Denuclearizing North Korea: Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building

Denuclearizing North Korea Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building

September 2011

An IFPA Project Report SUPPORTED BY The Carnegie Corporation of New York For over thirty years, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), has conducted studies, workshops, and conferences on national security and foreign policy issues and produced innovative reports, briefings, and publications. IFPA’s products and services help government policymakers, military and industry leaders, and the broader public policy communities make informed decisions in a complex and dynamic global environment. With core staff in offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., the Institute maintains a global network of research advisors and consultants. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis: innovative strategies for new security challenges. Denuclearizing North Korea Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building

September 2011

Report by Mr. Weston S. Konishi, Associate Director of Asia Pacific Studies

Project Principal Directors: Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice-President Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice-President and Director of Studies Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

A publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

CONTENTS

Executive Summary and Key Points vii

Introduction 1 Peace, Denuclearization, and the Growing North Korea Problem 4

Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula 9 Trilateral Consensus Building 12

Implications for the Six-Party Talks and Other Regional Security Mechanisms 15

Harmonizing Trilateral Approaches to North Korea 18

Korean Peninsula Peace Regime 21 Characteristics of a Peace Regime 25 Developing a Peace Regime Consensus: Themes and Perspectives 29 Korean Peace Regime Consensus Building in Support of Denuclearization 37 The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor and Regional Considerations 38

Conclusion 41

List of Acronyms 44

References 46

Appendices 50

Concise Chronology of the Events on the Korean Peninsula app:1

Trail of Documents Related to Korean Peace Regime Development app:11

North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, app:13 and Cooperation and Exchange (Basic Agreement), 1991

Agenda from January, 2011 Workshop app:16

Participants from January, 2011 Workshop app:19

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY POINTS

ith support from the Carnegie Corporation a brief summary of the workshop and subsequent Wof New York, the Institute for Foreign Policy research findings:1 Analysis (IFPA) collaborated with the Institute of • North Korean provocations over the past year Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) and have had a considerable impact on the strategic the US Institute of Peace (USIP) to organize a tri- environment in Northeast Asia, negatively affect- lateral Track 1.5 dialogue in Seoul, South Korea ing a range of bilateral ties. For instance, strains on January 19, 2011 entitled “Risk Reduction and have deepened between South and North Korea, Confidence-Building on the Korean Peninsula: South Korea and China, and China and the Unit- Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for ed States. At the same time, the region is once Regional Stability.” The dialogue brought togeth- again polarizing into two main camps (U.S.-ROK- er approximately 50 prominent policymakers and Japan versus PRC-DPRK). experts from the United States, China (People’s • The leadership succession process in North Korea Republic of China, or PRC) and the Republic of appears to be promoting more defiant and aggres- Korea (ROK, or South Korea) for in-depth discus- sive behavior by the regime and adds further sions focusing on the current security situation on unpredictability to the already tense regional and surrounding the Korean Peninsula and pros- security environment. pects for greater cooperation among the three • The nature of deterrence on and surrounding nations represented at the workshop. The event built the Korean Peninsula may be shifting, with the on earlier workshops that IFPA has organized with North seemingly emboldened to act out with Carnegie Corporation support to examine a variety impunity and the South declaring a new policy of regional security challenges in Northeast Asia, of “proactive deterrence” in response to further including the likely impact of nuclear and ballistic provocations. missile proliferation trends, the potential value of • South Korean anxieties about the reliability of multilateral risk reduction and confidence-building the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent have been measures on the Korean Peninsula, and the pros- heightened by the North’s provocations and by pects for developing over time a Korean Peninsula peace regime (KPPR) based in part on the denu- 1 Note that this summary does not represent the opinions of all workshop participants or their organiza- clearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of tions. It is not a consensus document, nor has it been Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). The following is reviewed by the participants prior to publication. IFPA has drawn its own conclusions from this exercise.

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building vii proposed policy changes outlined in the Obama • Over time, regional CBMs and risk-reduction administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review mechanisms can lead to a new regional security (NPR). Washington should continue to reassure architecture and/or a potential peace regime on South Korea and other regional allies about the the Korean Peninsula. U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. • There is an ongoing debate over whether a KPPR • In the absence of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S.- would be an end-state, such as an updated ver- ROK-China strategic triangle has become an sion of the 1953 armistice, with a formal end to increasingly salient mechanism for managing the war and a framework for reconciliation, or regional crises in the short term and for shaping a process leading to some form of North-South a future security structure in Northeast Asia over reconciliation and, possibly, a Korean confeder- the long term. Enhanced cooperation and coor- ation. Regardless of the scenario, denucleariza- dination among these three nations can lead to tion of the peninsula should be a prerequisite for a more effective diplomatic approach to negotiat- the formation of a peace regime. ing the denuclearization of North Korea. • The development of a KPPR should not in any way • The three countries have diverging priorities, impede or detract from the U.S.-ROK alliance, with the United States and South Korea empha- which will remain a critical element of regional sizing denuclearization and China emphasizing security for the foreseeable future. peace and stability on the peninsula. Harmoniz- ing these priorities is a fundamental requisite for adopting a common approach to the North Kore- an problem, including achieving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. • China’s deepening economic engagement with North Korea is frustrating U.S. and South Kore- an attempts to isolate and pressure the regime. As this engagement continues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to sanction North Korea without impinging on Chinese commercial and economic interests. • Washington and Seoul should explore ways to persuade Beijing to join initiatives to curb North Korean provocations and nuclear development in return for clearer assurances about allied inten- tions on the Korean Peninsula over the longer run, especially in the context of a reunified peninsula under the leadership of the South. • The United States, South Korea, and China should improve trilateral security coordination and cooperation through enhanced CBMs and other risk-reduction measures. Opportunities to cooperate with China in deterring North Korean provocations and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development should be pursued when- ever possible.

viii Denuclearizing North Korea INTRODUCTION

fter a turbulent 2010, the security situation on made a four-star general and given several senior Athe Korean Peninsula has settled into a relative- party posts, necessary steps in building his legit- ly stable—although still tense and tenuous—stasis imacy as the country’s next leader. Kim Jong-un’s among the relevant regional players. This is a some- profile has subsequently become more prominent what welcome development, given the alarming and the regime appears increasingly prepared to series of events of 2010, when North Korea mount- make him the nation’s figurehead at some future ed deadly conventional attacks on South Korea date. The delicate, and largely opaque, succes- while revealing significant progress on its nucle- sion process likely played some part in the North’s ar weapons program. In March 2010, North Korea provocations in 2010 and has added yet another torpedoed the ROK navy corvette Cheonan, kill- unpredictable variable to the lingering tensions on ing forty-six South Korean sailors.2 In November, and surrounding the peninsula (Kim Jin-Ha 2010). the DPRK launched an artillery attack on civilian- Taken together, the developments on the Korean populated Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Peninsula since the first half of 2010 have had a Korean marines and two civilians. Both incidents significant impact on the regional security envi- were among the most violent and deadly actions by ronment, including heightened tensions across a the DPRK since the end of the Korean War. Adding series of bilateral state-to-state relations. In addi- to the already tense security environment, North tion to the increasing acrimony between North Korea disclosed in late November 2010 the exis- and South Korea, the past year has also seen U.S.- tence of a new uranium enrichment program (EUP) China, China-ROK, and China-Japan relations and a light-water reactor, signifying substantial suffer (although the latter rift between Beijing and advancements in the country’s nuclear development. Tokyo is mainly a result of a bilateral spat over the These actions occurred against the backdrop of disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands). The collapse the DPRK’s leadership succession process, from of the Six-Party Talks, after North Korea’s abrupt Kim Jong-il to his young son and heir-apparent, Kim withdrawal from them in April 2009, has also left Jong-un. At a conference of the Workers’ Party of the region without a functioning multilateral mech- Korea (WPK) in September 2010, Kim Jong-un was anism for managing the ongoing crisis through

2 Pyongyang denies responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan diplomatic means. and refutes the results of a ROK-led multinational investigation Through the summer of 2011, preliminary that found evidence of North Korean torpedo parts linked to attempts were made to restart the Six-Party Talks,3 the attack. China, which was not a member of the multinational investigation, has raised doubts about the accuracy of the inves- 3 In July 2011, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho met ROK tigation and has refused to blame North Korea for the attack. chief nuclear negotiator Wi Sung-lac on the sidelines of the

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 1 but the prolonged breakdown of the talks over the 2008 to 2011) exploring peace regime building on past few years has cast renewed doubts about the the Peninsula in ways that support and facilitate the feasibility of a new regional security architecture denuclearization objectives of the Six-Party Talks. that might emerge from the six-party process—a The project, formally titled Peace Regime Building prospect that was much discussed in the middle for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Korea, was fund- part of the decade when the talks reached a peak ed by a major three-year grant from the Carnegie of activity. At that time, the notion of a Korean Corporation of New York. Our aim was to com- Peninsula peace regime was also raised as a poten- bine research and dialogue in a mixed academic/ tial mechanism for “directly related parties” to policy (track 1.5) environment among the relevant address the many unresolved political, diplomatic, parties to explore the linkages mentioned above, and national security issues in Korea that contrib- and to develop a broader consensus regarding the ute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. After all, potential synergies between armistice management, North and South Korea are still technically at war peace regime building and denuclearization.The with one another, and the armistice agreement that series of workshops conducted by IFPA and its part- has governed the cease-fire for over fifty-five years ners have yielded some of the most comprehensive was never intended as a long-term resolution of the and far-reaching work that has yet been done on the Korean War. subject of a Korean Peninsula peace regime. Over Yet despite the obvious importance of a poten- the course of this undertaking, we have mapped tial Korean Peninsula peace regime the idea has out the many definitional and conceptual aspects of never been fully fleshed out and at least as many such a regime, providing a much clearer picture of a interpretations of its meaning remain as there are peace regime for the consideration of policy makers “directly related parties.” A peace regime has alter- from all relevant nations. Areas of convergence and nately been described as “a mechanism to create divergence have also been illuminated by workshop peace;” “a framework for ameliorating the mutu- discussions, leading to further understanding of the al distrust and the hostile relationships… [and] a complex geostrategic dynamics affecting peninsular foundation for peaceful coexistence and mutual and regional security. prosperity between the two Koreas”; “an institu- Yet, paradoxically, as our research has produced tional device for legal termination and prevention a clearer picture of what a Korean Peninsula peace of wars and maintenance of peace”; and “a process regime might look like, events on the peninsula of building peace, not the ultimate state of peace” over the past year have made the prospect of a peace (O 2007; Lee Sanghee 2007; Lee In Ho 2008; Cho regime appear all the more distant and out of reach. 2007). Each of the parties sees the peace regime in Instead of progress toward peace talks on the pen- light of its own strategic interests, often with com- insula, the region has seen a troubling escalation of peting goals, objectives, and purposes vis-à-vis the tension and a heightened level of brinkmanship on other regional players. the part of the North. Rather than moving toward a In order to shed further light on the conceptual revitalized six-party process, the parties have splin- parameters of a Korean Peninsula peace regime, the tered in the wake of the North Korean regime’s Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), work- provocative actions. And, as these trends continue, ing with partners in South Korea, the United States, positions have polarized among the key strategic and China, embarked on a multi-year project (from actors shaping the regional security environment. Indeed, perhaps the most dangerous aspect of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting this unwelcome development is the divergent reac- in Bali the possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks. A follow-up meeting between DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kim tions by the United States and South Korea on the Kye Gwan and U.S. counterparts in New York later that month one hand, and China on the other. The ROK and did not produce a breakthrough on restarting the talks.

2 Denuclearizing North Korea In many ways, China because of Beijing’s wariness regarding the long- term implications of pressing harder for substantial over the past few years change on the peninsula. As the stakes get higher, the main players are moving in opposite directions, has become part of the even if recent rhetoric from Beijing highlights the concerns it shares with the allies over North Korea. problem rather than Given the growing role of the US-ROK-China dynamic in managing the North Korean crisis, IFPA part of the solution to the dedicated more focused attention to the trilateral relationship in the last phase of our peace regime many security concerns project. Recognizing that the three countries have not engaged in a comprehensive dialogue that focuses on on and surrounding the managing near-term nuclear and deterrence challenges and developing a shared vision for the future of the Korean Peninsula. Korean Peninsula, the project came to address this deficiency in the context of broader implications for peace-regime building. A track 1.5 project workshop United States have maintained diplomatic pressure held in Seoul in January 2011 primarily included high- on Pyongyang in response to its recent provocations. level representatives from all three nations, yielding Beijing, however, has shifted from sanctioning important trilateral dialogue on common approaches North Korea for its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 to confidence building, denuclearization, and region- to accommodating and even enabling the regime’s al security mechanisms leading to a potential peace development and proliferation of nuclear tech- regime on the Korean Peninsula. nology. China has also refrained from openly The following report is a summary of key find- criticizing Pyongyang for its role in the Cheonan and ings and points of discussion over the course of our Yeonpyeong incidents, further straining Beijing’s workshop meetings, beginning with a review of our ties with Seoul and Washington. In many ways, most recent workshop, held in Seoul in January China over the past few years has become part of 2011, and its focus on the trilateral U.S.-ROK-China the problem rather than part of the solution to the dynamic. The report then turns to the conceptual many security concerns on and surrounding the dimensions of a Korean Peninsula peace regime and Korean Peninsula. how such a regime might facilitate the denuclear- It is evident that the primary cause of the diver- ization of North Korea and the creation of a new gence in the US-ROK-China triangular dynamic is a regional security architecture.5 widening gap in priorities among the three powers Some may question the relevance of studying a in relation to the North Korean problem. While the peace regime at a time when tensions in the regional United States and the ROK emphasize the impor- security environment remain relatively high despite tance of denuclearizing the peninsula, China has a recent push to restart the six-party process. Yet, increasingly come to emphasize maintaining sta- as out of reach as such a regime may appear at the bility within the North Korean regime in order to, moment, recent events on the peninsula should not among other objectives, preserve a buffer from per- distract from long-term thinking about how to get ceived allied encroachment along its border.4 In to an eventual peace process and a denuclearized particular, China is underestimating near-term risks 5 James L. Schoff, Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at from proliferation and conflict escalation, in part IFPA, contributed substantially to this report before 4 For a thorough analysis of China’s priorities vis-à-vis his secondment to the Office of the Secretary of the DPRK, see International Crisis Group (2006). Defense as Special Advisor for East Asia Policy.

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 3 North Korea. Further, if the past pattern of behav- cal challenges long before hitting the first nail with ior is any indication of the future, tensions on the a hammer in the spring. Like any negotiation filled Korean Peninsula have a tendency to diffuse just as with complexity and historical significance, solv- suddenly as they flare up—sometimes leading to ing the security dilemmas surrounding the Korean unexpected opportunities for engagement and dia- Peninsula requires time, patience, and a clear view logue on the diplomatic front. After a year or more of the promises and perils that lie in the road ahead. of heightened anxiety in the region, a swing back in This report is intended to be a contribution to the the direction of peace building is in due order, bar- latter endeavor. ring any further escalation of tension—perhaps one reason why there is renewed interest in restarting the Six-Party Talks. Even in the darkest of times, Peace, Denuclearization, and the it behooves policy makers and intellectual leaders Growing North Korea Problem to stay ahead of the curve so as not to lose sight of The pendulum swing between peace building and long-term goal of a stable, peaceful, and denuclear- potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula has ized Korean Peninsula. occurred many times since the armistice agreement Indeed, however intractable problems on the was signed in 1953. An initial round of talks aimed Korean Peninsula appear to be, they are not stat- at “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question” ic. The prospects for lasting peace in Korea will rise broke down in 1954. In 1972, allusions to a final and fall, and policy makers must be ready to take at Korean political settlement resurfaced with the least one step forward each time they rise. Just as release of the North-South Joint Communiqué, but in building a house, even in winter one can begin North Korea circumvented the ROK just two years to design, seek approvals, and prepare for logisti- later by appealing directly to the Americans for

North Korea’s Major Naval Bases and Artillery Deployments in the Yellow Sea

Yellow Sea NORTH (West Sea) KOREA

Northern Limit Line (NLL)

SOUTH Yeonpyeong Island KOREA

North Korean artillery barrage 76mm, 130mm artillery Nov. 23, 2010

Silkworm, Samlet missiles

4 Denuclearizing North Korea peace talks. Hope for moving past the armistice was U.S. government now estimates that at its current renewed in 1991, when top officials from Seoul and pace of nuclear and ballistic missile development, Pyongyang signed the South-North Joint Agreement North Korea could become a direct threat to the on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation United States within five years, with the implication and Exchange (the so-called Basic Agreement), but that Washington must take more concerted steps to largely as a consequence of North Korea’s ambiva- address this threat (Dombey 2011). Comments by lence regarding implementation, that agreement has Chinese participants at the IFPA trilateral workshop remained an unfulfilled promise. in January 2011, however, indicate a more fatalistic Throughout the late 1990s and the 2000s, other and to some extent cavalier view from Beijing, with attempts have been made to officially end the one attendee from China actually suggesting that “a Korean War and to introduce various confidence- weapon leaves an arsenal only when it is replaced building measures, but the few gains achieved have by another weapon…such as the aircraft carrier eroded significantly in recent years to leave just the replacing the battleship.” For North Korea now, this joint industrial zone at Gaesong and a handful of participant went on to argue, the only acceptable cultural exchanges. Most recently, North Korea’s “replacement” for their nuclear weapons is probably shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 U.S.-North Korea normalization, which is why he pushed inter-Korean relations as close to war as believed that dialogue and attempts at reconcilia- they have been in at least seventeen years. Since tion with North Korea would be more productive the shelling, both sides have taken steps to avoid than girding for a fight. Other Chinese attendees further armed conflict but they continue to trade offered variants of this advice. harsh rhetoric back and forth across the DMZ and The second worrisome trend is that the process a general sense of anxiety persists in the region. of leadership transition in North Korea may lead to The current situation, moreover, is potentially more more aggressive or at least even more unpredictable dangerous than past periods of tension and hostili- behavior on the part of the North Korean leader- ty for three main reasons. ship and especially the military, as evidenced by First, North Korea continues to develop and the attacks on the ROK navy corvette Cheonan and improve its nuclear weapons and missile capabili- Yeonpyeong Island, revelations about the North’s ties, and when combined with its stockpiles of other covert UEP facility, and recent reports of an increase WMD and North Korea’s deteriorating convention- in public executions and stricter border controls in al military assets, the potential for WMD use and the DPRK (Chosun Ilbo 2010). North Korean dem- horrendous casualties in a conflict on the Korean onstrations of strength and control might seek to Peninsula is unacceptably high. North Korea’s pro- contradict incipient internal or external doubts grams are expanding, and much remains to be regarding the new regime’s ability to govern and uncovered. For example, a recently leaked report protect the country, but in the short term this of the so-called UN Panel of Experts monitoring approach is also undermining the regime’s abili- compliance with UN sanctions against North Korea ty to reform the economy and make use of outside highlighted not only the regime’s advancements in investment. This, in turn, is a problem at two levels: nuclear and missile development, but also its abili- first, the North’s provocative behavior could spark ty to circumvent international efforts to control its an escalation of conflict that neither side can readily proliferation of WMD-related technology.6 predict or control, and second, the DPRK’s deteri- There is also an increased risk of a wider con- orating economy could lead to a genuine political flict involving the mainland United States, as the and humanitarian crisis in the North, or it could be

6 The Panel of Experts’ report has not been official- weakened enough to tempt conservative ROK policy ly released yet, reportedly thanks to China’s efforts to makers into thinking that they can push the North block its publication. See Charbonneau (2011a).

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 5 over the edge through their own form of brinkman- Public Opinion Comparison between ship. Either way, both China and the United States Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents would have much at stake in the outcome. Indeed, whether it is an economic breakdown of This chart shows the percentage of people who the North’s own making or one prompted by out- responded positively regarding the administration’s change of attitude towards side pressure, the tenuous nature of North Korea’s military retaliation after the two incidents economic and political viability over the mid- to long term is a source of potential conflict between report to 75 the allies and China, as each seeks to manage the UN Security situation and promote its own interests. The North Council 79.9 Korean reality today is that the ruling regime’s pre- dictions just a short time ago that it would establish economic 58.5 a “great, prosperous and powerful country” by 2012 sanctions have already given way to a ten-year plan “to rank 58 among the advanced countries by 2020” (Kyodo News 2011). North Korea is struggling to feed its suspend 45.2 North-South relations 42.5

…whether it is an economic limited 28.2 military breakdown of the North’s retaliation 68.6

own making or one poll taken 4/24/2010 poll taken 11/27/2010

prompted by outside Data source: East Asia Institute pressure, the tenuous people and boost productivity, and a significant failure on this front could seriously undermine the new nature of North Korea’s regime. The World Food Program (WFP) indicated that North Korea is heading for a new, “chron- economic and political ic” food crisis in 2011, with a need to import over 860,000 tons of cereals to help serve an estimat- viability over the mid- to ed five million people facing food shortages (World Food Program 2010). North Korea has requested long term is a source of food aid from all three countries,7 and it is seeking additional economic investment as well. potential conflict between Faced with these trends, could China, the United States, and the ROK ever agree on common strate- the allies and China, as gies to provide humanitarian or economic assistance to North Korea? Should a crisis erupt, can they avoid each seeks to manage the challenging each other as they seek to influence 7 The Obama administration sent a fact-finding mission to North situation and promote Korea in May 2011 to assess the regime’s food situation. At this writing, the administration is weighing whether or not to pro- its own interests. vide food aid over objections from the Lee government in Seoul.

6 Denuclearizing North Korea Percentage of South Koreans National Security Concerns Since 2000

100 Yeongpyeong island incident 11/2010 80 DPRK’s ﬁrst nuclear test DPRK’s second 12/2006 nuclear test DPRK withdraws from NPT 06/2009 60 08/2003 04/2010 Cheonan incident George W. Bush innauguration 40 06/2001 07/2004 08/2002 2nd and 3rd rounds 12/2007 IAEA inspectors expelled of Six-Party Talks 03/2009 2nd inter-Korean 20 prior to DPRK missile test 09/2000 summit 1st inter-Korean Summit 0

Data source: East Asia Institute events? Are there steps they could take togeth- lic concerns about security in general are at their er before any potential crisis to reduce the impact highest level in fifteen years (with a quadruple and speed recovery? Could progress on one policy increase in South Koreans being “very concerned” front open the door to wider trilateral collabora- or “slightly concerned” about security, up from 19 tion on Korean security on other fronts, including percent in 1999) (Lee and Jeong 2010). South Korea cooperative threat reduction in the nuclear arena? is now looking to divert defense funds to strength- More importantly, might the three countries learn en a new West Sea command, and the stakes over in this way to coordinate their various sticks and the controversial Northern Limit Line (NLL) have carrots to achieve a common purpose with regard to risen (Chosun Ilbo 2011b). Where just a few years Pyongyang? Whatever the answers, further North ago, under President Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul dem- Korean aggression and North Korean collapse are onstrated flexibility regarding the NLL’s status as two quite plausible scenarios during the political a de facto maritime border, the ROK government transition now unfolding in the North, which is now appears willing to risk war over nearly any why there is now an added degree of uncertainty on encroachment of this demarcation. the peninsula and increased anxiety with regard to The predominant South Korean perspective in its future trajectory. the wake of recent events is, quite understandably, The third reason that the security situation on that restraint has only encouraged the North to con- the peninsula is more volatile is that ROK public tinue its provocations, and that a firm response to attitudes toward the North are changing, and there the next attack will be necessary to enhance deter- is increased political pressure on the ROK govern- rence for the longer term. President Lee Myung-bak ment to be tough in its response to North Korean has called this a “proactive deterrence” approach8, aggression or even its “charm offensive” tactics. and the ROK military is backing it up with invest- After the Yeonpyeong Island shelling in late 2010, 8 In response to the Cheonan incident, ROK President Lee nearly 70 percent of South Koreans supported lim- Myung-bak announced on May 24, 2010, “From now on, the Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the ited military action in response, compared to less North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence. than 30 percent after the Cheonan sinking, and pub- If our territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense” (2010).

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 7 ROK Public Opinion on Aid and South Korean Public Opinion on Long-Term Policies with DPRK Military Responses and Government Response to Yeonpyeong Island Aid to DPRK minimize/abolish maintain/increase positive assessment of government response

agree with 24.3 30.9 disagree with strong military strong military response 64.3 58.3 response

negative assessment of government response

Data source: East Asia Institute

Seoul to respond to and deter future North Korean military action, so the allies will be tempted to (and must) prepare for further retaliations. Unfortunately, such preparations could also lead North Korea to

01/2010 05/2010 11/2010 believe that a larger-scale attack was being planned, Cheonan Yeonpyeong perhaps leading to a miscalculation on Pyongyang’s incident incident part. In this regard, China and the United States

Long-Term Policies reconciliation/cooperation share the risk that they can potentially be drawn into a conflict of someone else’s making. with DPRK hardline policy Indeed, even if a broader conflict is avoided, recent developments on the peninsula have also made China increasingly nervous about its security interests in the region. Chinese participants at the January 2011 workshop acknowledged the severity of North Korea’s provocations and said that these acts, along with the regime’s nuclear development, pose a serious dilemma for Chinese security interests as well. As one Chinese participant pointed out, “We are all in the same boat” regarding North Korea’s potential to destabilize the region. 05/2010 11/2010 The DPRK’s provocations, it was admitted, serve Cheonan incident Yeonpyeong incident to undermine Chinese security interests by, among

Data source: East Asia Institute other things, driving Japan, the United States, and South Korea closer together, increasing interest in ments in Joint Direct Attack Munition missiles all three countries in missile defenses that may (JDAMs) and more concerted efforts to relax range degrade China’s ballistic missile capabilities, and and payload limits on its ground-based missile raising the overall prospect of the very instability force.9 No one really knows whether Pyongyang within the region that China hopes to prevent.10 will perceive these measures as credible steps by 10 As Zhu Feng writes, “China worries that North Korean actions will lead to deeper defense and security coopera- 9 South Korea is looking to develop missiles with ranges up to one tion among South Korea, Japan and the US. Perceptions that thousand kilometers, more than three times the range allowed China “protects” North Korea could lead to the emergence of under a current U.S.-ROK bilateral pact. The two countries are in the a powerful Washington-Tokyo-Seoul axis directed, not only process of discussing options at this time. See JoongAng Daily (2011). against North Korea, but also implicitly at China” (2010).

8 Denuclearizing North Korea DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

he events of 2010 have, indeed, raised new take in response to another attack, without taking Tquestions about the nature of deterrence on a more coordinated, alliance-oriented approach to the Korean Peninsula, and what the appropri- the next provocation. The potential for an escala- ate allied response should be toward the North. tion of hostilities is all the higher in the context Workshop participants from South Korea and the of the DPRK’s succession process, which makes United States argued that a robust allied response Pyongyang less willing to back down in a contest of to North Korea’s recent provocations was called for wills with Seoul. The North, meanwhile, is likely to and was necessary to deter further aggressive acts continue attacks as part of its own deterrence strat- by the regime. South Korean experts argued that President Lee’s “proactive deterrence” policy is nec- ROK Public Opinion on the Future essary to ensure that further provocations from the of the R.O.K-U.S. Alliance North will not be tolerated indefinitely. They added independent foreign policy that the policy is meant to send three messages to the North: 1) that South Korea will retaliate pro- maintain current levels portionately to another attack; 2) that although the reinforcement of alliance South does not want war it will not avoid one if it is inevitable; and 3) that South Korea will continue to strengthen the alliance with the United States beyond the 2015 deadline for transferring wartime operational control from the U.S. to ROK command. Still, not all participants at the IFPA workshop agreed with Seoul’s new “proactive deterrence” policy. An American participant argued that the new policy is dangerous for several reasons. Among them, he said, is that President Lee may be held politically hostage to future provocations from the

North by being forced to retaliate or else risk losing 1/2010 7/2010 11/2010 his credibility. This situation also binds U.S. poli- Data source: East Asia Institute cy makers to any actions that President Lee would

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 9 egy, which is to demonstrate that it is not afraid of ty assurance (NSA) as outlined in the new NPR. conflict with outside powers. Under this clause, the United States pledges not to Chinese participants said that Beijing’s behind- use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non- the-scenes diplomatic efforts have successfully kept nuclear weapons states that have joined the Nuclear North Korea from making any further provocations Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are in compli- since the Yeonpyeong incident—somewhat contra- ance with those treaty obligations. South Korean dicting their claims throughout the day that China analysts worry that this could create a loophole for has less leverage over North Korea than is common- the DPRK to attack the ROK with chemical, biologi- ly assumed. An American participant conceded that cal, or conventional weapons without fear of nuclear the reduction of tensions on the peninsula through retaliation from the United States, even though the the winter of 2010–11 may have been a result of NPR lists North Korea and Iran as current excep- behind-the-scenes measures by China or U.S.-ROK tions to the NSA policy (Cheon 2010). demonstrations of deterrence but wondered wheth- Concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extend- er the current state of relative calm is sustainable ed nuclear deterrent have triggered calls in some over time. South Korean circles for the United States to rein- Nonetheless, the debate over deterrence on the troduce tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea peninsula has intensified in South Korea of late, or for the ROK to develop its own nuclear weap- spurred not just by the DPRK’s provocations and the ons capability (Cheon 2010). The United States debate over the appropriate means of responding to has reportedly not deployed nuclear weapons on them but also by anxieties over the Obama admin- the peninsula since 1991, when former President istration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR outlines five key objectives for U.S. nuclear weapons policy and posture: 1) preventing nucle- Concerns about the ar proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national reliability of the U.S. security strategy; 3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; extended nuclear deterrent 4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 5) sustaining a safe, have triggered calls in secure, and effective nuclear arsenal (U.S. Dept. of Defense 2010). Some South Korean scholars and some South Korean circles policy makers, however, worry that the proposed changes in the U.S. nuclear posture may negatively for the United States affect South Korean security interests and undermine deterrence toward the North. to reintroduce tactical In particular, South Korean critics point to two elements of the 2010 NPR that are of potential con- nuclear weapons into cern.11 First is the question of whether the planned reduction of the overall U.S. nuclear arsenal might, South Korea or for the ROK in effect, reduce the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent over South Korea. A second to develop its own nuclear concern relates to the so-called negative securi-

11 See, for instance, Cheon (2010). weapons capability

10 Denuclearizing North Korea George H.W. Bush ordered the withdrawal of over- As the United States and seas tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Some South Korean experts advocate the reintroduction its allies seek to bolster of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons as a way to extract North Korean concessions on denuclearization and deterrence on the Korean to deter further acts of aggression from the North. The reintroduction of tactical U.S. nuclear weap- Peninsula they should ons, these experts argue, could also put pressure on China to rein in the North’s belligerent behav- also engage China in ior and induce the regime to return to negotiations over denuclearization. order to reduce risks and However, many U.S. experts argue that reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons on the pen- explore opportunities to insula would not produce the positive outcomes that South Korean advocates predict. To the con- enhance regional strategic trary, U.S. experts warn that reintroducing nuclear weapons would likely feed into DPRK propaganda dialogue and cooperation claims that the United States is adopting a “hostile” policy toward the regime—perhaps then leading Pyongyang to accelerate its nuclear weapons The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, development (Cossa 2011). Further, the pursuit of including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this indigenous South Korean nuclear capabilities would assurance (U.S. White House 2009).” The U.S.-ROK constitute a major departure from the ROK’s non- Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) nuclear posture, with significant repercussions for was subsequently formed in December 2010 in South Korea’s international prestige and for region- order to coordinate bilateral deterrence policies vis- al security in general (Cossa 2011). à-vis the DPRK (Yonhap News Agency 2011a). In light of the ongoing debate over extended Last year’s provocations by North Korea, how- deterrence, the need for the United States to reas- ever, highlight the complex challenges facing allied sure South Korea (and other regional allies such as deterrence strategies in Asia, including the dilemma Japan) about its continued strategic commitments of how to deter conventional attacks from the North. remains a top priority. Indeed, one of the central Pyongyang’s brazen acts of aggression in 2010 were tenets of the 2010 NPR is to strengthen region- apparently based on a calculation that allied retalia- al deterrence while reassuring allies and partners tion would not eventually lead to the use of nuclear as the U.S. nuclear posture evolves. The Obama weapons. Indeed, in the case of limited convention- administration consulted closely with Seoul and al conflicts, the use of nuclear weapons is out of the Tokyo during the nuclear review process and both question, given the moral hazards that that would allies were, of course, included in the follow-up create. Thus, the U.S. nuclear deterrent did not pre- Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 2010. President vent the two conventional attacks by the DPRK, Obama reinforced the U.S. commitment to extend- and may fail to do so again in the future. At the ed deterrence in a joint statement with President same time, however, the potential use of nuclear Lee Myun-bak in 2009, stating, “We will maintain weapons may have kept all sides from allowing a a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabili- conflict to escalate into all-out war. This has cre- ties which support both nations’ security interests. ated a so-called stability-instability paradox on the

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 11 The divergent policies could enhance trust in the region and potentially lead to unexpected avenues for joint defense cooper- taken by China on ation vis-à-vis North Korea.12 China’s participation could also be incorporated into a broader deter- the one hand, and the rence strategy, as Ken Jimbo writes: “China also has the capacity to augment deterrence. North Korean United States and South fear of abandonment from China continues to grow as indicated by the frequent visits by Kim Jong-il Korea on the other, may and other high-ranking officials to China. Given the stability-instability paradox, the role played by continue to magnify China in terms of deterring low-intensity aggression and supporting escalation control seems current dangers if not pivotal. China’s unusually active, intense and public degree of engagement after the Yeonpyeong incident more squarely addressed showed how alarmed Beijing was by crisis escalation” (Jimbo 2011).

Korean Peninsula whereby mutual deterrence pre- vents an escalation of conflict but does not prevent Trilateral Consensus Building the outbreak of low-intensity hostilities such as the In some ways, the North Korea problem under- Yeonpyeong Island incident (Jimbo 2011). scores the common security concerns among the For the time being, there is little recourse in the regional players, at times serving as an impe- face of the North’s aggressions other than to seek tus for enhanced security cooperation among the stronger United Nations Security Council (UNSC) United States, South Korea, and China.13 Yet, while resolutions condemning North Korean behavior and the three countries may all be “in the same boat” bolstering allied defense coordination, primarily by regarding North Korea, they may be “rowing in dif- conducting joint U.S.-ROK military exercises and ferent directions,” as an American participant at enhancing U.S.-ROK-Japan defense cooperation. the workshop pointed out. The divergent policies The United States, in particular, must demonstrate taken by China on the one hand, and the United to friends and foes alike that improvements in con- States and South Korea on the other, may contin- ventional capabilities can offset a reduced role for ue to magnify current dangers if not more squarely nuclear weapons while maintaining credible deter- addressed. The allies remain concerned that China’s rence levels, as outlined in the 2010 NPR (Bunn and stance allows the first problem of North Korea’s Manzo 2011). nuclear and missile programs to persist, provides As the United States and its allies seek to bolster political space for the more destabilizing aspects of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula they should also engage China in order to reduce risks and 12 For instance, one Chinese scholar, Shen Dengli, has outlined how China could potentially join allied military exercises: “To pre- explore opportunities to enhance regional strategic vent China from viewing U.S.-ROK naval drills as provocative, dialogue and cooperation. A nuclear dialogue with the U.S. and South Korea could invite China to join. Forging a China, for instance, could address common con- China-U.S.-ROK trilateral naval exercise would carry great political symbolism and expand the international coalition to deter the cerns about North Korean WMD development and aggression that has led to recent regional instability” (2011, 2). proliferation as well as mutual concerns about each 13 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun write: “The evolution of regional approaches to North Korea ironically reveals North other’s long-term nuclear strategies (Bush 2011). Korea as the primary source of insecurity and as a cata- A strategic dialogue with Beijing along these lines lyst for enhanced security cooperation among Northeast Asian players over the past two decades” (2011, 62).

12 Denuclearizing North Korea political transition in the North, and exacerbates in ticipant, Beijing’s attempts to transcend the Cold the process the third problem of a more confronta- War security paradigm have been repeatedly set tional political atmosphere in the South. back by allied responses to events on the Korean For its part, China believes that the allies’ more Peninsula, which have stressed joint military coop- aggressive stance in the wake of Yeonpyeong has eration and strategic solidarity. Moves to strengthen actually made each of these problems harder to U.S.-ROK-Japan defense ties following the Cheonan resolve. “North Korea wants to change its exter- and Yeonpyeong incidents only deepen the sense of nal relationships to support transition,” said one insecurity in North Korea and raise Chinese con- Chinese participant in IFPA’s January 2011 trilateral, cerns about strategic encroachment by the allies “but we need to facilitate this in a peaceful manner. (Zhu 2010, 1). This also feeds into the perception in If we get too confrontational, it will be more diffi- Beijing that the United States and its allies are cre- cult.” Moreover, China continues to decry what it ating a regional security structure that is balancing sees as the “strengthening of the Cold War struc- against China rather than seeking ways to incor- ture in East Asia,” stimulated by various US-ROK porate China’s legitimate security interests into a and US-ROK-Japan initiatives to coordinate and broader regional architecture. bolster their deterrent capabilities. It is important to keep in mind, moreover, that Indeed, Chinese participants criticized the U.S.- China is not simply providing North Korea with led alliance system in Asia as “moving backward” in political and diplomatic cover, it is investing heavily the direction of a Cold War security structure that in North Korea’s future in the hopes of promot- Beijing and Pyongyang perceive as threatening and ing economic development and enough political counterproductive. According to one Chinese par- confidence in the North to allow Pyongyang, so China’s Merchandise Trade with the DPR

($ in millions) 3000

2500

2000

China’s Exports 1500 China’s Imports

1000

500

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Data source: Congressional Research Service

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 13 the Chinese argue, to take steps to smooth tense that China should be included in IAEA or six-par- relations with its neighbors and the United States. ty survey teams when inspections of North Korea’s Some of these measures are directed from Beijing, nuclear programs occur (if they ever do). In addi- but many are being carried out at the provincial and tion, China has consistently blocked the submission private levels. As a result, North Korea’s trade with of reports by the UN Command (UNC) in South China has increased more than 500 percent since Korea since 2010, including both special investi- 2000, and China now accounts for over 70 percent gation and annual reports.14 From the Chinese of North Korea’s overall trade (Nishimura 2011). perspective, the UNC is an outdated vestige of the And this does not even account for the black market Korean War and cannot escape its legacy as a “war- economy that has grown as UNSC sanctions force ring party.” These are all examples, it is said, of the North Korean vendors to lean on more sophisticated United States, South Korea, and the “old” UN sys- Chinese trading companies to complete illicit trans- tem trying to investigate and adjudicate activities on actions. As one U.S. workshop participant noted, the Korean Peninsula without significant Chinese not only are China’s and the allies’ strategies at involvement, but with U.S. and ROK expectations odds, but it is becoming more difficult, given the that China will sign onto their policy choices and complex intertwining of Chinese and North Korean North Korean punishments. patterns of trade and investment, to “surgically cut out” criminal DPRK elements without “touching Chinese nerves.” As a result, while the United States becomes increasingly aggressive in its pursuit of DPRK proliferation networks, pressures on the U.S.-China relationship are almost certain to intensify, as Chinese trafficking channels are more regularly and precisely targeted. In some ways, then, rather than creating opportunities to push Pyongyang toward reform and accommodation, China’s effort to gain greater leverage over North Korea via greater trade and investment may end up simply widening the gap between Washington and Beijing, as the United States seeks to clamp down on illicit trafficking to and from North Korea and China feels compelled to protect its increased investment in the North. Discord at the United Nations on North Korea issues is yet another manifestation of the problem, as unanimous votes sanctioning North Korea for nuclear weapons development have given way to blocked votes and weak statements about Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior and nuclear program advances. At the IFPA trilateral dialogue in Seoul, Chinese participants complained that China was excluded by South Korea from participating 14 And, as mentioned earlier, Beijing has apparently tried to block the release of the 2011 UN Panel of Experts in the Cheonan investigation, and they have argued report that implicitly blames China for aiding North Korean efforts to sidestep international sanctions.

14 Denuclearizing North Korea IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AND OTHER REGIONAL SECURITY MECHANISMS

ivergent priorities have also changed how the Experts at the January 2011 workshop took dif- Dthree countries now perceive the main goals ferent positions on the usefulness of the Six-Party of the Six-Party Talks, which have not resumed Talks at this stage of the crisis. Chinese partici- since North Korea withdrew from the talks in April pants argued that the Six-Party Talks could still be 2009. As Beijing has shifted away from an empha- effective but they urged the U.S. to be more flex- sis on denuclearization, it has repeatedly called on ible and to consider normalizing ties with North a resumption of the six-party process in order to Korea in exchange for denuclearization (members manage tensions arising from the North’s recent of the Chinese delegation, in contrast to their more provocations. China therefore appears to see pessimistic American counterparts, stressed the the talks as a crisis management mechanism as possibility that the right package of inducements opposed to a mechanism that focuses first and fore- could persuade the North to give up its nuclear pro- most on denuclearization issues. On the other hand, gram). Another suggestion offered by a Chinese Washington and Seoul continue to see the talks participant was to broaden the scope of the Six- as a means for negotiating the denuclearization of Party Talks, essentially focusing on softer issues North Korea and have balked at Beijing’s calls to such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and resume the talks in the aftermath of the Cheonan other matters before tackling harder issues such as and Yeonpyeong incidents. The breakdown of the denuclearization. six-party process over the past several years has cast South Korean participants reiterated their gov- doubt on whether the talks can be a viable regional ernment’s position that some form of apology from security mechanism.15 the North over the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, however pro forma, should be a precon- 15 This also has implications for broader regional security cooperation. As Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun write: “The failure to make practical progress in implementing the goal of denuclearization of tion, and integration of the six party mechanism within the broader the Korean peninsula has impeded the advancement, coordina- process of regional community building in East Asia” (2011, 61).

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 15 dition for resuming the Six-Party Talks.16 One the voluntary nature of the PSI and the fact that Korean expert said that the Six-Party Talks must Beijing could determine on its own what it would be resumed in order to find a solution to the North be prepared to contribute to the initiative. However, Korean nuclear problem. He suggested two differ- Chinese participants, mirroring their government’s ent approaches to compel North Korea and China position, did not appear receptive to the idea of to change their positions: 1) a hard-line approach joining the PSI. Instead, one Chinese expert sug- that would use enhanced allied security coopera- gested that the United States and South Korea could tion and deterrence capabilities to impel China to invite China as an observer in joint naval exercises more seriously consider denuclearization as a pol- in less strategically sensitive areas (the Yellow—or icy priority; and 2) a soft-line approach that would West– Sea, for example) as a mutual trust-building provide the North with assurances about its leader- measure. This would, according to the expert, give ship succession process in exchange for concessions China the opportunity to prove to the international on nuclear weapons. This latter approach, in other community that it is a “responsible stakeholder” in words, would use the succession process as a bar- the region. gaining chip, although the expert conceded that he was not sure about how that might be implemented as an actual policy. Divergent priorities have In lieu of the Six-Party Talks, one American expert proposed the creation of a five-party also changed how the three Northeast Asia security dialogue that would promote cooperation on disaster relief, humanitarian countries now perceive assistance, cross-border health issues, and other common challenges confronting the region. The the main goals of the Six- advantage of this approach, the expert argued, is that the dialogue would not be held hostage to Party Talks, which have North Korean participation (or lack thereof) and could be used initially to tackle less contentious not resumed since North issues before, over time, taking on larger strategic issues such as denuclearization, missile reduction, Korea withdrew from and contingency planning on the Korean Peninsula. Workshop participants considered other options the talks in April 2009 for enhancing regional cooperation through confidence-building measures and other risk-reduction Although the notion of creating a peace regime measures. One suggestion was for the United States on the Korean Peninsula seemed remote in the and China to collaborate on controlling North immediate wake of the DPRK’s provocations Korean proliferation networks, including prolifera- in 2010, participants at the IFPA workshop tion networks that the North has developed within recognized some merit in discussing how such China. Another idea, suggested by U.S. participants, a regime should be approached in the future. was to include China in the Proliferation Security One U.S. participant, in particular, argued that Initiative (PSI). This would bring China into the a peace regime should not necessarily be linked fold of international counter-proliferation efforts to a peace treaty with North Korea. According to toward North Korea. The participant stressed this participant, a peace treaty is a “non-starter”

16 South Korea has called for an apology as a precondition for absent a major breakthrough with Pyongyang on inter-Korean talks, although media reports in late June 2011 sug- denuclearization issues. He added, however, that gested that Seoul may drop this demand (Chosun Ilbo 2011a).

16 Denuclearizing North Korea the absence of a breakthrough on denuclearization should not hamper efforts to conceptualize what a peace regime might look like in the future and how a broad range of CBMs and tension-reduction measures in the midterm might lead to a potential peace regime over the long term.

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 17 HARMONIZING TRILATERAL APPROACHES TO NORTH KOREA

he ongoing North Korean problem presents Recent events on the Korean Peninsula could Tunique challenges, not just for the prospects have had the potential to drive Seoul, Beijing, and of future regional security architectures but, per- Washington closer together, but it is clear that large haps more fundamentally, for trilateral cooperation gaps still remain on this front. In many cases, these among the United States, China, and South Korea.17 gaps stem from a lack of Chinese confidence in the Getting all three countries to “row in the same region’s ability to manage instability in North Korea direction” again will depend on harmonizing their and from China’s anxiety over the ultimate shape of priorities over the near to long term. One U.S. participant pointed out that there may be more of a convergence of priorities than meets the eye, as The ongoing North denuclearization and stability are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact, inextricably linked. As Korean problem presents U.S. and ROK participants contended, “We can’t have peace and stability without denucleariza- unique challenges, not tion.” Indeed, based on the workshop discussions, it would appear that trilateral collaboration has just for the prospects of the best chance of success if it is focused first on harmonizing U.S., Chinese, and ROK priorities future regional security and strategies on the three broad issue areas: 1) near-term stability and crisis management; 2) denu- architectures but, perhaps clearization and nuclear security; and 3) the shape of long-term peace on the peninsula. more fundamentally, for

17 Bonnie S. Glaser and Scott Snyder write, “Absent coordination of an effective response to spillover effects from possible insta- trilateral cooperation bility in North Korea, the actors most directly involved, namely China, South Korea . . . and the United States, are unlikely to build among the United States, the mutual understanding necessary to stabilize the region and lay the basis for cooperative security over the long term” (2010). China, and South Korea

18 Denuclearizing North Korea a long-term peace regime. In this sense, while the strategic interests and would give Beijing a key U.S. participant mentioned above chose to focus on role in deciding the direction of this new securi- the nexus of the first two issues (stability and denu- ty arrangement. clearization), China tends to see the challenge more If the allies can begin to reassure China in this broadly, with the ultimate peace structure and sup- way, it might be possible to enlist more effective porting security system of paramount importance. Chinese cooperation on counter-proliferation prior- Therefore, if serious progress is to be made toward ities and the containment (and eventual rollback) of harmonization, trilateral cooperation must deal North Korea’s nuclear programs. Viewed from this with all three issue areas simultaneously. angle, solving the North Korea nuclear problem has Looking ahead, so-called front-end dialogue more to do at present with “getting China right,” about the entry point for renewed six-party negotiations is, of course, necessary, but it may not allow for sustainable progress, because the barriers to Although virtually all coordinated action have as much to do with the three countries’ discordant visions for the future as of the relevant parties they do regarding the present. For this reason alone, trilateral dialogue over the next few years could be in the region have made far more productive if it were focused on a number of near- to midterm crisis management issues in a references to a peace way that illustrates to China how all three countries can work together to cope with instabilities regime at various points (including a cross-border disaster or humanitarian crisis), while at the same time exploring the longer- in the past, there remains term requirements of a Korean peace regime and regional security system that accounts for China’s little consensus on what a needs. This could potentially include the following points: KPPR would look like or • U.S. assurances to Beijing that potential post- unification allied force structures would not be how it could be developed aimed at containing China or checking its strategic interests. This could include promises not to given the often divergent forward-deploy U.S. bases near the border with China and a discussion of possible reductions of strategic interests of the U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula under certain security conditions. key regional players • Reassurances that Chinese economic and commercial interests would be maintained in post- than with trying to engage and/or seek negotiated unified Korea and that China would continue to terms with Pyongyang. And while strengthening the have a major stake in the future economic devel- US-ROK alliance and the US-ROK-Japan strategic opment of the peninsula. triangle is an important way to bolster deterrence • More concrete proposals for a Korean Peninsula in the short run, it will not provide a full or lasting peace regime or post-unification regional securi- solution to the long-term problems posed by North ty structure that would take into account China’s Korea. China should be part of that solution, and

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 19 there is a long way to go to develop a policy framework that all three countries can support and that will lead to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and a more stable regional security environment. Achieving that goal will likely involve the future creation of some form of peace regime or multilateral framework for managing the transition toward a more peaceful peninsula. Although virtually all of the relevant parties in the region have made references to a peace regime at various points in the past, there remains little consensus on what a KPPR would look like or how it could be developed given the often divergent strategic interests of the key regional players. North Korea’s provocative actions, not just in 2010 but throughout the past decade, have also set back progress in developing a common vision for a peace regime. Drawing on the results of IFPA’s ongoing research, the next section of this report examines the conceptual contours of a Korean Peninsula peace regime and the necessary steps that the various parties must take before it can be realized.

20 Denuclearizing North Korea KOREAN PENINSULA PEACE REGIME

he term “peace regime” officially made its Six- peace regime, no KPPR talks have occurred and no TParty Talks debut in the September 2005 joint one can identify a probable start date or even a like- statement from the fourth round of those negotia- ly agenda for those negotiations. Notwithstanding tions, as the participating nations emphasized their the recent moves to restart the Six-Party Talks, commitment to build a lasting peace in Northeast these have been stalled for the past several years, Asia by pledging to initiate a separate negotia- and with the aftershocks of the DPRK’s hostile acts tion for a “permanent peace regime on the Korean in 2010 still affecting regional dynamics, the pros- Peninsula” at an appropriate time.18 Although the pects for true peace in Korea seem dimmer than Six-Party Talks have been primarily focused on they have been in more than a decade. A brief over- denuclearizing North Korea, the mention of a sep- view of the historical origins of the KPPR, however, arate peace regime dialogue by “the directly related shows that this is not unprecedented and that, in parties” acknowledged the many unresolved politi- fact, peace-regime building has ebbed and flowed cal, diplomatic, and national security issues in Korea ever since the Korean War ended over a half-cen- that contribute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. tury ago. After all, North and South Korea are still techni- In 1943, the United States, Britain, and China cally at war with one another, and the armistice stated in the Cairo Declaration that “in due course, agreement that has governed the cease-fire for over Korea shall become free and independent,” but that fifty-five years was never intended as a long-term had not come to pass by the time North Korean sol- solution to the Korean War.19 diers crossed the 38th parallel in 1950 (Oberdorfer Despite this acknowledgement of the ultimate 2001, 5). On July 7, 1950, shortly after the war importance of establishing a Korean Peninsula began, the newly established United Nations passed Security Council resolution UNSC 84, which called 18 The six-party talks consist of delegations sent by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and for the establishment of the U.S.-led United Nations the United States. For a detailed discussion about Command (UNC) to help South Korea defend itself. the Six-Party Talks, see Schoff et al (2008). 19 Balbina Y. Hwang writes, “Despite the fact that the Korean armi- One year into the conflict, in July 1951, the stice has been remarkably successful in preventing the resumption Soviet delegation to the UN approached the UNC of full-scale military conflict between the two Koreas for near- to initiate negotiations for ending the war. Although ly 60 years, it has largely been dismissed as a potentially useful basis for developing a permanent peace arrangement and more the parties agreed in principle that the 38th paral- often than not considered an impediment to overcome” (2011, 2).

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 21 lel should serve as a guide for a demarcation line, desire to see the NLL pushed farther south, and at talks continued for two years as disagreements a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting intensified over prisoner exchanges and the final in 1973 the North declared that it would not recog- demarcation line. Finally, the UNC command- nize the NLL. er, the commander of Chinese “volunteer” forces As one IFPA workshop participant noted, “The (Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, or CPV), and armistice’s objective of a complete cessation of North Korea’s supreme commander signed the hostilities was temporary in nature, until a final Korean War Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. peaceful settlement would be achieved.” The par- Although the agreement was relatively effective at ties designed the armistice to segue from a military institutionalizing a cease-fire, the signatories never settlement to a political one, and they scheduled meant for it to serve as a political settlement. It a meeting for within three months of signing the is instead a military document signed by military armistice to plan for that transition. In what would leaders, containing mechanisms to help the parties emerge as a pattern with inter-Korean negotiations, keep the cease-fire. “In fact,” as Balbina Y. Hwang however, those talks were delayed by nearly a year asserts, “the Korean armistice is a uniquely excep- and were eventually abandoned. tional agreement in that it is a purely military Allusions to a final Korean political settlement document since technically no nation is a signatory did not resurface until 1972 with the release of to the agreement, only the representatives of armed the North-South Joint Communiqué. In that doc- forces” (2011, 5). ument, the two Koreas agreed in principle to For example, the armistice established the threat-reduction and confidence-building measures Military Demarcation Line (MDL) along the 38th and recognized their mutual desire for reunifica- parallel, a line separating North and South. The tion and a peaceful conclusion to the Korean War. armistice also created a two-kilometer buffer on It reads, “Firstly, reunification should be achieved either side of the MDL known as the demilitarized independently, without reliance upon outside force zone, or DMZ. In addition, it established com- or its interference; secondly, reunification should mittees and commissions to provide multilateral be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse oversight of the terms of the cease-fire. to the use of arms against the other side” (see The armistice contains many limitations despite Appendix B for a list of KPPR-related documents). its continued utility. First, the armistice failed to What prompted Pyongyang to seek talks with Seoul construct an effective means by which to adjudicate in 1972 on these issues? The answer is not clear armistice violations. For instance, the UNC claims (and is probably multifaceted), but one important that North Korea has violated the terms of the armi- factor might have been Washington’s new China stice 430,000 times while North Korea recognizes policy and President Nixon’s visit to Beijing earli- approximately 3. Conversely, North Korea accuses er that year. It is hard to know, however, if North the South of 830,000 violations when the number Korea sensed potential U.S. weakness (its former of violations is probably closer to 16 (Lee Sanghee enemy embracing its ally), or if it was more con- 2007). Second, North Korea rejects the West Sea cerned with possible Chinese abandonment (its demarcation line. Soon after the armistice was former ally embracing its enemy). signed, the UNC determined that the West (Yellow) Although the 1972 joint communiqué offered Sea islands of Pak Yong Do, Dae Cheong Do, So a degree of optimism, North Korea circumvented Cheong Do, Yun Pyung Do, and Woo Do would fall the South Koreans just two years later by appealing under UNC control and established the Northern directly to the Americans for peace talks. Limit Line (NLL) three nautical miles to the north The DPRK government sent a letter to the of those islands. Pyongyang often expressed its U.S. Congress in which it proposed direct bilater-

22 Denuclearizing North Korea al negotiations in order to create “the prerequisites ciples… and they will insist they be included in any to the removal of tension on Korea and the accel- agreement you try to negotiate with them.” eration of the country’s independent and peaceful The Basic Agreement was followed by the 1992 reunification.” The letter continued, “It is becom- North-South declaration of the denuclearization of ing increasingly evident that as long as the U.S. the peninsula, which, interestingly, directly con- troops remain in south [sic] Korea it is impossible nected the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to remove tension and consolidate peace in Korea” to helping “to create conditions and an environment (DPRK government 1974). North Korea did not favorable for peace and peaceful unification.” This recognize South Korea as a sovereign and legiti- agreement also suggested establishing a South- mate state, and for Pyongyang, the presence of U.S. North joint nuclear control commission (JNCC) to troops on the peninsula constituted the main issue aid in verification, but the two sides could never that required resolution.20 agree on how to launch that organization. The 1974 DPRK peace proposal sought the disso- Pyongyang’s apparent lack of interest in actu- lution of the UNC and the withdrawal of all foreign ally implementing these two agreements with any troops from Korea. Needless to say, the United vigor again raises the question of why the North States and South Korea were opposed to such terms, agreed to their terms in the first place. As during and North Korea’s proposal was not acted upon. 1972, external factors might have been critical, as Hope for introducing a KPPR was renewed in 1991 Pyongyang watched Germany reunify in late 1990 when top officials from Seoul and Pyongyang signed and the Soviet Union collapse at the end of 1991. the North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Kim Il-sung might have viewed reaching out to Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange South Korea as a useful strategy to provide his coun- (the Basic Agreement—see Appendix C). This was a try some diplomatic space and political breathing comprehensive document in which the two parties room as it contemplated the possible ramifications pledged to “exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful of these tumultuous geopolitical events. unification,” including various CBMs such as the In 1993, amidst DPRK-IAEA wrangling over establishment of a South-North liaison office at nuclear-related inspections, the United States and Panmunjom and plans to reconnect certain railways, North Korea met for “policy-level” talks in New roads, and many Korean families separated since York and later issued a brief joint statement that, the war. Important points to note about this doc- among other items, agreed to the familiar prin- ument include that the two parties described their ciples of assurances against the threat and use of relationship not as one between states, but instead force (including nuclear weapons), mutual respect as a “special interim relationship stemming from for each other’s sovereignty, non-interference in the process toward unification.” each other’s internal affairs, and support for peace- In addition, the agreement pledged recognition ful reunification of Korea. A series of inter-Korean and respect for each other’s system of government, talks began around this time as well (Poneman, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, no Wit, and Gallucci 2004). But as one veteran Korean slander or vilification, and no actions of sabotage or negotiator reminded workshop participants, “Any attempts to overthrow the opposing regime. A for- optimism with the North turned out to be a frustra- mer ROK official emphasized at the workshop, “The tion and a disappointment, and any good agreement North Koreans are really obsessed with these prin- rarely lasted more than two years.” In this case, the momentum for peace that began building in 1991 20 For its part, the ROK constitution enacted in 1987 states in lasted only slightly more than two years, as the first article 3 that “the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.” For the North Korean nuclear crisis heated up in 1994. English version, see Constitutional Court of Korea (1987, 2).

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 23 What little progress had been made during those the United States, and China to discuss replacing the years regarding possible U.S.-DPRK normalization, armistice with a political settlement. Even though limiting U.S.-ROK military exercises, and exchang- the Four-Party Talks failed to achieve their objec- ing North-South special envoys was gone, and the tives, one Korean workshop participant involved in spotlight was back on denuclearization. Still, the those talks noted that “It provided an important 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework that came venue for bilateral discussions to happen simulta- out of this crisis offered a new (albeit fragile) dip- neously in the four-party context. These meetings lomatic path to support reconciliation efforts. The were an important ice-breaking moment, in terms framework did focus more on the nuclear issue of our ability to talk very frankly with each other than on peace-regime building, but it also led to about our concerns, and to begin an initial explora- an unprecedented level of economic and diplomatic tion of some basic concepts regarding what we are engagement, including planning for the construction now calling a peace regime.” The United States also of two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea opened bilateral talks with the North on missiles, by a multinational consortium, KEDO (the Korean the recovery of U.S. soldiers missing in action from Peninsula Economic Development Organization). the Korean War, and future denuclearization logis- Moreover, the Agreed Framework paved the way tics (such as fuel-rod removal). for other initiatives, such as a four-party meeting The next key milestone came amid ROK proposed by presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill President Kim Dae-jung’s so-called sunshine policy Clinton in 1996, involving North and South Korea, toward the North, specifically the first-ever inter- Korean leadership summit in June 2000. Although the resulting joint declaration was short on specif- The United States ics, the endorsement by top leaders for promoting exchanges and economic development led to several clearly sees substantial inter-Korean projects including the joint industrial zone at Gaesong and a tourism zone at Mt. Kumgang, (if not nearly complete) as well as a series of family and cultural exchanges. At the summit, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il DPRK denuclearization also “agreed that there is a common element in the South’s concept of a confederation and the North’s as a prerequisite for formula for a loose form of federation.” For a brief time after the summit meeting, it seemed as if the diplomatic normalization spirit of the Basic Agreement of 1991 (which had hardly been implemented throughout the 1990s), and signing some sort of had been revived, and that the political environment was finally favorable for carrying out the ambitious declaration ending the agenda described in that document. In the “two steps forward, two steps back” dance war, even if planning of negotiating with North Korea, however, many of these achievements were rolled back over the for a peace regime and next nine years. A change in administration in the United States and new evidence regarding a possi- implementing CBMs ble North Korean UEP contributed to the collapse of the Agreed Framework and the second North might begin beforehand Korean nuclear crisis, in 2002. North Korea then

24 Denuclearizing North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to end the current armistice regime and build a per- (NPT) in January 2003, a move that later prompted manent peace regime…[and] of having the leaders a multilateral approach to pursuing denucleariza- of the three or four parties directly concerned to tion in the form of the Six-Party Talks. convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the The Six-Party Talks have a mixed record in terms war.” of stopping North Korea’s nuclear program, and they This question about the number of directly con- have contributed only slightly to the future develop- cerned parties (three or four) is discussed in more ment of a KPPR. Still, the talks on denuclearization detail below, but the statement is noteworthy in that have been closely intertwined with formally end- Pyongyang seemed to acknowledge the multilater- ing the Korean War and normalizing U.S.-DPRK al nature of the problem. In the past, even though relations, even if the parties have not agreed on North Korea participated in the Four-Party Talks, it which step comes first. The United States clear- never truly accepted the legitimacy of South Korea’s ly sees substantial (if not nearly complete) DPRK right to participate, as Pyongyang only wanted to denuclearization as a prerequisite for diplomatic negotiate directly with the United States. After a normalization and signing some sort of declaration decade of negotiating with liberal governments in ending the war, even if planning for a peace regime Seoul, Pyongyang seemed to recognize at the 2007 and implementing CBMs might begin beforehand. summit that South Korea deserves an official seat After North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, for exam- at the peace table. Whether or not this would ever ple, White House spokesperson Tony Snow stated, mean that the North would sign a peace treaty “If the North Koreans dismantle their nuclear pro- directly with the South, however, is still an open grams and renounced further nuclear ambitions, we question. are willing to do a whole series of things, including declaration of the end of the Korean War.” Conversely, North Korea prefers to hold onto its Characteristics of a Peace Regime nuclear devices until after normalization and related Although the 2005 joint statement may have official- KPPR steps, as a way to maintain deterrence until ly linked a peace regime to the Six-Party Talks, few it is convinced that America has ended its “hostile experts can adequately define the KPPR concept, let policy” toward the North. A North Korean Ministry alone specify its components. As one participant at of Foreign Affairs statement, for example, released the IFPA-organized workshop confessed, “I’m not on July 22, 2007, explained, “The establishment of sure what the organizers mean when they say ‘peace the peace regime on the Korean peninsula is one regime.’ In fact, I’m not sure what I mean when I of processes to the goal of denuclearization.” This say ‘peace regime.’ And I’m pretty convinced that is a fundamental challenge going forward, though the people in 2005 who wrote ‘peace regime’ into it is perhaps an area where discussing a KPPR can the joint declaration didn’t have a clue what they be useful, since, depending on how it is structured, meant when they said ‘peace regime.’” This point it could include incremental steps that might pro- was echoed by others at the workshop, and from a vide political cover for both sides so that it does not U.S.-ROK alliance perspective, this lack of clarity appear that one has capitulated to the other. can lead to misunderstandings and a misalignment The final historical milestone worth mention- of expectations. Defining the concept of a KPPR ing is the second inter-Korean leadership summit and its implementation is critically important to in October 2007. The resulting Declaration on the the alliance and the success of future negotiations. Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, As one participant offered, “If at the end of the day Peace and Prosperity further emphasized the “need we can come up with a common definition of what

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 25 we all mean by ‘peace regime,’ we will have proba- counterparts that a peace regime refers to a process bly already made a major contribution to this effort.” and not just an outcome. One Korean participant Academics and policy makers often think of argued that a “peace regime is something bigger regimes as sets of norms, rules, patterns, and prin- than peace agreement. It should involve reconcil- ciples of behavior guiding the pursuit of interests, iation among the parties and confidence-building around which actors converge (Krasner 1983). measures among the parties.” An American partic- Regimes usually are not as formal as institutions ipant concurred that a peace regime is a “process, (with a specific address, staff, or letterhead), and not just an end state, and that the process codifies they can often be quite expansive (such as the mutual actions and it provides for the requisite con- nuclear non-proliferation regime based on bilateral fidence-building measures.” and multilateral treaties and involving international Several participants focused on replacing the organizations and supplemental supplier initia- armistice with a permanent political settlement. An tives). Although many scholars have been studying American government official commented, “The and writing about various KPPR schemes for years, peace regime is a grouping of international agree- there is still no clear consensus about what approach ments that specifically constitute a framework for is best. ending the Korean War and establishing an endur- There are two principal debates regarding the ing peace on the peninsula.” Another participant nature of a KPPR, and they are interconnected. agreed: “The Korean War Armistice Agreement The first revolves around what a peace regime is should be replaced by a peace treaty with a final supposed to produce (that is, how we describe its peaceful settlement as it is stipulated in the pre- purpose and the desired end state). At its most basic amble of this agreement.” According to one Korean level, the KPPR could be an updated version of the participant, the current South Korean administra- 1953 armistice, with an added political agreement tion views peace-regime building as a mechanism to end the war and endorse a framework for rec- to replace the armistice. The participant said, “The onciliation along the lines of the Basic Agreement KPPR as we know it and we view it means a politi- signed in 1991; this would be only a slight change cal and legal state where the Korean War has been from the status quo based on hope for improved officially terminated and where a permanent peace North-South relations over time. A more ambitious has replaced the current regime on the peninsula.” view links a KPPR directly to the process of recon- Yet for one Korean participant, the armistice ciliation and confederation, to settling tough issues though outdated has provided a relative peace quite like the West Sea Northern Limit Line (NLL), to successfully. He explained, “I am living in Korea facilitating cross-border traffic, trade, and commu- with the peace regime of the armistice agreement. nication, and to meaningful military CBMs that Actually we maintain peace relatively well since reduce military forces along the DMZ. Related to 1953.” He suggested that a peace regime should build this, the second debate focuses on whether a peace upon the armistice and focus on other issues that regime is primarily a process (or even just the trig- the armistice fails to deal with, such as the process ger for a process) that eventually leads to a desired of unification or confederation. This might seem a end state, or instead more of a destination that will bit like splitting hairs—whether or not the armistice codify or institutionalize a particular outcome. is “replaced” or “built upon”—but it should at least Participants at the IFPA-organized workshop prompt analysts and policy makers to consider the shared varying interpretations of peace regime specific day-to-day (and extraordinary) responsibil- and peace-regime building as well. Many of the ities of the current armistice infrastructure so that participants agreed with some of their academic key duties are addressed and capabilities maintained

26 Denuclearizing North Korea Roadmap for Building the New Peace Structure stage laying the groundwork institutionalizing establishing denuclearization • completion of • nuclear disarmament • completion of nuclear phase nuclear disablement • accepting IAEA safeguards dismantlement (including and declaration nuclear materials • nuclear disarmament talks and weapons) • North Korea’s return to the NPT Korean Peninsula • conduct a Peace Forum • take initial steps of • terminate the armistice Peace Regime • adopt a joint statement the peace regime agreement on the peace regime road • organize a South-North- • conclude a peace map at the Peace Forum U.S. peace governing body treaty and international • hold regular South- • hold inter-Korean assurances North dialogue arms control talks • operate an inter-Korean • carry out a functional peace governing body shift of the United Nations Command (UNC) Northeast Asia • conduct Six-Party • conduct negotiations to • establish Northeast Asian peace regime ministerial talks organize Northeast Asian Security Cooperation • conduct Northeast Security Cooperation Asian Security Cooperation Dialogue Korean-U.S. • adopt a vision for Korea- • advance to Korea-U.S. • restore wartime alliance U.S. strategic alliance comprehensive alliance operational control • revise role and size of U.S. to Korea Forces Korea (USFK) • dissolve the UNC This table represents one notional approach to creating a Korean Peninsular Peace Regime according to the Korea Institute for National Unification. or enhanced. For the sake of security and peace, it is changes in behavior, and changes in the way the important to strike the right balance between build- regime operates.” ing confidence and maintaining deterrence. When considering the various benchmarks or There is also an overarching question of whether preconditions that would most likely comprise any the KPPR ends up facilitating Korean reconciliation peace-regime process for the Korean Peninsula, it and unification, or if in fact it serves to solidi- is possible to foresee major roadblocks that will fy the division of Korea by allowing North Korea emerge during negotiations. For instance, the to strengthen its economy through more normal- United States has made it clear that peace cannot ized external relations while its leadership remains occur without denuclearization, effectively making focused on maintaining internal control and try- denuclearization a precondition for normalization, ing to improve its ability to dictate terms for future peace with South Korea, or even legally ending the reunification. In other words, is a prerequisite for Korean War. For the North Koreans the sequence is a KPPR essentially a North Korean political deci- reversed. One participant said it best: “I can’t imag- sion to seek unification on terms acceptable to the ine a peace regime or any type of peace agreement South, or can a KPPR be realized even if North being actualized before denuclearization. I also have Korea just wants to be left alone? As one participant never met a North Korean who could imagine denu- put it, “The peace regime process should be seen clearization before there was a peace agreement or a as changing the game in North Korea, not locking peace treaty or some similar arrangement. Therein it in place. That means it should lead to changes I think lies the rub and one of the reasons why we in Pyongyang…maybe not a change in regime, but find this so difficult.”

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 27 If we choose to define implemented until both sides are no longer suspi- cious or fearful. The regime itself does not alleviate a peace regime as a suspicion or fear. A participant offered, “We’ll probably only be able to implement a peace regime when destination, then the we don’t really need one anymore.” If we choose to define a peace regime as a des- final settlement should tination, then the final settlement should amount to a package deal addressing the outstanding issues amount to a package plaguing negotiations and considering the demands and preferred timing for implementation by each deal addressing the party. A near simultaneous exchange presents the best chance of success. One former U.S. official at outstanding issues our workshop stated, “I look at a peace regime or peace arrangements as made up of different com- plaguing negotiations ponents. It’s not a single document. And I think it’s sort of a deal where nothing is agreed until every- and considering the thing is agreed on this. It’s got to be a package… if you don’t do that, you don’t have the possibility demands and preferred of developing something that’ll hold.” By executing such a complex diplomatic maneuver, the preferred timing for implementation timing of each party can be satisfied. The United States achieves denuclearization prior to nor- by each party malization and the DPRK obtains normalization before denuclearization. This suggests a very long However, there is much more to it than just the and drawn-out negotiating process that focuses on nuclear issue. Washington and Seoul can begin by building mutual confidence. To be successful, all defining what they consider to be the conditions sides must commit at some level to this process. necessary for peace on the peninsula, each by itself, Viewing a KPPR as a far-off destination does not and as an alliance. As they do this, it is likely that absolve the interested parties from their responsi- they will end up describing a peace regime more as bility to work toward that goal, however indirectly a destination than as a process. In other words, the or incrementally, even if they are convinced that no conditions acceptable to the allies are not something progress is possible in the near term (for example, that North Korea is likely to agree to in advance, because one party considers a counterpart’s ruling in such areas as verifiable denuclearization, reduc- regime or administration to be completely hostile ing the forward-deployed disposition of the DPRK to its own core requirements). A policy of throw- forces along the DMZ, or scaling back the DPRK’s ing up one’s hands and claiming that nothing can missile programs. Similarly, the allies are probably be done is not an acceptable option for policy mak- not yet ready to meet North Korea’s likely early con- ers, even in the short term. Some productive work ditions for shaping a peaceful environment, such can always be carried out, either in an alliance con- as limiting U.S.-ROK military exercises, cutting text, a trilateral ROK-U.S.-China context, or by U.S. forces or military investment on the peninsu- engaging North Korea in the simplest of confidence- la, avoiding any sanction or criticism of DPRK illicit building measures related to armistice maintenance activity or human rights violations, and many other and armistice modernization. Official and unoffi- possible conditions. A peace regime cannot be fully cial dialogue on armistice and KPPR issues amongst

28 Denuclearizing North Korea the parties and the UN (and UN-related organiza- a good way to strike this balance. Regular military tions) will pay dividends in the future if the parties exercises are required to complete this transition can begin to lay a baseline for common agreement confidently, and the U.S. support role (and nucle- on KPPR development.21 Some non-governmental ar umbrella) will remain in place indefinitely. These interaction (such as medical assistance or education are not negotiable in a peace regime, but there are and cultural exchanges) might also be useful in the ways to begin to address each side’s legitimate secu- interim, to keep channels of communication open rity concerns (such as through traditional CBMs and to try to improve mutual understanding. and certain security assurances), as long as North Korea is truly interested in enhancing transparency and military-to-military (mil-to-mil) communica- Developing a Peace Regime tion and exchanges. Consensus: Themes and Perspectives Since 2004, South Korea has been taking over a A long journey begins with a single step, and number of missions directly associated with main- although there have been many false starts in the taining the armistice, including security of the DMZ past, it is possible that North-South or U.S.-DPRK and counter-fire command and control, among oth- bilateral meetings in the future could begin again to ers (Bell and Finley 2007). In addition, the alliance outline ways to develop the conditions necessary for is planning to transfer wartime operational control peace on the peninsula. If the next attempt at peace (OPCON) of ROK forces from the combined forc- building is to have any substance, however, greater es commander, a U.S. general, to the ROK military mutual understanding and solidarity on key issues leadership—a change that was originally scheduled among South Korea, the United States, and China to take effect in 2012, although it is now postponed will be necessary to move North Korea into a poten- until December 2015 in light of the DPRK’s hos- tially more flexible position under a new regime in tilities last year. According to the OPCON transfer the future. This will likely require some compro- plans, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should become mise by the allies and by China as well. U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), after which

First, Do No Harm: Armistice and Operational Control Any roadmap for a Any roadmap for a KPPR or U.S.-DPRK normalization dialogue must allow for the delicate balance KPPR or U.S.-DPRK between fostering a peaceful atmosphere and reassuring South Korea of the U.S. security commitment. normalization dialogue Any U.S.-DPRK rapprochement that causes Seoul to lose confidence in the alliance and seek such things must allow for the as new longer-range missiles or nuclear reprocessing capabilities will do nothing to help create conditions delicate balance between necessary for peace, and it could in fact undermine stability. China understands this, too, and the slow fostering a peaceful and steady plan underway to transfer wartime leadership for South Korea’s defense to ROK forces is atmosphere and reassuring 21 Indeed, according to Hwang, “Only by reinvigorating and revi- talizing the functions of the armistice can it serve as an effective South Korea of the U.S. institutional basis for a permanent peace arrangement while ensuring the prevention of further conflict in the interim” (2011, 6). security commitment

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 29 KORCOM and ROK Joint Forces Command will U.S.-ROK alliance than the allies are willing to become “complementary, independent commands consider at the moment. Although China does not in a supporting-to-supported relationship” (Bell anticipate (or push for) a weaker U.S.-ROK alliance and Finley 2007). In other words, the ROK com- in the same way as North Korea (which is seeking mander will indicate what U.S. support he needs, de facto U.S. political neutrality on the peninsula), and KORCOM will be responsible for carrying out some Chinese scholars have pointed out that Beijing those activities. Of course, any campaign will be would expect a “reclassification or redefinition” of closely coordinated and planned together. alliance roles and missions as part of a KPPR in a OPCON transfer has the potential to be an way that dilutes the U.S. presence, commensurate important factor in the KPPR debate. Discussions with North Korean tension reduction steps. From about armistice maintenance will increasingly be the allies’ point of view, while they have stated an inter-Korean matters, and although this might not interest in pursuing reciprocal threat reduction pol- please Pyongyang, it is altogether appropriate and icies and CBMs with the North, the core of their will eventually leave North Korea with no choice mutual security commitments contribute signifi- but to engage with the South on security matters. cantly to peace on the peninsula and is not up for This should also please Beijing in the long run, as negotiation. Whether or not a “redefinition” of cer- it could lead to a less prominent U.S. military role tain alliance roles and missions can be reconciled on the peninsula in the future. Putting the lead- with threat reduction and CBMs to yield a result ership for South Korea’s defense in the hands of that can satisfy the “interested parties” is some- South Korea is a potential point of consensus for thing that will take them many years to sort out the United States, ROK, and China, which would and will require more mutual confidence than cur- put additional pressure on North Korea to change rently exists. its outdated perspective on the regional security landscape. Basic Agreement as a Foundation The United Nations Command (UNC) will It is widely agreed that the 1991 Basic Agreement also step back into a supporting role with OPCON remains the most promising document in terms of transfer, and under a peace regime it could eventu- establishing concrete measures and mechanisms to ally transform into a neutral forum to assist with improve conditions for peace-regime building, and monitoring and dispute resolution (though it would this is probably still the case despite North Korea’s have to undergo some change to accommodate cer- unilateral repudiation in January 2009 of all past tain DPRK objections). This is also consistent with inter-Korean political and military accords. Many thinking among many policy specialists in China experts have argued that the Basic Agreement could that while the UN could have an important role to serve as the basis for a future political settlement. play in a KPPR, the legacy of the UN in Korea is One Korean participant at the IFPA workshop urged that of a warring party, and the roots of that lega- the new administration in Washington to “recon- cy should be essentially ripped out in order to allow firm the value of the Basic Agreement.” A second for a new, untainted UN role. This new role, in the participant from the United States reiterated his words of one Chinese scholar, would take advantage Korean colleague’s point and said that even though of the UN’s contemporary peacekeeping and peace- the failure to implement the measures set forth by building expertise, and it would also “reflect better the Basic Agreement would make it difficult to use the current balance of power within the UNSC.” the agreement as the key political agreement to For the longer term, Beijing is looking for more transition from the armistice, the agreement “does substantive changes to the fundamental role of the

30 Denuclearizing North Korea offer an internationally recognized, legally sufficient ences of opinion, caveats, and qualifications begin foundation upon which to build a peace regime.” to emerge. Fortunately for the U.S.-ROK alliance, The Basic Agreement, as mentioned earlier, out- there is unanimous agreement that a KPPR is first lines several CBMs and other gestures to foster and foremost a Korean (that is, inter-Korean) ini- goodwill and build the trust necessary to make tiative. Pyongyang professes to agree, judging from real progress on a KPPR. These go beyond mere the language it has approved in North-South doc- pledges to refrain from aggression or interfering in uments dating back to 1972. The first principle each other’s internal affairs. The Basic Agreement authorizes the establishment of a Korean joint military committee to oversee the implementation of The Basic Agreement is CBMs including, among other measures, notification of troop movements, exchange of military a template for improving personnel and information, phased and verifiable arms reductions, and direct telephone links. It also inter-Korean relations paves the way for various economic, social, and cultural exchanges, also managed by different joint and a way to help bring committees. The Basic Agreement is a template for improv- about the conditions ing inter-Korean relations and a way to help bring about the conditions necessary for peace. It is also necessary for peace an agreement that Pyongyang consented to at one point in its history. “It is really necessary to think about the conditions that will enable a peace regime for reunification in the 1972 North-South Joint to establish real peace,” one participant said, “and Communiqué, for example, is that it “should be it seems to me that as a starting point that begins achieved independently, without reliance upon out- with threat reduction. And that begins with the side force or its interference.” This point, conveyed implementation of the basic agreements. I think with slightly different wording, has been reiterat- this is absolutely fundamental as a starting point.” ed in every important inter-Korean agreement since. President Lee Myung-bak supports the idea of using DPRK leaders, however, seem to view ending the Basic Agreement as a foundation for peace- the Korean War and working toward unification as regime building. In March 2008, Lee declared that two separate endeavors, because in many ways they previous agreements should act as a basis for mak- always saw themselves as legitimately represent- ing progress with North Korea and that the Basic ing all of Korea and the war as one of self-defense Agreement outweighed any other in significance against the Americans (and their “traitorous pup- (Kang 2008). pet lackeys” in the South). Over the years, North Korea has persistently tried to isolate South Korea Parties to a Peace Regime at multilateral talks, and to seek direct bilater- At first glance, identifying the “directly related paral negotiations with the United States regarding a ties” to a KPPR seems quite obvious, namely the peace treaty. A Korean participant expressed his two Koreas, the United States, and China (given worry that at some point Washington might oblige their central involvement in the Korean War and Pyongyang, if only to try to move the diplomatic the precedent of the Four-Party Talks). Scratch process along. “There is concern in Korea that in the surface, however, and some important differ- the end, it might just be the U.S. and the DPRK in

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 31 the process,” he said, “and this would perhaps unin- by changing the situation from an armistice to a tentionally accept the longstanding North Korean peace regime, not with South Korea, but with the argument that Washington and Pyongyang were United States. That’s the only way of regime surviv- the major players, or parties of the Korean War.” al in their mindset.” Third, North Korea suggests The participant continued, “Doing so would also that technically speaking, South Korea should not mistake Washington support for the North Korean participate in peace-regime building, since only the logic that the U.S. initiated the Korean War, and UNC commander, a Chinese representative, and a recognize North Korea as the only legitimate politi- North Korean representative signed the armistice. cal entity on the Korean Peninsula.” If a peace regime intends to replace the armistice, Participants at the IFPA-organized workshop North Korea argues, only the signatories of the offered four major reasons behind North Korea’s armistice should sit as parties to a peace regime. strategy to engage directly with the Americans for Fourth, North Korea seeks to buttress its belief that ending the war. First, North Korea views the United Pyongyang is the sole legitimate leadership in Korea. States, not South Korea, as the central obstacle to U.S. officials, however, have consistently sup- peace, symbolized by the U.S. military presence on ported the idea that South Korea should be a party the peninsula. An American official pointed out to any agreement involving resolution of the war. They often counter North Korea’s arguments by pointing out that the United States was not a signa- One participant answered tory to the armistice either; rather, it was the UNC commander who signed on behalf of all UNC mem- fears concerning the ROK’s bers (including the Republic of Korea). Moreover, when the armistice was signed, the Korean People’s potential isolation by Army (KPA) and CPV commanders made a point of confirming this fact, because they wanted to make stating, “A peace regime sure that ROK forces would be required to abide by the terms of the agreement (United Nations 1995, must, at its core, have 6). So, if North Korea and China were satisfied in 1953 that the armistice was binding on ROK forces, a Korean agreement they cannot now claim that Seoul was never a party to that agreement. and be seen by others ROK leaders have made some progress over the years in making their argument that Seoul will be a as a Korean solution.” key player in KPPR dialogue and that it should be a party to ending the war. One participant answered that “the main reason the North Koreans partici- fears concerning the ROK’s potential isolation by pated in the Four-Party Talks was because the U.S. stating, “A peace regime must, at its core, have agreed that one agenda item could be the possible a Korean agreement and be seen by others as a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula and Korean solution.” Since the introduction of the term establishment of a separate peace treaty between “peace regime” in the Six-Party Talks in 2005, Seoul the U.S. and North Korea.” Second, Pyongyang and Pyongyang did manage to agree that there were sees peace with the United States as a more effec- “three or four parties directly concerned,” when tive guarantor of regime survival. One participant President Roh Moo-hyun met with Kim Jong-il observed, “The North wants to preserve its regime in October 2007. The three they referred to were

32 Denuclearizing North Korea apparently the two Koreas plus the United States, For example, following a series of skirmishes and China might be the fourth. But given the vague- over fishing areas in the West Sea that peaked in ness of what KPPR actually means, this still does 1997 and 1999, North and South Korea initiated not clarify that the North would accept South Korea working-level engagements in 2001 to find a diplo- as a signatory to a formal peace treaty to end the matic solution to the fishing controversy and other war. Pyongyang instead might view a KPPR as a col- maritime issues surrounding the disputed NLL. The lection of agreements and arrangements, including effort accelerated after the 2002 naval clash that left a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty. dozens of sailors killed or injured. Finally, following Another reason why North Korea might be a general-level military meeting in 2004, the two reluctant to include the South in formal peace trea- sides signed the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement ty talks is because of all the potential claims this and Subsequent Exchange on June 14, 2004. The could open up from Seoul. For example, a Korean agreement encouraged the establishment of a mil- workshop participant listed a few points (from a itary hotline, along with the use of the same radio ROK perspective) not often mentioned during dis- frequencies so as to avoid future miscommunica- cussions of peace regime. He said, “First, we need tion, as well as to stop propaganda along the DMZ to hold war criminals accountable in the historic (Sang-min 2004). The 2004 agreement served as context. Second, there has to be some discussion a foundation from which the two sides continued of reparations for the damages incurred during the to issue further threat-reduction measures in the Korean War.” There are also many in the South who maritime domain. More recently, both sides held believe that the North is still holding hundreds, if colonel-level talks in February 2011 to diffuse ten- not thousands, of prisoners of war in their country. sions in the wake of the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong The North makes similar claims against the South. Island incidents, although the talks broke down Getting into these disputes would open up a large after the North Korean delegation refused to take number of intractable issues that could easily derail responsibility for the provocations.22 peace talks before they ever got started. Koreans are Workshop participants also considered the going to have to think hard about whether or not inclusion of China as a party to KPPR negotia- they are willing (and able) to formally end the war tions, not least in consideration of its growing without solving these problems. There might be a clout as a regional and global leader. Participants way to end the war and establish a joint commit- unanimously agreed that China should be includ- tee to explore and resolve these claims as part of ed in KPPR discussions and that in many ways peace-regime building, but the parties must also be the United States and China could act as endors- careful not to sweep too much under the rug in the ers or guarantors of what would primarily be an early stages, lest the peace collapse and confidence inter-Korean agreement.23 In some cases the roles be further undermined for the future. for the United States and China in the KPPR might Even though a key component of peace-regime mirror or complement each other, perhaps includ- building is a sincere inter-Korean dialogue, which ing some involvement in dispute resolution, where appears quite elusive in the near term, tension Washington would need to coordinate its objectives between the two has sometimes facilitated an inter- Korean effort to institute certain threat-reduction 22 North Korea later revealed that secret talks were held with South Korean officials in May 2010 in an attempt to lay the measures without the assistance of the international groundwork for an inter-Korean summit. The secret talks community. The mechanisms may prove imperfect broke down under similar circumstances to the February colo- yet they demonstrate a capacity for the two states to nel-level meetings. See Christine Kim and Ser Myo-ja (2011), 23 Ren Xiao writes, “In the creation of a permanent peace mechanism, work bilaterally at times. if the U.S. is an indispensible power, China is an equally important player in the region that cannot be left out” (2011, 144).

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 33 and modalities with Beijing. One participant offered, tion to take the lead or get directly involved at this “At the end of the day, the key track that emerges is time. The UN considers the North Korean nucle- between the U.S. and China. Because whatever we ar issue and peace-regime building as a contained want to do on the Korean Peninsula, the manage- issue already being handled by responsible par- ment of the U.S.-China relationship will be the key ties in a multilateral fashion. Time will tell if this pillar, and we have to plan in advance.” assessment continues. The main qualitative difference in Chinese and American involvement is, of course, the fact that U.S. Five Tracks troops are forward deployed on ROK soil and oper- As IFPA workshop participants considered the ate in a joint command (and there are no Chinese potential contours of a peace regime, they identified forces in North Korea), and it seems that this point five principal tracks as core elements of any process was instrumental behind the mention of “three or to develop a viable peace regime: four parties” at the second inter-Korean summit. 1. ROK-DPRK. As discussed, the inter-Korean The suggestion is that there are some military CBM dialogue remains the central focus of any peace issues that only need to be discussed amongst the regime. The ROK-DPRK track addresses the need two Koreas and the United States, since only their for a Korean solution to a Korean problem. An troops would be involved. It remains to be seen inter-Korean agreement to build a peace regime whether or not Pyongyang’s distinction of “three or is a prerequisite for KPPR development. four” also applies to other possible components of 2. U.S.-DPRK. The United States will also play a a KPPR. key role in peace-regime building, in part because In addition to individual states, the United of its commitments to the U.S.-ROK alliance and Nations is also a directly related party to some in part because of North Korea’s desire for nor- degree, and its involvement could prove useful malized bilateral relations with Washington. The when the other parties seek international legitima- United States, through a U.S.-DPRK track with- cy and external support in the form of monitoring in a wider framework, can offer North Korea sev- and development assistance. The UN authorization eral important diplomatic carrots that may help for the UNC is still in force, and the UNC will still convince North Korea to pursue denucleariza- exist even after the transfer of operational control tion and feel more comfortable compromising in 2012. UN members that still maintain a liaison with the South. (or stronger) presence in the UNC include Australia, 3. Quadrilateral. In addition to these two bilater- Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, al tracks, a quadrilateral track reminiscent of the Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Four-Party Talks will be critical, since it is this the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United group that will most likely be responsible for for- Kingdom, and the United States. An American offi- mally ending the armistice and endorsing the suc- cial commented, “I would argue that while a UN cessor arrangement. role specifically is not required, either legally or 4. Loose multilateral. A wider and looser track practically, it is likely prudent nonetheless in order consisting of other parties such as Russia and to ensure international legitimacy of this process.” Japan, and perhaps multilateral or intergovern- Yet despite the UN’s lack of direct involvement, a mental institutions, in order to ensure that a participant from the United Nations explained that peace regime accounts for their interests and to although the UN would welcome an opportunity harness any support they can provide for the pro- to be part of a solution to the Korean dilemma, it cess. Those involved in building a KPPR should does not necessarily see a need for it as an institu- also examine the possibility of using or creating

34 Denuclearizing North Korea intergovernmental institutions based upon the approach. And with the mention of peace regime in various European models, allowing for the cre- what was otherwise a denuclearization negotiation, ation, if needed, of additional mechanisms for the linkage between denuclearization and peace regional support for a peace regime. The North- regime was established. east Asia peace and security mechanism envi- Ever since North Korea stepped up its nucle- sioned in the Six-Party Talks is related to this ar program in the 1980s, however, U.S. policy has broad track. been to make verifiable denuclearization a sine qua 5. Six-Party. Any peace regime arrangement must non of any discussion about formally ending the include complete and verifiable denuclearization. Korean War. For U.S. policy makers, it is a funda- This is, in essence, the main Six-Party track. In mental component of the “conditions necessary for fact, some qualify denuclearization as an entire- peace” that have been embraced by successive U.S. ly separate process, even if it remains in reali- administrations. As President George W. Bush stat- ty a component of a final peace regime. As one ed in September 2007, “We look forward to the day participant familiar with current South Korean when we can end the Korean War. That will happen thinking as it relates to the new U.S. adminis- when Kim Jong-il verifiably gets rid of his weap- tration’s diplomatic strategies towards the North ons programs and his weapons” (Chosun Ilbo 2007). said, “An important strategy of the [South] Kore- President Barack Obama’s special representative for an government is to create a new peace structure, North Korea Policy, Stephen Bosworth, made this what we call structure, on the Korean Peninsu- point to DPRK officials in late 2009 during a trip la. This structure can be based on two pillars, to Pyongyang, where he explained that peace trea- first, the denuclearization of North Korea, and ty negotiations could not even begin until there was the second is the establishment of a peace regime concrete progress on denuclearization in the Six- on the peninsula.” Party Talks (Bosworth 2009). South Korea’s position on this issue has been The Six-Party/KPPR Linkage more flexible over the years, most dramatically The notion of peace-regime building entered the under the liberal Roh administration, which pro- Six-Party Talks slowly but surely. The Chinese dele- moted the idea of declaring an end to the war first, gation proposed a draft of a joint statement in 2005 and then working toward denuclearization. The that included language referring to a final peace conservative Lee Myung-bak government, how- settlement, and experts speculated that the United ever, sees denuclearization more similarly to how States, South Korea, North Korea, and China would the United States currently views it, and Seoul has meet in follow-up engagements following the Six- insisted that the nuclear issue be on the agenda of Party Talks to discuss a final peace settlement (Jin any North-South summit involving President Lee. 2005). The result was the September 19, 2005, joint So, even if Seoul sees these as separate issues, they statement, which, as mentioned earlier, formally are certainly complementary components of peace introduced the term “peace regime” to the denu- on the peninsula. clearization negotiation. The statement, however, Much to the chagrin of allied negotiators, how- stipulated that reaching a peace regime would con- ever, North Korea continuously interweaves stitute a separate track from the Six-Party Talks. denuclearization with U.S. troop withdrawal from The South Korean offer, made in 2005, of an eco- the peninsula and places it after a peace agreement. nomic and security package in return for nuclear North Korean officials emphasize that Pyongyang dismantlement was a step toward recognizing seeks the “the complete denuclearization of the that denuclearization required a comprehensive Korean Peninsula,” which they describe as the

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 35 elimination of the threat posed by U.S. troops peace talks can stimulate constructive denucleariza- on the peninsula and its alliance with the South tion negotiations, while others think that the only (Bosworth 2009). For North Korea, a peace trea- way peace talks can be productive is if they are pre- ty with the United States to end the Korean War ceded by some success at denuclearization. As one comes first, followed by an inter-Korean dialogue Chinese former diplomat put it, “Denuclearization on peace-regime development. When the U.S. and a peace regime are two sides of the same coin. threat is gone, Pyongyang will consider denuclear- Take away one side, and there is no coin.” A South ization. Although the Chinese government does not Korean former government official countered, “The agree with sequencing denuclearization so late in peace issue is not a way to solve the nuclear issue. the process, it generally concurs that Washington Nuclear weapons are part of the overall Korean and Seoul must give due consideration to North problem. We should focus on improving the con- Korea’s security concerns, and it is reluctant to push ditions necessary for peace over the long term, and a settlement that requires too much up front from the 2005 Six-Party agreement is the best way for- the North (You 2011). Such differing perspectives ward on this front.” on what denuclearization would entail (and when) It is possible to carry on these two tracks of dia- cloud the peace-regime building process by making logue and negotiation simultaneously, of course, denuclearization an endless cycle of trying to build but practically speaking one track must take prece- a bridge that is too short to reach both sides. dence or be weighted more heavily than the other The near-term challenge is to develop a consen- (that is, at some point the chicken must either hatch sus regarding the linkage between the Six-Party or lay an egg). The general consensus at the IFPA- Talks and companion peace negotiations, even if the organized workshop was that the Six-Party Talks initial consensus is only among the United States, should first be resumed and then, based on prog- South Korea, and China. It is a classic “chicken- ress in the talks, Seoul and Washington should be and-egg” question in the sense that some believe willing to participate in peace talks. The question is, how much progress in the Six-Party Talks is necessary to begin a KPPR discussion? Most would The near-term challenge respond “a little,” “some,” or “picking up where we left off in December 2008,” but others emphasize is to develop a consensus that “significant” progress is needed, or else hope- less peace negotiations could doom the Six-Party regarding the linkage Talks. Negotiators could do more damage if they try too early and fail on this issue. Moreover, rath- between the Six-Party er than queuing peace talks behind a resumption of the six-party process, some suggested it might be Talks and companion better to link peace talks more closely with a North- South summit meeting or some other progress in peace negotiations, even if the inter-Korean dialogue. A separate argument in favor of starting peace the initial consensus is only talks earlier rather than later, however, takes into consideration North Korea’s leadership transition among the United States, from Kim Jong-il to, presumably, Kim Jung-un. Regardless of who succeeds Kim, that leader will South Korea, and China inherit an isolated and economically weak country

36 Denuclearizing North Korea amidst potential domestic competition for power. required to try to address North Korean concerns The DPRK military will be very influential and on this front. Finally, all seem to agree that, at the could end up running the country, while the new moment, North Korea is not sincere when it says leader will not likely be in a strong enough political that it wants to negotiate a peace treaty or peace position to initiate peace talks from scratch, given regime to end the war, at least not in the sense that the military’s traditional hard line. It might be eas- it would approach such talks with any flexibility or ier for him, however, to “resume” negotiations that seriously consider what it knows are non-negotia- were already started (and sanctioned) by Kim Jong- ble positions of the United States and South Korea. il himself, if the new ruler ever decides to pursue a At this point, the onus is on North Korea to prove new course for the sake of his nation and his regime. South Korea, China, and the United States wrong. There could be some value, therefore, in setting a The three also disagree in some areas, including precedent for peace talks. North Korea has offered the aforementioned question about when to begin to begin peace talks “in the framework of the Six- peace negotiations. In addition, although they agree Party Talks,” so this could possibly be a way to to some extent that North Korea has its own secu- facilitate de-escalation and develop common terms rity concerns, they disagree about the true depth of of reference for peace building, if Pyongyang does those concerns and their legitimacy. South Korea not attach too many conditions to its offer and if the in particular is worried that the three could inad- talks ever resume. vertently consent to North Korea’s longstanding assertion that U.S. “hostile policy” and military postures caused the North’s nuclear development, Korean Peace Regime and some believe that this could unintentionally Consensus Building in Support signal acceptance of North Korea’s argument that of Denuclearization it and the United States were the main parties in There are some points on which South Korea, the the Korean War. In addition, as earlier discussions United States, and China appear to agree regarding have already noted, China has an interest in a down- the development of a peace regime on the Korean graded U.S.-ROK alliance as an incentive to change Peninsula. First, the core of a KPPR is a North- North Korean behavior and support KPPR develop- South peace agreement (be it a treaty reaffirming ment, as well as a desire to uproot the UNC and the the Basic Agreement, or something else). Neither legacy of UN involvement on the peninsula. China nor the United States will interfere with a Thus, despite some encouraging signs of agree- North-South agreement. Second, the United States ment (at least among South Korea, the United and China should be involved in KPPR develop- States, and China), it seems clear that the timing is ment, and they will likely play a role of endorser not right for serious KPPR negotiations. The pros- and/or guarantor of some kind. The U.S.-DPRK pects for progress are too remote and the danger dialogue is another important component, so this of further disrupting the six-party process and the would be essentially a four-party discussion with U.S.-ROK alliance is too great. The best that can be North-South and U.S.-DPRK components. Third, done is to initiate KPPR “preliminary discussions” verifiable North Korean denuclearization is anoth- or pre-negotiation consultations of some kind, in er core component of a KPPR, and it is appropriate parallel to renewed Six-Party Talks (assuming they to link peace talks to denuclearization at some level. restart). These could address overall parameters of The three parties might disagree regarding how future KPPR negotiations, expected outcomes or early or how much to link a KPPR to the Six-Party potential key milestones, options for dispute res- Talks, but they recognize that an effort will be olution, or development of agreed-upon terms of

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 37 South Korea and the ing open lines of communication and sustaining the dialogue, which might yield at least smooth- United States should er implementation of the armistice arrangements. “Eliciting Pyongyang’s cooperation will always work proactively with present obstacles,” writes Balbina Y. Hwang, “but ultimately it is in North Korea’s interests to ensure China and regional that the armistice is not abrogated; after all, it has served as effective a deterrent in keeping ROK and partners in the region to U.S. military forces south of the DMZ as it has in keeping large-scale DPRK forces from crossing into envision a framework the South” (2011, 6). If North Korea is unresponsive, however, it will only compound its isolation. For the for building a KPPR, United States and South Korea, being flexible without abandoning their friends or their principles is which in turn may help the only way forward. improve the conditions The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor for peace-regime building and Regional Considerations As policymakers move forward and begin to under- and denuclearization stand what characterizes a peace regime and how best to approach peace-regime building, they must reference so that the parties can clarify the pre- also examine the endeavor from the perspective of cise meaning of terms such as “interested parties,” the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with looking closely at “denuclearization,” “hostile policy,” and “confidence other regional considerations. History demonstrates building.” The allies should enter these talks sin- that improperly coordinated diplomacy frustrates cerely and with an open mind, but they should also any hope of negotiating with North Korea effective- go in with low expectations. Until North Korea truly ly and satisfactorily from an alliance standpoint. accepts the South as its primary partner for peace, For years North Korea has pursued a nego- there can be little progress except for some forging tiating strategy of trying to split and weaken the of a consensus among the other three nations. alliance by moving each bilateral dialogue for- Even if it seems that a peace regime is not pos- ward at different speeds. The overarching feature of sible without the collapse of the North Korean North Korean diplomacy remains its attempt to iso- political system, this cannot be the only policy late South Korea by repeatedly probing the United approach—that is, to simply wait for North Korea States to test Washington’s receptiveness to bilat- to collapse or for some kind of external change. eral negotiations. When the United States displays South Korea and the United States should work a willingness to explore the possibility of conduct- proactively with China and regional partners in the ing bilateral talks with North Korea, South Korea region to envision a framework for building a KPPR, begins to fear isolation or abandonment. Many which in turn may help improve the conditions for South Korean experts worry that North Korea may peace-regime building and denuclearization. Even in fact manage to manipulate the United States into negotiating with the North Korean regime in its engaging in a bilateral track to the detriment of the current form can be beneficial in terms of keep- alliance and South Korean national interests. A par-

38 Denuclearizing North Korea ticipant warned, “The end result would be a North terparts to play the bad cop, in order to make U.S. Korean victory in political, ideological, psycholog- “carrot” offers look more attractive. Seoul pondered ical warfare and political embarrassment for our this, only to find out in subsequent discussions with government and the South Korean people. It would others in the administration that the U.S. commit- also lead to the decline of the U.S.-ROK alliance and ment to providing carrots was tenuous at best. The ultimately may lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces participant lamented, “How could I guarantee that from the peninsula. Maybe that is the end result of my side would be a bad and tough cop, when the such a U.S.-DPRK peace-regime building process.” other side cannot be counted on to be a reliably The alliance must approach negotiations with good cop?” a clear, mutual understanding of national and alli- An American participant recalled that U.S. and ance interests, short-, medium-, and long-term ROK negotiators have often undermined each other objectives, other regional influences such as China by not properly coordinating their carrot-and-stick and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and diplomatic strat- approach toward North Korea. This is perhaps one egies. One participant remarked, “I believe it is reason why Seoul is reportedly nervous about the essential for our two countries to closely cooperate Obama administration’s consideration of food aid as allies throughout the whole process of relevant to North Korea—a move that the Lee administra- negotiations.” Only a unified and coordinated dip- tion believes will take the pressure off of Pyongyang lomatic front can thwart and deter North Korean (Yonhap News Agency 2011b). Washington, howev- efforts to destabilize the alliance and derail multi- er, has a tradition of “de-linking” humanitarian aid lateral negotiations. and assistance from political goals and objectives. The alliance can begin the process of coordi- As Scott Snyder points out: “Even if Americans nating its diplomatic strategies by first clarifying operate by the Reagan-era maxim that ‘a hungry certain points that may help improve conditions on child knows no politics,’ North Korean counter- the ground and guide future negotiations, such as parts do not (nor have South Korean counterparts, a the outlook for continued U.S. military presence circumstance which opens the possibility for misun- on the peninsula and the importance of achieving derstanding within the U.S.-ROK alliance)” (2011). denuclearization. A participant stressed the impor- Thus, here again is an example of the complexi- tance of gaining a “common understanding on ties of the good-cop-bad-cop dynamic that must be prospective agendas including measures to reduce carefully managed by the United States and South military tensions and the relationship between the Korea as they cope with the North Korean problem. KPPR and the U.S.-ROK relationship.” A Korean participant echoed calls for coordina- Participants offered their opinions about how tion and remarked that the United States and South the United States and South Korea could improve Korea, even trilaterally with China, should begin to the coordination of negotiating strategies and main- prioritize objectives, agree upon future steps, and tain open lines of communication. One participant identify the timing and sequencing of events. He highlighted the appeal of the good-cop-bad-cop sce- suggested that a committed track 2 channel may nario in which one country offers carrots while the best fulfill the need to initiate such coordination. other threatens to use sticks of some kind, thus The participant said, “And such common ground maximizing incentives. In reality, this scenario has should be further expanded through quiet, but sub- not always played out well. A Korean participant stantive discussions like this very forum.” recalled his experience trying to execute the good- Although the alliance needs to better coordinate cop-bad-cop tactic with the Bush administration. its strategies vis-à-vis North Korea and appear unit- At the time, U.S. officials urged their ROK coun- ed in its effort to denuclearize the peninsula and

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 39 build a peace regime, South Korea must ultimately ed strategy to pursue peace-regime building. The lead peace-regime building. Despite the many layers inclusion of multiple regional actors is further of the Korean dilemma, the inter-Korean relation- complicated by considering the importance of the ship remains the core issue, and ultimately a peace U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan’s legitimate interests regime must emerge from an inter-Korean dialogue. in the resolution of the Korean War and the outcome A participant said, “Regardless of how you define of peace-regime building. Japan’s grievances against North Korea include the unknown whereabouts of Japanese abductees and the threat of a nuclear Although the alliance North Korea armed with ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japanese shores. Notwithstanding needs to better coordinate Tokyo’s disagreements and fears regarding North Korea, Japan could play an important role in the its strategies vis-à-vis North process. One participant recommended approach- ing Japan first and then China. He said, “The next Korea and appear united step should be to involve Japan in the trilateral mechanism. That way we can increase our package in its effort to denuclearize of incentives and disincentives. And then we have to go to China to explain our plan, so that they are the peninsula and build a also onboard. The sequence of consultation is very important.” peace regime, South Korea In sum, U.S. policy makers should review carefully the sordid history of Korean peace efforts must ultimately lead before considering substantive bilateral negotiations with the North, even if those talks occur peace-regime building ostensibly within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. It is clear that Korean history, peacemaking, peace regime, the South Koreans have to take the and denuclearization are all tightly intertwined, and lead.” Yet the possibility of North Korea accepting Washington must understand how gestures in one South Korea as a major, if not the main, player in area might impact inter-Korean relations and the this conversation appears to have grown more dis- U.S.-ROK alliance more generally. The best way to tant in the past year. The participant added, “And do this is to work closely with Seoul to combine the prospects of North Korea cooperating with historic review with forward-looking policy mak- the South in that regard, at least today, seem fairly ing in a way that takes into consideration these slim.” In order for peace-regime building to progress, interconnections, and with other key regional play- North Korea must recognize that the road to recon- ers they can begin to chart a practical course for ciliation and normalization runs through Seoul and peace-regime development. Ultimately, neither the not exclusively through Washington. North Korea alliance nor North Korea can determine on its own cannot continue to insist on pursuing alternative what constitutes the conditions necessary for peace negotiations bilaterally with the United States—at or how to achieve them. This can only be accom- the expense of the multilateral process—and bilat- plished through dialogue involving all three nations erally with South Korea. (and including China), and it will no doubt be a long The alliance must also consider other regional journey. influences and partners as it develops a coordinat-

40 Denuclearizing North Korea CONCLUSION

olatility on the Korean Peninsula over the past with a dangerous escalation of tensions. In the Vyear has set back momentum toward a peace absence of any subsequent acts of aggression by the regime and produced aftereffects that continue to DPRK, it is possible to infer that allied deterrence reverberate in the regional security environment. has played some role in limiting further hostilities If anything positive has come from the events of on the peninsula for the time being.25 2010, it is the deepened strategic ties and solidar- Yet while the allies may be able to claim some ity between the United States and its allies in the measure of success in that regard, a long-term solu- region following North Korea’s provocations. Not tion to the North Korean problem remains elusive. only did the United States and ROK, among other North Korea continues to make advancements measures, launch a series of joint military exercises in its nuclear weapons program and to engage in aimed at sending a strong signal to Pyongyang, but the dangerous proliferation of WMD technologies trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan strategic relations deep- despite allied pressure and international sanctions. ened as a result of actions taken by North Korea Recent reports also highlight further North Korean in 2010. The robust allied response to the Cheonan advancements in missile production and delivery and Yeonpyeong incidents may well have deterred systems (Korea Herald 2011). In other words, allied Pyongyang from committing further acts of aggres- cooperation and deterrence may limit North Korean sion last year, and played some role in compelling provocations in the short term, but deterrence alone China to rein in North Korean behavior behind the will not likely provide a long-term solution to some scenes.24 Anything less than that kind of response of the more intractable security problems posed by from the United States and its allies would have cast the North Korean regime and its increasing military doubt on the regional U.S. security guarantee and capabilities.26 invited further provocations from the North, along 25 That is not to say that further provocations from the North are 24 Certainly, many Chinese intellectuals give Beijing credit for out of the question. According to Julian Borger, “Government playing some role in ensuring that there were no follow- officials in Seoul, speaking off the record, agreed that they were up acts of aggression by North Korea in late 2010, although braced for a North Korean ‘provocation’, because Pyongyang’s they remain vague about how that was achieved. As You peace overtures of the past few months have failed to per- Ji writes: “… if one analysed the softening of the North’s suade Seoul, Washington or Tokyo to enter a dialogue” (2011). provocations vis-à-vis the ROK, such as making no mili- 26 Critics such as U.S. Senator John Kerry charge,“Our cur- tary move against the latters’ retaliatory artillery drill in the rent approach of strong sanctions and intense coordination Yeonyeong Island, one could detect the Chinese influence, with South Korea and Japan does not provide sufficient lever- although it is not clear what concrete measures Beijing had age to stabilize the situation, much less bring about a change used to pressure Pyongyang in December 2010” (2011,32). in North Korean behavior. Left unchecked, Pyongyang will

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 41 That goal will require a broader international to dodge U.N. sanctions and to continue its illicit effort beyond the strict parameters of allied coop- trade networks.27 eration in pressuring and isolating the North. The As stated earlier, “getting China right” is there- long-term problems of denuclearization and coun- fore in many ways the key component in finding a ter-proliferation of WMDs can be more effectively long-term solution to the North Korean problem. addressed if China is enlisted as a more reliable Since 2009, Beijing has taken an approach that pri- partner of the United States and its allies. As the oritizes peace and stability over denuclearization of leaked 2011 report of the UN Panel of Experts is the peninsula, putting it at odds with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. China’s subsequent policies and official rhetoric suggest that that …allied cooperation and course of action is not likely to change any time soon. However, Chinese scholars themselves admit deterrence may limit to a growing debate within China about the wisdom of its North Korea policies and the inherent pitfalls North Korean provocations of an approach that turns a blind eye to Pyongyang’s more egregious provocations and nuclear ambitions. in the short term, but Thus, persuading China to modify its approach to North Korea and to work more closely with the deterrence alone will United States, South Korea, and other partners in the region is not necessarily an act of futility.28 It not likely provide a long- will, however, require steadfast diplomacy, close consultation and coordination among the allies, and term solution to some some degree of flexibility in assuring Beijing that enhanced efforts to denuclearize North Korea do of the more intractable not represent a net loss for Chinese security interests—if anything, they can reinforce China’s stated security problems posed goals of preserving peace and stability in the region. Getting China, South Korea, and the United by the North Korean States to converge again on basic priorities vis-à-vis the North can potentially pave the way for greater regime and its increasing cooperation in other areas, not least of which could be restarting the six-party process (a somewhat military capabilities higher possibility of late). Some form of progress said to point out, collusion by third-party states has 27 A memorandum by the Congressional Research Service states, “Clearly, China holds the key to implementing sanc- allowed North Korea to sidestep many of the U.N. tions on the DPRK, and it arguably could devote more sanctions aimed at limiting its nuclear development resources to detecting and stopping North Korean violations of U.N. Security Council Resolutions” (Nikitin et al 2010). and weapons proliferation (Charbonneau 2011b). 28 As Zhu Feng writes, “There are signs that Chinese thinking Although not explicitly named in the report, China toward North Korea is becoming increasingly pluralistic. But is widely blamed by the United States and many in the North Korean question remains the single most divisive foreign policy issue in China. There are powerful reasons why the international community for enabling the DPRK China shouldn’t ‘abandon’ North Korea; historical ties, geo- graphical proximity, fears of a refugee influx, and uncertainty surrounding the security implications of sudden regime collapse all make China’s calculations vis-à-vis North Korea very build more nuclear weapons, test them and develop missiles complex. Many of China’s fears and concerns, however, could that could directly threaten the United States” (Kerry 2011). be addressed through international collaboration” (2011, 1).

42 Denuclearizing North Korea on the talks could, in turn, lead to further trilateral initiatives and CBMs, such as cooperation in HA/DR operations, border security, counter-proliferation, and other joint measures. Over time, more concrete dialogue between the United States, China, and South Korea could be conducted on revamp- ing or reconfiguring the armistice, developing regional security architectures, and laying the foun- dations for a potential peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 43 LIST OF ACRONYMS

CBM Confidence-building measures

CPV Chinese People’s Volunteer Army

DMZ demilitarized zone

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

GO general officer

IFANS Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (ROK)

IFPA Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (U.S.)

JNCC joint nuclear control commission (DPRK-ROK)

JSA Joint Security Area

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

KORCOM U.S. Korea Command (to be established in 2012) KORUS FTA Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement

KPA Korean People’s Army

44 Denuclearizing North Korea KPA/CPV MAC Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Military Armistice Commission

KPPR Korean Peninsula peace regime

MAC Military Armistice Commission

MDL military demarcation line

NLL Northern Limit Line

NNSC Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee

NSS Nuclear Security Summit NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty NSA Negative security assurance

OPCON operational control PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

UEP uranium enrichment program

UN United Nations

UNC United Nations Command

UNCMAC United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission

USFK U.S. Forces Korea

USIP U.S. Institute for Peace

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48 Denuclearizing North Korea Vershbow, Alexander. 2007. “A Peace Regime on —. 2011b. “S. Korea Voices Reservations on Food the Korean Peninsula: The Way Ahead,” remarks Aid to N. Korea despite EU Decision,” July 5, to the IFANS special seminar, “Peace Regime http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/20 on the Korean Peninsula: Visions and Tasks,” 11/07/05/14/0401000000AEN20110705007800 October 26. 315F.HTML. World Food Program. 2010. “North Korea Faces —. 2010. “North Korea Renews Call for Peace Treaty Serious Cereal Deficit, Food Shortages and with U.S. before Denuclearizing,” April 14. Undernourishment to Continue,” November —. 2009. “North Korea Says Nuclear War Only 17, http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/ Matter of Time,” April 17. north-korea-faces-serious-cereal-deficit-food- You Ji. 2011. “Dealing with the ‘North Korea shortages-and-undernourishment-conti. Dilemma’: China’s Strategic Choices,” RSIS Yonhap News Agency. 2011a. “S. Korea, U.S. set for Working Paper, no. 229, June 21. High-Level Talks on Extended Deterrence Next Zhu Feng. 2010. “China’s Policy Toward North Week,” March 21, http://english.yonhapnews. Korea: A New Twist?” PacNet, no. 60, Pacific co.kr/national/2011/03/21/34/0301000000AE Forum CSIS, December 8, http://csis.org/files/ N20110321001800315F.HTML. publication/pac1060.pdf.

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 49 APPENDICES Appendix A CONCISE CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

FROM JANUARY 2009 TO JUNE 2011

(Main sources: Comparative Connections, vol. 11 (2009) and vol. 12 (2010), Pacific Forum, CSIS; and Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea, vol. 34 (2011), Yonhap News Agency; articles from the Korea JoongAng Daily, the Dong-A Libo, the Chosun Ilbo, the Yonhap News Agency, the Korea Times, the Korean Central News Agency, the Interfax Information Service, the Xinhua News Agency, and the New York Times).

January. 17, 2009: Foreign Ministry of North Korea news outlet are detained by North Korean guards announces that the country will maintain its “sta- near the border between China and North Korea. tus as a nuclear weapons state” as long as it per- March 17-21, 2009: DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il ceives a nuclear threat from the United States. makes a five-day visit to China where he tours February. 24, 2009: DPRK announces that it is Shandong Province and meets senior officials preparing to launch an “experimental commu- in Beijing, including Premier Wen Jiabao, NPC nications satellite.” Standing Committee Chairman Wu Banguo, and March 9-20, 2009: Annual U.S.-South Korea joint President Hu Jintao. military exercise Key Resolve/Foal Eagle is held. March 24, 2009: A North Korean Foreign Minis- According to the USFK, this year’s drill involves try official warns that if the United States pushes 26,000 troops and a nuclear-powered carrier to for UN sanctions in response to its planned rock- test the ability to quickly deploy forces in the case et launch, the DPRK will quit the already stalled of a North Korean invasion. Six-Party Talks and restart a nuclear plant mak- March 17, 2009: Two U.S. journalists who work ing weapons-grade plutonium. for former U.S. Vice President Al Gore’s online March 29, 2009: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates says that the United States has no plans

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:1 for military action to pre-empt the launching of May 26, 2009: South Korea announces that it will a long-range missile by North Korea and would fully participate in the Proliferation Security Ini- act only if the missile or its parts appeared to be tiative (PSI). headed toward U.S. territory. May 26, 2009: U.S. President Obama tells ROK April 3, 2009: President Obama tells Chinese Pres- President Lee in a telephone conversation that ident Hu Jintao that the United States would con- “U.S. military strength and nuclear umbrella are sider a DPRK missile launch to be provocative and expansive enough to protect South Korea.” that the United States would seek punishment at May 27, 2009: Panmunjom office of the KPA the UN in response. declares the 1953 armistice “nullified” by this April 5, 2009: North Korea launches a rocket, “declaration of war against us.” It threatens a mil- which ends up in the waters about 1,984 miles itary strike if South Korea tries to interdict any from the launch site, about double the range com- of its ships, and warns it can no longer guaran- pared to the 1998 launch. tee the safety of U.S. and ROK military or private April 8, 2009: Chosun Ilbo reports that the DPRK vessels in waters west of the peninsula. notified the United States, China, and Russia in June 1, 2009: Sources in Seoul claim that on May advance of its plan to launch the long-range rock- 25, just after North Korea’s nuclear test, key et. DPRK institutions were formally notified that April 13, 2009: The UNSC unanimously adopts a Kim Jong-il has designated his third son, Kim nonbinding President’s Statement on the DPRK Jong-un, as his successor. rocket launch, condemning the action as a vio- June 12, 2009: UNSC unanimously passes Resolu- lation of a resolution banning the country from tion 1874, which calls on UN members to inspect all missile activity and demanding no further cargo vessels and airplanes suspected of carry- launches. ing military materials into or out of North Korea. April 14, 2009: In reaction to the UNSC statement, June 12, 2009: DPRK Foreign Ministry denounces the Foreign Ministry says the DPRK will “never” UNSC Resolution 1874 and says that North Korea again attend the Six-Party Talks, and will restore will “weaponize” its existing plutonium stock- its nuclear facilities to strengthen its deterrent. piles and begin a program to enrich uranium. April 29, 2009: Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry says Jun. 15, 2009: President Lee and President Obama that unless the UNSC apologizes for its criticisms hold a summit in Washington. They adopt a state- of the DPRK, it will conduct further nuclear and ment on a “joint vision for the Korea-U.S. alli- missile tests, start building a light-water reactor, ance.” and produce nuclear fuel. Jun. 15, 2009: Meeting with President Lee, Secre- May 12, 2009: U.S. special representative for DPRK tary of Defense Gates says the United States will policy, Stephen Bosworth, says he will consider use all means necessary, including nuclear arms, visiting Pyongyang to revive stalled talks on dis- to defend the ROK against military threats from mantling the DPRK’s nuclear program. the DPRK. May 25, 2009: North Korea conducts an under- June 17, 2009: In Washington, President Lee vows ground nuclear test near Kilju in the northeast. to break with the old pattern of compensating ROK President Lee calls this “truly disappoint- the North following provocations by the DPRK. ing.” North Korea also fires three short-range President Obama concurs. missiles toward the Sea of Japan. July 2, 2009: The DPRK test-fires four short-range KN-01 surface-to-ship missiles, with a range of

app:2 Denuclearizing North Korea 120-160 kilometers, from a base at Sinsang-ri August 4, 2009: Ex-U.S. President Clinton visits north of the port of Wonsan. the DPRK. After three hours of talks and dinner July 3, 2009: President Barack Obama says that with Kim Jong-il, he departs with two U.S. jour- the United States is trying to “keep a door open” nalists, who were arrested and sentenced for illic- for North Korea to return to international nucle- itly entering the DPRK from China. ar disarmament talks, even as Washington pur- August 8, 2009: Rodong Sinmun, daily paper of the sues sanctions against the DPRK. Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), says that “the July 4, 2009: North Korea fires seven ballistic mis- improvement and development of North-South siles—two mid-range Nodongs and five shorter- relations is a prerequisite to settling the problems range Scuds —into the East Sea/Sea of Japan of the Korean nation.” But the paper blames cur- from its Kitdaeryong base near Wonsan. This rent tensions on Seoul’s “confrontational policy.” is its largest one-day barrage since a long-range August 17–27, 2009: The U.S. and South Korea Taepodong-2 and six smaller missiles were fired conduct Ulchi Freedom Guardian, an annual joint in July 2006. military exercise involving about 56,000 ROK July 6, 2009: ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung- troops and 10,000 U.S. troops. hwan says his ministry will be in charge of per- August 19, 2009: KCNA says that a Northern del- suading the United States to allow the ROK to egation led by WPK secretary Kim Ki-nam will pursue a broader commercial nuclear program visit Seoul to mourn former President Kim Dae- including the “recycling” of spent fuel. jung. July 7, 2009: President Obama says that he doesn’t August 22, 2009: WPK director Kim Yang-gon and think a war “is imminent” with the DPRK. He ROK Unification Minister Hyun In-taek hold the also says, “I think they understand that they first high-level inter-Korean talks in nearly two would be overwhelmed in a serious military con- years, in Seoul. Hyun also hosts a dinner for the flict with the United States.” entire six-person Northern delegation that eve- July 7, 2009: ROK Defense Ministry official says ning. that the United States is open to talks on the pos- August 23, 2009: Having extended their stay in sibility of South Korea developing ballistic mis- Seoul, visiting DPRK delegates meet President siles capable of striking all of North Korea. Lee at the Blue House and deliver a verbal mes- July 13, 2009: U.S. Ambassador to ROK Kath- sage from Kim Jong-il. leen Stephens says that the nuclear agreement September 1, 2009: DPRK leader Kim Jong-il says between the United States and the ROK should in a commentary carried on Pyongyang Radio, “We be changed based on the understanding that can ease tensions and remove the danger of war peaceful nuclear development is important to on the peninsula when the U.S. abandons its hos- the ROK. tile policy and signs a peace treaty with us.” July 14, 2009: The commander of USFK, Gen. September 14, 2009: MOFAT spokesman says Walter Sharp, says that the United States has no Seoul does not oppose the idea of bilateral U.S.- immediate plans to allow South Korea to devel- DPRK talks, provided these expedite the six-par- op longer-range missiles to counter North Korea’s ty process rather than replacing it. nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. September 15, 2009: President Lee attributes July 25, 2009: DPRK Ambassador to the UN Sin recent DPRK gestures to the impact of UNSC Son-ho says that Pyongyang is “not against dia- sanctions, but says it “is still not showing any logue” with Washington. He also says “the Six- sincerity or signs that it will give up its nucle- Party Talks are gone forever.” ar ambitions.”

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:3 September 16–18, 2009: A Chinese delegation led of Japan. Officials in Seoul say this violates UNSC by State Councilor Dai Bingguo visits Pyongyang Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874. and meets top legislator Kim Yong-nam and Vice October 13, 2009: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Foreign Ministers Kang Sok-ju and Kim Yong-il. Clinton says the US has absolutely no intention Dai delivers a letter from President Hu to Kim of relaxing sanctions against the DPRK before Jong-il. denuclearization. September 21, 2009: Visiting the United States, October 14, 2009: Rodong Shinmun says “a peace President Lee proposes a “grand bargain” to accord should be concluded between the DPRK resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, including eco- and the United States if the nuclear issue on the nomic-political incentives and a security guar- peninsula is to be settled.” U.S. Assistant Secre- antee. tary of State Kurt Campbell says that the Unit- September 22, 2009: State Department spokesman ed States is ready for an “initial interaction” with Ian Kelly reiterates that the U.S. will provide a the DPRK “that would lead rapidly to a six-party package of incentives to the DPRK if it takes irre- resumption of talks.” versible steps toward its denuclearization. October 20, 2009: DPRK Vice Foreign Minister September 22, 2009: An ROK official at the Min- Kim Kye-gwan says, “We are committing our istry of National Defense says the ROK has no own efforts for the good result and for the good plan to participate in the U.S.-led global ballis- future of relations between our two nations and tic missile defense (BMD) network. for successful talks with the United States and September 30, 2009: President Lee says Seoul to defend the peace, which is the common goal should take the lead in resolving global issues of our two nations, the Americans and the peo- as well as those involving the DPRK. Regard- ple of the DPRK, to live as friends.” ing the North, he adds: “We’ve lacked our own October 24, 2009: U.S. Special Envoy for Disarma- voice in simply following proposals from Wash- ment Talks Sung Kim meets DPRK envoy Ri Gun ington and Beijing.” to convey the US position on denuclearization. September 30, 2009: KCNA rejects Lee Myung- November 1, 2009: An official in Seoul says that bak’s “grand bargain” idea unless the ROK first the United States and ROK have finalized Oper- discards confrontational policies. ational Plan (OPLAN) 5029, which specifies October 1, 2009: On ROK Armed Forces Day, Pres- joint responses to possible DPRK contingencies, ident Lee Myung-bak says: “South-North dia- including regime collapse. logue and peace will progress when we have a November 3, 2009: KCNA says that the DPRK has strong military with firm readiness.” “successfully completed the reprocessing of 8,000 October 6, 2009: Xinhua reports that DPRK lead- spent fuel rods,” with “noticeable successes…in er Kim Jong-il told Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao turning the extracted plutonium weapon-grade that the DPRK “is willing to attend multilateral for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deter- talks, including the Six-Party Talks, depending on rent.” the progress in its talks with the United States.” November 10, 2009: A DPRK patrol boat enters October 7, 2009: Gen. Walter Sharp, commander Southern waters and responds to a warning shot of US forces in Korea says the US will transfer with fifty rounds of live fire. The ROK navy fires wartime control of ROK troops in 2012 despite two hundred rounds and seriously damages the concerns over a nuclear-armed DPRK. boat. October 12, 2009: North Korea test-fires five KN-02 short-range missiles in the East Sea/Sea

app:4 Denuclearizing North Korea November 16, 2009: Rodong Sinmun demands that March 11, 2010: Gen. Sharp says that U.S. troops the United States must pull its troops out of the who would be tasked with eliminating the ROK as early as possible. DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction in the event November 17, 2009: Rodong Sinmun vows that of armed conflict are participating in the current North Korea “will continue to make active efforts Key Resolve-Foal Eagle U.S.-ROK military exer- for the improvement of North-South relations.” cise (from March 8–18). November 19, 2009: President Obama pledges in March 26, 2010: The twelve-hundred-ton ROK Seoul that the U.S. commitment to peace and navy corvette Cheonan sinks off Baengnyeong, stability in Korea “will never waver.” South Korea’s northwestern island, close to the December 8-10, 2009: Ambassador Bosworth vis- Northern coast and near the NLL, which the its Pyongyang and says that the United States DPRK disputes. has reached a “common understanding” with the April 11, 2010: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates DPRK on the need to resume the Six-Party Talks announces that the U.S. will leave “all options and implement the principles outlined in 2005. … on the table” vis-à-vis North Korea, including December 9, 2009: Rodong Sinmun says the DPRK the use of nuclear weapons. nuclear issue resulted from the hostile policy May 3–7, 2010: Sources in Seoul report that Kim of the United States, is “totally bilateral,” and Jong-il has begun a nominally secret visit to “would be solved spontaneously” after the Unit- China, his first since 2006. He returns home on ed States drops its anti-DPRK policy, eradicates May 7, apparently a day earlier than planned and the military threat against Pyongyang, and stops possibly in high dudgeon. its nuclear war provocation. May 20, 2010: South Korea’s Joint Investigation January 10, 2010: North Korea’s Foreign Minis- Group (JIG) publishes its findings that Cheonan try proposes discussions on a peace treaty, either was sunk by a DPRK torpedo. The United States, within the Six-Party Talks framework or at an Japan, and other Western allies offer support and independent meeting of signatories of the 1953 condemn North Korea. armistice (that is, China, the US and DPRK, but May 27, 2010: South Korea launches an anti-sub- not the ROK). Washington and Seoul call for marine drill off its west coast. Pyongyang to first return to the Six-Party Talks. June 4, 2010: ROK formally refers the Cheonan sink- January 27, 2010: U.S. President Barack Obama, ing to the UNSC. North Korea threatens “the in the State of the Union Address, calls on the toughest retaliation” should the world body dis- DPRK and Iran to abandon their nuclear ambi- cuss punishing the DPRK. tions, warning of stronger sanctions if they con- June 16, 2010: President Obama announces that tinue to pursue atomic weapons. the United States will extend its current sanc- January 27, 2010: The KPA fires about thirty artil- tions regime on North Korea by one more year, lery rounds near, but on its side of, the Northern arguing that the “existence and the risk of prolif- Limit Line. The ROK Navy ripostes with about eration of weapons-usable fissile material on the 100 warning shots. Pyongyang says this is an Korean Peninsula continue to pose an unusual annual drill, which will continue. It does, firing and extraordinary threat” to the United States. a total of about 350 rounds through January 29. June 26, 2010: Presidents Lee and Obama decide to February 8, 2010: In an interview with CNN, U.S. delay Seoul’s scheduled takeover of wartime oper- Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says the Obama ational control of its troops (OPCON) to Decem- administration will continue engaging the DPRK ber 1, 2015. to convince it to return to the Six-Party Talks.

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:5 July 8, 2010: China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman September 16, 2010: Assistant secretary of state Qin Gang says that China “resolutely opposes” for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, joint naval exercises that South Korea and the testifies before the Senate Armed Services Com- United States plan to conduct in the Yellow Sea. mittee, making it clear that the State Department July 9, 2010: The UNSC adopts a Presidential State- won’t get ahead of Seoul in engaging North Korea. ment on the Cheonan, which avoids directly con- September 27, 2010: South Korea and the United demning North Korea. States launch joint anti-submarine military exer- July 25–28, 2010: The United States and South cises in the Yellow Sea. Korea conduct a large-scale naval exercise code- September 28, 2010: Kim Jong-un is named vice named Invincible Spirit in the Sea of Japan that chairman of the Central Military Commission includes the aircraft carrier USS George Washing- of the WPK. ton and twenty other ships and submarines, one October 1, 2010: The Koreas hold their first direct hundred aircraft, and eight thousand personnel military talks (colonel level) in two years. The from the U.S. and ROK armed services. South insists on an apology, while the North still August 5, 2010: Following joint US-ROK exercises demands to send its own inspectors to examine in the East Sea, South Korea holds its own five- the Cheonan wreckage. day naval maneuvers in the West (Yellow) Sea. October 8, 2010: U.S. Secretary of Defense Sec- August 9, 2010: DPRK fires some 130 rounds of retary Robert Gates and ROK Defense Minister artillery into the Yellow Sea near its border with Kim Tae-young say that both allies are fully ready the South. for “all situations that could occur.” August 16–26, 2010: South Korea and the United October 10, 2010: In his second major public States conduct the annual Ulchi Freedom Guard- appearance, Kim Jong-un joins his father (and ian (UFG) exercise, a computer-based simulation a senior Chinese delegation) on the saluting involving about fifty-six thousand ROK and thir- stand for a large-scale military parade marking ty thousand US troops. the WPK’s sixty-fifth anniversary. August 25–27, 2010: Former president Carter vis- October 12, 2010: North Korea’s lead Six-Party its Pyongyang and wins the release of an Amer- Talks negotiator Kim Gye-Gwan meets China’s ican humanitarian activist. vice foreign minister and chief negotiator at the August 26–30, 2010: Kim Jong-il makes a sudden Six-Party Talks, Wu Dawei, in Beijing. trip to China, his second in four months. He vis- October 13-14, 2010: South Korea hosts a PSI mar- its several cities in the northeast, meeting Pres- itime exercise off the coast of Pusan. ident Hu Jintao in Changchun. October 25, 2010: The Pentagon announces it will August 30, 2010: President Obama signs an exec- postpone planned joint naval drills in the Yellow utive order mandating new financial sanctions Sea with the ROK, but adds that China had noth- on North Korea. ing to do with the decision. September 1, 2010: China starts a four-day artil- October 28, 2010: In a speech given in Honolulu, lery exercise in waters off Qingdao. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to the September 12, 2010: U.S. special representative U.S.-Korea alliance as a “lynchpin” of peace and for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, and security in the region. U.S. special envoy for the Six-Party Talks, Sung October 29, 2010: North Korea fires two rounds Kim, arrive in Seoul to meet with Shin Kak-soo, toward South Korea and South Korean troops the acting foreign minister, and Wi Sung-lac, the return fire. ROK’s chief nuclear envoy.

app:6 Denuclearizing North Korea November 9, 2010: U.S. Chairman of the Joint upcoming U.S.-ROK joint exercises in the Yel- Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Adm. Mike Mullen reiter- low Sea. ates the U.S. pledge to send an aircraft carrier November 27, 2010: Chinese State Counselor Dai into the Yellow Sea for joint drills with the ROK Bingguo makes a sudden visit to Seoul to meet in the near future. President Lee. November 11, 2010: Presidents Obama and Lee November 28, 2010: China proposes emergen- meet on the sidelines of the G20 in Seoul to dis- cy consultations with members of the Six-Par- cuss the KORUS FTA, North Korea, and resump- ty Talks. tion of the Six-Party Talks. November 28–December 1, 2010: The United November 20, 2010: The New York Times reports States and the ROK hold large-scale joint naval that earlier this month Siegried Hecker, the for- drills off the west coast of the peninsula, includ- mer head of Los Alamos National Laboratory, ing the ninety-seven-thousand-ton aircraft carri- was shown a hitherto unsuspected ultra-mod- er USS George Washington. ern uranium enrichment (UE) facility contain- November 29, 2010: In a televised address, ROK ing some two thousand centrifuges at Yongbyon. President Lee pledges strong retaliation to any On November 22 Hecker publishes a full report future provocations. He says Seoul has given up of his visit. hope that dialogue will make Pyongyang abandon November 22, 2010: U.S. special representative brinkmanship and nuclear weapons. He rejects for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, dis- China’s proposal for convening an emergency patched to Asia in the wake of Hecker’s UE rev- meeting of the Six-Party Talks. elations, says that this news is disappointing and December 6, 2010: According to the White House, provocative, but “not a crisis.” President Obama asks President Hu Jintao “to November 22, 2010: ROK begins its annual large- send a clear message to North Korea that its prov- scale Hoguk military exercise. ocations are unacceptable.” November 22, 2010: Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong- December 9, 2010: Kim Jong-il meets Chinese un visit the DPRK’s southwest coast, to inspect State Counselor Dai Bingguo in Pyongyang. fish farms. December 13, 2010: The United States and the November 23, 2010: The KPA fires some 170 artil- ROK form the Extended Deterrence Policy Com- lery shells at the ROK’s Yeonpyeong Island, close mittee, a joint committee to make decisions about to the DPRK west coast. ROK forces fire about the alliance’s nuclear and extended deterrence 80 rounds back. The KPA claims Seoul started policies. this, by firing shells into its territorial waters. December 14, 2010: Beijing says Pyongyang has President Lee calls the North’s act “an invasion agreed to an emergency meeting of chief envoys of South Korean territory.” to the Six-Party Talks. Seoul and its allies are less November 24, 2010: The State Department urges than keen, to put it mildly. China to influence North Korea to reduce ten- December 15, 2010: Deputy Secretary of State sions. James Steinberg leads a delegation to Beijing to November 25, 2010: Secretary Clinton reassures discuss Northeast Asian security and develop- the ROK of the U.S. commitment to the alliance. ments on the Korean Peninsula. November 26, 2010: Chinese Foreign Minister December 16, 2010: North Korea’s Foreign Min- Yang Jiechi expresses Beijing’s concern over the istry states that the DPRK “supports all proposals for dialogue including the Six-Party Talks…

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:7 to prevent a war and realize denuclearization on February 8–9, 2011: Preliminary military talks the Korean Peninsula.” between South and North Korea break down December 16, 2010: Chosun Ilbo reports that Kim as the North refuses to apologize and admit its Jong-il said during a meeting with State Coun- responsibility for deadly provocations in 2010. selor Dai Bingguo that he was willing to consider February 25, 2011: ROK Prime Minister Kim allowing IAEA inspections into the DPRK. Hwang-sik says absorption-based reunification December 16–19, 2010: New Mexico Gov. Bill is not an option despite protracted military ten- Richardson visits Pyongyang for an unofficial dip- sions between South and North Koreas. lomatic mission at the invitation of DPRK nego- February 28–March 31, 2011: The United States tiator Kim Gye-gwan. and South Korea begin to conduct the annual Key December 18, 2010: China expresses its opposi- Resolve-Foal Eagle military exercise. This year’s tion to South Korea’s upcoming drills. drill involves thirteen thousand U.S. troops and December 20, 2010: An emergency session of the more than two hundred thousand0 ROK troops, UN Security Council fails to agree on a state- including a U.S. Navy carrier strike group led by ment on defusing tensions on the Korean Pen- the USS Ronald Reagan. insula. China reportedly threatens to veto any March 25–29, 2011: North Korean diplomats phrase condemning the DPRK for its November including Ri Gun, director-general in charge of 23 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong. U.S. affairs meet with ex-U.S. officials includ- December 20, 2010: South Korea conducts a nine- ing Joel Wit and Richard Allen in the closed- ty-minute live-fire drill on Yeonpyeong, firing door forum in Germany arranged by the Aspen about fifteen hundred rounds. North does not Institute. respond. April 14, 2011: A Pentagon official tells the Sen- December 22, 2010: North Korea and the United ate Armed Services Committee that the United States restore their New York dialogue channel. States and South Korea signed an agreement for cooperation in developing a future BMD program December 23, 2010: South Korea stages massive against North Korea. firing drills involving missiles, artillery, and fight- er jets near the border with North Korea. April 18, 2011: U.S. Department of State urges North Korea to improve ties with South Korea December 30, 2010: ROK 2010 Defense White Paper before moving to another round of the Six-Par- labels the DPRK an “enemy.” While harsher than ty Talks. the phrase “direct military threat” in the last White Paper, this is not as strong as “main enemy” April 26–28, 2011: Former president Carter visits which was used from 1995–2004, which some Pyongyang with other former world leaders. Cart- now wished to restore. er has a meeting with Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam January 3, 2011: In his New Year’s address, ROK and Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun. President Lee says, “I remind the North that the path toward peace is yet open. The door for dia- May 9, 2011: ROK President Lee says he will invite logue is still open.” He adds that “nuclear weap- North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to the second ons and military adventurism must be discarded.” nuclear summit in Seoul in March 2012 if he makes a firm commitment to scrapping his nucle- January 26, 2011: DPRK Foreign Ministry releases a ar weapons program. statement reiterating North Korea’s commitment to the denuclearization of the “entire Korean Pen- May 17, 2011: DPRK leader Kim Jong-il meets with insula” and also warns Seoul against setting “uni- a Russian delegation headed by M. Y. Fradkov, lateral preconditions” for the cross-border talks. director of the External Intelligence Bureau of

app:8 Denuclearizing North Korea Russia, and discusses the nuclear and humani- June 9, 2011: Another Sino-DPRK joint economic tarian aid issues. development project of the Rason Economic and May 20–26, 2011: Kim Jong-il unofficially visits Trade Zone begins construction. China and meets with PRC President Fu, Pre- June 13, 2011: Kim Jong-il meets with the Chi- mier Wen, and Vice President Xi Jinping. This is nese delegation headed by Li Yuanchao, a head his second-longest visit to China since becoming of the CPC Organization Department. Xinhua general secretary of the WPK. KCNA says both news agency reports that DPRK leader Kim says, sides recognize that “the adherence to the goal of “The DPRK would like to join hands with China denuclearization on the whole Korean Peninsula, to enhance high-level contacts, maintain close peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue coordination, boost practical cooperation, expand including the resumption of the Six-Party Talks cultural exchange and safeguard regional peace and the elimination of obstructive elements con- and stability.” The Chinese delegation arrived on form to the overall interests of Northeast Asia.” June 10 and held a strategic dialogue with North May 21–22, 2011: Chinese Premier Wen attends Korean counterparts. the PRC-ROK-Japan trilateral summit in Tokyo June 16, 2011: South Korea sets up a new mili- and explains to his counterparts about Kim Jong- tary command to defend five frontline islands il’s visit to China. It is a rare case for China to near the Yellow Sea border from possible North explain the visit to foreign leaders before Kim Korean attacks. has left China. June 17, 2011: South Korea deploys several preci- May 24-28, 2011: Robert King, U.S. special envoy sion-guided land missiles, known as the Army for North Korean human rights, travels to North Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), capable of Korea to assess the severity of North Korean food striking Pyongyang. shortages. June 19, 2011: Yonhap News Agency reports ROK June 1, 2011: KCNA says that representatives of official says South Korea will distinguish the the two Koreas met secretly in Beijing more than DPRK nuclear issue from the apology request once starting May 9, and ROK officials offered to North Korea on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong an envelope full of cash for inter-Korean sum- island incidents in order to promote the recov- mits to be held in late-June, August 2011, and ery of the Six-Party Talks process. March 2012. ROK MOU official admits the meet- June 23, 2011: ROK President Lee says to parlia- ings but denies any bribes or dates for summits mentary members that China clearly warned were offered. North Korea that South Korea would retaliate June 6, 2011: DPRK decides to set up the Hwang- if North Korea carries out another provocation. gumphyong and Wihwa Islands Economic Zone June 27, 2011: Chosun Ilbo reports that ROK official in the middle of the Yalu River in order to boost says there is no pre-condition to the inter-Kore- the DPRK-China friendship and expand and an talks for denuclearization. develop bilateral economic relations. Construc- June 28, 2011: Korea JoongAng Daily reports that the tion will begin on June 8. United States wants Seoul to do more on its part June 9, 2011: Chosun Ilbo reports that North Korea to improve inter-Korean relations, despite reaf- test-fired one KN-06 short-range surface-to-air firming that inter-Korean talks should precede missile from a coastal area of North Pyongan the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Province to in the West (Yellow) Sea during the June 30, 2011: Korea JoongAng Daily reports that a previous week. summit between Kim Jong-il and Russian Pres- ident Dmitry Medvedev in Vladivostok appears

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:9 to have been cancelled, reportedly scheduled on discussed the potential resumption of the Six- June 30 or July 1. Party Talks. July 22, 2011: Chief negotiators from South and July 28, 2011: North Korean first vice minister Kim North Korea meet for the first time since 2008 Kye-Gwan meets U.S. special envoy on North on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Korea Stephen Bosworth at the U.S. mission to Asian Nations regional forum in Bali. Wi Sung- the United Nations for “exploratory” discussions lac of South Korea and Ri Yong-ho of North Korea on further denuclearization talks

app:10 Denuclearizing North Korea Appendix B TRAIL OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO KOREAN PEACE REGIME DEVELOPMENT

Date Title Parties Highlights 7/27/1953 The Korean War Armistice Chinese People’s Codified the ceasefire Agreement Volunteers Established 38th parallel as Military Demarcation Line Korean People’s Instituted special commissions to oversee terms Army United Nations Command 7/4/1972 North-South Joint North Korea The first official joint statement agreeing to principles of Communiqué South Korea independent and peaceful reconciliation

12/13/1991 Agreement on North Korea Created foundation for future discussions regarding peace- Reconciliation, South Korea ful reconciliation Nonaggression, and Detailed several CBMs Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (Basic Agreement) 1/20/1992 Joint Declaration of the North Korea Agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, possess, store, Denuclearization of the South Korea deploy, or use nuclear weapons Korean Peninsula Agreed not to possess uranium enrichment facilities

6/11/1993 Joint Statement of the North Korea Recognized each country’s sovereignty DPRK and the United United States Pledged non-interference in domestic affairs States 10/21/1994 Agreed Framework North Korea First official mention of moving toward “full normalization” of between the United States United States U.S.-DPRK relations and the DPRK U.S. assurances against the threat or use of nukes against the North

6/15/2000 South-North North Korea Sought common ground between the South’s concept of Joint Statement South Korea confederation and the North’s formula for loose federation Promoted balanced development of the national economy 9/19/2005 Joint Statement of the China DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and pro- Fourth Round of the Six- Japan grams, and U.S. affirmed no-attack pledge Party Talks North Korea Agreed that the “directly related parties will negotiate a Russia permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an South Korea appropriate separate forum.” United States

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:11 11/17/2005 Joint Declaration on the South Korea The “two leaders shared a common understanding that the ROK-U.S. Alliance and United States process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will pro- Peace on the Korean vide an important basis to build a durable peace regime on Peninsula the Korean Peninsula.” 2/13/2007 The Initial Actions for the China Established five working groups to deal with core issues Implementation of the Japan including U.S.-DPRK normalization and NE Asian regional Joint Statement North Korea security Russia Reiterated plan for directly related parties to negotiate a South Korea KPPR United States 10/4/2007 Declaration on the North Korea Reaffirmed principles in the June 15 Joint Declaration Advancement of South- South Korea Recognized the need to end the armistice and build a perma- North Korean Relations, nent peace regime Peace and Prosperity Agreed to work together to have the “leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned” to declare an end to the war

app:12 Denuclearizing North Korea Appendix C NORTH-SOUTH JOINT AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION, AND COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE (BASIC AGREEMENT), 1991

Adopted at the third-day session of the fifth north-south high-level talks in Seoul on December 13, 1991 Pursuant to the will of all the fellow countrymen desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country, reaffirming the three principles of national reunification laid down in the July 4th North-South Joint Statement; Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of detente and for the guarantee of peace; To realize many-sized cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation; and To make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not the one between countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification, the north and the south have agreed as follows:

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:13 1. North-South Reconciliation Article 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side. Article 2. The north and the south shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. Article 3. The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side. Article 4. The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the other side. Article 5. The north and the south shall make concerted efforts to convert the present armistice into a durable peace between the north and the south and observe the present Military Armistice Agreement until such peace has been achieved. Article 6. The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each other and make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena. Article 7. The north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south liaison office at Panmunjom within three months after the effectuation of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and prompt consultation with each other. Article 8. The north and the south shall form a north-south political subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures for implementing and observing the agreement on north-south reconciliation.

2. North-South Nonaggression Article 9. The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they invade the other by force of arms. Article 10. The north and the south shall settle differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue and negotiation. Article 11. The north and the south shall designate as the demarcation line and zone of nonaggression the Military Demarcation Line which was laid down in the agreement on the military armistice dated July 27, 1953 and the area which has so far been within the jurisdiction of the sides. Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression the north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south joint military committee within three months after the effectuation of this agreement. The north-south joint military committee shall discuss and promote the realization of military confidence- building and disarmament, such as notification of and control over the transfer of large units and military exercises, use of the Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, exchange of military personnel and information, the realization of phased arms cutdown including the removal of mass destruction weapons and offensive capability and their verification. Article 13. The north and the south shall install and operate direct telephone links between the military authorities of the sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts. Article 14. The north and the south shall form a north-south military sub-committee within the framework of the full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement and discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and the removal of military confrontation.

app:14 Denuclearizing North Korea 3. North-South Cooperation and Exchange Article 15. The north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange, such as joint development of resources and the exchange of goods in the form of exchange within the nation and joint investment for the coordinated and balanced development of the national economy and for the promotion of the well-being of the whole nation. Article 16. The north and the south shall effect cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as science, technology, education, literature and art, public health, sports, environment and mass media including newspapers, radio, TV and publications. Article 17. The north and the south shall effect free travels and contacts between members of the nation. Article 18. The north and the south shall effect free correspondence, travels, meetings and visits between the separated families and relatives and their reunion based on their free will and take measures regarding other problems awaiting humanitarian solution. Article 19. The north and the south shall connect severed railways and roads and open sea and air routes. Article 20. The north and the south shall install and connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of post and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere of exchange. Article 21. The north and the south shall cooperate with each other in economic, cultural and many other fields in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities. Article 22. For the implementation of the agreement on effecting cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as economy and culture, the north and the south shall form a north-south joint economic cooperation and exchange committee and other departmental joint committees within three months after the effectuation of this agreement. Article 23. In order to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on cooperation and exchange between the north and the south, the two parts shall establish a north-south cooperation and exchange subcommittee within the framework of the full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of the agreement.

4. Amendments and Effectuation Article 24. This agreement can be amended and supplemented by mutual consent. Article 25. This agreement shall become effective as from the date when the north and the south exchange its text after they go through necessary formalities.

Inked December 13, 1991 by, Yon Hyong Muk Premier, DPRK Administration Council, Head of the north side’s chief delegate of the delegation to the N-S high-level talks Chong Won Sik Prime Minister, ROK Chief delegate of the south side’s delegation to the S-N high-level talks

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:15 Appendix D AGENDA FROM JANUARY, 2011 WORKSHOP

Risk Reduction & Conﬁdence-Building on the Korean Peninsula: Challenges, Opportunities & Implications for Regional Stability

January 19, 2011 Seoul, Republic of Korea Organized by: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Supported by: The Carnegie Corporation of New York

January 19, 2011

9:00-9:15 Welcome and Introduction Amb. Lee Joon-gyu, IFANS Dr. Charles Perry, IFPA

Session I: The Post-Cheonan and Post-Yeonpyeong Security Environment 9:15-10:45 This session will address such questions as: • How has the peninsular and regional security environment changed almost one year after the Cheonan incident? Are there new perceived threats to regional stability and have calculations of deterrence been altered since the incident? To what extent is this reflected in the November 2010 tensions? Is there a need for improved crisis management capabilities? • What is the impact, if any, of the North Korean succession process on regional security calculations? On the prospects for effective dialogue and threat reduction efforts? What might be done to make the most of the changes? • How have critical bilateral relations among the key players (i.e., US-PRC, ROK-DPRK, ROK-PRC, Japan-PRC, etc.) changed, and how are these ties likely to evolve over the long-term? What is their likely impact on broader regional relations? • What lessons can we learn from the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, and how can we move beyond them in order to avoid similar crises and take advantages of opportunities to reduce tensions? Is the prospect of new North Korean leadership an opportunity or only another complication? Moderator: Dr. Charles Perry, IFPA Lead US Discussant: Mr. Ralph Cossa, PacificForum CSIS Lead China Discussant: Dr. Shen Dingli, Fudan University Lead ROK Discussant: Dr. Shin Beom Chul, KIDA

app:16 Denuclearizing North Korea Session II: Toward a Revamped Crisis Management and Risk Reduction Framework 11:00-12:30 This session will address such questions as: • What adjustments could be made to bolster near-term risk management and address ongoing concerns about proliferation threats (and their interconnections) on the Peninsula? • How can existing non- and counter-proliferation mechanisms be applied more effectively to North Korean challenges, thereby promoting and supporting regional stability? • How can additional Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) support the Armi- stice and reduce future risks and tensions in the region? • What can the relevant parties do to support implementation of the inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration? • What is the proper division of labor between various bilateral measures and multilateral measures to reduce tensions and support stability on and around the Peninsula? • How can a revamped Armistice build toward long-term stability and set conditions for an eventual peace regime on the Peninsula? Moderator: Dr. Jacquelyn Davis, IFPA Lead China Discussant: Dr. Teng Jianqun, CIIS Lead US Discussant: RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), CNA Lead ROK Discussant: Dr. Cheon Seongwhun, KINU

12:30-14:00 Keynote Luncheon Address The Honorable Hwang Jin Ha (Ret. Lieutenant General, ROK Army), Member, ROK National Assembly; Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee

Session III: Envisioning a New Peninsular and Regional Security Structure 14:00-15:30 This session will address such questions as: • How can the five parties work together beyond the six-party-talks structure to stabilize the Korean Peninsu- la and reduce tensions over the long-term? What additional parties (e.g., Australia, the ARF, etc.) and global institutions (i.e., the UN and its affiliated agencies) should be involved in the process? • What additional risk reduction measures can the five parties and global institutions under- take to address North Korea’s WMD-related programs and the risks they pose? • What would an ideal regional security structure look like without the baggage of legacy issues (i.e., past conflicts and disputes over history, territory, etc.)? What would be the priorities of that new framework, and how would regional players cooperate to achieve those objectives? • Can a new regional security structure evolve into a peace regime over time? Is there already a peace regime strategy in place among the key players? If so, what are the goals and objectives? • How can the key players work together to realize a peace regime, and how can they cooperate to make it effective and sustainable? What can be done to implement elements of a peace regime now? • How can we work over the short term and long term to bring about positive change in North Korea and with respect to North Korea’s regional role? Moderator: RADM Eric McVadon, USN (Ret.), IFPA Lead Korea Discussant: Prof. Kim Young-ho, KNDU Lead China Discussant: Prof. Zhu Feng, CISS, Peking University Lead US Discussant: Amb. Jack Pritchard, KEI

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:17 Session IV: Workshop Discussion Wrap-up and Possible Next Steps 15:45-17:00 Based on the previous sessions, what are specific “take away” points that could be followed up by participants from each nation? How can we best coordinate bilateral, trilateral, and broader multilateral efforts to promote the ideas covered in today’s workshop? Do the security dialogues and risk reduction efforts of other regions in transition – such as post-Cold War Europe – hold useful lessons for setting in place a new peace and security regime in Northeast Asia? What specifically should future Track 1.5 dialogues focus on to support key objectives identified during the workshop discussions? Moderator: Mr. Weston Konishi, IFPA Lead US Discussant: Mr. Scott Snyder, Asia Foundation Lead China Discussant: Prof. Zhuang Jianzhong, CNSS, Jiaotong University Lead Korea Discussant: Prof. Choi Kang, IFANS

18:00-20:00 Closing dinner Hosted by The Honorable Hyun In-taek, Minister of Unification, Republic of Korea

app:18 Denuclearizing North Korea Appendix E PARTICIPANTS FROM JANUARY, 2011 WORKSHOP (In alphabetical order by country/affiliation)

CHINA Dr. JIN Canrong Mr. YANG Xiyu Professor & Associate Dean Senior Fellow School of International Studies, China Institute of International Studies and Renmin University Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. LI Jun Professor ZHU Feng Associate Research Professor Deputy Director Korean Peninsular Studies Division, Center for International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations Peking University Dr. SHEN Dingli Professor ZHUANG Jianzhong Director, Center for American Studies and Deputy Director Vice Dean, Institute of International Affairs, Fudan Center for National Security Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University University Dr. TENG Jianqun Director and Research Fellow Center for Arms Control, China Institute of International Studies

UNITED STATES Mr. Ralph A. COSSA Dr. Patricia FALCONE President Senior Policy Analyst on Extended Deterrence Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Office of Science & Technology Policy, Studies (CSIS) The White House Dr. Jacquelyn K. DAVIS Captain John M. FIGUERRES, USN Executive Vice President Director, DPRK Strategic Focus Group, IFPA U.S. Pacific Command Ms. Dorothy Anne (“Deidi”) DELAHANTY Mr. L. Gordon FLAKE Political Military Counselor Executive Director U.S. Embassy, Seoul The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:19 Mr. Philip A. (“Tony”) FOLEY Center for Conflict Management, Director, Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Dr. Charles M. PERRY U.S. Department of State Vice President and Director of Studies Mr. Ken GAUSE IFPA Senior Research Analyst Mr. Bryan PORT Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Senior Analyst & Deputy Director, Strategy Dr. Robert H. GROMOLL Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5, United Nations Command, Director, Office of Regional Affairs Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Korea U.S. Department of State Ambassador Charles L. (“Jack”) PRITCHARD Mr. Thomas JUNG President Policy Planning Staff Korea Economic Institute (KEI) U.S. Department of State Mr. James L. SCHOFF Mr. Michael H. KEIFER Special Advisor for East Asia Policy Chief, Advanced Concepts Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, U.S. Department of Defense Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Mr. Scott SNYDER Mr. Weston S. KONISHI Director Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, IFPA The Asia Foundation Colonel Kevin W. MADDEN, USA Dr. Paul B. STARES Defense and Army Attaché Director and General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow U.S. Embassy, Seoul Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations Dr. Mark E. MANYIN Specialist in Asian Affairs Mr. William H. TOBEY U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Senior Fellow Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Rear Admiral Michael McDEVITT, USN (Ret.) Harvard University Vice-President and Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Brigadier General Martin WHELAN, USAF Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Deputy Associate Director, Operations Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Rear Admiral Eric A. McVADON, USN (Ret.) Sr. Advisor & Director Emeritus Dr. Abiodun WILLIAMS Asia-Pacific Studies Vice President IFPA Center for Conflict Management, Colonel Frank L. MILLER, Jr., USA (Ret.) U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Mr. Derek MITCHELL Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs U.S. Department of Defense Dr. John S. PARK Senior Research Associate & Director, Northeast Asia

app:20 Denuclearizing North Korea REPUBLIC OF KOREA Dr. BAE Geung-chan Ambassador KIM Hong-kyun Dean of Research Director-General, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau IFANS, MOFAT Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) Dr. CHEON Seongwhun Dr. KIM Hyun-Wook Senior Research Fellow Professor Center for North Korean Studies, Department of American Studies, IFANS, MOFAT Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) Dr. KIM Jae Cheol Dr. CHO Jung-hyun Professor Visiting Professor Department of International Relations, Catholic University IFANS, MOFAT Mr. KIM Jung Ro (“J.R.”) Dr. CHOI Kang Director, Division of Policy Cooperation Director-General and Professor Ministry of Unification (MOU) Department of American Studies, Ms. KIM Minsung IFANS, MOFAT Researcher Dr. CHOI Wooseon Department of American Studies, IFANS, MOFAT Professor Dr. KIM Sung-han Department of National Security and Unification Studies, Professor IFANS, MOFAT Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University Mr. CHOO Won Hoon Dr. KIM Young Ho First Secretary, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Division Chair and Professor Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) Department of International Relations, Dr. HA Jung-yul Korea National Defense University (KNDU) Head of Security and Strategy Mr. KOH Young Kul Korea Research Institute for Strategy (KRIS) Second Secretary, Division of Planning and Research Dr. HAN Sukhee IFANS, MOFAT Associate Dean and Professor Lt. Col. LEE Chung Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei Combined Forces Command University Mr. LEE Dohoon Colonel HONG Jaeki, ROK Air Force Deputy Secretary to the President for National Security Director, C-WMD/Non-Proliferation Division Strategy Ministry of National Defense Blue House Mr. HONG Seok-in Dr. LEE Dong Hwi Director, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Division Professor Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) Department of International Economy and Trade Studies, Dr. JUN Bong-Geun IFANS, MOFAT Professor Dr. LEE Ji-yong Department of National Security and Unification Studies, Visiting Professor IFANS, MOFAT Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security Mr. KANG Byung-jo (IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) First Secretary, Korean Peace Regime Division Ambassador LEE Joon-gyu Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) Chancellor IFANS, MOFAT

Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:21 Brig. Gen. LEE Sangchul, ROK Army Deputy Director-General of Arms Control Policy Planning Bureau, Ministry of National Defense Ms. PARK Ji-hyun Director, Division of Planning and Research IFANS, MOFAT Dr. PARK Won Gon Director, Office of External Cooperation Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) Dr. SHIN Beomchul Director, North Korean Military Studies Division Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) Ambassador SHIN Jung-seung Director, Center for Chinese Studies IFANS, MOFAT Mr. YANG Chang Seok Director-General, Bureau of Intelligence & Analysis Ministry of Unification (MOU) Brig. Gen. YANG Young Mo, ROK Army (Ret.) Director, Korea Arms Verification Agency (KAVA) Ministry of National Defense Brig. Gen. YEOM Wongyun, ROK Army Director, U.S. Policy Division Ministry of National Defense Major Gen. YOO Jeh Seung, ROK Army Director-General, Policy Planning Bureau Ministry of National Defense

app:22 Denuclearizing North Korea

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