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UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in Sout-East Asia, 1905-1941 Bussemaker, H.Th. Publication date 2001 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Bussemaker, H. T. (2001). Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in Sout-East Asia, 1905-1941. in eigen beheer. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:11 Oct 2021 431 1 Chapterr 4. AUSTRALIA A 4.1.. Introduction. Whenn Japanese forces assaulted the natural cordon sanitaire of Australia - the Malay Barrierr - Australia found itself in the embarrassing position that over three-quarters of its bestt troops were fighting the Germans and the Italians in the Middle East almost three- quarterss of its pilots were flying RAF planes over Western European skies, and more than halff its fleet was patrolling the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Australia had placed itself in aa unique position in that respect in the history of World War II . No other country had its mainn forces more than 5,000 miles from its own borders, while being threatened by an enemyy which was much closer. Howw did the Australian Government get into this predicament? This chapter is intended to givee an answer to this question, an answer which was also important for the Dutch defencee planning of the Netherlands East Indies. It will be shown that the defence of the Malayy Barrier was not as strong as it could have been, because of the altruistic Australian defencee policies, in the period between the German war declaration and the Japanese attackk on Pearl Harbor. The Dutch paid the ultimate price - the loss of their colony, much losss of life and inhuman treatment of their soldiers and civilians and of the indigenous Indonesianss by the Japanese occupying forces. The Australians just barely escaped that fate,, but it was a close thing. Howw could this happen? To comprehend this amazing situation, Australia's "Grand Strategy"" has to be discussed, as formulated by the Australian political parties and influen- cedd by Australian History. Next the foreign policy as formulated by the ruling government is treated.. Any credible foreign policy must be based upon sound defence planning, which thereforee will be covered extensively. In fact, Australia paid much attention to defence planning,, almost from its beginnings as a colony, and even started re-armament much earlierr than the Netherlands East Indies. Likee Japan, Australia emerged from the First World War with expanded responsibilities for thee peace in the region of Asia and the Pacific. Unlike Japan, however, Australia invested heavilyy in the development of a social-economic welfare state; together with New Zealand probablyy the first viable one before the Second World War. It could invest in this experi- ment,, because it had obtained an Imperial guarantee from the Royal Navy for its protecti- on.. Australia resembled the Netherlands East Indies in this respect, because that colony alsoo profited enormously from the Pax Britannica without any formal agreement Unlike the Netherlandss East Indies, the Australians were partners in Imperial defence, and therefore hadd some influence on the extent and credibility of this British guarantee. Subsequent Australiann Governments, irrespective of their political colour, did not exploit this advantage- ouss position however, notwithstanding the growing menace of Japan. Australiaa as a nation remained in a position of filial bondage to its beloved and much- respectedd Mother country. Therefore the Australian Government did not challenge the 432 2 assumptionss underlying the British guarantee, even when it became clear in the late thirtiess that the guarantee was based on bluff, and no longer on real power. This theme hass been more fully explored in Chapter 2. A more independent attitude of the Australian Governmentt however, combined with a faster industrialisation and a higher labour productivity,, would have resulted in Australia being better prepared, which might also have beenn in a position to save the Dutch from ignominious defeat. Therefore, certainly for Dutchh readers, the Australian defence policy and pre-war plans and preparations are of moree than just academic interest. It should be recalled that eleven months before Pearl Harbor,, the Australian Prime Minister was talking to the Dutch Governor General about the possibilityy of locating an Australian Division in Java2054. This suggestion came to nought becausee of Dutch pride, but the potential was there. Thee important role of the Australian Government in helping the Dutch colonial administra- tion,, during the trying period the Netherlands was occupied by the Germans, has not attractedd much attention at all in historical publications, neither in English nor in Dutch publications.. Well-known Dutch-language publications, like the 13-volume history of the Netherlandss in the Second World War by de Jong2055 or the impressive 3-volume Histo- ry20566 of the Koninklijke Marine (The Netherlands Royal Navy) do not pay much attention too Dutch relations with Australia. Thee increasing formal and informal contacts between Colony and Dominion after May 1940 aree highlighted in the second part of this chapter, which lead to a degree of cooperation evenn before Pearl Harbor. At that time it was unmatched by either Great Britain or the Unitedd States. This positive Australian attitude2057, more than anything else, was responsi- blee for strengthening the hand of the Dutch colonial administration, when facing increasing Japanesee demands. By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 2, ƒ page 217-221) the British Governmentt refused to give any guarantee to the NEI until a few days before Pearl Harbor.. According to mutually agreed plans, however, Australia provided for stocks and maintenancee parties in 1941, in those parts of the archipelago which they had agreed to defend.. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Australian planes and troops had taken over the defencee of those parts of the NEI. Moreover, it was in Australia where, after the Allied defeat,, the remnants of the Royal Dutch Netherlands Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands- IndischIndisch Leger or KNIL) tried to reconstitute itself2058. The important role of Australia in thee support of the NEI colonial administration against looming Japanese aggression, is the ""** Telegram Governor-General N.E.I, to Minister for Colonies, no 37/U of 29 January 1941, in ARA, Departmentt of Foreign Affairs, Archives of the Consulate-General in Sydney, accesion number 2.05.48.14, inventoryy number 78. This will be referred in future notes as ARA, Sydney Archives, no 78. 20599 Dr. L. de Jong: "Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog" The most interesting volumee of this series, dealing with the war in the Far East, is Volume 11-a: "Nedertands-lndiê I", tweede helft, Martinuss Nijhoff Leiden 1984. This publication will be referred to in subsequent notes as De Jong, 11a. 805,11 Ph.M. Bosscher: "De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog". Volume 2 , Franeker 1986. This volumee deals with S.E. Asia, and will be subsequently referred to as Bosscher. **77 Prime Minister Menzies told the Governor-General on January 28. 1941 that Australia would do whateverr was in its power to assist the Netherlands East Indies in the provision of weapons and munitions. ARA,, Sydney Archive, 78 Ibid. 80™™ J.M. Ford: Allies in a bind - Australia and the Netherlands East Indies relations during the Second World War.War. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Univ. of Queensland, Santa Lucia 1994. To be subsequently referred to as Ford. 433 3 subjectt of the second part of this chapter. Itt should not be forgotten that another British Dominion played a sometimes decisive role: Neww Zealand. It had much in common with Australia. New Zealand is not covered in a separatee chapter, but is dealt with in the present study where it played an important role. 4.2.. A short political history of Australia. Australia,, terra australis incognito (the unknown Southland of the Renaissance maps) is thee smallest of the world's continents. Its west coast was discovered by Dutch navigators blownn off course on their way to the East Indies. They christened the desert shores north off the modern city of Perth "Nieuw-Holland". Dutch expeditions explored the uninviting Northh Coast, but the wild aboriginals had no trade potential whatsoever, that being the only subjectt the Dutch were really interested in. Abel Tasman, in his epic voyage around the southh of the continent, discovered Tasmania ("Van Diemen's Land') and the west coast of Neww Zealand in 1642, but he missed the Australian east coast, which was discovered by Jamess Cook in 1770. Cook'ss discovery of the lush Australian east coast came at the appropriate moment Englandd needed a penitentiary colony to relieve its overburdenend prisons, filled with convictss who were being punished under the harsh laws existening in England. The loss of thee American colonies also meant the loss of a dumping ground for these convicts. Moreover,, the start of the industrial revolution created an underclass which turned more andd more to violence, thus overloading the prison system.

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