe notes arenearlyidentical to earlier ones ascribedtoKaehler,ithas been established that the Collins notesinfact stem fromthe mid-1770s,which explainssome of their features (liketheir emphasis on inclinations) compared to Kant’smaturemoral (see Denis/Sensen 2015,pp. 3–4; Nar- agon 2006,entry on ‘Collins 2’ in ‘Moral Philosophy’). III 9 and the second Critique. The division of loveofneighbour into loveofbenevo- lence and loveofdelight resurfaces in TheMetaphysics of Morals,and in ch. 4 Iinvestigate how the general division of loveofneighbour can be mapped onto the more familiar pathological-practical distinction. If all the evidence is taken into account,includingwhat Kant says about loveinfriendship (ch. 5), we can see that lovefor other human beingsisgenerallydivided into loveofbe- nevolence and loveofdelight,sothat it is possible to love others benevolently1) from inclination or 2) from reason, and to take delight in others 3) pathologically or 4) intellectually(see ch.4.1; 4.3; 5.2.2; Appendix). From areligious perspective, God’sloveofbenevolence is the ground of creation and moral ,and his loveofdelight is (hopefully) an eventual favourable responsetothe sincere moral striving of the human being (ch. 3). How exactlythe general division of loveinKant operates is to agreat extent the main problem of the whole study, and my exegetical work is largely meanttocorroborate the existenceof the general division of loveinKant.The investigation of the general division of lovereveals thatthe aspectsofloveare not isolated from each otherbut over- lap to some extent and, taken together,form adynamic and highlycomplex net- work of closelyintertwined . It should also be noted that Kant’sconcep- tion of lovecannot be entirely reducedtothe general division: under the broad and complex rubric of self-love, we find the strongest,rudimental, non-rational im- pulsesofhuman nature, namelythose of self-preservation (loveoflife) and sex- uality (sexual loveinthe narrow sense), which are discussed in terms of lovebut not graspedbythe general division (ch. 1.1; 2.2.1).³ The second major claim of the studyisthat if we look at the different aspects of lovealongside each other, we see an ascentoflove from the natural, animal

 The distinction between loveofbenevolenceand loveofdelight has its historical roots, of course, but as Ialreadymentioned,inthis work Icannot offer detailed historical comparisons or aproperaccount of the genealogy of this pair of concepts prior to Kant.Asimilar distinction appears,for instance, in Hutcheson’s An Inquiryintothe Originalofour IdeasofBeauty and Vir- tue. There, Hutcheson divides lovetoward other rational agents into loveofcomplacencyand loveofbenevolence(see Hutcheson 1990 [1725], pp. 127ff., Treatise II.2–5), which weretranslat- ed into German as Liebe aus Wohlgefallen and Liebe aus Wohlwollen. Apparently, Kant owned the German translation of Hutcheson’swork (I thank Michael Walschots for providing me with this informationregarding the link between Hutcheson’sand Kant’sconceptions of love). More gen- erally, amor benevolentiae and amor complacentiae belongedtostandardScholasticism and werediscussed at length by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae. In his highlyintricateconceptual network of love, Aquinas includes athird general notion: amor concupiscientiae,orloveasde- sire.Through Aquinas,the origin of the general division of lovecan be traced to Christianthe- ology and Aristotle’sconcept of benevolence, especiallyinhis discussions of in the Nic- omachean Ethics. 10 Introduction impulses toward the highest moral-physical good in the form of cosmopolitan friendship – or so Iwill argue. Through the aspects of self-love, sexual love (and loveofbeauty), loveofGod, loveofneighbour,and loveinfriendship, loveisseen to condition important focal pointsinhumanity’sascent from crude animality to morallydeserved happiness.This picture of an ascent of loveinKant is obviouslyaninterpretative reconstruction. Kant never systema- tised his discussions of loveinto asingle whole, but the reconstruction Ioffer is nevertheless basedfirmlyonwhat he said. It is made from the pieces Kant laid out,eventhough he himself never put all the pieces together. Thepicture contains both descriptive elements, which Kant uses to portrayhuman nature, and prescriptive elements, which explicate notions of duty as they relateto love. The ascent concerns boththe subjective level of an agent’scharacter devel- opment and the communal level of the species. It alsocontains the regulative ideal of the highest good as the that we ought to strive for. Overall, this view of an ascent of loveisaconceptual classification or ahierarchy of the different kinds of loveasthey relatetocreation, nature, and the highest moral-physical well-being.Icall this picture the ascentmodel of loveinKant. The model consists generallyofthe various notionsoflovespelled out by Kant in his works,the interrelations between these notions, and the wayinwhich the gen- eral division of lovebringsarelative unity to Kant’sconcept of love as awhole. The ascent model of loveultimatelyprovides apanoptic view of the aspects of lovediscussed in this book. To make the claim more precisely, the ascent model of loveisaviablegeneral model of love in Kant. Forreadersfamiliar with Plato’s Symposium and the famous ‘ladder of love’ discussed in that work, the notion of an ascent model might ring abell. Isn’tDi- otima’sand ’ account of Eros in the latter half of the Symposium precise- ly an ascent model?AmItrying to arguethat Kant is actuallysome kind of Pla- tonist when it comes to love? The answer to the first question is: yes, the first ascent model of loveinWestern philosophywas formulated by Plato. To the sec- ond question, I’minclined to answer no,but this must be carefullyqualified to avoid misunderstandings. Naturally, if Iamgenerallyarguing that an ascent of lovecan be detected in Kant,there are goingtobeatleast some structural sim- ilaritieswith Plato’s(or Diotima’s) account in the Symposium. With Plato, one be- gins by eroticallyloving the physical beauty of an individual youngman, and the impulses of self-preservation and the sexual instinct likewise at the natural basis of Kant’sconception of love. Echoing Plato’s ‘ladder metaphor’,Kant often associates lovewith the notionsof‘higher’ and ‘lower’,and he continually talks about loveinrelation to our striving for perfection, or in relation to the cul- tivation of our faculties – wherethe ultimateend is obviouslythe completehigh- est good. What is clearlydifferent,however,isthat for Plato, the ‘peak’ of love’s IV 11 ascent is akind of quasi-mystical vision, wherethe lover suddenlygrasps the fundamental oneness of the idea of beauty,asifinasingle, sweepingintuition. Now this is not acomparative studyofloveand the highest good in Platoand Kant; it is not even astudy of the highest good in Kant,and Iwill not go into much detail in my comparison. UsingPlato’sladder casuallyasaheuristic point of departure through which to elaborate on Kant’snotionoflove, Ibelieve we can saythat for Kant,the ‘peak’ we strive to reach is amorecommunal notion of love(conditioned by respect) in cosmopolitan friendship. Subjectively, it con- sists in lovefor the moral law,the full attainment of which signifies the absence of all contra-moral inclinations in the agent.Communally, or on the species level, it consists in the prevalence of benevolence (Liebedes Wohlwollens)and intellectual delight (Liebe des Wohlgefallens)inequal, reciprocal, and respectful human relationships that ultimatelyobtain throughout the planet. ForKant,the attainment of these highest modes of loveisagradual, laborious,and never- ending project of .The Kantian agent is never ‘rewarded’ with the actualised, sweeping vision of the beautiful, radiant oneness described by Plato. ForKant,the ascent of loveisless about subjectively comingto‘see’ something and more about making moralprogress in terms of loveinone’- teractions with other human beings. Iamnot saying that Plato’saccount cannot also be construed along these lines, but on the face of it at least,thereare clear differences between the two. Plato’sladder of loveemphasises the vision of the one as the highest good, whereas my ascent model of loveinKant emphasises the duty of moral .

IV

If Inow brieflycomparemyperspective with the previous,more general propo- sitions made on Kant and love, Ibelievethe benefits and originality of my ap- proach can be brought to light.First of all there is an older doctoral dissertation (55 pages) from Germanywith the title TheConceptofLove According to Kant [Der Begriff der Liebebei Kant](Streich 1924). Detlev Streich’smain claim is that lovecan never be amoral motive for Kant.While this is strictlyspeaking true, Streich’scoarse-grainedposition reduces lovetoafeeling,and he does not problematise his conception in the light of Section XII of the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (see Streich 1924,p.38), wherethe feeling of loveis described as asubjectivelynecessary predisposition for receptivity to duty. Streich does not discuss loveofGod or analyse the varieties of self-love; he onlymentions sexual loveinpassing (Streich 1924,p.46) and has aparticularly one-sided view of loveinfriendship (he thinks it’smerelyburdensome [lästig]) 12 Introduction

(Streich 1924,pp. 42,44). Morerecently, in an article on Kant and the biblical commandment of love, Martin Moors claims to ‘formulate ageneral evaluation of Kant’sphilosophyoflove’ (Moors 2007,p.266). However,Moors does not ex- actlyprovide this,and instead identifies six aspects ‘with regard to Kant’s prac- tical concept of love’ (Moors 2007,p.266;emphasis added).Included in Moors’s account are ‘religious’, ‘theological’, ‘theonomical’, ‘ethical’, ‘voluntaristic’,and ‘anthropological’ varieties of love. From my perspective,the first threewould seem to come close to love of God, the fourth and fifth to loveofneighbour, and the sixth to the notion of . (Moors 2007,p.266) Moors does not dis- cuss the varieties of self-loveinsignificant detail; he says nothing about sexual love(and loveofbeauty), nor does he mention love in friendship. ForMoors, Kant’snotion of loveasduty ‘evaporatescompletely’ (Moors 2007,p.267), but he does not notice that an end of the duty of loveisthe happiness of others. From amorecharitable perspective,Jeanine Grenberg has defended ‘aKantian understanding of the role of loveinawell-livedhuman life’,alovethe concep- tion of which is ‘entirelymoral’ (Grenberg2014, p. 211). Grenberg seems to effec- tivelyreduce ‘Kant’snotionoflove’ (Grenberg2014, p. 220) to love for the moral law (see Grenberg2014, pp. 218–219; cf. ch. 3.1below). But Ithink aKantian comprehension of love’srole can hardlybereduced in this way, and besides lovefor the law, Grenbergprovides no account of the manythingsKant has to sayabout love.⁴ The most interesting,detailed, and modest general proposal is that provided by Schönecker(2010) in the Introduction to his paper on love in Section XII of Kant’sIntroduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.First of all, Schönecker makes clear thathis list is not perfect,and the aim is onlytodem- onstrate the complexity of the concept of love(Schönecker 2010,p.135). Schönecker divides loveinKant into at least four contextsand twelve different meanings. The first context is biological and includes 1) sexual love, 2) self- love, and 3) loveoflife (self-preservation). The second context is the duties of love,whereSchöneckeridentifies4)amor benevolentiae,5)heartfeltbenevo- lence, 6) lovefor all human beings, 7) loveasanaptitude to the inclinationof beneficence, and 8) practical love. Schönecker’sthird context is loveinfriend- ship,wherehedistinguishes between 9) loveasfriendship with , 10) the duty of benevolenceasafriend of human beings, and 11) benevolence in wishes. The last context is loveasamoral predisposition of amor complacen- tiae,which is 12)loveofdelight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. Withoutgoing into de-

 Perhapsitwould be morecharitable to view Grenberg’saccount as awork in progress, be- cause elsewhere she also discusses loveinthe Herder and Collins notes on ethics (see Grenberg 2015). V 13 tail, Schönecker’sanalysis is very helpful, and from my perspective the only main contexts thatare omitted from his account are loveofGod and loveof beauty.AsSchönecker does not ground his tentative analysis on the general di- vision of loveinto loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight,itisunderstandable that he is not so sensitive to the operation of the division within the contextshe distinguishes. Ithink Schönecker’sloves 4–11 can actuallybeviewed in terms of varyingkinds or degrees of loveofbenevolence. Loveofdelight,onthe other hand, is abroader notion thanSchöneckeracknowledgesinhis list; it alsofig- ures in self-love, loveofGod, and, arguably, in loveinfriendship. The context of biological or natural lovecan alsobeconstrued such that the non-rationalim- pulsesofloveoflife and sexual love(the latter of which, in the broad sense, in- volves more than just biology) belong to an umbrella concept of self-love, which further includes the general division of loveonanactuallyrational level (see ch. 1).

V

This studyisdivided into 5chapters accordingtothe aspects of love on which I will focus. In these chapters, Ianalyse the operation of the general divisionof loveinthe relevant contextsand carveout the various building blocks that, taken together,form the ascent model of loveinKant.Kant’sdiscussions of lovetake place mainlywithin moral philosophy, philosophyofreligion, anthro- pology, and teleology, while he does not reallytalk about loveinthe framework of (‘love’ is not mentioned in the ). Apart from the first Critique,myreadingsemphasise the main published works from the mature period, and Ionlyuse the lecture notes and minor writingsas auxiliary tools of interpretation when helpful. My readingstrategyisfairlycon- sistent from chapter to chapter; while Itend to organise my discussions themati- callyaround the problems related to the general division of love, Inormallyread Kant’sworks chronologicallytoappreciate the transformations his on loveundergo over time. Ibelievethat, like anygreat system or project of human thought, Kant’sphilosophymust be understood as adynamic and cumulative endeavour,wheremore stable positions are found on which details are then built,while some positions change, wane, or become redefined, and the thought itself remains constantlyatwork, constantlyinflux. Followingthe methodolog- ical advice of Ernst Cassirer,mine is not so much astudyof‘puzzles’ or ‘appa- rent ’ in the 29 volumes of Kant’scollected works but rather a studyofthe dynamic structure of aparticularphilosophical concept – aconcept which aphilosopher can onlyform graduallyoverthe course of several decades 14 Introduction of conceptual labour (seeCassirer 1981, pp. 1–2, cf. 137–138). Such aconcept of love, while certainlynot the onlypossiblesuch concept,can nevertheless be very beautiful, and can perhaps help us more generallytounderstand what loveis, how it arises, what it feels like, and what it requiresfrom us rationally. To under- stand love better is the deeper,underlying aim that has resulted in this book. In the first chapter,Ioffer athree-level interpretation of self-loveinKant.I arguethat the concept of self-lovecan be divided accordingtoascendinglevels of rationality. Ishow that there is alow,arational, ground-level form of self-love that consists of the strongest animal impulses of human nature: loveoflife (self- preservation), sexual love and parenting (species preservation in the narrow sense),and instinctive .Icall this level ‘animal mechanicalself-love’. My analysis then turns to an actuallyrational level thatIcall the ‘middle level’ of self-love, whereself-loveisdivided (in avery complex way) according to the general division of love into love of benevolence and loveofdelight.Last- ly,Ianalyse self-lovehypothetically, on an ideallyrational level of infinite ap- proximation towards the highest good. Iargue that even in this infinite ascent an element of self-lovepersists.Overall, Ithus arguefor the persistence of self- love on three levels. The second chapter has two exegetical tasks. Ibegin by analysing the rela- tionship between sexual love and loveofbeauty,which relationship figures prominentlyinKant’searlier philosophybut wanes towards the 1790s.Ithen for- mulate adistinction between narrow and broad sexual love,wherenarrowsexual loveconsists merelyofthe naturalimpulseofprocreation, whereas broad sexual loveisthe natural impulseunited with the moral loveofbenevolence in the con- text of heterosexual marriage. In comparison with the other chapters in this study, the chapter on sexual lovealso containsanevaluative element,which re- flects the fact that most of the previous research in this areaisfeminist and thereforeevaluative in orientation (as far as Iknow,mystudyisthefirst to an- alyse sexual loveinKant from an exegetical point of view). From this perspec- tive,Ishow how broad sexual lovesupports aless misogynistic picture of Kant thanisoftenpresented, even though problems and internal tensions re- main in Kant’sdiscussions on the issue of sex. The third chapter formulates an ascent model of loveofGod. Ibegin with the observation that loveofGod comprises two ‘directions’:amovement upwards, from human beings to God, and amovement downwards, from God to human beings. Icall this starting point the two-directionality thesisoflove of God. Ipro- ceed by analysinghuman beings’ love for God and then God’slovefor human beings. ForKant,morality leads to religion, and lovefor God is the foundation of all inner religion. It is close to the regulativeideal of loving the morallaw, which involves fulfilling one’sduties gladly [gern](thus implying the absence VI 15 of contra-moral inclinations in the perfect agent). Ishow how God’slovecan be analysed in terms of its role as both an end and a ground: God’sloveofbenev- olence towardhumans is (from areligious perspective)the ground of creation and duties,and God’sloveofdelight is amoral delight God in the end hopefully takes in the sinceremoral striving of the human being. The fourth chapter proposes anovel ‘feeling-action-cultivation’ account of loveofneighbour.Itrack down Kant’sdiscussions of neighbourly love from the earlyHerder notes onwards,focusingonTheMetaphysics of Morals. Ipro- pose thatloveofneighbour consists of both moral-rational and sensory-emotive elements and that it includes the cultivation of amoral . Loveof neighbour divides into loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight,sothatloveof benevolence towards others is either 1) benevolent or beneficent inclination or 2) active rational benevolence (practical love). Practical loveisfurther divided into beneficence, gratitude,and . Loveofdelight is either apatholog- ical or an intellectual delight taken in the perfections (or even the sheer human- ity) of another.Itisnot merelyanactual feeling but alsoapredisposition of sen- sibility to be subjectively receptive to duty. The final chapter reconstructs Kant’smaturephilosophyoffriendship from the perspective of love. Ishow the existenceofthe general division of loveinthis context and analyse the wayits components function. Loveinfriendship is at least loveofbenevolence, but if the lecture notes on ethics are included as evi- dence, it is both loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight.Ingeneral Iargue that in the context of friendship, love(conditioned by respect) marks the path to- wards the highest good in equal and reciprocal human relationships. Friend- ships as such are intimate, but the notion of a ‘friend of human beings’ [Men- schenfreund; Freund der Menschen]bringswith it abroader cosmopolitan outlook thatindirectlyaims at the ideal moral community in terms of friendship. Icall this overall account the ‘ascent view of loveinKantian friendship’.Taken together with the previous chapters of this study, this account corroboratesthe general division approach and the ascent model of loveinKant.

VI

Before moving to the main discussion, Iwould liketosay awordortwo about certain aspects of lovetowhich Idonot devote entire chapters but that also de- servemention. First,Iapproach the notion of loveofbeauty through the lens of sexual love(ch. 2.1). This is by no means the onlystrategyavailable, and love of beauty could also be considered for its own sake (even though there are onlytwo direct passages on it in the ). One could, for instance, begin 16 Introduction one’sdiscussion with the third Critique,establish thatloveofbeauty is loveof delight,and then try to establish links between these passages and Kant’sdis- cussions in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ and the Vigilantius notes on ethics with an eyetoelaborating further on the general qualities of loveofdelight.But this kind of more experimental exegesis is beyond the scope of the present work. Loveofbeauty has been recentlydiscussed by Anne Margaret Baxley (2005) and Gabriele Tomasi (2015), and with reference to theirdiscussions Iadopt a merelyreactive attitude in ch. 2.1, pointingout that an exegetical problem con- cerningloveinthe Critique of Judgment is left untouched by these accounts. However,this is not the main point of the chapter,and in all honesty Idonot provide ageneral account of loveofbeauty. Second, Idiscuss love of honour under self-love. Loveofhonour is an ambig- uous notiondetached from the general division of love(in itself it is neither love of benevolence nor loveofdelight). Loveofhonour consistentlymarks aconcern for respect (from others), but it comes in physical and moral variants,the phys- ical variant belongingtothe conceptual cluster of self-loveand the moral variant being grounded in respect for the moral law. My discussion of loveofhonour is indebted to the careful accounts provided by Houston Smit and Mark Timmons (2015) and LaraDenis (2014), but Ishould still note thatneither Smit and Tim- mons nor Denis attempt to connect loveofhonour to love’sgeneral concept.I consider the relationship between loveofhonour and loveingeneral at the end of ch. 1.1. The moralideal of love for the law is discussed in ch. 1.3and es- pecially in ch. 3.1. Iconsider love of human beings in conjunction with loveof neighbour,especiallyinch. 4.2.1. Further,there are various ‘aspects’ of lovethat are mentioned by Kant only in passing, in singular isolated contexts or in adverbial constructions,but that are never elaborated on or systematicallydeveloped. Some of these might be more, some less importantfor someone interested in ageneral concept of love, but since they are not givensubstantial consideration by Kant in terms of love, Idonot discuss them or incorporate them into my framework. Of such loves, the most prominent is undoubtedlyparental love, yeteventhough the natural impulse towardthe preservation of offspringbelongsto‘animal me- chanicalself-love’ in the Religion (R,6:26.12–18), the onlypublished referenceto ‘parental love’ [die Liebe der Eltern]occurs in the Prolegomena,whereKant uses loveofGod and parental loveasexamples through which to explain, formally, the notion of an analogical relation as such (4:357fn.; cf. 28:1087–1088). Parents do have aduty to provide for theirchildren, accordingtoKant,and children are said to have aduty of gratitude (which is aduty of love) towards their parents (MM, 6:280–281; cf. 9:482).When Kant discusses the differencebetween hatred and anger in the lecturesonethics, he mentions aparent’sanger towarda VI 17 child’sbad behaviourasanexample of anger that presupposes love(LE, 27:687. 38–688.1). That parentslovetheir children would seem to be implicit in Kant’swritings, but he does not discuss the parent-child relation in connection with lovetoany great extent.Hence, Idonot include parental love in my frame- work. Loveoftruth is mentioned acouple of timesinthe lectures but never in the publishedworks (seeLE, 27:60 –62;27:448–449). In the first Critique,Kant writes that ‘we shallalways return to metaphysics as we would to abeloved woman with whom we have had aquarrel.’ (C1, A850/B878)⁵ Although this is an interesting metaphor,tomyknowledge Kant never elaboratesonit. Even more remoteexamples of ‘brieflymentioned loves’,which for the most part never appear in Kant’spublished works, include ‘loveofthe fatherland’,ascon- trasted with universal loveofhuman beings(LE, 27:673; see my ch. 5.3), ‘loveof ’ (LE,27:688–689), ‘-loving’ (C2, 5:61.10; seealso LE, 27:687. 2),and the carnivorous ‘loveofroast beef’ (LA, 25:1361.8), none of which are developed further in terms of love. The existenceofconstructions like ‘loveofroast beef’ merelyshows that, in the most general terms, ‘love’ can be usedtosignify anykind of relatively intense liking or . From this flexibility of the concept of loveitdoes not follow that the framework of love should be expanded ad in- finitum to accommodateever-new aspects or kinds of love. Rather,itshows the need to restrict the framework through careful, quasi-inductive evaluations, so that the concept of lovecan remain at the sametime broad and informative.

 ‘Man kann also sicher sein, […]man werde jederzeit zu ihr wie zu einer mit uns entzweiten Geliebten zurückkehren’. 1Self-Love

AccordingtoKant,itisabasicfact of human nature thatweall loveourselves. Human beingsare imperfect rational creatures who want thingstogowell for themselves, and thereisreallynoway around this fundamental trait of our spe- cies. We want to be happy.Indeed, Kant tends to describe self-love[Selbstliebe, Eigenliebe]¹ as the basic of subjective happiness. Self-loveisthe natural motivational ground of action, to which the moral incentive (respect for the moral law) is opposed. Self-loveisactive within us, and it is onlyhinderedby moralitytothe extent that it givesrise to contra-moralinclinations. There are du- ties in , of course (e.g. the dutiestoperfect oneself and to promote the happiness of others), and in light of our duties we should keep self-lovein check and diminish its influence. Self-lovecan often appear as , and as such it is prone to impedeour striving for virtue.Itmay threaten the free- dom and happinessofothers. But what does the aboveactuallymean,and can something like this be said to be the whole picture of self-loveinKant?While the basics are relatively simple from the perspective of moral theory,self-love poses problems for Kant’sethics. It is asignificant concept in his moral philosophyand has receivedattention from scholars. Treatments of self-loveinthe previous literature, however,can be quite varied. Someview self-loveas‘an objective principle of practical reason’ (Paton 1947, p. 91) or even as ‘furthering morality’ (Šimfa 2013,p.107), whereas others holdthat ‘love is not an attitude that clear-sighted and rational people could ever take towardthemselves.’ (Wood 1996,p.144) Often, scholars touch upon self-loveindiscussing other issues, such as beneficence(Hill 1993), benev- olence (Edwards 2000), or respect for the moral law(e.g. Reath 2006;Engstrom 2010)².Yet none of the previous readingsaim to provide asystematic, exegetical interpretation of the notion of self-love.

 Ihavebeen unable to detect adifference in meaningbetween the twoGerman terms,even though it seems that Kant tends to use Eigenliebe when he is contrastingself-lovewith self-con- ceit [Eigendünkel](see e.g. C2, 5:73.12– 14).  Thomas Hill’sfocus (1993, pp. 1–2) is generallyonthe possibilityofaltruism, and he draws from alooselyKantian framework, statingexplicitlythat his aims arenot exegetical. JeffreyEd- wards’sreading focuses on the Groundwork and the second Critique and is in fact adefenceof Hutcheson against the basic framework of Kant’smaturemoral philosophy. Andrews Reath and Stephen Engstrom analyse the moral incentive (or ‘spring’ [Triebfeder], as Engstrom puts it) and its relation to non-moral . In doing this, they also offer very helpful analyses of self-love, particularlyinrelation to self-conceit within the contextofthe second Critique (see Reath 2006, pp. 14 – 17,23–25;Engstrom 2010,pp. 101ff.).

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 1Self-Love 19

My fundamental goal is to understand the intricate structure of self-loveand the role it plays in Kant’sthought.What,for instance, does Kant mean when he says that self-loveisapredisposition to the good (R,6:26)? Or when he argues that it is the sourceofevil (R,6:45)? What does he mean when he holds that all material practical fall under self-love(C2,5:22)?What is the status of rational self-love(C2,5:73; cf. R, 6:45 – 46fn.), and how does self-loverelate to the general division of loveinto loveofbenevolenceand loveofdelight?Finally, what is the place of self-loveinthe infinite progress towardsmoral perfection – will it continue to exist or not? In what follows, Ishall present what Icall a ‘three-level’ interpretation of Kantian self-love, according to which the concept of self-loveisdivisible into as- cendinglevels of rationality.Ibegin by discussing self-loveatarudimentary, non-rational level of the cognitive structure of the human being,whereitfigures as the strongest impulses of human nature.These fundamental animal impulses include self-preservation (loveoflife), preservation of the species (sexuality and parenting), and sociality.Together,they maybeidentifiedas‘animal mechanical self-love’,and accordingtoKant they constitute apredisposition to the good. The main point of the first section is to laythe ground for the three-level interpreta- tion of self-love(and for the ascent model of loveinKant more generally) by showing that Kant discusses the strongest impulses of human nature in terms of love.Iwill strive to understand whyKant calls these non-rational animal im- pulses ‘love’ in the first place, and whyhethinks thatthey constituteapredis- position to the good. To this end, Iwill also problematise the relationship be- tween animal self-loveand the ‘self-loveofhumanity’ (the latter of which implies what Icall the ‘middle level’ of self-love) by looking at notions of social- ity and love of honour in this context. Second, Ianalyse the middle level of self-loveinmoredetail, from the per- spective of Kant’smoral philosophy. Iargue thatthis level of self-loveisbestap- proached by acknowledging the operation of the general division of loveaslove of benevolence and love of delight.This level impliesthe actuality of reason, and here self-lovecan be considered to informall non-moral ends the agent may have and the instrumental reasoningrelated to them. The middle level brings with it the notion of self-conceit,which Kant incorporatesinto the framework of self-lovethrough very complicated discussions. Loveofbenevolence for one- self is willing one’sown happiness (or lovefrom others), and this is apermanent and acceptable part of humanity;self-conceit,bycontrast,isamorallyreprehen- sible, delusional delight [Wohlgefallen]taken in asense of special self-worth in comparison with others. Self-conceit arises when one makes the self-loveofbe- nevolence an unconditional law. Rational self-love,onthe otherhand,refers to 20 1Self-Love the middle level of self-loveunder moral conditions:itisprudencelimited by morality(love of benevolence) or moral self-contentment(loveofdelight). Third, Iconsider what would happen to self-loveinthe ideallyrational state of moral existence, wherethe highestgood as moralhappiness is realisedas closelyaspossible. Here, Iargue that because the end of morality will necessa- rilyinvolve happiness,itfollows that self-benevolence and moral self-content- ment will be present in the infinite approximation towards the highest good. I don’tsee away to conceive of morallydeserved happinesswithout including some kind of self-benevolence or moral self-contentment,both of which can ar- guablybecashed out in terms of self-love. Hence, the three levels of self-lovein my interpretation consist of: 1) animal mechanicalself-love; 2) the middle level or general division of self-love; and 3) self-loveand the highest good. Ithus arguethatwhile there is an important sense in which self-loveisin tension with morality and constitutes an obstacle to moral progress,itisanir- replaceable component of human existence. In Kant’smoral thought,there is no prescription (or even possibility) of atype of agencythat is completelystrip- ped of self-love(even though unselfishacts mayvery well be commanded). Self- lovecuts through the ascendinglevels of the cognitive structure of the moral agent and can also be used to illuminatethe notion of moral progress from a broader species perspective.Although the third and highest level of self-love is of course idealised, it functions in my argument to illustrate the persistence of self-loveinthe infinite approximation to the highest good. No matter how closelythe moral happiness of all rational creatures is realised, the Kantian agent will still retain some minimum of an attitude of lovetowardsherself. Overall, then, the three-level interpretationofself-lovehas two exegetical functions: 1) it outlines the first relatively comprehensive analysis of the concep- tual structure of self-loveinKant,and 2) it serves as apreliminary for the ascent view of Kant’sconception of loveasawhole.

1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love

We cry for and flee from fire. We cravesex, even without seeing or thinking of anyone in particulartohavesex with. We will do almost anything to keep our children alive.Weare drawntoothers of our kind for warmth, shelter,and ac- ceptance. These notions clearlyexpress fundamental human – desires that members of our species tend to share. But are these desires expressions of love?And if so, how? Kant does think thatcrude self-preservation, sexuality and care for offspring, and our instinctive attractiontoother human beingscan be discussed in terms of 1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love 21 love. But these loves, at their natural core, are not Kant’susual concern when he talks about love. They are not his concern when he writes in the Religion: ‘Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into loveofbenevolence and loveof delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.’ (R,6:45.22–25)³ As such, the crude natural loves, as funda- mental impulses of desire, operate completelyirrespective of reason. They are non-rational, and they are neither benevolence nor delight.Given thatthe first major claim of my book is that the general division of loveinto loveofbenevo- lence and loveofdelight is akey to understanding loveinKant,itmay seem pe- culiar that Ibegin the overall argument by pointing to alove(or aset of loves) that is not grasped by the general division of love. Iseem to begin with acounter- example to what Iwish to arguefor.But while the general division of loveisin- deed akey to understanding loveinKant,itdoes not follow that the concept of loveinKant is completelyreducible to the general division. This leavesuswith the problem of how to understand thoseloves that Kant discusses as lovebut that do not fall into the general division of love. It is this task that Iwillnow un- dertake with respect to the ‘lowest’ possible level of human existence. The main point of the first section is to show that Kant thinks of the strongest impulses of human nature in terms of love. Together,these non-rational drives maybeidentified as animal mechanical self-love. But to say just that is not very conducive to understanding Kant’sview. While the main point is necessary for the argument of this chapter (and for the ascent model of loveinKant as a whole), it is equallyimportant to ask what Kant means when he speaks of loveashedoes. In particular,there are two questions Ifind pressinginthe con- text of animal mechanicalself-love. Whydoes Kant call these non-rational drives ‘love’ in the first place? And what does he mean when he says that animal me- chanicalself-loveisa‘predisposition to the good’?Inthis section Iprovide some answers to these questions. In the first part of Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason,Kant asserts that there is an ‘original predisposition to good in human nature’ (R, 6:26.2–3⁴;see also 6:43.18 – 21). The original predisposition to the good consists of three aspects of the human being (or the whole species)⁵ in an ascending order:1)animality (life);2)humanity (rational life); and 3) personality (rational responsible life). The third predisposition is about morality,which is not my con-

 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt,sokann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollensund des Wohlgefallens (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheiltwerden, und beide müssen (wie sich von selbst versteht) vernünftigsein.’  ‘ursprünglichen Anlage zum Guteninder menschlichenNatur.’  See R, 6:25.17– 20. 22 1Self-Love cern at this particular point,but the first two are explicitlyarticulatedinterms of self-love. The first is about non-rationalanimal self-love, and the second is about aself-lovefor which reason is required. Because the latter is relevant to under- standing the former,Iwillreturn to it later on in the section. With regard to the first predisposition, Kant writes:

1. The predisposition to ANIMALITY in the human beingmay be broughtunder the general title of physical and merely mechanical self-love, i.e. alovefor which reason is not re- quired. It is three-fold: first,for self-preservation; second,for the propagation of the spe- cies,through the sexual drive,and for the preservation of the offspringthereby begotten through breeding; third,for community with other human beings,i.e.the social drive. (R,6:26.12–18)⁶

As this passageclearly shows, Kant thinks thatcertain non-rational animal drives – self-preservation, sexuality and parenting,and sociality – are species of ‘self-love’.But whydoes Kant use the word ‘love’ at all in this context?⁷ He speakselsewhereof‘loveoflife’ [Liebezum Leben]and ‘sexual love’ [Liebe zumGeschlecht]inthe context of depicting ‘the strongest impulses of nature’ [die stärksten Antriebe der Natur], linking loveoflife to self-preservation and sex- ual lovetothe preservation of the species (AP, 7:276.28–33). In one sense it is obvious whyKant might use the word ‘love’ in the context of sexuality:there has been aclose association between loveand sexuality ever since the ancients, as Eros,which is traditionallyusedtodepict sexual desire, is preciselyanele- mentary notion of love. Another well-documented point in the literature con- cerningthe original predisposition in the Religion is the observation that Kant owes much of his discussion to Rousseau(e.g. DiCenso2012,p.48; Pasternack 2014,p.94; see alsoWood 2009,pp. 127–128)⁸.Inthe Discourse on the and Sciences,for example, Rousseaufamouslyholds thatthe human beingisnatu-

 ‘1. Die Anlage für die THIERHEIT im Menschen kann man unter den allgemeinen Titel der physischen und bloß mechanischen Selbstliebe, d.i. einer solchen bringen, wozu nicht Vernunft erfordert wird. Sie ist dreifach: erstlich zur Erhaltung seiner selbst; zweitens zur Fortpflanzung seiner durch den Trieb zum Geschlecht und zur Erhaltung dessen, was durch Vermischung mit demselben erzeugt wird; drittens zur Gemeinschaft mit andern Menschen, d.i. der Trieb zur Gesellschaft.’  Even though the predispositions to the good have receivedattention in the literature(e.g. Wood 1999,pp. 118–120, see also pp. 210 –212; Palmquist 2009,pp. xxiv–xxv;DiCenso 2012, pp. 46–50;Pasternack 2014,pp. 93 – 96), to my knowledge,their status as love has not been ex- amined previously. The new Kant-Lexikon (Willachek et al. (Eds.), 2015) omits the predisposi- tions (R,6:26) altogether from the article on Selbstliebe.  Interestingly,J.B. Schneewind views animal mechanical self-love as reminiscent of ‘the Stoic view of our initial tendency toward self-preservation.’ (Schneewind2009,p.107) 1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love 23 rallygood, and that developments in the arts and sciences cause moral degen- eration (Rousseau1997[1750], pp. 4–28). In the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men he states: ‘Man’sfirst sentiment was that of his existence, his first care that for his preservation.’ (Rousseau1997 [1755],p.161)Rousseaudistinguishesbetween two typesofself-love: amour propre and amourdesoi-même. Amourdesoi-même is ‘anatural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation, and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity,produces humanityand virtue.’ (Rous- seau1997, p. 218) Amour propre,onthe other hand, originates in , makes people prefer themselvestoothers, inspires evil, and is also ‘the genuine sourceofhonour’ (Rousseau 1997, p. 218). So thereisarelatively easy answer to the question: ‘Whydoes Kant call these drives(self‐)love, if he does not think of them in terms of his general division of love?’ The easy answer is thatsexuality has been called loveeversince the dawn of our culture, and the rest he just picks up from Rousseau. But there is amoreinteresting answer,Ithink,which does not avoid making referencetothe ancients but is not similarlyreliant on Rousseau’sinfluence. The fact that Kant calls the animal impulses lovemay also be explained in terms of another,moregeneral of lovethat has been with us at least since Plato. This paradigm of lovecan be called love as desire,and its origins trace back to Socrates’ speech in the Symposium,wherethe loveobject is by definition something thatthe lover desires (and, accordingtoSocrates,lacks) (see Plato 2006,200a–201a). ForKant,the drivesofanimal mechanical self-loveare direct- ly connected to what he calls the faculty of desire [Begehrungsvermögen]. It is through the notion of desire and its connection to the classicalparadigmof love as desire that we can shed light on the statusofthese impulses as love. Further down in the Religion,Kant explains that ‘thereisnoquestion here of other predispositions except thosethatrelateimmediatelytothe faculty of de- sire’ (R,6:28.22–23)⁹.By‘the facultyofdesire’,Kant is referringto‘abeing’s fac- ulty to be by means of its representationsthe cause of the of the objects of these representations.’ (C2, 5:9fn.¹⁰;see also MM, 6:211; 20:206) Kant divides de- sire into lower and higher faculties;where the lower faculty is sensuous, the higher facultyisassociatedwith pure practical reason (C2, 5:24–25). All living beingsact in accordance with the of the faculty of desire (C2, 5:9fn.), and as such, animal desire is necessitated by mechanisms of nature in contrast

 ‘hier vonkeinenandern Anlagendie Rede ist,als denen, die sich unmittelbar aufdas Begeh- rungsvermögen […]beziehen.’  ‘das Vermögendesselben [eines Wesens], durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache vonder Wir- klichkeit der Gegenständedieser Vorstellungen zu sein.’ 24 1Self-Love with the morallawsoffreedom (see LE,27:344;C2, 5:95–97). Moreover,the fac- ulty of desire is connected to pleasure and displeasure (see LE, 27:344;C2, 5:95– 97;MM, 6:211–213; cf. Frierson 2014,p.99).¹¹ In atypical case of a ‘lower’ desire, for example adesire for chocolate (or for eating chocolate), we represent (eating) chocolateassomething pleasurable, and the facultyofdesire motivates us to the action of eating chocolate, or in otherwords, it motivates us to be the cause of the reality of the pleasure of eating chocolate. But the animal impulses go cognitivelyevenlower than that.InAnthropology from aPragmatic PointofView,Kant speaksofthe relationship between animality and the objects of desire in terms of instincts: ‘the inner necessitation of the faculty of desire to take possession of this object before one even knows it,isinstinct (like the sex- ual instinct,orthe parental instinct of the animal to protect its young,and so forth).’ (AP, 7:265.23–26)¹² It therefore seems that the primitive nature of desire in animal mechanical self-lovecan be understood such that acquaintance with an object is not even required for the impulse to be operative,and even when one encounters an actual object (sayfood or asexuallyattractive other), the satisfaction of the animal impulse does not requirethatone be able to form aconcept of the object. In the early ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautifuland Sublime’,¹³ Kant speaks of aman who loves women onlyas‘thingsthat are to be enjoyed’ [genießbare Sachen](2:208.3–5) and who is capable of enjoying gratification

 ForKant’sgeneral threefold classification of the faculties of the human intocognition, the feelingofpleasure, and desire,see (C3, 5:178; 20:206). Basically, through cognition we en- counter objects in the first place, through desireweactualise certain objects,and through pleas- ure we have feelings for the objects (cf. Frierson 2014,p.99). Frierson notes: ‘Human action is caused by desire,which is caused by pleasure, which is caused by cognition.’ (Frierson 2014, p. 99) This maybethe case with the lowerfaculty of desire, but in the case of the higher faculty of desire pleasurecannot precedebut can onlyfollow the determination of the faculty of desire (MM, 6:212.27–213.2; see also 5:24.32– 40). Frierson’sfocus is on empiricalpsychology,which mayexplain whyherelates the higher faculty of desire not to purepractical reason (C2, 5:24.35–36) or purerational principles (MM, 6:212.31) but morelooselyto‘character’ and ‘max- ims’.According to Frierson, the higher faculty of desirecan have empirical determininggrounds, as in the case of a ‘ whosmokes [cigarettes] from principle’ (Frierson 2014, pp. 99–100). This reading contradicts Kant’saccountofthe higher faculty of desireaslaid out in his moral philosophy(cf. MM, 6:426.20 –26).  ‘die innere Nöthigung des Begehrungsvermögens zur Besitznehmung dieses Gegenstandes, ehe man ihn noch kennt,der Instinct (wie der Begattungstrieb, oder der Älterntrieb des Thiers seine Jungezuschützen u. d. g.).’ Notethat here, the ‘object’ seems to refer to another living creature as such rather than the pleasuretakenininteractingwith it.This is an ambiguity that Kant does not clarify in his discussions of desire.  ‘Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen’. 1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love 25

‘without ever having to others or even being able to formany concept of others’ (2:208.6–9)¹⁴.The feeling this man enjoys ‘can occur in complete thoughtlessness’ (2:208.14– 15)¹⁵.Despite the slight differenceinterminology, the example seems to match what Kant says about instincts in the Anthropology quite closely. As non-rational and instinctive,animal mechanicalself-love(as in the case of the sexual impulse) operates thoughtlessly, without acknowledging the personhood of others, indeed even without aconcept of others. In terms bor- rowed from Rae Langton, animal mechanical self-lovecan give rise to (Langton 2009,p.316,see also pp. 325ff.)¹⁶,wherethe agent lets the rudimentary desires intrinsic to animal life override reason and understandingand ends up taking no account of the ends or the personhood of others, or her own person- hood. This is how various can become grafted onto animal mechanicalself- love.¹⁷ The animal within us is consumed by desire. It is drawntoothers, but it does not understand that others exist as separate from itself,and it knows nothing of the moralvocation of the organism of which it is aconstitutive part.The animal within us does not understand that others set ends autonomouslyand that they have acapacity to be happy. Thishelps to explain what puts the love in animal

 ‘ohne daß sie anderebeneiden dürfen oder auch vonandern sich einen Begriff machen können’.  ‘bei völliger Gedankenlosigkeit statt finden können.’  Langtonuses the term mainlyinthe contextofsexuality and attaches it specificallytosome of Kant’sdiscussions of sexual desireorsexual love(see LE, 27:384ff.; Langton2009,p.316). I discuss the issue of sexuality further in ch. 2.  These arevicesofcrudeness[Rohigkeit], such as gluttony[Völlerei], lust [Wollust], and wild lawlessness [wilde Gesetzlosigkeit](see R, 6:26.18 – 27.3;cf. MM, 6:424– 427). Because Ihavechos- en to outline the general conceptual structureofself-love, and because my main focus is under- standingthe broadest conceptual divisions of loverelated to it,itisnot possible for me to an- alyse specific vices(or the duties to which they areopposed) in detail. Since ‘self-love’ is the general term in Kant’smoral philosophytowhich the moral incentive and the overall framework of duties is contrasted, the points of contact between self-loveand duties would be overabun- dant consideringmyaims.Thereare specific negative duties against , unnatural sex, glut- tony,and the misuse of substances, which are connected to the animal natureofthe human being(MM, 6:421– 427). Kant insists that these duties aregrounded in the (not animal nature)(see MM, 6:422.31–423.6; 6:425.23–26;6:427.5 – 19;GW, 4:429.15–25; 4:425.12–27;4:421.24–423.14). The success of his various arguments has been widelydebated in the literature(for suicide,see e.g. Paton 1947, pp. 150 –154;Korsgaard 1996,pp. 87– 92; Wood 1999,pp. 84–86;Allison 2011, pp. 183–184;cf. Timmermann 2007,p.81; for unnatural sex, see Denis 1999 and Soble 2003). Here, Icannot add anythingnew to these debates, and aproper attempt to do so would throw me off course with respect to my chosen focus on seeking out and clarifyingthe most general divisions of (self‐)loveinKant. 26 1Self-Love mechanical self-love: animal mechanical self-loveisaform of self-centred or species-centred desire that does not take others into account.Itisakind of lovebut not acaseof‘true love’ [wahreLiebe](see 8:337. 33 – 34), which would requirereason and respect. We know that Kant grounded the moral good in pure practical reason and viewed rationalityasthat which distinguishes humanityfrom animality.How, then, is animal mechanicalself-loveapredisposition to the good? Scholarlydis- cussion on this topic would appear to be scarce. In particular, previous commen- tators do not problematise the notion of apredisposition to the good in relation to animal mechanical self-love; they simply tend to assume thatanimal mechan- ical self-loveisgood without explaining how this could be so.¹⁸ Before moving on to analyse the middle level of self-loveinmore detail, let us pause to consider this question. ‘Predisposition’ [Anlage]isoriginallyaterm from biology(seeShell 2015, p. 96). ForKant,apredisposition is anaturalfeature,,orcapacity of an organism (or species) that accounts for its developing in acertain way(see Allison 2009,p.26fn.; cf. Wood 1999,p.211;2009,p.113;see also 2:434 – 435; cf. MM, 6:399.11). In the Religion,Kant writes: ‘By the predispositions of a being we understand the constituent parts required for it as well as the forms of theircombination that make for such abeing.’ (R,6:28.17– 19)¹⁹ If the being is not even possible without agiven predisposition, then the predisposition is original,and if this is not the casethen the predisposition is contingent (ibid., 6:28.19 – 21). As original predispositions, animal self-love, the self-loveofhuman- ity,and personality are all fundamental to the human species. As alreadynoted, even though the predispositions are regularities, they are not static. They are not ready-made, rigid ‘building blocks’ of organisms but insteadinvolvedevelop- mental processes. AccordingtoKant,itisageneral feature of nature (including ) that ‘[a]ll natural predispositions of acreature are determined

 Forinstance, Gordon Michalson claims that: ‘All three predispositions […]are good in them- selves’ and that they ‘effectively constitutethe hand we areinitiallydealt, while […]how we play it depends upon the wayweourselvesintroduce the wild card of freedom.’ (Michalson 1990, pp. 39–40) Stephen Palmquist writes: ‘Animal self-love predisposes livingbeings to do good by causingthem to preservethemselves, propagate the species,and form social groups for mu- tual protection.’ (Palmquist 2009,p.xxiv) In the same vein as Michalson,James DiCenso holds that Kant’s ‘discussion [of the predispositions]starts from an assumption of the goodnessofour natureassuch’ (DiCenso 2012,p.47), whereas LawrencePasternack notes merelythat ‘the Pre- disposition to Animality has akind of innocence’ (Pasternack 2014,p.94).  ‘Unter Anlageneines Wesens verstehen wir sowohl die Bestandstücke, die dazu erforderlich sind, als auch die Formen ihrerVerbindung,umein solches Wesen zu sein.’ 1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love 27 sometime to develop themselvescompletely and purposively.’ (8:18.19–20)²⁰ In the human species, the unfolding of our higher,rational predispositions can only take place through agradual, intergenerational, and indefinitelylong cultural process(8:18–19). As Allen Wood and Paul Guyer remind us, Kant conceives of the natural predispositions of the human species teleologically(seeWood 1999,pp. 209–211; Guyer 2009,p.145). The mature Kant views nature as if it wereasystem of ends or purposes, wherethe natural predispositions of the human being are ultimatelyreferred to our moral vocation, which is connected to the ideal of the completehighest good (the morallydeserved happiness of ra- tional creatures) as the final purpose of the world (seee.g.C3, 5:429.29–32; 5:434–435; 5:451). Naturally, the highest good of the human species cannot be reached in asingle lifetime or by an individual organism. At best,the species can graduallyapproximate the highestgood. But even if we reflect on animal mechanicalself-lovefrom the perspective of our moral vocation, its goodness, or the goodness to which it is predisposed, maystillappear problematic. What exactlyisthe function of this self-love with respect to the good?Inthe second Critique,Kant distinguishesbetween two notions of the ‘good’ in the German language, using ‘das Wohl’ for physical well-being or pleasure and ‘das Gute’ for the moral good (C2, 5:59–60;see also 5:62– 63).²¹ In the Religion (written after the second Critique), it is ‘das Gute’ that appears in the heading of Kant’sdiscussion of the original predisposition. But as animal mechanical self-loveisphysical and not moral, in the light of the second Critique it should be impossiblefor animal mechanical self-lovetobegood [gut] ‘in itself’ or ‘as such’,against the claims of some commentators (see Michalson 1990,p.39; DiCenso2012,p.47). Indeed, Kant is not making the unqualified claim that animal mechanicalself-loveisgood [gut]assuch. HereisKant’s own clarification: ‘All these predispositions in the human being are not onlyneg- atively good (they do not conflict with the moral law) but they are alsopredispo- sitions to the good (they further compliancewith that law).’ (R,6:28.12–14)²² ‘The good’ of which Kant speaks here is clearly the moralgood, but it is not the case that animal mechanicalself-loveis(morally) good in itself. Kant does not elab-

 ‘Alle Naturanlagen eines Geschöpfessind bestimmt,sich einmal vollständigund zweckmä- ßigauszuwickeln.’  Note, however,that even here,whereheexplicitlydefines the concept of the good [das Gute] in terms of morality,heallows the use of ‘good’ [gut]asanadjective in the contextofinstrumen- tallyrational action from empiricaldetermininggrounds (C2, 5:62.30 – 31).  ‘Alle diese AnlagenimMenschen sind nicht allein (negativ) gut(sie widerstreiten nicht dem moralischen Gesetze), sondern sind auch Anlagen zum Guten(sie befördern die Befolgung des- selben).’ Translationmodified followingPluhar. 28 1Self-Love orate on what he means by ‘furthering’ [befördern]the moralgood in terms of animality,but the idea must be that animal mechanicalself-lovesomehow helps, promotes, or facilitates moral progress or the formationofour moral char- acter on the species level. But how? Naturally, animal mechanical self-loveisanecessary condition for anykind of progress on the part of the human species – it concerns the very possibility of our species as such. If the animal within us didn’tstruggle for its ownpreserva- tion, if it wererepulsed by all representations of sex, if it couldn’tcare less about its offspring (if anyevenappeared), and if it were prone to isolate itself com- pletelyfrom others of its kind, therewould be no future for the human being. In this fundamental and necessary sense, animal mechanical self-loveenables moral progress. Admittedly, if the published Anthropology is included as evidence,Kant’s use of the notion of the good in conjunction with animal mechanicalself-love is more ambiguous thanmight be implied by the Religion. In contrasttothe sec- ond Critique’sdistinction between the physical ‘das Wohl’ and the moral ‘das Gute’ (C2, 5:59 – 60), the published Anthropology divides ‘das Gute’ into physical and moral goodness (AP, 7:277.6 – 7)²³.There, in asection titled ‘On the Highest Physical Good’ [von dem höchsten physischen Gut], the animal mechanical im- pulsesofloveoflife (self-preservation) and sexual love(species preservation) are connected with what is physically best for the world [das physiche Weltbeste] (AP, 7:276.28–277. 3):

The strongest impulsesofnatureare love of life and sexual love,which represent the invis- ible reason (of the ruler of the world) that provides generallyfor the highestphysical good of the human race by means of apowerhigher than human reason,without human reason havingtowork towardit. Love of life is to maintain the individual; sexual love, the species. (AP, 7:276.28–33)²⁴

 Sincethe Anthropology contains material from several decades of Kant’sthinking, one could conjecture that this distinctionisaremnant of an earlier period of Kant’sthought. Yetthe sec- tions that contain this use of ‘das Gute’ in the published works arenot to be found in Kant’s earlier lectures on anthropology.This suggests that the material was added, or at least architec- tonicallyreorganised, well after the publication of the second Critique.  ‘Die stärksten Antriebe der Natur,welche die Stelle der unsichtbar das menschliche Ges- chlecht durch eine höhere, das physische Weltbeste allgemein besorgende Vernunft (des Weltre- gierers) vertreten,ohne daß menschliche Vernunft dazu hinwirken darf, sind Liebe zumLeben und Liebe zumGeschlecht;die erstere um das Individuum, die zweite um die Species zu erhal- ten’.Note that it is somewhat unclearwhether unsichtbar refers to the invisibility of the reason or to the invisibility of the process the reason generates. 1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love 29

This does not have to be viewed as conflictingwith the account in the Religion, but it adds another dimension to how animal impulses are predisposed to the good. The physicallygood must be understood in conjunction with pleasure. In the light of this evidence there is alsoasense in which the strongest impulses of human nature (loveoflife and sexual love) are good because they give us pleasure, apparentlyvia good meals (see AP,7:278.10 – 12)and sexual inter- course.²⁵ As alreadymentioned, no progress whatsoever is possibleonthe species level withoutanimal mechanical self-love. This is the bare minimum that Kant must have in mind with respect to the relationship between animal mechanical self-loveand the moral good.²⁶ There may, however,bestrongerconnections.I discuss the issue of sexual lovefurther in ch. 2, but there is another link that can shedlight on animal self-loveaspredisposed to the good. Thislink is the animal impulseofsociality [Gemeinschaft; Gesellschaft](R, 6:26.17– 18)²⁷.The so-

 This passage mayalso raise questions about the roleofGod’sreason in this context. As we areheredealingwith a physical good (pleasure) that human reason does not have to work for (AP, 7:276.30 –31), it seems that Kant’sreference to God’sreason shouldn’t(at least on the face of it) be primarilyunderstood fromthe perspective of the moral postulateofGod. Rather,the ref- erence seems to point towardthe notion of providence [Vorsehung], which Kant makes use of in the philosophyofhistory (see e.g. 8:30.19; 8:121.3; 8:123.23). Interpreted from this perspective, animal mechanical self-love yields physical pleasureaccording to a ‘hidden plan of nature’ [der verborgene Plan der Natur](see 8:272–273), the final purpose of which is the completede- velopment of all our predispositions (see 8:18.19–20). Relatedly, in TheMetaphysics of Morals, loveoflife (self-preservation) and sexual love(species-preservation) areconnectedwith ‘an in- telligent cause’ [der Ursache […] Verstand]interms of the critical teleology (see 6:424.12–18). In the critical teleological framework articulated in the third Critique,all natural purposes must be thought of as if they wereintelligentlycaused (even though we cannot know this theoretically) if they are to be systematicallyconnected to the ideal or the final purpose of the highestgood (the morallydeserved happiness of rational creatures).The reason for this is that Kant thinks that the highest good is possible onlyifGod is postulated (see ch. 3).  In Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy,the first principle of education is to discipline the wildness of animality,and hencethe education related to animality is negative: ‘To discipline means to seek to prevent animality from doing damage to humanity,both in the individual and in society. Discipline is therefore merely the tamingofsavagery.’ (9:449.28–30;see also 9:441.18;9:465.30) / ‘Discipliniren heißtsuchen zu verhüten, daß die Thierheit nicht der Menschheit in dem einzel- nen sowohl als gesellschaftlichen Menschen zum Schaden gereiche. Disciplin ist also blos Be- zähmungder Wildheit.’ This supports the view that animality on its own does not playapositive roleinmoral progress.  In English,this animal impulse might also be termed ‘sociability’,since ‘sociality’ and ‘so- ciability’ arenearlyindistinguishable. Accordingtothe Merriam-Websterdictionary,for in- stance, ‘sociality’ is ‘sociability’,but ‘sociality’ involves in particular ‘the tendency to associate 30 1Self-Love cial impulse connects animal self-lovewith the self-loveofhumanity, and look- ing more closelyatthis connection might help to explain how animal mechan- ical self-loveispredisposed to the good. Letustherefore turn to the predisposi- tion of humanity:

2. The predispositions to HUMANITY can be broughtunder the general title of aself-love which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is, onlyincomparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy.Out of this self-love originatesthe inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others,originallyof course, merely equal worth: not allowinganyone superiority over oneself, bound up with the constant that others might be strivingfor ascendancy; but from this arises grad- uallyanunjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others.(R, 6:27.4 – 12)²⁸

Kant’sdiscussion implies what Icall the actuallyrational ‘middle level’ of self- love, which Idiscuss from amoral theoretical perspective in the second section. Here, the passageinquestion connects particularlywellwith Kant’sphilosophy of history,whereheuses these kinds of terms to discuss the development of human . Animal self-lovemakesusapproach other animalsofour kind for sex and nurturing and to live in their company, but our rational predis- position bringswith it acomparative and competitive drive.Asrational creatures who live in societies, we observeothers and compareourselveswith them. We constantlyevaluate their well-being,their various skills, theirwealth, power, how good they are morally, and so on. We do not want to be worse than others, and we are afraid thatthey will strive to be superior to us. We alsowant them to think well of us. Thisrational but non-moral predisposition of self-lovemotivates us to emulate and compete. It givesrise to social antagonism, which Kant fa- mouslycalls ‘unsociable sociability’ [die ungesellige Geselligkeit](8:20.30)²⁹.In

in or form social groups’.Sincethis belongs to the animal level, Iuse ‘sociality’ for the animal impulse and (unsocial) ‘sociability’ for the social self-lovefor which reasonisrequired.  ‘2. Die Anlagenfür die MENSCHHEIT können aufden allgemeinen Titel der zwar physischen, aber doch vergleichenden Selbstliebe(wozu Vernunft erfordert wird) gebracht werden: sich näm- lich nur in Vergleichung mit andern als glücklich oder unglücklich zu beurtheilen.Von ihr rührt die Neigung her, sich in der Meinung Anderer einen Werth zu verschaffen;und zwar ursprünglich bloß den der Gleichheit: keinem über sich Überlegenheit zu verstatten, mit einer beständigenBe- sorgniß verbunden, daß anderedarnach streben möchten; woraus nachgerade eine ungerechte Begierde entspringt,sie sich über Anderezuerwerben.’  The keytexthere is ‘Idea for aUniversal History with aCosmopolitan Aim’.Kant’sbasic idea of unsocialsociability is not his own invention, and similar notions had been previouslyex- pressed by various authors.Asnotedabove, Rousseau called the self-loverelated to social an- tagonism amour propre (see Rousseau 1997[1755], p. 218; see also 1974 [1762],pp. 173 – 5(begin- 1.1 Animal Mechanical Self-Love 31 unsociable sociability,self-lovedraws us togethertoform communities,and the same self-lovealso threatens to destroy them (see8:20.30 –33). Self-lovecan be a great sourceofevil, asourceofarrogant self-conceit,greed, dominance, tyranny, and ,but competitive antagonismalso drivescultureforward and propels the development of natural human predispositions. The self-loveofhumanitymakes us advance our various talents, taste, and the argumentative skills we need in our quest for knowledge (see Cohen 2014,p.81). It motivates us to emulate the morality of others, and it is generallyasourceofour inclinationfor honour (see Denis 2014,p.200). As Kant explains in ‘Idea for aUniversalHistory with a Cosmopolitan Aim’³⁰,this culturalprocessgrounds aframe of mind ‘which can with time transformthe rude natural predisposition to make moral distinctions into determinate practical principles and hence transformapathologically com- pelled agreement to form asociety finally into a moral whole.’ (8:21.14– 17)³¹ This is at base how the self-loveofhumanityispredisposed to the good. What is particularlyinteresting from the perspective of animal mechanical self-love, and self-loveand lovemore generally, is that the higher (though still physical and not moral) self-loveisrooted in animal sociality.AsWood (2009, p. 115) notes,unsociable sociability is a ‘modification’ of the social animal pre- disposition. Being instinctively drawntoothers grounds rational comparison with others, and the development of comparative self-lovefrom this basis can somehow be morallytransformative at the level of society. Before concluding this section, let us turn to whether this idea can be made sense of by looking at the connection between animal sociality and what Kant calls loveofhonour [Ehrliebe]. AccordingtoKant,the inclination to be equal to others givesrise to emulation, which we ought to cultivateand which ‘serves merelytoeducateour animal nature and make it adequate to humanity, or the intellectual being within us, and to its laws.’ (LE,27:695.17– 20)³² This emu- lative tendencygives rise to loveofhonour (LE,27:695.25–30;see Denis 2014, p. 200). Drawing from previous discussions on this topic (Smit &Timmons 2015;Denis 2014), Iwould suggest that there are twobasickindsofloveofhon-

ningofBook IV)). Formoredetailed accounts of the historical influencesbehind Kant’sidea of unsociable sociability,see Schneewind(2009) and Wood (2009,esp. pp. 114–117).  ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichteinweltbürgerlicher Absicht’.  ‘welche die grobe Naturanlagezur sittlichenUnterscheidung mit der Zeit in bestimmteprak- tische Principien und so eine pathologisch-abgedrungene Zusammenstimmungzueiner Gesell- schaft endlich in ein moralisches Ganze verwandeln kann.’  ‘sie dient nur zur Ausbildung unserer thierischen Natur,und um sie mit der Menschheit oder dem intellectuellen Wesen in uns und dessen Gesetzen angemessen zu machen.’ Translation modified. 32 1Self-Love our in Kant:one physical,the other moral.³³ The first kind is emphasised in Kant’searlier lecturesonethics³⁴,while the latter plays agreater role in his ma- ture moral philosophy. Physical loveofhonour is anatural impulse [Trieb]orin- clination to secure respect and a ‘favourable judgment’ [ein günstiges Urtheil] from others (LE, 27:408.4–5; 27:408.29). Like the other drivesconnected to self-loveand unsociable sociability,loveofhonour has an ambiguous nature. When we takethe judgmentsofothers into account in assessing our own ac- tions, we indirectlypavethe wayfor morality.This loveofhonour is anatural and in itself unselfish (see LE,27:410.30 –31) inclination merelynot to be an ob- ject of contempt (LE, 27:408.35–37). As such, it is not directed to one’sown ad- vantage (27:408.5–7), but it can easilyturninto an ambitious craving for honour, or arrogant self-conceit,such that we come to view others as inferior and think of ourselvesasbeing entitled to their highestrespect.InKant’smature moral philosophy, on the other hand,itisrespect for the moral lawthat grounds loveofhonour.InTheMetaphysics of Morals,loveofhonour is avirtue based on the self-assessmentofour in comparison with the morallaw (MM, 6:420.13–30;see LE, 27:609.5 – 610.9; 27:695– 696; 27:667.12–21). Loveofhonour is also abasic claim to be respectedbyothers because of one’sfundamental standing (and equality with others) as amoral being (MM, 6:464.5– 11;see Denis 2014,pp. 206–207). Themoral loveofhonour is not based on external concern for the opinions of others: ‘Alover of honour finds in himself no need to be known [for his merits]’ (LE, 27:665.6 – 7)³⁵.Hence the two basic kinds of loveofhonour differ from each other with respect to their ground. Even though the physical loveofhonour can be unselfish, it must be classified under self-loveinthe broadest sense because it is based on inclination (and con-

 The analysesofthis topic offeredbySmit and Timmons (2015) and Denis (2014) areextreme- ly helpful.However,neither Smit and Timmons nor Denis make an attempt to connect loveof honour with love’sgeneral framework – i.e. they do not problematise the status of loveofhon- our as love. As with the animal impulsesofself-love,Kant never discusses loveofhonour in terms of the general division of love. Givenmyprevious analysisoflove and desire, we can see whyKant might call the physical loveofhonour ‘love’:asaninclination,itisconnected with the (lower)faculty of desire.Thereisalso along-runninglinguistic involved here: even Aristotle referredtodesire for honour as ‘loveofhonour’ (1984;Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV,1125b1–25;see Denis 2014, p. 203). On the other hand, as Iwill show below,moral love of honour comesclose to respect.  In particular,I’mspeakingabout the Collins notes on ethics.  ‘Ein Ehrliebender findet in sich kein Bedürfnis, bekannt zu sein’. 1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love 33 nected with emulation).³⁶ Moral love of honour,or‘true loveofhonour’ [wahre Ehrliebe](see LE,27:695.26)would seem to be akind of self-respect. Forthe mature Kant,ofcourse,animality cannot serveasthe basis of mor- ality,which must be grounded in pure practical reason. In the Vigilantius notes on ethics, however,true loveofhonour can come about when animal natureis educated by cultivating the natural, inborn tendencytoemulation, such that one learns graduallytotest one’sworth not against others but against the morallaw (LE, 27:695.20 –26). Kant does not elaborate on how one learns this,but it would probablybethrough moral education (see 9:446–449). My conceptual point is that by looking at loveofhonour,itispossibletodetect apredisposition to the good in the animal self-loveofsociality.Through the unsociablysociable self-loveofhumanity, animal sociality connects to loveofhonour and may thus be acontributing factor in the acknowledgment of the fundamental equality of all human beingsasmoral beings. But as Denis (2014, p. 205) warns us, maybe the continuity in Kant’saccounts of loveofhonour shouldn’tbeexaggerated, and my basic claim in this section does not hingeonthis tentative suggestion concerning the role of loveofhonour in mediatinganimality and morality. The bulk of my discussion in this section has been motivated by adesire to understand. Ihavemerelyargued that Kant views the strongest impulses of human nature in terms of love, and that these impulses can be classified under animal mechanicalself-love. Moreover,Iam confident that animal me- chanicalself-loveissomehow apredisposition to the good. The social impulse of animal self-lovegrounds the unsociablysociable self-loveofhumanity, which belongstothe history and teleology of moral progress.Loveofhonour is an interesting notion along this trajectory.Atthe very least,animal mechan- ical self-loveis, for Kant,anecessary condition of the continued survival of our species.

1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love

Ishall now moveontowhat Icall the broad middle level of self-love. The first section alreadyidentifiedthis level from the perspective of the philosophyofhis- tory.Here, my focus will be moralphilosophy. The moralperspective marks the self-lovenormallyreferred to in discussions of self-loveinKant,and it is clearly

 The next section will show,with referencetothe second Critique,that all inclination-based maxims fall under self-love, even if they are not ‘selfish’ in the sense of seekingone’sown ad- vantage. 34 1Self-Love this kind of self-lovethat Kant had the most to sayabout.Inorder to make sense of this notion, Iwill consider the operation of self-loveinthe mature period, fo- cusing on the Groundwork,the second Critique,and the Religion,while also tak- ing into account the Vigilantius lecturesonethics and TheMetaphysics of Mo- rals. Iwill approach this level of self-lovewith an interpretative key provided in the Religion,accordingtowhich loveingeneral, and self-loveinparticular, is divided into two distinct forms or types of love, namelyloveofbenevolence and loveofdelight.For this reason, Iwill begin by groundingmyinterpretation in the Religion and then work my waybackchronologicallythrough the Ground- work and the second Critique. We might call this the general division approach to the middle level of self-love. Considering the overall aims of the present chapter and this studyasa whole, there are three main claims that Ishallargue for in this section: 1) Kant’smoral philosophycontains anotion of self-lovethat requires reason (and thatishencedistinct from and cognitively ‘higher’ than animal mechanical self-love); 2) this self-lovemay be plausiblyinterpreted in terms of the general divisionoflove, such that self-loveismainlybenevolencetoward oneself but also delight in oneself; and 3) while the latter especiallybringswith it the danger of self-conceit [Eigendünkel], which is evil, both forms of loveare acceptable under moralconditions. Itake it thatnone of these claims are trivial, and they maybeevenmore prone to objections thanmyassertions in the previous section. It would be pos- sible to argueonthe basisofcertain passages in the Groundwork that animal me- chanicalself-loveand ‘higher’ self-loveare in fact not distinguishable from each other,and that the general division of loveissimply apeculiarity of the Religion, and not supported by Kant’sother major works.However,Ihope to show that these lines of argumentationwill not work. The textual evidence suggests that Kant developed his account of self-lovesubstantiallyafter the Groundwork, and since the later works are fairlyconsistent in outline among themselves, their picture of self-loveispreferable. This is not to saythatKant essentially changed his mind on self-loveafter 1785 or that the period following the Ground- work was marked by completeuniformity.Iwish onlytosuggest that certain dis- tinctions that we find in laterworks werenot yetclearlyinplace in 1785.Afur- ther possible objection against my claims is that,evenifitweregranted that part of self-loveinvolvesreason and that the general division of lovehas something to do with it,this self-lovestillcontains elements, or some meaning,thatcannot be grasped in terms of the general division. At face , this objection seems to me to be the most promising, and its success hingesonwhether or not the gen- eral division is robust enough to captureKant’smost all-encompassingformula- 1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love 35 tions of self-love, whereself-love informs all instrumentallyrational non-moral activity.Ibelievethe general division is indeed robust at the middle level and that the general division of love, together with the multilevel account of self- love, makes it possibletoharmonise the self-lovediscussed in the Groundwork with the later works while continuingtoappreciate their apparent differences. As mentioned above, in the fourth section of the first part of the Religion (‘Concerningthe Origin of Evil in Human Nature’)³⁷,Kant introduces the idea of ageneral division of love, which is applicable to self-loveinparticular: ‘Likeloveingeneral, self-love toocan be divided into loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evi- dent) must be rational.’ (R,6:45.22–25)³⁸ The first amountstowanting[wollen] thingstogowell [wohl]for oneself, and it is rational insofar as the instrumental reasoningrelated to the pursuit of happiness [Glückseligkeit]orwell-being [Woh- lergehen]isapt.The rational maximsofloveofbenevolence for oneself are non- moral; they subordinate reason to natural inclination. (R,6:45.25–32)Rational loveofdelight,onthe otherhand, has two senses, the first of which coincides with loveofbenevolence: ‘we takedelight in those maxims, alreadymentioned, which have for the end the satisfaction of natural inclination […]and then it is one and the samewith love of benevolence towardoneself’ (R,6:45.35– 38)³⁹. The second sense of loveofdelight for oneself is distinctive and seems to implymorality: ‘Onlythe of self-love, of unconditional delight in oneself (independent of gain or loss resulting from action), is however the inner princi- ple of contentment onlypossiblefor us on condition thatour maxims are sub- ordinated to the morallaw.’ (R,6:45.40 –46.18)⁴⁰ This passagesupports point 1) above: there is some sort of rationalself-love in Kant that is distinct from the wayanimal mechanical self-loveisdescribed (this point is corroborated by the existenceofthe ‘self-loveofhumanity’ dis- cussed in the latter half of the previous section; see R, 6:27.4 – 12). Hence, it maybeproposed that thereare at least two ‘levels’ of self-loveinKant: anon-

 ‘VomUrsprunge des Bösen in der menschlichenNatur.’  ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt,sokann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollensund des Wohlgefall- ens (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheiltwerden,und beide müssen(wie sich vonselbst versteht) vernünftigsein.’  ‘wir uns in jenen schon genannten aufBefriedigung der Naturneigung abzweckenden Maxi- men […]wohlgefallen; und da ist sie mit der Liebe des Wohlwollens gegensich selbst einerlei’. Translation modified.  ‘Allein die Maximeder Selbstliebe des unbedingten (nicht vonGewinn oder Verlust als den Folgen der Handlung abhängenden) Wohlgefallens an sich selbst würde das innerePrincip einer allein unterder Bedingungder Unterordnung unserer Maximen unter das moralische Gesetz uns möglichen Zufriedenheitsein.’ 36 1Self-Love rational level and arational level. WhatIwish to focus on next is claim 2),which concerns the viability of the general division of loveinthis context.Byshowing that the general division of loveisindeed viable, Ihope to provide the necessary conceptual tools for establishing and clarifyingthe meaningof3)–the claim that self-loveisacceptable under moralconditions while self-conceit is evil. In the Groundwork,self-loveisexplicitlycontrasted with respect for the moral law. The latter represents aworth that ‘infringes’ [Abbruch thut]onself- love(GW,4:401.28–29fn.) in the sense that we are to the moral law ‘with- out consulting self-love’ (GW, 4:401.33fn.)⁴¹.When explaining the proper motiva- tional ground of moral action, Kant uses Selbstliebe as ageneral term to capture those motivational grounds that are distinct from morallyadequate motivation. Pure morality abstracts from the presentation of ends, and by implication self- lovecan be seen to refer generallytocases whereanexpected ‘effect’ [Wirkung] of conductismadethe motivational ground of action. It seems to be self-love that informs all our fears and inclinations. (GW, 4:401) In this sense, in the Groundwork picture, self-lovesimplydenotes all of our non-moral interests (see also GW,4:406) – apicture that is consistent with the second Critique. Throughout his writings,Kant assumesthat what human beings(as imperfect ra- tional creatures) naturallydesire is happiness, and hence self-lovemay be iden- tified as the principle of subjective non-moralhappiness.Infact,itisthe name giventothe subjective interest in happiness. But the Groundwork does not clearlydistinguish between rational and non- rational aspectsofself-love. In Section I, ‘preservation’ [Erhaltung]and ‘prosper- ity’ [Wohlergehen]are identifiedasthe constituents of happiness, which accord- ing to Kant is better pursuedwith instinct rather than reason. Here, self-preser- vation (which Kant later calls ‘loveoflife’)isnot distinguished from prosperity in terms of reason, as is the caseinthe Religion (GW, 4:395.4 – 12; R, 6:26.12 – 18; cf. 6:45fn.). However,happiness as the satisfaction of the sum of all one’sincli- nations (GW, 4:394.17– 18;see Timmermann 2007,p.20) in the Groundwork is a purpose that is assumedtobenaturallynecessary in all imperfect rational crea- tures (GW, 4:415.28–33). In other words, even though the distinctionbetween an- imal mechanical self-loveand rationallycomparative self-loveisnot clear in the Groundwork,Kant says neither thatself-loveisnon-rational or irrational nor that it is impermissible as such. We must interpret his idea such that,inthe light of his basic division between natureand freedom/morality,self-loveconcerns our natural inclinations (it flows from the side of nature, as it were) but is entangled in our rational capacities.

 ‘ohne die Selbstliebezubefragen’. 1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love 37

In the Groundwork,the pursuit of happiness comes in the guise of ‘hypothet- ical assertoric imperatives’⁴²,which meansthat the pursuit involves principles or quasi-commands (seeGW, 4:414– 415; cf. 4:418.28–32) stemmingfrom means- end reasoningconcerning the purpose of ‘one’sown greatest well-being’ (GW, 4:416.2)⁴³.Inthis limited and qualified sense,Herbert Paton (1947, p. 91) is cor- rect: self-loveinthe Groundwork is ‘an objective principle of practical reason’,for it is assumedasactual in all finite rational beings. But the ‘objective’ here should not be confused with ‘objectively necessary’ in the moralsense. Self- loveisnot aduty,and as such it is not in the service of morality.Indeed, what is at issue in Kant’sexamples of the specific duties not to commit suicide and not to make false promises is ‘the principle of self-love’ [Princip der Selbs- tliebe](GW,4:422.7; 4:422.24), but the key point is that the self-loveinquestion maynot be universalised (seeTimmermann 2007,p.81). In Kant’sexamples of how the principle of self-lovefunctions in moral life, what we encounter are im- moral instances of self-love. Suppose, for instance, thatIborrowmoney and falselypromise to repayit. This maywell promotemy‘own benefit’ [eigenen Zu- träglichkeit]and ‘future well-being’ [künftigen Wohlbefinden], but if universalised the promise would contradict itself, for then no one would believeothers’ prom- ises (GW, 4:422.15–36).⁴⁴ Self-lovemay be objectivelyactual (its principle is ac- tive in all humans), but it is by no means objectively good (good ‘as such’ or ‘in itself’). Can the natural but rational and principled self-loveofthe Groundwork be interpreted in terms of the general division of lovefound in the Religion?Instan- ces of self-loveinthe Groundwork seem to refer to one’sown happiness or well- being,and in this sense self-loveinthe Groundwork maywellbeviewedalong the lines of loveofbenevolence in the Religion. In short,itconsists in wishing or willing that thingswill go well for oneself. There is no talk in the Groundwork

 According to Kant,arational beingisendowed with awill – that is, the capacity of acting from principles, which arerepresentationsoflaws. Objective principles arerational commands, the formulae of which areimperatives. Imperativesare further divided into hypothetical and cat- egorical; hypothetical imperativesconcernmeans-end reasoning,whereas onlycategorical im- perativesare moral and do not refer to other ends.Hypothetical imperativesare further divided into problematic and assertoric practical principles,where the former concernpossible purposes and the latter actual purposes.Moral imperativesare apodicticallypractical principles. (GW, 4:412– 415) However,hypothetical imperativesare not commands strictlyspeakingbut rather ‘counsels’ [Anrathungen](GW,4:418.31). In the second Critique,the hypothetical imperativesof self-love are, properlyspeaking, theoretical; they merely point out empirical causal connections and do not necessitateuniversallyindeterminingthe will. (C2, 5:25–26)  ‘seinem eigenen größten Wohlseyn’.  Idonot aim heretodetermine whether this argument is ultimatelysuccessful. 38 1Self-Love of anyspecific pleasure or delight takeninthe maxims of self-love, which would seem to exclude the possibility of interpreting the self-loveofthe Groundwork di- rectlyinterms of loveofdelight.Inthe Groundwork,Kant writes that ‘skill in the choice of the meanstoone’sown greatest well-being can be called prudence’ (GW, 4:416.1– 3)⁴⁵,eventhough the subjective concept of happiness cannot be de- termined with completecertainty (GW, 4:418). In the Religion,loveofbenevo- lence is rational if it is ‘consistent with’ [zusammen bestehen]and ‘apt’ [tauglich] with regardstohappiness at the level of one’schoices(R, 6:45.27–30). These ra- tionality criteria seem to match the Groundwork definition of prudence quite closely. Thissupportsthe idea that while the non-rationality/rationality divide in the Groundwork is occasionallyfuzzy when it comes to self-love, the principle of self-lovediscussed in the Groundwork is indeed love of benevolence. Hence, while the general division of self-loveisnot explicitlyoperative in the Ground- work,the principle of self-lovemay be plausiblyinterpreted in terms of it, which lends support to claim 2) above.⁴⁶ Inow moveontothe second Critique. Forexplanatory purposes, we can roughly divide Kant’streatment of self-loveinthis work into two ‘phases’ accord- ing to the function of self-loveinthe discussion. It seems to me that the function of self-loveinthe first chapter of the ‘Analytic’ is more or less equivalent to how self-loveoperates in the Groundwork: accordingtoKant’sdualistic conception of possibledetermining grounds of the will, self-lovefunctions as ageneral term for the determiningground of awill not determined by the moral law(see fig.1). In the third chapter,onthe otherhand,Kant discusses how the morallaw oughtto influencethe will as regards self-love and the moraldanger thatensues if this

 ‘kann man die Geschicklichkeit in der Wahl der Mittelzuseinem eigenen größten Wohlsein Klugheit […]nennen.’ Notethat in this passageKant speaks of prudence ‘in the narrowestsense’ [im engsten Verstande]. It is unclear what the broader sense would be, but Kant explains in a footnotethat prudence divides into ‘worldlyprudence’ [Weltklugheit]and ‘private prudence’ [Pri- vatklugheit]. The former is the skill of usingothers for one’spurposes;the latter,the unification of one’spurposes to one’s ‘enduring advantage’ [daurenden Vortheil](GW,4:416.30 –33). Itake it that private prudenceisthe broader of the two, but this is in tension with the equallyplausible notion that skill or insight [Einsicht]touniteone’spurposes belongs to skill in choosingthe means to one’s ‘own greatestwell-being’ (which is prudenceinthe narrowest sense). (Cf. Kain 2003,pp. 247, 263fn.60)  Notethat even if my interpretation of self-loveinthe Groundwork is rejected, we might still need to accept the general division interpretation of the middle level of self-loveonthe basis of the relative harmonybetween the second Critique and the Religion. In this case, we would need a weighty argument as to whythe doctrine of self-loveinthe Groundwork overrides the combina- tion of the second Critique and the Religion. However,itisdifficultfor me to see how this could be charitable, and Idon’thavesuch an argument in sight. 1.2 The Middle LevelofSelf-Love 39

EMPIRICAL SUPERSENSIBLE GROUNDS GROUNDS

REASON

maxims

SELF-LOVE MORALITY

Figure 1. Determining Grounds of the Will does not takeplace properly(the problem of self-conceit).Iwill now consider both of these ‘phases’ in the light of the general division. The lion’sshare of the first chapter of the second Critique is dedicated to es- tablishingthat the practical principles of self-love(which Kant calls ‘material’) are not the principles generatedbythe moral law(which is ‘formal’).⁴⁷ The basic idea is summarised in Kant’sfamous statement: ‘Allmaterial practical principles as such are,without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-loveorone’sown happiness.’ (C2, 5:22.6–8)⁴⁸ Equallytellingisthe following: ‘The direct opposite of the principle of morality is the principle of one’sown happiness made the determiningground of the will’ (C2, 5:35.7– 8)⁴⁹.Welearn that in the case of self-love, the determining ground of the will always rests on expectations of pleasure or displeasure, ‘agreeableness’ [Annehmlichkeit]or‘disagreeableness’ [Unannehmlichkeit]. The fact thatpleasure is involved makes it plausible to suppose thatthe self-love at issue might be loveofdelight.Thisconjectureissupported by the fact that

 As Jens Timmermann has pointedout to me, the discussionisalso directed against rivaleth- ical schools,most notablythe of (see C2, 5:24.15 – 20).  ‘Alle materiale praktischePrincipien sind, als solche, insgesammt voneiner und derselben Art und gehören unterdas allgemeine Princip der Selbstliebeoder eigenen Glückseligkeit.’ It is importanttonote that the broad formulation of self-loveimplies that even beneficent loveof neighbour,ifbased on inclination, is technicallysubsumed under self-love.However,this does not mean that lovingone’sneighbour out of inclination is selfish; it merely means that in the choiceofthe objectsofbeneficent lovefrominclination we areprone to a ‘second order self-partiality’ (see Wood 1999,p.271). Note also that Kant occasionallydistinguishes be- tween sympathy[Sympathie]and self-love[Philautie](C2,5:85.12).  ‘Das gerade Widerspiel des Princips der Sittlichkeit ist: wenn das der eigenen Glückseligkeit zum Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens gemacht wird’. 40 1Self-Love there are no instances of ‘benevolence’ [Wohlwollen]inthe first chapter of the ‘Analytic’.With this said, is ‘delight’ [Wohlgefallen]mentioned in this context? As Gregornotes, ‘Kant […]usesavariety of words for “pleasure”’ (C2, p. 157fn.a), and words such as Lust, Vergnügen, Zufriedenheit and Wohlgefallen are all quite close to each other. As determininggrounds of the will, they belong to the ‘lower faculty of desire’ [unteres Begehrungsvermögen], as opposed to the ‘higher faculty’ [oberes Begehrungsvermögen], which alone is moral and furnish- ed by pure practical reason irrespective of sensibility.And indeed, under Remark Iofthe basic theorem of self-love(Theorem II), we find achain of signifiers that goes from ‘satisfaction’ [Vergnügen], ‘joys’ [Freuden], ‘amusements’ [Ergötzun- gen]⁵⁰,and ‘enjoyment’ [Genuß]back to ‘satisfaction’ [Vergnügen], and finally the word Wohlgefallen appears (C2, 5:24.11– 12). The point is that even though the pleasures we takein‘overcoming obstaclesopposed to our plans’ (C2, 5:24.4 – 5)⁵¹ are ‘more refined because they are more in our control than others’ (C2, 5:24.6 – 7)⁵²,the determining ground of this delight is nevertheless our own happiness, or the lower faculty of desire – i.e. self-love.⁵³ (C2, 5:24) It thus seems plausible to identify the self-loveatissue in Chapter Iofthe ‘Analytic’ as loveofdelight.But does this createaninconsistency with the Groundwork,whereIidentified self-loveasloveofbenevolence? In both cases, the basic point is clearlythatself-loveand the morallaw constitutetwo opposing grounds of action or determination of the will. How is this apparent similarity regardingthe function of self-lovetobeexplained if we are dealing with twodif- ferent dimensions of the general division of love? Quite easily, Ithink, if we re- call thatKant explains in the Religion that the first sense of loveofdelight is in fact identical to loveofbenevolence (R,6:45fn., see above). In this case, loveof delight simplydenotes taking pleasure in the inclination-based maxims of love of benevolence (insofar as these maxims yield successfulresults) ‘like amer-

 Iherefollow Timmermann’ssuggestion (privatediscussion) when it comestotranslating Ergötzungen. Gregoruses ‘delights’,but this would be confusing as Irender Wohlgefallen ‘de- light’.Inthis context,Gregorhas Wohlgefallen as ‘pleasure’.  ‘Überwindung der Hindernisse, die sich unserem Vorsatze entgegensetzen’.  ‘feinere […], weilsie mehr wie andereinunserer Gewalt sind.’  Cf. (1997, p. 220), whoargues, in asupposedlyKantian fashion, that the instrumental reason related to pursuingour aims shares ‘acommonnormative source’ with moral reason in the of the agent.Eventhough specificallymoral aims also often re- quire auxiliary instrumental reasoning,Ithink that Korsgaard’saccount,atleast from an exeget- ical perspective,does not sufficientlyappreciateKant’sbasic distinction between self-love and the moral lawastwo opposingsources of motivation for action, which he so vehementlyholds in both the Groundwork and the second Critique. Korsgaard’sviews have been forcefullycriti- cised by Camilla Kong (2012). 1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love 41 chant whose business speculations turn out well and who, because of the max- ims he adopted therein, rejoices in his good insight’ (R,6:45fn.)⁵⁴.The fact that Kant identifiesthis taking of pleasure with ‘wanting thingstogowell for oneself’ implies that the notion of pleasure is implicitlyincluded in the loveofself-be- nevolence as such. The general division thereforehelps to make clear that,at ageneral level, the self-loveofthe first chapter of the second Critique is not onlyconsistent with the self-loveofthe Groundwork but can also be viewed as an elaboration of it.⁵⁵ However,inthe ‘second phase’ of Kant’sdiscussion of self-loveinthe sec- ond Critique,thingsbecome exegeticallymorecomplicated.InChapter III, ‘On the IncentivesofPure Practical Reason’ (C2, 5:72.27)⁵⁶,Kant discusses the effects of the moral lawonthe mind as an incentive or ‘spring’ [Triebfeder](seeEng- strom 2010,pp. 91–93). Because Kant’sbasic system of the mental structure of the agent relies on the dualism of the moral lawand sensibility,the effects of the moral lawmust be felt as effects on sensibility.Weknow that allowing the sensuous side of our nature to determine the will is equatedwith self-lovein abroad sense, and thus the effectsofthe morallaw are necessarilyeffects on self-love(inclinations, feeling). Awill determined by the morallaw must reject all such self-lovethat is opposed to the law. In this context,Kant refines the con- ceptual framework of self-love, introducing new systematic distinctions:

All the inclinations together (which can be brought into atolerable systemand the satisfac- tion of which is then called one’sown happiness) constitute regard for oneself (SOLIPSIS- MUS). This is either the self-regard of love for oneself,apredominant benevolence toward oneself (PHILAUTIA), or that of delight in oneself (ARROGANTIA). The former is called, in particular, self-love,the latter, self-conceit. Pure practical reason merely infringesupon self-love,inasmuch as it onlyrestricts it,asnatural and active in us even prior to the moral law, to the condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational self- love. But it strikes down self-conceit altogether […]. (ibid., 5:73.9 – 18)⁵⁷

 ‘wie ein Kaufmann, dem seine Handlungsspeculationengut einschlagen, und der sich wegen der dabei genommenen Maximen seiner guten Einsicht erfreut.’ Pluhar’stranslation.  Iamnot claimingthat the twoaccounts aretechnicallyidentical. Forinstance, thereare dif- ferencesinthe wayKant construes his treatment of hypothetical imperatives, but Icannot dis- cuss these differences in detail here.  ‘Vonden Triebfedern der reinen praktischen Vernunft’.  ‘Alle Neigungen zusammen (die auch wohl in ein erträgliches System gebracht werden kön- nen, und derenBefriedigung alsdann eigene Glückseligkeit heißt) machen die Selbstsucht (SOL- IPSISMUS) aus. Diese ist entweder die der Selbstliebe,eines über alles gehenden Wohlwollens gegensich selbst (PHILAUTIA), oder die des Wohlgefallens an sich selbst (ARROGANTIA). Jene heißtbesonders Eigenliebe,diese Eigendünkel. Die reinepraktischeVernunft thut der Eigenliebe blos Abbruch,indem sie solche, als natürlich und noch vordem moralischen Gesetze in uns 42 1Self-Love

Is thegeneral division of love intoloveofbenevolence andloveofdelightop- erativeinthispassage? Yesand no. WhatKantgenerally callsself-love in other parts of the Groundwork andthe second Critique is nowcalledself-regard [Selbstsucht]. Here,Kantseems to usethe term ‘self-love’ [Selbstliebe,Eigenlie- be]inamorerestrictivesense:self-love ‘in particular’ [besonders]isbenevo- lencetowards oneself, and it is distinguishedfromdelightinoneself, which is ‘self-conceit’ [Eigendünkel]⁵⁸.The basic notions of the general division of love, benevolence anddelight, areexplicitly operative, but ‘self-love’ is here connected only to benevolence.This suggests that loveofbenevolence is a more paradigmatic formofself-love. But what should we make of the fact that delightisdiscussed here not in termsoflovebut in termsofself-conceit, which,asimplied by thecontext,isobviouslyreprehensible? Does this cast doubt on the ‘acceptability-thesis’ of claim3)above, accordingtowhich both benevolencefor oneselfand delightinoneselfare somehow acceptable? Or doesitmean that the delightinoneself thatisunder discussion hereisnot part of self-love? And if delightasself-conceit does notbelongtoself-love, what arethe implicationsfor thesuccess of the general division approach in the particular contextofself-love? Iwilladdress from three different directions the problem of how self-love, delight in oneself, and self-conceit interrelate, which will clarify the status of the general division of loveinthis context and bring to aclose my discussion of the middle level of self-love. These threedirections are 1) the generality of self-love, 2) the problem of rationalityinself-love, and 3) the Vigilantius notes.

1) Firstly, there is asense internal to the second Critique in which both benevo- lence and delight in Chapter III can be, or even must be, interpreted as belonging to self-loveinthe broadest middle-level sense. Kant’sdescription of self-regard as the sum of inclinations (as atolerable system) necessarilyfalls under the basic description of self-lovein‘Theorem II’,whereself-loveincludes ‘all mate- rial practical principles’ (C2, 5:22.6)⁵⁹.Wecan understand the relation between self-regard and self-love(in the broad sense of the second Critique)either such that they are equivalent,insofar as the system of self-loveis‘tolerable’ [erträg- lich], or such that self-regard is aname used for self-lovewhen everything that

rege, nur aufdie Bedingung der Einstimmung mit diesem Gesetze einschränkt; da sie alsdann vernünftigeSelbstliebe genannt wird. Aber den Eigendünkel schlägt sie gar nieder’.  Foranearlier,pre-autonomytreatment of self-loveand self-conceit, see the Collins noteson ethics,whereself-love or philautia is describedasloveofdelight and contrasted with self-conceit (LE, 27:357).  ‘Alle materiale praktischePrincipien’. 1.2 The Middle LevelofSelf-Love 43 falls under self-loveistaken together (seeabove,5:73.8 – 19). In both cases, any instance of benevolence for oneself or delight in oneself is subsumedunder self- love(irrespective of whether the system is ‘tolerable’). Further along in Chapter III Kant explains that self-loveisthe propensity to turn ‘subjective determining grounds of choice into the objective determiningground of the will in general’, whereas ‘if self-lovemakes itself lawgiving,itcan be called self-conceit.’ (C2, 5:74.15 – 19)⁶⁰ The latterpassageconfirms that self-conceit belongstoself-love: it is self-lovethatarrogantlytakes the place of the moral law.⁶¹ Thus the fact that Kant distinguishes between self-loveand self-conceit cannot as such be taken to warrant the interpretation that the latter does not belong to the former. The viability of the general division approach is not threatened on the mere basis of the existenceofsuch adivision.

2) In the light of the second Critique and the Religion,wenow have at least three different senses of ‘rational self-love’,which mayormay not turn out to be equiv- alent.Inthe Religion,loveofbenevolence as willing one’sown happiness is ‘ra- tional to the extent that with respect to the end onlywhat is consistent with the greatest and most abidingwell-beingischosen,and that also the most apt means for each of these components of happiness are chosen.’ (R, 6:45.27–30)⁶² In the second Critique,loveofbenevolence is rational when it is ‘infringed’ by the morallaw ‘to the condition of agreement with this law’ (C2, 5:73.15 – 17)⁶³.Ifweinterpret consistency ‘with the greatest and most abiding well-being’ as implying that one does not act immorally, then the two senses of rational loveofbenevolence in the Religion and the second Critique can in- deed be viewed as equivalent.This would implythat they coherewith the pru- dence discussed in the Groundwork and that Kantian prudence as such implies

 ‘den subjectivenBestimmungsgründen seiner Willkür zum objectivenBestimmungsgrunde des Willens überhaupt’ / ‘welche [die Selbstliebe], wenn sie sich gesetzgebend und zum unbe- dingten praktischen Princip macht, Eigendünkel heißen kann.’  The self-love that serves as the ground of self-conceit can now be viewed as either loveof benevolencetowardoneself (wantingthings to go well for oneself)orloveofdelight as taking pleasureinthe maxims of the former (whichwould amount to the same thingastheformer on the basis of the Religion). Fordetailed discussions of self-conceit, see Reath (2006,pp. 14– 17, 23–25), Engstrom (2010), and Moran (2014).  ‘vernünftig, als theils in Ansehung des Zwecks nur dasjenige,was mit dem größten und dauerhaftestenWohlergehen zusammenbestehen kann, theils zu jedem dieser Bestandstücke der Glückseligkeit die tauglichsten Mittelgewähltwerden.’  ‘Abbruch thut’ / ‘aufdie Bedingung der Einstimmung mit diesem Gesetze’. 44 1Self-Love amoral side constraint: the prudent agent does not act immorally.⁶⁴ This inter- pretation is charitable, for it renders the mature period consistent in this respect. But the interpretation is not necessary,and the text remains ambiguous. It is equallypossible that thereare two different rationalitycriteria for love of benev- olence, such that rationalityimplies mere instrumentality irrespective of morali- ty in the case of the Religion (and, supposedly, the Groundwork)and the ‘stron- ger’,morallyconstrained instrumental rationalityappears onlyinthe second Critique. Fortunately, my argument does not hingeonthis point.The third type of rational self-loveconcerns loveofdelight (as distinct from loveofbenevo- lence). In the Religion,the condition of rationality for this self-loveisquite sim- plymorality in the sense in which morality wasfirst opposed to self-loveinthe Groundwork and the second Critique. Forthis reason, Kant has doubts about the appropriatenessofthe term ‘rationalself-love’ in this case:

We could call this lovearational love of oneself that prevents anyadulteration of the in- centivesofthe power of choicebyother causes of contentment consequent upon one’sac- tions (under the name of happiness to be procured through them). But,sincethis denotes unconditional respect for the law, whyneedlesslyrender moredifficultthe clear under- standingofthe principle with the expression rational self-love,when this self-love is how- ever moral onlyunder the latter condition, and we thus go around in acircle (for we can loveourselvesmorallyonlytothe extent that we areconscious of our maxim to makere- spect for the lawthe highestincentive of our power of choice)? (R,6:46.21–30)⁶⁵

Is this the samesense in which rational loveofbenevolence is described as ‘ra- tional’ in the second Critique? Clearlynot,since the rationalitycriterion for ra- tional loveofbenevolence in the second Critique is morality merelyinthe neg- ative sense: reason maystill be used in the service of inclination, and it suffices that the prudential maxim is not contra-moral. Yetthe rational moralloveofde- light in the Religion implies acontentment [Zufriedenheit]thatisonlypossible through ‘unconditional respect for the law’.Itisalso worth noting that in the sec- ond Critique passagequoted above(C2,5:73.9 – 18), ‘self-love’ is not mentioned in

 Note, however,that even in this case thereisnothingmoral about the self-loveassuch. It is just negatively constrained by morality.  ‘Man könnte diese die Vernunftliebe seiner selbst nennen, welche alle Vermischung anderer Ursachen der Zufriedenheitaus den Folgen seiner Handlungen (unter dem Namen einer dadurch sich zu verschaffenden Glückseligkeit) mit den Triebfedern der Willkürverhindert. Da nun das letztere die unbedingte Achtungfürs Gesetz bezeichnet, warum will man durch den Ausdruck einer vernünftigen,aber nur unterder letzterenBedingung moralischen Selbstliebe sich das deut- liche Verstehen des Princips unnöthigerweise erschweren, indem man sich im Zirkel herumdreht (denn man kann sich nur aufmoralische Art selbst lieben, sofern man sich seiner Maxime bewußtist,die Achtungfürs Gesetz zur höchsten Triebfeder seiner Willkür zu machen)?’ 1.2 The Middle LevelofSelf-Love 45 the context of delight in oneself, which is defined as self-conceit.Does this mean that the doctrines of self-loveinthe second Critique and the Religion are incom- patible,oratleast that they cannot be plausiblyharmonised in terms of the gen- eral division of love? No, for in the second Critique we do find anotion of accept- able delight in oneself thatisnot self-conceit and that appears to coincide with the description of moralrational love of delight in the Religion. In the section on the ‘Critical Resolution of the AntinomyofPractical Reason’ (C2, 5:114)⁶⁶,Kant introduces the notion of asatisfaction or delight [Wohlgefallen]inoneself that is not based on material determininggrounds and instead rests solelyonthe di- rect determination of the will by the moral law. (C2, 5:116.25–33)This is ‘content- ment with oneself’ [Selbstzufriedenheit], which is ‘anegative delight in one’sex- istence, in which one is conscious of needingnothing.’ (C2, 5:117. 28–31)⁶⁷ It denotes ‘mastery over one’sinclinations’ [der Obermacht über seine Neigungen] rather than ‘completeindependence’ [gänzliche Unabhängigkeit]from them. (C2, 5:118.26–33)Iinterpret its negativity to mean thatitisadelight that is not based on the positive satisfaction of anyinclination (unlikethe first sense of loveofdelight in the Religion)and merelyfollows from of being able to ‘negate’ inclinations through respect for the moral law. There are thereforetwo kindsofdelight in oneself in the second Critique: self-conceit [Ei- gendünkel]and contentment with oneself [Selbstzufriedenheit]. The former (self- loveasthe unconditional practical principle in C2,5:74.17– 19) is practicallyiden- tical with the Religion’sidea of self-loveasthe spring of evil: ‘self-love[…], when adopted as the principle of all our maxims, is preciselythe sourceofall evil.’ (R, 6:45.14– 15)⁶⁸ Self-contentment in the second Critique comes close to the second sense of love of delight in the Religion,which is also contentment [Zufriedenheit] with oneself through respect for the moral law. Hence, while the conceptual sys- tems of self-loveinthe second Critique and the Religion seem different,these dif- ferences can be considered superficial. The respectivenotions of self-lovecan be harmonised, which provides support for claims 2) and 3) aboveconcerning the

 ‘Kritische Aufhebungder Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft’.  ‘ein negativesWohlgefallen an seiner Existenz andeutet,inwelchem man nichts zu bedürfen sich bewußtist.’  ‘Selbstliebe […], als Princip aller unserer Maximen angenommen, gerade die Quelle alles Bösen ist.’ It now seems to me that the reason self-conceit is not discussed in terms of rational self-love either in the second Critique or in the Religion is that whilethe notion of self-conceit implies the existenceofthe rational capacity (its possibilitybelongs to the predisposition to hu- manity), it involves amorallyimproper use of reason, and in this sense it is irrational. Recall that the ground of evil cannot be located in anatural impulse and that its rational origin remains inscrutable (R,6:32– 43). 46 1Self-Love middle level of self-love: the general division of loveisinoperation, and both loveofbenevolence for oneself and loveofdelight in oneself are acceptable under moralconditions.⁶⁹

3) The Vigilantius notes on ethics from 1793 – 94 corroborate the picture of the middle level of self-loveIhave drawnthus far.Theyexplicitlyconfirm that Kant’suse of the general division is not simply an anomaly found onlyinthe Religion but is rather foundational to how Kant viewed self-loveinthe mature period. They also explain the relation between the conceptual systems of the sec- ond Critique and the Religion. In the Vigilantius notes,self-loveisdiscussed as philautia.Philautia is divided into loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight.It is implied that loveofbenevolence means the inclination or the willtopromote one’sown ends, and there is no reason to view the account as differing signifi- cantlyfrom Kant’sprevious discussions.⁷⁰ Loveofbenevolence is assumedtobe active in all human beings, and it is acceptable. If the duty of lovetowards oth- ers⁷¹ is excluded from consideration, loveofbenevolence is ‘solipsism’ [Solipsis- mus]⁷² or ‘egotism’ [Eigennutz], in which case it becomes amoral flaw. (LE, 27:620)Loveofdelight,onthe otherhand,ismore complex, and as we would assume on the basis of the combination of the second Critique and the Religion,

 In general, the Religion asserts that both loveofbenevolenceand loveofdelight ‘must be rational’.This should now be understood in both adescriptive and anormative sense: these forms of self-loveare rational on their own as amatter of definitional necessity (they imply the level of reason), and they appear under anormative requirement to be harnessedbyreason or made rational. Even if loveofbenevolenceisconstrued as beingcompletelynon-moral, the demand of aptness in instrumental reasoning imposes quasi-normative constraints on the oper- ation of self-love. Love of delight maybemoral as aconsequenceofthe operation of pureprac- tical reason (see also Section III of my Introduction).  In comparison with the second Critique and the Religion,the main shift of emphasis in Kant’s discussionofself-love in the Vigilantius notes(and The MetaphysicsofMorals)isthat whereas self-love (as loveofbenevolence) was previouslymainlyabout the maxims of actions and want- ing things to go wellfor oneself, in the latter twosources philautia is mainlyabout regarding oneself as worthyofbeingloved by others [Liebenswürdig]. Arrogance, on the other hand, is an unwarranted claim to respect,and Ibelieveatleast part of the explanationfor this shift of emphasis has to do with the fact that the distinction between loveand respect has such a prominent placeinthe ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.Sinceself-love (as willingthat things go wellfor me or that others loveme) brings about self-conceit if made an unconditionallaw,itseems that somehow the will to be happy and loved by others bringsabout unjustified claims to respect from others if universalised absolutely(see LE,27:621).  See ch. 4.2.2.  Notethat the notion of Solipsismus seems morerestrictive and negativeintoneherethan in the second Critique (see C2, 5:73). 1.2 The Middle Level of Self-Love 47 three meaningsofloveofdelight can be detected in Kant’streatment.Even though loveofdelight forms the other half of the division of philautia in these notes,itseems that Kant reserves the paradigmatic meaning of philautia for loveofbenevolence.⁷³ The first meaning,inwhich loveofdelight maybeconsid- ered equivalent to loveofbenevolence, is skimmed over in passinginthe very first sentence, the latter part of which alreadyimpliesthe danger of irrational self-conceitedness:1)‘This, too, is philautia,ifitisexclusively entertained to- wards oneself, but also becomes unreasonable’ (LE, 27:621.18 – 19)⁷⁴.Wethen learn that in comparison with others, loveofdelight becomes ‘self-estimation of oneself’ [Selbstschätzung seiner selbst], which has two possible outcomes: 2) ‘arrogance’ [Arroganz]and 3) ‘true self-esteem’ [wahreSelbstschätzung]. (LE, 27:621.26–622.5) The first is afaulty,unjustified claim to respect from others, and giventhat in the second Critique Kant defined self-conceited delight precise- ly as arrogance, we maytakeitthatthis is the samedelight thatwas at issue in Kant’sprevious discussion of self-conceit.This arrogant delight is now discussed explicitlyinterms of loveofdelight.True self-esteem, on the other hand,is based on ‘aclose examination of oneself’ (LE, 27:621.29)⁷⁵ and is onlywarranted on the condition of performing imperfect meritorious duties.Asamorallycondi- tioned and permissible delight in oneself, this corresponds roughlytothe moral loveofdelight in the Religion (which impliesunconditional respect for the moral law) and the negative moral delight of the second Critique (which implies moral freedom or mastery over inclinations).InVigilantius,however,the emphasis shifts from negative to positive: ‘we thereby add asupplementtomorality’ and ‘can thus acquiremerit in relation to others’ (LE, 27:622.17– 20)⁷⁶.There is apositive moraldelight in oneself in Vigilantius,which seems very close to the concept of ‘ethical reward’ in the actual Metaphysics of Morals,areward which is similarlyoccasioned by the performance of wide duties and is ‘a moral pleasure thatgoes beyond mere contentmentwith oneself (which can

 This was the case in the second Critique,where philautia was loveofbenevolenceand dis- tinct fromself-conceited delight (C2, 5:73). This is also the case in The Metaphysics of Morals, where philautia is contrastedwith self-conceit (MM, 6:462.5–10). The Vigilantius notes, however, allow for the construal of false claims of moral in Wohlgefällige Selbstliebe as philautia (LE, 27:624–625). The contextwould seem to implythat this loveofdelight for oneself is in fact the self-conceit of the published works, but my argument does not hinge on this, and Idonot wish to force the interpretation.  ‘Auch diese ist Philautie, wenn sie ausschließend gegensich selbst ausgeübt wird, wirdaber auch vernunftwidrig.’  ‘vorgängiger genauer Prüfungseiner selbst’.  ‘wir geben dadurch der Moralität einen Zusatz’ / ‘Verdienstekönnen wir indeß nur dadurch gegenandereenlangen’. 48 1Self-Love be merelynegative)’ (MM, 6:391.12–13)⁷⁷.Based on the combination of these pas- sages, the interpretation must be thatthereare actuallytwo possibleforms of morallyacceptable loveofdelight in oneself: negative self-contentment and pos- itive moralpleasure from merit⁷⁸ (bothofwhich, however,involve the danger of self-conceit). Let us take stock of what we’ve learned about the middle level of self-love thus far.Ihope to have shown:1)that there is aself-lovethatinvolvesreason (one thatis‘higher’ thanmere animal nature); 2) that even though the concep- tual system of this level of self-lovevaries throughout the mature period, these variations can be made sense of by using the general division of loveinaway that renders the outlinesand main tenetsofKant’sdiscussion (relatively)consis- tent; and 3) thatself-loveis, paradigmatically, an acceptable loveofbenevolence for oneself common to all human beings,but it is also loveofdelight for oneself. Ihavealso shown that loveofdelight maybe1)simplyequivalent to loveofbe- nevolence, or 2) an acceptable moral self-contentment(negative)orself-esteem in afeeling of merit(positive), but it mayalsobe3)self-loveturned into morally reprehensible self-conceit or arrogance. On this basis, the structural outline of the middle level of self-lovemay be presented in the form of adiagram (see fig.2).

1.3 Self-Loveand the Highest Good

We sawabove that the onlykind of self-lovethat Kant explicitlyrejects is self- conceit or arrogance. Self-lovethatismade an unconditional lawis‘the source of all evil’,and the morallaw ‘strikes down’ such self-conceit.But we have also seen that self-loveisscarcelyreducible to self-conceit,and thatthereare various

 ‘einer moralischen Lust,die über die bloße Zufriedenheit mit sich selbst (die blos negativ sein kann) hinaus geht’.  In relation to others,the positive pleasuremight actuallybederivedfromasympathetic re- action to the recipient of the moral action whose happiness is promoted by the virtuous act (see 6:391.16 – 21). Ithank Jens Timmermann for makingmeawareofthis (in privatediscussion). However,Timmermann’sline nevertheless leads to the question of why, then, Kant uses the term ‘moral pleasure’ [moralische Lust], if this pleasureisbased on sensuous sympathy. One clue is that Kant is speakingofmoral pleasurehereinterms of ‘receptivity’ [Empfänglichkeit] (MM, 6:391.11). Moral pleasuremight thereforebeconnected to Kant’sdiscussion of ‘moral feel- ing’ [das moralische Gefühl]inSection XII of the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,where the natural predisposition of moral feelingisdescribedasEmpfänglichkeit to moral pleasureand displeasure(MM, 6:399.19; 6:400.18). Perhapsthe moral pleasurehere is not asympathetic reac- tion but apositive dimension of ‘moral feeling’. 1.3 Self-Love and the Highest Good 49

SELF-LOVE

Loveofbenevolence Love of delight

Benevolence towards oneself1.Pleasureinloveofbenevolence (philautiaproper) (equivalence relation)

2. Moral pleasure (negative&positive, will determined by self-love, but respect for! the law) self-benevolenceasunconditional law 3. Self-conceit (arrogance, philautia) ! Figure 2. The General DivisionofSelf-Love kinds of self-lovethat Kant views as necessary elements of our animal nature (animal mechanical self-love) and our humanity(loveofbenevolence). Arguably, there are also forms of self-lovethat Kant accepts on the basis that they are pro- duced by morality (negative and positive moral loveofdelight). It must therefore be said that anystronginterpretative claim made in direct opposition to self- love, such as Wood’sassertion that ‘love is not an attitude thatclear-sighted and rational people could ever take towardthemselves’ (Wood 1996,p.157), is very difficult to sustain.⁷⁹ It is onlyapplicable to self-conceit,and then the pic- ture of ‘an attitude of love’ becomes implausiblynarrow. But isn’tthere ademand in Kant to the effect thatweshould aim to mitigate or diminish our self-love? As adeterminingground of the will, self-loveisclearly opposed to the morallaw,and it is equallyobvious that we should aim to further and strengthen the position of the moral lawasanincentive to our actions. When speakingof‘lovefor the law’⁸⁰ in the second Critique,Kant proposes that we ought to strive for amoral disposition such thatwehavenoinclinations that are in tension with what moralitycommands.This would be astate of sub- jective moral perfection, whereone’sattitude towards the morallaw would be

 Towards the end of his article, Wood also suggests that ‘Kant holds that people of virtuous disposition will limit their claims on happiness to those of reasonable self-love.’ (Wood 1996, p. 157) However,Wood does not explain whyreasonableself-loveshould not be considered an attitude of lovetowards oneself, and for this reason Iadmit to findingthe main claim of his argument ambiguous.  Idiscuss lovefor the lawindetail in ch. 3.1. 50 1Self-Love not respect but actuallyloveorliking [Zuneigung]. (C2, 5:83 – 84) Insofar as self- loveisageneral name for inclinations and is opposed to the moral lawasade- terminingground of the will, with love for the lawself-loveinthis sense would cease to exist,and lovefor the lawseems to be something that is called for.Sim- ilarly, the Religion asserts that what is required of us is adispositional ‘revolu- tion’ []ora‘changeofheart’ [Änderung des Herzens], which consists in adopting the morallaw as our supreme maxim and agradual and laborious reworking of our conduct on this basis (R,6:47– 48). But does this mean that we ought to getrid of self-love? Or in other words, is there or oughtthere to be an endpoint of human moral progress in which self- loveisnolonger apart of the constitution of our cognitive framework?Idon’t think so. The second Critique discussion of lovefor the lawmakesvery clear that because we are imperfect creatures,lovefor the lawcan never actuallybe achieved. We ‘can never be altogetherfree from desires and inclinations’,and lovefor the lawremains a ‘constant though unattainable goal of […]striving’ (C2, 5:84.4 – 15)⁸¹.Itisofcourse the casethat from adecidedlymoral perspective Kant expresses astrongdislike of inclinations. In the Groundwork,inclinations ‘are so far from having an absoluteworth […]thattobeentirelyfree from them must rather be the universalwish of every rational being’ (GW, 4:428.16–17)⁸².Inthe second Critique,inclinations ‘are always burdensome to arational being’ who wishes ‘to be rid of them’ (C2, 5:118.7–9)⁸³.These state- ments are not surprising,since the basicbusiness of pure practical reason is to disregard inclinations altogether when determiningthe will (seee.g.C2, 5:118.16–18). As alreadymentioned, however,eventhough inclinations can be disregarded in moral decision-making,Kant holds that ridding ourselvesofincli- nations entirelyisnot possible.When he considers the human being more broad- ly – as both amoral-rationaland anatural-physical creature – his tone with re- gardtoinclinations is different.Inthe Religion,heholds not onlythat we cannot rid ourselvesofinclinations but also that we should not: ‘Considered in them- selves natural inclinations are good,i.e.not reprehensible,and to want to extir- pate them would not onlybefutile but harmful and blameworthyaswell; we must rather onlycurb them’ (R,6:58.1–4)⁸⁴.Heclearlydoes not reject inclina-

 ‘niemals vonBegierden und Neigungen ganz frei sein’ / ‘beständigen, obgleich unerreichba- Ziele […]Bestrebung’.  ‘habensowenigeinen absolutenWerth […]daß vielmehr,gänzlich davonfreyzuseyn, der allgemeine Wunsch eines jeden vernünftigenWesens seyn muß.’  ‘sind sie einem vernünftigenWesen jederzeit lästig’ / ‘ihrerentledigt zu sein’.  ‘Natürliche Neigungen sind, an sich selbst betrachtet, gut,d.i. unverwerflich, und es ist nicht allein vergeblich, sondern es wäreauch schädlich und tadelhaft,sie ausrotten zu wollen; man 1.3 Self-Loveand the Highest Good 51 tions or self-loveassuch. Kant understands full well that although we have a moral vocation, we are also natural creatures.Eventhough all inclinations lack moral worth and anyinclinationcan be contra-moral at the token level⁸⁵, some inclinations, such as sexual inclination, can be viewed as predisposed to the good at least in the sense of being necessary for the continued survival of the species. Some inclinations can even be beautiful results of moralaction (such as the benevolent inclinationoflovetowards others that arises from being beneficent to others from duty) (C2, 5:82.18–20;MM, 6:402; seech. 4 below). Itherefore think that aiming for ‘love for the law’ does not constitute ademandnot to have inclinations at all; rather,itinvolvesstrengthening the moral incentive within us so thatinclinations have less power over us. This moral striving also involves the cultivation of at least some inclinations (such as the inclination of benevolence for others), to the end that our emotional dis- positions harmonise with moral demands (see ch. 4.2.2.A).Strivingfor amorally better character thereforemeans making the moral lawthe supreme incentive in the sense that it is capable of overriding self-love.⁸⁶ There is thus no real demand in Kant’smoral philosophytoeradicate self- lovefrom our lives. Themost precise formulations of the thoughtthatself-love should be limited or conditioned can be found in the second Critique and The Metaphysics of Morals. The wayinwhich it is permissible to make self-loveor loveofbenevolence lawlikefor ourselvesisbylimiting the maxim of our own happiness with the happiness of others. We can call this the universalisability condition of the maxim of one’sown happiness. My own happiness ‘can become an objective practical lawonlyifIinclude in it the happiness of others.’ (C2, 5:34.31–32)⁸⁷ In this case, as we learn from the second Critique,self-lovemay ac- quire ‘objectivevalidity’ [objective Gültigkeit], as the determiningground of the will is not self-lovebut the lawful form, through which self-loveislimited and the notionofhappiness is applied to all finite beings. In TheMetaphysics of Mo- rals,wefind amirror imageofthe same idea, now concerning ‘practical love’,or the groundingofthe duty of active rational benevolence toward others [Liebedes

muß sie vielmehr nur bezähmen’. ‘Curbing’ or taming [bezähmen]our inclinations successfully is once againcalled ‘prudence’ [Klugheit](R, 6:58.7). Notealso that the ‘goodness’ of inclinations is not unqualifiedbut merelynegative: they are not ‘reprehensible’.  Ithank Jens Timmermann for remindingmeofthis. Consider,for example, afather who(out of inclination-based benevolent love) rushes to buy abirthdaypresent for his child and on his waytothe toystore neglects to help someone whoisdrowninginanearby pond.  This general view is inspiredbyBaron (1995).  ‘kann nur alsdann ein objectives praktisches Gesetz werden, wenn ich anderer ihre in die- selbe mit einschließe.’ 52 1Self-Love

Wohlwollens]. Assumingthatself-loveisauniversal aspect of humanity,itisnow the case that in order for there to be aduty to loveothers practically, one must include oneself in the universalisedmaxim of loveasanobject of love:

Iwant everyone else to be benevolent toward me (BENEVOLENTIA); henceIought also to be benevolent toward everyone else. But sinceall others with the exception of myself would not be all,sothat the maxim would not have within it the universality of alaw,which is still necessary for imposingobligation, the lawmakingbenevolenceaduty will include myself, as an object of benevolence, in the command of practical reason.(MM, 6:451.4–10)⁸⁸

Kant explains that the abovedoes not make self-loveaduty but merely ‘permits’ [erlaubt]self-love[Liebe des Wohlwollens]onthe condition of one’s ‘being benev- olent to every other as well’ (MM, 6:451.16–17)⁸⁹.Thus the moral permissibility of self-loveasloveofbenevolence depends on adopting the maximofpractical loveofbenevolence towards others (I discuss practical love in more detail in ch. 4.2.2).⁹⁰ But still, the more virtuouswebecome, the less we will entertain self-regard- ing inclinations, and the more we will be dedicated to pursuing our imperfect duties of love towardsothers. Is there some sort of limiting value in our striving to approximate the highest good as our ownmoral perfection⁹¹ – alimiting value wherethe maximofpractical lovetowards others has taken over and the maxim of self-lovehas been reducedtosome absoluteminimum,such that it onlycon- tinues to exist as apart of the formal condition of our duty to loveothers? In the second Critique,the highest good is defined from the perspective of the agent.Itcontains the moral lawasits determiningground or supreme con- dition (C2, 5:109) and consists of two elements: virtue (morality) and happiness. Virtue and happiness have to be combined in the concept of the highest good, but as they rely on basically opposing principles (those of moralityand self-

 ‘Ich will jedes Anderen Wohlwollen (BENEVOLENTIA)gegen mich; ich soll also auch gegen jeden Anderen wohlwollend sein. Da aber alle Andere außer mir nicht Alle sein, mithin die Max- ime nicht die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes an sich haben würde, welche doch zur Verpflichtung nothwendig ist: so wirddas Pflichtgesetz des Wohlwollens mich als Object desselben im Gebot der praktischen Vernunft mit begreifen’.  ‘unter der Bedingung,daß du auch jedem Anderen wohl willst’.  Forfurther discussion of the problem of self-benevolenceinthis context,see Schönecker (2013,pp. 334– 339).  Thereare several aspects of the highestgood, which Iwill discuss in moredetail in chs. 3 and 5. 1.3 Self-Love and the Highest Good 53 love, respectively), their combination is very difficult to conceive.⁹² Kant thinks that if aconcept includes two determinations that are necessarilycombined in the concept (as must be the casewith the concept of the highest good), the de- terminations must be thoughtofinterms of ‘ground and consequent’ [Grund und Folge]. AccordingtoKant,this kind of connection is either alogical (analytic) or acausal (synthetic) connection. (C2, 5:111.6–10) Because the two principles in question are heterogeneous, Kant holds thattheircombination cannot be thoughtofanalytically(in terms of identity) but must be asyntheticrelation of cause and effect.This implies that the purelyintellectual morallaw must be conceivedasacause of sensiblehappiness.For this to be possible, it must be assumed that one’smoral disposition belongsboth to the ‘noumenal’ realm and to the empirical realm of appearances,for happiness as asensibleef- fect requiresthat its cause be empirical. (C2, 5:111–115) Thetype of satisfaction, or the ‘analogue of happiness’ [Analogon der Glückseligkeit](C2,5:117.27), that maycome about this wayispreciselythe delight that Ipreviouslyidentified (drawing on the Religion)asnegativemoral love of delight in oneself. It is the morallyacceptable self-contentment felt upon being ‘free from inclinations’ in the sense of being able to override them morally. This type of self-lovewould thereforebeapart of aworld in which the highest good, as the subjective com- bination of virtue and happiness, has been realised. It seems possible, however, that abeing thatnolonger had anyinclinations that rancontrary to the moral lawwould lose its ability to feelsatisfaction in being able to override them (but Kant does not address this issue). Recall, moreover,that the evidence Ipro- vided for the interpretation that the negative delight of the second Critique is in fact self-loveisindirect⁹³.Inthe Religion,Kant both defines moraldelight in one- self as self-loveand expresses doubts about calling it self-love. The aboveconsiderations to the side, insofar as the highest good involves one’sown happiness and the happiness of others (whichitmust),itnecessarily involves self-love. If we conceive of aworld (or better,aninfinite approximation towards aworld) whereour selfish inclinations have been reduced to an absolute minimum,there must still be something that makesushappy.Where can this happiness come from?Since happiness accordingtoKant’sparadigmatic defini- tion is the sum totalofsatisfied inclinations, it seems to me that the first main

 Kant calls this the antinomyofpractical reason.For apessimistic view of his discussion, see Beck (1960,pp. 245–247). Here,myintention is not to workwith the details of the antinomyas such but onlytofurther articulatethe roleand structureofself-loveinrelation to it.  The basis of the identificationwas that the second sense of loveofdelight in the Religion was Zufriedenheit in oneself based on respect for the moral law, and the second Critique spokeofa Wohlgefallen that was also Zufriedenheit in oneself and also based on respect for the law. 54 1Self-Love candidate for apossiblesourceofhappiness is animal mechanicalself-love(en- joyment of nutrition and sexuality,the preservation of offspring,and natural so- ciality). The second option is that, since humans in such aworld would be large- ly unselfish, asourceofhappiness might be the benevolent practical love[Liebe des Wohlwollens]that we would shower on and receive in abundance from others around us. It seems possible that there is something intrinsic to loving others as well as ourselvesthat makes us happy.⁹⁴ In Kant’sphilosophy, we are receptive to benevolent lovebecause we wishtobehappy or wishtobeloved,which is pre- ciselyloveofbenevolence for ourselves. The third option is the moral delight dis- cussed in the aboveparagraph, which, despite the doubts Ihaveexpressed, may plausiblybeinterpreted in terms of loveofdelight. Admittedly, Kant is ambiguous about the nature of the happinessinvolved in the highest good. Because approximation to the subjective highest good is infin- ite, it must involvethe practical postulate of .This is the onlyway to conceive of the infinite ascent towards perfect happiness proportionate to perfect virtue in terms of asingle agent.But if immortality or the practicallypostulated is an immaterial state of being (as we have good reason to assume), and if we know that the ground of inclination is material, then how can the afterlife contain satisfiedinclinations?Kant does not seem to consider this problem, es- pecially giventhe manypassages in which there is no implication that the virtu- ous life is devoid of inclinations.⁹⁵ Our approximation to the highest good may eventuallybecome completelydevoid of all inclination-based happiness, but this is unclear; it depends on our interpretation of the postulate of immortality and involves bracketingactual intergenerationalmoral progress on the species level, whereinclinations will clearlycontinue to exist.Evenifwedecide to brack- et the species level and conceive of approximation toward the highestgood as involving the abolition of inclinations, what is left is negative moral delight in oneself, which mayarguablybecalled loveofdelight for oneself.

 In ch. 4wewill learn that Kant holds that lovingothers from the incentive of the moral law (with practical loveofbenevolence) will cause us to lovethem from inclination too. Thereisa pleasureconnected with beneficent love(LE,27:419.4 – 7; cf. MM, 6:402.19–21), and in the high- est good as an ultimateend ‘human beings seek somethingthat they can love’ (R,6:7.27–28)/ ‘sucht der Mensch etwas,was er lieben kann’.Neighbourlylovefrominclination must be sub- sumed under the basic theorem of self-love(C2,5:22.6–8).  However,Kant does problematise his conception in terms of the end of all time. Sincethe final end of all things is anon-temporal, unchangingstate, its possible qualities arebeyond our comprehension. In ‘The End of All Things’ [Das Ende aller Dinge], Kant,somewhat jokingly in my opinion, envisions this kind of bliss as the universal congregation’seternal repetition of the same song(‘Alleluia!’ or monotonous wailing), which indicates acomplete absenceof change (8:334.36– 335.3). 1.4 Self-Love Persists on Three Levels 55

Perhaps the real sourceofmorallydeservedhappiness in all three ele- ments (animal desire, loving others and the need to be loved benevolently, and one’sown virtue). All in all, Ifind it highlydifficult to conceive of the pos- sibility of happiness in the infiniteapproximation towardsthe comprehensive highestgood without reference to self-love. Icall this general finding the persis- tence of self-love.

1.4 Self-LovePersistsonThree Levels

In the first chapter,Iargued for a ‘three-level interpretation’ of self-love, accord- ing to which self-lovecan be plausiblydivided into three ‘levels’ utilising aver- tical metaphor to describe ascending levels of rationality. Iheld firstly that thereisalow,arational ‘ground level’ of self-love, which I identifiedas‘animal mechanicalself-love’.Animal mechanical self-loveincludes the strongest impulses of human nature and divides into loveoflife (self-preser- vation), sexual loveand parenting(preservation of the species), and sociality. The existenceofthese terms shows that Kant discusses the strongest impulses of human nature in terms of love. Ipointed out how animal mechanicalself- lovecan be understood as desire and how it is generallyapredisposition to the good, at least in the sense thatitisanecessary condition of species-level moral progress.Further,Ishowed how the social impulsecan be seen as the ground of the unsociablysociable self-loveofhumanity,which belongstothe history and teleology of moral progress.Ialsodiscussed the role of love of hon- our in this context. Second, Iargued that there is ahigher level of self-lovethat implies reason and which Icalled the ‘the broad middle level of self-love’.Ishowed how this level can be analysed in terms of the general division of loveinto loveofbenev- olence and loveofdelight.Self-loveisfundamentallythe principle of one’sown happiness:itisloveofbenevolence towards oneself, which consists in wanting thingstogowell for oneself and being loved by others. This loveofbenevolence is morallypermissible on the condition that one includes the happiness of others in one’smaxim. Iidentifiedthree separate notions of loveofdelight in oneself: 1) pleasure in loveofbenevolence towards oneself (in which case loveofbenevo- lence and loveofdelight are equivalent);2)afeeling of self-contentment(as ‘negative’ freedom over inclinations) or afeeling of positive moral merit due to the performance of imperfect duties; and 3) morallyreprehensible arrogance or self-conceit,which is an unjustified claim to respect from others that arises from making the maximofloveofbenevolence towards oneself an uncondition- al practical law. 56 1Self-Love

Third, Iargued for the persistence of self-love by analysingthe place of self- loveinwhat Icall the third or highest level of self-love. Unlikethe two lower lev- els of self-love, which are actual, the third level is an idealised notion that in- cludes close proximity to the moral-physical highestgood (the virtue and happi- ness of all rational creatures). Since happiness involves self-lovebydefinition – and since even negative moral self-contentment can plausiblybeinterpreted as loveofdelight – Iconcluded that self-loveisanirreducible aspect of even the higheststages of moralhappiness.This conclusion is in line with Kant’sview that there is no reason to rid ourselvesofinclinations as such. Further,benevo- lence towardsothers [Liebedes Wohlwollens], which figures as apath towards universal moral happiness,can onlybeviewed as conducive to happiness under the supposition that human beingswant thingstogowellfor themselves or want to be loved by others. In Kant,then, love can make us happy onlyifan element of self-lovepersists. 2SexualLove

While Kant’sviews on sex differences and sexual morality have been under dis- cussion for several decades, it seems that,somewhat surprisingly,there are no previous exegetical analyses of sexuality in Kant specificallyfrom the perspec- tive of love. As we sawinChapter 1, sexualityasanatural impulse of procreation belongsatbottom to ‘animal mechanical self-love’.Hence, the sexual impulseis basically acomponent of the broad conceptual cluster of self-love. We also learned that,asavehicle of (human) species-level sustenance, sexual love is a ‘predisposition [Anlage]tothe good’.Yet even abrief glance at Kant’sdiscussions of loveinthe context of sexuality reveals that several questions were left unan- swered in the first chapter: 1) Are the sexual impulse and sexual loveone and the same – or what is their relationship?2)Just how is sexual lovepredisposed to the good – or how are teleology and morality related to sexual love? 3) What is the relationship between sexual love and loveofbeauty?4)Isthe general division of loveoperative in sexual love – and if so, what is its role? 5) How does the notion of loveilluminatethe status of sex and genderdifferences in Kant as regards the equalityofhuman beings? These issues form the underlying framework for the discussion of this chap- ter.Two main exegetical claims emerge from my reading: 1) In Kant’searlier works,thereisastrongconnection between sexuality and loveofbeauty,but this link wanes towards the 1790s.Beauty can be seen to mediate between sex- uality and morality in terms of love, but the extent to which Kant holds on to this picture duringthe mature period is unclear.2)Ingeneral, sexual lovemay be divided into narrow and broad sexual love, such thatnarrow sexual loveissim- plythe natural impulse of procreation, whereas broad sexual lovecombines sex- ual inclination with moral loveinthe context of heterosexual marriage. My in- terpretative distinction between narrow and broad sexual lovewill also clarify the status of the general division of lovewithin this framework. Narrow sexual loveremains basicallyoutside the grasp of the general division, but broad sexual loveproceeds from the narrow when the sexual impulse or sexual inclination unites with moral loveofbenevolence for another human being.¹

 Notethat Kant uses at least the words ‘impulse’ [der Antrieb], ‘inclination’ [die Neigung], and ‘instinct’ [der Instinkt]todescribe the natureofsexuality.Adistinction can be found between inclination and instinct,sothat inclination presupposes acquaintancewith the object whereas instinct is blind (LE, 27:417.26–27;cf. LA, 25:1114.18–19;both cited in Tomasi 2015). Impulses seem to generallyimplythe species level, whereas inclinations sometimes presuppose agiven agent.Often, however,Kant seems to use these terms interchangeably, and my argument does not hinge on these distinctions. Therefore, Iwill not analyse them in further detail (see

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 58 2Sexual Love

In accordancewith the two main claims, the chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part,Ianalyse the relationship between sexualityand love of beauty.Ibegin by discussing loveinthe precritical ‘Observations on the Feel- ing of the Beautiful and Sublime’ and then track the link between the notionsof sexual loveand the beautifulthrough the contextsofKant’sphilosophyofhis- tory (in the ‘Conjectural Beginnings of Human History’²)and the third Critique. This discussion willalsoserveasapreliminary for the interpretative distinction between narrow and broad variants of sexual love. In the second part of the chapter,Iestablish the division between narrow and broad sexual loveingreater detail by analysinghow the word ‘love’ operatesinanarray of passages on sex- uality in various works by Kant.When showing the existenceofbroad sexual love, Ifocus especiallyonthe perspectivesofmoralityinmarriageright on the one hand and teleology on the other. Unlikethe other chapters, this one also contains an evaluative element.This is because most of the previous research on sexualityinKant is specificallyfem- inist in orientation. The existenceofthese secondary discussions is reflected in the wayItreat this particulartopic. Manyscholars hold that Kant’sviews on women are deplorable (seee.g.Schott 1997, esp. Schröder 1997; seealsoWood 1999;Marwah 2013;cf. Herman 1993), and his insights werecriticised even by his contemporaries.³ Recent feminist debate on this issue mainlyconcerns the question of just how deplorable Kant’sviews are. From this perspective,Kant is by no means aforerunneroffeminism, and the more charitable interpretations tend to assert that his opinions are not ‘quite so deplorable as critics make them out to be’ (Baron 1997, p. 166;see Mikkola 2011, p. 92). The scholars who take the more charitable routesometimesalso holdthatifwebracket Kant’ssubstantial discussions on sexual differenceassuch, we maystill use the universalistic, sup- posedlygender-neutral groundings of Kant’smature moral theory as emancipa- tive conceptual tools for approaching contemporary problems of equality (gen- der issuesamong others) – and in this ‘formal’ sense, Kant’smoral philosophycan be beneficial to (e.g. Nagl-Docekal 1997; Baron 1997; cf. Mikkola 2011,p.105). On the other hand,some draw on the connections be- tween sexual love(or marriage) and friendship in Kant in approaching questions of solipsism and objectification (Langton 2009,pp. 318–327, 362–365), reciproci-

ch. 1.1). As regards sexual love, the main concern for me is the distinction between nature(in- stinct,impulse,inclination) and morality,and how this distinction is mediated.  ‘Muthmaßlicher Anfangder Menschengeschichte’.  Forinstance, Goethe sawaremark of Kant’sasbeingbefittingof‘an old bachelor’ [Hagestolz] (Goethe 1970 [1798], p. 518), and Schleiermacher accused Kant of treatingthe female sex ‘com- pletelyasameans’ [durchaus als Mittels](Schleiermacher 1799, p. 306) (see Hull 1996,p.313). 2Sexual Love 59 ty and responsibility (Korsgaard1996,pp. 194–196), or with the specific intent of revisingKant’soriginal positions (Denis 2001b). With all these discussions in mind, Iwish to show that while an interpretative endeavour such as mine cannot bracket Kant’ssexual teleologyand/or his anthropological opinionsonsexual , the notion of broad sexual lovedevelopedbelow nevertheless sup- ports the idea thatKant was less misogynistic than is often assumed. All in all, my analysis of sexual loveinKant shows that despite his seeming- ly negative remarks on sexualityand his apparent in sexual philos- ophy, there is no need to reject the basic idea that for Kant,(narrow) sexual love is astrongand necessary naturalimpulse of procreation and apredisposition to the good. Moral restrictions onlyallow the impulsetooperate within heterosex- ual marriage, wherethe of the sexes are nominally equal but the husband is de facto the leader.InKant’searlywork, the union of the sexual impulse and moral loveinthe husband maybeviewed through the notion of loveofbeauty. Promotingtheir wives’ happiness through the moral practical loveofbenevo- lence remains the most important duty that husbands have towards their spous- es, whereas wivesare described as being generallymore prone to lovefrom in- clination. Women serveanauxiliary purpose in the moral progress of human kind, and while they ultimately(or at least arguably) share the samerational ca- pacities as men, they are domestic creatures in Kant’ssexual teleology.The sta- tus of women as legal and moral persons is ambivalent and limited, and in this sense thereisaninconsistency or an insoluble tension between Kant’sformal moral and his philosophyofsex. In comparison with some of the contemporary statements in the feminist debate around Kant,Ihope my ar- gument will alsopoint towardamorebalanced interpretation of the status of sex differenceinhis philosophy.⁴

 By focusingonsexual loveinheterosexual relationships,Ido not wish to suggest that homo- sexuality is irrelevantordevoid of love. My chosen focus follows from my Kant immanentexe- getical method: Kant’snarrow basic notion of sexual loveisthe natural impulse of procreation, and he does not discuss homosexuality in terms of love. As one whowas not particularlypro- gressive in this respect,still less asexual , Kant viewed homosexuality as ahorrendous moral flaw. Iwill also have to omit adetailed discussionofKant’scondemnation of masturba- tion, even though , too, relates to the sexual impulse,and hencetosexual lovein the narrow sense. Forcriticisms of Kant’snotorious views on these topics, see Denis (1999) and Soble (2003). Here, Ilimit my treatment to the kind of sexuality that Kant explicitlydiscusses in terms of love: sexuality between men and women. 60 2Sexual Love

2.1 Sexual Loveand LoveofBeauty

‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’ (1764) begins with a distinction between two different kinds of pleasurable feelingsanagent may have.The first kind represents the simple satisfaction of inclinations. This kind of pleasure is mere ‘gratification’ [Vergnügen]and mayoccur withoutany special talents on the part of the agent,without amorallyvirtuous disposition, and apparentlyevenwithout the use of rational capacities:it‘can occur in com- plete thoughtlessness’ (2:208.14– 15)⁵, ‘without their having to envy others or even being able to form anyconcept of others’ (2:208.7–9)⁶.Asexamples of this type of pleasure Kant mentions thingslike food and drink, , business profits,and akind of sexual pleasure. The sexual feeling is defined in terms of love. It is the feelingofaman ‘who loves the opposite sex onlyinsofar as he counts it among the thingsthat are to be enjoyed’ (2:208.3–5)⁷.Ifwecompare this kind of sexual lovewith what is said about ‘animal mechanicalself-love’ in the Religion,wesee that the terms attributed to sexuality in both cases seem equivalent.The animal mechanical impulseofsexuality in the Religion is arational and does not involvecomparison – or,more precisely, does not in- volveanevaluation of the happiness of others in comparison with one’sown happiness.Similarly,the sexual lovementioned in the beginning of the ‘Obser- vations’ need not involvethought,envy, or even the formationofaconcept of another human being.⁸ Thesimilarity of these descriptions of sexuality in the

 ‘bei völliger Gedankenlosigkeit statt finden können.’  ‘ohne daß sie anderebeneiden dürfen oder auch vonandern sich einen Begriff machen können’.  ‘derjenige,der das andreGeschlechtnur in so fern liebt,als er es zu den genießbaren Sachen zählt’.  Considering that the sexual impulse mayhinder the use of one’srational capacities,one might like to think of the impulse in terms of ‘passion’ [Leidenschaft], for the hinderingofreason is constitutive of what apassion is for Kant.However,inthe Anthropology Kant explains that ‘one cannot list anyphysical loveaspassion, because it does not contain a constant principle with respect to its object.’ (AP, 7:266.12–13) / ‘keine physischeLiebe als Leidenschaft aufführen kann: weil sie in Ansehung des Objects nicht ein beharrlichesPrincip enthält.’ According to Kant,sexual desire disappears (at least temporarily) onceitissatisfied, and passions are morelikelong-term obsessions.Inthe Anthropology,however,Kant also lists sexual inclination (alongside the inclination to freedom) as a ‘passion of natural inclination’ (AP, 7:267. 35 – 268.1; see also MM, 6:426.26). As anatural passion, sexual inclination relates to affects,which are rash, sudden,overwhelmingfeelings (see AP,7:252). In the discussion that follows, though, he again distinguishes between sexual inclination (of mere animals) and passion (AP, 7:269.13–14)and does not sayanythingabout it in terms of passion (or affect) (cf. LA, 25:1361). Perhaps he means that obsessive (or simplylong-term) sexual lovefor aperson can 2.1 Sexual Love and Love of Beauty 61 general framework of the concept of loveserves as preliminary evidence that there might be such athing as narrow sexual love in Kant,which consists merely of the animal impulsetosex and the pleasurable satisfaction of this impulse. Since this kind of sexual loveseems to involveviewing the other as a ‘thing’ [eine Sache], it also suggests that there is akind of solipsism relatedtosexuality (see Langton 2009,325–327) – thatis, the objectification or depersonalisation of the other human being in the context of the animal impulse. What interests me most in the first section of this chapter is the relationship between the sexual impulse and the notionofthe beautiful. The question is: how does loveofbeauty proceed from crude or narrowlyconstrued sexuality?Kant’s essayquickly movesontodistinguish the abovementioned ‘lower’ feelingsfrom feelingsofa‘finer’ [feinere]sort.The finer feelingsare feelingsfor the beautiful and the sublime.⁹ In general, Kant analyses the finer feelingsbyattributing them to various topics,such as landscapes,morality,national characteristics, and sex- ual difference. In the sphere of sexuality,Kant’sbasic idea is that women are marked out by the notion of the beautiful, men by the sublime. Thisbasic dis- tinctioncorresponds to adistinction Kant makes concerning morality: ‘Subduing one’spassions by meansofprinciples is sublime’,and ‘true virtue alone is sub- lime’ (2:215.5 – 24)¹⁰,whereas ‘tenderheartedness that is easilyled into awarm feeling of sympathyisbeautiful and loveworthy’ (2:215.33 – 35)¹¹.This latter,fem- inine virtue is, however, ‘weak and always blind.’ (2:215.37– 216.1)¹² As some commentators (like Patrick Frierson (2011)) have noted, Kant’sidea is not that women are not at all sublime and men not at all beautiful. It is rather that indi- viduals of both sexes express these qualities in varyingdegrees, such that in comparison with men women are for the most part more beautiful and less sub- lime, and vice versa (Kant does not discuss whether the qualities might be re- versed within aparticularindividual, or whether agiven woman might be

be a ‘passion’ (see MM, 6:426.20–26). The distinctions around §82and §83ofthe Anthropology appear particularlyunclear (AP, 7:267–270).  These concepts areseminal to the domain of ,and their history runs throughEd- mund Burke’s APhilosophical Enquiryintothe Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) down to Longinus’ treatise On the Sublime (around 100 AD). Both texts were widelyread and very influential in Kant’stime, even though they arenot mentioned by Kant in the ‘Obser- vations’ (for Kant’slater discussions of Burke, see C3,5:277;20:238).  ‘Bezwingung seiner Leidenschaften durch Grundsätze ist erhaben.’ / ‘ist wahreTugend allein erhaben.’  ‘Weichmüthigkeit,die leichtlich in ein warmes Gefühl des Mitleidens gesetzt wird, ist schön und liebenswürdig’.  ‘schwach und jederzeit blind.’ On the whole, the passage anticipates Kant’smaturediscus- sion of sympathetic participation, or Teilnehmung,in(MM, 6:456 – 457). 62 2Sexual Love more sublimethanagivenman, or aman more beautifulthan awoman). Kant asserts further that general education and societal relations pertaining to sexual differenceshould be organised so thatthe definingcharacteristics of both sexes are emphasised. As Frierson points out,Kant’sdistinctionbetween the beautiful and the sublimeasregards sex is both descriptive and normative. (Frierson 2011, pp. xxix–xxx)¹³ Kant emphasises that the beauty of women, regarding both theirlooks and their demeanour in abroader sense, is basedonthe sexual drive,which is de- pendent on the aims or purposes of nature: ‘no matter how far one might try to go around this secret,the sexual inclination is still in the end the ground of all other charms’ (2:234.21–23)¹⁴.Further down he writes:

This whole enchantment is at bottom spread over the sexual drive.Naturepursues its great aim, and all refinements that areassociated with it,however remotefromitthey seem to be, areonlyveils, and in the end derive their charm from the very same source. (2:235.19–22)¹⁵

In the ‘Observations’,the great end of the beautiful and the sublime as regards the character of the sexes is marital happiness. This is the proper object of re- fined sexual love, and it is in this context that the broader notion of loveofbeau- ty develops out of the crude and arational, narrowly conceivedsexual impulse. What is of importance here is that beauty occasions love, and sublimity esteem. Hence, in the ‘Observations’ Kant holds that loveinthe broader sense does not operate symmetricallybetween the sexes. The experienceofsexual beauty is aroused by nature’sprocreative aim through the male sexual impulse.¹⁶ Even

 Kant’snotorious comments on women’seducation, which was ahotlydebated public issue during his time, derive from his normative insistence on the supposedly natural characteristics of the sexes (see Petschauer 1986). As Baronpoints out (1997, p. 167), Kant does not implythat women arenot capable of higher learning; he apparentlyopposes their education on the basis that it would compromise their beauty.And as Peter Petschauer (1986,p.285)correctlyargues, Kant’sviews on women’seducation ‘remainstatic’ between the ‘Observations’ and the published Anthropology. In terms of Kant’snear contemporaries,gender-equal education was advocatedby the mayorofKönigsberg, Theodor vonHippel (see Schröder 1997).  ‘man magnun um das Geheimnißsoweit herumgehen, als man immer will, die Geschlech- terneigung doch allen den übrigenReizen endlich zum Grunde liegt’.  ‘Diese ganze Bezauberungist im Grunde über den Geschlechtertrieb verbreitet. Die Natur verfolgt ihregroße Absicht,und alle Feinigkeiten, die sich hinzugesellen, sie mögennun so weit davonabzustehenscheinen,wie sie wollen, sind nur Verbrämungen und entlehnen ihrenReiz doch am Ende auseben derselben Quelle.’  It is, however,implicitlyclear throughout Kant’swritings that the sexual impulse is active in both sexes, and Iknow of no scholars whodenythis. 2.1 Sexual Loveand Love of Beauty 63 though it seems that women might perhaps be generallymoreprone thanmen to a(non-sexual, neighbourly) feeling of love¹⁷,itismen who love women rather thanthe otherway around. The man appreciates the noble [das Edle]inhimself and the beautiful in the woman, whereas the woman’sfeeling is for the beautiful in herself and for the noble in the man (2:240.26–32). Trans- ported into the sphere of love, this idea means that ‘the man […]can say: Even if you do not lovemeIwill force you to esteem me,and the woman, […]: Even if you do not inwardly esteem us, we will still force you to loveus.’ (2:242.5–9)¹⁸ However, this should not be understood in terms of squabbling or acrude struggle for power.The marital couple is ‘asingle moral person, which is animated and ruled by the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife.’ (2:242.14– 16)¹⁹ The end is mutual happiness,and it is moral loveand beautiful obligingness that yield the proper flavour of marital life: ‘the more sublime acast of mind is, the more inclined it alsoistoplace the greatest goal of its efforts in the satisfaction of abeloved object,and on the other sidethe more beautiful it is, the more does it seek to respond to this effort with complaisance.’ (2.242.18–22)²⁰ In fact,Kant seems to propose that the man should ultimatelycome to lovehis wife not because she is beautifulbut because she is his wife. (2.220.30 –221.7) The love(of beauty) at issue in marriageinthe ‘Observations’ is thus not merelythe crude sexual impulse, or the mere desire to derive pleasure from the use of another person as asexual object;atleast from the man’sperspective, it is acombination of sexual desire and what Kant later comes to call loveofbe-

 Kant statesthat women ‘do somethingonlybecause they loveto, and the art lies in making surethat they loveonlywhatisgood.’ (2:232.1–2) / ‘thun etwas nur darum, weil es ihnen so be- liebt,und die Kunst besteht darin zu machen, daß ihnen nur dasjenige beliebe, was gutist.’ And later on: ‘the feelingofloveofwhich she is capableand which she inspires in others is fickle but beautiful’ (2:236.29–30) / ‘das Gefühl der Liebe, dessen sie fähigist und welche sie anderen einflößt, ist flatterhaft,aber schön’.The association of women with inclination and beauty seems to parallel the ideas put forth later in the Groundwork,and especiallyinthe second Cri- tique,according to which beneficencefrominclination or lovelacks proper moral worth but is nevertheless beautiful (C2, 5:82.18–20). Note,however,that the verb used in the first ‘Observa- tions’ passage aboveisnot lieben but belieben,which according to the Grimm and Adelungdic- tionaries can be close to lovebut can also implylikinginamuch moregeneral sense.  ‘der Mann […]sagenkönnen: Wenn ihr mich gleich nicht liebt, so will ich euch zwingen mich hochzuachten,und das Frauenzimmer […]: Wenn ihr uns gleich nicht innerlich hochschätzet, so zwingen wir euch doch uns zu lieben.’  ‘eine einzige moralische Person […], welche durch den Verstand des Mannes und den Gesch- mack der Frauen belebt und regiert wird.’  ‘so ist eine Gemüthsart,jeerhabener sie ist,auch um destogeneigter die größteAbsicht der Bemühungeninder Zufriedenheit eines geliebten Gegenstandes zu setzen, und andererseits je schöner sie ist,desto mehr sucht sie durch Gefälligkeit diese Bemühungzuerwiedern.’ 64 2Sexual Love nevolence for another human being – thatis, practical love or active rational be- nevolence. In this context,loveofbeauty denotes aman’ssexual lovefor a woman in the broad sense,and hence the ‘Observations’ supportsthe basic claims of the chapter.There is aclose connection between sexuality and beauty in terms of love: the beauty of women is grounded in the sexual impulse, and the lovethis beauty occasions is not merelyanimal mechanicalself-lovebut abroad- er kind of sexual loveofbeauty. In ‘Conjectural BeginningofHuman History’ of 1786,wefind an even stron- gerstatement concerning the relationship between sexuality,love, and beauty. In arather playful manner,Kant here imagines apossible developmental history for the human species, the beginning of which he models on the biblical account of Genesis – starting with the first human couple (8:110.11). In this earlystate of human existence, the impulses of animal mechanical self-loveare in operation: ‘After the instinct of nourishment,bymeans of which nature preserves each in- dividual, the instinct of sex is most prominent,bymeansofwhich nature pre- serves each species.’ (8:112.27–29)²¹ Kant’sstory then begins to unfold as an ac- count of the effect of reason on the foundational natural impulses or instincts. His description of the effect of reason on sexualityisparticularlyinteresting. Reason marks aseparation between the human stimulus to sex and the mostly periodic impulse found in animals. By means of reason and imagination, the human being can uphold sexual desire, which is something animals are unable to do. Kant appeals to the example of the use of fig leavestocover genitalia to illustrate this point.When the sexual object is concealed (that is, when the gen- itals are covered with afig leaf), imagination strengthens and prolongs sexual desire (8:112.31–113.3).²² Through concealing the sensory object and postponing immediate desire satisfaction, imagination and reason lead sexuality from mere animal mechanical sensibilitytoalevel of rational ideality.Most importantly, and more specifically, they inform the transition from animal sexuality to love, and finallytothe notion of beauty (even as detached from human objects):

Refusal was the first artificefor leadingfromthe merely sensed stimulus over to ideal ones, from merely animal desire graduallyovertolove, and with the latter from the feelingofthe

 ‘Nächst dem Instinct zur Nahrung, durch welchen die Natur jedes Individuum erhält, ist der Instinct zum Geschlecht,wodurch sie für die Erhaltung jeder Art sorgt,der vorzüglichste.’  As Wood correctlynotes, Kant’sslightlysatirical position seems to imply ‘that Adam and Eve first put on figleavesnot out of shame but to excite one another’ssexual desires’ (Wood 2007, p. 161). 2.1 Sexual Love and Love of Beauty 65

merely agreeable over to the tastefor beauty,inthe beginningonlyinhuman beings but then, however,also in nature. (8:113.7– 11)²³

In the ‘Conjectural Beginning’,the sexual impulseisclearlydistinguished from love. What is implied is that when reason and imagination operate on the sexual impulse, the resulting love must be differentiated from animal mechanicalself- love. The ‘Conjectural Beginning’ does not make clear what this higher loveis like, but we know it is occasioned by the workingofreason on sexuality,and the overall context of the essaysuggeststhat it is moral and, as related to sex- uality,predisposed toward general species-level progress, ‘graduallyfrom the worse towardthe better’ (8:123.25)²⁴.The ‘Conjectural Beginning’ also supports the idea that loveofbeauty is occasioned by sexual love. The trajectory above is from an animal impulse to loveand from lovetoataste for beauty,which in turn starts with human beauty but maythen be somehow generalised to the rest of nature.²⁵ The claim is obviouslystronger than that made in the ‘Ob- servations’,wheresexuality is presented merelyasthe ground of femalebeauty; here, it is presented as the ground of the taste for bothhuman beauty and non- human natural beauty.Based on the combination of the ‘Observations’ and the ‘Conjectural Beginning’,the naturalistic ground of beauty (that is, beauty in a quite general sense) is animal sexuality, and the transition between the two is mediated by reason and love. But there is an obstacle to this interpretation. Kant’smost extensive discussion of beauty is located in the third Critique, whereitforms nearlyhalf of the entire work. At first glance, thereseems to be astriking discontinuity between Kant’sdiscussion of beauty here and his earlier works.Eventhough 1) the division between the beautifuland the sublime is still in operation, 2) the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ [Analytik des Schönen]inthe third Critique relates the beautiful to aesthetic pleasure [Wohlgefallen]²⁶,and 3) Kant’s general idea is to show how the notion of the beautiful mediates between nature and morality, there is hardly anylink between sexuality and beauty in the mature

 ‘Weigerung war das Kunststück, um vonbloß empfundenenzuidealischen Reizen, vonder bloß thierischen Begierde allmähligzur Liebe und mit dieser vomGefühl des bloß Angenehmen zum Geschmack für Schönheit anfänglich nur an Menschen, dann aber auch an der Natur über- zuführen.’  ‘vomSchlechtern zum Besseren allmählig’.  We hear echoes of Diotima’sspeech in Plato’s Symposium.  Pluhar rightlywarns that in the third Critique, Wohlgefallen simplymeans liking,and we should not attach special meaningtothe word as such and should instead attend to the context (C3, 49fn.14). In particular,weshould not assume that Wohlgefallen automaticallydenotes love of delight.Insofar as thereare links between loveand Wohlgefallen in the third Critique,these must be established via context-specific argument. 66 2Sexual Love work. The paradigmatic case of the beautiful is aesthetic reflection of beautiful natural forms, and the notion of the beautiful is then secondarilyapplied to ar- tistic works.Wedofind two statements that link aesthetic judgmentconcerning the beautiful to love, but they do not seem to provide the necessary connection with sexuality that we would expect, based on the earlier works.²⁷ How can we reconcile this lack of sexual loveofbeauty in the third Critique with Kant’spre- critical position and the position he continued to hold in philosophyofhistory, accordingtowhich beauty is based on sexual impulse? There is one passageinthe third Critique thatconcerns human feminine beauty.When discussingthe beauty related to fine art,Kant notes as an aside that judgments of beauty regardingcertain animate objectsofnature take their objective purposiveness into account.Insuch cases, the aesthetic judgment is grounded in ateleological one, as with women’sbeauty: ‘Thus if we say, e.g., That is abeautiful woman, we do in fact think nothing other than thatnature offers us in the woman’sfigure abeautiful presentation of the purposes [inher-

 First: ‘The beautiful prepares us for lovingsomething, even nature, without interest’ (C3, 5:267. 35–36) / ‘Das Schöne bereitetuns vor, etwas,selbst die Natur ohne Interessezulieben’. This is neither about sexual love(sincesexual lovehas an interest) nor,perhaps, even about lovingthe beautiful, and the lovehintedat(but in no wayelaborated) in this remarkisprobably some kind of loveofdelight toward other beings that neither reducestoself-interest nor takes an interest in the other’swell-being, but that acquires some sort of reflective quasi-moral status in disinterested pleasure. It maybepossible to interpret the notion of being ‘without interest’ in terms of not involving an to use the love object (see MM, 6:443.2– 9). Second, loveof natural beauty maydenote adirect,non-selfish interest in the existenceofthe objectsinques- tion, yetwithout assigning apurpose or an end to them. Someone ‘whocontemplates the beau- tiful shape of awild flower,abird, an insect,etc., out of admiration and lovefor them, and would not want naturetobeentirelywithout them […]istakingadirect interest in the beauty of nature’ (C3, 5:299.8 – 14)/‘welcher […]die schöne Gestalteiner wilden Blume, eines Vogels, eines Insects u. s. w. betrachtet,umsie zu bewundern, zu lieben und sie nicht gerne in der Natur überhaupt vermissen zu wollen, […]nimmt ein unmittelbares und zwar intellectuelles Interesse an der Schönheit der Natur.’ According to Kant,this kind of directlyinterestedloverequires that one have aprior interest in the moral good, or at least apredisposition to it (C3, 5:300.35– 36). Thus,inthe third Critique,the experience of beauty in general does not necessarilyimplylove but mayserveaspreparation for aquasi-morallove(which does not hingeonsexuality). More- over,the loveofbeauty directlyaddressed in this work rests on explicitlymoral about the agent.Inher discussion of loveofnatural beauty in Kant,Baxley argues that natural beauty maybevalued ‘both for its own sake […]aswellasfor the sakeof[…]the moral message we take from it’ (Baxley 2005,p.42).Ithink this is correct,but Baxley does not problematise the status of the two seeminglydifferent types of loveatplay: lovewithout interest and directlyin- terested love. This distinction is also not noted by Tomasi (2015). Unfortunately, Icannot provide ahighlydetailed investigation of this issue heresincemychosen perspective focuses on the par- ticular relationship between sexual loveand loveofbeauty. 2.1 Sexual Love and Love of Beauty 67 ent] in the femalebuild.’ (C3, 5:312.1– 4)²⁸ The purpose Kant has in mind here is undoubtedlythe preservation of the species through procreation. Hence, in the case of women, their beauty remains grounded in the teleologyofsexual desire, and we can at least saythatthere isn’tanabsolute discontinuity between the earlier works and the third Critique. Unlikethe ‘Conjectural Beginning’,however, this passagecannot be taken to suggest that sexualityisthe foundation from which aesthetic judgmentsingeneral are ultimatelyderived. Furthermore,ina comment on the moral proof of God’sexistenceinthe ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’²⁹,Kant implies that historically, judging the beauty (of nature) was grounded on the existenceofmorallypractical reason: ‘Indeed, it was in all probability through this moralinterest that people first became attentive to the beauty and the purposes of nature.’ (C3, 5:459.1– 3)³⁰ There is no hint of beau- ty’sbeing generallygrounded in sexualityinthe third Critique. DidKant change his mind on the issue in the late 1780s? This is possible, and quite clearlythe link between sexual loveand loveof beauty wanestowards the 1790s,asdoes the association between women and the beautiful. Anthropology from aPragmatic PointofView,publishedin1797, does not discuss women in terms of beauty.³¹ Does this mean that Kant did not think that beauty was grounded on sexualityinthe end?Itseems to me that when Kant began his search for apriori foundations for judgmentsofbeau- ty,hewas forced to shift the focus of beauty away from women, who remained paradigmaticallycloser to empirical inclinations in comparison with men (even though arguablyequipped with rational capacities). On the otherhand,the crit- ical distinction between the aesthetic and the teleological forced Kant to ground judgmentsofbeauty on something other than the objectivepurposiveness of na- ture. Objective purposiveness (as in the sexual impulse) was now amatter of tel- eological judgment,not amatter of aesthetics.Asnoted above, in the third Cri- tique the beauty of women is construed as an isolated special case of beauty that

 ‘In einem solchen Falle denkt man auch, wenn z.B. gesagtwird: das ist ein schönes Weib, in der That nichts anders als: die Natur stellt in ihrerGestaltdie Zweckeimweiblichen Baue schön vor’.  ‘Kritik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft’.  ‘Auch wurde aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach durch dieses moralische Interesse allererst die Aufmerksamkeit aufdie Schönheit und Zwecke der Natur rege gemacht’.Note that the German is slightlyambivalent regarding whether die Schönheit referstothe beauty of natureortobeauty in general. Pluhar opts for the first alternative,which does seem morelikely.  The anthropology lectures confirm this shift: the Friedländer notesfrom1775–1776 treat beauty equallyasaproperty of men and women(LA, 25:665), and in the Mrongovius notes from 1784–1785 we even find astartlingPlatonic claim, according to which beauty is essentially masculine (LA, 25:1330.20–21). 68 2Sexual Love is grounded in teleology.Importantly, however,the third Critique simply does not make specific conjectures about the possible arational foundation of beauty – a topic which was dealt with in the ‘Conjectural Beginning’.All in all, Idon’tthink it’ssufficientlyclear whether Kant meanttorenouncewhat he had previously said about the connection between the sexual impulseand loveofbeauty.I am forced to takethe position that in the precritical phase and in the ,Kant views loveofbeauty as grounded in the sexual impulse, but this picture is indeed blurred by the third Critique and the development of the anthro- pology. All we can sayisthatmen’smoral sexual loveofbeautiful women (which Iwill call broad sexual love) is grounded in the objectively purposive sexual im- pulse (which Iwill termnarrowsexual love). This finding on sexual loveofbeau- ty nevertheless supports the basic claims of the chapter: 1) Kant’searlier works show astrongconnection between sexuality and beauty in terms of love, and 2) sexual lovecan be plausiblysaid to divide into narrow and broad variants.

2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love

In this section, Ihope to illustrate in further detail how Kant’snotion of sexual loveindeed divides into narrow and broad sexual love. As we’ve seen, the basic idea behindthis interpretative distinction is that narrow sexual loveconsists merelyinthe animal impulseofprocreation, whereas broad sexual lovecom- bines sexual inclination with moral loveinthe context of heterosexual marriage. Iwill establish this claim by analysing how the word ‘love’ operatesinKant’s discussions of sexuality,first from the perspective of nature, then from the per- spective of morality and marriageright,and finallyfrom the perspective of tele- ology. If we look at the various passages in which Kant addresses this topic, we see that the relationship between the twovariants of sexual love is both additive or accumulative and transformative.Inother words, it seems to me that when animal sexualityunites with moralityinmarriage, the rudimentary form of sex- ual loveboth remains in place and is transformed into something more tender and compassionate.When the operation of pure practical reason imposes restric- tions on animal desire and other kinds of demands on how the agent acts within the interpersonal relationship originallyfounded on the natural impulse, the re- sultant loveisreminiscent of both the original sexual instinct and the kind of practical loveofneighbour that one mayalso express towards strangers.But the loves are different: broad sexual loveismilder thansheer lust or animal crav- ing for sex and more intimate, more caring,than beneficencesimplyfrom ration- al benevolence. 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 69

2.2.1 Narrow SexualLove

Is there reallysuch athing as narrow sexual love in Kant?The literature in this area is scarce. Of the few who have touched on the topic, Langton most clearly perceivesthat Kant does use ‘sexual love’ for ‘sexual desire’ (Langton 2009, p. 325)³²,but on the other hand Wood holds that for ‘Kant,sexual desire is not aform of love, because loveseeks the good of its object whereas sexual de- sire does not.’ (Wood 2008, p. 225) Aposition like Wood’siscertainlynot an ab- surd position to maintain, and we should carefullyput together amore compre- hensive picture of the evidence before deciding on the matter.Inthe Collins notes on ethics, which Wood cites,Kant does state the following: ‘But if he loves them merelyfrom sexual inclination, it cannot be love; it is appetite.’ (LE, 27:384.22–23)³³ Indeed there is further evidence for his position in the Mron- govius notes on anthropology,inthe ‘Conjectural Beginning’,and in TheMeta- physics of Morals. In the Mrongovius notes,sexual inclination is distinguished from ‘genuine love’ [eigentlicheLiebe](LA,25:1361.6 – 7), and as we sawinthe previous section, the ‘Conjectural Beginning’ contrasts ‘animal desire’ with love(8:113.7– 11). Finally, from TheMetaphysics of Morals we learn that sexual inclination does not belong to love’sgeneral division into love of benevolence and loveofdelight: ‘it cannot be classed with either the lovethat is delight or the loveofbenevolence’ (MM, 6:426.26–28)³⁴. But even though this mayseem likealot, it is hardlythe completepicture of the evidence,and if we investigate further we find thatthere is more to be said for the view thatdoes include sexual inclination or the natural sexual impulse in the general concept of love. Letmerehearse the evidence for the existenceof narrow sexual lovediscussed thus far,connect it with further evidence, and then try to provide abalanced summary of the overall situation. Recall the passageonanimal mechanical self-loveinthe Religion:

 Interestingly,Langton speaks of an ‘optimistic’ and a ‘pessimistic’ Kant in the context of sex- ual love(Langton2009,pp. 320 –321, cf. 325–326). It seems to me that Kant’s ‘pessimistic’ re- marks on sexual loverelatetomoral problems in the contextofwhat Iwould call ‘narrow sexual love’,whereasthe ‘optimism’ that Langtonalso sees in Kant is close to my ‘broad sexual love’ (the differenceisthat Langtonemphasises the similarity between sexual loveand friendshipin describingKant’s ‘optimism’ (Langton2009,pp. 320 –321, 327, 363), whereas Iemphasise loveof benevolenceinmydescription of ‘broad sexual love’).  ‘Allein wenn er sie bloß ausGeschlechts-Neygung liebt,sokanndies keine Liebe seyn, son- dern Appetit.’  ‘Sie kann[…]weder zur Liebe des Wohlgefallens,noch der des Wohlwollens gezähltwerden’ (cf. LE, 27:417. 27–28). 70 2Sexual Love

1. The predisposition to ANIMALITY in the human beingmay be broughtunder the general title of physical and merely mechanical self-love, i.e. alovefor which reason is not re- quired. It is three-fold: first,for self-preservation; second,for the propagation of the spe- cies,through the sexual drive,and for the preservation of the offspringthereby begotten through breeding; third,for community with other human beings,i.e.the social drive. (R,6:26.12–18)³⁵

In the Religion the sexual drive is clearlyaform of love. It belongsto‘animal me- chanicalself-love’ and is therefore part of love’soverall concept.Rememberalso that in the ‘Observations’,Kant used the word ‘love’ to describesomething felt by aman who onlywants to use women for his own pleasure (2:208.3–5). In TheMetaphysics of Morals,weencounter the claim: ‘Sexual inclinationisalso called love (in the narrowest sense of the word)’ (MM, 6:426.20–21)³⁶.Against this, one could arguethat Kant’suse of the passive voice means thatwhat he is addressingisnot in fact his own view but aview generallyheld by other peo- ple. Yetthe fact that he concedesthat what is at issue is the ‘narrowestmeaning of the word’ seems to implythatitisause that he accepts – for whyelse would he use the word ‘narrowest’ [engsten]? Further evidence for narrowsexual love can be found in Anthropology from aPragmatic PointofView: ‘The strongest im- pulsesofnature are loveoflife and sexual love,[…]Loveoflife is to maintain the individual; sexual love, the species.’ (AP, 7:276.28–33)³⁷ Andfinally,once more from TheMetaphysics of Morals: ‘Just as loveoflife is destinedbynature to pre- servethe person,sosexual loveisdestined by it to preservethe species;inother words, each of these is a natural end’ (MM, 6:424.12–14)³⁸. If we now weigh the evidence, we see one published and two unpublished instances that detach sexual inclination or animal desire from loveor‘genuine love’,one published instance that detachessexual inclination from love’sgener- al division, and five published instances that explicitlyconnect the sexual drive, sexual inclination, or the sexual impulse to love’soverall framework. It seems to me thatabalanced interpretation has no option but to hold thatthere is such a

 ‘1. Die Anlagefür die THIERHEIT im Menschen kann man unterden allgemeinen Titel der physischen und bloß mechanischen Selbstliebe, d.i. einer solchen bringen, wozu nicht Vernunft erfordert wird. Sie ist dreifach: erstlich zur Erhaltung seiner selbst; zweitens zur Fortpflanzung seiner Art durch den Trieb zum Geschlecht und zur Erhaltung dessen, was durch Vermischung mit demselben erzeugt wird; drittens zur Gemeinschaft mit andern Menschen, d.i. der Trieb zur Gesellschaft.’  ‘Die Geschlechtsneigung wirdauch Liebe (in der engsten Bedeutungdes Wortes) genannt’.  ‘Die stärksten Antriebe der Natur […]sind Liebe zum Leben und Liebe zumGeschlecht;die erstere um das Individuum, die zweite um die Species zu erhalten’.  ‘So wie die Liebe zum Leben vonder Natur zur Erhaltungder Person,soist die Liebe zum Geschlechtvon ihr zur Erhaltung der Art bestimmt; d.i. eine jede vonbeiden ist Naturzweck’. 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 71 thing as narrow sexual love. It is also very important to see that,more generally, the existenceofnarrowsexual lovesupportsthe view that even though the gen- eral division of loveinto loveofbenevolence and love of delight is apowerful key for understandingmuch of what Kant says about love, on the whole his con- ception of love is irreducible to the general division. The sexual impulsebelongs to lovebut remains outside the grasp of the frameworkofloveofbenevolence and loveofdelight.But to account for the contrasting evidence presented above, it must be noted thatnarrowsexual loveisloveonlyinahighlyrestricted sense; it is non-rational and sometimes distinguishedfrom love. It denotes mere- ly ‘the strongest possible sensible pleasure in an object.’ (MM, 6:426.21–22)³⁹

2.2.2 Broad SexualLove

Iwill now moveontoshowing how the broader notion of sexual loveaccumu- lates on top of the narrow.Asnoted above, broad sexual loveisessentiallythe non-rational sexual inclination united with moral loveinthe context of hetero- sexual marriage. In the recent literature, Kant’s ‘philosophyofmarriage’ has been stronglycriticised.Scholars oftenspeak of thingslike Kant’s ‘steelycyni- cism on the subject of marriage’ (La Vopa 2005,p.1), or arguethat even at its best Kantian marriageis‘asystem of mutualexploitation’ (Wood 1999,p.257), or that it marks ‘the self-destruction of the categoricalimperative’ (Schröder 1997, p. 282). Ithink these kinds of views are unnecessarilyone-sided and are largely due to lack of analysis of the concept of lovewithin the context of mar- riage. Forinstance, the view that Kant conceivedofmarriageasmerelymutual exploitation is, Ithink, adistorted position that results from placing improper weight on his discussion of marriageright (the tone and vocabulary of which is at least in part set by its necessarilylegalistic context) and from neglecting his discussions of the duties of the spouses and how loveoperatesinrelation to thoseduties.Iarguethatifsexual loveinmarriageisanalysed in terms of the broader notion of loveIcall ‘broad sexual love’,manypessimistic readings of Kantian marriagewill thereby be mitigated. Now it is trueand generallywellknown that sexual desire or narrow sexual loveismorallyproblematic for Kant.For instance,Kant compares the satisfac- tion of the sexual appetitetosuckingthe juiceofalemon and then throwing it away: ‘As soon as the person is possessed, and the appetitesated, they are thrown away,asone throws away alemon after sucking the juicefrom it.’

 ‘die größte Sinnenlust,die an einem Gegenstandemöglichist’. 72 2Sexual Love

(LE, 27:384.31–33)⁴⁰ He speaks of sex as being like eating roast pork (LE, 27:386.35– 36) or even like cannibalism (MM, 6:359.33 – 360.7). Since we know that the sexual impulseis, at bottom, anon-rational animal instinct,wemay saythat sexual desire on Kant’sview,inits natural crudity,operates completely irrespective of the humanity and the personhood of the otheragent.The desire maynot even require the concept of another human being to yield enjoyment or fulfil its purpose (see R, 6:26;cf. 2:208.1–15). As such, the impulsedoes not take into account that the other human beingtowhich it is directed has acapacity to set ends and make moral choices.However,asaninclinationdirected towardsa particularhuman other,the sexual inclination has aprofound connection to the person or the personhood of both parties. Kant emphasises thatsexual desire it- self is not directed to the humanityofthe other; it is not adesire for ahuman ‘qua human’ [als Menschen](LE, 27:385.16) but rather aphysical or animal desire for the other’ssex [Geschlecht](LE, 27:385.15 – 22;27:386.36 – 37;27:387. 28–29; 27:637.37–638.2; 27:638.10 –20;see alsoMM, 6:277–278).⁴¹ However,Kant thinks that it is preciselythrough this base mechanism thatthe humanity or the person of the otherispossessed, enjoyed, or used as athing (LE, 27:384.30 –31; 27:385.23–35;27:386.30 – 39;27:387. 25–29;MM, 6:426.1– 15). ForKant,sexual de- sire is directed to apart of the human being,the use or enjoyment of which im- plies the use of the whole human being: ‘aperson is an absolute unity’ (MM, 6:278.4–15)⁴²,and ‘if someone concedes apart of himself to the other,hecon- cedes himself entirely’ (LE, 27:387.29–31⁴³;see also MM, 6:278.32–279.12; Herman 1993, p. 55). In this way, desiringapart comes to mark the enjoyment of the whole. As Langton puts it, ‘the extensional object of sexual desire is in fact aper- son […]but the desire is for that person qua body’ (Langton 2009,p.368). Since

 ‘So bald sie nun die Personhaben, und ihrenAppetit gestillet so werfen sie dieselbe weg, eben so, wie man eine Citrone wegwirft,wenn man den Saft ausihr gezogen hat.’  Pace Korsgaard, whoasserts that for Kant the object of sexual desireisaperson qua person, even though she also sees Kant as ‘sometimes changinghis ground’ (Korsgaard 1996,pp. 194, 214). In support of her claim, she quotes the Collins notes: ‘They themselves, and not their work and services, areits [sexual desire’s] Objects of enjoyment’.(LE, 27:384.3 – 5; cited in Kors- gaard 1996,p.194;see also Langton2009,p.367)However,the construction ‘they themselves’ is apeculiarity of the translation Korsgaardisusingand is not at all contained in the original Ger- man. The German speaks of man’sdesire as immediatelydirected to ‘other human beings as ob- jects of his enjoyment’.This phrasingofcourse requires interpretation. ‘Der Mensch hat eine Neigung die gerichtetist aufandreMenschen, nicht,soferne er die Arbeit und die Umstände anderer genießen kann, sondern unmittelbar aufandreMenschen als Objecteseines Genußes.’ (LE, 27:384.3 – 5)  ‘Person […]eine absoluteEinheit ist’.  ‘wenn der Mensch einen Theil vonsich dem andern überläßt, so überläßtersich ganz.’ 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 73 the person is used as an object of enjoyment,and since this does not involve consideration of the higher ends of humanity (since what is at issue is merely the satisfaction of an animal impulse), the person becomes athing.Because ‘each partnerdishonors the humanity of the other’ (LE, 27:385.31– 32)⁴⁴,the same happens to both parties. In this way, sexual desire turns both the self and the other into mere objects or thingsfrom which sensualpleasure is derived. Kant thereforeholds that sexuality is morallydegrading.One bothmakes oneself an object and fails to treat the humanity of the other as an end in itself, render- ing that other amere means. However,itmust still be emphasised that, contra certain interpreters,itdoes not follow that Kant thinks ‘that by its very nature sexuality is bad’ (Singer 2009,p.377). ForKant,the sexual impulseremains pre- disposed to the good. In TheMetaphysics of Morals,the proper naturalend of the sexual impulseisevenmore crucial thanself-preservation. It is ‘an end even more important than that of loveoflife itself, since it aims at the preservation of the whole species and not onlyofthe individual.’ (MM, 6:425.3 – 5)⁴⁵ From the perspective of love,however,what is most important in this context is that throughout his writingsKant holds thatthe sexual impulsecan unite with neighbourly, other-regarding love: ‘The sexual inclination can admittedlybe combined with loveofhuman beings, and then it alsocarries with it the aims of the latter’ (LE,27:384.34–36)⁴⁶.Interpreted in the light of Kant’slaterdiscus- sions of loveofhuman beings[Menschenliebe], the loveinthe abovequotation from the Collins notes on ethics is most likelythe rational loveofbenevolence as found in the general division of loveand developedaspractical loveinthe ‘Doc- trine of Virtue’.Itisactive rationalbenevolence by which one adopts the ends of another as one’sown.The roots of this idea trace back to the precritical ‘Obser- vations’,which Iquoted at the beginning of this chapter: ‘the more sublime a cast of mind is, the more inclined it also is to place the greatestgoal of its efforts in the satisfaction of abeloved object,and on the other side the more beautiful it is, the more does it seek to respond to this effort with complaisance.’ (2:242.18–22)⁴⁷ It is not the case that Kant held acynical view concerning the possibilityofmoral sexuality. The sexual end of humanityis‘to preservethe spe-

 ‘einer entehrt des andern seine Menschheit’.  ‘Zweck der Natur […]noch wichtigern, als selbst der der Liebe zum Leben ist,weil dieser nur aufErhaltung des Individuum, jener aber aufdie der ganzen Species abzielt.’  ‘Die Geschlechts-Neigungkann zwar mit der Menschenliebe verbundenwarden, und denn führt sie auch die Absichten der Menschenliebe mit sich’.Translation modified.  ‘so ist eine Gemüthsart,jeerhabener sie ist,auch um destogeneigter die größteAbsicht der Bemühungeninder Zufriedenheit eines geliebten Gegenstandes zu setzen, und andererseits je schöner sie ist,desto mehr sucht sie durch Gefälligkeit diese Bemühungzuerwiedern.’ 74 2Sexual Love cies without forfeiture of the person’ (LE,27:391.23–24)⁴⁸.The aim of this resul- tant,broader notion of sexual loveisthus not onlyprocreation or sensible pleas- ure but also the happiness of the other human being.This point is confirmed in TheMetaphysics of Morals,wheresexual inclination is distinct from, but may unite with, moral love: ‘this ardor has nothing in common with moral loveprop- erlyspeaking,though it can enter into close union with it under the limiting con- ditionsofpractical reason’.(MM, 6:426.29–32)⁴⁹ The properlymoral loveofThe Metaphysics of Morals is at least the practical loveofbenevolence, but it might also refer to intellectual loveofdelight,the attributes of which Iwillelaborate on in the chapter on loveofneighbour.For Kant,the waysexual inclination and moral lovecan be united is through marriage. In other words, marriage occa- sions the transition from narrow to broad sexual love. It seems thatthe moral loveKant is speaking about is reallyahusband’slove for his wife;Kant never explicitlyconsiders wivesasloving their husbands in the moral-practical sense of active rational benevolence. Furthermore, as feminist scholars like Hannelore Schröder (1997) have argued, theredoseem to be restric- tions to women’smoral personhood that become apparent in the context of mar- riage. The most charitable recent interpretationofKantian marriageinthis re- gard, by Mari Mikkola, asserts that Kant’s ‘entire account of marriageisaimed at safeguardingwomen so thatthey are not reducedfrom persons to things.’ (Mikkola 2011, p. 106) There is much to be said for Mikkola’sview.Asalready noted, as such, human heterosexuality is directed onlyatthe use of the sexual attributes or the sexual organs of the other human being,but since Kant views persons as essentiallyindivisible wholes,hethinks that the use of the sexual or- gans implies the use of the whole person (LE, 27:387– 388). As constitutive,rudi- mentary parts of one’snature on the animal level, sexual organs are essential components of one’soverall personhood. The justification of their use in mar- riagerelies on the condition that both partiesacquirethe lifelong possession of (or right to use)the sexual attributes of the other.Because use of the sexual attributes implies use of the whole person, adefault consequenceofmarriageis that all property rights that the spouses have prior to marriagebecome corre- spondingly mutual (even though the spouses maydecide otherwise with asep- arate contract) (LE, 27:639–640). In line with the egalitarian foundations of his mature moral philosophy, Kant rejects polygamy, concubinage,and morganatic marriageonthe grounds that these arrangements place women in an inferior po-

 ‘die Erhaltung der Arten ohne Wegwerfung seiner Person’.  ‘das Brünstigsein hat mit der moralischen Liebe eigentlich nichts gemein, wiewohl sie mit der letzteren,wenn die praktische Vernunft mit ihreneinschränkenden Bedingungen hinzu kommt,inengeVerbindungtretenkann.’ 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 75 sition: in polygamy, wivespossess onlyafraction of the husband; in concubin- age, onlythe prostituteispossessed; and in morganatic marriage, property rights remain unfairlyonone side (generallythat of the man). (MM, 6:278–279) These moral and legal restrictions on the sexual contract clearlysupport Mikkola’s view,oratleast the view thatKant is not insensitive to the protectionofthe per- sonhood of women and their rights (see also Korsgaard1996,p.195). It is the mu- tuality of possession in marriagethat supposedlysecures the personhood of the parties: ‘while one person is acquired by the other as if it wereathing, the one who is acquired acquiresthe other in turn; for in this wayeach reclaims itself and restores its personality.’ (MM, 6:278.10 –13)⁵⁰ The basic set-up of marriage right thus clearlyassumesthe personhood of both sexes. With this said, the statusofwomen’spersonhood in Kantian marriageis more ambiguous thanMikkola’sproposition implies. Acloser look at Kant’sdoc- trine supportsaless charitable view.What we are dealing with is rather a nom- inally equal arrangement that constitutes what Jane Kneller aptlycalls an ‘illu- sion of equality’ (Kneller 2006,p.468). The relevant paragraphs in the ‘Doctrine of Right’ [Rechtslehre]suggest that even though possession is mutual and equalinmarriage, it is really the men who possess the women. First of all, in the openingclause regardingthis question, Kant unambiguously declares that ‘a man acquires a wife’ (MM, 6:277. 3 – 4)⁵¹.The point about possession’s being mutual appears onlylater,asifjustifyingthe first clause. Further,inre- sponse to the immediate criticism launched against his views (see La Vopa 2005,pp. 8–9; Rauscher2012,ch. 5), Kant objects that ‘if Isay “my wife”,this signifies aspecial, namely arightful, relation of the possessor to an object as a thing (even though the object is also aperson).’ (MM, 6:358.31–33)⁵² The ‘wife’ is mentioned here just as an example, but it is tellingthat Kant does not think of constructingthe relationship the other wayaround. Most important- ly,Kant does seem to hold thatinmarriage, natural equalityisnot in conflict with the masterhood of the man:

If the question is thereforeposed, whether it is also in conflict with the equality of the part- ners for the lawtosay of the husband’srelationtothe wife, he is to be your master (he is

 ‘indem die eine Person vonder anderen gleich als Sache erworben wird, diese gegenseitig wiederum jene erwerbe; denn so gewinnt sie wiederum sich selbst und stellt ihrePersönlichkeit wieder her.’ ’sinterpretation of this is eloquent: ‘Perhaps it goes this way: Igive myself (or rights over me) and yougiveyourself; but sinceyou have me, in givingyourself to me yougivemeback to me.’ (Herman 1993, p. 60)  ‘Der Mann erwirbt ein Weib’.  ‘Sageich […]: mein Weib, so bedeutet dieses ein besonderes, nämlich rechtliches,Verhältniß des Besitzers zu einem Gegenstande (wennesauch eine Person wäre), als Sache.’ 76 2Sexual Love

the party to direct,she to obey): this cannot be regarded as conflictingwith the natural equality of acouple if this dominance is based onlyonthe natural superiority of the hus- band to the wife in his capacity to promotethe common interest of the household […]. (MM, 6:279.16–25)⁵³

In the Anthropology,astowho has supreme command in the household Kant writes: ‘there certainlycan be onlyone who coordinates all transactions in ac- cordance with their ends.’ (AP, 7:309.28–30)⁵⁴ Even though it seems possible that Kant leavesroom for cases wherethe husband is not naturallysuperior in the sense required for legal dominance,Kant’snaturalistic vocabulary appears to support the notion that he does not view the legallysubordinate status of women as merelycontingent.Thisiscorroborated by the essayon‘Theory and Practice’⁵⁵ (1793), wherethe natural requirement for being acitizen (or eligible to vote) is not being achild or awoman (8:295.14 – 15). By implication, women are naturally not citizens (cf. Mikkola 2011,p.101).⁵⁶ As Schröder puts it: ‘Men are both the owners of women and yettheir equal partners.’ (Schröder 1997, p. 294) Kantian marriageisnot just about safeguardingthe personhood of women; it also affirms the dominance of men. It is preciselythis that has led scholars to describe marriageas‘astress point’ (La Vopa 2005,p.5)orascon- stituting a ‘deep tension’ (Kneller 2006,p.469)inKant’sethical system. Iagree with the critical voices that despite the nominal equality of the marital relation- ship, there is an inconsistencyorinsoluble tension between the universalistic notion of personal autonomyand Kant’s de facto doctrine of women. For Kant,women are quasi-persons, subordinatetotheirhusbands, and the publish-

 ‘Wenn daher die Frageist: ob es auch der Gleichheit der Verehlichten als solcher wider- streite,wenn das Gesetz vondem Manne in Verhältniß aufdas Weib sagt: er soll dein Herr (er der befehlende, sie der gehorchende Theil) sein, so kann dieses nicht als der natürlichen Gleichheit eines Menschenpaares widerstreitend angesehen werden, wenn dieser Herrschaft nur die natürliche Überlegenheit des Vermögens des Mannes über das weibliche in Bewirkung des gemeinschaftlichen Interessedes Hauswesens […]zum Grunde liegt’.  ‘denn nur Einer kannesdoch sein, der alle Geschäfte in einen mit dieses seinen Zwecken übereinstimmenden Zusammenhang bringt.’ Translation modified. The Louden translation speaks of asingle end, whereasthe German is in the plural. The syntax implies that the ends might be ‘his’ [Einer], but it’salso possible that the seinen refers back to the ‘household’ [Haus]mentioned in the previous sentence,and I’ve tried to preservethis ambiguity.Itisunclear to me whatthe function of the dieses in the construction is.  ‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugtaber nicht für die Prax- is’.  In the Vigilantius notes, however,the wife’sbelongingtothe husbandinservitude ‘is due merely to her lesser ability to provide for herself’ (LE 27:642.20 –21)/‘so rührt dies blos von derenSchwäche, sich selbst zu erhalten, her’. 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 77 ed evidence would seem to suggest thatheviewed this not as acontingent fact but as natural.

2.2.3 The TeleologyofSexualLove

To conclude the argument of this chapter,especiallyregarding the distinction be- tween narrow and broad sexual love,Iturn finallytothe question of teleology. As Inoted in the beginning,inthe Religion Kant holds thatthe non-rational an- imal impulse of sex (narrow sexual love) is somehowpredisposed to the good. But what does this mean?How is sexual lovepredisposed to the good, and what is the status of sexdifference in this respect? There are basically three ways to understand what Kant might mean by ‘good’ here. It might mean the moral good, it might mean the physical good as sensible happiness,orboth. With all its dangers in terms of sensiblehappi- ness, sexualitycan be viewed as being conducivetothe physical good to the ex- tent thatitproduces the strongest possible sensiblepleasure in an object.The context in the Religion,however,suggests thatKant is talking about the moral good, or good in both senses (see ch. 1.1). But how can the crude physical im- pulse of sexuality be apredisposition [Anlage]tomoral goodness?Ithink there are two possible answers to this question. First,wecan take aweak notion of Anlage and hold that the impulseispredisposed to the moralgood merelyin the sense that it is anecessary condition of the continued existenceofthe spe- cies. The sexual impulseworks to preservethe species, and in this sense it en- ables moral progress in the long term. On the other hand, we maytake astronger notion and suggest that thereissomething in the sexual impulse that,despite its non-,isstill somehow conducive to moral goodness,perhaps in the sense that it serves to occasion morallovebetween the sexes. In other words, narrow sexual loveispredisposed to the good in the sense that we mayjudge that it leads to broad sexual love. Most likely, all of the aboveisthe case, even though Kant does not elaborate on the connection between sexuality and the good in much detail. In this re- spect, Anthropology from aPragmatic PointofView (1798) is akey source.⁵⁷ In

 Forscholars seekingacharitable interpretation of Kant’sviews on sexuality or sexual differ- ence, one method is to reject or ‘bracket’ the anthropological remarks altogether,asthey do seem to conflict with Kant’smaturemoral .This is the strategytaken, for instance, by Mikkola (2011, p. 105). But most of what Kant says aboutsexual differenceisactuallycon- tained in the anthropological discussions, and if this evidenceisruled out thereisnot much left to interpret.Kant did teachananthropology course every winterfor twenty years (so it is 78 2Sexual Love the chapter ‘On the Highest Physical Good’ in the Anthropology,sexual loveis associated with progress towardsspecies-level happiness in the physical sense. There, loveoflife (self-preservation) and sexual loverepresent God’s ‘rea- son […]that provides generallyfor the highest physical good’ (AP, 7:279.29–30)⁵⁸, irrespective of human reason. Ibelievethe passageisaremnant of an earlier pe- riod in Kant’sphilosophy, wherehehad not yetworked out the critical notion of teleological judgment.The statement regarding God’srole seems too strong in the light of the third Critique (see C3,5:447 ff.; see alsomych. 1.1), but the point must at least be that loveoflife and sexual loveprovide the species with sensuous happiness.Inthe same passage, however,Kant seems to go slight- ly further,connectingsexual love and culturalprogress:

Forbymeans of the general mixingofthe sexes, the life of our species endowed with rea- son is progressively maintained, despitethe fact that this species intentionallyworks to- wardits own destruction (bywar). Nevertheless,this does not prevent rational creatures, whogrowconstantlyincultureeveninthe midst of war,fromrepresentingunequivocally the prospect of astateofhappiness for the human race in future centuries,astatewhich will never againregress.(AP,7:276.33– 277.4)⁵⁹

We know from Kant’sphilosophyofhistory thatthe kind of progress described abovemust involveamoral element and that, in fact,the proposition of cultural progress cannotevenbeunderstood as amerelydescriptive prediction of how thingswill work out. ‘The prospect of astate of happiness’ is aregulative ideal, approximation to which requires moral striving on the part of human agents. Kant is not naïveabout progress.Itisofcourse possible to provide a

clearlyapart of his thinking). He also authorised the publicationofAnthropology from aPrag- matic Point of View,which was put together fromhis own notesand for which he also wrotea preface – even if his mental powers werealreadyweakening at that time. Because of this,and because we can follow the development of Kant’santhropology through the lecturenotes of the 1770sand 1780s,Itakeitthat its published form is arealsource and ought not to be bracketed off, at least when one’sgoals areexegetical. The Anthropology does of course contain alot of material that we would call precritical,but then the properapproach is to read it cautiously, to- gether with other sources, when seekinganoverall interpretation of Kant’sposition on agiven question.  ‘das physische Weltbeste allgemein besorgende Vernunft’.  ‘da dann durch Vermischung der Geschlechter im Ganzen das Leben unserer mit Vernunft begabtenGattung fortschreitend erhaltenwird, unerachtetdiese absichtlich an ihrereigenen Zer- störung(durch Kriege) arbeitet; welche doch die immer an Cultur wachsenden vernünftigen Ge- schöpfe selbst mitten in Kriegen nicht hindert,dem Menschengeschlecht in kommenden Jahr- hunderten einen Glückseligkeitszustand, der nicht mehr rückgängigsein wird, im Prospect unzweideutigvorzustellen.’ 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 79 weak interpretation of the passage: sexual loveismerelythe necessary enabling condition for anykind of future for the human species. We may, however,bere- minded of the passagein‘Conjectural Beginning’ (8:113.7– 11), whereanimal de- sire givesrise to ahigher kind of love,which in turn bringsabout ageneral ap- preciation of beauty,which again (as we know from the third Critique), is closely linked to moralityorevenfunctions as abridge between natureand the moral good. Athorough investigation of the Anthropology reveals that even though we do not find an explicit link between sexualityand beauty,there is indeed akind of quasi-moral aspect involved in the waysexual teleologyisdiscussed. In the chapter on ‘The Character of the Sexes’ [Der Charakterdes Ges- chlechts], Kant assigns aspecific teleological role to women, and only women, in the moral progress of the species.Kant holds that if one wishestocharacterise women or their role in species-level progress,one must relyonconsiderations of natural teleology rather than considerations of morality or virtue: ‘One can only come to the characterization of this sex if one uses as one’sprinciple not what we make our end, but what nature’send was in establishingwomankind’ (AP, 7:305.29 –32)⁶⁰.Nature’spurpose or end [Zweck], which Kant alsodescribes in terms of nature’s wisdom [Weisheit]concerning womankind, is twofold: ‘(1) the preservation of the species, [and] (2)the cultivation of society and its refinement by womankind.’ (AP, 7:305.35– 306.2)⁶¹ The first purpose is familiar from the con- text of narrowsexual love. Giventhis purpose, nature instils in women afear that something willhappen to the foetuses they carry in their wombs. Thus the first purpose makes women seek male protectionout of fear of physical in- jury.The second purpose assigns women aplace in the moral development of men. Kant thinks that the sexual union generallyrequires thateach partner be in some waysuperior to the other – otherwise,the self-loveofeach would bring about mere ‘squabbling’ [Zank](AP,7:303.14 – 19).⁶² While men are superior in physical strength and economic status, women rule men through controlling male desire by demands of ‘gentle and courteous treatment’ (AP, 7:306.14)⁶³.

 ‘Man kann nur dadurch, daß man, nicht was wir uns zum Zweck machen,sondern was Zweck der Natur bei Einrichtung der Weiblichkeit war,als Princip braucht,zuder Charakteristik dieses Geschlechts gelangen’.  ‘1. die Erhaltung der Art,2.die Cultur der Gesellschaft und Verfeinerung derselben durch die Weiblichkeit.’  What this boils down to is characterisedbyKant in terms of adistinctionbetween dominat- ing [herrschen]and governing [regieren]. According to Kant, ‘inclination dominates,and under- standinggoverns’ (AP, 7:309.32–33)/‘die Neigung herrscht,und der Verstand regiert.’ The wife dominates the household, but onlyinsofar as the governing husband approves.  ‘sanfte, höfliche Begegnung’. 80 2Sexual Love

Women thereforelead [bringen]men, ‘if not to morality itself, to that which is its cloak, moral decency, which is the preparation for morality and its recommenda- tion.’ (AP, 7:306.16 – 18)⁶⁴ It is unclear what exactlythis means, but the idea is probablythat because women are equipped with ‘finer feelings[…]ofsociability and propriety’ and tend to express ‘’ and ‘eloquence’ in comparison with men (AP, 7:306.10 – 11)⁶⁵,men are moreprone to adopt behavioural patterns ap- propriatetothese kinds of ‘feminine’ traits when associating with women within various social contexts. In his recent criticism of Kant’ssexual teleology,Inder Marwah suggeststhat Kant’steleological view of sex difference ‘requires women to adopt an explicitly non-moral character’ and thatwomen are thereforereduced ‘to the status of means’ in the moral development of humanity.(Marwah 2013,p.559)The first question to ask is of course: if women are reduced to means for the moral devel- opment of the species,who or what is using them as means?⁶⁶ Possible answers to this question include men as individuals,men as agroup of individuals,and nature itself. The context suggests that,since the natural purposes here are not about what ‘we make our end’,the ‘agent’ responsible for using women as means can onlybe‘nature’.Regardlessofthe stance one takes toward this ques- tion, Idothink there is asense in which Marwah is correct.First,the teleological role of women is primarilyasupportive function: by protecting and nurturing children, women promotethe physical existenceofthe species. Second, through the procreative sexual bond,women servetomake menmore moral. It is telling, though,that the role seems to be onlypreparative: real morality is something men must accomplish for themselves. There is no clear prescription or teleolog- ical judgment in Kant to the effect that women should or will attain aproper moral status, even though Kant does not seem to suggest thatthey in principle lack the requisiterationalstructures.⁶⁷ In the teleologyofsexual love, women’s

 ‘wenn gleich dadurch eben nicht zur Moralität selbst,doch zu dem, was ihr Kleid ist,dem gesitteten Anstande, der zu jener die Vorbereitungund Empfehlungist’.The Mrongovius notes on anthropology makethe same point morebluntly: ‘The female sex is for the cultivation of the male sex’ (LA, 25:1394.12 – 13) / ‘Das weibliche Geschlecht ist zur Cultur des männlichen’.  ‘die feinerenEmpfindungen […]der Geselligkeit und Wohlanständigkeit’ / ‘Sittsamkeit’ / ‘Be- redtheit’.Note how the word feinere carries with it an allusion to the ‘finer feelings’ of beauty and sublimity in the early ‘Observations’.  Ithank Alix Cohen for posingthis question to me.  Admittedly, the evidenceinthis area is ambiguous and inconclusive.Kant doubts women’s capacity for principles(2:232.2–3; LA, 25:722.23–25)but also views them as beingcapable of morality (LA, 25:705.16 – 27)and recognisingmoral worth (C2, 5:153.19–23.). In the essay ‘An An- swer to the Question: What is Enlightenment’ [Beantwortung der Frage: Wasist Aufklärung] (1784), we can plausiblyreadKant as sayingthat ‘the entirefair sex’ [das ganzeschöne Ges- 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 81 ends are subordinatetothe moral progress of men. In this sense of sexual tele- ology, women are means. But are women mere means? DidKant view them as ‘natural serfs or ani- mals’,asSchröder suggests (1997, p. 296)? Or did he see them as belonging to hu- manity’smoral development ‘in the worst sense of the word’,asMarwah propos- es (2013,p.564)? In this chapter,Ihaveargued that if the notion of sexual loveis accounted for in the broad sense, the picture of Kantian sexual relations is much less grim thancommonlythought. From the precritical ‘Observations’ up until the final published version of the Anthropology,Kant maintains that if there is to be marital loveinthe broadest,proper meaning, it is the happiness of the wife that the husband must make his principal aim. The earlier works make the same point by making use of the concept of the ‘finer feeling’ of loveofbeau- ty.From this perspective,tolovethe beautiful, be it in woman or non-human na- ture, is to experience non-instrumental delight [Wohlgefallen], which prepares one for virtue. The comprehensive notion of teleology, which includes the highest good as the moralhappiness of rational creatures,mustalso include the happi- ness of bothmen and women. The highest good cannot involvethe misery of ei- ther sex. In the Mrongovius notes on anthropology,for instance, we encounter the statement: ‘Nature wanted the happiness of both sexes.’ (LA, 25:1392.24)⁶⁸ And if women are to participate in happiness,they must also be capable of vir- tue⁶⁹ (but Kant never directlyaddresses this point). The Anthropology confirms that women’shappiness is principallyachievedvia theirhusbands’ making their happiness theirprimary aim: ‘The husband’sbehavior must show that to him the welfareofhis wife is closest to his heart.’ (AP, 7:309.33–310.1)⁷⁰ This clearlyincludes the general principle of practical love[Liebe des Wohlwollens] on the part of the husband:the husband must adopt his wife’sends as his own. Therein lies the teleological function of broad sexual love: it aims at the happiness of women. Even though Kant does give women asubordinaterole in his sexual teleology,the broader notion of lovethat Kant consistentlyinsists on ensuresthat women are not mere means but also ends in themselves.

chlecht]isinastate of ‘self-incurred minority’ [selbst verschuldete Unmündigkeit], which implies that in principle they might in the futurematureand come to use their own understanding with- out external direction (8:35).Ithank Martin Sticker for convincingmeofthis last point over the course of several informal discussions.  ‘Die Natur hat die Gluckseeligkeit beydes Geschlechts gewollt.’  Ithank Jens Timmermann for bringingthis to my attention.  ‘Das Betragen des Ehemanns muß zeigen: daß ihm das Wohl seiner Frau vorallem anderen am Herzen liege.’ 82 2Sexual Love

In this way, the transition from morallyproblematic narrow sexual loveto broad sexual love, which acknowledgesand promotesthe happiness of women, can also be seen to provide what Langton calls ‘an escape from solip- sism’ (Langton 2009,p.321), even if, in this case, onlyfrom amale perspective. Perhaps broad sexual lovecould be generalised so that it involves areciprocal and equal relationship of loveand respect between the spouses (or lovers in gen- eral), and the relationship based on sexual lovewould then actuallybearela- tionship of friendship. Ideas along these lines have been presented in the liter- ature, and writers like Korsgaard and Langton have rightlypointed out the similaritybetween some of Kant’sdiscussions of sexual loveand friendship in the Collins notes,interms of the of ‘self-surrender and retrieval’ (Korsgaard 1996,p.195;see Langton 2009,pp. 319,363). In both marriage and friendship, one yields oneself to the other and gets oneself back through the other (LE, 27:388.23–37;cf. 27:423.37– 424.6). As Langton shows (2009,p.320), in his correspondence Kant speaks of both marital loveand love in friendship as assuming ‘the samemutual respect’,writing that this virtuous lovecommon to both ‘wantstocommunicateitself completely’ (11:331.31–332.2)⁷¹. On the otherhand,Denis (2001b) has listed six ways in which marriageand friendship differ from each other in Kant: 1) the basis of marriage is more sensu- ous and less intellectual thanthat of (moral) friendship; 2) marriagerequires a relation of dominance in which husbands are ultimatelysuperior to their wives; 3) women are generallyinferior to men; 4) because of this, reciprocity in mutual disclosure is less likelybetween husband and wife than between friends (and women can’treallykeep secrets)⁷²;5)the proper distance required for respect is unlikelyinmarriage; and 6) friendship is more loving than mar- riage. (Denis 2001b, pp. 13–16) Denis’saim is to revise Kantian marriageinto a ‘moralmarriage’ on the basis of aKantian model of friendship, and for the most part her characterisation of Kantian marriageisaccurate. Yether sixth point,the point about love, paints apicture of Kantian marriage nearlyexclu- sively in terms of narrow sexual love, and while she acknowledgesthat ‘marriage promises partners some measure of practical love’ (Denis 2001b, p. 16), she most- ly neglects the passages on which my notionofbroad sexual loveisbased. Friendship is indeed not the sameassexual loveormarriage, and my aim here is not to venture beyond Kant but merelytodohim justice. From this per-

 ‘gleichegegenseitige Achtung’ / ‘will sich gänzlich mittheilen.’ Foradramatic story about the correspondencebetween Kant and Maria vonHerbert,which also illuminates the relation- ship between various aspects of Kant’slife and his philosophy, see Langton’s ‘Duty and Deso- lation’ (in Langton 2009,pp. 197–222).  See AP,7:304.1– 2. 2.2 Narrow and Broad Sexual Love 83 spective,broad sexual lovemay provide us with further resources when it comes to seeing the ‘optimistic’ Kant described by Langton (Langton 2009,p.321). This optimism is missing from Denis’scharacterisation of Kant’s(non-revised) ac- count of loveinmarriage. However,ifweare to generalise the notion of broad sexual lovesuch that it operates symmetricallybetween the sexes, the basic premise we would need to addtoKant’sframework (in amuch more powerful waythan he does) is thatwomen and men are equal. Onlythen would something like ‘sexual friendship’ be possible in Kantian terms.But this is beyond the scope of my present work. It is true thatKant’sviews on women are generallynot very enlightened, even by the standards of his day. It is particularlytrue thatKant was opposed to women’shigher education, and thatthe role he sawfor women was adomes- tic one. The problem was,and is, that he could not see that women’shappiness might reside outside the domestic sphere, in the public – in practicing science or striving for moral self-perfection based on principles. The distinction Ihave drawnbetween narrowand broad sexual lovereveals aKant who is by no means afeminist but whose views on sexuality are not as cynical or negative as is often thought,and who clearlyreserves aplace for loving morality and lov- ing within the sexual sphere. The ascent of sexual lovecan thus be said to mark atransition from narrow to broad sexual love, from the merelynatural to the natural-moral. TheMrongovius lecturesonanthropology summarise this idea:

as long as it [sexual inclination] is brutal and aims merelyatenjoyment,itisonlyanimal instinct. – But as soon as it is connected to benevolenceand aims at the happiness of the other,itbecomes genuine love. It must not be likeloveofroastbeef, which one devours. (LA, 25:1361.4– 8)⁷³

 ‘sie ist nur thierischer Instinkt so lange sie brutal ist und bloß aufden Genuß geht – Sobald sie aber mit Wohlwollen verbunden ist und aufdie Gluckseeligkeit des andern geht; so wirdsie eigentliche Liebe. Sie muß nicht sein wie Liebe zum RinderBraten den man destruirt’. 3LoveofGod

In this chapter,mytask is to locate the term ‘love’ in the context of Kant’scon- siderations of God [Die Liebe Gottes, Gottesliebe]and to analyse the precise func- tions that love is givenwithin these contexts. Since Kant’s ‘rationalreligion’ is based on amoral philosophicalinterpretation of Christian scripture, and since loveofGod is afoundational notioninChristianity,itisfair to assume as awork- ing hypothesis thatloveofGod is asignificant concept in Kant’sapproach to re- ligion, and hence in his overall project. If one takes into account thatKant sometimes viewed religion as ‘rooted in the loveofGod’ (LE,27:720.25–26)¹,was sympathetic to the Christian idea that God is love² (R,6:145.21; LE, 27:721.2),and held in the concluding remark of his late moral philosophicalwork TheMetaphysics of Morals thatthe intention of the world’sauthor ‘can have onlylovefor its basis’ (MM, 6:491.2–3)³,itisalmostsur- prising that very little has been written about this topic in the literature. As was the case with self-loveand sexual love, there seem to be no system- atic exegetical interpretations of loveofGod available. There are, however,dis- cussions of Kant’sreadingofJesus’ basic commandment to loveGod above all, and your neighbour as yourself ⁴.Ina Goy,for instance, observes that for hu- mans, the commandment to loveGod results in an ‘unattainable ideal’⁵ (Goy 2014,p.19), whereas Moors claims that ‘the loveofGod equals […]moral self- love’ (Moors 2007,p.256,see also 269). On the other hand, some interpreters seem to view God’slovefor human beingsasequatable to the ideal of love for the moral law(Palmquist 2000,p.261;Axinn 1994,p.119;Reardon 1988, p. 143), while some posit generallythat Kant’sGod is loving (Wood 1970, p. 248), and others that his God is not loving (Goy 2014,p.23). While Ithink that all the previous propositions in this area are interesting and merit discussion, if taken as accounts of loveofGod they are ultimately problematic. The problem is first of all methodological: the propositions are not intended as systematic discussions of the issue but are rather brief com- ments made in the midst of otherinterpretative concerns.⁶ Second, Ithink asim-

 ‘in der Liebe Gottesberuhet.’  As expressed in the Gospel of John in the New Testament of the Christian : ‘The one who does not lovedoes not know God, because God is love.’ (1. John 4:8)  ‘die nur Liebe zum Grunde habenkann.’  Mark 12:28;similar in Matt.22:34.See my ch. 4.1.  ‘ein […]unerreichbares Ideal.’  The case is different in Moors’sarticle, wherehegoes so far as to claim that he is formulating ‘ageneral evaluation of Kant’sphilosophyoflove’ (Moors 2007,p.266). But Moors’seclectic ap-

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 3LoveofGod 85

GOD

love by God love forGod

AHUMAN BEING

Figure 3. The Two-Directionality of Love of God ple yetessential structural feature of loveofGod has not been fullyacknowl- edgedbythe previous commentators: the fact that loveofGod works in two dif- ferent directions. It can either mean the human being’slovefor God, or it can mean God’slovefor human beings, so that thereisan‘upward’ direction from human beingstoGod and a ‘downward’ direction from God to human beings (see fig. 3).⁷ This chapter aims to determine more preciselythe relationship between these two directions and the extent to which they are distinguishable from each other.Drawinginpart from previous research in this area, Ishall build my discussion around the following questions: Whatisthe relationship between loveofGod and lovefor the moral law? Does lovefor the lawrelatetolove for God, to love by God, or to both – or do loveofGod and love for the lawmean the same thing?What is the place of the general division of love(as loveofbenev- olence and loveofdelight) in loveofGod – does the general division even playa

proach has other problems,asnoted by Goy:Heisinsensitive to the dynamic temporal structure of the Kantian corpusand does not use source criticism when choosingthe passagesonwhich he bases his interpretations (see Goy 2014,p.6). Idiscuss Moors’sevaluation in my general in- troduction to this study. On the other hand, Dennis Vanden Auweele’s(2014) ‘Forthe Loveof God: Kant on Grace’ focuses solelyongrace and does not provide an interpretation of how lovefunctions in this context.  Goy (2014, p. 16) appears to recognise this structurebut does not make interpretative use of it, whereas Moors fruitfullyacknowledgesthat in the Vigilantius noteslovefor God is dependent on God’slove. However,byclaimingthat the duty of loveistheregrounded on a ‘theologico-met- aphysical idea’ of God’slove(Moors 2007,p.258), Moors downplays the point that for Kant,du- ties can onlybegrounded in pure practical reason. Moors is not entirelyunawareofthis moral groundingofduty,but his notion of a ‘theologico-metaphysical basis’ of duty and love(Moors 2007,p.259) seems overlyreligious from amoral perspective.The overall context of Kant’swrit- ingsonreligion suggests that the idea of God’sloveismoral-rational (somethingthat reason givestoitself)rather than ‘theologico-metaphysical’.Ihope to show this moreclearlytoward the end of the chapter. 86 3Love of God role? Is loveofGod somehow reducible to rational or moral self-love? And final- ly,isKant’sGod loving or not? Iwill divide my treatment roughlyinto two exegetical parts. In the first,Iwill investigate human lovefor God;inthe second,God’slovefor humans.The third section analyses the relationship between loveofGod and self-loveand makes more general remarks concerning the place of God in Kant’sphilosophy. Within the twothematicsections, Iwill proceed chronologicallywith an eyetotracking the possible of Kant’sthought, focusing on the most relevant works from the mature period: the second Critique,the Religion,and TheMetaphysics of Morals (as well as the Vigilantius notes on ethics). Iwill thus walk up the same path twice, but using adifferent perspective each time so as to gain an ac- curate overall picture. Iwill show that lovefor the lawisideallyrelated to lovefor God (rather than lovebyGod) and thatlovefor God can be meaningfullydiscussed in terms of a scale structure. Iwill also point out that the general division of loveisoperative in love of God and that by using the general division God’slovecan be divided into an end account and a ground account. LoveofGod will be seen as irreduci- ble to rational or moral self-love. On the whole, and in its perfection, loveofGod is anecessary and sufficient condition for the completehighest good. Kant’sGod is ultimatelyarational idea, or an ideal rationalconstruction, and the evidence suggests that this God is aloving God, even though Kant remains puzzled about the relationship between God’sloveand God’sjustice. Iwillcall the overall pic- ture arrivedatinthis investigation the ascentmodel of love of God.

3.1 Lovefor God

ForKant,religion is very much about the cognition []ofour duties as divinecommands (C2, 5:129.18 – 19;R,6:153.28–29;MM, 6:443.27–31). Moralityis the proper stuff of religion, but it is morality viewed or cognised from apartic- ular perspective,mainlythatofChristianity. Thisperspective includes assump- tions or beliefs that have apractical significancebut that are absent from mor- ality considered merelyinitself. It appears that Kant,atleast from the Herder lectures (1762 – 1764) onwards,never accepts that moralityisgrounded in religion and instead maintains that the concept of morality leadsustobelieveinGod (see LE,27:73– 74;27:306–308;C2, 5:129;see also Timmermann 2016a, p. 1). Mor- ality is the necessary condition of religion – thatis, religion in the proper,moral sense, and not as amere cult (e.g. LE, 27:305;R,6:51– 52; see also 6:12–13). How- ever,asTimmermann has shown, up until the ‘Canon’ [Kanon]ofthe Critique of Pure Reason,Kant thinksthat in God is necessary if we are to have asuf- 3.1 Lovefor God 87 ficient motive to moralaction. Even though the sourceofmoral laws can be judgedtolie in reason, an external lawgiver with threats and rewards is needed as an incentive for compliancewith those laws. Without God,moral laws would be ‘idle chimeras’ [leere Hirngespinste]withoutreality (C1, A811/B839). This pic- ture changes with the Groundwork,wheremoral motivation is connected with the new notions of autonomyand respect for the morallaw.From thatpoint on, be- lief in God is no longer necessary as amotive for moralaction, but God and re- ligion are still necessary conditions of our hoping for and aiming toward the highestgood (as the morallydeservedhappinessofrational creatures). (Timmer- mann 2016a; see C3,5:450 –541; cf. MM, 6:443.35) In the first section of this chapter,Iinvestigate human lovefor God. As we would assume, Kant’streatmentsofthis topic take place at the intersections of moralityand religion. What remains constant in his discussions is the idea that human love for God is about viewing our duties as divine commands and about strivingtopractice these duties gladly [gern]. In Kant’smature period afterthe Groundwork,this striving is developed in terms of aregulative ideal that Kant calls ‘lovefor the law’,which is the unattainable goal of one’sstriving for glad- ness in fulfilling all of one’sduties.The exegetical problems Iwish to address in this section are as follows: What is the relationship between human lovefor God and love’sgeneral division?Ishuman lovefor God equatable with lovefor the law, or do they remain somehow discernible from each other?Iwill answer these questions toward the end of the section. It seems that Kant does not write about loveofGod directlypriortothe sec- ond Critique. To be sure, he recognises from the early1760s onwardsthat there might be an obligation to love, but in its earliest formulations this obligation is not explicitlyassociatedwith God and is apparentlydiscussed more as an in- terpersonal issue.⁸ By contrast,itisequallythe case thatthe earlier Kant recog-

 See ‘AttempttoIntroduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy’ [Versuch den Begriff der negativenGrößen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen](1763)(2:183.35–36) and ‘Inquiry Concerningthe Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality’ [Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grunsätzeder natürlichen Theologie und der Moral](1764) (2:300.2), as wellasthe Herder lectures on ethics (27:65 – 66). Goy (2014, pp. 15–16) speculates interestingly whether loveofGod might alreadybelocated in the aforementioned ‘Inquiry’,because the prin- ciple of mutual loveisdiscussed in the same paragraph as the proposition to do ‘what is in ac- cordance with the will of God’ / ‘das,was dem Willen Gottes gemäß ist’ (2:300.17). Goy is correct to notethat the link between mutual loveand loveofGod (and the commandment to loveone’s neighbour)isunclear,and Itherefore think that she is stretchingthe rather vagueevidencetoo far when she claims that in the ‘Inquiry’ loveofGod (and loveofneighbour)are ‘examples of the “manysimple feelings of the good”’ (Goy 2014,p.16; see 2:299.33). It is not clear whether loveof God is even meant to be at issue in the ‘Inquiry’,and it certainlyisn’tmentioned in that text. 88 3LoveofGod nises that we have traditional obligations to God (e.g. 2:300.16 – 18), but these are not explicitlydiscussed in terms of love. It is also noteworthy that the later Kant of TheMetaphysics of Morals specificallydenies thattherecould be duties to God [gegen Gott]. The duties we mayhave with regardto[in Ansehung] atranscendent being (of which reason provides us an idea) are, properlyspeak- ing,duties to ourselves. (MM, 6:443.27–444.8) The first time that lovefor God actuallycomes up in the Kantian corpus is in the Collinsnotes on ethics. Kant’smature theory of moral motivation is not yetin place, but his several remarks clearly anticipate the later works and indicate con- tinuityinhis treatment.Inthe Collins notes,Kant states,for instance,that ‘the disposition to performance of duties is to be cultivated, and this is what the teacher of the gospels says:thatweshould do everythingfrom the lovefor God. But to loveGod is to do His commands gladly.’ (LE,27:274.13–15⁹;similarly at 27:300.6 – 9; 27:335.35– 37;see also27:322.23–25)Animportant interpretative key is provided in the abovepassage: human lovefor God is closelyconnected with the notion of ‘cultivating’¹⁰ one’sdisposition to perform dutiesgladly. Later on in the lectures,inKant’sdiscussion of duties (and love) towards other people, we learn that to do something gladlyisconnected with doing it willingly,from one’s ‘own impulse’ [aus eignemTriebe]orfrom ‘inclination’ [aus Neygung] (LE, 27:413.18 – 19). In terms of Kant’smature moral philosophyfrom the Groundwork onwards, the idea of acommandment to do something out of inclination or inclination- based lovemay seem puzzling.Inthe foundational terminology of Kant’smature moral philosophy, duty and inclination are opposing terms:ifanactionisdone from duty,itisnot done from inclination, and conversely, if something is done from inclination, it is done from asort of natural liking and thereforenot from duty.But as we shall learn next,itisnot the case that the commandment to loveGod in Kant’smature period prescribes practicing duties from inclination; instead, it prescribes practicing duties with afacilitating or corresponding incli- nation, and hence gladly. What will remain impossible for humans is the com- plete attainment of alovefor the moral law(see ch. 1.3). We will always have in- clinations thatrun contrary to what morality demands, which also means that we can never loveGod perfectly.

 ‘ist die Gesinnungder Leistungder Pflichten zu cultiviren, und dieses ist das,was der Lehrer des Evangelii sagt,daß man alles ausLiebe zu Gott thun soll. Gott lieben ist aber seine Gebothe gerne thun.’ Translation modified.  Idiscuss the notion of cultivationinch. 4.2.2.A. 3.1 Love forGod 89

Kant’smain discussion of lovefor God occurs in the second Critique. In the chapter ‘On the IncentivesofPure Practical Reason’¹¹ Kant engagesinphilosoph- ical interpretation of Jesus’ basiccommandment to loveGod aboveall and one’s neighbour as oneself. Iwillread this passagebyfirst pointing out the implied existenceofthe general division of love in this context,and then by looking at the waythe adverb ‘gladly’ functions, in order to analyse how Kant under- stands the relationship between lovefor God and lovefor the law. The starting point of Kant’senquiry is the idea that the twofold religious commandment is in agreement with the notion that while we are the lawgivers of morality,weare also its subjects: ‘For, as acommandment it requires respect for alaw that commands love and does not leave it to one’sdiscretionary choice to make this one’sprinciple. But lovefor God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for he is not an object of the senses.’ (C2, 5:83.5 – 7)¹² Here, in the context of lovefor God,Kant seems to rely implicitly on the same division be- tween inclination-based loveand reason-based lovethat he uses extensively in the context of neighbourlylove. In my chapter on love of neighbour,Iwill show how this distinction can be understood in terms of love’sgeneral division into loveofdelight and loveofbenevolence (bothofwhich can be either intel- lectual/moral or pathological). Assumingthese results, it seems thatwhat is ex- cluded in the passagequoted aboveisthe possibilityofloving God in the sense of inclination-based loveofbenevolence or pathological loveofdelight (or,even more obviously, the crude animal impulseofsex). We can hence plausiblysay that lovefor God at least makes implicit referencetolove’sgeneral division and can be analysed in conjunction with that division. Kant goes on to conclude that since inclinations (and loveinparticular)can- not be directlycommanded, the commandment to lovecan onlyconcern practi- cal love, i.e. loveofneighbour as active rationalbenevolence (see ch. 4.2.2).But it seems thatfrom the side of naturalinclination-based love(whichfor Kant is the more paradigmatic type of love) we still getaresidue or a supplement, which informs the kind of emotional state we should aim to approximate when acting from duty: ‘To loveGod means, in this sense, to do what He com- mands gladly;toloveone’sneighbor means to practice all duties toward him gladly.’ (C2, 5:83.12 – 14)¹³ The idea of gladness in lovefor God retains areference

 ‘Vonden Triebfedern der reinen praktischen Vernunft’.  ‘Denn es fordert doch als Gebot Achtungfür ein Gesetz, das Liebe befiehlt,und überläßtes nicht der beliebigenWahl, sich diese zum Princip zu machen. Aber Liebe zu Gott als Neigung (pathologische Liebe) ist unmöglich; denn er ist kein Gegenstand der Sinne.’  ‘Gott lieben, heißtindieser Bedeutung, seine Gebote gerne thun; den Nächsten lieben, heißt, alle Pflicht gegenihn gerne ausüben.’ 90 3LoveofGod to inclination-based loveinmoral action. As noted above, however,there cannot be adirect duty to be glad; rather,gladness is something for which we must strive [streben]. Thecommandment to loveGod (and one’sneighbour) ‘presents the moraldisposition in its completeperfection’ (C2, 5:83.23–24)¹⁴,and werethis to be attained, the moral agent would not have anyinclinations that run contrary to the moral law. She would be fullyinclined to do what moralitycommands in every situation: she would always be moral gladly. Kant calls this ideal end state, which he stresses is not attainable (C2, 5:84.1– 2; 5:84.15) for finite imperfect crea- tures likeus, lovefor the law[Liebe zumGesetze](C2,5:84.12).¹⁵ Lovefor God, or the commandment to loveGod, thus involves recognisingall duties as divine commands and striving to approximate lovefor the morallaw by aiming for gladness in the fulfilment of duties.Lovefor God concernsone’sown moral per- fection, which includes aglad, cheerful disposition. It prescribes the rational ideal of the highest subjective moralgood. But can we saythatlovefor God and lovefor the moral laware thereforethe same thing? If it is the casethat lovefor God and lovefor the laware simply the same, and that lovefor the lawisanunattainable ideal, then it would follow thatlove for God is also unattainable, not onlywith regard to feeling or inclination-based lovebut also with regardtomoral practice. It might be more charitable to as- sume that thereisadifferencebetween the two notions, such thatwhile love for the lawremains unattainable we can still speak of some kind of lovefor God, in anysuch case whereweare able to practice some duty gladly – that is, from respect for the morallaw but with an accompanying inclinationtowards the particular action (or its result)¹⁶.But to answer the question properly, it is necessary to investigate how love for God and lovefor the laware linked in Kant’sworks after the second Critique. Iwill do this by investigating the relevant remarks from the Religion and the roughlycontemporaneous Vigilantius lectures on ethics. There are two particularlyrelevant passages in the Religion thatshed light on this connection. Firstly, in a ‘General Comment’ [Allgemeine Anmerkung]to the third book of the Religion,wefind afamiliar statement: ‘The highest goal, however,ofthe moral perfection of finite creatures – never completelyattainable

 ‘stellt […]die sittliche Gesinnunginihrer ganzenVollkommenheit dar’.  Goy (2014, p. 19) is thus correct to note that in the second Critique the lovecommandment results in an unattainable ideal.  Ileave open herewhether the inclination concerns the action itself, the effect of the action, or both. Idon’tsee evidencetowarrant anystrong response to this question. 3.1 Lovefor God 91 for human beings – is loveofthe law.’ (R,6:145.17– 19)¹⁷ The brief remark does not address lovefor God directly, but it is important to note thatKant here uses the word ‘completely’ [völlig]. Lovefor the lawisnot completely attainable, and hence it seems possible thatitisattainable to some extent. But this still does not answer the question about the relationship between lovefor God and lovefor the law. Kant movesoninthe immediatelyfollowing paragraph to discuss God’s lovefor human beings: ‘In with this idea, the following would be a principle of faith in religion: “God is love”’ (R,6:145.21–22)¹⁸.Thisimplies that the idea of lovefor the lawisinharmonywith the principle of God’sbeing love, or perhaps thatthe idea of lovefor the lawshould be understood in con- junction with the idea thatGod is love. In either case, this ‘conformity’ is arel- evant finding and willbediscussed in the latter half of this chapter. There are three very strongreadings of the aboveconjunction in the litera- ture. Firstly, Sidney Axinn states that in the abovepassages of the Religion, ‘Kant’sinterpretation of “God is love” is developedinterms of loveofthe moral law.’ (Axinn 1994,p.119) However,Axinn does not elaborate on this. Tak- ing asimilar position to Axinn’s, Bernard Reardon seems to hold that Kant equa- tes loveofthe lawwith the notion that God is love: ‘To express this idea [loveof the law] in religious terms is, he thinks, to affirm that “God is love”’ (Reardon 1988, p. 143). Reardon correctlypoints out that God’sloveisatleast partlyare- sponse to ‘man’sefforts to fulfilthe holylaw’ (Reardon 1988, p. 143), but Ifail to see how this (at least partial) interdependence of loveofthe lawand the idea that God is lovemakesitthe case that the latter is simplya‘religious expression’ of the former. The sameobjection can be put to Palmquist,who holds that ‘the religious equivalent of the idea of “loveofthe morallaw” is the “article of faith,

 ‘Das höchste, für Menschen nie völlig erreichbareZiel der moralischen Vollkommenheit end- licher Geschöpfe ist aber die Liebe des Gesetzes.’ DiCenso’sreading of the passage is in striking contrast with the second Critique. According to DiCenso: ‘Learningtolove the moral law means maturingethicallytothe point where we do not requireexternal coerciontooffset our predilec- tion for maxims based on self-love.’ (DiCenso 2012,p.197)Inthe second Critique,however,lov- ing the moral lawisdependent on havingathorough liking for what the moral lawcommands. The criterion for loveofthe lawinDiCenso’sinterpretation is significantlyless demanding: it suffices that we do not require ‘external coercion’ for ‘offsetting’ the maxims of self-love, i.e. in DiCenso’sreading the moral agent loves the lawifshe is matureenough to autonomously override her maxims of self-love(without beingforcedtodosobyothers). But in this case she could, by means of her own will (i.e. without external coercion), offset the predilection to self-love but do it grudgingly. In my view,followingthe moral lawautonomouslybut grudgingly would hardly be lovefor the law(which somehow requires liking), and Ihavenot found textual evidencethat would support DiCenso’sinterpretation.  ‘Dieser Ideegemäß würde es in der Religion ein Glaubensprincip sein: “Gott ist die Liebe”’. 92 3LoveofGod

‘God is love’”.’ (Palmquist 2000,p.261)¹⁹ It seems to me that in their readings (which are immanent to the Religion)Axinn, Reardon, and Palmquistdonot an- alyse these twonotions of love of God, i.e. love for God and love by God. It seems completelypossible, and even probable, that further evidence will show that there is something in human striving for loveofthe law(or in human lovefor God) that is not as such contained in God’slove, and vice versa, that thereis some elementinGod’slovethat goes beyond human striving for loveofthe law. We should not equate the twodirections of lovewithout careful and thor- ough analysis.Itshould alsoberemembered that in the second Critique,the reg- ulative ideal of loving the lawisitself occasioned by the command to loveGod, and hencethe notion of loving the lawisgrounded in religious vocabulary.It would thus be somewhat odd, in my opinion,tocall God’slovethe ‘religious ex- pression’ or ‘religious equivalent’ of lovefor the law, as lovefor the law, too, seems very much connected to an interpretationofChristian scripture. While the commentators are right to note thatlovefor the lawand God’sloveare ob- viouslylinked (through the notion of conformity), in the light of textual evidence lovefor the lawand love for God seem even more tightlyconnected, as they are both loves wherethe human being is the subject of love. In lovefor God and love for the law, the object of loveisideal or ‘higher’ than human nature,i.e.both of these loves have an ‘upward’ direction. The second passageinthe Religion concerns human lovefor God,but it also relates implicitlytolovefor the law. In discussing service to God, Kant distin- guishesbetween two doctrines thatcan be taught in relation to religion: ‘the doc- trine of godliness’ [Gottseligkeitslehre]²⁰ and ‘the pure doctrine of virtue’ [die reine

 Perhapswecould makeAxinn’s, Reardon’s, and Palmquist’sinterpretations plausible by ap- pealingtoasubtle distinction in Kant’sterminology.Inthe second Critique,Kant uses the term ‘Liebe zum Gesetze’,whereas in the Religion he speaks of ‘Liebe des Gesetzes’,which translate roughlytolove for the lawand love of the law, respectively.Inthe latter case, we could try to arguethat while the lawis(ideally) an object of love, it is also somehow the subject of love. Then we might understand God’sloveinterms of love of the law. This position would equate God with the moral law, and loveofGod in general would be subsumed under loveflowing to and from the moral law. However,Iam not convinced by this argument,asitneglects several passageswhere God and the moral lawseem distinct – the argument seems to uncriticallysyn- thesise toomanythings.Moreover,Axinn, Reardon, and Palmquist do not argueanythingofthe sort.Further,therewould still be twodirections of lovetobeaccounted for,and their relation- ship would then be quiteunclear.  Gottseligkeit is not amodern German word,and according to the AdelungDictionary it means an endeavour [Bemühung]oranaptitude [Fertigkeit]toplaceGod at the ground of one’sentireconduct and to direct one’sactions to God’shonour [Ehre]. Ithank Jens Timmer- mann for drawing my attention to this. 3.1 Love forGod 93

Tugendlehre](R, 6:182.21–22).The lattershould be the starting point of moral and religious instruction, whereas the formerserves ‘onlyasameans to strength- en […]the virtuousattitude’ (R,6:183.15 – 16)²¹.The doctrine of godliness consists of two moral attitudes – fear of God and loveofGod: ‘Fear of God is this attitude in compliancewith his commands from obligated (a subject’s) duty,i.e., from re- spect for the law, but love of God is this attitude from one’sown free choice and liking [Wohlgefallen]for the law(from filial duty).’ (R,6:182.27–30)²² In this context,loveofGod [Liebe Gottes]isclearlythe human being’slove for God. It is again distinguished from mere respect for the lawand implies (in addition to involving freechoice) a ‘liking for the law’,which is described in terms of Wohlgefallen. Further,the passagestronglysuggests thatinsofar as this liking for the lawmay indeed be interpreted in terms of lovefor the law (as the common context of lovefor God implies), this love is loveofdelight. The doctrine of godliness thereforeseems to provide further evidence for the vi- ability of the general divisionofloveinthe context of lovefor God. What is par- ticularlyinteresting here, moreover,isthatthere is no mention of the unattain- ability of this kind of lovefor God. Rather,inthis context it seems possiblethat we can loveGod by liking the law. If we now read this passagetogether with the earlier passagefrom the Religion and the first passagefrom the second Critique, what reveals itself is ascalingstructure for the of lovefor God, wherelovefor God comes in degrees and onlyits highest stageisproperly called lovefor the law(which remains unattainable). Let us call this the scale of love for God. Recall that in the second Critique the command to love God prescribed the ideal of practicing all duties gladly, which was unattainable (but there was no claim that no duties could be practiced gladly). In the first passageofthe Reli- gion,loveofthe lawisdescribed as being not completely attainable, whereas in the second passagelovefor God seems quitepossible. Thescale of lovefor God thus has two extreme endpoints, between which the actuality of lovefor God falls. At one end we have fear of God (or mere respect for the law), which is the zero-point of lovefor God (there is no lovepresent). At the other end we have perfect lovefor God (i.e. love for the law), whereall duties are subjectively accompanied by acorresponding inclination. The normative end of progress on this scale is astate where ‘dread changes into liking and respect into love’ (C2,

 ‘nur zum Mittel dienen […]die Tugendgesinnung, zu stärken’.  ‘Furcht Gottesist diese GesinnunginBefolgung seiner Geboteaus schuldiger (Unterthans‐) Pflicht,d.i. ausAchtungfürs Gesetz; Liebe Gottes aber auseigener freier Wahl und ausWohlge- fallen am Gesetze (aus Kindespflicht).’ Pluhar’stranslation. 94 3LoveofGod

5:84.17– 19)²³.The actualityoflovefor God lies between these endpoints.²⁴ We hereby arrive at asubtle distinctionbetween lovefor God and lovefor the law: lovefor God is anyinstance of liking the law, i.e. of doing one’sduty gladly, whereas lovefor the lawisthe ideal and unattainable perfection of this dispo- sition. In this way, despite our imperfections, it is nevertheless possiblefor us to loveGod practically.²⁵ The Vigilantius notes on ethics appear to corroborate this general picture, even though the criterion for loving the lawisdescribed slightlydifferently:

§143.Love towards God is the foundation of all inner religion. The maxim of gladlyfollowingalawislovefor the lawitself, which presupposes aliber- ation from the inclinations that hinder us fromfollowingit; and hence we do that very un- willingly, so long as such contrary impulses arestill to be found in us,representing an ob- stacle to be overcome. (LE, 27:720.1– 7)²⁶

Here, it seems to be the adoption of the maxim(to follow the moral lawgladly) that we oughttostrive for in our attempt to approximate lovefor the law. Since the maxim presupposes ‘liberation from the inclinations’,itisrelatively clear that it cannot be adopted perfectly. This finding seems to be consistent with the accounts giveninthe second Critique and the Religion. It is alsoimplied a little further down that loveofthe lawwillremain an ideal, whereas lovefor God mayberelatively attained by conjoiningacorresponding inclination to the representation of particularduties: ‘so in loveofthe lawthere is no com- mand, and the so-called categorical: Love God tells us no more than to base our observanceoflaws, not merelyonobedience […]but on an inclinationin conformity with what the lawprescribes.’ (LE, 27:721.10 – 14)²⁷ The notion that loveofthe lawisnot associated with anycommand confirms thatthis ideal

 ‘verwandeltsich […]die […]Scheu in Zuneigung und Achtungindie Liebe’.  This is not to suggest that thereisacalculus for lovefor God in Kant; the idea is merely that we have twoidealised ends and anotion of progress that is beingprescribed throughaninter- pretation of the lovecommandment,such that we areable to speak of less and more within this context.  Iamgrateful to Jens Timmermann for discussions that led me to arrive at this interpretation.  ‘§143.Die Liebe gegenGott ist das Fundament der ganzeninnern Religion. Die Maxime, ein Gesetz gern zu befolgen, ist Liebe fürs Gesetz selbst,welches eine Befreiung vonden Neigungen voraussetzt,die die Befolgung des Gesetzesbehindern: und daher thut man es so lange überaus ungern, als noch dergleichen Antriebe zum Gegentheil in uns sich finden, die ein zu überwin- dendes Hinderniß sind.’  ‘es liegt also in der Liebe des GesetzeskeinGebot: und die sogenannteCategorie / liebe Gott heißtnichts weiter als: die Befolgung der Gesetze nicht blos aufGehorsam, […]sondern aufeine mit der Vorschrift des Gesetzes übereinstimmende Neigung gründen.’ 3.2 God’sLove 95 end state involves the absence of inclinations contrary to morality.Itisalso im- portant to note that in actual lovefor God there is no reversal of, or threat to, the ground of morality: respect for the moral lawremains the actual determining ground of doing one’sduty,but in lovefor God moral action is also supported²⁸ by an inclination to execute the prescribed action (or achieveits outcome). For example, we loveGod when we help others from duty while also feeling lovefor them (‘love’ here meaning the inclination to benefit others or to derive sensible pleasure from their happiness or their existence). But our lovehere, or our glad- ness, is merelysubjective and not the objective ground of our duty,and the pri- mary function of this love, from amoral philosophical perspective,istopromote the happiness of others and aid humanity with respect to moral progress. In sum, lovefor God is the glad practice of duty (in areligious context where duties are viewed as divinecommands). Lovefor God is closelylinked (but not identical) to the ideal of loveofthe law, which is loveofdelight for all of one’s duties (implying the completeabsenceofcontra-moral inclinations). Ideal love for the lawisalso the equivalent of perfect lovefor God. The actuality of love for God thus falls between two endpoints: astate with no loveand astate of per- fect love. Reason demands thatthe agent strive to make progress on this contin- uumtoward perfect lovefor God or for the law. The picture of such an ascent can thereforebecalled the scale of lovefor God.

3.2 God’sLove

Inow turn to God’slovefor human beings. My main aim will be to clarify the role of the general division of loveinthis context.Once this is clarified, it will be eas- ier to assess the relationship between God’slovefor human beingsand human beings’ lovefor God. There are two distinct accounts of God’sloveinthe Kantian corpus,one in the Religion and another in TheMetaphysics of Morals (the latter is corroboratedbythe Vigilantius notes on ethics). At the outset,itmay seem that these accounts have little in common (and Kant does not discuss them in direct conjunction with each other).Iwill show,however,that these two accounts may in fact be harmonised by using the general division of loveasaninterpretative tool. In otherwords, Iwill show how the accounts are distinct from each other in terms of the general division and thatthey maythereforebeseen to complement

 Based on the Groundwork and the second Critique,weknow that our observanceoforcom- pliancewith our duties should not be based on inclinations.Inthis light,the word ‘gründen’ (to ‘ground’ or to ‘base’)inthe Vigilantius passage above(LE,27:721.10 –14)seems simplytoo strong,evenifwethink that this grounding is to be understood merely in asubjective sense. 96 3Love of God each other, thus yielding an overall picture of God’sloveinKant.Ishallterm the accounts the end account of God’sloveand the ground account of God’slove. The rather striking dynamic structure that emergesfrom this analysis reveals God’sloveofbenevolence as the ground of human lovefor God (and human love for one’sneighbour), such that human lovefor God is dependent on God’slove and aims to reciprocate it by means of the glad fulfilment of duties. At its highest stage, this human striving connects seamlesslywith the other aspect of God’s love, moral delight,which is something we can onlyhope for in our morallyim- perfect state of existence. God’sloveisthereforeboth the ground of and are- sponsetohuman lovefor God, in accordancewith the general division of love. In other words, with God’slovethe beginning and the end of an ascending structure of loveare marked in terms of the general division of love.

3.2.1 The End Account

The Religion is filled with statements asserting or implying thatakey element of religion is to aim to become pleasing to God [Gott wohlgefällig zu werden]by means of morallygood life conduct (see R, 6:47.19; 6:66.21–22;6:67.15; 6:71.28–29fn.; 6:73.14 – 15;6:75.5 – 6; 6:105.1;6:116.11– 12; 6:117; 6:120.10 –12; 6:133.6; 6.159.14; 6:170 – 175; 6:177– 178; 6:193.19;6:195.35fn.; 6:198.9 –10). Kant re- peatedlyaffirms that the primaryexample or archetype of ahuman being who is pleasing to God is God’sson, Jesus Christ,inwhom we encounter arational model of humanity in its perfection (see R, 6:60.14; 6:61.25; 6:62.3;6:62.29–30; 6:63.24–25;6:64.7; 6:119.7;6:128.18 – 129.1;see also GW,408.28–409.9). Given the features of human lovefor God discussed above, it seems reasonable to as- sume thatfrom areligious perspective the good life conduct we oughttoaim for is preciselylovefor God.But the real question is whether the pleasure or delight [Wohlgefallen]ofGod to which good conduct hopefullyorideallyleads can be cashed out in terms of love.Ifitcan – if good conduct leads to God’sloving us with delight – is thatthe whole picture when it comes to God’slove, or is there more to it? The evidence directlyconnectingGod’sdelight with the notion of God’slove can be found at the end of the third book of the Religion,immediatelyfollowing Kant’sassertionthatloveofthe lawisthe highest (but never completelyattain- able) goal of human moral striving.God’sloveissaid to be in conformity with what wassaid about lovefor the law, and it is discussed in terms of the Trinity:

In conformity with this idea, the followingwould be aprinciple of faith in religion: ‘God is Love’;inhim one can venerate the lovingone (with his loveofmoral delight for human 3.2 God’sLove 97

beings insofar as they areadequatetohis holylaw), the Father;inhim, furthermore, insofar as he exhibits himself in his all-preservingidea, humanity’sarchetype begotten and be- loved by him, one can venerate his Son;finallyalso, insofar as he limits this delight to the condition that human beings harmonize with the condition of that loveofdelight, and thereby proves it to be alovebased on wisdom, one can venerate the (R, 145.20 –146.1)²⁹.

This passageclearly confirms the connection between God’sloveand God’sde- light.Inother words, in conformity with the regulative ideal of loveofthe law, God’sloveistobeunderstood in terms of loveofdelight.Inhis analysis,Kant utilises atripartite structure for God, which at bottom is standard Christian dogma and which he had alreadybrieflymentioned in his own mature frame- work in the second Critique.³⁰ In the Religion,Kant views the three main attrib- utes of God as expressingGod’s ‘moralconduct’ [das moralische Verhalten](R, 6:140.2) towards humankind. First,as‘holylawgiver’,God giveshumanity the moral laws. Second, as a ‘benign ruler’,heaccounts for the moralconstitution of humans and compensates for their moral inabilities. Third, as ‘just judge’, he limits his compensation with the condition thathumans have tried their best to be moral. (R,6:141.9 – 25) In the long passagequoted above, this tripartite structure is mappedonto the names ‘Father’, ‘Son’,and ‘HolySpirit’.Inharmonywith the notionthat ‘God is love’,Kant’sdiscussion assumesthat lovesomehow encompasses all three attributes.First,insofar as human beingsare adequate to the holylaw/ moral law, God is morallypleased with them, i.e. he loves human beingswith the loveofmoral delight.Second, he loves the archetype or the rational ideal of human moral perfection as his ‘Son’.Third, as the ‘HolySpirit’,helimits his loveofmoral delight so that human beingsmust ‘harmonizewith the condi- tion of that love’.Onthe face of it,itseems especiallydifficult to draw amean-

 ‘Dieser Idee gemäß würde es in der Religion ein Glaubensprincip sein: “Gott ist die Liebe”; in ihm kannman den Liebenden (mit der Liebe des moralischen Wohlgefallens an Menschen, so fern sie seinem heiligen Gesetze adäquat sind), den Vater;ferner in ihm, so fern er sich in seiner alles erhaltendenIdee,dem vonihm selbst gezeugtenund geliebten Urbilde der Menschheitdar- stellt, seinen Sohn;endlich auch, so fern er dieses Wohlgefallen aufdie Bedingung der Überein- stimmungder Menschen mit der Bedingung jener Liebe des Wohlgefallens einschränkt und da- durch als aufWeisheit gegründeteLiebe beweist,den heiligenGeist verehren’.Pluhar’s translation,but rendering Wohlgefallen as ‘delight’ instead of ‘pleasure’.  In the second Critique,Kant mentions in passingthe three main attributes of God, which are all moral. He is holy[heilig], blessed [selig], and wise [weise]. In actingfrom the first attribute, God creates the world and givesthe moral law; in actingfromthe second, he governs and pre- serves the world with goodness or benignity [gütigkeit]; and in actingfromthe third, he judges human beings (C2, 5:131.32–38;cf. R, 6:139.22–27;see also LE, 27:306). 98 3LoveofGod ingful distinction between the first and the third attributes, but in along and ob- scure footnote Kant explains that the judgment of the ‘HolySpirit’ is connected to one’sconscience(R, 6:146.5– 20). As noted by Palmquist,the ‘HolySpirit’ bringswith it afirst-person perspective on measuring up to the condition of God’slove(see Palmquist2000,p.262). But in the footnote the ‘Son’ also judges: he judgesbetween people, based on their being capable of morality or being re- ceptive to the possibilityofacquiringmoral merit (R,6:145.29–146.4). The details of Kant’saccount of the Trinity as loveare elusive,but fortunately, the success of my argument does not depend on the correct exegetical interpretation concern- ing these relationships.³¹ What is essential here is that in the Religion,the idea that ‘God is love’ is discussed in terms of loveofdelight,and this love by God for human beings is somehowdependent on the moral striving of humans. This is how ‘God is love’ is in ‘conformity’ with lovefor the law. But God’slovefor us is not guaran- teed. If we interpret God’sconditional response of loveinthe general context of the delight he takes in us, it seems that the condition of this morallyapproving love, alovewemay at best hope for,isour sincere attempt to become morally better: ‘everyone must do as much as is in his powers in order to become abetter human being’ (R,6:52.2–3³²;see also e.g. 6:66.21–67.12).Ifweadopt amoral at- titude, the adoption of which Kant also describes as a ‘changeofheart’ [Änder- ung des Herzens](R, 6:47.28), and strive to approximate lovefor the law, we will be entitled to the hope that this striving will eventuallybemet with God’smo- rallyapprovinglovefor us. In other words, God’slovefor humans, as loveofde- light,isaconditioned response to the human moral endeavour to approximate lovefor the law – that is, it is aresponse to the human attempt to gladlyfulfil moral duties (viewed as divine commands). Ithereforecall this account of God’slovethe end account,since it is alove that we mayhope for in the end, provided we do our best to loveGod in the

 In TheConflict of the Faculties [Der Streitder Fakultäten], written slightly after the Religion and published in 1798, Kant himself complains in passingthat reason cannot keep up with the textofthe Bible when it comestothe Trinity (7:23.25–28). He now holds that,assuch, the doctrine of the Trinity is devoid of practical significance(7:38.33–34), but it may(or even must) be interpreted through practical reason (7:38.28–32). However,contrary to Samuel Powell (who makes his claim without anytextual evidence), the Religion makes clear that Kant does not ‘dismiss’ the doctrine of the Trinity ‘as idle’ (see Powell 2011, p. 268). It is equallynot the case that Kant viewed the Trinity as being ‘outside the scope of Christian faith’ (O’Regan 2011,p.254). Rather,Kant is attemptingamoral-rational interpretation of the Trinity.For amoreoptimistic/ affirmative discussion on Kant’srelationship with the Trinity,see Palmquist (2000,pp. 466– 467).  ‘ein jeder so viel, als in seinen Kräften ist,thun müsse, um ein besserer Mensch zu werden’. 3.2 God’sLove 99 meantime. Admittedly, the English word ‘end’ is ambiguous between apurpose and the lastpoint of atemporalseries.³³ ForKant,the relevant terms in this re- spect are Zweck and Ende,the first referringtoapurpose and the second to a temporalend (see alsoPluhar,fn.c, in R, 6:35). Iintend the end account of God’slovetobetaken in bothsenses. By this Imean that the ‘end’ under discus- sion in the context of God’sloveishis loveofmoral delight for human beings. This loveisboth the religious purpose of our moral striving and the (quasi‐)tem- poral end of the temporal series (hopefully)connected to this striving.Ingener- al, we know that in Kant morality leads to religion, and the idea of God’sloveis required for us to hope thatthe end of the highest good (in the sense of purpose or Zweck)will be realised. Insofar as God’sloveofmoral delight is lacking,we clearlyhaveyet to attain the highest good. In religious terms, our end, i.e. our purpose, is thatGod will loveuswith the love of moral delight.But this picture is tightlyconnected to afurther meaning of God’sloveofdelight as the (quasi‐) temporalend of human moral striving.Despiteany possible ‘changeofheart’,in this life our moralstriving will remain deficient.Weare imperfect by nature and can onlygraduallyapproximate moral perfection, which means that at anygiven point in time we willnot have reached the moralideal of humanity that would be pleasing [wohlgefällig]toGod (R,6:66–67). AccordingtoKant,however,God judgesthe ‘heart’ (R,6:48.4–16), or the fundamental ‘attitude’ [Gesinnung]ofthe human being,asa‘unity of time’ [Zeiteinheit]that is not divided into time seg- ments (R,6:70.fn) but is rather a ‘perfected whole’ [vollendet Ganze](R, 6:67.13). This kind of perspective of eternity is not easy to understand,and Kant acknowledgesthat the (religious)notionofatemporal ‘end of all things’ is theoretically incomprehensible (see Kant’sessaybythe samename in 8:327– 339; see also my Conclusion). We can onlyhope that our moral striving will be met with God’sdelighted loveatthe incomprehensible completion of the temporalseries, where God will hopefullycompensatefor our lack of perfec- tion by means of grace (see e.g. R, 6:118–120)³⁴.Bythis Imean thatwhile God’s loveofmoral delight is the purpose of our moral striving from aparticular reli- gious perspective, this same love is alsothe hoped-for (temporal) end of the tem-

 Ithank Rae Langtonfor remindingmeofthis.  Avery interesting question, but one that cannot be pursued here anymoreexplicitly, is whether Kant’saccount of grace should actuallybeanalysed in terms of God’slove. My findings certainlyseem to point in that direction, or at least in the direction that in the light of textual evidence, it is plausible to assume such alink between God’sgrace and God’slove. However, as Kant is not explicit about this link and does not elaborateonitmorethan Ihaveshown, it is understandable that the previous commentators on grace don’tdiscuss this connection (see e.g. Vanden Auweele 2014 and Stevenson 2014). 100 3LoveofGod poral series related to moral striving.The reason for this is that in the religious picture, nothing comes after God’sperfect love of moral delight for human be- ings. In this way, God’sloveofdelight can be seen to mark atransition from time to eternity (see 8:327), signifyingsalvation and eternal bliss. Of course, nothing of this can be known theoretically, but in ‘The End of All Things’ Kant playfullyenvisions the heavenlycongregation ‘as striking up always the same song,their “Alleluia!” […]bywhich is indicated the total lack of all changein their state.’ (8:335.1– 3)³⁵ According to Kant,atthe end of temporalalteration ‘the last thought, the last feeling in the thinkingsubjectwillthen remainforever the samewithout anychange.’ (8:334.29–30)³⁶ If God is love(as the Religion sug- gests), and if the purpose of God’sloveasmoral delight is achieved, the last thoughtorthe lastfeeling (beitinGod or in the human being) can onlybe the very samelovethat is achieved. To put it simply, if we sincerelystrivetobe- come more moral, we may hope for God’sloveofdelight in the sense that ‘all’s well that ends well’ [Ende gut, alles gut](see R, 6:70fn.; 6:77.36).

3.2.2 The Ground Account

In TheMetaphysics of Morals,wefind adistinctlydifferent account of God’slove. The main point of the concluding remark of the entire work is that religion lies beyond ethics. Since the idea of God is man-made, our duty toward God is, ethi- callyspeaking, ‘aduty of ahuman being to himself […], for the sake of strength- ening the moral incentive in our ownlawgiving reason.’ (MM, 6.487. 22–25)³⁷ In this context Kant continues his discussion of the moralattributes of God (includ- ing God’slove):

The divine end with regardtothe human race (in creating and guidingit) can be thought onlyasproceedingfrom love,that is, as the happiness of human beings.[…]Toexpress this in human terms, God has created rational beings from the need, as it were,tohavesome- thingoutside himself which he could loveorbywhich he could also be loved. (MM, 6.488.26–35)³⁸

 ‘immer dasselbe Lied, ihr Hallelujah, […]anstimmen […]wodurch der gänzliche Mangelalles Wechsels in ihremZustande angezeigt werden soll.’  ‘der letzteGedanke, das letzteGefühl bleiben alsdann in dem denkenden Subject stehend und ohne Wechsel immer dieselben.’  ‘Pflicht des Menschen gegensich selbst,[…]zur Stärkung der moralischen Triebfeder in uns- erereigenen gesetzgebenden Vernunft.’  ‘Den göttlichen Zweck in Ansehungdes menschlichen Geschlechts (dessen Schöpfungund Leitung) kannman sich nicht anders denken, als nur aus Liebe, d.i. daß er die Glückseligkeit der 3.2 God’sLove 101

Here, God’sloveispresented as the ground of the existenceofthe human race. The divine end related to this loveisthe happiness of human beings. The con- nection between God’sloveand human happiness in this context seems strongly to implythatthis loveisthe loveofbenevolence, as we know from the cases of self-loveand loveofneighbour that loveofbenevolence has preciselythe hap- piness of the object of loveasits end. In other words, if we view the ground of creation through the notionthat God is love, it makes sense to assume thatitis God’sloveofbenevolence thatyields the moral commandments,through which God wants us to be happyand wants us to lovehim back. But the problem with this interpretation is that loveofbenevolence is not mentioned in this context.It is unclear what kind of loveKant is talking about. There is another passageatthe end of the conclusionthatsheds light on this issue. Kant’sproblem is now how to harmonise God’sjustice(or right) with his lovewith regard to the end or purpose of the human race. Basically, if God is omnipotent and the ground of creation is God’slove, then in the end all human beingswillbehappy.But Kant sees this as contradictingsome of the deepestcommitments of his moral philosophy, namelythat happiness can onlybemorallyproportioned accordingtovirtue. There are, Kant thinks, crimi- nals who do not deserve to be happy,inwhich case God’sloveand God’sjustice seem to conflict:³⁹

punitive justice would make the end of creation consist not in the creator’s love (as one must yetthink it to be) but rather in the strict observanceofhis right […]. But sincethe lat- ter(justice) is onlythe condition limitingthe former (kindness), this seems to contradict principles of practical reason, by which the creation of aworld must have been omitted if it would have producedaresultsocontrary to the intention of its author,which can have onlylovefor its basis.(MM, 6.490.21–491.4)⁴⁰

Menschen sei. […]Mann könnte sich (nach Menschenart) auch so ausdrücken: Gott hat vernünf- tigeWesen erschaffen,gleichsam ausdem Bedürfnisse etwas außer sich zu haben, was er lieben könne, oder auch vondem er geliebt werde.’  This is of course one of the classical problems of :how can an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God send certain people to hell for eternal damnation and ?  ‘würde die Strafgerechtigkeit den Zweck der Schöpfungnicht in der Liebe des Welturhebers (wie man sich doch denken muß), sonderninder strengenBefolgung des Rechts setzen […], welches,dadas Letztere (die Gerechtigkeit) nur die einschränkendeBedingung des Ersteren (der Gütigkeit) ist,den Principien der praktischen Vernunftzuwidersprechen scheint,nach wel- chen eine Weltschöpfunghätteunterbleiben müssen, die ein der Absicht ihresUrhebers,die nur Liebe zum Grunde habenkann, so widerstreitendes Product geliefert haben würde.’ Translation modified. 102 3LoveofGod

From this Kant concludes thatinethics, the moralrelation between God and human beingsisincomprehensible, and thereforeethics can onlyconcern rela- tions between human beings. (MM, 6:491) There are no dutiestoward God (see also MM, 6:443–444). This does not mean, however,that Kant renounces the postulate of God. He merelydelineatesthe sphere of ethics so as to keep it clear- ly separate from religion. God remains apractical postulate that entitles us to hope for the completehighest good, even though just how God can or will help to bring about the highest good cannot be rationallymade sense of in eth- ics. With this said, from my interpretative perspective it now seems clear that in the concluding argument of TheMetaphysics of Morals Kant does indeed appeal to what can be called the ground account of God’slove. In the latter passage quoted above, the between God’spunitive justice and his lovere- lies preciselyonthe idea that God’soriginal intention in creating the world ‘can have onlylovefor its basis’.These two passages in TheMetaphysics of Morals, compared with the discussion in the Religion,are enough to warrant the claim that there are two distinct accounts of God’sloveinKant’sworks:the ground account and the end account.But even though theyare discernible from each other with respect to the quasi-temporal structure of God’screation, it is still un- clear whether they can be distinguishedinterms of the general division of love. The end account of God’sloveinthe Religion clearlyconcerns loveofdelight,but the ground account in TheMetaphysics of Morals merelyimplies that the loveat issue is perhaps love of benevolence. However,astrongcase for this interpreta- tion can be made by using the Vigilantius lecture notes as an auxiliary source. In the Vigilantius notes,God’sloveisdiscussed not in terms of delight (as in the Religion)but explicitlyinterms of benevolence. Kant’streatment is again in- timatelyconnected with lovefor God and the notion of loving the law. However, unlike in the Religion,God’sloveispresented here not as aresponsetoour moral striving but as a ‘necessary ’ of our lovefor God. In the Vigilantius notes,the picture is thatbyloving God we return or give back our loveinre- sponse to God’soriginal lovefor us: ‘If we are to think, morally, thatwelove God, then it is necessary for us to presuppose His lovefor us, and His will for our well-being,orHis loving-kindness.For no return of lovecan be elicited there, if the command to thateffect does not itself arise from morallove.’ (LE 27.720.18 – 22)⁴¹

 ‘Sollen wir uns moralisch denken, daß wir Gott lieben, so ist notwendig,daß wir seine Liebe gegenuns und seinen Willen für unser Wohl oder seine Gütevoraussetzen. Denn es läßtsich da nicht Gegenliebe erzwingen, wenn das Gebot dazu nicht ausder moralischen Liebe selbst en- tspringt.’ 3.2 God’sLove 103

This looks very much like an elaboration of the idea in TheMetaphysics of Morals,according to which God created us to have something to loveor‘by which he could also be loved’ (MM, 6:488.35). In the Vigilantius notes, the idea is thatinorder for it to be possiblefor us to loveGod, the sourceofthe di- vine command must itself be ‘moral love’ [moralische Liebe]. In other words, the commandment thatweloveGod is here portrayed as being grounded in God’s moral love.⁴² What is this moral love? GiventhatGod’slovefor us is described in the Religion as loveofmoral delight,itissafe to saythat this loveismoral. But there is no mention of Wohlgefallen in this context in the Vigilantius lectures, and the sourceofthe morallovenow at issue is linked to God’swill[Wille] for our well-being [Wohl]⁴³ and his loving kindness [Güte]. The fact that God’s moral loveishere discussed in terms of God’swanting thingstogowell for us (implying our happiness as the end of thatlove) suggests that the loveat issue might instead be the loveofbenevolence. This suspicion is confirmed onlyafew lines down:

God’slovefor us (also expressed by the words: God is love)isthus the divine benevolence and kindness toward us,which constitutes the foundation of the potestas legislatoria div- ina. Now to return that loveisthe correspondingdutyofall His subjects,and constitutes the prime source of anydisposition to religion. But this loveofGod can be known only through our reason (LE, 27:721.1– 6)⁴⁴.

This bothdifferentiates the account from the one giveninthe Religion and sup- ports the interpretation accordingtowhich God’sloveinTheMetaphysics of Mo- rals can be viewed as loveofbenevolence(seealso 28:1114). It alsoshows the two-directionality of loveofGod:here, loveofGod is God’slove. There is no

 This point is wellnotedbyMoors (2007, pp. 257–259), but he goes so far as to claim that the duty of loveisthereby grounded in an ‘originatingtheologico-metaphysical basis’ (Moors 2007, p. 259). Moors maynot fullyappreciatethe basic point that for Kant,religion is very much about viewing our duties as divine commands, and the notion of God is arational idea derivedfrom moral reason.Iwould thus be wary of talkingabout a ‘theologico-metaphysical basis’ of any- thinginKant.Inthe Vigilantius notes, for instance, just beforethe passageinquestion, Kant states that ‘[i]t is easy to see that for man there is no wayleft,but that of fashioninghis own God .’ (LE, 27:719.37–38) / ‘Man sieht leicht,daß für den Menschen kein Wegüberbleibt,als sich aufdem Grunde der Moral seinen eigenen Gott zu machen.’  This must mean our overall moral-physical well-being.  ‘Die Liebe Gottesgegen uns (oder welches man auch ausdrückt: Gott ist die Liebe)ist also das göttliche Wohlwollen und Gütegegen uns, die das Fundament der potestatis legislatoriae divinae ausmacht.Die Gegenliebe ist nun die correspondirende Pflicht aller Untergebenen und macht die erste Quelle aller Religionsgesinnungaus.Diese Liebe Gottes kann aber nur durch unsereVernunft erkannt […]werden.’ 104 3LoveofGod question as to the apparent differenceinterminologybetween how God’sloveis discussed in the Religion and in the Vigilantius notes on ethics. In the former, it is loveofdelight; in the latter,loveofbenevolence. Indeed, the Vigilantius notes are highlyconsistent with TheMetaphysics of Morals. In both texts,God’slovefor us is viewed as logicallyprior to our lovefor God: God’sloveisseen as the ground of our lovefor God. As noted above, Idon’tsee anyreason for therefore viewing the ground account and the end account as contradictory.Rather,the existenceofthese accounts suggests that even though Kant didn’tanalyse the re- lationship between the two aspects of the general division of loveinthe context of God, he in fact made use of the division. In the Religion,God’sloveofdelight is viewed as aresponse to our lovefor God, whereas in the Vigilantius notes God’sloveofbenevolenceisviewed as prior to the commandment to love God. In the Vigilantius notes,our lovefor God is aresponse to God’sloveofbe- nevolence. The existenceofthe end account and the ground account of God’s lovefurther corroborates the plausibility of the general division approach to Kant on love. Thus, the general picture of God’sloveisthat God’sloveofbenevolence is the ground of creation and the ground of the duty to loveGod by practicing moral duties gladly. God’sloveofmoral delight is the loving response we may hope for in the end if we do our best to be moral gladly, i.e. if we loveGod and strive to lovethe law. We maycall this general picture the ascentmodel of love of God (see fig.4). God’sbenevolent lovelies at the basisofthe existence of the world, and God’sdelighted loveishoped for at the end of human moral progress.Actual human love for God takes place between these two as- pects of God’slove, with the impliedprescription to ascend higher through moral striving.Eventhough questions remain about the relationship between God’sloveand God’sjustice, the evidence thus suggests that an unqualified neg- ative claim such as Goy’s, that Kant’sGod ‘is not aloving god’ (Goy 2014,p.23), is implausible. Kant’sGod is indeedaloving God (in harmonywith Wood 1970, p. 248).⁴⁵

 Timmermann has expressed (in privatediscussion) an interesting worry with respect to love of God: If, as Ihaveshown, loveofGod includes two-directionality,then maybe thereisnosuch thingasloveofGod, as it includes two subjects (God and the human being) and twoobjects (the same two) that are not on par with each other.Inone sense God is an object of love, and in an- other sense he is the subject of love, and the same holds for the human being. Perhapsthis means that we should put loveofGod in scare quotes: ‘loveofGod’.Maybe so, but onlyif we think that an aspect of love(without scare quotes, that is) cannot be fundamentally ambig- uous, and of this point I’mnot convinced. We mayaccept that in agiven linguistic community or research framework the ambiguities related to an aspect of loveare sufficientlystandardornor- 3.3 Is Love of God Self-Love? 105

highest good

God’s love (love of delight) love for the law (regulative ideal)

morality nature

love forGod (gladpractice of duty) gladness (inclination correspondingwithduty)

God’s love (love of benevolence) supersensiblegroundofbeing

Figure 4. The Ascent Model of Love of God

3.3 Is LoveofGod Self-Love?

Before concluding this chapter,Iwould like to address afurther question, which has until now been lurkinginthe background of my discussion. This question concerns the relationship between loveofGod and the self. If one takes apanoptic view of the various statements about God in Kant’s major writingsfrom the critical period (mainlyinthe three Critiques, the Religion,

mal to warrant talk of that aspect without inverted commas.Wemay clarify ambiguities without ironyorscepticism with respect to the wayaculturallyacknowledgedaspect of loveappears in the writings of ahistorical . The dynamic Kantian pictureofloveofGod begins with God’sbenevolent lovecreating human beings (and givingthem duties), whothen return God’s lovevia the glad practice of duties.When God has receivedhis own loveback, he loves his cre- ation with delight. Of course, the whole business of loveofGod becomes morallyreduced to ideas that reason givestoitself. But the picture is structurallysimilar to the reciprocal self-sur- render we see in sexual loveand loveinfriendship, where one givesoneself to the other and then gets oneself back throughthe other’slove(see LE, 27:388.23–37;cf. 27:423.37–424.6). Sure,loveofGod is aspecial case because it refers to atranscendent being. But we could not see this interesting similarity (with regards to givingoneself or one’sloveand then being loved back in return) between these aspects of loveifwedidn’taccept loveofGod as an aspect of loveinall its ambiguity. 106 3Love of God and TheMetaphysics of Morals), one gets the impression that there is acertain amount of ambiguity as to the place of God in the logical structure of the Kantian universe. It is clear from the first Critique that we mayhavenotheoretical knowl- edge of God, but that God is nevertheless amorallynecessary assumption de- rivedfrom the practical necessity of the efficacy of morallawsinthe world. (C1, A811/B839–A819/B847) In otherwords, if the moral lawistoultimately have its final effect (virtueaccompanied by proportionate happiness) necessarily, then we must assume the existenceofGod as the first cause of the world.⁴⁶ For Kant,aperfect effect requires aperfect cause.⁴⁷ It is alsorelatively clear from the second Critique and TheMetaphysics of Morals that the concept of God in Kant is derivedfrom or based on moral reason. Or,inthe terminologyofthe third Critique:onthe basis of the final purpose of the highestgood (visible even to ‘the commonest reason’ [die gemeinste Menschenvernunft](C3,5:448.30)), God is judgedtobethe moral cause of the world (C3, 5:450). Again, this argument does not provide us with anytheoretical insight into God and ultimatelyrests on our prior awareness of morality.⁴⁸ All in all, Kant clearlyholds thatifall ra- tional creatures are to become morallyhappy (as reason dictates), God must be postulated. What is less clear,however,iswhether we are to assume, with the practical postulate of God, thatGod is something external to our reason or merelyaprod- uct of our reason. It seems that in order for us to have faith or even hope that God will eventuallysupplement our imperfections, and thus occasion the complete highestgood, we must believethatGod is irreducible to our own being,which by definition consists of moral imperfection. On the other hand,toward the

 In the first Critique,Kant thinks that without the assumption of God, moral laws would be ‘idle chimeras’ [leereHirngespinste](C1,A811/B839). In the third Critique,however,itseems that the moral lawisstill bindingevenifGod is not assumed to exist – the drawback to not postu- latinghis existencebeingthat we then cannot aim for the complete highest good as the moral happiness of all rational creatures (C3, 5:451).  See e.g. C2, 5:124. This sort of position, Ibelieve, was widelyshared among generations of Scholastic philosophers and is clearlyvisible in Kant’sclose predecessors,e.g.Descartes (see Russell 1945, p. 567) and Berkeley.  In moreelaborateterms,this is close to what Kant means when he speaks of God, or loveof God for that matter,interms of the notion of a schematism of . Forinstance, when we discuss God’sloveinterms of his sacrificeofhis son, we arenot expanding theoretical cognition but merely elucidatingaconcept that is otherwise incomprehensible to our reason.This kind of endeavour takes placefor purposes that are ultimatelymoral. (See R, 6:65fn.) In the technical jargonofthe third Critique,such aprocedure is called ‘symbolic hypotyposis’ (C3, 5:351), which serves what Kant in that work terms ‘ethicotheology’ (C3, 5:484–485). Ithank Dieter Schönecker for remindingmeofthe notion of analogy in the contextofloveofGod. 3.3 Is LoveofGod Self-Love? 107 end of Kant’sphilosophical career we find increasingly strongstatements con- cerningthe mind-dependence of God. According to the Vigilantius notes on eth- ics, human beingscan but ‘fashion’ or make [machen]their ‘own God on the basis of morality’ (LE, 27:719.37–38)⁴⁹.InTheMetaphysics of Morals the idea of God is something that reason ‘makes for itself’ (MM, 6:487.11)⁵⁰.And in the ,whereKant explicitlyasks whether the idea of God ‘has reality or whether it is amere thought-object’ (22:117. 8)⁵¹,heconsistentlyholds that God is not asubstance or abeing outside of man (22:52.11–12; 22:55.10 –11; 22:60.15 – 16;22:123.1) but rather an idea of pure reason (22:53.1– 2).⁵² Now Idonot wish to make anyconclusive interpretative claim as to what Kant thoughtabout the existenceofGod, but Idothink thatinsofar as God is an idea of reason basedonwhat he must be like in order for the highest good to be possible, we must think that our conceptions of the relations of love be- tween God and human beingsare giventousbyour reason. There is asense in which loveofGod is essentiallydependent on and derivedfrom the workings of the human mind. It is this point,Ithink,that occasions Moors’sclaim that loveofGod is actuallyself-love. Ifind this idea highlyintriguing and wish to con- sider it carefully. Moors argues thatsince lovefor God involves ‘the moralcommand of glad- ness’,loveofGod is turned into alove ‘one has to have for one’sown purified heart’ (Moors 2007,p.256). Moors then picks up the definition of loveofdelight for oneself from the Religion and claims (I takeit) that since this love for oneself denotes acontentment following the subordination of one’smaxims to the moral law, ‘love of God is indeednothing but this egocentric, rationallysublimated var- iation of amor complacentiae (a morallysublimated Liebe des Wohlgefallens an sich selbst).’ (Moors 2007,p.257) Ithink we oughttobegin by noting that by love of God Moors means love for God (his argument doesn’tseem to be meant to applytoloveofGod as two-directional). From this perspective Moors is moving in the right direction but onlytothe extent that lovefor God is mainlyabout our own moralperfection.

 ‘aufdem Grunde der Moral seinen eigenen Gott zu Machen.’  ‘sie sich selber macht.’  ‘Realität habe oder blos ein Gedankending[…]sey’.  It is of course possible to contest the relevance of the Opus Postumum as asource. These are posthumouslypublished fragmentary notesfromaperiod when Kant’smental capacity was al- readywaning. Dependingonthe context, Iwould arguethat we should give the Opus Postumum roughlysimilar weightasthe lecturenotes. In this case, the Vigilantius notesand the Opus Post- umum support each other. 108 3LoveofGod

Strictlyspeaking, love for God cannot be equated to moral self-love. The rea- son for this is that Kant’sadverb ‘gladly’ and the notion of ‘contentment’ [Zufrie- denheit], the latterofwhich is characteristic of moral self-love, do not denote the same thing,which technicallyexcludes the possibilityofequating these two loves. The indirect imperativetostrivefor gladness in the practice of duty seems to implyaliking for the actions or the effects of the actions, whereas Zu- friedenheit is, Iwould argue, astate of (negative)self-satisfaction that stems from consciousness of one’sability to override maxims of self-love(maxims of loveof benevolence for oneself). It is true thatlovefor God maybring about morallove of delight for oneself (even though Kant himself doubts the relevance of the term ‘self-love’ in this context in the Religion). There is, however,abasic difference between lovefor God and loveofdelight for oneself: lovefor God is very much about striving (for gladness in the fulfilment of duties), whereas love of de- light for oneself is very much about contentment (in respect for the moral law). They are not exactlythe samething,and it is also very important to note that neither notion is ‘egocentric’,atleast in the sense of ‘caring too much about yourself and not about other people’⁵³.Onthe contrary,lovefor God depends on the laborious cultivation of other-regarding attitudes,and moralself-lovere- lies on our capacity to override selfish maximsthrough respect for the moral law.

3.4 The Ascent of LoveofGod

In this chapter,Ihaveargued for a two-directionality thesis of loveofGod accord- ing to which loveofGod consists of human beings’ lovefor God on the one hand and God’slovefor human beingsonthe other.Ipointed out that lovefor God can be analysed in terms of a scale,wherefear of God (or mere respect for the moral law) denotes the zero-point of lovefor God,and lovefor the moral lawisan un- attainable endpoint of lovefor God, prescribed to us via amoral philosophical interpretation of the Christian commandment.The actuality of lovefor God lies between these endpoints and consists in practicing moral duties (viewed as divine commands) gladly. Ialso showed thatGod’slovecan be analysed in terms of the general divi- sion of love. That is, it can be divided into a ground account and an end account, such that from areligious perspective the ground of creation and moral duties is God’sloveofbenevolence (which also grounds the moral duty to love God). In the end, the sincereagent can hope that her moralstriving to love God (and the

 The Merriam-WebsterDictionary. 3.4 The Ascent of Love of God 109 moral law), understood in terms of amoral ascent,will be metwith God’sloveof moral delight. While the place of God (and its relation to the self)inthe Kantian universe remains somewhat ambiguous, it is clear thatthe idea of God is aproduct of human reason for the purposes of securing hope for the highest good. It does not follow from this, however,that love of God is to be equated with moral self-love. In sum, the overall analysis yields an ascentmodel of love of God. 4LoveofNeighbour

The aim of this chapter is to analysethe notion of loveofneighbour [Nächsten- liebe]inKant’smoral philosophy, focusing on the published works from the ma- ture period. As was the case with the earlier chapters, although the literature does contain discussions related to this topic, therehas not been adetailed ex- aminationofwhat Kant means when he speaksofloving one’sneighbour and what kind of role the notion plays in his ethical thought. Based on the work of previous commentators, we now know that even though the duties of lovewehavetoothers maybeless fundamental than duties of respect,they are vital for Kantian ethics (Baron &Fahmy2009,p.226). Fur- ther,ithas been shown thatKantian practical loveisnot reducible to benefi- cencebut involves the cultivation of benevolent attitudes (Fahmy2010). We are also aware thatloveinKant’svirtue ethics is (at least in part) akind of moral emotion that plays asecondary role (Horn 2008, p. 173), and that Kant’s account of this moralemotion is developedinconjunction with the biblical com- mandments (Goy 2014). Apart of loveofneighbour is anaturalpredisposition necessary for one’ssubjective receptivity to duty,and this predisposition is loveofdelight (Schönecker2010). Now Ithink all these accounts are in impor- tant ways correct and can well be said to illuminate loveofneighbour in Kant.Ido not take issue with them, but Ithink they are incomplete. What Ithink is missing from the analyses mentioned aboveisattention to the underlying general structure of lovethat is at work behindthe various sec- tions and passages that the existinginterpretationsrelyon. Thisunderlying structure can onlybegrasped through achronological and fairlydetailed exeget- ical investigation of the notion of love of neighbour per se. Perhaps not all will agree with me that thereisanunderlying general structure, but Iaim to show that there is, and to clarify it.Thisenquiry should also work more generallyto draw further attention to the complex relationship between the emotive and moral-rational aspectsofhuman existenceinKant. Several interpretative problems are particularlytrickyinthe context of love of neighbour.Tobegin with: what is the role of the general division of love – to what extent can it be used to capture Kant’sidea of love of neighbour?What ex- actlyispractical love, and how does it relatetothe feelingoflove? Is there adis- continuity between Kant’saccounts of loveofneighbour in the Groundwork and the second Critique in comparison with the one presented in TheMetaphysics of Morals?Why does Kant use adistinctionbetween pathological loveand practical loveinthe two formerworks – and whydoes he distinguish between loveofde- light and loveofbenevolenceonlyinthe latter?Are these two pairs of distinc-

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 4Love of Neighbour 111 tions parallel?Inother words, how are pathological love/the feeling of love (these mayormay not be the same), practical love, loveofdelight,and love of benevolence all related to each other? In what follows, Ishallargue for two main positions. First,that loveof neighbour is most comprehensively understood in the light of what Ihave throughout this work called the general division approach to Kant on love. In the context of loveofneighbour,the principal feature of the general division ap- proach is its emphasis on the co-existenceand interrelatedness of sensory-emo- tive and rational-moralcomponents in love, captured by Kant’suse of the terms loveofdelight and loveofbenevolence. Second, Ihope to show thatthe general divisionapproach yields what maybecalled the feeling-action-cultivation ac- count,which can be defended as aviable interpretation of loveofneighbour in Kant.Essentially, this account involves the claims that1)loveofneighbour in- cludes feelingorsensation, rationallywilled action,and the cultivation of a moral disposition, and that2)loveofneighbour is irreducible to anyofits com- ponentstaken in isolation. Ialso arguethat while the details are sometimes elu- sive,there is an intricate continuity in Kant’sconception of loveofneighbour be- tween 1785 and 1797,and the broad outlines of the concept remain consistent throughout the mature period. Ithereforetakeitthat the general division ap- proach is indeed robust in outline and supports the feeling-action-cultivation ac- count.Myaim here is not to engageincasuistry or debates in , but rather to make sense of the broadest conceptual divisions that loveofneigh- bour in Kant entails. To make my case, Iwilltrack down the history and evolution of the concept of loveofneighbour in Kant’smoral thinking from the 1762– 1764 Herder notes onwards.Iwill alsohavetorecapsome evidence alreadypresented in the studytomake the argument as transparent as possible. The kind of chronolog- ical, dynamic, and cumulative reading I’mabout to offer will make it easier to see the changes in Kant’sthoughtbetween the different works.The concept of loveofneighbour indeedvaries throughout Kant’swritings, but it does not vary randomly, and foundational invariances and subtle evolution can be detect- ed. Theconceptual framework becomes more and more complex, morerefined, as Kant’sthought matures.The task of the interpreter is to understand the differ- ences between the relevant instancesand to preserveoverall continuity and con- sistencyasfar as is rationallypossible. This chapter is divided into two major sections, followed by aconcluding summary.Inthe first section, Idiscuss loveofneighbour prior to TheMetaphy- sics of Morals,and in the second section Ianalyse the notion within TheMeta- physics of Morals (also using the Vigilantius notes). Iwillbegin by groundingmy interpretation in the Herder and the Collins notes on ethics and will then move 112 4Love of Neighbour on to discuss the conceptual divisionsofloveofneighbour in the Groundworkof the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason,bymeans of a close comparison of two relevant passages. Ithen analyse the main distinctions that are relevant to loveofneighbourinTheMetaphysics of Morals,with the aim of harmonising the conception presented in Kant’sfinal moral philosophical treatise with those from the Groundwork and the second Critique,giving special emphasis to the general division of loveand the notion of cultivation. Iconclude by outlining the feeling-action-cultivation account of loveofneighbour.

4.1 The General Division Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals

Recall the basic published evidence for the existenceofageneral division of love in Kant: ‘Like loveingeneral, self-love too can be divided into love of benevo- lence and loveofdelight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.’ (R,6:45.22–25)¹ Does this apply to the con- text of love of neighbour?Inother words, can loveofneighbour alsobedivided into the loves of benevolence and delight?Asweshall see, the general division of loveisoperative in this context,but to understand justhow,and to see the exegetical difficulties that remain, requires athorough analysis that utilises var- ious moral philosophical resources within Kant’scorpus. The first piece of evidence to note comesfrom the Herder lectures on ethics from 1762– 1764².Theseearlynotes refer to ‘asystem of loveofhuman beings’ [System der Menschenliebe], the concept of which is divided into two kinds of loveofbenevolence: ‘loveofbenevolence (of the other’sgreater welfare) is either active or wishful.’ (LE, 27:64.13 – 14)³ The wishful love of benevolence is here weak, fanciful, or idle, whereas active loveofbenevolence is ‘practical love’ [Praktische Liebe]. Practical loverelates mainlytohelping others, such as when aman of nature,his loveuncorrupted by society,saves someone in danger on the basis of instinct (LE,27:64.20 –65.7).⁴ From the perspective of the general divisionoflove, what is important to note in the context of the Herder notes is

 ‘Wie Liebe überhaupt,sokann auch Selbstliebe in die des Wohlwollensund des Wohlgefallens (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE) eingetheiltwerden, und beide müssen (wie sich von selbst versteht) vernünftigsein.’  Notethat the reliability of the Herder notes in particular has been questionedbyKant’seditors (see Schneewind 1997, p. xiv, esp. n.5).  ‘die Liebe des Wohlwollens (anderer großerer Wohlfart) ist entweder thatig oder wünschend.’  Kant’sdiscussion reminds one of Rousseau’sadmiration of the simple, ‘natural’ state of human existence(see also Grenberg2015,pp. 239–244). 4.1 The General Division Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 113 that one of the two basiccomponents of the general division is alreadyinplace: loveofbenevolence. But loveofdelight is not mentioned. Also significant is the fact thatactive loveofbenevolence is associated with practical love. The general division of loveisexplicitlypresented for the first time in the Collinsnotes on ethics from the late 1770s. These notes are an invaluable re- sourcefor interpreting loveofneighbour in Kant’slater works.Iwillthus pause here to quote the Collinsnotes at length. As we now know that the Collins notes in fact predatethe Groundwork,thereis, however,alsothe danger of read- ing toomuch into the notes,ormaking overlystronginterpretations of Kant’s later views on their basis. Iwish to avoid these dangers, and that’swhy Ifind it very important to stress that, at least when it comes to loveofneighbour or loveofother human beings, the Collins notes should never be useduncritically or on their own,but always onlyinconjunction with the authoritative published works from the mature period. The distinctions Kant drawsinthese notes in re- lation to loveseem tentative,like awork in progress,and it is not always clear how what he has said last relates to, or could be harmonised with, what he stat- ed in the preceding paragraph. This said, the foundational components of loveof neighbour thatKant continues to use up to TheMetaphysics of Morals are found here. At the outset of Kant’sdiscussion of duties to others⁵,loveisagain (as in the Herder notes) defined in terms of benevolence:

Love is benevolencefrominclination. But therecan also be kindnessonprinciple. Hence our pleasureand delight in doinggood to others maybeeither an immediateoramediate pleasure. The immediatepleasureinwell-doing towards others is love, the mediatepleas- ure of beneficence, where we aresimultaneouslyconscious of havingdone our duty,iswell- doing by reason or obligation. (LE, 27:413.18 – 25)⁶

 In the Collins notes,duties to others aredivided into duties of benevolence[Wohlwollen]and duties of indebtedness [Schuldigkeit], which distinction corresponds roughly with the maturedis- tinction between imperfect and perfect duties to others.  ‘Liebe ist Wohlwollen ausNeygung.Eskann aber auch Gütigkeit statt finden ausGrundsät- zen. Demnachist unser Vergnügenund Wohlgefallen am Wohlthun anderer entweder ein unmit- telbaresoder ein mittelbares Vergnügen. Das unmittelbareVergnügenamWohlthun anderer ist die Liebe, das mittelbareVergnügendes Wohlthuns, wo wir uns zugleich bewußtsein, unsre Pflicht erfüllet zu haben, ist das Wohlthun nach Verbindlichkeit.’ Retaining Heath’stranslation. The German construction ‘Wohlthun anderer’ implies that it is the others whoare beingbenefi- cent.This is, however,incontrast with how Kant usuallyspeaks of these issues:elsewherehe seems to have in mind the beneficenceofthe agent.Rendering ‘Wohlthun anderer’ as ‘benefi- cence of others’ would also introduceaweird shift of perspective at the end of the passage, where the mediatepleasureisclearlyabout our consciousness of havingdone our duty.Timmer- mann has suggested(in private conversation) that we areprobablydealingwith ausage of the 114 4Love of Neighbour

The elements of the general division of loveare visible, but the division itself is not yetclearly in place. Whatisimplied aboveisthat loveis1)benevolence from inclination or 2) the immediate delight taken in beneficence, which beneficence is apparentlybased on benevolence from inclination. Here, both benevolence and delight are on the sideofinclination, and this inclination-based loveisdis- tinguishedfrom kindness [Gütigkeit], or beneficencefrom rational principles. But as Kant’sdiscussion continues for apageortwo, the terminology changes, and this changeleadsuptoanew definition of love.First,Kant makes room for two different kindsofbenevolence – one from love, and one from obligation: ‘Benev- olence from lovecannot be commanded, though benevolence from obligation can.’ (LE, 27:417.10 – 11)⁷ Kant explains thatpracticing beneficencefrom duty will eventually, through habituation, lead to our beingbeneficent alsofrom love(LE, 27:417.11– 19). Immediatelyafter this we getanew definition of love, now astrongstatement affirming the general division:

All loveiseither loveofbenevolenceorloveofdelight.Loveofbenevolenceconsists in the wish and inclination to promotethe happiness of others.Loveofdelight is the pleasurewe take in showing approval of another’sperfections.This delight maybeeither sensuous or intellectual. All such delight,ifitislove, must first of all be inclination. The lovethat is sensuous delight is adelight in the sensuous , due to sensuous inclination […]. The lovebased on intellectual delight is alreadyharder to conceive.(LE,27:417.19–30)⁸

This statement explicitlydivides ‘all love’ into the variants of the general division of lovefound later in the Religion. Iwill return to the distinction between the two kinds of delight (sensuous and intellectual) in the latter part of this chapter.⁹ genitive peculiar to 18th-century German,and Ithank him for makingmeawareofthis obscure featureofthe passage.  ‘Das Wohlwollen ausLiebe kann nicht gebotenwerden, wohl aber das Wohlwollen ausVer- bindlichkeit.’  ‘Alle Liebe ist entweder Liebe des Wohlwollens oder Liebe des Wohlgefallens.Die Liebe des Wohlwollens besteht im Wunsch und in der Neigung das Glück anderer zu befördern. Die Liebe des Wohlgefallens ist das Vergnügen, welches wir haben, den Vollkommenheiten des andern Beyfall zu beweisen. Dieses Wohlgefallen kannsinnlich und intellectual seyn. Alles Wohlgefall- en, wenn es Liebe ist,muß doch vorher Neygung seyn. Die Liebe des sinnlichen Wohlgefallens ist ein Gefallen an der sinnlichen Anschauung, aussinnlicher Neigung […]. Die Liebe des intel- lectualen Wohlgefallens ist schon schwerer zu concipiren.’ Note that in the Collins notessexual inclination is classed with sensuous loveofdelight (LE, 27:417.19 – 30), whereas TheMetaphysics of Morals rejects this classification (MM, 6:426.26–28). This serves as indirect evidencethat love of delight in the published work could be intellectual loveofdelight.  As such, the frameworkinthe Collins notesisnot my main target, and Iwill discuss these ideas and elaborate on them further to the extent requiredbymyanalysisofthe maturepub- lished works. 4.1 The General Division Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 115

After defining ‘all love’ in the aboveterms, Kant goes on to make yetanother major changetohis conception of love for others in the Collins notes.Towards the end of his discussion, Kant begins to allow for talk of lovefrom obligation, whereas at the beginning of the discussion loveisdefined exclusively in terms of inclination. In this lastmanoeuvre, he provides an interpretation of Jesus’ com- mandment to love one’sneighbour,and now he equates loveofbenevolence with lovefrom obligation, while loveofdelight seems to remain closer to incli- nation: ‘If we are told: Thou shalt love thyneighbour,how is this to be under- stood?Itisnot with love of delight that Iamtolovehim, for with thatIcan also lovethe worst of ; it is with loveofbenevolence.’ (LE,27:417. 34–37)¹⁰ Again, Kant is clearlyappealingtothe general division of loveinthe context of loveofneighbour. When it comes to understanding the development of Kant’s thinking about this aspect of lovefrom the Groundwork onwards, this last pas- sageisparticularlyimportant.Inthe mature period, Kant continuallydraws a distinction between two kinds of neighbourly love: one that is not commanded, and one that is. Thisdistinctionroughlyparallels the nature-freedom distinction that lies at the heart of Kant’smature moraltheory.The question is: can the ma- ture distinction between different kinds of lovefor others be interpreted in terms of the distinction between loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight?Ifso, then loveofbenevolence should most likelybeidentified with the lovethat is com- manded, and loveofdelight with the love that is not commanded. These latter passages from the Collins notes,when combined with the Religion,certainlysug- gest thatsomething along these lines might be the case. Inow proceed to the Groundwork,whereloveofneighbour will again be dis- cussed via philosophical interpretation of Jesus’ commandment.¹¹ One of the

 ‘Wenn es nun heißt: du sollst deinen nächsten lieben, wie ist das zu verstehen?Nicht mit der Liebe des Wohlgefallens soll ich ihn lieben, mit solcher kann ich auch den größten Bösewicht lieben, sondern mit der Liebe des Wohlwollens.’ Kant explains that this kind of loveofbenev- olencefor the will contain the wish that he actuallybecome worthyofhappiness (LE 27:417. 37– 418.4), and apparentlyitisthis that separates the moral loveofbenevolencehere from sensuous delight or from the mere benevolent inclination to promotethe material well- beingofthe villain in question. Note also that in the Collins notesKant ends up maintaining that even though loveofdelight cannot be commanded, to lovethe humanity of the villain with (intellectual) loveofdelight is still aduty(LE, 27:418).  As with loveofGod, the cultural contextisdecisively Christian here, and the classical con- cept of loveasAgape looms in the background. It is worth mentioningKant’skey references from the New Testament.Jesus articulates his basic idea of loveofneighbour when preaching in Jerusalem, in response to ascribe’squestion about God’sfirst commandment: ‘The first is, “Hear,OIsrael: The Lordour God, the Lord is one; and youshall lovethe Lordyour God with all your heart,and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.” 116 4Love of Neighbour most basic distinctionsofGroundwork Iisbetween agood will [der gute Wille] and inclinations: these twoare profoundlydifferent.Agood will must be pro- duced by reason, and in humans it is closelyconnected to the concept of duty.Inclinations, on the other hand, are basedonnatural impulses, are not mo- rallycommanded, and are often in tension with duty.Inclinations relatetosen- sations or feelingssuch as satisfaction, sympathy[Sympathie], compassion [Theilnehmung], and love(GW,4:397.28–398.36;see Timmermann 2011, p. xiii). It must also be emphasised that in Groundwork I, whenKant speaks of lovewith- out further qualification (GW, 4:397. 28–30), he is relatinglovetoinclinations. This is in line with the earlier lecture notes on ethics, whereloveisoftendis- cussed through the notion of inclination. The finding warrantsthe hypothesis that the loveproximal to inclinations is somehowamore paradigmatic type of love. With this in mind, let us movetothe passageconcerning loveofneighbour. It appears in the context of Kant’sfamousproposition that beneficent action only has true moralworth if carried out from duty rather thaninclination. Kant ex- plains thatwhile beneficence[Wohltätigkeit]isaduty,there are compassionate [theilnehmend gestimmte]philanthropists [Menschenfreunde]who are such that ‘even without another motivatingground of vanity,orself-interest,they find an inner gratification in spreading joy around them,and can relishthe content- ment of others, in so far as it is their work.’ (GW, 4:398.9 –12)¹² Properly speaking, the actions of these philanthropists,which are guided by inclinations, have no moral worth, even though the actions conform with duty and maybeconsidered amiable or worthyoflove¹³ [liebenswürdig].¹⁴ However,ifaphilanthropist of the

The secondisthis, “Youshall loveyour neighbour as yourself.” There is no other commandment greater than these.’ (Mark 12:28;similar in Matt.22:34) In his Sermon on the Mount,Jesus im- plies that the concept of one’sneighbour mayeveninclude one’senemies: ‘But Isay to you, Love your enemies and prayfor those whopersecuteyou’ (Matt.5:43; see also Luke 6:27,cf. the , Leviticus 19:18, where the concept of one’sneighbour does not include one’senemies).  ‘sie auch ohne einen andern Bewegungsgrund der Eitelkeit oder des Eigennutzesein inneres Vergnügendaran finden, Freude um sich zu verbreiten, und die sich an der Zufriedenheit ander- er,sofern sie ihr Werk ist,ergötzen können.’  According to the Grimm dictionary, liebenswürdig literallymeans ‘worthy of love’ but is nor- mallyused in amoreexternal sense. Adelung,however,stresses the worthiness aspect: ‘der Liebe würdig, würdiggeliebt zu werden’.  Anyreading that affords Kant the view that it would be bad or wrong to be beneficent from inclination is henceclearlyincorrect.Inthe second Critique,doinggood fromthe feelingoflove is describedasbeingbeautiful. (C2, 5:82.18–20)Notealso how the feelingofloveasamotiva- tional force conditions Kant’swidest formulations of self-love in the second Critique: all material practical principlesbelongtoself-love/one’sown happiness (C2, 5:22.6–8). In the widest sense, 4.1 The General DivisionPrior to The Metaphysics of Morals 117 abovesortisovertaken by sorrow and hence loses ‘all compassion for the fate of others’ (4:398.21–22)¹⁵ and yetstill acts beneficentlyfrom duty without inclina- tion, the action is morallyworthy. AccordingtoKant,the case is similar when a beneficent agent has little sympathy[wenig Sympathie]tobegin with: onlyac- tions done from duty have moralworth. These considerations form the moral philosophical context of the passageonloveofneighbour.Kant writes:

It is in this way, no doubt,that we aretounderstand the passagesfromScripturethat con- tain the command to loveone’sneighbor,evenour enemy. Forloveasaninclination cannot be commanded, but beneficencefromdutyitself – even if no inclination whatsoever impels us to it,indeed if natural and unconquerable aversion resists – is practical and not patho- logical love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of sensation,inprinciples of action and not in melting compassion; and onlythe former can be commanded. (GW, 4:399.27–34)¹⁶

This looks alot likethe previous passageonthe same topic from the Collins notes:lovefrom inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficencefrom duty can. What is clearlydifferent is thatinthe Groundwork neither loveofbenevo- lence nor loveofdelight is explicitlymentioned. The basic distinction is now be- tween pathological love and practical love. In Groundwork I, practical love relates to the good will, to principles of action, and to duty,whereas pathological love relates to sensation or feeling [Empfindung]and to compassion [Theilnehmung] and cannot be commanded. While both pathological and practical lovecan have the happiness of others as their ends, in practical lovethe motive of duty is primary,whereas in pathological lovethe agent’sinterest in the happi- ness of others is determined by inclination (see Timmermann 2009,p.55). If we now tentativelyinterpret the distinction between pathological loveand practical loveinthe light of the earlier lecture notes,keepinginmind the termi- nologyofthe general division of love, we are led to the following observations. First,the Herder notes explicitlyappeal to the notion of practical love, and there

self-love need not be directlyself-interested and mayinfact appear as inclination-based benef- icent loveofneighbour.AsWood puts it,while the self imposes limits on love, an inclination towardthe happiness of others is not amere means to my happiness: ‘Loveexhibits akind of second-order self-partiality’ (Wood 1999,p.271).  ‘alle Theilnehmung an anderer Schicksal’.  ‘So sind ohne Zweifel auch die Schriftstellen zu verstehen, darin gebotenwird, seinen Nächs- ten, selbst unsern Feind zu lieben. Denn Liebe als Neigung kannnicht gebotenwerden, aber Wohlthun ausPflicht selbst,wenn dazu gleich garkeine Neigungtreibt, ja garnatürlicheund unbezwingliche Abneigung widersteht,ist praktische und nicht pathologische Liebe, die im Wil- len liegt und nicht im Hange der Empfindung,inGrundsätzen der Handlung und nicht schmel- zender Theilnehmung;jene aber allein kanngeboten werden.’ 118 4Love of Neighbour practical loveisactive loveofbenevolence. The Collins notes do not explicitly mention practical love, but they do refertoalovetowhich there is obligation, and the context thereisidentical to that in Groundwork I(both interpret Jesus’ commandment). The lovethatisobligatory in the Collins notes (in the immediate vicinity of the discussion of Jesus’ commandment) is loveofbenevolence. These findingsstrongly suggest atentative identificationofpractical lovewith loveof benevolence. Also significant is the fact that the identificationofpathological (or inclination-based love) in terms of the general division is moredifficult.InHerd- er,loveofbenevolence is based on inclination or instinct,and in Collins, the lovebased on inclination can be either loveofbenevolence or loveofdelight. But in the particular passageinCollins, the context of which is identical with the context in the Groundwork,itisexplicitlyloveofdelight that is not com- manded(even though just abit further in Collins Kant says that thereisalso an obligation to lovethe humanity of others with loveofdelight). Furthermore, we have thus farestablished arelatively clear tentative identification between practical loveand loveofbenevolence. It is therefore plausible to assume that,insofar as we take seriously the statements from the Collins notes and the Religion to the effect that all loveiseither loveofbenevolence or loveofde- light,orthatloveingeneral is divided into those two, the lovethatisnot com- mandedinthe Groundwork (i.e. pathological love) might very well be loveofde- light.But we do not know this. However,the aboveconceptual analysis can alreadybeused to make better exegetical sense of the previouslymentioned famous example of the sorrowful philanthropist in Groundwork I, who is beneficent without inclination. Wood ar- gues thatthe wayKant construes the example is duetohis aim of setting ‘up a derivation of the most formal version of the categorical imperative’,and that Kant failstonotice that help giventoothers ‘is not the result of sticking to aprin- ciple’¹⁷ (Wood 2008, p. 35). Rather,Wood argues, the philanthropist acts out of the loveofhuman beings[Menschenliebe]thatKant describes in ‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ as feeling. Wood thinks thatthis loveisa‘feeling produced directlybyreason’ (Wood 2008, p. 35) – not to be confused with prac- tical love, which Wood reduces to action. Here, Ithink, Wood misconstrues love’s general structure. The loveproduced directlybyreason is itself an obligation; it is loveofbenevolence or practical love. It is not the same as the feeling of love, which even in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ resides on the side of nature (as we will see later in this chapter). Idon’tthink Kant says or implies anywhere that the feeling

 Cf. Timmermann (2009,pp. 46,50), whoholds that actions always implylaws, or maxims as subjective principlesofaction. 4.1 The General Division Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 119 of loveisproduced directlybyreason. It is of course possible that the sorrowful philanthropist has neglected the indirect duty of cultivation and that he ought to have moreloving feeling,but this is not discussed in the example. If we wish to interpret Kant charitablyand respect the premises of his example, acknowledg- ing what we know about the general structure of lovewhile still appealing to the notion of loveofhuman beings, we ought to saythat the sorrowful man is acting from the lovethat is benevolence; that is, he is acting from practical love.¹⁸ In the second Critique,the passageonloveofneighbourisfound in the third chapter of the analytic of practical reason, whereKant discusses the incentives [die Triebfedern]ofpure practical reason. While both Groundwork Iand this chapter deal with the proper motivational ground of moral action, in Groundwork Ithe question concerns the moral worth of actions, whereas here the discussion revolvesaround how to make respect for the lawareliable determining ground of the will. Thecloserweget to the passage, the more Kant seems to applythe specific ideas of Groundwork I, repeatingthe basic notion that actions onlyhave moral worth (see C2,5:81.17– 19) when done ‘from duty and from respect for the law, not from loveand liking for what the actions are to produce.’ (C2, 5:81.23–24)¹⁹ As in Groundwork I, the feeling of loveinthe second Critique is not moral as such and does not constituteaproper basis for moral conduct: ‘It is very beautifultodogood to human beingsfrom lovefor them and from sympathetic benevolence; or to be just from loveoforder;but this is not yet the genuine moral maxim of our conduct’ (C2, 5:82.18–20)²⁰.Now this remark, which appears just before the principal passageonloveofneighbour in the sec- ond Critique,confirms the division between some sort of loveand morality that was clear in the Groundwork. Obviously, the lovementioned abovecannot be the practical loveofthe Groundwork,because that practical lovewould have to be related to our duty or to a ‘genuinelymoral maxim’.Ifwethink of the context of beauty,and the idea thatdoing good to others from love is beautiful, we

 This will become even clearer as we progress to TheMetaphysics of Morals. There,loveof human beings is discussed in twodifferent places and is giventwo different principal meanings. In the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,loveofhuman beings is equated with loveof neighbour (MM, 6:399;cf. 6:401) and discussed as anatural aesthetic predisposition to morality, or even as a ‘feeling’,asWood notes. In the doctrine of the elements,however,loveofhuman beings is discussed as practical love(MM, 6:450). In his analysis of the sorrowful philanthropist, Wood is not sensitive to this distinction within the concept of Menschenliebe (or Nächstenliebe).  ‘aus Pflicht und ausAchtungfürs Gesetz, nicht ausLiebe und Zuneigung zu dem, was die Handlungen hervorbringensollen’.  ‘Es ist sehr schön, ausLiebe zu Menschen und theilnehmendem Wohlwollen ihnen Gutes zu thun, oder ausLiebe zur Ordnung gerecht zu sein, aber das ist noch nicht die ächte moralische Maxime unsers Verhaltens’. 120 4Love of Neighbour are closer to loveofdelight than practical love of benevolence. However,the pas- sagealsorefers to ‘sympathetic benevolence’ [theilnehmendes Wohlwollen], which is not properlymoral. Ithink this must now be understood in the light of the earlier lecture notes,whereitwas possible to have benevolence for others either from inclination or from obligation. Quite clearly, in the second Critique Kant continues to relyonthe distinction between pathological loveand practical lovefamiliar from Groundwork I. The issue is now how to make respect for the lawthe incentive of action. As in the Groundwork,Kant sees our relation to the moral lawasanalogous to – or more precisely, as agreeing with [stimmtHiemit] – Jesus’ commandment to loveGod aboveall and one’sneighbour as oneself (C2, 5:83.3). Kant explains first that,asatranscendent being,God cannot be loved pathologically, and while pathological lovetowards other humans is possible, it cannot be com- manded. Jesus’ dictum thereforeconcerns onlypractical love:

Itis, therefore, only practical love,that is understood in that kernel of all laws. To loveGod means,inthis sense, to do what he commands gladly;toloveone’sneighbor means to practice all duties towardhim gladly. But the command that makes this arule cannot com- mand us to have this dispositionindutiful actions but onlytostrive for it.(C2,5:83.11–16)²¹

The idea is familiar from Groundwork I, but Kant’sconception of love of neigh- bour does indeedvaryfrom the Groundwork to the second Critique. In the Groundwork,Kant argues thatJesus’ commandment concerns practical love and not the feeling of love, period. Here he argues that while Jesus’ command- ment concerns practical loveand pathological lovecannot be commanded, what is commanded is nevertheless love, and so the commandment bringswith it a duty to strive for aglad disposition in practical love.²² How is this obvious differ- ence between the passages of the Groundwork and the second Critique to be ex- plained?

 ‘Also ist es bloß die praktische Liebe,die in jenem Kern aller Gesetze verstanden wird. Gott lieben, heißtindieser Bedeutung, seine Gebote gerne thun; den Nächsten lieben, heißt: alle Pflicht gegenihn gerne ausüben. Das Gebot aber,das dieses zur Regel macht,kannauch nicht diese GesinnunginpflichtmäßigenHandlungen zu haben,sondern bloß darnach zu stre- ben gebieten.’  The idea of doing what God commands gladly can alreadybefound in Kant’slectures on ethics.Itappears all over the Collins notes(LE,27:274.15;27:300.8 – 9; 27:322.32–33; 27:335.35–36), and giventhat these notesare morallyprecritical, it is not the case that Kant came up with this idea somewherebetween the Groundwork and the second Critique. For morediscussion, see ch. 3.1above. 4.1 The General Division Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 121

It has been noted thatwhat is at stake in the Groundwork is the establish- ment of the supreme principle of morality,and what Kant most wants to steer clear of is the naturalist of Hutcheson and Hume, which grounds moralityinnatural passions (e.g. Baron 1995,p.204). This explains,atleast in part,why Kant excludes feelingsfrom the sphere of duty in the Groundwork, but Ithink thereismoretobesaid about the apparent shift between the concep- tions presented in these two works.Itissignificant that in the second Critique, Kant considers not onlythe ground of morality but also its ends. The second Cri- tique passageappears in the middle of adiscussion that pertains to the impos- sibility of achieving holiness(aperfectlymoral disposition), the attainment of which would mean thatwenolonger had anyinclinations against morality and could speak of alovefor the law(C2,5:84).²³ Lovefor the lawremains im- possiblefor imperfect creatures,but it seems thatone waytoapproach it is by striving for gladness in loving one’sneighbour practically. This interpretation re- lies on an idea according to which increasingthe amount of glad practical love from duty in our liveswill consequentlydiminish the power that (contra-moral) inclinations generallyhaveoverus(seech. 1.3). It can at least be said that when- ever we practice lovefor our neighbours gladly – that is, with an accompanying inclination for the moral actionorits end – we do not at the same time struggle with contra-moral inclinations. Optimistically, approaching lovefor the law through glad practical neighbourly lovecorresponds with Kant’sassertion that lovefrom duty will actually lead to lovefrom inclination (MM, 6:402.14– 21; LE, 27:419.4 – 7). In anycase, the Groundwork passagediscusses the ground of moral action in the good will, whereas the second Critique passageprescribes the end of subjective moral perfection. Another wayofmaking anearlyequivalent point is to note abasic difference in how the Groundwork and the second Critique present the notion of the highest good. In the Groundwork,the highest good is used in the sense of the good will

 With regardtoloveofGod, Kant’streatment of the command to loveGod shifts the object of lovefromGod to the moral law, such that lovefor the lawbecomes the unattainable object of one’smoral striving. Idiscussthis point in ch. 3.1. What is interesting here,however,isthat while the notion of cultivation is alreadypresent in Collins (LE, 27:317.35– 38), therewould ap- pear to be no mention of the ideal of lovingthe lawinthe context of lovingGod prior to the second Critique,eventhough the term comes up in Mrongovius II (but there in the contextof rewards) (see LE, 29:639.39). Ithink this can be explained simplybythe fact that onlyafter the Groundwork had established and solidified the status of the moral lawwas Kant ableto view lovingthe moral lawasanalogous or parallel to lovingGod, as the second Critique shows.This hypothesis is consistent with the later Vigilantius notes, where lovetowards God is discussed in terms of lovingthe law(LE,27:720.1ff.). 122 4Love of Neighbour

(GW, 4:396.25) or God²⁴ (GW, 4:408.37–409.1), so that in the latter case, the con- cept of the highest good is derived ‘from the idea of moral perfection’ (GW, 4:409.1– 3)²⁵.Unlikeinthe second Critique,inthe Groundwork the notion of the highest good is not developedinterms of asubjective process of striving to approach it.Further,the component of happinessisnot mentioned in connec- tion with the highest good in the Groundwork,which again impliessimply that the focus there is on the ground of morality.Inthe second Critique,however, the highestgood has morality as its supreme condition (C2, 5:119) and the hap- piness of the rational moral agent as its end; onlythe perfectlyvirtuousagent is worthyofperfect happiness.Following my interpretation of the relation between lovefor the lawand glad practical loveofneighbour presented above, we may take it thataslovefor the lawdenotes asubjectively perfect virtuous condition, it is apartial description or an element of the completehighest good. Hence, glad practical loveofneighbour can be plausiblyviewed as aregulative guide- line for striving to approach the highest good in the subjective sense. By marking this differenceregarding the usageofthe highestgood in the two works,I’mnot implying anykind of worry about contradiction or inconsistency. I’mmerelynot- ing that in the Groundwork passageonloveofneighbour this sort of ‘end-notion’ of the highest good is not at issue, and thus the contexts of the two passages are clearlydifferent: the one concerns the ground of morality,the other its end. With respect to their ground, the conceptions of loveofneighbour in the Groundwork and the second Critique are therefore similar and consistent since both divide loveofneighbour into practical and pathological loveand hold that onlypractical lovecan be commanded. Unlikethe passageinthe Ground- work,the passageinthe second Critique includes aduty to strive for aglad dis- position in practical lovefor the end of one’smoral perfection,and in this re- spect the twoconceptions are different.Asthe following willshow,the second account anticipates TheMetaphysics of Morals,wherethe duty of loveand the sensiblesideoflovewill stillbeseen as distinct,but even more intertwined. It should also be kept in mind that in both the Groundwork (GW, 4:421.31–33) and the second Critique (C2, 5:8.15–23), Kant explicitlyreserves the systematic divisionorclassification of duties for afuture work, which, as implied in the sec- ond Critique,might further include aspecial referencetohuman nature. But the problem concerning the relationship between loveofneighbour and the general division of lovestill remains.Inthe Collins notes on ethics and in the Religion,Kant claims that all love, or loveingeneral, can be divided into love of

 As such, associating God with the highest good is of course traditional for Christianity.  ‘ausder Idee […]von sittlicherVollkommenheit’. 4.2 Love of NeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 123 benevolence and loveofdelight.The Collins notes explicitlyrelyonthis distinc- tion in the context of loveofneighbour or love of other human beings. In the Groundwork and in the second Critique,however,the terms of the general divi- sion are not applied to the context of neighbourly love. Instead, both works dis- tinguish between practical loveand pathological love.Inlight of Herder and Col- lins, it is plausible to interpret practical loveasloveofbenevolence, but the status of pathological love in terms of the general division remains unclear. Even though indirect evidence indicates that pathological lovefor others is most likelyloveofdelight,this is by no means certain, and pathological love might actuallyrefer to both pathological loveofdelight and loveofbenevolence from inclination. Iwill now move on to analyse loveofneighbour in TheMeta- physics of Morals,which will corroborate my tentative identifications concerning the general division of loveinthis context.However,the picture will again be- come different and even more complex thanone might have assumed based on the previous works.

4.2 LoveofNeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals

Ihavenow established that despite their obvious differences, Kant’sdiscussions on loveofneighbour in both the Groundwork and the second Critique contain a distinction between pathological love and practical love – adistinction that it makes sense tentativelytointerpret in terms of love’sgeneral division. In The Metaphysics of Morals we find loveofneighbour addressed in twospecific places within the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.Itfirst appears in ‘Introduction XII’ and then in the ‘Elements’.Iwill now analyse the basic divisions of the concept of love in these contexts to demonstrate that the wayKant organises his discussion explic- itlyrelies on the general division of lovefound in his earlier works.This analysis will show thatthe broad outline of Kant’sconception of loveofneighbourre- mains consistent throughout the mature period, even though its treatment in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is much more nuanced and detailed, and hence exegeti- callymore cumbersome, than the passages found in the Groundwork and the sec- ond Critique. Compared to the Groundwork in particular,which focuses on the ground of morality,the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ proposes amore or less systematic divisionofduties from the perspective of the ends of morality,while placing more emphasis on the fact that besides reason, the human being is also endow- ed with specific natural qualities or dispositions thatmay not just be morallyin- different or workagainst morality, but mayalso servethe realisation of moral ends, or even lie at the subjective basesofbecomingmoral. We will see an ob- vious distinction between afeelingorsensation of love(loveofdelight) and 124 4Love of Neighbour practical love(loveofbenevolence), but the feelingorthe aesthetic predisposi- tion of neighbourlyloveasdescribed in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is not necessarily merelypathological but mayinfact be closer to what Kant in the Collins notes termed intellectual loveofdelight (as Schönecker (2010,pp. 155–157) has shown). Lastly, Itake alook at the conceptual distinctions related to the more specific duties of practical loveinorder to establish the basic system of the feel- ing-action-cultivation-account of loveofneighbour.

4.2.1 On the Feeling²⁶ of Love

In Section XII of the Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,Kant distinguishes between four ‘[a]esthetic preconditionsofthe mind’sreceptivity to concepts of duty as such’ (MM, 6:399.2–3; Guyer 2010)²⁷.These are ‘natural predispositions of the mind’ (MM, 6:399.11)²⁸ or ‘subjective conditions of receptiveness to the con- cept of duty’ (MM, 6:399.8 – 10)²⁹.AccordingtoKant, ‘[t]o have these predisposi- tions cannot be considered aduty;rather,every human being has them, and it is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation.’ (MM, 6:399.12 – 14)³⁰ Sub- jectively, they ‘lieatthe basis of morality’,but they are not morality’s ‘objective conditions’ (MM, 6:399.9 – 10)³¹.Assuch, the predispositions seem to have re- ceivedlittle attention in the literature(see Guyer 2010;Schönecker 2010), and their functionissomewhat unclear.Atface value, they might seem to suggest some sortofdeparture from Kant’sprevious premises in the apriori groundings

 Iuse the English word ‘feeling’ here broadly,somewhat like Gregordoes in her translation of ‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.This is not implausible as I’mtryingtocover with it those variants of loveofneighbour that arenot presented as aduty in Kant’smaturepublished works. The English word ‘feeling’ can refertobodilysensations,emotionalstates, and thoughts of wanting to help others (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). These aspects of ‘feeling’ correspond roughlytoKant’susage of Empfindungen, Gefühle,and (wohlwollende) Neigungen. These are all close to each other in Kant,and generallyonthe side of natureincontrast with purepractical reason. The technical term for specific emotional ‘feelings’ in Kant is Gefühle,and Iindicate these moresubtle distinctions in my discussion whenever necessary.  ‘Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüths für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt.’ FollowingGuyer’stranslation in ‘Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals’.Notealso the mis- take in footnote ‘f’ of Gregor’stranslation (MM, p. 528fn.f). The German should read as above, not ‘Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts Achtung’.  ‘natürliche Gemüthsanlagen’.  ‘subjective Bedingungen der Empfänglichkeit für den Pflichtbegriff’.  ‘welche Anlagenzuhabennicht als Pflicht angesehen werden kann, sondern die jeder Mensch hat und kraft derenerverpflichtet werden kann.’  ‘der Moralität zum Grunde liegen’ / ‘objectiveBedingungen’. 4.2 Love of NeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 125 of moral philosophy, as he now holds that there are some sorts of specific nat- ural sensory conditions which make duty subjectively possible. My aim here is not to provide adetailed interpretation of the function or meaning of these pre- dispositions in general, nor to make anystrong claim as regards their overall sta- tus, but merelytoanalyse the conceptual outlines of loveofneighbour from the perspective of love’sgeneral division in this context.Ido takeitthat,against the backdrop of the previous works I’ve discussed in this chapter,weare slowlyar- riving at amore nuanced, more comprehensive picture of the relationship be- tween human nature and morality, just as Kant indicates in the second Critique (C2, 5:8.15–23). By making further assumptions about the natural side of the cog- nitive make-up of the agent,the moralgroundingofthe concept of duty is not thereby inverted. Ithink that Kant’sbasic moral philosophical positions stand, and we are just witnessing afurther stepinthe gradual unfoldingofhis attempt to make sense of human existence.EvenifIam mistaken about this more gen- eral point,myspecific exegetical analysis of the conceptual outline of lovecan still be viable. The four aesthetic predispositions that Kant lists are moral feeling,con- science, loveofneighbour or love of human beings, and self-respect. There is one previous exegetical account of the aesthetic predisposition of lovefor one’sneighbour.Schönecker (2010) argues thatthis predisposition, as presented in ‘Introduction XII’,cannot be practical loveand must instead be understood as loveofdelight.IbelieveSchönecker is correct,and Iadopt the main resultsof his readingand will merelymake avery similar systematic point from the per- spective of love’sgeneral division. Idothink thatasSchöneckerisnot ultimately groundinghis analysis in the distinction between loveofdelight and loveofbe- nevolence, the overall results my reading yields regardingloveofneighbour are more general (even if less detailed) than the ones arrivedatbySchönecker. Before looking at the passages on love of neighbourinmore detail, Iwould like to saysomething about the conceptual relationship between loveofneigh- bour [Nächstenliebe, die Liebedes Nächsten]and loveofhuman beings[Men- schenliebe]inTheMetaphysics of Morals.³² Based on the division of ‘Introduction

 From astrictlyhistorical and etymological perspective,Dagobert de Levie (1963) shows,in- terestingly,that the German word Menschenliebe onlyemergedduringthe 18th century.Itwas de- rivedfromthe Christian principle of love, and could even be identified with Nächstenliebe (de Levie 1963, p. 301). Menschenliebe was used both in religious contexts and as asecularised En- lightenment version of the Christian principle (de Levie 1963, pp. 301ff.). Even though Nächsten- liebe and Menschenliebe arenearlyequivalent in Kant,Iam emphasising Nächstenliebe to ac- knowledge the importance of the culturalcontext of Christianity, in which Kant’sdiscussions of lovetakeplace, as well as to highlight the interrelatedness of loveofneighbour,self-love, 126 4Love of Neighbour

XII’,loveofneighbour and loveofhuman beingswould seem to be the same. In the first preliminary instance, Kant lists die Liebe des Nächsten as one of the four natural predispositions (MM, 6:399.6 – 7) and then groups his discussion under the title ‘On the LoveofHuman Beings’ [Vonder Menschenliebe](MM, 6:399.22).Inthe ‘Elements’,whereloveofneighbour is discussed from the point of view of duty or practical love, Kant usesthe general heading ‘On the Duty of LovetoOther Human Beings’ [Vonder Liebespflichtgegen andere Men- schen](MM,6:448.7). In both ‘Introduction XII’ and the ‘Elements’,alarge part of Kant’streatment revolvesaround interpretation of the biblical command- ment to loveone’sneighbour,and in this sense thereisclear continuityfrom the Groundwork and the second Critique to TheMetaphysics of Morals. There is agen- eral sense in which Kant seems to equate loveofhuman beings or love of other human beingswith loveofneighbour (see MM, 6:402.17;cf. 6:448.16–17; cf. 6:450.3; cf. 6:450.16;cf. 6:450.33 – 34). He also speaks of universal loveof human beings[allgemeine Menschenliebe]interms of loveofneighbour [Näch- stenliebe](MM, 6:451.21; cf. 6:451.29), but from this perspective adistinction in the extensions of loveofneighbour and loveofhuman beingscan be drawn. Kant’sconceptual work on loveofneighbour (or loveofotherhuman beings) in- volves an account of morallyconditioned self-benevolence in the loveofall human beingstowards one another.Ifthe maxim of benevolence is to hold uni- versallyasaduty,Imust include myself in the set of ‘all others’ as an object of benevolence, which inclusion makesself-benevolence permitted on the condi- tion that one is benevolent towards others as well (MM, 6:450.30 –451.19;see ch. 1.3above). So there seems to be asense in which loveofhuman beingsin general can be interpreted to be extensionallyaslightlybroader concept than loveofneighbour.While loveofhuman beingsmight be thoughttoincludea type of morallyconditioned self-love, in the second Critique Kant clearlyrejects anyinterpretation of the biblical commandment thatwould reduce loveofGod or loveofneighbour to self-love(C2,5:83fn.33–36; pace Moors 2007,pp. 256, 269). Loveofneighbour therefore equates to loveofhuman beingsinthe Intro- duction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (see also MM, 6:458.1–19), and generallyto loveofother human beings. The Introduction account of loveofneighbour is reminiscent of the Ground- work and the second Critique:

Love is amatter of sensation,not of willing,and Icannot lovebecause I will to,still less because I ought to (I cannot be constrained to love); so a duty to love is an absurdity.

and loveofGod, which interrelatedness is essential both for Christianityand for the ‘enlight- ened’ Kantian concept of love. 4.2 Love of NeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 127

But benevolence (AMOR BENEVOLENTIAE), as conduct,can be subject to alaw of duty. (MM, 6:401.24–28)³³

This passagealigns especiallynicelywith the Groundwork,and the general divi- sion terminologyisclearlyinoperation (benevolence is termed amor benevolen- tiae). This suggests that the loveatissue here is not something completelynew, of which Kant has not spoken previously; instead, we are getting an account of the natural side of loveofneighbour, as mentioned previouslyinthe Groundwork and the second Critique,but now developeddifferently, as anatural sensory pre- disposition for subjective receptivity to duty.Eventhough the parallel with the previous works is clear and loveishere anatural sensation distinct from the loveofbenevolence, it is not clear that this aesthetic predisposition is merely pathological. The abovedistinction is similar to those from the Groundwork and the second Critique,but it’snot exactlythe same. Further on, we also learn that it is inappropriate to call benevolence love(MM, 6:401.28–29), and we should read this claim as saying thatbenevolence cannot be called lovein the context of sensation, or thatitcannot be called lovewithout qualification. Since we know thathaving the aesthetic predisposition cannot be aduty,and since the passageonloveofneighbour here begins specificallybyidentifying lovewith sensation [Empfindung]rather than willing,itisclear that the love at issue here cannot be the practical loveofbenevolence (practical loveimplies duty and willing). But can the aesthetic predisposition of neighbourly lovebeidentifiedwith loveofdelight,asSchöneckerclaims?Once again, Kant refers to the biblical commandment of love, and once again his discussion introduces new logical re- lationships between the different notions of loveatplayinthatcontext:

Beneficence is aduty.Ifsomeone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventuallycomes actuallytolovethe person he has helped. So the saying ‘you oughttolove your neighbor as yourself’ does not mean that youought immediately(first) to lovehim and (afterwards) by means of this lovedogood to him. It means,rather, do good to your fellow human beings,and your beneficencewill produce loveofthem in you(as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficenceingeneral). Hence onlythe lovethat is delight (AMOR COMPLACENTIAE) is direct.But to have a duty to this (which is apleasurejoined immediatelytothe representation of an object’sex-

 ‘Liebe ist eine Sache der Empfindung,nicht des Wollens,und ich kannnicht lieben, weilich will,noch weniger aber weil ich soll (zur Liebe genöthigt werden); mithin ist eine Pflicht zu lieben ein Unding. Wohlwollen (AMOR BENEVOLENTIAE) aber kannals ein Thun einem Pflichtgesetz unterworfen sein.’ Translation modified. 128 4Love of Neighbour

istence), that is, to have to be constrained to take pleasureinsomething, is acontradiction. (MM, 6:402.14– 21)³⁴

Guyer calls this discussion ‘limited and disappointing’ (Guyer 2010,p.145). Ac- cording to Guyer, ‘Kant actuallyclaims that feelingsoflovetowards (specific) others are aconsequenceoreffect of beneficence, not an aestheticprecondition or cause thereof.’ (Guyer 2010,p.145)Guyer’sview is understandable, but he does not reallyanalyse the passageorproblematise the loveatissue in ‘Introduc- tion XII’.Sowhat is going on in the abovequotation?Inharmonywith Schöneck- er’sresults, we can note, first,thatthe loveKant discusses as the object of Jesus’ lovecommandment cannot be the aesthetic predisposition. This is because Jesus’ commandment concerns practical love, and as I’ve shown abovethe identifica- tion of practical lovewith the aesthetic predisposition of loveisalreadyruled out in the first sentenceofKant’sdiscussion of the aesthetic predisposition of loveof neighbour.Second, along the lines of his thinkinginthe Collins notes (LE, 27:417.11– 19;27:419.4 – 7), Kant continues to hold that beneficencefrom duty will produce an inclination of loveinthe beneficent subject.Inthe ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,the lovethat resultsfrom beneficenceisdefined as ‘an aptitude of the inclination to beneficenceingeneral’ (MM, 6:402.20–21). Building on the Collinsnotes,wecan identify this derivative love as loveofbenevolence from in- clination. It is the supposed identification of this derivativelovewith the aesthet- ic predisposition of neighbourlylovethat disappoints Guyer.But as Schönecker (2010,pp. 152, 154) has shown, the point is preciselythat because the aesthetic predisposition of loveis‘antecedent’ [vorhergehend]and ‘lies’ subjectively ‘at the foundation’ [zumGrunde liegen]ofmorality,the aesthetic predisposition cannot be identified with the love that resultsfrom beneficence – apoint that Guyer does not consider.What we are left with is the lastsentence of the long quotation above, whereKant defines loveofdelight,and loveofdelight ‘alone’ [allein], as direct or immediate pleasure in the presentation of an object’sexistence – a

 ‘Wohlthun ist pflicht.Wer diese oft ausübt,und es gelingt ihm mit seiner wohlthätigen Ab- sicht,kommt endlich wohl gar dahin, den, welchem er wohl gethan hat,wirklich zu lieben. Wenn es also heißt: du sollst deinen Nächsten lieben als sich selbst,soheißtdas nicht: du sollst unmittelbar (zuerst) lieben und vermittelst dieser Liebe (nachher)wohlthun, sondern: thue de- inem Nebenmenschen wohl,und dieses Wohlthun wirdMenschenliebe (als Fertigkeit der Nei- gung zum Wohlthun überhaupt) in dir bewirken! Die Liebe des Wohlgefallens (AMOR COMPLACENTIAE) würde also allein direct sein. Zu dieser aber (als einer unmittelbar mit der Vorstellungder Existenz eines Gegenstandes verbun- denen Lust) eine Pflicht zu haben, d. i. zur Lust worangenöthigt werden zu müssen, ist ein Wi- derspruch.’ 4.2 Love of NeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 129 pleasure that it is not aduty to have.This loveofdelight matches the general characteristics of the aesthetic predispositions and is the onlylogical option left when it comes to identifying the aesthetic predisposition of loveofneigh- bour,given the conceptual resources of lovegenerallyatour disposal. By building on Schönecker’sanalysis,IbelieveIhave shown that the ele- ments of the general division of loveare clearly at work in ‘Introduction XII’ and thatthe aesthetic predisposition of loveofneighbour can onlybeidentified with loveofdelight.Strictlyspeaking,this would be enough for the argument I wish to make in this context,but Ithink just abit more should be said about the kind of loveofdelight at playhere. Recall that the basic division in the Ground- work and the second Critique is between pathological loveand practical love(the latter being loveofbenevolence from duty). As lovein‘Introduction XII’ is dis- tinguishedpreciselyfrom benevolence, which is amatterofduty,itmay be temptingtoidentifythe aesthetic predisposition with pathological love of de- light,because this would introduce avery smoothcontinuity to the natural side of the concept of loveofneighbour among all the main moral philosophical works from the mature period. But how could apathological sensation lie at the subjective basis of receptivity to concepts of duty?Furthermore, regarding the predispositions in general, Kant holds that: ‘Consciousnessofthem is not of em- pirical origin; it can, instead, onlyfollow from aconsciousness of amoral law, as the effect this has on the mind.’ (MM, 6:399.14 – 16)³⁵ If loveofdelight is merely pathological, how can consciousness of it depend on one’sconsciousness of the moral law? Fortunately, the Collins notes provide the resources to identify the loveofde- light here as intellectual,which means that the object of the antecedent predis- position to loveone’sneighbour is an immediate delight in the humanity (or the rational nature)ofanother person (seeLE, 27:418). Again, Iowe this point to Schönecker (2010,pp. 156–157). The actual feeling of delight will vary according to the moral perfection of the actual other in question, but Kant does not really spell this out in much detail, and he never drawsaclear distinction between the aesthetic predisposition (or the capacity) of the feeling of loveand the actual feeling of love. Perhaps it is still possiblethat the loveofdelight in question is both pathological and intellectual, but my argument does not depend on the answer to this question.³⁶ Formypurposes, the context-specific existence of the general division of loveisenough.

 ‘Das Bewußtsein derselben ist nicht empirischen Ursprungs,sondern kann nur aufdas eines moralischen Gesetzes,als Wirkung desselben aufs Gemüth, folgen.’  Forfurther discussion of the attributes of loveofdelight in this context, see Schönecker (2010,pp. 158ff.). 130 4Love of Neighbour

4.2.2 On PracticalLove

Inow turn to loveofneighbour in the ‘Elements’ of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.The basic division here is that between duties to oneself and duties to others. Duties to others are further divided into dutiesofloveand duties of respect.³⁷ Based on Kant’sprevious accounts in the Groundwork,the second Critique,and ‘Introduc- tion XII’,which all hold that onlypractical lovecan be aduty,weshould now assume thatinthe light of love’sgeneral division the lovethat is primarilyat issue in Kant’soverall discussion in ‘On the Duty of LovetoOther HumanBeings’ (MM, 6:448.7)³⁸ is not loveofdelight but practical love. And so it is:

In this context,however,LOVEisnot to be understood as feeling (aesthetic),that is, as pleasureinthe perfectionofothers;loveisnot to be understood as delight in them (sinceothers cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in beneficence. (MM, 6:449.17– 22)³⁹

The basic premise of practical loveinTheMetaphysics of Morals is therefore very much consistent with the Groundwork and the second Critique (see alsoMM, 6:450.16 – 19). Practical loveisonce again distinguished from the feeling of lovetowhich there is no duty (here explicitlydelight or Wohlgefallen)and is now identified as the maximofbenevolence resulting in beneficence. The duty of practical loveisfurther divided into threedistinct duties:beneficence [Wohltätigkeit], gratitude [Dankbarkeit], and sympathetic participation⁴⁰ [Theil- nehmung](MM, 6:452.11–12). Next,Ishall discuss each of these in turn to

 The basic division of duties in general in the Vigilantius lecturenotesfrom1793isbetween duties of right and duties of love(LE,27:600.12–19;27:604.5 – 6), which suggests that Kant was still workingout the final form of the divisionsofthe moral system around the time of the pub- lication of TheMetaphysics of Morals.  ‘Vonder Liebespflicht gegenandere Menschen.’  ‘Die LIEBE wirdhier aber nicht als Gefühl (ästhetisch), d.i. als Lust an der Vollkommenheit anderer Menschen, nicht als Liebe des Wohlgefallens,verstanden (den Gefühle zu haben, dazu kanneskeine Verpflichtungdurch Anderegeben), sondern muß als Maxime des Wohlwollens (als praktisch)gedacht werden, welche das Wohlthun zur Folgehat.’ Translationmodified. Gre- gortranslates both Gefühl and Empfindung as ‘feeling’,eventhough for Empfindung, ‘sensation’ could be used. However,itisdifficulttomake out aconsistent technical distinctionbetween the two terms in Kant.Note how both Gefühl and Empfindung (MM, 6:401.24–28)are related to the aesthetic or the sensory,which,inthe context of loveofneighbour,seems to confirm yetagain the parallelism between the general division of loveand the nature-freedom division. Gefühl and Empfindung areterms of nature.  FollowingFahmy’s(2009) suggestion in translating Theilnehmung. 4.2 LoveofNeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 131 show thatthe general division approach and the feeling-action-cultivation ac- count of loveofneighbour are indeedrobust.Again, rather than providingan interpretation of each of these duties, Iaim primarilytotrace the conceptual out- lines of my general account of loveofneighbour in Kant’swritings. That is, I hope to show thatKant’sdiscussions continue to relyonadistinctionbetween feeling and reason-based action, or between affectiveand rational elements in the cognitive apparatusofthe agent,and that the notion of cultivation is oper- ative when it comes to the duties of practical love.

A) Beneficence Givenmyfoundational aim of systematising the general outlines of aKant imma- nent conceptual framework, with regard to beneficenceitsuffices to make sense of the logical relationship between beneficenceand benevolence and how this distinction relates to loveofneighbour through notions of practical loveand cul- tivation. It should now be basically clear that Kantian amorbenevolentiae in- volves at least goodwill, maxims of action, and actual beneficence. In the ‘Ele- ments’,the general duty of lovefor one’sneighbour [Nächstenliebe]isfurther characterised ‘as the duty to make others’ ends my own (provided onlythat these are not immoral)’ (MM, 6:450.4 – 5)⁴¹,which would make amor benevolen- tiae the duty to adopt maxims thatfurther the ends of others, according to their concepts of happiness (see MM, 6:454.18–20). In the specific discussion on beneficence, however,weare givennew definitions of benevolence and be- neficence: ‘Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others; but beneficenceisthe maxim of making others’ happinessone’send’ (MM, 6:452.26–28)⁴².Here, benevolence is defined as satisfaction, beneficenceas the maxim. At face value, this seems confused, but Ithink the new definitionsmust be understood in the light of the immediatelypreceding paragraph, whereKant dis- cusses degrees of benevolenceand explains that ‘the benevolence present in lovefor all human beingsisindeed the greatest in its extent,but the smallest in its degree’ (MM, 6:451.21–22)⁴³.This is ‘benevolence in wishes’ [das Wohlwol- len des Wunsches](MM, 6:452.1; cf. LE,27:64.13 – 14), which borders on indiffer-

 ‘die Pflicht Anderer ihre Zwecke (so fern diese nur nicht unsittlichsind) zu den meinen zu machen’.  ‘Wohlwollen ist das Vergnügenander Glückseligkeit (dem Wohlsein) Anderer;Wohlthun aber die Maxime, sich dasselbe zum Zweck zu machen’.  ‘Das Wohlwollen in der allgemeinen Menschenliebe ist nun zwar dem Umfange nach das größte, dem Grade nach aber das kleinste’. 132 4LoveofNeighbour ence. AccordingtoKant,this weak, universal benevolence is arather passive de- light [Wohlgefallen]inthe well-beingofothers (MM, 6:452.2–3), and we see Kant actuallyusing the Wohlgefallen terminology to describe this form of well-wish- ing.The weak benevolence is distinguished from practical love, which is ‘active, practical benevolence (beneficence), making the well-beingand happiness of others my end.’ (MM, 6:452.4–5)⁴⁴ The seemingly confused passageceases to be confused: we should take the ‘satisfaction definition’ of benevolence as refer- ring to weak, universal benevolence and the ‘maxim definition’ of beneficenceas referringtoactive benevolence. Certain cases of rational benevolence are there- fore merelywishful and do not leadtoactual beneficence, which means that ra- tional benevolence and beneficencecan be viewed as logicallydistinct.Kant al- lows that acts of beneficenceingeneral can be limited by beneficencetoward individuals closer to oneself. ForKant,interms of the Christian commandment, loving the other ‘as oneself’ refers to the rational ground of universal benevo- lence, whereas in acting Iamallowed to lovethose further away from me to a lesser degree and maylovethose closer to me more, perhaps even ‘as myself’, in the closest of cases (see §28, MM, 6:451– 452). It is therefore possible that be- neficencetoward,say,one’sparents,may effectively inhibitthe actualisation of beneficencetowardsomeone further away.Inthe inefficient case, too, rational benevolence as the ground of obligation remains in place and mayatleast in some cases be experiencedaswhat Timmermann calls ‘subjective regret’.(See Timmermann 2013,esp.pp. 47 ff.) Once again, rational benevolenceisnot exact- ly the same as beneficence.⁴⁵ Giventhe above, it should now be clear that Kant- ian practical loveinvolves both benevolence and beneficence. This finding is relevant to the current exegetical debate, as is made clear when we consider arecent take on practical loveinthe literature.Inher article ‘Kantian Practical Love’,Fahmy(2010) argues that practical loveisbest under- stood through what she calls the ‘cultivation account’,according to which ‘[t]he duty of practical loveisthe duty to cultivateabenevolent disposition to- ward other human beingsaswell as practical beneficent desires.’ (Fahmy 2010,p.321)Inparticular,and correctly, Iwould argue, Fahmyrefuses to reduce

 ‘ein thätiges, praktisches Wohlwollen, sich das Wohl und Heil des Anderen zum Zweck zu machen, (das Wohlthun)’.  Kant does not specify how much is requiredfromusinterms of beneficence, and it is not my aim heretodiscuss Kant’stake on the normative issue of demandingness (see e.g. van Ackeren &Sticker 2015). At aminimum, one should not be so beneficent as to cometoneed the benef- icenceofothers (MM, 6:454). 4.2 Love of NeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 133 practical lovetorespect or beneficence.⁴⁶ The division between loveand respect is agroundingdualism in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,and benevolence and benef- icence, while sometimesnearlyequivalent,remain logicallydistinct.Ialso agree that throughout the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ Kant emphasises our duty to cultivatea moral disposition, including our natural feelings. What does it mean to cultivatesomething in Kant’smoral philosophy? As Fahmy(2010,pp. 319–322) has shown, it is essential to keep in mind that one of the most foundational claims in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is thatthere are two ends that are also duties:one’sown perfectionand the happiness of others (MM, 6:385–388). Pursuing these is necessarilyanongoingprocess, in which an agent cultivates herself by increasing her fitness or capacity for pursuing these ends: ‘Natural perfectionisthe cultivation of any capacities whatever for further- ing ends set forth by reason.’ (MM, 6:391.29–31⁴⁷;see also 6:418fn.)Asregards morality, cultivation aims at the perfection of doing one’sduty from duty (MM, 6:392),which involvesacheerful heart in carrying out one’sduties with the thoughtofduty in mind (MM, 6:484–485). Ithink we can saygenerallythat the kind of cultivation thatisethicallyrequired of us with regardtothe ends that are also duties is striving to harmonise our emotive or affective faculties with what duty commands,inorder to removecognitivehindrances that make it more difficult for us to do our duty. In the case of beneficence, Kant consistentlyholds, from the Collins notes onwards,that beneficent action from duty produces afeeling or an inclination of love in the virtuoussubject, which feeling is in turn prone to yield more be- neficence(LE, 27:417.11– 19;27:419.4 – 7; MM, 6:402.14– 21). Thiswould be an in- stance of cultivatingneighbourly love. However,Ifear that in correctlydistanc- ing herself from the reductive actionaccount,Fahmyrisks underminingthe action component of practical love. She not onlyholds that practical loveisdis- tinct from beneficence but claims, further,that practical loveisone of four dis- tinct duties of love alongside beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participa- tion (Fahmy2010,p.327). From asystematic exegetical perspective,this view is difficult to maintain. In my opinion,itfailstoacknowledge the general consis- tencyinlove’sdivision throughout the Groundwork,the second Critique,and TheMetaphysics of Morals,according to which love of neighbour divides into

 Iwill therefore not use anyfurther resourcestodiscuss the possibilitythat in Kant’sethics practical lovemight be reducible to respect or to mere beneficent action. These kinds of ideas are not in line with the text. Formoredetailed debate, see Fahmy(2010); cf. e.g. Johnson (1997).  ‘Physische,d.i.Cultur aller Vermögen überhaupt zu Beförderungder durch die Vernunft vor- gelegtenZwecke.’ Gregor picks the word ‘perfection’ [Vollkommenheit]fromthe subheadingim- mediatelyabovethe German quotetomakethe English smoother. 134 4LoveofNeighbour the feelingofloveand the duty of love, the latter being everywherepractical love. We also sawabovehow in Kant’stext beneficencewas apart of the defini- tion of practical love. Further,inthe ‘Elements’ the duty of loveisgenerallyiden- tified with practical lovetwice in the preliminary main clauses (MM, 6:449.17– 22; 6:450.16 – 19), and the dutiesofloveare then explicitlydivided into three specific duties further along: ‘They are dutiesofA)beneficence,B)gratitude,and C) sym- pathetic participation.’ (MM, 6:452.11–12)⁴⁸ In my opinion, the charitable view, which does not assume asignificant gaporaradical changeinKant’sideas within the critical period, and which is also exegeticallyconsistent with the letter of Kant’stext,istosee beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy as falling within the division of practical love.

B) Gratitude What role does loveplayinthe duty of gratitude?According to Kant, ‘[g]ratitude consists in honoring aperson because of abenefit he has rendered us. The feeling connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as onlyinarelation of lovetoward the recipient.’ (MM, 6:454.31–455.1)⁴⁹ On the face of it,gratitudeassuch involves not the feeling of loveonthe part of the grateful agent but rather respect as a response to receivedbeneficence. In relation to practical love,then, it would seem to be aduty specifying how we oughttoreact to love.⁵⁰ We then learn that gratitudemay be divided into ‘active’ [thätige]and ‘affec- tive’ [affectionelle]variants,implying that mere benevolence ‘without physical results’ occasions affective gratitude (MM, 6:455.1– 4)⁵¹.Such benevolence is ‘al- readyabasis of obligation to gratitude’,inwhich casethe grateful disposition is called ‘appreciativeness’ [Erkenntlichkeit](MM, 6:455.22–24)⁵².However,Kant does not explicitlyelaborate the division further,and interpretations of his posi- tion vary.Some, like Baron and Fahmy, seem to reduce active gratitude to the cultivation of affective gratitude (Baron &Fahmy2009,p.224), somewhat ne-

 ‘Sie sind: A) Pflichten der Wohltätigkeit,B)der Dankbarkeit,C)der Theilnehmung.’ Transla- tion modified.  ‘Dankbarkeit ist die Verehrung einer Person wegen einer uns erwiesenen Wohlthat.Das Ge- fühl, was mit dieser Beurtheilung verbundenist,ist das der Achtunggegen den (ihn verpflich- tenden) Wohlthäter,dahingegen dieser gegenden Empfängernur als im Verhältnis der Liebe betrachtet wird.’  Iwish to thank Jens Timmermann for bringing this to my attention.  ‘ohne physische Folgen’.  ‘schon Grund der Verpflichtungzur Dankbarkeit’. 4.2 LoveofNeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 135 glectingthosepassages that emphasise action in gratitude. Others, such as Smit and Timmons (2011) and Gudrun vonTevenar (2006), construe gratitude as hav- ing no necessary connection to feeling (Smit &Timmons 2011,p.304;Tevenar 2006), but they tend to somewhat neglect the active-affective distinction(Smit &Simmons, Tevenar)orend up arguing that Kantian gratitude is primarily about discharging the duty (Tevenar).Given these varied interpretations, I think that amore balanced view of active and affective gratitudeisrequired in order to appreciatewhat Isee as the gist of Kant’sdiscussion from love’sper- spective. In the first place, Kant asserts thatgratitude is asacred duty,bywhich he means that ‘it cannot be dischargedcompletelybyany act in keepingwith it (so that one who is under obligation always remains under obligation).’ (MM, 6:455.16 – 17)⁵³ Second, Kant does seem to holdthat affective gratitude is a duty,which at face value presents an interpretative problem since we know that it cannot be aduty to have afeeling.The duty of affective gratitude might be understood as an indirect duty to cultivatethe moralfeeling,which is depend- ent on reason-induced respect for the moral law. This would be consistent with Kant’saccount of the moral feeling in ‘Introduction XII’ (seeMM, 6:399.32– 400.1), but Idonot want to forcethis interpretation and willleave the question open. Active gratitude is also aduty,however,for Kant maintains that ‘[t]he least degree⁵⁴ [ofgratitude] is to render equal services to the benefactor if he can re- ceive them (if he is still living) or,ifhecannot,torenderthem to others’ (MM, 6:456.6 – 8)⁵⁵.This is clearlyademand for actionthat is missed by Baron and Fahmy, and if the cultivation account of active gratitude is to make sense, the action component should be unambiguouslyincorporated as action.⁵⁶ The idea, then, is that gratitude cultivates love. Rather than ‘regardingakindness re- ceivedasaburden one would gladlyberid of’ (MM, 6:456.8– 11)⁵⁷,weshould ac- tivelyseek out opportunities to be grateful:

 ‘die […]durch keinen ihr gemäßen Actvöllig getilgt werden kann (wobeider Verpflichtete immer noch verpflichtet bleibt).’ Tevenar (2006,p.181) mentionsthis passageatthe beginning of her reading but does not wish to incorporate it in her interpretation of Kant’sactual position.  The German text givesthe impression that what is under discussion in the last paragraphon gratitude is the least degree of gratitude. This seems somewhat peculiar, if onlybecause Kant givesnoaccountwhatsoever of other degrees of gratitude.  ‘Der mindesteGrad ist, gleiche Dienstleistungendem Wohlthäter,der dieser empfänglich (noch lebend) ist,und, wenn er es nicht ist,Anderen zu erweisen’.  The implications of gratitude as action have been analysedinsome detail by Smit and Tim- mons (2011).  ‘eine empfangene Wohlthat […]wie eine Last,deren man gern überhoben sein möchte, […] anzusehen’. 136 4Love of Neighbour

takingeventhe occasion for gratitude as amoral blessing, that is, as an opportunity given one to unite this duty of loveofhuman beings,which combines the cordiality of abenev- olent dispositionwith sensitivity to benevolence(attentiveness to the smallest degree of this disposition in one’sthoughtofduty),and so to cultivate loveofhuman beings.(MM, 6:456.11–16)⁵⁸

Kant’sdiscussion thus ends with an emphasis on sensitivity,which, since benef- icenceisnot mentioned or implied here, should be taken as related to affective gratitude or the feeling of respect occasioned by even the most minor instances of benevolence. We mayinterpret the passagesuch that respectingbenevolence in other human beingsstrengthens their incentive to it⁵⁹ and hence cultivates loveofhuman beings, which in this context can onlybeviewed as benevolent lovefrom others. It can thereforebeargued that Kantian gratitude, as asacred duty of practical lovetoother human beings, involves the feelingofrespect for one’sbenefactor, the active renderingofequal services wherepossible, and, through affective sensitivity to benevolence, the cultivation of loveofbenev- olence (see fig.5).

C) Sympathetic Participation Finally, let us turn to the problem of sympathetic participation [die Theilneh- mung]. Like gratitude, the duty of Theilnehmung has oftenbeen viewed as an ad- junct to beneficence. In recent years, however,this picture has started to shatter,

 ‘selbst die Veranlassungdazu als moralische Wohlthat aufzunehmen, d.i. als gegebene Ge- legenheit,diese Tugend der Menschenliebe, welche mit der Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesin- nungzugleich Zärtlichkeit des Wohlwollens (Aufmerksamkeit aufden kleinsten Grad derselben in der Pflichtvorstellung) ist,zuverbinden und so die Menschenliebe zu cultiviren.’ Translation modified. The syntax of this passageisfairlydifficulttofollow.While Itakeittoberelatively clear that dazu referstogratitude, just what is meant to be combined or united with zu verbinden is far less clear.Gregortakesitthat gratitude is united with loveofhuman beings,but the Ger- man syntax does not implythis. Ibelieveweshould read zu verbinden according to sense 5in the Grimm dictionary – der begriff des bandes,der bei allen bisherigenbedeutungen hervortrat,as the concept of the ties by which all meanings thus far surface – in which case verbinden does not grammaticallyrequire that somethingiscombined with something else and mayinstead referto asort of inner unification. Itranslate Wohlthat as ‘blessing’ to emphasise the sacredness of the duty,followingsense 2ofWohltat in Grimm, wherethe meaningshifts from the action to the ef- fect of the action and Wohlthat is related to Geschenk,or‘gift’.Iwish to thank Martin Stickerfor his help with the linguistic difficulties of the passage.  Iowe this point to Smit and Timmons,although they makeitinterms of beneficence: ‘hav- ing agratefuldisposition that is manifested in acts of sincere gratitude tends to encouragefur- ther acts of beneficence’ (Smit &Timmons 2011, p. 318). 4.2 LoveofNeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 137

AGENT 1

RESPECT (BENEFICENCE) BENEVOLENCEactiveaffective

AGENT 2

Figure 5. Gratitude with interpreters likeWood (2008, pp. 176– 177)⁶⁰ and Fahmy(2009) pointing out that in Kant,there is asense in which Theilnehmung is adirect duty in its own right.However,the exegetical details of Sections 34 and 35 remain under discus- sion. Iwill not attempt ageneral interpretation of these passages; adopting the basic results of Fahmy’sreading in particular,⁶¹ my aim is to consider the wayin

 Even though Wood problematicallyconflates beneficenceand practical love(Wood 2008, p. 176; cf. Fahmy2010). As Ihaveshown, the consistent wayofreading Kant in the light of the general division of loveinvolvesviewingbeneficence, gratitude, and sympathyasthe divi- sion of practical love(admittedly, beneficenceseems to be the paradigm case).  My onlyrealexegetical disagreement with Fahmy’sinterpretation relates to the translation of the title of Kant’sdiscussion: ‘Theilnehmende Empfindung ist überhaupt Pflicht’ (MM, 6:456.18), which Gregor translates as ‘Sympathetic feelingisgenerallyaduty’.AsFahmy(2009,p.34) notes, the title presents aproblem sinceweknow that in Kant,itcannot be aduty to have a feeling. Fahmysuggests that the title refers to cultivated sympathetic feeling(Fahmy2009, p. 46), in which case Ithink it would read somethinglike ‘cultivated sympathetic feelingisgen- erallyaduty’.Fahmyherself still finds ‘the title somewhat odd’ (Fahmy2009,p.50fn.23), and I agree, for it seems to implythat to have the cultivated feelingisgenerallyaduty,asopposed to the idea that to cultivate sympathetic feelingis(only) an indirect duty.According to Fahmy (2009,p.49fn.4), Timmermann has suggestedthat it might be bettertotranslate überhaupt as as such,but this movedoesn’thelp to solve this particular issue. Idobelieve, however,that adifferent translation of überhaupt will. While it is clear that the basic abstractmeaningofüber- haupt (literally, overhead)refers to generality (as opposed to particularity), the Grimm and Ade- lung dictionaries show that,atleast in 18th-century German, überhaupt often carries the meaning of ‘in sum’, ‘in all’,or‘all things considered’.Itrefers to somethingalong the lines of the end- point of acalculation or consideration. Grimm B.1reads: eine mehrheit von gegenständen zusam- menfassend – the majority of objectssummarised or attached together.Adelung 1. reads: In allem, alles zusammen genommen – in all, all takentogether.This would make good sense in relation to Kant’saccounts (e.g. GW,4:399.27–34;MM, 6:457. 24–25), which hold that sympathet- ic feelingisnot aduty: all in all, when not just the ground of morality but also the final ends of humanity are taken into account,together with the fact that human beings are natural creatures with feelings,onwhich their happiness largely relies, there is an important sense in which sym- 138 4LoveofNeighbour which the feeling-action division is yetagain repeatedinthe duty of Theilneh- mung and how cultivation figures in this division from the perspective of the con- cept of love. Kant’sbasic distinction here is between humanitas practica and humanitas aesthetica. Humanitas aesthetica is anaturalreceptivity to ‘joy for others and pity (SYMPATHIA MORALIS)’,which are ‘sensuous feelingsof(what should thereforebecalled aesthetic) pleasure or displeasure at the state of gratification as well as pain of others’ (MM, 6:456.20–22)⁶².AccordingtoKant, ‘to use them as ameans to the advancement of active and rational benevolence is stillapartic- ular,ifonlyconditional, duty under the name of humaneness (HUMANITAS).’ (MM, 6:456.24–27)⁶³ In other words, at the beginning of Section 34, ‘humane- ness’ [Menschlichkeit]isaconditional duty to use humanitas aesthetica or our natural receptivity to the feelingsofothers to promoteactive benevolence, which might make the duty of humaneness an adjunct to beneficence. As Wood and Fahmyhaveargued, however,acloser look at how Kant elaborates the notion of ‘humaneness’ (see also C2,155fn.) seems to reveal the existence of another,independent direct duty:

Now,itcan be seen either as the capacity and will to communicate with one another with regardtoone’s feelings (HUMANITASPRACTICA), or merely as the receptivity,given by Na- ture herself, to the feelingofgratification or pain we sharewith others (HUMANITAS AES- THETICA). The first is free and is thereforecalled participating sympathetically (COMMUNIO SENTIENDI LIBERALIS), and is founded on practical reason.The second is unfree (COMMU- NIO SENTIENDI ILLIBERALIS,SERVILIS) and can be called communicable (likethat of heat or of contagious diseases) and also compassivity,because it spreads naturallyamong human beings livingside by side. There is obligation onlytothe first.(MM, 6:456.28– 457. 5)⁶⁴

pathetic feelingisafter all aduty,ifonlyanindirect duty of cultivation. Ithereforepropose what Icall the ‘all-in-all’ intepretation of überhaupt: the title should be translatedas‘All in all, sym- pathetic feelingisaduty’.  ‘Mitfreude und Mitleid (SYMPATHIA MORALIS)’ / ‘sinnlicheGefühle einer (darum ästhetisch zu nennenden) Lust oder Unlust an dem Zustande des Vergügens sowohl als Schmerzens Ander- er’.Timmermann’s(privatelycommunicated) translation.  ‘diese als Mittel zu Beförderung des thätigen und vernünftigenWohlwollens zu gebrauchen, ist noch eine besondere, obzwar nur bedingte Pflicht unterdem Namen der Menschlichkeit (HU- MANITAS)’.Timmermann’s(privatelycommunicated) translation.  ‘Diese kann nun in dem Vermögen und Willen,sich einander in Ansehung seiner Gefühle mit- zutheilen (HUMANITAS PRACTICA), oder blos in der Empfänglichkeit für das gemeinsameGefühl des Vergnügens oder Schmerzens (HUMANITASAESTHETICA), was die Natur selbst giebt,ge- setzt werden. Das erstere ist frei und wirddaher theilnehmend genannt (COMMUNIO SENTIENDI LIBERALIS) und gründetsich aufpraktische Vernunft: das zweite ist unfrei (COMMUNIO SEN- TIENDI ILLIBERALIS, SERVILIS) und kann mittheilend (wie die der Wärme oder ansteckender 4.2 Love of NeighbourinThe Metaphysics of Morals 139

Above, Kant statesthatthere is obligation [Verbindlichkeit]onlytohumanitas practica. It thereforeappears that the direct duty of Theilnehmung based on hu- manitas practica should not be confused with the duty of humaneness in the ear- lier sense. Humanitas practica occasions adirect participatory duty of human be- ingstocommunicate their feelings to each other or to incorporate theirfeelings in their communication (seeFahmy2009,pp. 35–36,42).Incomparison with gratitude, we maynote that,whereas gratitude includes asymmetrical subject positions in arespectful reaction to beneficenceorbenevolence, the direct duty of Theilnehmung as Mittheilung is symmetricallyreciprocal (see fig.6).⁶⁵ Kant provides one further description of the relationship between these two duties of sympathy:

But while pity (and thus also joy) for others is not in itself one’sduty, active sympathetic participation in their fateis; and to this end it is thus indirectlyone’sduty to cultivatethe natural (aesthetic) feelings of pity in us,and to use them as so manymeans to sympathetic participation frommoral principles and [from] the feelingthat conforms to them. (MM, 457:24–29)⁶⁶

Krankheiten), auch Mitleidenschaft heißen: weil sie sich unternebeneinander lebenden Men- schen natürlicher Weise verbreitet. Nurzudem ersterengiebts Verbindlichkeit.’ Timmermann’s (privatelycommunicated) translation. As Fahmycorrectlypoints out,the verb mittheilen involves givingsomething to another (Fahmy2009,p.35). In fact,accordingtoGrimm, communication is but one of its instances, and the general meaningissomethinglike ‘imparting’;ithovers close to the notions of gift [das Geschenk], active favour [die Wohlthat], and even blessing[die Gnade], bringingits meaninginintimateproximity to beneficence. The English word ‘compassivity’ [Mi- tleidenschaft]isanarchaic word for compassion, which Timmermann uses to emphasise the ‘passive’ natureofthis mechanical sympathy(on ‘Mitleidenschaft’,see Timmermann 2016b; AP,7:179.15 – 24).  TylerPaytas (2015) has proposed a ‘patient-centred’ accountofKant’sduty of sympathy. I sympathisewith Paytas’scareful and emotionallyastuteargumentation and agreefullythat the needs of others have asubjectively grounding moral significance. However,Iworrythat the term ‘patient-centred’ risks obscuringthe basic idea of reciprocity in the direct duty of Theil- nehmung: it is adutythat human beings owe to each other. Paytas’sposition is indeed sensible, but because he uses Gregor’stranslation as his sole source, he cannot see that her translation does not preservethe construction sich einandern mitzutheilen. It seems that Paytas is talking moreabout the duty of cultivation or the roleoffeelings in beneficencetoothers.  ‘Obzwar aber Mitleid (und so auch Mitfreude) mit Anderen zu habenansich selbst nicht Pflicht ist,soist es doch thätigeTheilnehmung an ihremSchicksale und zu dem Ende also in- directePflicht,die mitleidige natürliche(ästhetische) Gefühle in uns zu cultiviren und sie als so viele Mittel zur Theilnehmung ausmoralischen Grundsätzen und dem ihnen gemäßen Gefühlzu benutzen.’ Timmermann’s(privatelycommunicated) translation. Note that the last instanceof ‘Gefühl’ is singular and governed by ‘aus’ (not ‘zur’)(cf. Fahmy2009,p.37).Itisvery likely that Kant means to suggest that we takethe singular feelingasconforming to the moral princi- ples rather than aestheticfeelings. 140 4Love of Neighbour

AGENT 1 rational will AGENT 2

(humanitas practica) (humanitas practica)

COMMUNICATING JOY /PAIN JOY /PAIN HUMANENESS

(humanitas aesthetica) (humanitas aesthetica)

natural receptivity

Figure 6. Sympathy

In this passage, it seems that active participation in the fate [das Schicksal]of others is aduty of humanitas practica,and one might well arguethatthis in- cludes,besides communication with regard to feelings, actual beneficence (this is indeedhow the passageisoften read). It is reasonable to suppose that humanitas practica is adirect duty of communication [mittheilen]with regard to feelings and hence distinct from beneficence. On abroader interpretation, it mayperhaps even be thought to include beneficenceinsuch away that it is then beneficence with feelings. This interpretation would unite Fahmy’sap- proach with the previous consensus view. On the other hand, the cultivation of feelingsishere clearlysupplementary to the duty of active sympathetic participation. The indirect duty should hencebe understood as the cultivation of compassionate natural feelingsthat maybeof use both in communication with regardtoour feelings and in active benevolence or beneficence. But the passageimplies further that compassionate feelings should be used as ameans to sympathetic participation from [aus]the feeling that conforms to the moralprinciples of humanitas practica. We can saythat hu- manitas practica resides in the free rational will and belongs to practical love, but what the ‘feeling’ and the ‘moral principles’ here actuallyrefertoisless clear.The feeling appropriate to moral principles could very well be respect for the moral law. But if the moral principles in question are principles of love of benevolence (as we are, after all, immersed in the rubric of practical love), the feeling could also be loveofdelight.Weknow that generally, loveand re- spect are the two feelings that relate to the performance of duties of virtue to oth- ers (MM, 6:448.14– 15). The idea might be thatwhile the duty of sympathetic par- 4.3 The Feeling-Action-Cultivation Account 141 ticipation(as communication) is grounded in pure practical reason, this commu- nication necessarilyrequires loveofbenevolence and is profoundlyfacilitated by loveofdelight as the feeling of love, for which our mechanical receptivity to the feelingsofothers serves as afurther aid. But this is speculation, and the conser- vative view would be to saythatKant is talking about respect.Ido not know whether the feeling referred to in this last instance is loveorrespect,and I am happy to leave it open. Remaining at the level of conceptual outline,my point is that we do encounter the notion of cultivation in this context,and that it is relatively important.⁶⁷ In Sections 34 and 35 of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,there is thus adirect duty of sympathetic participation (reciprocal communication with regardtofeelings), as well as an indirect duty to cultivatenatural sympathetic joy and pity,tobeused as means to active rational benevolence and to sympathetic participation from moral principles and the feelingofloveorrespect.Quiteclearly, the duty of sym- pathy(or Theilnehmung)includes feelings, the reciprocal action of communica- tion, and the cultivation of feelings.

4.3 The Feeling-Action-Cultivation Account

To my knowledge,the most general previous account of neighbourly lovein Kant’smoral philosophyisthat proposed by Christoph Horn (2008). Ibelieve I’mnow in aposition to evaluate what Itake to be his main proposition. In ‘The Concept of LoveinKant’sVirtue Ethics’,Horn offers arich readingof loveinseveral of Kant’sworks,focusingonTheMetaphysics of Morals. If Iinter- pret Horn correctly, he ends up viewing loveasone of our moral feelings,sug-

 Baron (1995,p.213) has wonderedwhether humanitas aesthetica is the same as loveof neighbour or whether it is ‘somewhat narrower’.IbelieveIcan now answer Baron’squestion. Humanitas aesthetica is clearlynarrower than loveofneighbour in the sense that,systematical- ly,itbelongs toloveofneighbour through belongingtothe duty of Theilnehmung,which in turn belongs to practical love – which, alongside the feelingoflove, is aprimarysubset of loveof neighbour.Onthe other hand, since humanitas aesthetica is defined in natural, emotive terms, it bears aspecial relation to the sensory-emotive side of loveofneighbour.With this said, Humanitas aesthetica is identical neither with inclination-based loveofbenevolencenor with loveofdelight; the former is an inclination to benefit the other,and the latter is aparticular positive feelingofdelight or immediatepleasureoccasioned by the other’sperfections or hu- manity (perhaps regardless of whether the other feels anylovefor us or not), or it is anatural predisposition to have such afeeling. Humanitas aesthetica seems to be amoregeneral capacity of receptiveness to the positive and negative feelings of others,such that through humanitas aes- thetica the feelings of others mayoccasion similar feelings in us. 142 4LoveofNeighbour gesting that Kant ‘admits onlyanindirect or secondary role for loveand other moral feelings.’ (Horn 2008, p. 173) Ithink Horn’sproposition is true in the sense that Kant would never accept that morality is objectively grounded in the feeling of love. To equate lovewith amoral feeling,however,ispossible onlyifwebegin by reading ‘love’ in the unqualified sense (as feeling). Admitted- ly,there is evidence in support of this interpretation. But in the light of the divi- sion between the feeling of loveand practical love, which Kant uses throughout his publishedmain works in moralphilosophy, Horn’sconclusion cannot be considered plausible, since practical lovebelongstoloveaspart of the division of loveofneighbour.The loveofpractical love involves goodwill thatresults in beneficenceand hence cannot be reduced to amoral feeling.Inother words, sys- tematically, practical loveofbenevolence cannot be reduced to (even if moral) loveofdelight.Too much is left out if practical love is omitted from the concept of love. Before concluding,thereisstill one final taxonomical worry that Ihaveyet to discuss. Indeed, it is possible that Ihavemisconstrued the taxonomyofloveof neighbour altogether, at the foundational level of the basic divisions.⁶⁸ Forisit not the case that when Kant is talking about love of neighbour he is most often referringtoJesus’ lovecommandment?And doesn’theexplicitlysay that,unlike practical lovefrom duty,the feelingoflovecannot be commanded?And if this is the case, then shouldn’twesay that love of neighbour actuallyconsists onlyof practical loveand does not include the feeling of loveatall?IfKant’sposition in the context of neighbourly love wereindeedreducible to affirming practical love, this would be the case. In other words, if Kant’sposition on loveofneighbour wereidentical to his interpretation of Jesus’ position, the feeling of lovemight actuallyberuled out of the framework.⁶⁹ Idonot think,however,that the text warrantsthis kind of reductivist reading, which would equate loveofneighbour with practical love.First,in‘Introduction XII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,Kant does use the term die Liebedes Nächsten (MM, 6:399.6)torefer to loveasafeel- ing,ormoreprecisely, loveas‘amatter of sensation’ [eine Sacheder Empfindung] (MM, 6:401.24), and thus thereisdirect textual evidence that he does use the term ‘loveofneighbour’ more broadly.⁷⁰ Another point is that when Kant speaks

 Ithank Günter Zöller for attacking my position fromthis perspective at aworkshop at the University of Luxembourgin2015.  This is the position held by Streich, whospeaks of ‘love of neighbour without love’ [Näch- stenliebe ohne Liebe](Streich 1924,pp. 29,39).  Schönecker’sposition is heresimilar to those of Zöller and Streich, and Schönecker calls Kant’suse of the term die Liebe des Nächsten in ‘Introduction XII’‘misleading’ [irreführend] 4.3 The Feeling-Action-Cultivation Account 143 of loveofneighbour,heusually refers to the distinction between pathological loveand practical love, or between the feeling of loveand practical love, and the text seems always to affirm that it is possibletoloveothers from inclination or with feeling (even though this is not commanded). Thus it is onlyifwetry to narrow Kant’saccount of loveofneighbour down to the lovethat is commanded that we encounter this taxonomical worry.But if we think thatloveofneighbour means the same thing as love of other human beings, it is clear that Kant’s taxonomyisbroader thanmere practical love. The third thing is that even if we try to reduce loveofneighbour to practical love,inorder to appreciate how practical loveactuallyworks in Kant’sethics and to account for the notion of cultivation we must still make sense of how the feelings of loveoperate within this conceptual framework. If loveofneighbour includes practical love and prac- tical loveproducesaninclinationofloveinthe beneficent subject, and if the aesthetic predisposition of the feelingofloveis, to begin with, asubjectively nec- essary preconditionofpractical love, then shouldn’twesay thatthe feeling of love somehow belongstoloveofneighbour?Itake it that Kant’saccount of loveofneighbour is not identical to what Jesus said, and that Kant’sframework of loveofneighbour does include feeling, action,and cultivation. (For basicdi- visions, see fig.7.) In this chapter,Ihave argued that loveofneighbour is best understood in the light of ageneral division approach to loveinKant,and that this general di- vision givessupport to anew interpretationofloveofneighbour in Kant,which I call the feeling-action-cultivation account. Ibegan by groundingthe general division of loveinKant’searlier works, and Iproblematised it in the Groundwork and the second Critique from the per- spective of loveofneighbour.Ithen showed the existenceofthe general division of loveinthe ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ of TheMetaphysics of Morals. Acomparison of the Groundwork,the second Critique,and TheMetaphysics of Morals revealed that while Kant’saccount of love of neighbour is constantlyinflux, some basic elements remain consistent throughout the mature period. If the earlier lec- tures on ethics are included, it is possibletodetectinclination-based loveofbe- nevolence, active rational loveofbenevolence, sensuous loveofdelight,and in- tellectual loveofdelight as all appearinginterms of love of neighbour.Despite all the complexity,inthe most general terms of the published main works, love of neighbour divides into the natural feeling or sensation of love(loveofdelight) and the duty of practical love (loveofbenevolence). Hence, the general division

(Schönecker 2010,p.153). Foraview morelikemine, which accepts emotive elements as belong- ing to loveofneighbour,see Green (1992, pp. 276–277). 144 4LoveofNeighbour

love of neighbour

love of benevolencelove of delight

frominclinationpractical love pathological intellectual

beneficencegratitude sympathy

active affective humanitas humanitas (beneficence) (respect) practica aesthetica

Figure 7. BasicDivisions of LoveofNeighbour of loveinloveofneighbour consists of anatural, sensory-emotive component and arational-moral component that emphasises actioninfurtheringthe ends of others. Ihavealso analysed how feeling, action, and cultivation figure in the duties of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy, and in this wayIhave shown that loveofneighbour includes the moral cultivation of the sensory-emo- tive aspects of our cognitive apparatus. Ihavethus provided aconceptual outline for the feeling-action-cultivation account of loveofneighbour. 5LoveinFriendship

In this final chapter,Idiscuss loveinfriendship. Over the past twenty years or so, afair amount of discussion has graduallyaccumulatedaround the notion of friendship in Kant.Inthe previous treatments,threebasic propositions con- cerninglovemay be detected. First,some hold that friendship in Kant is always based on the feeling of love(Wood 2015,pp. 12,16). Second, the majority of scholars take the view that for Kant,friendship essentiallyorideallyincludes aunion, or abalance, between loveand respect (Paton 1993, p. 137;Denis 2001b, p. 4; Filippaki 2012,p.35; Moran 2012,p.170;Baron 2013,p.381;Wood 2015,p.4). And third, there are those who posit that for Kant,loveisevenop- posed to the concept of friendship, or at least bracketed from what Kant calls ‘moral friendship’ (Marcucci 1999,p.440;Van Impe 2011, p. 137). What is common to the previous approachesisthat they tend not to offer a very detailed or systematic account of how the word ‘love’ actuallyoperates within the framework of friendship.¹ In particular, there is relatively little uni- formity in the literature concerning the logical relations that obtain between the basic components of love’sgeneral division within this context,that is, rela- tions between love of benevolence and loveofdelight.Some accounts leave the loveatissue in friendship relatively unspecified (Marcucci 1999;Moran 2012; Van Impe 2011;Baron 2013)²,some equate lovewith benevolence (Denis 2001b, p. 7; Moran 2012,p.173), and some equate it with both benevolence and delight (Paton 1993, p. 138;Wood 1999,pp. 278, 280; Wood 2015,pp. 12–15). Some view the loveatissue as practical love(Denis 2001b, p. 7), whereas others see it as the feeling of love(Moran2012,pp. 197–198;Wood 2015,p.16). In what follows, Iwill offer asystematic reconstruction of Kant’smature phi- losophyoffriendship from the perspective of the concept of love. The basicques- tion to be asked is simply: what does it mean to loveone’sfriends, accordingto Kant – or how does lovefunction in the context of Kantian friendship?Against the backdrop of the previous discussions, anumber of more specific problems must be highlighted: what is the relationship between loveand respect in friend-

 With the possible exception of Wood (1999;2015), whose account nevertheless has some prob- lems,towhich Iwill return below.  Marcucci and Barondonot discuss the components of the general division. Kate Moran notes that mere ‘well-wishinglove’ in the Vigilantius notesseems weaker than the loveatissue in friendship in TheMetaphysics of Morals (Moran 2012,p.173), but she doesn’tconnect this to de- light in terms of love(see Moran 2012,pp. 197–198). VanImpe recognises the distinctions be- tween different types of loveinthe Vigilantius notesbut does not analyse their connection to loveinfriendshipinTheMetaphysicsofMorals.

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 146 5Love in Friendship ship?Isfriendship basedonloveorrather on respect,ordoes it rest equallyon both?Whatrole does the general division of loveplayinloving friendship?Isthe loveatissue in friendship loveofbenevolence, loveofdelight,orboth?Islove opposed to the concept of friendship, or at least somehow bracketed in some kinds of friendship?And finally,what is the role of loveand friendship in hu- manity’sascent towardthe ideal ethical community? In general, Iwill arguethat if the systematic or architectonic role of friend- ship in Kant’sphilosophyistaken into account and an exegetical interpretation of how the word ‘love’ operates within the context of friendship is provided, it becomes clear thatlove(conditioned by respect) marks the path towards the highestgood in equal and reciprocal human relationships. Kant is not out to denythe relevance of love but views both loveand respect as the necessary con- ditionsoffriendship (even though respect has amorallygroundingfunction). To- gether,loveand respect form the relativelysufficient condition of friendship. In friendship we cultivatebenevolence (Liebedes Wohlwollens)and openhearted- ness while enjoying each other intellectually(Liebe des Wohlgefallens)and re- specting appropriate distance. Friendship alsoserves amediating role in human- ity’sascent towardthe ideal moralcommunity (seeWood 2015,p.6): by cultivating personal friendships, and as friends of humanity in general, we strive to bring about acosmopolitan community of loveand respect.Icall this overall interpretation (for which Iamindebted to Moran and Wood) the ascentview of love in Kantian friendship. When taken alongsideanalysis of the general division of loveinfriendship and the previous chapters of the study, the ascent view of loveinKantian friendship serves to corroborate the main claim of this studyasa whole: that the general division approach and the ascent view of love are plau- sible and defensible general notions regarding Kant on love. Iwill begin by summarising Kant’sdiscussion of loveinfriendship prior to TheMetaphysics of Morals. Iwill then reconstruct the ‘official’ mature position in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,paying special attention to the distinction between love and respect and the question of how to interpret the general division of lovein this light.Finally, Ishow how an ascent towards acommunity of ‘cosmopolitan love’ maybedetected in Kant’saccounts of friendship.

5.1 LoveinFriendship Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals

Dependingonwhich textual sourceone emphasises, thereismore thanone pos- sible waytoconstruct the basictaxonomyoffriendship in Kant.The threemain sources that scholars commonlyuse in this context are the Collins/Kaehlernotes on ethics, the Vigilantius notes on ethics, and the section on friendship at the 5.1 Love in Friendship Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 147 end of the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ of TheMetaphysics of Morals. Ithink it is very im- portant to note that the discussion in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is the onlypublish- ed account of Kant’sconception of friendship. Admittedly, the lecture notes give amuch richerand morenuanced picture of the topic, and it is not at all surpris- ing that scholars have been keen to draw interpretations on their basis. However, Ibelievethat for an accurate ‘official’ account of Kant’smature position, one has to emphasise the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,eventhough one should alsouse the lec- tures as auxiliary toolsfor interpretationinsofar as they can be harmonised with the published work. Iwillbegin my discussion by considering how the notion of loveworks in the lecture notes on friendship, before turning to TheMetaphysics of Morals. In the Collins notes’ discussion of friendship, the basic distinctionisbe- tween the motivesofself-loveand morality.Friendship is about overcoming the motive of self-love: it is chosen on moral grounds and involves an inter-indi- vidual, reciprocal mode of caring about another’shappiness (LE, 27:422–423). In the idea of friendship, ‘self-loveisswallowed up in the idea of generous mutual love.’ (LE, 27:423.8 – 9)³ Kant makes clear that friendship is an unattainable idea or ideal that marks ‘the maximumofmutual love’ [DasMaximum der Wechsel- liebe](LE, 27:423.37–38), which is astate whereone loves the other as oneself.⁴ He divides friendship into three forms or types: thoseof‘need’ [Bedürfniß], ‘taste’ [Geschmack], and ‘disposition’ [Gesinnung](LE,27:424.38–39). The friend- ship of need is the ‘lowest’ or most rudimentary form of friendship and is about mutualhelp in the satisfaction of material needs. It occurs,for instance, ‘when savagesgohunting’ (LE,27:425.5)⁵.Every friendship presupposes the friendship of need, which means that friends can relyoneach other’shelp if necessary, even though they should avoid asking for help, because this would threaten the equality of the relationship (LE, 27:425.27–426.21). The friendship of taste is not real friendship but its ‘analogue’ [Analogon]and occurs when persons of different occupations (e.g. ascholarand asoldier)take pleasure in each oth- er’scompany, perhaps withoutaview to each other’shappiness (LE,

 ‘die Selbstliebe verschlungenist in der Ideeder großmüthigenWechselliebe.’  The ideal nature of the idea of friendship remains consistent throughout Kant’sdiscussions. Foranalysisofthe idea/ideal distinction in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,see Baron(2013,p.375). Vic- toria Wike (2014) provides ahelpful account of the notion of ‘practical idea’ in this context. For my purposes,itissufficient to notethat for Kant,moral or practical ideas come with regulative ideals for action and the cultivationofcharacter,and the idea of friendship means just that: that friendship has an ideal natureweought to strive to approximateinpractice or in some actual human relationships.  ‘Wenn daher Wilde aufdie Jagd gehn’. 148 5Love in Friendship

27.426.21–37). The third form is the friendship of disposition or sentiment[Senti- ment]. Friendship of disposition is basedonthe human need to communicate thoughts and feelingstoothers. In society,our prudential mistrust of others pla- ces constraints on the openness of communication, and the friendship of dispo- sition is about establishingthe required for confidinginanother individual, in order to be ‘fullyincompanionship’ (LE, 27:427.13)⁶.This sort of friendship is onlypossible with one or two people (LE, 27:427.20 –21), but it mayhelp to open our hearts more generally(LE,27:428.12–23). It is about ‘dispositions of feelings, and not those of actual service.’ (LE, 27:426.39–427.1)⁷ Acondition for the possi- bility of this ‘highest’ formoffriendship is that the friends share asimilar moral outlook: ‘They need to have the same principles of understanding and morality, and then they can fullyunderstand each other’ (LE, 27:429.6 – 7)⁸. This brief summary of Kant’searlyaccount reveals the unwavering impor- tance of loveinKantian friendship. Friendship is contrastedwith self-love, and the idea of friendship is defined as the maximum of mutuallove. In a tone reminiscent of Kant’sapproach to (moral) sexual love in the samelectures, in the idea of friendship one givesoneself (or one’slove) to the otherand gets oneself back through the other’slove. In this way, one mayloveone’sfriend ‘as oneself’,orasmuch as oneself. (LE, 27:423.37– 424.6; cf. 27:388.23–37;see ch. 2.2.3; Korsgaard1996,p.195;Langton 2009,pp. 319,363)The account in Col- lins also bringswith it certain questions that are useful to keep in mind as we proceed towards Kant’slaterdiscussions. While the general division of loveisal- readygiven aformulation in the Collins notes (LE, 27:417– 418), Kant does not elaborate on the ‘mutuallove’ [Wechselliebe]referred to in the context of friend- ship in terms of the general division. Indirect evidence suggests that in Collins, the loveatissue in friendship is at least loveofbenevolence, for with regardto the extension of friendships Kant states: ‘People do not favour everyone with their benevolence, but would soonerconfine themselves, in thatrespect,toa small circle.’ (LE, 27:427.37–39)⁹ But Idon’tsee anything to exclude the possibil- ity that friendship in Collins could alsoinclude love of delight.Recall that in Col-

 ‘gänzlich in Gesellschaft.’ Translation modified. The German Gesellschaft is ambiguous be- tween society at large and morerestricted companionship or company. Kant might be implying that by harbouring close special bonds we arealso betterable to participateinsociety in general (see ch. 5.3).  ‘Gesinnungender Empfindung und nicht der wirklichen Dienstleistungen.’  ‘Sie Müssen gleiche Principia des Verstandes und der Moralität haben, denn können sie sich complet verstehn’.  ‘Die Menschen machen sich nicht allgemein mit ihrem Wohlwollen, sondern mögensich gern darin restringiren aufeinen kleinen Zirkel.’ 5.1 Love in Friendship Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 149 lins, intellectual loveofdelight for another’shumanity is defined as aduty (see LE, 27:418), and in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,loveofdelight is anecessary natural predisposition for receptivity to duty (see ch. 4.2.1), and further,one mayfeel pathological delight in response to the physical perfections of one’sfriend. An- other interesting fact in comparison with Kant’slater treatments is that the no- tion of respect is alot less prevalent in Collins than in Vigilantius or the ‘Doc- trine of Virtue’.This is explained at least in part by the fact that Kant’stheory of moral autonomy, which relies largely on the notion of respect for the moral law, is not yetinplace. We do find the notion of respect in Collins¹⁰,and regard- ing friendship in particular Kant proposes: ‘The name of friendship should in- spire respect,and even if our friend has somehow become an enemy, we must still venerate the previous friendship’ (LE,27:429:27–29)¹¹.Thisisanisolated in- stance of Achtung,however,and in the Collins notes friendship is defined nearly exclusivelyinterms of love. The Vigilantius notes from 1793 – 1794 explicitlyanticipate the publication of TheMetaphysics of Morals,and they are particularlyinteresting when it comes to figuring out the details of Kant’smature conception of loveinfriendship. As in Collins, the notion of friendship in Vigilantius still involves an ideal that we can- not realise and can onlystrive for and approach (LE, 27:680.34–35). However, the previous threefold distinction (between friendships of need, taste,and dispo- sition) is no longer explicitlyvisible, and it is somewhat unclear whether Kant still relies on the previous taxonomy. Whatisclear is that in Vigilantius friend- ship is defined explicitlyinterms of the general division of love, and the notion of respect now plays amuch more important role than it did in Collins. The basic (ideal) definition of friendship in Vigilantius is: ‘Acompleteloveofbenevolence and delight among equals, in regardtotheir moral disposition and inclinations.’ (LE, 27:680.28–30)¹² As in Collins, the basic definitionofthe concept of friendship is here given exclusively in terms of love. It is striking that the ideal of friendship in Vigilan- tius unites the two aspects of love’sgeneral division in arelationship between equal persons. Kant explains that the concept of friendship actuallyinvolves five elements, which are combined in the (ideal) definition of friendship: 1) recip-

 See e.g. LE, 27:302.33–34,where pureethics involves respect.  ‘Man muß Achtungvor vordem Namen der Freundschaft haben, und wenn auch unser Freundwodurch Feind geworden ist,somüßen wir doch die vorigeFreundschaft veneriren’.  ‘eine vollständige Liebe des Wohlwollens und Wohlgefallens gleicher Personen in Ansehung ihrermoralischen Gesinnungund Neigungen.’ 150 5LoveinFriendship rocal loveofbenevolence; 2) equality;3)reciprocal possession of each other; 4) reciprocal enjoyment of each other’shumanity;and 5) reciprocal loveofdelight. Kant describes love of benevolence, the first component of friendship, in a waythat is similar to how he depicts it in the context of loveofneighbour in TheMetaphysics of Morals. It is ‘the universal duty of love, which we owe to every human being’ (LE, 27:675.36–37)¹³.Kant also notes that in comparison with loveofdelight,this loveis‘more closelyand strictlycoupled with the idea of friendship’ (LE, 27:676.10)¹⁴.Interpreted in terms of the official account of loveofbenevolence in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,this love would have to be practical love, as it is defined as aduty.But thereare interesting differences be- tween Vigilantius and TheMetaphysics of Morals in terms of how Kant elaborates on the duty.InVigilantius, ‘we must absolutelymake it our maxim to promote goodness in others.’ (LE,27:675.38–39)¹⁵ In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,however, loveofbenevolence is directed to promotingthe happiness of others, not their goodness. In the context of friendship, we can understand this in terms of Kant’sidea thatitisaduty in friendship to point out our friends’ flaws, even though this is always risky and must be done cautiously, without loss of respect (MM, 6:470.21–28;LE, 27:685.4– 19). In general, benevolenceinthe intimacy of friendship alsoinvolvespromotingthe moral progress of the other. The second ideal component says that the friends must be equallycapable of promotingeach other’swell-being in terms of ‘powers’ [Kräfte], ‘’ [Reich- tum], and ‘influence’ [Einfluß](LE, 27:676.29–31). Third,the friends possess each other intellectuallyormorally, which means that ‘each mutuallyshares in every situation of the other,asifitwereencountered by himself’ (LE, 27:677.13 – 14)¹⁶. Interestingly,Kant here explicitlycompares this mutual possessionwith mar- riage, but unlike marriage, wherethe foundation of the union is sexual love, in friendship the ‘reciprocal possession is founded […]onmoral principles and amutual lovederivedfrom that’ (LE, 27:677.4 – 5)¹⁷.This suggests that the sharing and sympathetic concern [teilnehmen]are based on rationalloveofbe-

 ‘die allgemeine Pflicht der Liebe, die wir jedem Menschen schuldigsind.’  ‘Näher aber und stricte verbindetsich mit der Idee der Freundschaft’.  ‘wir das Gute in andern zu befördern uns schlechthin zur MaximeMachen müssen.’  ‘wechselseitiganjeder Lage des andern teilnehmen, so als wenn es ihm selbst wiederfahren wäre’.  ‘wechselseitige Besitz ist aber aufmoralische Grundsätze und eine daher abgeleitete Wech- selliebe gegründet’.Another obvious differenceincomparison with marriage is that according to Kant (in Vigilantius), the marriage relation is not equal and is instead arelation of ‘superioris erga inferiorem’ (LE, 27:683.9), such that the husband is superior to the wife (see ch. 2.2.3). Foranelaborated list of six differences between friendshipand marriage in Kant,see Denis (2001b, pp. 13–16). 5.1 LoveinFriendship Prior to The Metaphysics of Morals 151 nevolence or intellectual loveofdelight.The fourth component is ‘the reciprocal enjoyment of their humanity’ (LE, 27:677.23)¹⁸,which occurs through openheart- ed communication [Mitteilung], wherethe friends ‘communicatenot onlytheir feelingsand sensations to one another,but also their thoughts.’ (LE, 27:677.26–27)¹⁹ It is thus clear thatthe friends enjoy each other through both the sensory-aesthetic and the rational parts of their humanity.That is, the com- munication that bringsabout this enjoyment involves both humanitas practica and humanitas aesthetica (see MM, 6:456 – 457; ch. 4.2.2.C) and relates bothtora- tional and to inclination-based loves in accordance with the general division. Kant pointsout,however,thatour friends might become our enemies in the fu- ture, and in contrast to the ideal he expressesasignificant amount of prudential caution with regardtoactuallyopening up one’sheart to another: ‘Trust him with caution only, and disclose to him nothing which he might be able to mis- use, to the detriment of your respect.’ (LE, 27:679.11– 13)²⁰ The fifth component is ‘lovefor mutual delight’ (LE, 27:680.22)²¹.The de- scription of this component is very brief. In the definition, we are told only that it ‘lies solely in the intellectual disposition of the friends, engendered through the material of reciprocal esteem, and on this rests the intellectual need for friendship.’ (LE,27:680.23–25)²² The notion thatthe loveofdelight be- longsexclusively to ‘the intellectual disposition of the friends’ must clearlybe understood in terms of the Collins notes distinctionbetween sensuous and intel- lectualdelight: ‘The loveofdelight is the pleasure we take in showing approval of another’sperfections. This liking maybeeither sensuous or intellectual.’ (LE, 27:417.21–24)²³ Ithink what is ruled out in Vigilantius is (ideal) friendship’sbeing based on, for instance,sexual inclination, or more generallyadelight in the physical perfections of another (since we are, however,dealing with a ‘complete love’ alsowith respect to inclinations, the possibility of sensuous delight is not ruled out of the framework altogether – it might be irrelevant,but it is not ‘pro- hibited’). The ‘intellectual need’ [das intellectuelle Bedürfnis]seems to refer to a

 ‘Der wechselseitige Genuß ihrer Humanität’.  ‘sich nicht allein ihreGefühle und Empfindungen, sondern auch ihre Gedanken einander mitzuteilen.’  ‘Traueihm nur mit Vorsicht,entdeckeihm nichts,wovon er mit Nachteil deiner AchtungMis- brauch machen könnte.’  ‘Die Liebe zu dem wechselseitigenWohlgefallen.’ Translation modified.  ‘liegt aber blos in der intellectuellenGesinnungder Freunde, durch den Stoff wechselseitiger Werthschätzung erzeugt,und daraufberuht das intellectuelle Bedürfnis zur Freundschaft.’  ‘Die Liebe des Wohlgefallens ist das Vergnügen, welches wir haben, den Vollkommenheiten des andern Beyfall zu beweisen. Dieses Wohlgefallen kannsinnlich und intellectual seyn.’ See ch. 4.1. 152 5Love in Friendship special kind of reciprocal desire to take delight in the moral perfections or the humanityofanother.Thismoral loveofdelight is not mere respect,for the effect does not seem to be described as essentiallyhumbling,and Kant’suse of the word ‘need’ implies the idea of approachingeach other or comingtogetherin communion. Recall thatinCollins, the object of intellectual loveofdelight is at bottom the sheer humanity of another human being (see LE, 27:418.19–20; ch. 4.1). We maythus take it thatinfriendship 1) reciprocal intellectual loveof delight has the humanityofthe other person as its object.And, since the defi- nition of loveofdelight includes pleasure or satisfaction [Vergnügen]inthe per- fections of another (MM, 6:449.17– 20;LE, 27:417.21–24), 2) therecan be agreater or alesser amount of intellectual loveofdelight,depending on the actual moral dispositions of the agents involved. It seems thatthis is exactlywhat Kant has in mind when he speaksofintel- lectualloveofdelight in the context of friendship in the Vigilantius notes.The aboveconsiderations map very closely onto the fourth ideal component of friendship, wherethe reciprocal enjoyment of the friends’ humanity is brought about by comprehensive communication. In other words, when, as friends, we come to appreciateeach other’smoral standing or disposition through various acts of communication, we loveeach other by approving of each other’shuman- ity.The more morallyperfect we become, the morecompleteour intellectual love of delight for each other.²⁴ In this sense, we mayspeak of an ascent of loveinthis context.Our moralascent has acorrelate in the loveweexperience when we ob- serveeach other’smoral attributes as unifying through sympathetic communica- tion:

So when friendship demands areciprocal love, in that it is based on unity of the moral dis- position, this is not anatural inclination, but rather an intellectual unificationofthe feel- ingsand thoughts of the parties,and the well-beingthat springs fromthis constitutes re- ciprocal love. (LE, 27:682.16–20)²⁵

 Wood goes so far as to saythat mutual loveofdelight ‘is the characteristic of friendship that makes it the final end of morality.’ (Wood 2015,p.15) Ithink Wood is right,ifwecan take the Vigilantius notes as trulycapturing Kant’sfinal position. The reciprocal delight human beings would take in view of each other’smoral disposition in the state of the perfect moral community is perhaps best expressive of whatKant might mean by ‘moral happiness’ as an ideal cosmopol- itan notion. (See also Korsgaard1996,pp. 193–194.)  ‘Daher wenn die Freundschaft eine wechselseitige Liebe erfordert,indem sie sich aufEinheit der moralischen Gesinnungstützt,soist dies nicht natürliche Zuneigung,sondern es ist dies eine intellectuelle Vereinigung ihrer gefühle und Gedanken; und das daraus entsprießende Wohlbefindenmacht die Wechselliebe.’ 5.2 Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals 153

Here, the reciprocal lovemust be loveofdelight since the loveatissue is defined as well-being that is an effect of intellectual communion. In the context of friend- ship, loveofdelight is thus intellectual pleasure rooted in the friends’ reciprocal openhearted moral approval of each other (this cannot be directlycommanded, since it cannot be adirect duty to be delighted by another’sexistence). In the Vigilantius notes,Kant clearlymakes use of love’sgeneral division, which now lies at the heart of his concept of friendship. Whether Kant still im- plicitlyrelies on the threefold taxonomyfound in Collins is not clear (nor is it essentialtomyargument),but it seems thatwhat Kant is mainlytalking about in Vigilantius is akind of ‘moral friendship’ thatmatches roughlywhat in Collins is called ‘the friendship of disposition’.²⁶ In contrasttothe Collins notes,respect is now also givenafundamental role. Kant emphasises that in friendship, mutu- al lovemustbeaccompanied by ‘mutualrespect for humanity in the person of the friend’ (LE, 27:683.23–24)²⁷,and hence respect must restrict reciprocal love. This meansthat we should not forceourselvesonour friends,neither in terms of our beneficencenor in terms of our needydemands, since this willalways pose a threat to the equalityofthe friendship.

5.2 LoveinFriendship in The Metaphysics of Morals

Iwill now move on to investigateloveand friendship in Kant’smaturemoral philosophical work. This discussion appears as the ‘Conclusion of the elements of ethics’ (MM, 6:469.13)²⁸,and, as mentioned above, it is the onlypublished sourcefor Kant’sconception of friendship. Iwill try to understand the relation between loveand respect by first aiming to identify the loveatissue in Kant’s official account and then taking acareful look at the claims made by Silvestro Marcucci (1999) and Stijn VanImpe (2011), accordingtowhom loveisinfactop- posed to the concept of friendship, or at least bracketed from what Kant calls ‘moral friendship’.The section will show 1) that the lovenow at issue in friend- ship is (at least)loveofbenevolence, and 2) that loveisnot opposed to the con- cept of friendship. In fact,the available evidence does not even seem to support the claim that loveisbracketed from (anykind of)friendship.

 This link seems to be taken for granted by Moran (2012, p. 170) and Wood (2015,p.7).  ‘wechselseitigerAchtungfür die Menschheitdes andern’.  ‘Beschluß der Elementarlehre’. 154 5Love in Friendship

5.2.1 Identifying the Love at Issue

In the Collins and Vigilantius notes,(ideal) friendship is defined solelyinterms of love. In Collins, it is ‘the maximum of mutual love’ (27:423.37–38); in Vigilan- tius, ‘the completeloveofbenevolenceand delight among equals’ (27:680.28–30). In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’, the definition is different to the extent that it now explicitlyincludes respect.First,the heading of Kant’sdiscussion is ‘On the Most Intimate Union of Lovewith Respect in Friendship’ (MM, 6:469.14– 15)²⁹.The definition givenimmediatelyunder the heading is: ‘Friend- ship (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mu- tual loveand respect.’ (MM, 6:469.17– 18)³⁰ To understand what loveKant is now talking about,itwill be helpful to take acloser look at what he says generallyabout the interplayofloveand respect in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.Inthe introductory section on the duty of love, Kant ex- plains that the laws of duty are analogous to the laws of physical nature. This nature is governed by the Newtonian forces of attraction and repulsion, and by analogysimilar forces operate in the moral realm, wherelovefunctions as at- traction and respect as repulsion³¹:

The principle of MUTUAL LOVE admonishes them constantlytocome closer to one another; that of the RESPECT they oweone another,tokeep themselvesatadistance from one an- other;and should one of these great moral forcesfail, ‘then nothingness (), with

 ‘Vonder innigsten Vereinigung der Liebe mit der Achtunginder Freundschaft.’  ‘Freundschaft (in ihrer Vollkommenheit betrachtet) ist die Vereinigung zweier Personen durch gleiche wechselseitige Liebe und Achtung.’  Formoredetailed analysis of the relation between Kant’snatural philosophyand moral theory with regardtothese Newtonian commitments,see Filippaki (2012). Note that Filippaki correctlydistinguishes between the duty of loveand the feelingoflove. But then she divides the feelingofloveinto ‘aesthetic’ and ‘moral’;she apparentlythinks that the ‘aesthetic’ feeling of loveisloveofdelight,whereas the ‘moral’ feelingofloveisthe natural predisposition to love one’sneighbour as describedin‘IntroductionXII’ in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ (Filippaki 2012, pp. 31–32). But in ‘Introduction XII’,the latter (Filippaki’s ‘moral love’)isexplicitlydefined as aesthetic. There,loveofneighbour is one of the Ästhetische Vorbegriffe. Alogicallyless cum- bersome interpretation is that ‘Introduction XII’ speaks of loveofdelight as an aesthetic predis- position to be subjectively affected by the duty of love(even though Kant’sdistinction between the feelingofloveand the aesthetic capacity (of love) to be affected by duty is not clear). Apo- sition similar to mine, which identifies the lovein‘IntroductionXII’ as loveofdelight,isheld by Schönecker (2010;see ch. 4.2.1above). In the broadest sense, the ‘feeling’ [Empfindung,Gefühl, Neigung]oflovecan refer at least to 1) the sexual impulse,2)loveofbenevolencefrominclina- tion, 3) sensuous loveofdelight,and 4) intellectual or moral loveofdelight,which includes both the aesthetic predisposition and the actual feeling. 5.2 Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals 155

gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like adropofwater’ (if Imay use Haller’s words,but in adifferent reference). (MM, 6:449.8 – 15)³²

The next paragraph goes on to explain that the mutual lovenow at issue is the duty of love(or practical love) and not the feeling of love.Onthis basis, it is safe to saythat when Kant speaks of loveasamoralforce(which bringshuman be- ingscloser to each other)and contrasts this lovewith respect,the loveheistalk- ing about is loveofbenevolence. The general point is the sameasthat found in Vigilantius:although we should approach each otherthrough active rational be- nevolence, our actionsmustbelimited by respect,bymeans of which we are (ideally) able to secure proper limits of intimacy and to preservethe equality of the relationship. This point is made explicitlyinthesection on friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’: ‘Forlovecan be regarded as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of lovebids friends to draw closer,the principle of respect requires them to stayataproper distance from each other.’ (MM, 6:470.4 – 7)³³ Connecting these twopassages in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,weare now in aposition to identify the lovethat is contrasted with respect in the con- text of friendship as the practical loveofbenevolence. At issue is the ‘principle’ [Princip]oflove. Now Idonot want to claim that this is the completepicture of loveinfriendship, and feelingsoflovedofigure in the framework, but the find- ing does have consequences with regard to previous research. Wood holds both that loveofbenevolence is afeeling and that friendship is based on the feeling of love: ‘But friendship is nevertheless based on loveasfeel- ing.The feeling of love as benevolence or well-wishing takes the form of friend- ship when it is reciprocal’ (Wood 2015,p.13). Wood baseshis interpretation on the Collins and the Vigilantius notes.When he reaffirms that ‘[t]he basis of friendship is always loveasfeeling’ (Wood 2015,p.16), Ithink he is not sensitive enough to the fact that in the Groundwork (GW, 4:399.27–34), the second Critique (C2, 5:83.3–12), and TheMetaphysics of Morals (MM, 6:449.17– 22),the practical

 ‘Vermöge des Princips der WECHSELLIEBE sind sie angewiesen sich einanderbeständig zu nähern,durch das der ACHTUNG,die sie einanderschuldigsind, sich im Abstande voneinander zu erhalten; und sollteeine dieser großen sittlichen Kräftesinken, “so würde dann das Nichts (der Immoralität) mit aufgesperrtem Schlund der (moralischen) Wesen ganzesReich wie einen TropfenWasser trinken” (wenn ich mich hier der Worte Hallers,nur in einer andern Beziehung, bedienen darf).’  ‘Denn man kann jene [Liebe] als Anziehung, diese [Achtung] als Abstoßung betrachten, und wenn das Princip der ersteren Annäherunggebietet, das der zweitensich einander in geziemen- dem Abstande zu haltenfordert’. 156 5Love in Friendship loveofbenevolence is consistentlydistinguished preciselyfrom loveasfeeling.³⁴ Perhaps Wood thinksthat practical loveisalso afeeling,but he doesn’targue for this controversial position (what seems to be missing from Wood’sdiscussion is adistinction between loveofbenevolence from inclination and loveofbenevo- lence as practical love, which distinction can onlybegrasped by careful compa- rative analysis of the earlier lectures and the mature publishedworks;see ch.4). Korsgaard, too, thinks thatKant’sdiscussion of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Vir- tue’ is about feelings (Korsgaard1996,p.191), and,likeWood, she does not take into account thatthe principle of lovecan onlyberational loveofbenevolence (as distinguished from love as feeling). In possible contrast with Wood and Kors- gaard, Denis (2001b, p. 4) holds that the loveatissue in friendship is indeed practical love, but she does not problematise this view. The basic difficulty in establishingthe operation of the general division of loveinthe context of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is that in the publish- ed work, loveofdelight is not directlymentioned even once. But Kant does (at least indirectly) speak about the feeling of love in this context.Henotes that one reason for the unattainability of the ideal of friendship is that it is difficult to ac- count for ‘what relation there is in the same person between the feeling from one duty and that from the other (the feelingfrom benevolence and thatfrom re- spect)’ (MM, 6:469.32– 34)³⁵.Inthis passage, benevolenceisclearlyviewed as aduty,soifitisloveofbenevolence, it must be practical love. The syntax makes clear that the feelingconnected with the duty cannot be identified with the duty:itisafeeling from [aus]benevolence.We also know that,ineffect,prac- tical love(as benevolence leading to beneficence) will also bring about the feel- ing of loveinthe broad sense, which can be identified as either loveofbenev- olence from inclination or the pleasure of love of delight (see MM, 6:402.14 – 21;cf. LE,27:417.11–19;27:419.4 – 7). So it is perhaps implied thatlove

 See ch. 4.1; cf. ch. 4.2.2. One reason for Wood’sseeminglyodd view might be that he thinks that loveofbenevolenceiscaused by loveofdelight (Wood 2015,p.4). It is difficulttomake out what Wood bases this claim on since the passagesherefers to (LE, 27:416;C3, 5:276; MM, 6:449) do not contain anysuch idea. The evidencewedohavesuggests that the feelingofloveorin- clination-based lovecan at least sometimesbebroughtaboutbypractical love(loveofbenev- olence) (MM, 6:402.14– 21;cf. LE, 27:419.4 – 7), even though loveofdelight is indeed the aesthetic predisposition for the subjective receptivity to the duty of love(MM, 6:399–402).Itisalso the case that thereissuch athing as loveofbenevolencefrominclination (which is not moral). As Ihavejust shown above, however,the loveinfriendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ must be identified at base as practical moral loveofbenevolence.  ‘noch mehr aber,welches Verhältniß das Gefühl ausder einen Pflicht zu dem ausder andern (z.B. das ausdem Wohlwollen zu dem ausder Achtung) in derselben Person habe’. 5.2 Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals 157 of delight alsofigures in friendship, but in the mature work this lovedoes not seem to be the basis of friendship. Kant also explicitlydenies that the loveinfriendship could be an ‘affect’ (MM, 6:471.22–24), but we know from elsewherethat affects are particularly rash emotional states that arise suddenly, drasticallyhindering one’sreflective capacities,and then die out quickly(MM, 6:407. 29ff.; AP,7:252–253). Kant’sre- jection of loveasaffect cannot be taken to implyageneral rejection of loveas feeling in the context of friendship. One further place to look for the feeling of loveinthe ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ account of friendship stems from Kant’sdistinction between ‘moral’ friendship and ‘aesthetic’ or ‘pragmatic’ friendship³⁶: ‘But that (pragmatic) friendship, which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of love, can have nei- ther the purity nor the completeness requisitefor apreciselydeterminant maxim; it is an ideal of one’swishes³⁷’ (MM, 6:472.27–30)³⁸.Here, the lovecan- not be the moralloveofbenevolence since that belongstomoral friendship. But since the love ‘burdens itself with the ends of others’,itisvery likelyloveofbe- nevolence from inclination. The probable interpretation is thatthe pragmatic friendship here is roughlyequivalent to the earlier friendship of need, but this

 It is not entirelyclear whether ‘aesthetic friendship’ and ‘pragmatic friendship’ arethe same, but Iwould arguethat they are. The clue comesfromWood, whotakesitfor grantedthat ‘prag- matic friendship’ corresponds to the friendshipofneed (Wood 2015,p.7). We must remember that in Kant’soriginal formulation in the Collins notes,the friendship of taste is onlyanana- logueoffriendship, whereasthe ‘friendshipofneed’ is presupposed in every friendship(LE, 27:425.27–28), and the ‘friendshipofdisposition’ is very close to his later discussions of moral friendship. So thereare actuallyonlytwo friendships in the original classification, and in the maturephilosophythis arguablymapsonto the phenomenal-moralorthe nature-freedom dualism. If we then look at the distinctions in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’–first between ‘moral friendship’ and ‘aestheticfriendship’,and onlyamoment later between ‘moral friendship’ and ‘pragmatic friendship’–we mayplausiblyconjecturethat ‘pragmatic friendship’ and ‘aes- thetic friendship’ mean the same thingand that the distinction between ‘aesthetic-pragmatic friendship’ and ‘moral friendship’ corresponds roughly to the previous distinction between ‘friendshipofneed’ and ‘friendship of disposition’.This merelyassumes that ‘aesthetic’ is hereread in the sense of ‘pertainingto’or ‘arisingfrom’ natural sensory experience. My identi- fication of ‘aesthetic’ with ‘pragmatic’ friendship is highlyconjectural and very uncertain, and the main points of the chapter stand or fall regardless of its success.  The fact that pragmatic friendship is defined as an ideal of one’swishes shows (perhaps) that the ideal of friendshipincludes not onlymoral perfection and an idealised balancebetween the dispositionsofthe friends and all the moral components of the friendship but also akind of maximum of the sensory-aesthetic elementsoffriendship.  ‘jene aber mit den Zweckenanderer Menschen sich, obzwar ausLiebe, belästigende (prag- matische) kann weder die Lauterkeit,noch die verlangte Vollständigkeit haben, die zu einer genaubestimmenden Maxime erforderlich ist,und ist ein Ideal des Wunsches’. 158 5Love in Friendship is uncertain. My point is merelythat we do find at least some kind of notion of the feeling of loveorpathological loveinKant’sofficial account of friendship, but it seems thatthis cannot be the proper basis of moralfriendship. Of course, the aesthetic predisposition of love of neighbour as loveofdelight must still be assumedtobegenerallyoperative as the subjective ground for receptivity to the moral benevolence requiredfor friendship (even though the predisposition is not the objective ground of moral benevolence; see ch. 4.2.1). We are now in aposition to make the general claim thatifone accepts the Vigilantius notes as areliable source, the general division of loveisstrongly present in friendship, such thatloveofbenevolence (as active rational benevo- lence) is the primary basis of friendship in terms of love, and intellectual loveof delight is pleasurable moralapproval, which is brought about by intimate sym- pathetic sharing and communication of feelingsand thoughts.But if onlythe publishedwork is accepted as asource, the existenceofloveofdelight in this specific context looks doubtful, and it is fairlyclear that the lovewhich ought to unite with respect in friendship is rational loveofbenevolence (and not so much loveasfeeling, though we know generallythat the feelingsofloveare re- lated to, and will alsobebrought about by,rational loveofbenevolence).

5.2.2 CanWeBracketLove from Friendship?

GiventhatKant’sgeneral definitions of friendship always include the word ‘love’,itissomewhat difficult to understand how lovecould be ‘opposed’ to friendship, or ‘bracketed’ from moralfriendship. However,preciselythese claims have been made in the literature, and since the claims have not yetbeen dis- cussed criticallybyother interpreters,Ithink it is important to analyse them here (Marcucci 1999;Van Impe 2011). Doing so willalso clarify the logical rela- tionship between loveand respect in friendship in light of TheMetaphysics of Morals and the Vigilantius notes. In the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’,Kant’semphasis on what he calls ‘moral friend- ship’ becomes increasinglyclear.Asalreadymentioned, the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ contains adivision between ‘moral’ friendship and ‘aesthetic’ friendship [ästhe- tischen]or‘pragmatic’ friendship. Here, Kant defines moralfriendship as ‘the completeconfidenceoftwo persons in revealing their secret judgmentsand feel- 5.2 Love in Friendship in The Metaphysics of Morals 159 ingstoeach other,asfar as such disclosures are consistent with mutualrespect.’ (MM, 6:471.27–29)³⁹ It is the abovenotion of moral friendship that supposedlywarrants Marcuc- ci’sclaim, accordingtowhich respect becomes ‘very important’ and ‘loveisput between brackets’ (Marcucci 1999,p.440). First,Marcucci seems to think that this is obvious giventhe definitionofmoral friendship. Supposedly, if loveis not mentioned in the definition of moralfriendship, then it does not belong to the concept.But if we unpack the definition, threeelements can be recognised within it: 1) completeconfidenceortrust [das völlige Vertrauen]; 2) revealing in- timate thoughts and feelings; and 3) respect.Now if we understand moralfriend- ship as aspecial relationship between individuals,arelationship thatdoes not automaticallyobtain between all human beings, we must also ask how such a relation is possible – thatis, how it can occur.What can it be that draws some individuals closer to each other in such away thatthey are able to form this special bond?Itmight be self-love, but then the relationship would not be moralatheart.Eventhough Kant does not mention loveinthe definition cited by Marcucci, he is very clear thatthere are two forces operative in the moral sphere: respect and love. Now the basis for trusting one another,and shar- ing intimate thoughts and feelings,might well be respect rather than love. As Kant explains, however,inthe moral sphere between individuals respect is a forceofrepulsion: respect keeps individuals at adistance from each other.It seems that on this definition of the moralforces as analogous to Newtoniannat- ural forces, respect cannot be responsible for bringingindividuals into an inti- mate union with each other.But (moral) loveasattraction establishes just that: ‘The principle of MUTUAL LOVE admonishes them constantlytocome clos- er to one another’ (MM, 6:449.8 – 10⁴⁰;see 6:470.4 – 5). Without love, there is no intimate relation to begin with, as the principle that drawsindividuals closer to- gether is lacking.Ido not see anything in the definition of moralfriendship that would make it the case that love of benevolence is no longer anecessary condi- tion of friendship. Further,revealing intimate thoughts and feelingsand being responsive to our friend’sdisclosures are dependent on akind of principled em- pathy, which Kant elsewherediscusses in terms of ‘sympathetic participation’ or ‘communication’ [Teilnehmung,Mitteilung]. AccordingtoKant,this ‘sympathetic participation’ is actuallyaduty of love, and thus it systematicallybelongstothe concept of love(see MM, 6:456 – 457; ch. 4.2.2.C). It can also be argued that the

 ‘das völligeVertrauen zweier Personen in wechselseitigerEröffnung ihrer geheimen Urtheile und Empfindungen, so weit sie mit beiderseitiger Achtunggegen einanderbestehen kann.’  ‘Vermöge des Princips der WECHSELLIEBE sind sie angewiesen sich einanderbeständig zu nähern’. 160 5Love in Friendship trust or confidencerequired for moralfriendship graduallycomesabout via the pleasure taken in mutualmoral approval, which in the Vigilantius notes is dis- cussed by Kant in terms of loveofdelight.Itdoes not follow from the mere fact that loveisnot mentioned in the definition of moral friendship thatloveisbrack- eted from its concept,since the conceptual components of moral friendship (ex- cludingrespect) seem to assume or presuppose the presenceoflove. However,if the notion of loveisqualified to mean merelythe pathological feelingoflove, then one maysay that loveisbracketed from moral friendship – but Marcucci does not analyse the divisionsoflove.⁴¹ Marcucci’ssecond point is that ‘Kant even opposes lovetothe concept of friendship itself’ (Marcucci 1999,p.440). How does he arguefor this?Asevi- dence for his point,Marcucci quotes the following passagefrom the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’: ‘“the relation between the protector as benefactor, and the protected, as obligated to gratitude,is[…]arelation of mutual love, but not of friendship, because their mutual respect is not the same in both parties.”’ (Marcucci 1999, p. 440;citing MM, 6:473.5 – 8; Marcucci’sitalics) Unfortunately, other than citing the passage, Marcucci does not elaborate on the rationale for his conclusion. Kant’spoint in the passageisthat afriend of human beings[Freund der Men- schen]⁴² not onlyloves human beingsbut also takes into account ‘the equality among them’ [der Gleichheit unter Menschen](MM, 6:473.1– 2).The reason for this is that the relationship between amere benefactor and the person beingpro- tected is not one of friendship, since even though loveispresent,respect is not equal. It appears to me that Marcucci’sargument is a non sequitur: from the premises that 1) equal respect is anecessary condition of friendship and 2) not all relations of loveare relations of friendship, it does not follow that 3) loveisopposed to the concept of friendship. More recently, Marcucci’sarguments have been repeated by VanImpe (2011). VanImpe derives the bulk of his discussion on loveinfriendship directlyfrom Marcucci’sarticle, and the onlynew consideration that he adds is the claim that ‘Kant alreadyseemed to consider this bracketingofloveinthe late Lectures on Ethics by arguing that “onlyareciprocal love basedon[gebaut]⁴³ respect can secure alasting friendship”’ (Van Impe 2011, p. 137;citing LE, 27:683.16–18;Van Impe’sitalics). Even though VanImpe does not sayit, Igather that he thinks that

 He is especiallyunawareofthe existenceofloveofbenevolenceand its operation in friend- ship.  Idiscuss the notion of a ‘friend of human beings’ in moredetail in ch. 5.3.  The verb Kant uses to describe the relationship between loveand respect in that passage is bauen,tobuild, and thus amoreappropriatetranslation might be ‘areciprocal lovebuiltonre- spect’. 5.2 LoveinFriendship in The Metaphysics of Morals 161 if loveweresomehowreducible to respect or based on respect,then lovewould be bracketed, and friendship would essentiallybeabout respect.The context of the passagecited by VanImpe is Kant’sidea that friendship is similar to mar- riagebecause both involveaunity of persons, but that unlike marriage, where the wife respects the husband more than the husband respects the wife, in friendship the parties are obligated to equally ‘preservethe other’srespect’ (LE, 27:683.15)⁴⁴.From this the passagequoted by VanImpe abovefollows as aconclusion.But does it follow from the passages that loveisamere effect of respect or that we should think thatloveisultimatelyonlyabout respect? ElsewhereinVigilantius Kant describes the appropriate relationship be- tween loveand respect by noting that lovemust be ‘coupled’ with or ‘tied to’ [verbundenseyn]respect (LE, 27:682.24–25), or that respect must imposea‘re- striction’ [Einschränkung]onlove(LE, 27:682.35). It is also the case that intellec- tual loveofdelight is grounded in amoral ‘esteem’ [Schätzung](see 27:680.23–25)for another person’scharacteristics. Further,in‘The End of All Things’,Kant holds thatrespect is anecessary condition of ‘true love’ [wahre Liebe](8:337. 33 – 34;see Wood 2015,p.4). Thus it is indeedthe case that,for Kant,respect plays acrucial and fundamental role in anykind of moral love. From amoral perspective,respect (for the moral law, for the humanityofthe other)forms the ground level on which subsequent moral relations are then built.But if we think of the basic distinction between (moral) loveand respect in TheMetaphysics of Morals,wesee that loveisstill attraction and respect is still repulsion: the twoare clearlydifferent.Wemust also remember that through the aesthetic predisposition of loveofdelight,eventhe duty of loveretains aspe- cial connection to loveasasensory-aesthetic phenomenon: the bond between loveofbenevolence and loveofdelight is close and complicated,and the inter- relations between the elements of the general division of lovecannot be thought of in terms of mere respect.Ittherefore seems to me that even though respect is morallyprimary (as Wood (2015,p.4)correctlynotes), lovecannot be reduced to respect.The identification or equation of lovewith respect would go against one of the most fundamental distinctions of Kant’smoral philosophy. Therefore, love cannot be bracketed this way. The last thing to remember is that during Kant’smature period, the basic definitions of friendship are ‘the completeloveofbenevolence and delight among equals’ (LE, 27:680.28–30) and ‘the union of twopersons through equal mutual loveand respect.’ (MM, 6:469.17– 18) If Kant thought that love (in general) was opposed to the concept of friendship or bracketed from some

 ‘des Andern Achtungzuerhalten’. 162 5Love in Friendship kind of friendship, this would introduce afairlydramatic contradiction between Kant’sdefinitions and his actual position.⁴⁵ As Ihaveshown, the evidence does not support this interpretation. The exegetical stance favours the view that in Kant’sphilosophyoffriendship, loveand respect must be balanced.

5.3 Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’sAscent Toward the Ideal MoralCommunity

Throughout his discussions, Kant makesclear thatfriendship is an intimate and special bond between avery limited number of individuals: friendship is usually held between two people. In such relationships,the friends embarkonajoint journey of moral progress,sharing their personhood, correcting each other’s faultscautiously(through loveofbenevolence limited by respect), and taking in- tellectual pleasure (loveofdelight) in each other’simproving moral attributes. They help each other to cultivatevirtue and to approach moral happiness in an openhearted union (see Moran 2012,pp. 168 ff.). As they become more virtu- ous, their active rational benevolence (Liebe des Wohlwollens)for each other grows stronger and more consistent,and the morevirtuous they are, the greater the delight (Liebe des Wohlgefallens)they takeintheir friendship. In this way, friendship, and the lovethat grows as the friends make progress,marks a path towards the highest good between two people (see Moran 2012,p.203). We maythereforespeak of an ascentofloveinfriendship,which means that by attending to the duty of friendship, the friends’ lovebecomesgreater and more perfect. But there is another notion closelyinterwoven with friendship thatismore general and that pointstowards an ascent of loveasamorecommunal or even cosmopolitan notion. This is the notion of being afriend of human beings[Men- schenfreund], not in an with someone in particular but with regard to humanityasawhole. Iwill end my discussion with an investigation of what it means to be afriend of human beingsfrom the perspective of love. In the Collinsnotes,Kant pointsout that as society arises from natural crud- ity or ‘savagery’ to civilisation, people tend to have fewer intimate friendships: ‘The more civilized men become, the more universal theiroutlook, and the small- er the incidence of special friendships. The civilized man seeks ageneral friend-

 Neither Marcucci nor VanImpe addresses this point. 5.3 Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’sAscent Toward the IdealMoral Community 163 ship and amenity,without having special ties.’ (LE, 27:428.30 –33)⁴⁶ This sort of ‘universalfriendship’ [Die allgemeine Freundschaft]does not mean that the civi- lised person would be friends with everyone, but rather concerns acapacity for establishing friendship with anyone. Such people are few in number: they are optimistic and possess benevolence, good-heartedness, understanding,and taste. Kant calls them ‘world citizens’ [Weltbürger]. (LE, 27:430.11– 27) In the Vigilantius notes,Kant’sattitude toward universal concern or affec- tion is more ambivalent.Herehewarns that ‘the friend to all humanity […]can- not fail to dissipate his inclinationthrough its excessive generality,and quite loses anyadherencetoindividual persons, […]though there is no denying that the great value of human loverests in the general loveofhumanityassuch.’ (LE, 27:673.25–31)⁴⁷ So while we should aim for ageneralised attitude of love, in doing so we risk losing proper sight of particular individual relationships. Kant explains further that in contrast to intimate reciprocal friendship, which in- volves amor bilateralis,being everyone’sfriend is aunilateral disposition of love: amor unilateralis. This unilateral love, which we ought to cultivate, is here clearly loveofbenevolence: ‘being everyone’sfriend; it does no more than formulate the duty to harbor loveofbenevolence for the happiness of others, and is quite dif- ferent from the term: to make friends with everyone.’ (LE,27:676.19–22)⁴⁸ Kant’sdefinitive account of what it is to be afriend of human beingsisgiven at the very end of his discussion of friendship in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’.This brief discussion serves as important evidence for Kant’scosmopolitan outlook as apart of his philosophyoflove. On this basic definition, afriend of human beings[Menschenfreund]is‘one who takes an affective⁴⁹ interest in the well- being of all human beings(rejoices with them)’ (MM, 6:472.34–35)⁵⁰.Kant

 ‘Je mehr die Menschen gesittet werden, destoallgemeiner werdensie, und destoweniger fin- den die besondern Freundschaften statt.Der Gesittete sucht eine allgemeine Freundschaft und Annehmlichkeit,ohne besondreVerbindungzuhaben.’  ‘der Weltliebhaber […], da es nicht fehlen kann, daß er seine Neigung durch die zu große Allgemeinheit zerstreut und eine einzelne persönliche Anhänglichkeit ganzverliert, […]obgleich nicht zu leugnen ist,daß der große Wert der Menschenliebe in der allgemeinen Menschenliebe als solcher beruhet.’ Notethat the word Kant uses in this passage is not Menschenfreund but Weltliebhaber.  ‘jedermanns Freundseyn: er drückt nichts mehr,als die Pflicht aus, Liebe des Wohlwollens für andererMenschen Glückzuhegen, und ist ganz verschieden vondem Ausdruck: mit jeder- mann Freundschaft stiften.’  Translating ästhetisch as affective with Baron, whofollows Gregor’s1991 translation (Baron 2013,p.366). Note that Gregor’sCambridge translation contains atypo:she uses ‘effective’ for ästhetisch when she clearlymeans ‘affective’.  ‘der,welcher an dem Wohl aller Menschen ästhetischen Antheil (der Mitfreude) nimmt’. 164 5LoveinFriendship then introduces adistinction between being a Menschenfreund and a Freund der Menschen (both of which translate to ‘friend of human beings’), such thatbeing afriend of human beings[Freund der Menschen]also involves ‘thought and con- sideration for the equality among them’ (MM, 6.473.1– 2; see 6:450,19–22)⁵¹.Itis this concern for equalitythat in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ preventsusfrom equat- ing afriend of human beings with someone who merelypossesses loveofbenev- olence.⁵² The beneficenceofafriend of human beings[Freund der Menschen]in- cludes ‘anecessary humbling of oneself’ [eine nothwendigeHerablassung](MM, 6:473.8 – 9). It is alsonoteworthythat the interest described is affective or senso- ry-aesthetic, which might include loveofbenevolence from inclination or even pathological loveofdelight in the loveofthe friend of human beings.⁵³ In an appendix immediatelyfollowing the discussion on being afriend of human beings, Kant explicitlyconnects the cosmopolitan outlook with the cul- tivation of virtue in reciprocal relationships,suggesting that,indirectly, this cul- tivation of reciprocity will lead to what is best for the world. Iwish to quotethis passageatlength:

It is aduty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself […]but to use one’smoral perfections in social intercourse […]. While makingoneself afixed center of one’sprinci- ples,one oughttoregardthis circle drawnaround one as also formingpart of an all-inclu- sive circle of those who, in their disposition,are citizens of the world – not exactlytopro- moteasthe end what is best for the world but onlytocultivatewhatleads indirectlytothis end: to cultivateadispositionofreciprocity – agreeableness,tolerance, mutual loveand respect […]. (MM, 6:473.16–24)⁵⁴

 ‘die Vorstellungund Beherzigung der Gleichheit unterMenschen’.  The notion of Menschenfreund is similar in the Groundwork,inthat in the first instancethe interest the Menschenfreund has for the well-beingofothers is aesthetic – or to be precise, based on inclination (GW, 4:398.20 –34). It is unclear whetherthe concept of Menschenfreund in the Groundwork is also supposed to cover the case where the agent lacks sympathybut is nonethe- less beneficent from duty (see GW,4:398.32–399.2).  The references to Menschenfreund in the Groundwork point in this direction (GW, 4:398.20 –34).  ‘Es ist Pflicht sowohl gegensich selbst,als auch gegenAndere, mit seinen sittlichenVoll- kommenheiten untereinander Verkehr zu treiben […], sich nicht zu isoliren […]; zwar sich einen unbeweglichen Mittelpunkt seiner Grundsätze zu machen, aber diesen um sich gezogenen Kreis doch auch als einen, der den Theil voneinem allbefassenden der weltbürgerlichen Gesin- nungausmacht,anzusehen; nicht eben um das Weltbeste als Zweck zu befördern, sondern nur die wechselseitige,die indirect dahin führt,die Annehmlichkeit in derselben,die Verträglich- keit,die wechselseitige Liebe und Achtung’. 5.3 Cosmopolitan Friendship: Love’sAscent Toward the IdealMoral Community 165

The passagecontains asweeping vision from the narrowly circled individual to ‘what is best for the world’ [das Weltbeste]. Since Kant obviouslythinks that the highestgood is what is best,Itakeitthat his notion of ‘what is best for the world’ can here be identified as the completehighest good (moral happiness of all rational beings) with regard to humans. However,Kant seems to think that this communal notion of ‘what is best for the world’ can onlybeapproached indirectly, through social intercourse. The basic components of friendship are ex- plicitlyoperative in this cultivation of sociality:reciprocity as disposition and mutualloveand respect (alongsideagreeableness and tolerance). It seems that by cherishing and cultivating love and respect in friendships, and by grad- uallyopening our ‘narrower circles’ to people who are not yetour friends,weas- cend towards the ideal ethical community.AsLangton reminds us, friendship unlocks ‘the “prison” of the self’ (Langton 2009,p.319;see MM, 6:472.12–13). Itsconcept provides us with an ideal model of what human relationships in gen- eral oughttobelike. Wood suggests thatitisfriendship ‘that is ultimatelytoen- compass the entire human race’ (Wood 1999,p.316). Of course, cosmopolitan friendship will not contain the level of intimacy characteristic of certain exclu- sive relationships, but we maysay that close to the end of the ‘Doctrine of Vir- tue’,Kant clearlygives the elements of friendship adecisive role when describ- ing the ascent to what is best for the world. In the words of Moran, friendship is crucial for ‘our progress towardthe highestgood’ (Moran2012,p.203).⁵⁵ We are now in aposition to appreciate the place of loveinfriendship in the overall structure of loveinKant’sphilosophy. We have come far from the crude natural impulses of self-loveand have temporarilybracketed love of God be- cause we are now consideringhuman moralrelations.Wenow know that love of neighbour alone is not able to bring about the highest communal good – since loveofneighbour as such is not necessarilyproperlyconditioned by re- spect.Onlythe profound acknowledgment of the equality of all human beings can make one afriend of human beings – one in whom the disposition of lovetowards the whole race is conditioned by respect for the humanityofall. By becomingfriends of human beings, we graduallyascend toward acosmopol- itan community of loveand respect.But most of us mayonlybecome friends of

 At this stage, Idonotfeel aneed to distancemyself from the basic positions formulated by Wood and Moran with respect to the relationship between friendship and the highest good. I don’tfeel the urge for ‘scientific dissensus’.Itake it that their generic propositions are viable and can be adopted by my ascentaccount of loveinfriendship. What remains novel in my ap- proach is the relatively detailed analysis of the concept of loveinthis context,aswellasthe moregeneral ascent model of love, to which the ascent of loveincosmopolitan friendship be- longs – as the final element of the general model. 166 5LoveinFriendship human beingsbyengaging in particularfriendships, whereweapproach moral happiness by cultivatingintimate loveofbenevolence conditioned by intimate respect.Inorder to ascend towardthe highest communal good, we must gradu- allyopen up our loveand extend it to thosewho are not yetour friends. This we can onlylearn to do while loving our friends and by striving to lovepeople around us more wisely. Conclusion

In the Prefacetothe first edition of the Religion,Kant explains that while the foundation of morality abstracts from the presentation of ends altogether,itis still impossible for humans to act withoutconceiving of ends. Because human beingsnaturallydesire happiness, morality leads to the presentation of the final regulative end as the highestgood, which is perfect happiness proportion- ate to perfect virtue.With regard to this highest purpose, Kant writes in afoot- note: ‘Now in this end human beingsseek something thatthey can love,even though it [the end]isbeing proposed to them through reason alone.’ (R, 6:7. 26–28fn.)¹ What is this lovethat human beings seek in the highest good? And how should one understand the connection between loveand the highest good anyway? Ibelievethere is no simple answer to this question, and Kant does not spell out what he means by loveinthe abovequotation.² There are passages in ‘The End of All Things’ (1794) thatseem somewhat parallel to the above. In that essay, Kant explains that while respect is morallyprimary and anecessary condition of ‘true love’ [wahreLiebe], love, ‘as afreeassumption of the will of another into one’smaxims, is an indispensable complement to the imperfection of human na- ture’ (8:338.3–5)³.Given the context,Kant is probablytalking about incorporat- ing the will of God (see ch. 3.1), but he might alsobetalking about lovemore generally. In human terms,Itakethe quotation to mean thatlovemakes us at- tentive to the ends of others in away that goes beyond mere acknowledgement of their autonomy. Furthermore, Kant tells us in ‘The End of All Things’,without lovewewill not be moral gladly[gern]. Without love, our moral actions will be scanty [kärglich], and we will be prone to evade what duty commands. (LE, 8:338.6–7) Based on what Kant says aboveand elsewhere, it appears that love, too, is essentialfor the morallives of imperfect rational creatures like us.

 ‘An diesem Zweckenun, wenn er gleich durch die bloße Vernunft ihm vorgelegt wird, sucht der Mensch etwas,was er lieben kann’.  David Sussman thinks this loveisclose to ‘pathological love’,bywhich he means ‘alovethat fullyintegrates our feelings,our imagination, and our attention around aparticular object of concern’ (Sussman 2010,p.143). While Sussman’sunderstanding of ‘pathological love’ seems to be broader than what we find in Kant’stexts, and while Iwould not rule out practical love as quicklyasSussman does (especiallygiven that the object of lovehereisproposed ‘through reasonalone’), Ineverthelessthink that from abroader,non-exegetical perspective,Sussman is on the right track.  ‘als freie Aufnahme des Willens eines Andern unter seine Maximen, ein unentbehrliches Er- gänzungsstück der Unvollkommenheit der menschlichen Natur’.

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 168 Conclusion

Respect is fundamental, but mere respect for the lawwill not account for our lov- ing God or furthering the happinessofother human beings. By itself, respect can never make us happy.Without love, the path toward the highest good will not be open. But what loveare we now talking about?In‘The End of All Things’,Kant ex- plains further thatthere is something loveable or loveworthy[liebenswürdig] about the Christian religion, which stems from Christianity’s ‘liberal wayof thinking’ [die liberale Denkungsart](8:338.23). Apparently, it is the freedom one feels in the choice of making the highestgood one’sultimateend that occa- sions loveinthis context.In‘The End of AllThings’,this loveisultimatelycon- nected to God’sbenevolent disposition towards humanity.Itseems that the ideas of God’sbenevolence and kindness [Gütigkeit]are what make Christianity love- able (8:338.23–339.19;cf. C2,5:131.10 –19). But can we interpret the lovethat human beingsseek in the highestgood as reducible to rational Christian love of God?Given the ambiguous nature of the highest good (see ch. 1.3), and giventhe results of my investigations of loveinthe five chapters of this study, this kind of reduction would be an oversimplification of Kant’sposition. At least if we emphasise strivingtowardsthe highest good in thislifeand in- finite, intergenerational, species-level progress,and if we putlessweightonspec- ulations regardingwhat the supposedly incorporeal afterlife is like,thenwe should understand the lovethat we ultimatelyseekasamoreholisticnotion, as the regulative,rational ideality that allthe differentaspects of lovebring with themintheir own contexts.Inthisway,the loveweseekisthe ideal union of the different kinds of lovethatcondition our lives. In self-love, we seekhappinessand lovefromothers;insexual love, amoral union of twopeople to procreateand enjoy eachother’ssexual attributes. In loveofGod, we striveto practiceour duties to others gladly,withabenevolent dispositionpleasing to God, which disposition at itsidealendpoint could also be called lovefor the law. In loveofneighbour,wetakedelight in the humanity of others and aim to love thempracticallywithactiverational benevolence, adoptingtheir endsasour own. In loveinfriendship,westrivetocultivate benevolenceand delightininti- mate, equal, and reciprocalhuman relationships whileseekingtoopenupthis lovesothatone daywemight all be able to calleachother friendsasmembers of thehuman race. In this study, Ihaveprovided the first systematic, exegetical,and compre- hensive account of the concept of loveasitappears in the philosophyofKant. In particular, Ihaveformulated and defended twomajor claims: 1) The general divisionoflove in Kant is akey to understanding loveinKant; and 2) the ascent model of love is aplausible general model of loveinKant.Ihave not claimed that my approach and results are flawless,absolutelycomprehensive,orall-encom- Conclusion 169

highest good

(love of God –delight) (love for the law)

morality nature

–loveinfriendship (general division)–love in friendship (general division) –loveofneighbour(general division)–love of neighbour(general division) mediates –love of beauty (delight) –sexuallove–sexuallove(animality +generaldivision) (general division) –self-love –self-love (general division+love of honourasinclination) (delight) –animal self-love (loveoflife,sexuality +parenting, sociality)

(love of God –benevolence) supersensible ground of being

Figure 8. Love’sAscent in Kant passing,and that no more work remains to be done within this field of enquiry.I am alsonot saying that the conceptual framework of loveinKant cannotbecon- strued otherwise. In future research on this topic, further historical considera- tions might be added, so that Kant’sconceptions can be situatedwithin abroad- er framework of loveinthe history of Western philosophy. On the other hand, Kant’smultifaceted concept could be used to formulate apost-Kantian philoso- phyoflove – with aview to contemporarydevelopments, for instance in evolu- tionary philosophyoranalytical metaphysics and ethics. In this work, Iamsay- ing merelythatthe general division of lovedoes provide akey to understanding loveinKant,that the aspectsIdiscuss do exist in Kant’sphilosophy, and that, taken together,itisrational to view these aspectsinterms of an ascent from crude natural impulses to the highest moral-physical good in cosmopolitan friendship. (See fig. 8; see also Appendix.) Iwant to conclude by noting the existenceofanaspect of love that underlies the whole conceptual framework presented here. This is the foundational meth- od thatnecessarilyconnects my approach with that of Kant’s. The researchobject and the method of the studyare both in themselvesinstancesoflove of wisdom – that is, philosophy. Historically, it was the philosophical method thatbrought about rational enquiry into loveinthe first place. Sure, people of the distant past experienced love, worshipped love, and so on. But it was Empedocles who first introduced the notion of loveinapost-Milesian naturalist framework, 170 Conclusion in order to make sense of love’splace in physis,ornature. The status of loveas an object of rationalenquiry wassolidified by Plato. Ifeelthat even though we now have aconcept of loveinKant,wemuststill ask: what is Kant’sconception of love of wisdom?Surely, if we are after aKantian philosophyoflove, the aspects of loveand the ascent model must be understood in this context.But does Kant even speak of loveofwisdom?And can we saythat ‘philosophy’ itself is akind of love, for Kant,ifhedoes not use the word ‘Liebe’ in the immediate vicinity of ‘Philosophie’? Kant’sreferences to ‘philosophy’ in his writingsare abundant,and aproper account of the various connotations would be atopic for another volume. How- ever,the notion of loveofwisdomcomes up onlyonce in the published works, and an analysis of this passagewill be the final task of the present study. The passageappears in the second Critique, close to the beginning of the ‘ of Pure Practical Reason’.The issue is once again the highest good, and more preciselyhow to determine its idea practically. Here, Kant calls this determina- tion the ‘doctrine of wisdom’ [Weisheitslehre], or the science of ‘philosophy’ in the ‘ancient sense’:

We would do well to leave this word [philosophy]inits ancient sense, as a doctrine of the highest good so far as reason strivestobringittoscience. For, on the one hand the restric- tive condition attached would suit the Greek expression (which signifies loveofwisdom) while yetsufficingtoembrace under the name of philosophyloveofscience and so of all speculativerational cognition insofar as it is serviceable to reason for that concept as wellasfor the practical determiningground, without lettinguslose sight of the chief end on account of which alone it can be called doctrine of wisdom. (C2, 5:108.18–28)⁴

Whattomakeofthissomewhat obscurepassage and the placeoflovewithin it? In general, we knowfromelsewherethatKant understandsphilosophy as the sys- temofrational cognition from⁵ concepts(seee.g.C1, A713/B741;A732/B760; A838/B866;C3, 5:171) and that philosophydivides into theoretical and practical

 ‘Es wäre gut, wenn wir dieses Wort bei seiner alten Bedeutungließen, als eine Lehrevom höchsten Gut,sofern die Vernunft bestrebt ist,esdarin zur Wissenschaft zu bringen. Denn ei- nestheils würde die angehängte einschränkendeBedingungdem griechischenAusdrucke (welcher Liebe zur Weisheit bedeutet) angemessen und doch zugleich hinreichend sein, die Liebe zur Wissenschaft,mithin aller speculativenErkenntniß der Vernunft,sofern sie ihr sowohl zu jenem Begriffe, als auch dem praktischen Bestimmungsgrunde dienlich ist,unter dem Namen der Philosophie mit zu befassen, und doch den Hauptzweck, um dessentwillen sie allein Weish- eitslehregenannt werden kann, nicht ausden Augen verlieren lassen.’  Idonot wish to debatethe correctness of this English preposition. In different places, Kant uses at least the German prepositions aus,nach, and durch to describe how rational cognition pertains to concepts in terms of philosophy. Conclusion 171 philosophy, wheretheoretical philosophy concerns what is and practicalphiloso- phywhat ought to be (e.g. C3,5:171;C1, A840/B868;see also A850/B878).⁶ In the first Critique he states: ‘Philosophyrefers everything to [the goal of]wisdom.But it doessobythe pathofscience’ (C1, A850/B878)⁷.Often when Kant speaks of wis- dom or being wise, he connects it withthe ideaofGod.Weviewthe worldasifit were the product of awise author or supreme wisdom,organised purposivelywith regard to the highestgood (seee.g.C1, A628/B656;A687/B715;A699/B727;A826/ B854;C2, 5:130 –131;C3, 5:444). Sometimeswisdomisdiscussed as theunion of benevolenceand justice(C3,5:444;see 8:257ff.), and for humans,wisdomisan ideal (C1, A569/B597). In termsofthese divisions,the mainpoint thatKant seems to be makingwithregardtoloveofwisdom in the second Critique is thatthere aretwo differentkinds of components in the doctrine of wisdom and the wayitrelates to the highestgood:there is atheoretical or scientificaspect and apracticalaspect. In the second Critique,wisdom is givenatwofold defini- tionexplicitlyinterms of the theoretical/practical distinction: ‘wisdom consid- ered theoreticallysignifies cognition of the highest good,and practically the fitness of the willfor the highestgood’ (C2, 5:130.36– 131.1⁸;see also 8:256fn.; cf.8:336.5– 7). And at thevery end of the conclusion of the second Critique:

In aword, science(criticallysoughtand methodicallydirected) is the narrow gate that leads to the doctrine of wisdom,ifbythis is understood not merelywhatone ought to do but what oughttoserve teachers as aguide to preparewelland clearlythe path to wisdom which everyone should travel(C2, 5:163.27–31)⁹.

If we now interpret the passageonloveofwisdom in the light of the abovere- flections, the theoretical and practical components of the doctrine of wisdom within the passageare broughttothe fore,which helps to clarify the word ‘love’ in that context.First,the ‘restrictive condition’ [einschränkende Bedingung] must refertoscience: the doctrine of wisdom must be scientific. However,this is

 Kant also uses ‘transcendental philosophy’, ‘speculativephilosophy’,and ‘philosophyofna- ture’ to refertothe theoretical approach, and ‘moral philosophy’ to refertopractical philosophy. As Ihavealreadymentioned,however,fine-grained analysis of these taxonomies is beyond my current aims.  ‘Diese [Philosophie] bezieht alles aufWeisheit,aber durch den Wegder Wissenschaft’.  ‘Weisheit,theoretisch betrachtet, die Erkenntnißdes höchstenGuts und praktisch die Angemes- senheit des Willens zumhöchsten Gute bedeutet’.  ‘Mit einem Worte: Wissenschaft (kritisch gesucht und methodisch eingeleitet) ist die enge Pforte,die zur Weisheitslehre führt,wenn unterdieser nicht blos verstanden wird, was man thun,sondernwas Lehrern zur Richtschnur dienen soll, um den Wegzur Weisheit,den jeder- mann gehen soll, gutund kenntlich zu bahnen’. 172 Conclusion merely love of science if the practical determiningground [praktische Bestim- mungsgrund]isnot included. The context implies that the ‘chief end’ [Hauptz- weck]isthe end of the highest good, and so we can saythatitislove of science, together with the practical determiningground (both taken with reference to the highestgood) that warrantsthe term ‘loveofwisdom’.Immediatelyfollowing this passageKant continues to explain that,from another perspective,wisdom can be understood ideallyasanobject of striving in the sense that its completion is an objectiverational idea, ‘whereas subjectively,for aperson, it is onlythe goal of his unceasingendeavors’ (C2, 5:109.2–3)¹⁰. This, Ithink, is connected to howKantusesthe word ‘love’ in the context of ‘lovefor the law’.Inthese twocases (love for thelaw and loveofwisdom), love seems to denoteanidealobjectofstriving. The objectis, at least to acertain ex- tent,aproduct of ourreason; it is in asense ‘higher’ than us,something the com- pletionofwhich we lack. This reminds one of how Eros is discussed in the Sym- posium. Kant’sloveofwisdom seems to denotepreciselythisrelationoflack, of pursuit, of strenuous ascent towardswhat we do not yetpossess.Ittherefore seems that, in addition to the most paradigmaticcasesoflove, wherethe object of loveisaperson and the loverelation is described directlyintermsofthe gen- eral division of love, thereisanother category of objects, wherethe objectoflove is arational ideal thatone desires and forwhich onestrives.Incomparison with animality,these ideals areatthe other end of thespectrum of desire(cf.ch. 1.1). The ideal cases arenot paradigm examples of loveinKant preciselyfor the reason thattheylackanexplicit connectiontothe general division, but theycannot be glossed as mere anomalies,because the links or thestructural similarities to the historical tradition of theconcept of love, especially in the case of loveofwisdom, arestrongand obvious.Ifwethink of Kant’sdiscussionsofGod as divine wisdom or as possessingsupreme wisdom,wecan ventureone step further and say, in termsofthe general division, that thereisnowisdom without loveofbenevo- lence, which in religious termsisthe groundofcreation. In general, loveofwis- dom signifiesthe unity of theoretical cognitionand practicalcognition in the pur- suitofthe highestgood. In summary,the aim of thisbookwas to providethe first relatively detailed analysis of theconcept of loveinKant’sphilosophy.Utilising anovel general di- visionapproach, Ihavepointed outhow lovepermeates human existencefrom the strongest impulses of nature to the highestideals of moral happiness. Overall, my analysis has yieldedanewascent model of loveinKant. Moregenerally, Ibe-

 ‘subjectivaber,für die Person, nur das Ziel seiner unaufhörlichen Bestrebungist’. Conclusion 173 lievethat Ihaveshown thatacomprehensive understandingofKantian ethical life is not possible without acknowledging themultidimensionalpresenceoflove. To step outside of the exegetical framework, Iwish to say, as aperson and a philosopher,that loveisavery complicated concept,and conceptsingeneral are not the kindsofthingsone grasps in the blink of an eye. Concepts are proposi- tional worlds,worlds one needs to explore without rushing, in peace and quiet,if one is to come to terms with them – even though it all happens in the midst of life. The acquisition, construction, or comprehension of aconcept is very much about coming to inhabit relatively stable propositional structures with one’smind. We studyreality,strive to understand it,and place our sentences under its ru- bric. Aconcept as broad and complex as lovecan onlybeapproached gradually, and when one has understood something,itdoes not implyacompletecompre- hension of the phenomenon. Loveisaconcept with both theoretical and practi- cal elements. We can formulate descriptive propositions, or more widely, models that outline the structural features of the concept of love, and attempt to say thingsregardingwhat loveis, in the philosophyofKant,for example. We can ob- servereality and use our reason to criticise the proposition sets we have suggest- ed, and through the critical process we mayreplaceour old propositions with better ones. Or we maybeabletoformulate propositions that endure,that come to appear as sustainable within the critical process, the processthrough which our fallible knowledge of reality grows and becomes morerefined. But this is not something for us to decide as authors of propositions, but amatter of later critical scrutiny. In practice, learning loveisslow.Itisnot asprint but anever-ending walk towards what is better.Aclimb, if youwill. While agiven proposition can perhaps be theoretically understood relatively quickly – it can be analysed and givenaninterpretation within its model or aconfined semantic universe – this is not so when it comes to incorporatingthe concept of loveinto one’slife or one’smoral behaviour.The normative requirements of the model must be embraced in adeeper way. That is the difficult part,and that is wherethe real work of practical philosophyhappens. What is comfortingis that,due to the very slow acquisition process of the concept of love, the love thus obtained is not amere chimerabut instead becomes an integral part of one’slife experience. One must become so immersed in the practical concepts one studies that the concepts become dynamic forms of life that are communi- cated both rationallyand emotionallyonvarious levels of interaction with oth- ers. Loveisreal. It is not adream one wakes up from in the morning,sothat then it’sgone. It is here, in this reality and on this planet,and it can be studied.Ifwe persevere and work diligentlytounderstand lovebetter, we are entitled to the rational hope that gradually, over the course of time, reality willbecome more loving. Appendix:ExplanatoryNote on Fig. 8

It is quite possible that after reading the whole study,fig.8(seeConclusion) will appear self-explanatory.However,despite their illustrative power,diagrams nec- essarilylose so much information thatIthink abrief explanatory note on the pic- torial image of the ascent model is in order,iffor no other reason than to pre- servesome of the ambiguity that interpretative positions within the exegetical studyofKant necessarilyinvolve.There are also some philosophical commit- ments made in fig.8thatshould not appear necessary basedonthe propositio- nal results of the chapters, and Iwish to clarify these pointsofemphasis, which are prevalent in the imagebut mayseem to contrastorbeambiguous in relation to what Isay about aparticularaspect of loveinmyactual discussion. Inote that loveofGod and lovefor the laware bracketed as idealisations, and they depict rational conditions and endpoints of moral striving.Itshould be transparent that arational animal mechanical self-lovelies completelyon the sideofnature and consists of the impulses of love of life, narrow sexual loveand parenting, and instinctive sociality.The self-lovefor which reason is re- quired can be viewed in terms of nature through the general division, so that loveofbenevolence is wanting thingstogowell for oneself and to be loved by others and loveofdelight is taking pleasure in those maxims. As an inclina- tion, loveofhonour belongstaxonomicallytothis level of self-love, whereas ‘true’ loveofhonour is afunction of respect.Inthe study Iargued that in certain moral contexts it is possibletospeakofamoral self-love, which would have to be loveofdelight,but Ifeelthe need to emphasise that for most purposes it suf- fices to saymore robustlythat thereisnothing moral about self-loveassuch. The model should never be read as saying that just anykind of delight in oneself counts as moral self-love. Based on textual evidence, broad sexual loveunites the animal impulseespeciallywith loveofbenevolence, but as Idon’tsee any- thing to prevent pathological delight,inclination-based benevolence, and intel- lectualdelight from enteringthe picture, Ipresent the general division on both sides of the nature-freedom distinction. We can hardlyavoid being physicallyde- lighted by another’sphysical perfections when such perfections appear,and moral benevolent lovewillbring about feelings of love(as inclinations to benef- icence). Moreover,wetakeintellectual delight in the humanity and moral perfec- tion of all human beings. Loveofbeauty appears to lie somewherebetween na- ture and morality (intellectual delight in otherhuman beings hovers somewhat similarlyonboth sides of the nature-freedom divide). In the figure, Itreat loveof neighbour and loveinfriendship in the same lenient wayassexual love. Even though onlyrational benevolence is commanded, and the predisposition of https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110544978-009 Appendix: ExplanatoryNoteonFig. 8 175 loveofneighbour is (perhaps intellectual) loveofdelight,Iallow inclination- based benevolence and pathological delight to figure in the framework, as these loves, too, willatleast occasionallyappear when one strivestoloveothers morally. With friendship, publishedevidence onlyallows for talk of moral loveof benevolence, but the same considerations apply(the lectures further emphasise intellectual loveofdelight). In life, all the loves are intermingled, and the higher,actual (non-ideal) as- pects in fig.8reflect thatview.Supposing one strivestobecome more moral, I see no need to restrict the operation of the general division of lovewith regard to the highest loves, as long as feelings of loveare conditioned by respect,which is the phenomenal foundation of morality. Irealise that for ahard-boiled exe- gete, my treatment of the loves in sexual love, loveofneighbour,and lovein friendship in fig.8mayappear too unrestricted or permissive,and if this is the case, Irecommend going back to the chapters for my exact positions with referencetogiven aspects. Fig. 8ismerelyaskeleton for understandinglove in Kant,and meaning has to be sought elsewhere. What Idowish to portray with the figure, in additiontothe basic conceptual structure of the ascent model, is that while the general division of lovewill figure differentlyand with varyingemphases with respect to different aspects of love, we will experi- ence bothmoral and natural benevolence and delight in loving relationships, and this (as long as respect is in place) is as such nothing to be worried about.The loves are beautiful, and it is awonderful feature of life that they are there. Finally, the inclusive attitude of fig.8with respect to the loves related to other persons is alsomeant to depict the insight of the matureKant,according to whom the frame of mind connected to loveisliberal. Bibliography

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Denis, Lara8,16, 25, 31–33, 59, 82f.,145, Marcucci, Silvestro145, 153, 158–160, 162 150,156 Marwah, Inder 58, 80f. DiCenso, James 22, 26f.,91 Michalson, Gordon 26f. Diotima10, 65 Mikkola,Mari 58, 74 – 77 Miller, Robert4 Edwards, Jeffrey 18 Moors, Martin 5, 12, 84f.,103, 107,126 Empedocles 3, 169 Moran, Kate43, 145f.,153, 162, 165 Engstrom, Stephen 18, 41, 43 Nagl-Docekal, Herta 58 Fahmy,Melissa4,110,130,132–135, 137– 140 O’Regan, Cyril 98 Filippaki, Eleni 145, 154 Frierson, Patrick 24, 61f. Palmquist, Stephen 22, 26, 84, 91f.,98 Fromm, Erich 5 Pasternack, Lawrence 22, 26 Paton, Herbert 18, 25, 37,145 Goethe, Johann 58 Paytas, Tyler 139 Goy,Ina 84f.,87, 104, 110 Petschauer,Peter 62 Green, Ronald 143 Plato3,10f., 23, 65, 170 Grenberg,Jeanine 5, 12, 112 Powell, Samuel 98 Guyer, Paul 27,124, 128 Rauscher,Frederick 75 Herman, Barbara58, 72, 75 Reardon, Bernard84, 91f. Hill, Thomas 18 Reath, Andrews 18, 43 Horn, Christoph 110, 141f. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 22f.,30, 112 Hull,Isabel58 Russell,Bertrand 106 Hume, David 121 Hutcheson, Francis3,9,18, 121 Schleiermacher,Friedrich 58 Schneewind, J.B. 22, 31, 112 VanImpe, Stijn 145, 153, 158, 160–162 Schott, Robin 58

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Schröder,Hannelore58, 62, 71, 74,76, 81 vonTevenar,Gudrun135 Schönecker,Dieter 4f., 12f.,52, 106, 110, Timmermann, Jens 25, 36f.,39f., 48, 51, 124f.,127–129, 142f.,154 81, 86f.,92, 94, 104, 113, 116–118, 132, Shell,Susan 26 134, 137–139, 174 Šimfa, Elvira 18 Timmons, Mark 16, 31f.,135f. Singer,Irving 73 Tomasi, Gabriele 16, 57,66 Smit, Houston 16, 31f.,135f. Soble, Alan 25, 59 La Vopa, Anthony71, 75f. Socrates 10,23 Stevenson, Leslie 99 Wike, Victoria 147 Sticker,Martin 81, 132, 136 Wood, Allen 18, 22, 25–27,31, 39, 49, 58, Streich, Detlev 5, 11, 142 64, 69, 71, 84, 104, 117–119, 137f., Sussman, David 167 145f.,152f.,155–157,161, 165, 174 SubjectIndex

affects 60, 157 commandment 12, 88–90,94, 101, 103, agape115 108, 110,115f.,118, 120,126–128, 132, amor benevolentiae 9, 12, 127,131 142 amor complacentiae 9, 12, 107 – to love84, 87–90,104,115, 120,126 -même 23 compassion 116f.,139 amour propre 23, 30 concubinage74f. animality 8, 10,21, 24, 26, 28f.,33, 172 cultivation 8, 10, 15, 51, 79f.,88, 108, 110– – animalnature25, 31, 33, 48f. 112, 119, 121, 124, 131–136, 138–141, appetite69, 71 143f.,147,164f. approximation 6, 14, 20, 53–55, 78 arrogance(see also self-conceit)46–48, 55 delight (see loveofdelight) ascent model of love 10f.,13, 15, 19, 21, – intellectual11, 15, 114, 151, 181 165, 168, 172 – moral 15, 47,53f., 96f.,99f., 103f.,109 aspects of love1,6,9f.,13, 15, 105, 149, – pathological 149, 181f. 168, 170,182 – sensuous 114f.,151 attraction and repulsion 154 desire 17,20f., 23–26, 30, 32f.,36, 50, 55, autonomy 40,42, 76, 87,149, 167 63f.,68–70, 72, 79, 132, 152, 167,172 – faculty of 23f.,32, 40 beautiful and the sublime (see also loveof – sexual 22, 25, 60, 63f.,67, 69, 71–73 beauty) 61f.,65 determining ground of the will38–40, 43, beneficence 49–51,119 – and benevolence131 discipline 29 – delight takenin114 dominance31, 76, 82 – from duty 114, 117,128 drive (see also impulse; instinct) 21–23, – from inclination 63 30–32 – willproduce love127 – sexual 22, 62, 70 benevolence(see also maxim) – social22, 70 – active132, 138, 140 duties (see duty of love) – and beneficence 131–133 – as divine commands 86f.,90, 103 – divine 103 – to God 88 – from inclination 113f. – to others113, 130,168 – in wishes 12, 131 duty of love12, 16, 46, 85, 103, 122, 126, – practical 132 130f.,134, 136, 150,154–156, 159, 161 – rational 15, 51, 64, 68, 73f.,89, 132, 138, – duties of love12, 52, 110, 130,133f. 141, 155, 158, 162, 168, 181 – sympathetic 119f. emulation 31, 33 – towards oneself (see also self-benevol- equality 32f.,57f., 75f.,147,150,153, 155, ence) 42 160, 164f. – towards others 52, 56 eros 3, 10,22, 172 – universal132 fear 36, 79, 93, 108 changeofheart 50, 98f. feeling Christianity 3, 84, 86, 122, 125f.,168 – finer 61, 80f. – moral 48, 124f.,135, 141f.

DOI 10.1515/9783110544978, © 2020 Rinne Pärttyli, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 186 Subject Index

– natural 8, 133, 140, 143 – morally deserved 1, 10,20, 27,29, 55, 87 – of love 2f., 8, 11, 63, 110f.,116, 118–120, – my own 51 128–130,134, 141–143, 145, 154–158, – of others12, 18, 51,53, 55, 60,95, 114, 160, 181f. 117,132f.,150,163 – of sympathy (see also sympathy) 61 – of women 81f. – sexual 60 – perfect54, 122, 167 feminism 58 homosexuality 59 friend of human beings 12, 15, 160,162– humanitasaesthetica 138, 141, 151 166 humanitaspractica 138–140,151 friendship humanity 10,12, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26, 29, 31, – aesthetic 157 45, 49, 52, 72f.,80f., 95–97,99, 115, – cosmopolitan 10f.,162, 165, 169 118, 129, 137,141, 146, 149–153, 162f., – idea of 147f.,150 165, 168, 181 – moral 145, 153, 157–160 – love of 163 – of disposition 148, 153, 157 – of the other 72f.,152, 161 – of need 147,149, 157 – sexual end of 73 – of taste147,157 husband 59, 74 – 76, 79, 81f.,150,161 – pragmatic 157 – universal163 ideal15, 27,29, 64, 84, 86, 90,92–95, 121, 146f.,149–152, 154, 157,162, 165, general division of love(see loveofbenevol- 168, 171f.,182 ence; loveofdelight) 1, 6–10,13–16 – highest 1, 172 genuine love(see also true love) 69f.,83 – moral 16, 99 gladness87, 89f.,95, 107f.,121 – of friendship 149, 156f. God (see love of God; Christianity; trinity) – rational 90,97, 172 – attributesof97, 100 – regulative 10,14, 78, 87,92, 97,147 – concept of 106 – unattainable84, 90 – idea of 85, 99f.,107,109, 168, 171 immortality 54 godliness92f. imperative 37,108 good – categorical 25, 37,71, 118 – approximation to the highest 20, 54 – hypothetical 37,41 – highest 3, 10f.,14f., 20,27, 29, 48, impulse 7, 10, 13f.,16, 19, 21–24, 28–30, 52–56, 81, 86f.,99, 102, 106f.,109, 32f.,45, 55, 57–61, 64f.,68, 70, 72f., 121f.,146, 162, 165, 167f.,170–172 77,88f., 94, 116, 165, 169, 172, 181 – moral 26–29, 66, 77,79, 90 – impulses of human nature1,9,14, 19, 21, – physical10, 28f.,77f., 169 29, 33, 55 good will7,116f.,121 – sexual 25, 57,59–73, 77,154 grace85, 99 incentive18, 25, 41, 44, 49, 51,54, 87,89, gratification (see also satisfaction) 24, 60, 100, 119f.,136 116, 138 inclination 8f., 12, 15, 30–33, 35f.,39–42, gratitude 15f.,130,133–137,139, 144, 160 44–47,49–60,63, 67,72, 79, 88–90, 93–95, 114–118, 120f.,123, 128, 133, happiness5,18–20, 35–41, 43f.,48f., 141, 143, 149, 151f., 154, 156f.,163f., 51 – 56, 59f.,62f., 74,77f., 81, 83, 95, 181f. 100f.,103, 106, 115–117,122, 131, 137, – benevolent (see benevolence, from inclina- 147,152, 162, 165–168, 172 tion) 51, 115 – analogue of 53 – contra-moral 11, 14, 18, 95, 121 Subject Index 187

– inclination-based love7f.,88–90,114, loveofhonour16, 19, 31–33, 181 118, 141, 143, 151, 156 – true 33, 181 – sexual 51, 57,60, 62, 68–74,83, 114, 151 loveofhuman beings 16, 73, 118f.,125f., – to beneficence; to benefit others95, 136 127f.,181 – system of 112 instinct 10,24f., 36, 57f.,64, 68, 72, 83, loveoflife 9, 12, 14, 19, 22, 28f.,36, 55, 112, 118 70, 73, 78, 181 interest 6, 36, 61, 66f.,76, 116f.,163f. – and sexual love 13, 28f.,70, 78 loveofneighbour(see feeling of love; loveof kindness101–103, 113f.,135, 168 benevolence; loveofdelight; practical love) liking7,17, 50, 63, 65, 88, 91, 93f.,108, – feeling-action-cultivationaccount of 15, 119, 151 111, 124, 131, 141–144 loveand respect 46, 82, 133, 140,145 f., – taxonomy of 142–144 153f.,158, 160–162, 165 loveofscience 170,172 loveasdesire 9, 23, 172 loveoftruth17 lovefor the law (see also lovefor the moral loveofwisdom 169–172 law) 12, 16, 49–51, 85–87,89–96, 98, 121f.,168, 172, 181 maritallove (see also sexuallove, broad) lovefor the moral law (see also love forthe 81f. law) 11f.,84f., 88, 90, 108 marriage(see also husband; maritallove; loveofbeauty (see also tastefor beauty) 6, wife) 14, 57–59, 63, 68, 71, 74 – 76, 10,12–16, 57–62, 64–68, 81, 181 82f.,150,161 loveofbenevolence(see benevolence) – and friendship 82, 150 – active112f.,118 – morganatic 74 f. – God’s9,15, 96, 101, 104, 108 – right 58, 68, 71, 75 – moral 14, 57,115, 156f.,182 maxim 24, 33, 35, 40f.,43–46, 50–52, 55, – rational 43f.,73, 143, 151, 156, 158 91, 94, 107f.,118f.,130–132, 150,157, – wishful 112 167,181 loveofdelight (see delight) – moral 119 – God’s15, 99f.,104 – of benevolence126, 130 – in oneself 46, 48, 55 – of one’sown happiness(see also self-love, – intellectual74, 114, 124, 143, 149, 151f., maxim of)35, 38, 51 f.,91, 108 158, 161, 182 – of practical love52 – moral 44, 47,49, 53, 108, 152, 154 mechanism 23, 72 – pathological 7, 89, 123, 129, 164 merit 32, 47f.,55, 84, 98 loveofGod (see also lovefor the law; loveof morality 3, 8, 18, 20f.,27, 31–33, 35–37, benevolence, God’s; love of delight, 44, 47,49, 52, 57f.,61, 65, 68, 79f.,83, God’s) 86–90,95, 98, 103, 106f.,119, 121– – actuality of lovefor God 93–95, 108 125, 128, 133, 142, 147f.,167,181f. – ascent model of loveofGod 14, 86, – end of 20, 123, 152 104f., 109 – ground of 95, 121–123, 137 – God is love84, 91f.,96–98, 100f.,103 – leadstoreligion 14, 99 – God’sperfect love100 – principle of 39, 121 – perfectlovefor God 93, 95 – pure36 – scaleoflovefor God 93, 95 moral law (see lovefor the moral law; respect – two-directionality of loveofGod 103 forthe moral law) 188 Subject Index

moral love32f., 57,59, 63, 66, 68, 71, 74, – of benevolence7,54, 59, 74,120,127, 77,102f.,154, 161 142, 155f. motivation 36, 40,87f. predisposition 11f.,15, 21–23, 26f., mutual love (see also reciprocal love) 87, 29–31, 45, 57,66, 70, 77,110,124f., 147f.,150,152–155, 160f.,164f. 127,129, 158, 181 – aesthetic 119, 124f.,127–129, 143, 154, objectification (see also sexual object) 58, 156, 158, 161 61 – natural 26f.,31, 48, 110,124, 126, 141, 149, 154 parental love16f. – of humanity 30 passion12, 60f. – original 21f.,26f. pathological love89, 111, 117f.,120,122f., –to animality 26 158, 167 – to the good 19, 21f.,26f., 33, 55, 59 – and practical love110,117,120,123, 129, principle 18, 24, 29, 35–39, 44f.,52f., 55, 143 60f.,79–81, 83, 87,89, 91, 96, 101, perfection 10,15, 83, 86, 90,94, 96, 99, 113f.,117f.,125, 148, 154f.,159, 164 114, 130,133, 141, 151f., 154, 181 – moral 139–141, 150 – moral 6, 19, 49, 52, 90,97, 99, 107,121f., – objective 18, 37 129, 152, 157,164, 181 – of love 125, 140,155f. – one’sown 133 – practical 19, 31, 37,39, 42, 45,116 – physical149, 151, 181 progress12, 19, 28f.,65, 78f.,93–95, 113, personality 21, 26, 75 119, 162, 165, 168 personhood 25, 72, 74 – 76, 162 – cultural78 philanthropist 116, 118f. –moral 11, 20, 28f.,33, 50, 54f.,59, 77, philautia 42, 46f. 79, 81, 95, 104, 150,162 philosophy (see loveofwisdom) prudence8,20, 38, 43, 51 – moral philosophy (see philosophy,practi- purpose (see also purposiveness) 27,29, cal) 2, 8, 13, 18f.,24f., 32–34, 51, 58, 36–38, 59, 62, 66f.,72, 79f.,99–101, 74,88, 101, 110,125, 133, 141f.,161, 171 106, 109, 167 – of history29f., 33, 58, 66, 68, 78 purposiveness(see also purpose) 66f. – practical (see philosophy,moral) 1, 171, 173f. quasi-induction 6, 17 – theoretical 13, 171 pleasure 2, 6–8, 24, 27,29, 38–41, 43, rationality 7, 14, 19, 26, 38, 42, 44, 55 47f.,54f., 60, 63, 65f.,70, 73, 96f., – instrumental 44 113f.,127–130,138, 141, 147,151f.,156, rational love (see also self-love, rational) 8, 160, 181 35, 44f. – displeasure 24, 39, 48, 138 reason, purepractical 2f., 8, 23, 26, 33, – intellectual153, 162 40f.,50, 68, 89, 119, 141, 170 – moral 47f. reciprocal love (see also mutual love) 150, – sensible 71, 74,77, 95 152f.,160 – sexual 60 reciprocity (see also mutual love; reciprocal polygamy 74 f. love) 59, 82, 139, 164f. postulate29, 54, 102, 106 respect forthe moral law 3, 8, 16, 18, 32, practical love(see benevolence, active; love 36, 45,47, 53, 87,90, 95, 108, 135, 140, of benevolence, active; maxim, of practi- 149 callove) reward 47,87, 121 Subject Index 189

satisfaction (see also gratification) 7, 24, solipsism 25, 46, 58, 61, 82 35f.,40f., 45,53, 60f.,63f., 71, 73, 108, striving 8–10,15, 18, 30, 50–52, 78, 83, 116, 131f.,147,152 87,90, 92, 96, 98–100, 102, 104, 108, self-benevolence20, 41, 52, 126 121f.,133, 166, 168, 172, 181 self-conceit (see also arrogance) 18f.,31f., sympathetic participation (see sympathy) 34, 36, 39, 41–43, 45–49, 55 61, 130,133f.,136, 139–141, 159 self-contentment 8, 45, 48, 53, 55 sympathy (see sympathetic participation) – moral 20, 48, 56 15, 39, 48, 116f.,134, 137,139–141, self-esteem 47f. 144, 164 self-estimation 47 self-love (see self-benevolence; self-conceit; tastefor beauty (see also loveofbeauty) 65 self-contentment) teleology 13, 29, 33, 55, 57f.,67f., 77,80f. – madeanunconditional law 46, 48 –natural 79 – maxim of 35, 38, 52, 91, 108 – sexual 59, 79–81 – of humanity 19, 26, 30f.,33, 35, 55 tenderheartedness61 – persistenceof14, 20, 55f. trinity 96, 98 – rational 19, 35, 41, 43–45 true love(see also genuine love) 26, 33, self-preservation 9f., 12, 14, 19f.,22f., 161, 167 28f.,36, 55, 70, 73, 78 sexuality 5, 9, 19f.,22f., 25, 54, 57–61, universal love(see also benevolence, univer- 64–68, 73, 77,79, 83 sal) 17,126 sexual love(see also loveoflife, and sexual unsociable sociability 30–32 love) – and friendship 69, 82 well-being 6, 10, 27,30, 35, 37f.,43, 66, – broad 14, 57–59, 68f.,71, 74,77, 81–83, 102f.,115, 131f.,150,152f.,163f. 181 wife63, 74 – 76, 79, 81f.,150, 161 – narrow 14, 57,61, 68–71, 77,79, 82, 181 wisdom (see also loveofwisdom; philoso- sexual object (see also objectification) 63f. phy) 79, 97,171f. sexual organs 74 – doctrine of 170f. sociality 14, 19, 22, 29f.,33, 54f.,165, 181 worth19, 30, 33, 36, 50f.,63, 80,116–119 – animal31, 33