Holding Elected Officials Accountable: an Examination of the Voting

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HOLDING ELECTED OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE: AN EXAMINATION

OF THE VOTING PATTERNS OF THE TEA PARTY

A Thesis

Presented to the faculty of the Department of Sociology

California State University, Sacramento

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Sociology

Alec V. Snelling

SPRING 2016

Alec V. Snelling

HOLDING ELECTED OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE: AN EXAMINATION

OF THE VOTING PATTERNS OF THE TEA PARTY

A Thesis

Alec V. Snelling

, Committee Chair

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111 Student: Alec V. Snelling

I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the thesis.

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Department of Sociology

Abstract

HOLDING ELECTED OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE: AN EXAMINATION

OF THE VOTING PATTERNS OF THE TEA PARTY

Alec V. Snelling

Knowledge of politicians not just as candidates, but also as legislators, can help inform an electorate when tasked with choosing a representative in government. Regarding the Tea

Party specifically, past research has focused on its formation and the composition of its supporters. The focus of this research is to examine the composition of elected Tea Party representatives as legislators. This study tracked longitudinal voting habits that compared Tea Party legislators against Establishment Republicans legislators using the baseline of a national Tea Party organization’s preferred vote position. In addition, an analysis of the effect of the Tea Party on Establishment Republicans was conducted.

The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative data to analyze the voting patterns of the House of Representatives and the Senate from 2005 to 2014. In total, 105,703 individual legislator votes were tallied and analyzed along with a close examination of v specific votes surrounding the 2013 government shutdown to determine any possible distinctions between Tea Party and Establishment Republican congressional legislators.

The findings discovered there were no statistically significant differences between the

Tea Party and Establishment Republican voting patterns in the House of Representatives; however, the voting patterns of Tea Party Senators were statistically significantly different than Establishment Republicans. This research provides evidence to support the notion that the organizational culture of the Republican establishment has been challenged by the existence of the Tea Party, though Republican attempts to absorb this challenge have been largely, though not always, successful.

.. Committee Chair to 4p12.;/ go/~ Date

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Nicole Ishiura, without whose support this would not have been possible. From undergraduate classes to late nights writing a thesis, her love and support has never wavered and that has kept me going no matter the obstacles that have fallen before me.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A thanks goes to my advisor, Kevin Wehr and his infinite patience and support. Thank you for sticking with me and for all of the ‘checking in’ emails. Also, to my brother,

Paul Hegyi, whose own educational accomplishments spurred on our competitive spirit.

Lastly, this project would not have been possible without all of the love and support of my parents Michael and Maxine Snelling. Thank you for always having my back and making my educational opportunities possible.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

Dedication...... vii

Acknowledgements ...... viii

List of Tables ...... xi

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 6

Selection of a Legislator ...... 6

Legislators and the Media ...... 8

Influences on New Legislators...... 9

The Tea Party Factor ...... 13

The Election of the Tea Party ...... 15

Precedent for Citizen Participation ...... 17

Summary ...... 18

Theory ...... 19

3. METHODOLOGY ...... 22

Sample...... 22

Instrument ...... 23

Variables ...... 24

Analysis...... 26

4. FINDINGS ...... 29

Quantitative Findings ...... 29

Hypothesis 1...... 30

Hypothesis 2...... 37

Qualitative Findings ...... 41

Background ...... 43

The Shutdown ...... 44

The Vote to End the Shutdown ...... 46

Comments from Republican Legislators ...... 48

Tea Party Organizations ...... 52

Summary ...... 53

5. DISCUSSION ...... 54

Subsequent Years ...... 62

Conclusion ...... 64

Appendix A. House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected in 2010 ...... 68

Appendix B. House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected in 2012 ...... 69

Appendix C. Senate: Tea Party Legislators Elected in 2010 and 2012 ...... 70

References ...... 71

LIST OF TABLES Tables Page

Table 1. House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected 2010 ...... 31

Table 2. House of Representatives: Vote Compliance by Endorsements ...... 33

Table 3. House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected 2012 ...... 33

Table 4. House of Representatives: Legislators Elected 2012 Breakdown ...... 35

Table 5. Senate: Tea Party Legislators Elected 2010 ...... 36

Table 6. Senate: Vote Compliance with Tea Party members elected in 2012 ...... 37

Table 7. House of Representatives: Vote Compliance 2005-2010 ...... 38

Table 8. House of Representatives: Vote Compliance 2011-2014 ...... 39

Table 9. Senate: Vote Compliance 2005-2010 ...... 40

Table 10. Senate: Vote Compliance 2011-2014 ...... 40

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The concept of democracy is firmly rooted in the historical fibers of the United

States. While many descriptions of American governance exist, the most accurate of the

United States’ government is a representative republic where the people come together to vote in annual, biannual, and quadrennial elections for one of their own to represent their political interests in a greater political body. At both the state and federal level, representatives are chosen to speak and legislate on the greater public’s behalf, which generates a separation between the creation of law from the general populous. With so much power bestowed on these legislators, having representation that truly acts upon the interests of their constituency becomes vital to the exercise of a healthy governmental body.

In 2009, the Tea Party movement, deriving its name from the 1773 Boston Tea

Party, which had previously been disparate protest groups that lacked organization, resources or saliency, coalesced in an impactful way that began supporting candidates and representatives for various political offices. The Tea Party movement is comprised of different chapters from local areas to national level organizations comprised of voters who claim to hold an anti-tax, small government ideology. The Tea Party’s first opportunity to test their effectiveness in supporting and electing representatives reflective of their views came in the 2010 congressional mid-term election. This culminated in 82 newly elected members of Congress who campaigned on a Tea Party platform and received Tea Party support in the form of national Tea Party group endorsements.

Though aspects of Tea Party ideology have been espoused by other members of Congress in the past, such a high number of elected legislators who claimed to hold strictly small government stances on every issue had not seen this level of electoral success since before the New Deal era (Glenn 2010).

Our political history not only gives insight towards the various ideologies that have prevailed but also the homogeneity in votes cast for legislation. The United States

Congress is composed of 435 members of the House of Representatives, each elected from unique districts across all 50 states, in addition to 100 members of the Senate with each state electing two members each. Despite this potential for diversity in representation, legislators often find themselves voting along strict party lines, potentially to the disservice of the individual constituencies who elected them. The degree of conservatism among Republicans can be difficult to measure (Crowson 2009); however, the Tea Party provides an opportunity to examine the possibly divergent ideologies within the Republican Party as a whole. By examining the recorded votes of elected Tea

Party members against those of Establishment Republicans, this study provides a unique insight into the degree to which an elected official’s campaign platform is being expressed in the legislature and if campaign rhetoric survives the occupational pressures encountered by candidates-turned-legislators. This pressure to conform is not one encountered by legislators solely based on the position being an occupation, but also due to the association with a political party that took part in supporting their election. Each elected Tea Party candidate ran as a Republican as opposed to a Democrat or third party.

While some Tea Party candidates expressed dissatisfaction with the Republican status-

quo, claiming the conservatism of Establishment Republicans did not go far enough, these candidates chose to work within our two-party political system and run under the

Republican banner even if it involved running against Establishment Republicans in

Republican primary elections. One explanation for this choice of major party affiliation is the benefits awarded to the then current members of those parties, be they Republican or Democrat. Due to the concentration of political power and resources held by only two parties in the United States, candidates running for office under the banner of Republican or Democrat find greater electoral success than if they spurned an affiliation with both of these groups. By attaching a candidacy to the efforts of a major party affiliation, there is also an expectation by the party for its elected officials to vote in unison within each political party. This has the potential to cause a conflict for a legislator who would have to choose between their Tea Party ideology and the resources, leadership, and expectations of the Republican Party. This ideological and political struggle is best examined using the theoretical lens of identity theory and the pressures of occupational socialization and path dependency which argues a difficulty exists for newcomers to an unfamiliar work environment to develop independence from the status quo.

In order to understand the voting bloc of Tea Party legislators, the present study will examine the voting patterns of these legislators on bills, amendments, and procedural votes within the United States Congress between the years of 2011 to 2014. The analysis of these votes will allow comparisons to be made between Tea Party Republican legislators and Establishment Republican legislators. For the purpose of this study, the term “establishment” will be utilized to identify Republican legislators in the House of

Representatives and Senate who held their position in Congress before the formation of the Tea Party in 2009. In addition, this term applies to Republican legislators who were elected in subsequent years, but without the support of a national Tea Party organization.

The analysis of Republican votes is then compared between the years of 2005 to 2014 against the preferred position of the FreedomWorks Tea Party organization which represents the ideal Tea Party position on a given vote.

FreedomWorks, a non-profit organization, was originally formed in 1984 as

“Citizens for a Sound Economy.” The organization has no official affiliation with a political party, however it promotes conservative ideology, supports like-minded candidates, and educates the public including grading legislators on their adherence to

Tea Party ideology. Having existed before the nascent of the Tea Party, FreedomWorks used its resources to foster the movement that would later become the Tea Party of 2009

(Zernike 2010). With six million listed American members and being politically active since 2009 promoting Tea Party candidates and ideology, this group has organized itself at a national level. Along with endorsing candidates for the House of Representatives and Senate who ran during 2010 and 2012 midterm elections, FreedomWorks’ maintains their voting record database which is currently at 391 legislative votes which represents over 115,000 individual legislator votes (FreedomWorks 2016).

Utilizing the FreedomWorks database of legislative votes taken in the United

States Senate and House of Representatives, the present study will analyze a total of 356 legislative votes that took place from 2005-2014. The primary analysis seeks to determine if a statistically significant difference exists between the voting records of Tea

Party and Establishment Republicans. Further analysis examines the voting habits of

Establishment Republicans against the FreedomWorks preferred position over the course of a decade in an effort to identify the potential effect on Establishment Republicans by the emergence of the Tea Party. A closer examination of the legislation graded by

FreedomWorks takes place in an effort to better determine the values of the Tea Party.

By closely examining the history, context, details, public comments, and fallout of a specific congressional vote, the differences and similarities between Tea Party and

Establishment Republicans are further elucidated in ways not captured by a comparison of voting records as a whole.

Identity theory and occupational socialization suggest that despite campaign rhetoric, once elected as legislators, Tea Party Republicans would fall in line with their

Establishment peers. With an understanding of their elected representatives outside of a campaign setting, this study can provide insight for the public on the actions of legislators compared to campaign promises and test the viability of the Tea Party as an independent voting bloc. There currently exists an impression that politicians are elected based on their connections with special interests and that false campaign promises are commonplace. The idea of finding methods to hold legislators accountable has long been appealing. By gathering data on the voting patterns of those in Congress with a focus on the new group of Tea Party legislators and comparing these votes against those of

Establishment Republicans, greater insight can be found on the nature of both legislative politics and occupational socialization.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The following chapter offers a brief overview of previous research into how the voting populous selects a candidate to represent them in the legislature. The review continues by revealing the relationship between the media and elected officials, specifically how a lack of media coverage frees politicians from being exposed to pressure from their constituency. Next, a detailed examination of the pressures faced by newly-elected officials in their occupational performance is undertaken. In addition, occupational socialization and path dependency are explored to explain how the conformity of new members of an organization is achieved. An examination of the political phenomenon known as the Tea Party and the candidates that ascribed to its ideology follows. The review closes by examining how identity theory and occupational socialization aid in the explanation of how Tea Party legislators, despite distinguishing themselves from Republicans during the 2010 political campaign, may ultimately vote in line with their Republican peers.

Selection of a Legislator

Before undertaking a method that analyzes the voting patterns of members of

Congress, an understanding must be reached as to how these members are elected, the separation between voters and their legislators, and the current methods that have been attempted, up to this point, to hold these elected officials accountable. Politicians are elected to represent the average citizen at the local, state, and federal levels of

government. Though a politician may view their relationship with their constituency as a simple equation of convincing enough people to vote for their candidacy, a voter’s investment in a candidate may be deeper. Karnig and Welch (1980) examined the dynamic of race and representation and found that while a black elected official may descriptively represent a greater black population, “if the elected official does not share the policy viewpoints of the black community, there would be no substantive representation” (Karnig and Welch 1980: 109). While this particular study focused on race as a descriptor, and it has been seen to be a proxy for ideology in past elections, ideology can just as much be the primary deciding point for a voter as they seek a candidate that best reflects their beliefs rather than just their appearance. Voters choose the candidate they feel best represents them at the end of an electoral campaign

(Schuessler 2000). Even when a previously elected legislator is running for office, whether to the same office or a new office, a political campaign finds these politicians presenting themselves outside their office as candidates and not legislators as they work to garner support from voters based on image, proclaimed policy stands, and perception.

This furthers the disconnect in how voters view an individual as both an elected legislator and a candidate. Although the retention of incumbents is overwhelming, newcomers do find electoral success, often running with a platform based on messages of reform and change in an attempt to distinguish themselves from their opponents who are more experienced veterans of that legislative body. This technique creates a perceived difference between an incumbent and challenger with the goal to play on perceptions of incumbents as ineffective or out of touch with their constituency and promote the value

of the outsider candidate (Eden & Levin 1962). If these challengers are elected, like many other jobs with new-hires, these elected officials must learn how to navigate the job to which they have been hired and undergo various forms of occupational socialization.

Legislators and the Media

The news media has long acted in the role of the most able and resourceful watchdog of Congress for the benefit of their constituencies. In the United States, news corporations and their corresponding political analysts have provided the viewing audience a number of tools to analyze a candidate prior to the election; however, the media’s examination of politicians, once elected, highlights a different practice. Once elected to office, legislators are no longer scrutinized by the media at the same degree or intensity as they were when candidates (Fogarty 2009). Fogarty (2009) goes on to discuss how in-step legislators, which are those who vote with the majority, receive less attention from the media. The argument, therefore, is that once elected, there is a lesser need for the news media to allocate resources into monitoring a legislator’s actions. Most often, coverage of elected officials begins and ends with the congressional leaders which creates a situation where rank-and-file members of Congress receive little media coverage (Sellers & Schaffner 2007). Providing further information on holding leaders accountable, Farnsworth (2003) analyzed national survey data that revealed a citizen’s approval of both Congress and their individual congressional representative had less to do with the legislator’s voting record as it did with the respondent’s perceived fairness of the political process and perceived responsiveness of a legislator. These findings support the

argument that legislators can vote with immunity from future political repercussions from their constituency given perceptions play a more decisive role in opinion formation and the media is not actively tracking or following a representative’s professional actions.

Influences on New Legislators

From menial labor to high-skill jobs, the difference between an individual who is entering a new job and that same person after experience has been gained is significant.

In their seminal work, Van Maanen and Schein (1977) define the theory of organizational socialization and posit that work offers more than a job, but its own culture, language, and ideology. This culture is transferred to a new employee upon entrance into that occupation and organization and continues to influence and shape their experience during their time with the organization. Seymour and Sandiford (2005), in their study of English occupational socialization, found that occupational expectations did not ebb, even if no formal training program was in place. Informal socialization was found to be a substitute for official training when that method was lacking and served to teach new workers how best to fit in the preexisting system no matter their background. Further, in participant observation research, Bargal and Heski-Leventhal (2008) studied volunteer occupational socialization and found where potential volunteers go through cultural changes from the beginning of their tenure towards retirement. Volunteers gain both the knowledge and skills to succeed in their position along with emotional development and changes in perception based on their experiences. It was concluded that, despite the setting, some degree of socialization must occur to be considered a useful member of an organization.

Another aspect of occupational socialization is how individuals handle expectations and emotion work. As Hochschild (1979) studied, emotion work is a demanding aspect of a job, but often goes ignored. Emotion work is that effort put forth to control emotions in a specific way to elicit a desired response from supervisors, coworkers, and customers. More recently, Seymour and Sandiford (2005) touched on this issue with those working in the service industry. They noted how good emotion work was often required of servers in order for them to retain employment. The people they served had expectations of them; therefore, regardless of how the server would approach or handle a situation outside of work, the service industry required answering questions in a specific way, adopting a passive attitude, and obscuring their true feelings from the customer.

This occupational expectation can transfer over to the halls of the legislature as elected officials seek to fit in and perform the role of contributing as a useful member of a preexisting team. Cooperation is required between many individuals to accomplish legislative victories in Congress. The common goal of new legislators may be to represent the voters who elected them; however, governing effectively and passing legislation necessitates the cooperation of others, and may conflict with these intentions.

While at least a plurality of voters choose the candidate whom they believe best represents them during the electoral process, it is important to understand the internal and ideological changes that takes place within these candidates once they take office.

Conformity is an effective tactic in increasing organizational effectiveness which translates to legislating as being a requirement to get things done or legislation passed.

Renkema, Stapel, and Yperen (2008) found that when routine is lacking, people will grasp to conformity through an established routine. The culture of legislating in

Congress has long been established and for those who are new to the process and environment, the adoption of this political and occupational culture can occur.

Once elected to office, the politicians that campaigned on the platform of acting for their constituency face a situation where the expectations of their constituency and the expectations of their political party may be opposed. Legislators can have fluctuating priorities and will focus on voting as another member of their political party with whom they associate and place their responsiveness to their constituency as a secondary concern. In Karnig and Welch’s (1980) description of African American elected officials, the examined constituencies were more likely to expect their officials to be responsive to the social needs that face their community. However, conformity with other legislators within the same party is the more likely course of action. As Grose and

Middlemass (2010) found, “what legislators communicate to their constituents is not representative of the extent to which their party shapes how they actually vote.” We see this through policy votes that fall down partisan lines and with this conformity, individualism of a legislator in Congress vanishes.

The concept of identity theory provides insight into how a legislator may navigate the conflict between their candidate self and legislator self. In examining the side of conflict that may win out, Cavazza and Mucchi-Faina (2008) found that the more important a group is to a person, the more likely they are to identify with that group.

There is a great deal of assistance in the form of resources, time, and money provided by

political parties towards a candidate (Brox 2004). Despite the actions of voters in electing officials, legislators may feel beholden to their political party that supported them during their campaign which may dilute the representativeness towards the actual voters who placed them in office.

Path dependency also plays a role in the maintenance of the status quo as the future is dictated by the decisions of the past with no present action having a substantive effect. Path dependency is a political theory that does not allow for a great degree of agency, but rather looks towards the actions, trends, and cultures of the past to be the best predictors of future events (Pierson 2000). Individualism and agency do not play as powerful of a role in elected bodies as one may think. Institutional and historical constraints play a large role in dictating what actions can come to fruition more so than the personal philosophies or wishes of legislators (Pierson 2000). Though new legislators may enter Congress with the intentions of bringing about change, path dependency suggests that such change is often difficult to accomplish because the rules of Congress and precedent set by former legislators can be tedious to deconstruct. This maintenance of the status quo is also seen with the high level of party line votes in a legislature where little independence takes place within a political party and causes the more anti- establishment rhetoric of candidates to fall short in practice as legislators. This was reflected in Levin-Waldman’s (2009) study of living wage ordinances. Using an analysis of various localities policies, it was found the key predictor for a living wage ordinance policy being passed was not social group pressure or even the makeup of the legislatures themselves, but the social and economic conditions of the city and its workers preceding

the policy’s passage. The cities that had lower skilled and less flexible workers were more likely to see a living wage ordinance pass as a last resort attempt to meet the basic needs of these relatively lesser skilled workers. Conversely, years of policy decisions in cities that allowed for the improved training, preparation, and support of workers shaped an environment where workers were better able to adapt to changing job conditions and the need for a living wage was nonexistent compared to the preceding example, so the policy did not pass.

The Tea Party Factor

The origins of the Tea Party are portrayed as a grass-roots effort of concerned citizens seeking greater representation in their government and opposed to the spending habits of the federal government (Coggin, Skocpol, and Williamson 2011). The true foundation of the Tea Party includes additional factors that lay outside those often expressed roots. This group’s organizational success in 2009 and electoral success in

2010 was aided by a top-down aspect of the movement and not a true grassroots origin

(Bratich 2011). While the public face of the Tea Party movement was one of citizens who claimed they were disenfranchised in their economic, social, and political life, a deeper examination finds the presence of organized political, financial and media support for this message that would have been less vocalized otherwise. Financial and organizational resources were provided for these local groups by Republican elites who have been politically active in Washington DC since the 1970s. In addition to their newfound organization, national media coverage by Fox News and others provided a

fertile ground for this movement to thrive while concurrently labeling itself as grassroots

(Coggin et al. 2011). The conservative media’s coverage was so effective in mainstreaming the Tea Party’s message that this group obtained a salience that far exceeded other protest organizations in the past (Guardino and Snyder 2012).

A closer examination also finds the Tea Party drawing its members from a specific demographic group. Polls showed that Tea Party members were, on average, more affluent, more educated, and more ethnically homogenous with 80-90% of this group comprised of whites (Esposito 2011; Coggin et al. 2011). This has led to the speculation that motivations for this group surpass the official economic concerns of the

Tea Party and include components of social and cultural views and fears (Berlet 2011;

Cunningham 2010; Coggin et al. 2011; Esposito 2011). Fear of “losing their country” to immigrant and minority groups has led to policy views outside of the primarily cited economic concerns of the Tea Party. These additional policy topics tend to center around more isolationist policies with the goal of protecting America’s borders (Berlet 2011).

An additional component that often surfaced was this group’s anti-Obama views with harsh critiques being leveled at virtually all actions and statements of the President who was both the first African American President as well as a Democrat. No matter this group’s composition or motivations, their impact on our government should not be overlooked as they have played an active role in our democracy since the 2010 congressional elections. The Tea Party’s popularity has outpaced that of Democrats and

Republicans, with 41% favorability in 2009 and electoral successes would see that support translate into self-described Tea Party representatives in office (Etzionni 2011).

The congressional elections of 2010 saw candidates running under the banner of the Tea Party winning their races and entering Congress as newly minted legislators.

Though not a political party in its own right, this movement was composed of independent and conservative voters that worked within the current two-party political system in the United States to obtain representation in Congress with a total of 75 new legislators in the House of Representative and 7 new legislators in the Senate, all of whom had been endorsed by a national Tea Party organization. (Washington Post 2010).

These representatives were elected as Republican Party members; however, it was often argued during their campaigns that the Tea Party is as much a vote against main-stream

Republicanism as it was against Democrats (Ashbee 2011). Ashbee (2011) goes on to describe the ideological makeup of the Tea Party, arguing that while the members of the movement share a generalized theme of supporting small government with the

Republican Party, they are more steadfast in opposing government spending than

Establishment Republicans, such as with their vocal opposition to Republican President

George W. Bush’s 2008 bailouts of private banks.

The Election of the Tea Party

Though still a young political movement in the context of electoral success, there is evidence that supporting Tea Party candidates is an act of political expression that is substantively different than supporting the Republican Party as a whole (Ashbee 2011).

Distinctions exist in critiques by Tea Party candidates of Establishment Republicans and

Republican leaders during the 2010 campaign cycle against those actions of

Establishment Republicans during their 2010 primary races. In some instances, Tea Party candidates defeated individuals who had the support and resources of the Republican

Party. These candidates would ultimately receive Republican Party support in the general election, but only after their ideal candidate was rejected by conservative voters.

Though these candidates would need additional popular support to ensure success in the election, both being in the position to be elected to office by winning their primary race and their victory in the general election was due to Tea Party support (Gardner &

Thompson 2010). In the months preceding their election in 2010, Establishment

Republican incumbents and leaders viewed the Tea Party and their candidates as potentially obstructive towards their goal of gaining a congressional majority. This fear was grounded in the view that the Tea Party’s more conservative ideology would be more critically viewed by the general electorate as compared to Establishment Republicans and these leaders rejected pressures to align themselves with the Tea Party (Ashbee 2011).

Given the rhetoric used during their campaign, those legislators elected with Tea Party support would not be taken for granted by Establishment Republicans. This ideological difference and difference in campaign rhetoric between the two groups makes examining the substantive votes of both parties worthwhile.

Despite some Tea Party candidates garnering support by expressing distaste for the ideology of Establishment Republicans and Democrats, as Republican Party elected representatives, these new legislators would face pressures from Republicans upon entering office. As previously discussed, when confronted with these occupational pressures, Tea Party legislators faced a decision to either fall in line with Establishment

Republicans or break from the party in support of the ideals they campaigned upon during the election.

Precedent for Citizen Participation

While a lack of media coverage and the heavy pressures of occupational socialization would suggest new legislators would quickly abandon their rhetoric in support of a Republican majority, this ideological reversal has the potential to negatively impact them during their next election. Exploring alternatives to acceptance of the status quo has been studied in resistance literature. In a study on policy changes to a welfare organization it was found that these were prompted by the poor who were being served as clients, who many thought possessed little influence (Cavendar, Cowgill and Jurick

2009). By working together, staying informed of policy changes, and investigating every possible avenue of change and even through subtler insubordinate routes, this population changed an organization perceived by their clients as judgmental to one where clients believed they could improve their lives. At the local level, political change through substantial citizen participation and grass-roots efforts has also been observed. In 2005,

Ho and Yurk initiated the Citizen Initiated Performance Assessment (CIPA) that sought to bring citizens together to review local policy in nine Iowa cities. They conducted interviews of local officials and created a dialogue with these officials in an attempt to learn what local governments were doing right and what they were doing wrong. The study proved mutually beneficial as “many city officials and citizen participants found

CIPA to be a valuable education opportunity for all parties” (Ho and Yurk 2005:3). In a

more recent study regarding a populous’ knowledge about their representatives, Sulkin,

Testa, and Usry (2015) found there is a link between a legislator’s behavior and their constituency’s assessment of them; however, this requires a constituency that is well informed of their representative’s actions and words which has been historically difficult to achieve. Change and reform in government is possible but the first step is gaining information. By revealing the actions of legislators through vote tracking, citizens are given additional tools by which to hold legislators accountable. With regards to the group of newly elected Tea Partiers, news media speculation was rampant on how this group would vote as compared to Establishment Republicans when faced with the business of legislating (Baker 2011; Pickler 2010).

Summary

The career lifespan of a politician involves two distinct phases as that of candidate and of legislator. Voters will often choose a candidate to support based on who they feel holds the most similar viewpoint to themselves. While a candidate has a great deal of media and public attention placed upon them, this changes once elected and a politician enters the role of legislator. The news media acts as the most resourceful non- governmental oversight body for elected officials that is available to the public; however, it has been shown that the media has paid significantly less attention to legislators than to those same politicians when they were candidates. Organizational socialization occurs in many different fields and at many different levels of participation that range from new volunteers to new hires. Further, occupational expectations are often present in a

workplace long before a new hire arrives, which results in an environmental pressure on these new hires to fit within the established culture and act in the predetermined manner regardless of their personal history before entering their new workplace. In the field of government specifically, path dependency is a prevalent force that indicates current and future policy are much more likely to be influenced or shaped by previous legislative actions than those actions of an individual legislator.

The Tea Party is a recent political and organizational movement that has moved beyond isolated political protest rallies to reach a widespread salience as well as achieve electoral success at both the state and national level. While aided by historical party elites and their resources along with coverage by conservative media, this group is potentially distinct to other political movements in recent history by rallying voters in a way that departs from the two party system of Democrats or Republicans. It is important to note, however, that all legislators elected with Tea Party support ran under the

Republican party, which invites further analysis and examination to determine if this political organization and group of legislators claiming to espouse Tea Party values is in fact distinct from their Establishment counterparts. It is ultimately through this analysis of these individuals as legislators and not just candidates that the populous can be fully informed when making future decisions on which candidates to support.

Theory

Identity theory provides an explanation as to how politicians differ in policy views from the time of their campaign and subsequent election to the time they are

inaugurated as active members in Congress, a role where they are proposing and supporting legislation in line with their party’s policy views. As Stryker and Burke

(2000) discuss, a higher saliency is found in those identities which people are more committed to and go on to be the greatest contributor to deciding that individual’s behavior. With a politician, their commitment to their electorate may be stronger during a campaign but a greater period of their time will be spent navigating Congress and legislating. A politician’s behaviors would then fall in line with the group of legislative peers to whom they are more often held accountable rather than voters. With the motivation of being a successful legislator, fitting in with one’s party and being a cooperative teammate with other party members becomes very important. Following this motivation, elected officials work towards presenting themselves in an acceptable way to others. A comparison of voting habits between groups of elected officials could identify strong similarities between those within one political party. If a similarity between multiple members of the same party existed, this can be credited to occupational socialization that unite otherwise different individuals under one ideological culture.

Conformity brings identity theory and occupational socialization together.

Through the process of occupational socialization, policy makers’ attitudes may begin to conform to one another. The maintenance of these similar views is important to legislators because of their commitment to their occupational identity. Identity theory would predict Tea Party legislators find a path of cooperation with fellow establishment lawmakers of their own Republican Party to breed good relations. This path of

cooperation is found in the conformity of views and ultimately homogeneity in legislative votes despite campaign promises to the contrary.

This study is grounded in past research and theory regarding identity theory and occupational socialization in examining these new entrants to a political organization.

The examination of the FreedomWorks voting database will focus on identifying both voting differences between Tea Party and Establishment Republicans as well as exploring details on specific votes. This study will utilize the following hypotheses to guide the analysis of Republican voting patterns:

Hypothesis 1: Republican legislators elected with the backing of Tea Party organizations will vote more in-line with Establishment Republicans than with full adherence to Tea

Party values.

Hypothesis 2: Establishment Republican legislators elected without the backing of Tea

Party organizations will have higher levels of compliance with Tea Party values upon seeing Republican candidates these organizations supported becoming elected.

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

This study incorporated mixed methods of analysis to produce a more detailed depiction of the Tea Party in the United States Congress. The quantitative analysis utilized the FreedomWorks congressional voting database (FreedomWorks database) to identify differences and similarities in voting habits between Tea Party and Establishment

Republican legislators. For the qualitative analysis, an examination took place to categorize the topics of the votes that formed the FreedomWorks database in an effort to identify the legislative values considered integral to the Tea Party’s doctrine and foundation. A content analysis was then performed which included an exploration of the history, context, details, public comments, and fallout of a specific congressional vote for the purpose of identifying differences and similarities between Tea Party and

Establishment Republicans in ways not captured by the quantitative analysis.

Sample

The present study analyzed the FreedomWorks database from 2005 to 2014. This database recorded each individual legislator’s votes in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The legislative votes selected for FreedomWorks database were done so by the FreedomWorks Tea Party organization and included a variety of votes on bills, amendments, and procedural motions of Congress. While the votes selected by

FreedomWorks covered a variety of topics, they represent only a small portion of the recorded votes taken by these legislative bodies and were not chosen at random.

FreedomWorks database is separated by political party and grades individual legislators on their rate of compliance with FreedomWorks preferred position on a legislative vote they have selected. For this study the vote data found within the database required reentry into Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), allowing the grouping of legislators and their voting habits in a manner that allowed for deeper analysis.

Instrument

The analysis of the Tea Party and Establishment Republican voting patterns was derived from both quantitative and qualitative data, with both forms of analysis utilizing the FreedomWorks database. To prepare the qualitative data for analysis, legislator votes were grouped in different ways including legislator’s political party, Tea Party endorsements received, and year of the vote. The instrument recorded legislator votes by their compliance with the preferred voting position of FreedomWorks rather than the individual legislator’s vote of “yea” or “nay.” The qualitative data was obtained through the review of the bills, amendments, and motions selected by FreedomWorks for their database. The votes were categorized by policy topic and upon identifying the topics of import to the Tea Party, two specific legislative votes were chosen for a more detailed analysis. The qualitative analysis continued with an expanded examination of these votes incorporating the historical and present context of the vote, public statements, and other media coverage in an effort to further identify differences between the Tea Party and

Establishment Republicans.

Variables

All variables in this study were nominal or ordinal level variables. As the hypotheses require an analysis of votes for the purposes of comparison along with identification of organizational values, the legislative vote is the unit of analysis. A total of 356 legislative votes were analyzed, which comprised of 206 legislative votes in the

House of Representatives and 150 legislative votes in the Senate. Taking into account the 535 individual legislator positions between the House of Representatives and Senate as well as changes in the officeholder outside of elections, a total of 90,378 individual legislator votes were tallied in the House of Representatives along with 15,325 individual legislator votes tallied in the Senate. The following section outlines the quantitative variables utilized in the research. The explanation of variables includes the values for each variable, which are underlined to allow for clarity.

Political Party

For the purposes of this study, legislators were grouped into three political party categories: Democratic, Establishment Republican, and Tea Party. Independent party legislators were grouped with the political party that they caucused with and all recorded occurrences added four Democrats. The grouping between Establishment Republicans and Tea Party legislators required greater consideration as both groups proclaim themselves to be representatives of the Republican party.

A legislator’s attachment to the Tea Party was defined by an endorsement of at least one of the national Tea Party groups, FreedomWorks or Tea Party Express. These

groups endorsements were chosen as the requirement for assignment to Tea Party for two reasons. Firstly, both organizations provided endorsements to candidates across the country in both the 2010 and 2012 congressional elections. Secondly, their national presence provides a unifying ideology for a group of voters who often associate with multiple localized Tea Party groups.

A legislator was grouped as an Establishment Republican if they held their position in Congress prior to the formation of the Tea Party in 2009. In addition, the value includes Republicans that were elected after the formation of the Tea Party but did not receive an endorsement from at least one of the two national Tea Party groups. While this grouping may exclude legislators who self-proclaim an ideology consistent with Tea

Party values, the present study seeks to compare Establishment Republicans and Tea

Party legislators in a specific manner. The hypotheses guide the research in examining new legislators and the pressures they encounter upon entering a workplace that was previously unfamiliar to them as well as to gauge the efficacy of the Tea Party as a distinct political party. This would exclude members of Congress who held their position prior to the formation of the Tea Party and had previously campaigned on a platform that was not labeled or affiliated with the Tea Party movement. For legislators first elected after the formation of the Tea Party, the requirement of an endorsement by at least one of the national Tea Party groups adds a degree of legitimacy, accountability, and expectation more so than a candidate’s self-referential statements that may change from day to day.

This results in the exclusion of Republicans elected after the formation of the Tea Party who did not receive the support and any benefits granted by an endorsement of a national

Tea Party organization in the 2010 or 2012 congressional election. While no incumbent

Republicans were endorsed by a national Tea Party organization, 43 members of the

House who were incumbents during their 2010 election would join the informal Tea

Party Caucus that formed within the House of Representatives in 2011 (Travis 2011). An additional 17 freshman Republicans also joined this caucus (Travis 2011), but there was a difference between the composition of this group and those newly running candidates endorsed by a national Tea Party organization, perhaps resulting from the electoral success seen by those candidates who were successfully labeled as Tea Party candidates.

Year

This variable recorded the calendar year in which the legislative vote took place.

As the FreedomWorks database only dates back to 2005, the following years were created as values: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.

Vote compliance

This variable recorded whether a legislator’s vote paralleled the Tea Party’s preferred position as indicated by FreedomWorks. The vote compliance value was grouped into three categories: compliant, not compliant, and no vote cast.

Analysis

The data analysis incorporated two symbiotic yet divergent methods of analysis.

The analysis of quantitative data measured a legislator’s vote on a specific bill and

compared their rates of compliance with the Tea Party position between political party groups from year to year. Utilizing SPSS, the qualitative data was inputted and formatted for analysis. Legislators were grouped by political party and the total number of compliant and not compliant votes were tallied for each legislative vote. The total Tea

Party compliance rate was determined by first grouping the individual legislator votes by political party, then by the year in which the vote took place, and finally a tally of compliant, not compliant, and no vote cast were totaled. By grouping the votes in this manner, a detailed examination of Tea Party compliance between political parties of

Democratic, Establishment Republican, and Tea Party as well as those votes over time was able to be assessed. Once the vote compliance data was broken down into the individual groups by year, legislative vote, and political party, a t-test was utilized for the purposes of determining if differences between political party’s mean vote compliance rate were statistically significant.

The qualitative analysis involved reviewing the same legislative votes measured in the quantitative section, but instead of investigating Tea Party compliance rates, the data was categorized by the general policy topic of each bill. This process allowed prominent themes to emerge on legislative policy topics that were of most interest to the

Tea Party. At this point, specific votes were chosen for further review. The two specific legislative votes chosen were done so because they were deemed to cover the most common topic of import to the Tea Party as well as the salience of the votes provided opportunities for further, more detailed analysis on these legislative votes. The qualitative analysis continued with an expanded examination incorporating the historical

and present context of the vote, public statements, and other media coverage. This was performed with the goal of further understanding differences between the voting political party groups of Tea Party Republicans and Establishment Republicans in a way the quantitative data could not address. While this analysis provides a richer exploration of differences, it lacks the longitudinal and overall picture of the quantitative analysis. By using mixed methods in this study, a more complete analysis is performed to better understand and address the hypotheses.

Chapter 4

FINDINGS

In this section, the data obtained from FreedomWorks database was sorted and analyzed to determine the voting patterns of legislators overall and by specific grouping.

The current research incorporated both quantitative and qualitative data to obtain a greater understanding of the differences between Tea Party legislators and Establishment

Republicans without Tea Party support. The quantitative and qualitative data will address the hypotheses with both a longitudinal perspective provided by the quantitative data and the qualitative data exploring specific votes upon which there were deviations between Tea Party and Establishment Republicans to provide further context and understanding on the differences between these two groups.

Quantitative Findings

The quantitative data provides specific insight into legislative vote compliance with Tea Party values from 2005-2014. For the House of Representatives, a total of 206 legislative votes taken by 433-440 legislators, the latter amount varying by year, were tallied. The range on total legislators exist due to resignations, deaths in office, and appointments and special elections. For the Senate, a total of 150 legislative votes taken by 100-105 legislators, the latter amount varying by year, were tallied. For both groups of legislators, the voting members were sorted into various groups of political party and

Tea Party endorsement.

After identifying Tea Party endorsed members of Congress and recording their compliance rate with votes scored by FreedomWorks, all data was inputted into SPSS for statistical analysis. Upon completion of the database, descriptive statistics were run to identify voting trends from year to year and examine the voting differences between congressional members of the Democratic, Establishment Republican, and Tea Parties. A t-test was then utilized to test for statistical significance between these groups. Two hypotheses were examined using the quantitative data to understand the voting nature of

Tea Party endorsed legislators. The first hypothesis seeks to identify statistically significant differences in the vote compliance rate of Tea Party values between the Tea

Party and Establishment Republicans. The second hypothesis seeks to quantify the effect of the Tea Party’s political presence against the voting behavior of Establishment

Republicans.

Hypothesis 1

Republican legislators elected with the backing of Tea Party organizations will vote more in-line with Establishment Republicans than with full adherence to Tea Party values.

The first hypothesis seeks to understand if newly elected Tea Party legislators will vote in alignment with the Tea Party organizations from whom they obtained support and endorsements during the election or if their votes would align with those of

Establishment Republicans. In 2010, Establishment Republicans far outnumbered their newly elected Tea Party counterparts with a total of 169 members compared to the Tea

Party’s 75 members. It is also important to note that all positions of power and

leadership within the Republican Party were filled by Establishment Republican members. A frequency analysis in SPSS was completed to determine the rate of compliance with Tea Party values, in the context of those legislative votes selected by

FreedomWorks, for all party affiliations once Tea Party candidates began to enter office.

The 2010 elections brought with it a new political era of Tea Party organizations existing in American politics including the election of Tea Party endorsed candidates in both 2010 and 2012. To fully understand this time period, along with legislative behavior before

Tea Party legislators entered office, multiple tables were created to allow for a clear presentation of compliance rates, measured as a percentage, during these different time periods and amongst these varying groups of legislators.

Table 1. House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected 2010 Year Democratic Establishment Tea Party Percentage Total Compliance Republican Elected 2010 Difference Legislative Compliance Compliance Votes 2011 10.4% 77.3% 79.3% + 2.0% 40 2012 17.7% 54.9% 57.1% + 2.2% 20 2013 22.5% 63.3% 64.6% + 1.3% 21 2014 20.1% 68.7% 68.2% - 0.5% 21 2011-2014 16.3% 68.3% 69.7% + 1.4% 102

The legislative session of 2011 brought with it the first legislators elected with

Tea Party support. A total of 75 out of the 85 freshman Republican legislators elected in

2010 to the House of Representatives were endorsed by one or both of the national Tea

Party organizations, FreedomWorks and Tea Party Express. This represented 88.2% of all new Republican House of Representative legislators, though only accounted for

30.7% of the 244 total Republican House members who served in 2011. Their

endorsement by Tea Party organizations had the intent of branding these candidate as

Republicans by political party but separate and more conservative than Establishment

Republicans. Tea Party legislator’s voting record when first elected reflect some degree of greater Tea Party value compliance; however, this changes over time. With every year that passed, this compliance rate difference with Establishment Republicans dropped leading to the 2014 rates when Tea Party legislators elected in 2010 actually complied with Tea Party values at a lower rate than Establishment Republicans. Though the Tea

Party members elected in 2010 would see their ranks decline from 75 legislators to 61 in

2013 and 2014, this specific voting group of Tea Party members retained 81.3% of their original members after the 2012 election. A two sample t-test was conducted of the vote compliance rate between all three political party groups at a confidence interval of 95% to determine if the differences in vote compliance between political parties in a given year was statistically significant. From 2011-2014, there was a statistically significant difference in vote compliance between Democrats and that of both Establishment

Republicans and the Tea Party. However, from 2011-2014, there was not a statistically significant difference in vote compliance between Establishment Republicans and the Tea

Party. The similarity in voting compliance rate between Tea Party legislators and

Establishment Republicans suggests support for the first hypothesis.

A further breakdown of these elected Tea Party legislators was performed, analyzing the vote compliance rate of Tea Party endorsed legislators based on the number of national Tea Party organizations, between FreedomWorks and Tea Party Express, that provided their endorsements.

Table 2. House of Representatives: Vote Compliance by Endorsements Year Establishment Tea Party Members Members Republican Elected 2010 Endorsed by endorsed by Compliance Compliance 1 TP Org 2 TP Org 2011 77.3% 79.3% 80.4% 77.8% 2012 54.9% 57.1% 58.3% 55.4% 2013 63.3% 64.6% 64.3% 65.0% 2014 68.7% 68.2% 67.2% 69.4% 2011-2014 68.3% 69.7% 70.1% 69.0%

At first glance, it does not appear there is a difference in whether Tea Party candidates were endorsed by one or two national Tea Party organizations in the context of their likelihood to comply with Tea Party values. For 2011 and 2012, those members endorsed by only one Tea Party organization voted in compliance with Tea Party values at a higher rate than those endorsed by two Tea Party organizations. In 2013 and 2014, these groups switched, but neither grouping of legislators varied to a great degree from the other. A two sample t-test was conducted with a 95% confidence interval and found no statistically significant difference between any of the groups of Establishment

Republicans, Tea Party legislators endorsed by one national Tea Party organization, and

Tea Party legislators endorsed by two national Tea Party organizations. These findings suggest the number of organizations that endorsed any one candidate had no predictive value on their voting habits in the context of compliance with Tea Party ideology.

Table 3. House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected 2012 Year Democratic Establishment Tea Party Percentage Total Compliance Republican Elected 2012 Difference Legislative Compliance Compliance Votes 2013 22.5% 63.3% 76.0% + 12.7% 21 2014 20.1% 68.7% 80.6% + 11.9% 21 2013-2014 21.3% 66.1% 78.3% + 12.2% 42

The 2012 election brought about another opportunity for Tea Party organizations to support candidates for elected office. Only Republican candidates were endorsed by these organizations with a total of 20 out of the 35 total freshman Republicans elected in

2012 endorsed by one or both of the national Tea Party organizations of FreedomWorks or Tea Party Express. These 20 legislators represented 57.1% of all new Republican

House of Representative legislators elected in 2012, which was a decreased amount compared to the 2010 endorsement and election rate. Despite fewer elected Tea Party endorsed candidates who found electoral victory in 2012 compared to 2010, the voting values of those who were elected appear to have been slightly more in-line with that of

Tea Party ideology compared to Establishment Republicans. A two sample t-test conducted with a 95% confidence interval found no statistically significant difference between Tea Party legislators elected in 2012 and Establishment Republicans in 2013 or

2014. It should be noted, Tea Party legislators elected in 2012 held an average compliance rate that was 12.2% higher than Establishment Republicans in 2013 and 2014 as compared to a compliance rate differential of only 0.4% between Tea Party legislators elected in 2010 and Establishment Republicans during that same time period of 2013 and

2014. Even with the 78.3% compliance rate being higher than that of Establishment

Republicans, the 2012 elected Tea Party member’s rate was still closer to Establishment

Republicans’ 66.1% rate than an ideal Tea Party legislator voting at 100% compliance.

This compliance percentage rate being closer to Establishment Republicans than the ideal

Tea Party position coupled with no statistical difference between political parties suggests further support for the first hypothesis.

Given Tea Party legislators elected in 2012 made up a smaller percentage of total newly elected Republicans that year, we are able to compare Tea Party members elected in 2012 with Establishment Republican legislators also elected in 2012.

Table 4. House of Representatives: Legislators Elected 2012 Breakdown Year Establishment Establishment Tea Party Republicans Republicans Elected 2012 Without 2012 Elected 2012 Elected Repubs 2013 62.9% 67.6% 76.0% 2014 68.3% 72.4% 80.6% 2013-2014 65.6% 70.0% 78.3%

When we look at the vote compliance rates of Establishment Republicans with all legislators elected in 2012 removed, we see a slightly greater difference between

Establishment Republicans first elected prior to 2012 as compared to those Tea Party supported legislators elected in 2012, though the difference is still not statistically significant. The voting compliance of Establishment Republican legislators elected in

2012 fell between these two groups indicating that both Establishment Republican and

Tea Party legislators elected in 2012 voted in compliance with Tea Party values more than Establishment Republicans who were first elected before 2012; though it should be noted that the t-test indicated that this was not a statistically significant difference.

In continuing the analysis of the first hypothesis, the examination moves to the

Tea Party legislators elected to the United States Senate. This legislative body has far less fluidity in its membership as only a third of its seats are up for election at any one time, as opposed to the House of Representatives, which places all members up for reelection in each election cycle. This leads to a smaller number of legislators elected with

Tea Party support resulting in a total of only 7 Tea Party legislators elected in 2010 and

2012.

Table 5. Senate: Tea Party Legislators Elected 2010 Year Democratic Establishment Tea Party Percentage Total Compliance Republican Elected 2010 Difference Legislative Compliance Compliance Votes 2011 23.4% 73.0% 95.6% + 22.6% 18 2012 5.1% 64.8% 90.8% + 26.0% 13 2013 1.9% 65.7% 93.3% + 27.6% 21 2014 2.0% 69.5% 95.0% + 25.5% 13 2011-2014 8.5% 68.3% 93.8% + 25.5% 65

The legislative session of 2011 saw five Republican senators elected with Tea

Party support. This group was part of 12 freshman Republican senators elected in 2010.

From the beginning of their time in office, these newly elected Tea Party senator’s voting record had a much greater rate of compliance with Tea Party values than their

Establishment Republican counterparts. With a greater vote compliance by 20% than

Establishment Republicans, this group distinguished themselves from Establishment

Republican in a more significant way than their colleagues in the House of

Representatives. Further, the Tea Party rate of compliance did not reduce over the years despite the exposure to Establishment Republican senators. A two sample t-test conducted with a 95% confidence interval found there was a statistically significant difference between all three political parties. These findings suggest a measurable ideological difference did exist between the Tea Party and Establishment Republicans which fails to support the first hypothesis. The findings are indicative of a possible distinction between these two political parties at an ideological level.

Table 6. Senate: Vote Compliance with Tea Party members elected in 2012 Year Democratic Establishment Tea Party Percentage Total Compliance Republican Elected 2012 Difference Legislative Compliance Compliance Votes 2013 1.9% 65.7% 92.9% + 27.2% 21 2014 2.0% 69.5% 88.5% + 19.0% 13 2013-2014 2.0% 67.2% 91.2% + 24.0% 34

The election of 2012 included the addition of two Tea Party endorsed senators.

These two senators were a part of a group of four new Republican senators to be elected in 2012. Vote compliance with Tea Party values for this group was also much higher than their Establishment Republican counterparts. Overall, Tea Party senators consistently voted at a greater compliance rate with Tea Party values when compared to

Tea Party legislators in the House of Representatives. A two sample t-test conducted with a 95% confidence interval found there was a statistically significant difference between all three political parties. These findings suggest a measurable ideological difference did exist between the Tea Party and Establishment Republicans which fails to support the first hypothesis. The findings are indicative of a possible distinction between these two political parties at an ideological level.

Hypothesis 2

Establishment Republican legislators elected without the backing of Tea Party organizations will have higher levels of compliance with Tea Party values upon seeing

Republican candidates these organizations supported becoming elected.

The next utilization of the FreedomWorks database sought to determine if

Establishment Republicans’ voting habits had been altered by the existence of the Tea

Party. Given the electoral success that Tea Party endorsed candidates experienced, it is possible that Establishment Republicans would shift their ideological position towards greater Tea Party compliance despite holding larger numbers in Congress and their stronghold on leadership positions within the Republican party. A frequency analysis in

SPSS was completed to determine the rate of compliance, by percentage, with Tea Party values for all party affiliations both before Tea Party organizations began supporting candidates in 2010 and in the subsequent years.

Table 7. House of Representatives: Vote Compliance 2005-2010 Year Democratic Establishment Total Compliance Republican Legislative Compliance Votes 2005 18.1% 69.8% 17 2006 13.4% 70.0% 12 2007 9.5% 79.0% 20 2008 6.9% 80.3% 16 2009 7.6% 89.4% 21 2010 10.8% 92.2% 18 2005-2010 10.8% 81.0% 104

In examining the Tea Party position compliance rate before the existence of the

Tea Party, we seek to establish the baseline from which to compare Establishment

Republicans’ voting habits after these organizations entered American politics. The rate of compliance with Tea Party values during the period between 2005-2010 was clearly higher by the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. Given the Tea Party’s self- proclaimed conservative values, this dichotomy is not unexpected. It is noteworthy that

Republican compliance increased each year which indicates the Republican legislators of

2010 were much more aligned with Tea Party values, supporting them 92.2% of the time

as compared to their counterparts in 2005 that supported Tea Party values 69.8% of the time.

Table 8. House of Representatives: Vote Compliance 2011-2014 Year Democratic Establishment Total Compliance Republican Legislative Compliance Votes 2011 10.4% 77.3% 40 2012 17.7% 54.9% 20 2013 22.5% 63.3% 21 2014 20.1% 68.7% 21 2011-2014 16.3% 68.3% 102

The compliance rate by Establishment Republicans after 2010 was much lower overall than before the entrance of Tea Party legislators in the House of Representatives.

The vote compliance rate change indicates the presence of the Tea Party did not have the effect of pulling Establishment Republicans closer to their values. In fact, the opposite is seen with vote compliance moving farther from the Tea Party’s preferred positions within the House of Representatives. This level of compliance would never reach those recorded in 2009 at 89.4% and in 2010 at 92.2%. As the compliance rate was not heightened by the Tea Party’s electoral success, the second hypothesis is not supported.

The findings do allow for the possibility that Tea Party influence may have existed given the origins of the Tea Party started in 2009. Though they had yet to find electoral success, just the Tea Party group’s organization and formation before endorsing candidates may have been sufficient enough to affect legislative action for the short period from 2009-2010. Once the first Tea Party members were elected, Establishment

Republicans in the House of Representatives would return to its 2005-2008 baseline with a compliance rate in the 60-80% range.

Table 9. Senate: Vote Compliance 2005-2010 Year Democratic Establishment Total Compliance Republican Legislative Compliance Votes 2005 9.0% 74.4% 15 2006 18.7% 74.9% 11 2007 4.2% 58.9% 12 2008 14.4% 56.3% 12 2009 18.7% 68.0% 12 2010 3.8% 88.5% 23 2005-2010 10.3% 72.6% 85

In examining Tea Party compliance rates between 2005 and 2010 for the Senate, the rate was varied ranging from the low of 56.3% in 2008 to the high of 88.5% in 2010.

Similar to the House of Representatives, an increase is observed after the formation and proliferation of Tea party organizations, but before Tea Party legislators entered the

Senate with a jump to 88.5% compliance in 2010.

Table 10. Senate: Vote Compliance 2011-2014 Year Democratic Establishment Total Compliance Republican Legislative Compliance Votes 2011 23.4% 73.0% 18 2012 5.1% 64.8% 13 2013 1.9% 65.7% 21 2014 2.0% 69.5% 13 2011-2014 8.5% 68.3% 65

The compliance rate by Establishment Republicans after 2010 and when Tea

Party senators took office began to fall back to the levels seen between 2005 and 2009.

Similar to the House of Representatives, the vote frequency analysis did not support the second hypothesis that argued the Tea Party presence would have the effect of pulling

Establishment Republicans closer to their values. In fact, Establishment Republican’s

compliance dropped to 54.9% in 2012, which was the lowest compliance rate in all years analyzed from 2005-2014.

Qualitative Findings

A review of the votes scored by FreedomWorks revealed general themes the Tea

Party organization relied upon to reach its goals of reducing the size of government.

Given their scorecards are meant to be a guide for both voters, in how they perceive their legislators, and for legislators on how best to vote to align with Tea Party ideals, an analysis of the type of legislation that this group chose to focus on was warranted. By analyzing these pieces of legislation, a better understanding of the values most important to the Tea Party can be achieved. In addition, this added layer of analysis can also illuminate the extent to which Establishment Republicans voted in line with Tea Party values on a specific piece of legislation which differs from the quantitative analysis that examined changes in a more longitudinal fashion on an annual basis.

Since FreedomWorks began scoring legislation in 2005, there have been a total of

356 bills and amendments that have been selected and analyzed by the organization.

When the topics of these votes were summarized and cataloged, two emergent themes were revealed as topics of high importance for FreedomWorks: government spending and healthcare. The first major theme from the scored bills and amendments was focused on cutting government spending. This included votes on budgets that reduced spending, votes on appropriations for specific departments that reduced their previous budget, and votes to cut other funding that had previously been in place at the time of that vote. This

category of legislation made up 44.7% of the total votes scored by FreedomWorks from

2005 to 2014. The second major theme from the scored bills and amendments focused on federal healthcare programs. This included votes on bills and amendments that either repealed, reduced, or eliminated federal healthcare programs such as the Children’s

Health Insurance Program and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This category of legislation made up 9.8% of the total votes that were scored by FreedomWorks from

2005 to 2014.

In addition to cataloging the votes scored by FreedomWorks, when identifying these two themes of government spending and healthcare, additional consideration was given to those votes that were deemed of extra importance by FreedomWorks. Of the

356 scored votes, ten were designated by FreedomWorks as counting as two separate votes when a legislator’s Tea Party compliance score was totaled. This served to convey the importance of these specific votes. Of these ten double-scored votes, six focused solely on the reduction of government spending, two focused on healthcare, and the final two votes focused on a combination of the two preceding topics. These two votes of note were related to the congressional votes on the 2013-2014 budget that failed to reduce spending or eliminate the ACA healthcare program. When accounting for both the total votes scored along with those double-scored votes by FreedomWorks, it becomes evident that of all the legislative votes that occur at the federal level in a given year, these two topics of government spending and healthcare were of utmost concern to the Tea Party.

It is with this information in mind that an analysis was performed of the 2013-

2014 budget vote, given that vote served to encapsulate both the major themes of

FreedomWorks as well as serves as an example of a split in voting behavior between the

Tea Party and Establishment Republicans. As the quantitative analysis indicated, the Tea

Party legislators elected in 2012 was slightly more compliant with Tea Party values than their 2010 counterparts and a deeper examination of their votes revealed possible ideological differences between Establishment Republicans and the Tea Party. The 2013-

2014 continuing appropriations bill that went through both the House of Representatives and the Senate was opposed by FreedomWorks as it did not reduce spending and did not eliminate the ACA healthcare program, which was included in original editions of the bill. The vote on this appropriations bill also ended the 2013 government shutdown and with the eyes of the nation on our federal legislators at that time more than any other in the recent past, there is fertile ground and opportunity for analysis of the Tea Party and

Establishment Republican’s actions and statements.

Background

As 2013 progressed, funding for the federal government was set to expire on

September 30, 2013. This also correlated with the implementation of most major provisions of the ACA that would launch healthcare exchanges and subsidies and allow

Americans to sign up for health insurance effective January 1, 2014. Up to this point, the

Republicans in the House of Representatives, who gained control after the 2010 midterm elections, had voted on numerous occasions to defund or eliminate the ACA (Cohen

2013). Given that they lacked control of the Senate or the presidency and Democrats would not vote against legislation they had fought hard to pass in 2009 and 2010, the

Republican-initiated votes were largely symbolic in nature. With most major provisions of the ACA going into effect January 2014, the fall of 2013 was seen as a last opportunity to prevent this legislation from going into effect (Hook and Peterson 2013). Unlike past votes which had been solely focused on the elimination of the ACA, by coupling healthcare with the federal government’s annual budget, Republicans sought to force the elimination of the ACA in a new way. By only allowing the government to be funded if the budget did not include funds specifically for the ACA, Republicans created a situation in which a government shutdown would result if Democrats did not vote in line. Both

Establishment Republicans and Tea Party legislators supported this strategy but with

Senate control held by Democrats, the Senate would only pass continuing government funding if the ACA was included in the appropriations bill. On October 1, 2013, the federal government ground to a halt as legislators were unable to arrive at a compromise between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The Shutdown

Even before the shutdown went into effect, both political parties jockeyed to place the blame for the government shutdown squarely with the opposing party. Both parties asserted that whichever political party was considered most at fault for the shutdown would be the ones to ultimately give in on the issue. While polls taken before the shutdown had Republicans perceived as more accountable by the populous if a shutdown were to occur, this was only by a plurality. Republican legislators dismissed these findings, instead pointing to other polls that indicated Americans’ opposition to the ACA

held a majority view and far outnumbered those who supported the healthcare program

(Heavey 2013). The government shutdown saw many federal agencies shuttering, forcing its employees out the doors for unpaid leave until the shutdown ended. Those federal employees whose agencies were deemed “essential” to the continued existence of the United States government were required to work without compensation and would not receive pay for their work until the end of the shutdown through the passage of a continuing appropriations bill. As the shutdown continued, public sentiment turned against the Republican party and on October 10, 2013 a poll was released that indicated the public squarely held Republicans responsible for the shutdown at a rate of 53%. The public held Democrats responsible in numbers paralleling previous polls and President

Obama’s approval rating actually increased by two points to 47% from the month before

(Murray 2013). Following the release of these poll results, substantive and fruitful discussions emerged between both parties in both legislative bodies which started legislators on a path forward to ending the shutdown. An additional factor taken into consideration for the sudden amelioration of gridlock was the rapidly approaching deadline to raise the debt ceiling for the United States by October 17, 2013. Without the debt ceiling being raised by this date, the government would no longer have the ability to meet its obligation on its usual payments and would have to prioritize which payments to make to its numerous obligees. This situation had never occurred in United States history and it was widely anticipated that failure to make all required payments when due would have unknown, unparalleled, and adverse effects on the United States economy.

Amid the flurry of political and economic factors, on October 16, 2013, John

Boehner, the Republican Speaker of the House, agreed to allow a vote on the floor for legislation that would continue funding the government including the ACA as well as to raise the debt limit. To move this legislation forward, the Speaker would forgo an informal rule of the House of Representatives that requires a majority of the members of the ruling political party to support legislation before it could be brought to a vote. As

Democrats held 200 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives and they would support the bill, a majority of Republicans would not be needed to pass this legislation.

The Vote to End the Shutdown

The bill that would become the vehicle for continued funding for the government and the ACA was “H.R. 2775, Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014.” FreedomWorks would release a preferred position for both the House of Representatives and the Senate that called for legislators to vote against this bill’s passage (FreedomWorks 2016). On

October 16, 2013, the bill received the support of all Democrats in the Senate along with two senators that self-identified as Independents. In comparison to the Democratic uniformity, Republicans were split with 27 Republicans voting in favor of the bill and 18 opposed its passage (GovTrack 2016). At the time of the vote, there were seven Tea

Party endorsed senators serving with five of them elected in 2010 and two in 2012. Ron

Johnson, Mike Lee, Rand Paul, Marco Rubio, and Pat Toomey were those elected in

2010 while Ted Cruz and Jeff Flake joined the Senate as a result of the 2012 election. On

H.R. 2775, with the exception of Jeff Flake, all Tea Party endorsed members voted

against the bill’s passage, placing theTea Party senator’s compliance rate at 85.7%. By comparison, Establishment Republicans had a 23.7% compliance rate as a result of a majority of these Republicans voting in favor of the passage of H.R. 2775 to end the government shutdown.

The bill then moved to the House of Representatives for a vote. While similar bills, which continued government funding and funded the ACA, had previously made their way to the House of Representatives, Boehner had not allowed these to be brought to a vote. This blacklisting was a result of the informal “Hastert Rule,” named after a previous Speaker of the House, which called for bills to be brought forward for a vote only if they were supported by a majority of the ruling political party. With a majority of

Republicans in the House unwilling to support bills that continued government funding and included the ACA, Boehner followed the Hastert Rule and withheld opportunities to vote on government funding until October 16, 2013. When H.R. 2775 was finally brought forward, the bill received support from all Democrats in the House. Republicans, on the other hand, were fractured in their voting with 87 Republicans voting in favor of

H.R. 2775 and 144 opposing the bill (GovTrack 2016). By 2013, there had been two elections with Tea Party endorsed candidates that resulted in a total of 61 Tea Party legislators originally elected in 2010 and 20 legislators elected in 2012 present to vote on

H.R. 2775. When examining the breakdown of this vote, differences were discovered between Establishment Republican and Tea Party legislators. The Establishment

Republicans displayed a Tea Party compliance rate of 58.4% on this vote. This contrasts with the compliance rate of the Tea Party which was 70.4%. A further breakdown

showed that legislators elected in 2010 had a compliance rate of 65.6% compared to 80% by those Tea Party legislators elected in 2012. These findings suggest that an ideological difference existed between Establishment Republican and Tea Party legislators with the most recently elected legislators exhibiting the greatest degree of compliance with the preferred Tea Party position. In total, 56 Tea Party legislators voted for the continuation of the government shutdown while 25 legislators voted to bring an end to the shutdown even though the bill preserved funding for the ACA.

Comments from Republican Legislators

Leaders of the movement that opposed implementation and funding of the ACA, even if it meant shutting down the government, derived from both the House of

Representatives and Senate. All of these legislators were newly elected in 2012 with the backing of the Tea Party and had only held office for less than 9 months when the shutdown started. Mark Meadows, a legislator in the House of Representatives, penned an open letter on August 21, 2013 to the Republican leadership in the House where he called for defunding the ACA by specifically linking defunding to any future appropriation bills that would fund the government. He went on to write, “James

Madison wrote in Federalist No. 58 that 'the power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon... for obtaining a redress of every grievance...’” (Meadows 2013). A total of 80 Republicans in the House of

Representatives then went on to add their support by signing Meadows’ letter. Of those who signed the letter, 36 House members were from the Tea Party which represented

44.4% of their 81 total members. In addition to the Tea Party legislators, 44

Establishment Republicans signed the letter, which represented 28.9% of their 152 total members in the House. FreedomWorks addressed the topic of holding elected officials accountable to Meadows’ letter in the article, “Have Your Members of Congress Signed the "Defund ObamaCare" Letter? Find Out Here!” (Withrow 2013). In the Senate, newly elected Tea Party Senator Ted Cruz worked to link the defunding of the ACA to continued government funding by holding a 21-hour speech on the floor of Congress on

September 24, 2013, days before the shutdown began. During this speech, Cruz attempted to explain his position and the importance of fighting to defund the ACA. It was in this speech that a common Republican sentiment was articulated by Cruz that was repeated throughout the shutdown, “Let me be very, very clear. I do not believe we should shut down the federal government. The only reason we might shut down the federal government is if President Obama and Majority Leader Reid decide they want to force a government shutdown” (Condon 2013).

Other Tea Party legislators that supported the government shutdown notably worked to shift blame for the shutdown on Democratic legislators. Representative George

Holding stated, "Instead of working with Congress, the President and Senate Democrats have repeatedly refused to negotiate and find a solution that would keep the government open" (Holding 2013). Representative Matt Salmon joined in when stating, “It’s now day

4 of the government shutdown and the difference is becoming increasingly clear:

Republicans continue to talk about opening up the government; Democrats continue to talk about how to keep it closed” (Salmon 2013). When confronted with the fact that the

government shutdown was widely unpopular, a counter-argument made by Republicans and the Tea Party noted that the ACA was also unpopular, such as when Representative

Jim Renacci stated, “The American people did not want Obamacare, don't support it today and cannot afford it. Harry Reid and his Senate allies are acting to shut down the government in order to force it upon the American people” (Eaton 2013). As the government shutdown came to an end on October 16, 2013, there was a noticeable difference in the public comments between Tea Party representatives who were in favor of continuing the shutdown and those who voted to bring it to an end. Those supportive of continuing the shutdown, such as Representative Chuck Fleischmann stated,

“Tonight’s vote was yet another move to kick the can down the road and does nothing to address our unmanageable debt” (Huotari 2013). Another member of the Tea Party who voted against H.R. 2775, Representative Andy Barr, defended his position when stating,

“I feel very confident that I did the right thing because this is what my constituents asked me to do” (Youngman 2013). In a succinct, yet revealing statement, Thomas Massie went on to say, “Goose egg, nothing, we got nothing” (Weisman and Parker 2013).

Those Tea Party Republicans who voted to bring the shutdown to an end, despite the vote being in conflict with Tea Party values, framed their votes to highlight their desire to keep the government functional and running. As Representative Mike Fitzpatrick stated,

“Americans want their government to remain open and want to see public officials resolve our differences to put our country back on the right track” (Tamari 2013).

Adding upon Fitzpatrick’s comments, Representative Pat Meehan went on to tweet, “I came to DC to fix gov’t, not shut it down” (Tamari 2013).

Establishment Republicans, for the most part, held similar positions to that of the

Tea Party by seeking to place the blame of the shutdown on Democrats, although some were willing to criticize the Tea Party coalition within their party. Senator John McCain stated, “[It was] the people that convinced so many millions of Americans, tea partiers specifically we’re talking about, that there was some way to defund Obamacare. We can’t” (Delreal 2013). Another Establishment Republican, Representative Peter King, went on to say, “The Republicans should not have started this,” placing blame within his own party (Robidoux 2013). Republican Establishment leadership, in the form of John

Boehner would simply state, “We fought the good fight, we just didn't win”

(Cunningham 2013). Boehner’s position and actions during the shutdown ranged as he was firmly in control of whether a vote on H.R. 2775 would take place due to his position as Speaker of the House. Boehner initially allowed the shutdown to take place by preventing the vote that would have averted the government shutdown, but also included funding for the ACA. He is also the one who went on to eventually allow the vote of

H.R. 2775 to continue government funding while preserving the ACA and in a lengthier statement, John Boehner explained his decision further:

The House has fought with everything it has to convince the President of the United States to engage in bipartisan negotiations aimed at addressing our country's debt and providing fairness for the American people under ObamaCare. That fight will continue. But blocking the bipartisan agreement reached today by the members of the Senate will not be a tactic for us…Our drive to stop the train wreck that is the President's health care law will continue. We will rely on aggressive oversight that highlights the law's massive flaws and smart, targeted strikes that split the legislative coalition the president has relied upon to force his health care law on the American people. (Boehner 2013)

Despite allowing the shutdown to start 16 days earlier, Speaker John Boehner and 86 other Republican legislators, all of whom voted for the shutdown to end, would be viewed as traitors to the Tea Party despite previous cooperation with the Tea Party and providing explanations for their vote.

Tea Party Organizations

Leading up to and during the government shutdown, perception of what political groups were to blame was widely discussed by the media. Even many conservative commentators were noted to place blame for the shutdown with the Republican Party

(Bishop 2013). Despite a perception that Republicans were to blame for the government shutdown, there were many Republicans who refused to vote to end the shutdown. To provide insight into this voting bloc’s motivations, one need only reference the Tea Party belief that the shutdown should not have ended until the ACA was completely defunded.

The immense pressure placed on legislators by the Tea Party and other conservative organizations proved effective in persuading some Republican legislators to maintain their position of favoring the shutdown (Viser 2013). One reason these groups were able to so effectively exert pressure was the fear held by Republican legislators. This fear stemmed from a future challenge in their political party’s primary process to be replaced as the Republican nominee by a candidate who held views more consistent with the Tea

Party (Nichols 2013). As predicted, this would be the plan developed in response to legislators who supported funding the government including two senators who were targeted by Tea Party organizations that vowed to support those legislator’s Republican

challengers in the following year’s election cycle (Debenedetti 2013). The condemnation by Tea Party groups extended to all Republicans who ultimately voted to bring the shutdown to an end with the pejorative term RINO, Republican in Name Only, becoming a frequently used phrase to describe Republicans that voted against the stated interests of

Tea Party groups (Freedlander 2013).

Summary

The quantitative examination of Tea Party and Establishment Republican votes found little difference between the compliance rate of House of Representative Tea Party legislators elected in 2010 and their Establishment Republican peers. A look back to

2011, when Tea Party legislators were new additions to Congress, found they also had an opportunity to shut down the government in April 2011. At the time, Tea Party organizations were not opposed to a shutdown (Cohen 2011), but a shutdown never materialized and legislators from both parties worked together to pass continuing funding. The quantitative examination of Tea Party candidates elected in 2012 found the group voted in a Tea Party compliant manner at a slightly higher rate as compared to

Establishment Republicans with the government shutdown of 2013 acting as a culmination of this ideological difference. A close analysis of the 2013 government shutdown examined the public comments and actions of the legislators involved and demonstrated that despite the conformity that appeared in those Tea Party members elected in 2010, instances did exist where a distinct Tea Party group of legislators emerged from Establishment Republicans.

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

The voting patterns of Tea Party legislators elected to the House of

Representatives supported the first hypothesis that theorized this new legislative political party would vote more in line with Establishment Republicans rather than fully adhering to Tea Party values. This finding was strongest in Tea Party members of the House who were first elected in 2010, where the largest deviation from Establishment Republicans was 2.2% in 2012, a year when Tea Party legislators had an overall compliance rate of

57.1% compared to Establishment Republicans’ compliance rate of 54.9%. This was not found to be a statistically significant difference. In contrast, Tea Party members of the

House who were elected in 2012 demonstrated a slightly larger variance in their voting patterns with a compliance rate averaging 12.2% higher than Establishment Republicans from 2013-2014. Despite this higher compliance rate, this variance was also not found to be a statistically significant difference. Further, even at their greatest level of Tea Party compliance in 2014, the Tea Party legislators’ voting rate (80.4%) remained closer to the

Establishment Republican’s rate that year (68.7%) than the Tea Party’s ideal compliance level of 100%. The only finding that represented a statistically significant difference between Tea Party compliance levels in the House of Representatives was that demonstrated between the Democratic party and both Establishment Republicans and the

Tea Party. Democrats held a Tea Party compliance rate that never exceeded 22.5% in any single year.

The voting patterns of the Tea Party legislators elected to the Senate did not support the first hypothesis that theorized this new legislative political party would vote more in line with Establishment Republicans rather than fully adhering to Tea Party values. Tea Party senators elected in both 2010 and 2012 voted in compliance with the

Tea Party ideal at a much higher rate than Establishment Republicans. There was a statistically significant difference between Establishment Republicans and Tea Party legislator’s voting compliance rate in all years analyzed. In 2013, the compliance level between these two groups had the widest variation with Tea Party legislators voting with

Tea Party ideals in 93.3% of all votes cast compared to Establishment Republicans voting with Tea Party ideals in 65.7% of all votes cast in that same year. The smallest range of compliance observed in any year by Tea Party senators was seen in 2014 by those Tea

Party legislators elected in 2012 when they held a vote compliance level of 88.5% which was still statistically significantly higher than the compliance level of Establishment

Republicans (69.5%) in that same year.

When comparing voting patterns of Tea Party legislators and Establishment

Republicans between the House of Representatives and the Senate, a distinct difference was revealed. While Tea Party legislators in the House generally conformed with their

Establishment Republican counterparts, those members of the Tea Party in the Senate deviated from this pattern by voting with a much higher Tea Party compliance rate. A traditional argument made when distinguishing the House of Representatives from

Congress has been its members are more responsive to their constituency as they must seek reelection every two years. The Senate is perceived as a more methodical legislative

body as Senators who are free from constant electoral concerns, given their six year terms, are able to focus on deliberating and legislating as a group and only allowing well developed pieces of legislation pass through its halls. The findings of this research would appear to contradict these traditional views of each body as Tea Party legislators of the

House conformed with Establishment Republicans and thus failed to live up to their statements as candidates of being outsiders and distinct from their Republican establishment. Meanwhile, it was the Senate Tea Party members who held much more strongly to their Tea Party values when it came time to cast legislative votes even when that meant deviating from Establishment Republicans. These findings reveal the opportunity for further exploration on additional dynamics taking place between legislators in the House and the Senate. One possible explanation for this finding is found in the requirements of a successful reelection effort for legislators. Not only is a plurality of votes required, but also a great deal of financial resources. While legislators in the House of Representatives must work towards obtaining these votes every two years and seek not to alienate their constituency, they also seek campaign funds and it is primarily in their political party’s national and congressional committees that they will find the greatest assistance in obtaining these funds and contacts for fundraising for their campaigns. With the constant need for fundraising in place, political parties wield a great deal of influence over legislators who first seek their political party’s assistance when the need arises for fundraising assistance, which for House of Representative members is every two years. Conversely, Senators are largely free from these fundraising requirements for much of their time in Congress and can limit appeasing party interests to

a much smaller percentage of their time as compared to members in the House of

Representatives. This fundraising factor may play a key role in an individual legislator’s party loyalty and voting patterns regardless of rhetoric delivered on the campaign trail.

The voting patterns of Establishment Republicans provided mixed results for the second hypothesis, which queried if Tea Party compliance increased over time once

Establishment Republicans witness the electoral success of Tea Party Republicans. In both the House of Representatives and Senate, the Tea Party compliance rate of

Establishment Republicans actually dropped from 2011 to 2014. In the House of

Representatives, the compliance rate of Establishment Republicans was 77.3% in 2011 but then dropped to a low of 54.9% in 2012 and finally rebounded to 68.7% in 2014. The

Senate displayed less variance, though a similar trajectory, than the House with the compliance rate at 73.0% in 2011, dropping to a low of 64.8% in 2012 and finally rebounding to 69.5% in 2014. For the time period before Tea Party members joined the legislature, it is found the highest level of Tea Party compliance by Establishment

Republicans in the House and the Senate were seen between the years of 2009 and 2010.

Establishment Republicans in the House of Representatives had their compliance rate peak in 2009 and 2010 at 89.4% and 92.2%, respectively. Senate Establishment

Republicans had their compliance rate peak in 2010 at 88.5%.

At first glance, the voting records indicate that Establishment Republicans became less conservative after the political emergence of Tea Party legislators, but the ideological framework and perspective of Congress may have shifted upon the entrance of Tea Party legislators. With the addition of Tea Party legislators, Republicans were

able to obtain majority control of the House of Representatives which gave the Tea Party an opportunity to propose more conservative pieces of legislation. With the existence of these Tea Party influenced bills, unlike the period from 2005 to 2010 when such legislation was never available to be considered in the legislature, there was a newfound opportunity for clearer distinction between conservatives within the Republican party.

The one finding indicative of a possible ideological shift were those voting results of Establishment Republicans from 2009 to 2010. Given the high rates of Tea Party compliance by Establishment Republicans between 2009 and 2010 when compared to the preceding and following years, an opportunity for further study on the phenomenon is presented. It is important to note that the Tea Party was in the initial stages of development in early 2009 and by 2010 had coalesced into stronger organizations that were actively supporting candidates in primary and general elections. Given the increasing political power wielded by the Tea Party, it could be argued that Establishment

Republicans would be under pressure to act and publicly speak in a more conservative manner to draw similarities to their Tea Party counterparts who were seeing a wave of populous support. In 2010, Establishment Republicans in both the House of

Representatives and Senate scored their highest ever Tea Party voting compliance level which are votes that took place during these legislator’s own primary and general elections. This lends weight to the second hypothesis as for a short period, perhaps in an effort to limit the proliferation of the Tea Party, Establishment Republicans voted in a more conservative manner that reflected Tea Party ideals.

An additional factor to consider when discussing the results of Republican compliance with Tea Party ideals comes in the rules of Congress governing legislation.

The controlling political party in the House of Representatives and the Senate hold absolute control over what legislation can be brought forward to a vote. Through control of committees, where legislation is introduced, and leadership positions, that formulate the overall agenda, the controlling party wields a great deal of control over the legislation that is even available for legislators to vote on. The election of 2010 brought about not only a wave of Tea Party legislators, but a new Republican majority. When the database of votes developed by FreedomWorks is considered in this context, it is seen that from

2006-2010 the votes selected for this database were largely available for selection only with Democratic influence and free from Tea Party input as they had yet to coalesce into a legislative force. Beginning in 2011, Republicans enjoyed both legislative agenda control and a group of Tea Party legislators willing to propose legislation that had not previously been seen. The overall viability of legislation proposed by the Tea Party was not always of primary concern and bills that would be considered outside the norm for even Establishment Republicans found their way to a vote (Haraldsson 2011, Riley

2011). One example of this situation included Senator Rand Paul’s budget proposal in

2011, which made drastic cuts to the federal government and was supported by only seven Republican legislators while 38 Republican Senators voted against its passage and against the ideal Tea Party position on this proposal (FreedomWorks 2016, Riley 2011).

Given newfound Republican control of the legislature and Tea Party members falling under the Republican Party, these pieces of legislation were now available for

consideration by FreedomWorks and created opportunities for an ideological and voting distinction between Establishment Republicans and the Tea Party. While Establishment

Republicans may have been voting in compliance with the Tea Party at a higher rate in

2009 and 2010, given their failure to support newly available Tea Party influenced legislation, their drop in compliance rate indicates they may not have been deviating from their ideological norm as the voting rate changes first indicated.

Through the application of identity theory and occupational socialization, the findings of Tea Party voting patterns in the House of Representatives provided further support for the conformity undergone by many new members to an organization. Path dependency was revealed to occur, to some extent, as the status quo remained unchanged despite the entrance of Tea Party legislators in Congress. Even when there were distinguishing moments, such as the Tea Party’s involvement in shutting down the government, Establishment Republicans ultimately compromised with Democrats subverting the actions of the Tea Party and allowing for the continuation of the status quo. Tea Party members in the Senate succeeded in setting themselves apart from

Establishment Republicans and situated themselves as a separate political party, but under the Republican party banner. However, the overall impact of their ideological and political splintering from Establishment Republicans was lessened by their relatively small numbers in the Senate. In fact, Tea Party Senators only comprised 15.5% of Senate

Republicans and 7% of all Senators at the height of their most numerous in 2014. While being perceived by Tea Party organizations as ideologically purer than Democrats or

Establishment Republicans, the overall impact on legislation was diluted by this lower

representation level. When looking at the House of Representatives, the Tea Party represented 34.3% of House Republicans and 18.6% of all legislators in the House of

Representatives. Despite their relatively larger percentage in 2013, compared to Tea

Party members in the Senate, the Tea Party legislators’ closer rate of conformity to

Establishment Republicans nullified any potential impact their larger numbers could have had in the House. When looking specifically at the 2012 Tea Party legislators in the

House of Representatives and ignoring, for the moment, the finding of no statistical difference between this group of legislators and Establishment Republicans, the Tea Party members exhibited a slightly higher level of compliance. However, these Tea Party legislators only comprised 8.5% of House Republicans and thus faced the same predicament as Senate Tea Party members in having too few members to make a significant political impact. These findings indicate the potential for change in the existing status quo and a departure from the path dependency seen in the legislature, but currently these effects remain only a possibility. Given the well-established establishment culture in Congress, the current leadership in place, and the large legislative coalition needed to upend the current dynamic, no matter the political ideology, it would take a political movement unseen in modern political history for this possibility to become reality. The Tea Party has certainly shown what a divergent political force that reaches elected office can accomplish; however, the existing party establishment also revealed their power to absorb deviant and subversive forces into the fold. In the case of the Tea Party, this cooptation by the establishment has not gone

unnoticed as has been observed in the political rhetoric of the 2016 presidential elections and the increasing stigmatization and vilification of the term “establishment.”

Subsequent Years

Although they have not ever represented a majority of legislators in Congress, nor a simple majority of Republicans, the 2013 shutdown of the federal government indicated that Tea Party legislators have held some degree of political power and influence with reverberations felt by other legislators and the general public. As discussed in the qualitative findings, the Tea Party and Republican legislators who supported ending the

2013 government shutdown were seen as traitors to the Tea Party movement and derogatorily labeled “RINO” or “Republican in Name Only.” This visceral reaction from

Tea Party organizations and the Republican electorate had significant staying power since

2013, revealing itself at certain flashpoints of electoral politics. The first instance was in the 2014 primaries where six Republican incumbents faced primary challenges from Tea

Party supported candidates. In all six cases, the Tea Party’s attempt to unseat the incumbents failed; however, the act of running against a fellow Republican incumbent was telling of the political discord (Terbush 2014). One such legislator was Senate

Minority Leader Mitch McConnell who was a five-term incumbent, having served in the

Senate for 30 years, and had never faced a serious challenge in the primary since his first election in 1984.

In the year that followed, 2015 found Representative Mark Meadows take action against the establishment in a manner that further distanced himself and the Tea Party

from Establishment Republicans. Two years after penning the open letter recommending the linking of the ACA to continued government funding, Meadows filed a motion in

July of 2015 to force a no-confidence vote against the Republican Speaker of the House

John Boehner, a member of his own political party. Despite its miniscule chances of success, the call for a no-confidence vote was viewed by the Tea Party as a positive move in the right direction eliciting comments from FreedomWorks CEO, Adam Brandon,

“Every time defenders of freedom need a leader, John Boehner has failed us. It’s time to remove Boehner from the speakership” (Miller and Howell Jr. 2015). Boehner would retire from his position as Speaker of the House and ultimately Congress entirely in

October of 2015. While Boehner did not explicitly link the Tea Party as the reason for his departure, there was speculation that he was looking to avoid holding power during another government shutdown push, this time over funding for Planned Parenthood

(Steinhauer 2015).

In late 2015, the focus of American politics increasingly turned to the race for

President with both the Tea Party and the stigmatization of the term “establishment” having a significant impact on the election. By March of 2016, only four Republican presidential candidates remained from an initial field of 17, with two of these candidates being Tea Party Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, both of whom were studied for the purposes of this research. Both candidates outpaced their third opponent, moderate

Republican John Kasich who had the longest history in politics and was arguably the most representative of the Republican Establishment. However, it was the Republican frontrunner for President that reveals the populous’ enduring desire for an outsider and

anti-politician to succeed in representing their political party. Donald Trump, a businessman from the private sector with no political office experience rode a populous wave in the presidential primaries of 2016 that saw record turnout in Republican primaries and victories over both Tea Party candidates and the last remaining

Establishment Republican candidate. Never in American history has there been a

President who has not previously held political office, a high ranking government position, or been a high ranking military officer. However, on the precipice of the 2016 presidential election, a candidate that had not held a single position previously mentioned has a chance to change history. While Trump benefited from a large backing of conservative voters, columnists argued this success was attributed to the candidate successfully exploiting an anger felt by voters over the inability of elected officials to be efficient and productive in governing. Trump’s candidacy and popular support is the culmination of a Republican political movement that began years ago and coalesced in the form of the Tea Party and now may have moved beyond that political expression.

The extent to which any lasting change can survive the status quo has yet to be seen but it is clear that there is pressure to override the current political landscape of the Republican party along with its corresponding culture and ideology.

Conclusion

Limitations of this research center on the composition of the database utilized for the analysis of legislative voting habits. While there was a significant benefit to the longitudinal voting records and the comparison to the Tea Party’s preferred position, the

votes available for analysis were selected exclusively by FreedomWorks. The scored votes represented only a fraction of the total votes on bills, amendments, and motions that take place in Congress and may not fully reflect the intricate differences between Tea

Party and Establishment Republicans. Further, given the selection of votes was compiled by FreedomWorks and it proved informative to examine their chosen votes, this did not allow for a representative sample of votes placed in Congress in any given year.

Additionally, vote tracking in general, and in this research, is complicated as selection was limited to roll call votes, which leaves voice votes and standing votes unrecorded, which misses additional pieces of legislation that can no longer be analyzed in this research.

The research was also limited by the grouping of legislators as Tea Party or

Establishment Republicans. There is a multitude of ways to define a member of the Tea

Party, which could not be taken into consideration, be it endorsements from local Tea

Party groups, those who self-identify as Tea Party candidates and legislators, or incumbents who were later embraced by Tea Party organizations. As discussed in the methodology section, the grouping had to be specifically defined with an endorsement by a national Tea Party organization being given weight in this research. However, given both Establishment Republicans and Tea Party legislators are all representatives of the

Republican party, there would naturally be conflict on who would best belong to each group.

Further research is required to examine the world of Republican politics to better understand the changing dynamic that may presently be occurring. This is of interest to

not only the political sciences, but also sociology, as understanding the ideological split that may be occurring would further the academic understanding of occupational and organizational socialization and how the culture can change within an organization within the political sphere. Research of the Republican establishment and their public comments regarding members within their own party, be they Tea Party legislators or outsider candidates for President, can provide enhanced insight into how a dominant organizational culture reacts to a significant threat to their identity. Additional research opportunities include exploring if the Tea Party as a political movement is on the decline given their decreasing electoral success. Further, exploring the changing electorate during midterm elections compared to presidential elections may provide insight into what factors shape the rise of successful political movements.

The current study has added significant understanding to both the Tea Party as well as the strength and reactiveness of political organizational culture. While there has been a great deal of speculation and discussion as to how the Tea Party has affected the

Republican party, this study is the first to compile and analyze legislative data with the goal of determining if a political difference truly existed between the Tea Party and

Republicans. Although the research relies on secondary data, by regrouping legislators into ideological subgroups, that had yet to be researched, the possibility to discern concrete distinctions between groups was achieved. This research also utilized a longitudinal design not often applied in legislative analysis. As there are biennial elections which sees some degree of turnover in Congress, examining voting habits over the course of many years is rarely considered. The benefit of implementing a

longitudinal analysis allows for the consideration of possible changes in a political and occupational culture as well as observing the fortitude and longevity of path dependency in a political body. Many studies have focused on a specific piece or type of legislation, but by taking a broader approach to voting habits, this study allows for larger scale findings to be explored. The largest contribution provided by this research goes back to the justification for the study – providing knowledge to a voting populous on elected officials. When armed with knowledge, an electorate can make a more informed decision on who to support in an election as well as the importance of consistently holding elected officials accountable to their actions as those actions may differ as politicians transfer their identity from candidate to legislator.

APPENDIX A House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected in 20101

Sandy Adams FW Randy Hultgren FW, ‘13 Justin Amash FW, TPE, ‘13 Bill Johnson FW, TPE, ‘13 Lou Barletta FW, TPE, ‘13 Mike Kelly FW, TPE, ‘13 Charles Bass FW, TPE Adam Kinzinger FW, ‘13 Dan Benishek FW, TPE, ‘13 Ral Labrador TPE, ‘13 Rick Berg TPE Jeff Landry FW Diane Black FW, ‘13 James Lankford FW, TPE, ‘13 Mo Brooks FW, ‘13 Billy Long FW, ‘13 Larry Bucshon FW, ‘13 Tom Marino FW, TPE, ‘13 Ann Marie Buerkle FW David McKinley FW, TPE, ‘13 Quico Canseco FW Pat Meehan FW, TPE, ‘13 Steve Chabot FW, TPE, ‘13 Mick Mulvaney FW, ‘13 Chip Cravaack TPE Kristi Noem FW, TPE, ‘13 Rick Crawford FW, ‘13 Alan Nunnelee FW, ‘13 Jeff Denham FW, TPE, ‘13 Steve Pearce FW, TPE, ‘13 Robert Dold FW Mike Pompeo FW, TPE, ‘13 Sean Duffy FW, ‘13 Ben Quayle FW, TPE Jeff Duncan FW, ‘13 Jim Renacci FW, TPE, ‘13 Renee Ellmers FW, ‘13 Reid Ribble FW, ‘13 Stephen Fincher FW, ‘13 David Rivera FW Mike Fitzpatrick FW, TPE, ‘13 Martha Roby FW, ‘13 Chuck Fleischmann FW, ‘13 Todd Rokita FW, ‘13 Bill Flores FW, ‘13 Dennis A. Ross FW, ‘13 Cory Gardner FW, TPE, ‘13 Jon Runyan FW, TPE, ‘13 Bob Gibbs FW, TPE, ‘13 Bobby Schilling FW Paul Gosar FW, TPE, ‘13 David Schweikert FW, TPE, ‘13 Trey Gowdy FW, ‘13 Austin Scott FW, ‘13 Tim Griffin FW, ‘13 Tim Scott FW Morgan Griffith FW, ‘13 Steve Southerland FW, ‘13 Michael Grimm FW, ‘13 Steve Stivers FW, TPE, ‘13 Frank Guinta FW, TPE Scott Tipton FW, TPE, ‘13 Richard Hanna FW, ‘13 Tim Walberg FW, TPE, ‘13 Andy Harris FW, ‘13 Daniel Webster FW, ‘13 Vicky Hartzler FW, ‘13 Allen West FW Joe Heck FW, TPE, ‘13 Steve Womack FW, ‘13 Jaime Herrera Beutler TPE, ‘13 Kevin Yoder FW, TPE, ‘13 Tim Huelskamp FW, TPE, ‘13 Todd Young FW, ‘13 Bill Huizenga FW, TPE, ‘13

1 Defined as receiving an endorsement from FreedomWorks (FW) or Tea Party Express (TPE) (Washington Post 2010) ’13 Held office for a second term beginning in 2013

APPENDIX B House of Representatives: Tea Party Legislators Elected in 20121

Andy Barr FW Kerry Bentivolio FW, TPE Tom Cotton FW, TPE Kevin Cramer FW Steve Daines FW Ron DeSantis FW, TPE George Holding FW Richard Hudson FW, TPE Thomas Massie FW Mark Meadows FW, TPE Robert Pittenger FW Trey Radel FW Keith Rothfus FW, TPE Matt Salmon FW Steve Stockman FW Ann Wagner FW Jackie Walorski FW Randy Weber FW Brad Wenstrup FW Ted Yoho FW, TPE

1 Defined as receiving an endorsement from FreedomWorks (FW) or Tea Party Express (TPE) (Burghart 2012)

APPENDIX C Senate: Tea Party Legislators Elected in 2010 and 20121

Elected in 2010 Ron Johnson FW Mike Lee FW Rand Paul FW, TPE Marco Rubio FW, TPE Pat Toomey FW, TPE

Elected in 2012 Ted Cruz FW, TPE Jeff Flake FW

1 Defined as receiving an endorsement from FreedomWorks (FW) or Tea Party Express (TPE) (New York Times 2010, Burghart 2012)

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