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THE SUPPLY LINES BATTLE 18Jan-9Fe B She Was Struck by a Torpedo Amidships, and at Once Began to Settle

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THE SUPPLY LINES BATTLE 18Jan-9Fe B She Was Struck by a Torpedo Amidships, and at Once Began to Settle CHAPTER 9 THE SUPPLY LINES BATTL E VENTS in the battle of communications, which in its main implicatio n E was one of supply both of troops in the field and civilian populatio n at home, led to a major change in the German naval command early in February 1943. With the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the northern supply line to that country became of outstanding importance , and in August 1941 the British inaugurated the "PQ-QP" convoys sailing from Iceland to Murmansk and Archangel . When America entered the war three months later, her merchant ships took part in these Russia n convoys, but the convoys remained a British naval responsibility . By the end of 1942, 20 Russia-bound convoys had sailed with a total of 30 1 merchant ships (53 were sunk), and 16 convoys left Russia with a tota l of 232 merchant ships (12 were sunk), and in the last quarter of 1942 a n additional 13 ships sailed to north Russia independently (only fiv e arrived) while 23 returned independently, with only one lost . In Decembe r 1942 the designation of these convoys was, for security reasons, change d from " PQ-QP " to "JW-RA " . "PQ18 " was the last of her series . The new series sailed from Loch Ewe, on the north-west coast of Scotland, instea d of as previously from Iceland, and the first, "JW51A", of 16 ships escorte d by seven destroyers and five smaller ships, sailed on 15th December, was not sighted, and reached Murmansk on Christmas Day.' It was "JW51B " , the succeeding convoy of 14 ships, which was the cause of the German command changes . "JW51B " sailed a week after its predecessor and experienced both heavy weather and enemy surfac e attacks by the German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and pocket battle- ship Lutzow, and six destroyers. The attacks were opposed by the destroyers of the convoy ' s escort and a covering force of two six-inch cruisers, Sheffield and Jamaica. 2 In a series of clashes on New Year's Eve, which ended with withdrawal of the German force, the Germans lost the destroyer Friedrich Eckholdt3 and suffered considerable damage to Hipper . The British lost the destroyer Achates4 and minesweeper Bramble ; 5 but the convoy arrived intact at Kola Inlet on 3rd January. Three days later, at Hitler' s headquarters in Berlin, the infuriated Fuehrer (whose first knowledge of his ships' failure was received fro m an English news broadcast) in a conference with Admiral Raeder, in which "the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, rarely had an opportunity t o i In the 19 convoys which reached Russia between their inauguration in September 1941 and the end of 1942, 125 of the 301 merchant ships were British . Most of the remainder were American . 2 HMS Jamaica, cruiser (1940), 8,000 tons, twelve 6-in and eight 4-in guns, 33 kts . 8 Friedrich Eckholdt, German destroyer (1937), 1,625 tons, five 5-in guns, eight 21-in torped o tubes, 36 kts . Sunk 31 Dec 1942 . * HMS Achates, destroyer (1930), 1,350 tons, four 4.7-in guns, eight 21-in torpedo tubes, 35 kts . Sunk 31 Dec 1942. 5 HMS Bramble, fleet minesweeper (1938), 875 tons, two 4-in guns, 17 kts . Sunk 31 Dec 1942 . 6 Jan-26 Feb 1943 DOENITZ REPLACES RAEDER 25 1 comment" ,6 belittled the achievements of the German Navy in the tw o world wars, condemned it for not fighting the New Year's Eve actio n through to a finish, and declared that the defeat spelt the end of the Germa n High Seas Fleet. He directed Raeder to prepare a memorandum on the advisability of scrapping the capital ships . Raeder resisted the intention, but to no avail, and on 30th January resigned the command he had held for fourteen years. Hitler appointed Grand Admiral Doenitz, Flag Office r Commanding Submarines, as Raeder's successor . Doenitz shortly sub- mitted to Hitler a scheme (which was approved) for stopping new con- struction of large surface ships, and decommissioning most of those the n in commission, thus releasing 250 officers and 8,000 men, many of whom would be used for submarines . And the new Commander-in-Chief wa s reported to have told the German Naval Staff when assuming his appoint- ment that the entire resources of the German Navy would henceforth be put into the service of inexorable U-boat warfare .? But before the end of February Doenitz had modified his views regarding big surface ships , and at a conference on the 26th of the month he secured Hitler's grudgin g consent to keep the new battleship Tirpitz, Lutzow and battle-cruiser Scharnhorst in commission, and to send the last named to join the othe r two in Norway to form a task force to operate against the Archangel convoys. Hitler asked how soon a convoy target might be found . Doenitz thought within the next three months . Hitler commented : "Even if it should require six months, you will then return and be forced to admit that I was right."8 As results of this German change in command the Admiralty decide d to retain in the Atlantic the battleship Malaya, which it had intended t o send to the Eastern Fleet in case the Germans decided to back their U-boat campaign with a more active policy by surface ships ; and on 9th February the Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Royle, tol d the Advisory War Council that there were then 95 U-boats operatin g in the Atlantic 9 and that he thought that anti-submarine measures shoul d be given first priority by the Allies . His comments were made in a discussio n on a supply problem which arose locally through the resumption of Japanese submarine attacks on Australian coastal shipping . II At half-an-hour after noon on 17th January the Union Steamship Com- pany's Kalingo (2,047 tons) left Sydney for New Plymouth, New Zealand . At 1 a.m. on the 18th, when about 110 miles east of Sydney, in brigh t moonlight with moderate wind and sea and considerable southerly swell , s Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 6 Jan 1943 . 4 Brassey's Naval Annual, 1944, p . 1 . 8 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 5 Mar 1943 . 9 An Admiralty source gave the figure of 105 boats operating in the Atlantic early in February 1943 . The effects of this concentration were soon felt . In January 1943 (partly due to bad weather ) U-boat sinkings totalled 29 ships, of 181,769 tons . In February these figures rose to 47 ship s of 296,217 tons . And in March (the worst month since November 1942) to 88 ships of 524,629 tons . 252 THE SUPPLY LINES BATTLE 18Jan-9Fe b she was struck by a torpedo amidships, and at once began to settle . Her attacker (who surfaced some two cables distant but made no othe r hostile move) was I21 of the Eastern Area Advanced Force. An S.O.S. was broadcast, but "the aerials seemed to be all mixed up and his receive r was also out of order so that the operator did not know if the messag e got through", 1 and it was never received . Twenty minutes after the torpedo hit, the master, Captain H . Duncan, ordered "Abandon ship" . The fore and after decks were awash, and the ship down by the head with a heavy starboard list. She sank soon afterwards . Thirty-two of the crew of 34 got away in a boat (two firemen were killed by the explosion) and reached Sydney late in the afternoon of the 19th . The N.O.I.C. (Muirhead - Gould) boarded the tug which took the survivors up the harbour, an d the captain's report remarks of the admiral's talk with the crew : "I would like to state that they did not keep anything back in reference to th e Navy not finding us " ; though the Navy could hardly be blamed for th e Kalingo's wireless failing to function . Some 21 hours after sinking Kalingo, 121 got her second victim whe n she torpedoed the American tanker Mobilube (9,860 tons) 60 miles from Sydney at 9.50 p.m. on the 18th. The torpedo, which struck under the port quarter, killed three of the engine-room watch, but it failed t o sink the ship, which was successfully towed to port . The submarine 's third quarry, the American Peter H. Burnett (7,176 tons), also remained afloa t and subsequently reached port . Bound from Newcastle to U .S.A., she was some 420 miles east of Sydney when, at 9 .55 p.m. on 22nd January, 121' s torpedo struck her on the starboard side . Its effects were minimised by her wool cargo. The ship was abandoned . Four of the boats returne d when it was seen that she was not going to sink. The occupants of the other boat were subsequently rescued . The ship's wireless alarms were received , but her estimated position was incorrect and it was some time before she was found and, on the 26th, taken in tow by the U.S. destroyer Zane, 2 with H.M.A. Ships Gympie3 (Lieut-Commander Patterson4 ) and Mildura (Lieutenant Guille 5 ) providing anti-submarine escort. Various ships attended her during the tow to Sydney . H.M.A.S. Deloraine (Lieut- Commander Weston') towed part of the way, and the French Le Triom- phant also lent a hand screening . She eventually reached Sydney in tow of the tug St Aristell on 2nd February .
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