India and Pakistan’s mid-1999 war is almost forgotten in the West, but was the highest-elevation conflict ever.

Air War at the By Ben Lambeth

Tophe Kargil War between of India contested the Kashmir in the Himalayas. World deep into Indian-controlled territory. and Pakistan, waged in the From this new vantage point, Pakistani On May 3, they were finally spotted disputed and mountainous troops overlooked the Indian town of by local shepherds. Kashmir region in mid-1999, Kargil. Then, in the first week of May 1999, rates as the highest-elevation The LOC that separates the Indian- the Indian Army units that had formerly conflict in air war history. and Pakistani-held portions of Kashmir manned the outposts began returning The clash lasted 74 days and cost bisects some of the world’s highest and to their stations. It was at that point moreT than 1,000 killed and wounded most forbidding terrain. Because of that they came face-to-face with the on each side. Though a blank to most dangerous weather, the Indian Army, in fact that NLI troops had moved in and Westerners, the Indian Air Force (IAF) harsh winter months, routinely vacated were prepared to fight. experience was a milestone, provid- inhospitable forward outposts that it At first, embarrassed Indian Army ing insights into uses of airpower in normally manned. leaders were bound and determined extremely demanding combat settings. to turn back the Pakistan incursion The Western profile of this war is Too Much Jawboning all by themselves. Thus commenced low, receding to the vanishing point. When the Indians withdrew in the several exchanges of fire. However, It was pushed off the front pages by late winter months of 1999, however, there was no change in the situation NATO’s higher profile air war over Pakistan mounted an infiltration that on the ground. Serbia, fought at the same time. Still, sought to make the most of this op- Checked for days by Pakistani it bears closer examination. portunity. forces, Indian Army leaders on May The seeds of war were planted in As many as 1,000 troops of the NLI, 11 finally approached the IAF for March 1999, when units of the Paki- moving by foot and helicopter, crossed help. The Indian Army wanted the IAF stani Army’s Northern Light Infantry the line. It was a stealthy success; the to provide close air support with its (NLI) crossed the so-called line of NLI troops managed to unobtrusively armed helicopters. The IAF responded control (LOC) into India’s portion of establish a new forward line six miles that the high terrain over which the 118 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 Indian Air Force photo

Left: An Indian Air Force Mirage 2000H on patrol over the Himalayas. An Mi-17 heli- copter, like the one pictured here, was shot down on the war’s third day by a Paki- stani shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missile. The Indian Air Force was reluctant to introduce the helicopters to the fight, and insisted fixed wing aircraft would better serve the Army. Below: Pakistani Army members look over the wreckage of an Indian MiG-21 shot down over Kashmir.

Photo via Bharat-Rakshak.com/Indian Air Force

AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 119 The Indian Army used heavy Bofors howitzers in the high-altitude fight.

the intruders to the fullest once its final role was settled upon. After much back and forth between the IAF and Indian Army over the character and extent of air support IAF would provide, the Army finally ac- ceded to the IAF’s insistence on using fixed wing fighters. This cleared the way for the air force to enter the fight. In a key May 25 meeting chaired

Photo by Sharad Saxena/The India Group/GettyToday Images by Indian Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee, the Indian Army Chief outlined the seriousness of the situa- tion and the need for the IAF to step in without further delay. At that, the Prime Minister said: “OK, get started tomorrow at dawn.” The Air Chief agreed that the IAF would attack only those Pakistani targets that were dug in on India’s side of the line of control. However, he requested permission for his aircraft, in the course of its operations, to fly across the LOC. Vajpayee said no; there would be no crossing of the LOC. With that rule of engagement firmly stipulated by the civilian leadership, the die was finally cast for full-scale IAF involvement. The stage was set for Operation Vijay (Hindi for “victory”), requested support was to be provided establish quick-reaction aircraft launch as the joint campaign was code-named. lay well above the effective operating facilities at the IAF’s most northern Kinetic air operations began at 6:30 envelope of its attack helicopters and operating locations. a.m. on May 26, three weeks after that the use of fixed wing fighters The next day, IAF Jaguar fighter the infiltration into Indian-controlled would be required if the Army really aircraft launched on a tactical recon- territory was detected. The opening needed assistance. naissance mission to gather target salvo comprised six attacks by MiG- The Army for days persisted in information. At the same time, the IAF 21s, MiG-23s, and MiG-27s against demanding use of attack helicopters established a direction center for the NLI targets. It was the first time IAF alone. The IAF no less adamantly tactical control of combat aircraft; it pilots had dropped bombs in anger declined to accede to that demand. was located at Leh, the IAF’s highest- since its Vampire fighters destroyed Because of this back and forth elevation airfield. Pakistani bunkers in the same Kargil jawboning, some later complained the Concurrently, Canberra PR57 and area 28 years earlier, in the 1971 Indo- IAF had refused to cooperate and, in MiG-25R reconnaissance aircraft were Pakistani War. the end, was forced into the campaign pressed into service, and electronic Pakistan chose to keep its F-16s out against its will. intelligence missions started in the of the fight. In fact, the IAF at the early date of vicinity of the NLI intrusion. May 10 had begun conducting recon- The IAF sent a Canberra to conduct Deadly Lessons Learned Quickly naissance missions over the Kargil reconnaissance of the area overlooking Nearly all targets attacked were on heights. It also at that time forward Kargil. It descended to 22,000 feet and or near Himalayan ridgelines at eleva- deployed IAF combat aircraft in num- entered a racetrack pattern that put the tions ranging from 16,000 to 18,000 bers sufficient to support any likely aircraft as low as 4,000 feet above the feet. The stark backdrop of rocks and tasking, established a rudimentary ridgelines. The Canberra was hit in its snow complicated target acquisition, air defense control arrangement, and right engine by a Chinese-made Anza already made difficult by the small size began practicing air-to-ground weapon infrared surface-to-air missile. The of the NLI positions in a vast and un- deliveries at Himalayan elevations. Indian pilot brought the airplane in differentiated snow background. That On May 12, as interservice delibera- for a safe emergency landing. unique terrain feature, as seen from a tions to establish an agreed campaign On May 14, the IAF activated its cockpit, inspired the code name given plan continued, an IAF helicopter was air operations center for Kashmir and to the IAF’s campaign—Operation fired upon near the most forward based mobilized its fighter units in that sec- Safed Sagar, or “White Sea.” of the NLI positions. That hostile act tor for an all-out air counteroffensive. In the second day of air operations, the was enough to prompt the IAF to place Such activities attested to the IAF’s IAF lost two fighters. One, a MiG-27, Western Air Command on alert and clear expectation that it would engage suffered engine failure while coming off 120 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 fighters capable of delivering laser guided bombs. By June 12, the Mirages were ready to commence precision strike operations. On June 17, the clash reached a turning point. A strike package of Mirage 2000Hs Staff map by Zaur Eylanbekov destroyed the NLI’s main logistics camp with unguided 1,000-pound bombs de- livered in high-angle dive attacks using the aircrafts’ computer-assisted weapon aiming capability. The war reached a second milestone on June 24, when an element of Mirage 2000Hs, in the IAF’s first-ever combat use of LGBs, destroyed the NLI’s com- mand bunkers on Tiger Hill with two 1,000-pound Paveway II LGBs. In these attacks, the target was acquired through the Litening pod’s electro-optical imag- ing sensor at about nine miles out, with weapons release occurring at a slant range of about five miles and the aircraft then turning away while continuing to mark the target with a laser spot. On June 29, the Indian Army captured two vital posts on the high ridgelines. On July 2, it launched a massive attack. In March 1999, units of the Pakistani Army’s Northern Light It finally recaptured the important NLI Infantry crossed the so-called line of control into India’s outpost on Tiger Hill on July 4, after an portion of contested Kashmir in the Himalayas. exhausting 11-hour battle in which the attackers climbed fixed ropes at night and in freezing rain to scale vertical a target. After two unsuccessful attempts above the lethal envelopes of enemy mountain faces 1,000 feet high. at an airstart, the pilot ejected, only to be man-portable SAMs. Afterward, not a By July 26, Indian forces had re- captured. He was repatriated on June 3. single Indian fixed wing aircraft was claimed a majority of their seized out- The second, a MiG-21, sustained lost to enemy fire. posts and driven NLI occupiers back to an infrared SAM hit while its pilot Whenever ground attack operations their own side of the LOC. was flying over the terrain at low were under way, Western Air Command The IAF’s contribution to Operation level, assisting in the search for the put MiG-29s on combat air patrol sta- Vijay lasted two months. IAF fighters had downed MiG-27 pilot. Its pilot also tions to keep the Pakistani Air Force flown more than 1,700 sorties, including ejected, but he was not as lucky as (PAF) out of the fray. Pakistan’s F-16As about 40 at night during the campaign’s the first pilot. He was captured, then typically maintained their CAP stations last weeks. In the final tally, the Indian reportedly brutalized and executed. at a safe distance, 10 to 20 miles away Army suffered 527 troops killed in ac- On the third day of operations, an from the line of control. tion and 1,363 soldiers wounded. The armed Mi-17 helicopter, introduced By the time air operations reached full NLI losses were not announced, but they to the fight reluctantly by the IAF swing, the IAF had forward deployed were at least equal to India’s. to placate India’s Army leaders, was some 60 of its best fighters to support The Indian Army and IAF were both downed by a shoulder-fired SAM while the campaign. As they awaited tasking, key players in a joint campaign; it would providing low-level fire support. The committed squadrons initiated special be hard to select one as the pivotal force. crash killed all four crew members. training aimed at better acclimating From a simple weight-of-effort perspec- In conducting these early attacks, their pilots to night attacks under tive, artillery was the main source of IAF officers quickly relearned what moonlit conditions. Such combat opera- fire support. The Army fired more than the Israelis had learned at great cost tions over high mountainous terrain at 250,000 rounds. One assessment said during the October 1973 War, when night had never before been attempted that this sustained laydown of fire was Egyptian and Syrian SAMs and anti- by the IAF. the most intense seen anywhere since aircraft artillery had downed nearly a Because of the rudimentary bomb World War II. third of the Israeli Air Force’s fighter sights on their MiG-21, MiG-23, and In contrast to this “profligacy in the use inventory (102 aircraft in all) before MiG-27 aircraft, IAF pilots typically of artillery in a carpet-bombing mode,” Israel managed to pull out a victory in achieved only limited effectiveness as the campaign’s air component com- the war’s latter stages. when attempting to provide close air mander later called it, the IAF dropped Badly bloodied, the Indian Air Force support. only around 500 bombs. Most were called a halt to further use of armed Accordingly, India’s Air Chief de- effective against their assigned targets. helicopters and directed that future cided on May 30, just four days into Close air support was a source of fighter attacks would be conducted from the campaign, to enlist Mirage 2000H frustration for the IAF. The small and AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 121 from replacing classic manual dive bombing by MiG-23s and MiG-27s with more accurate GPS-aided level bombing from safer altitudes. Once

Photo via Ben Lambeth the Mirage 2000H was introduced, the accuracy of unguided bomb deliveries increased even further, thanks to the aircraft’s much-improved onboard avionics suite. A major joint-arena shortcoming highlighted by the Kargil experience was the total absence of candid com- munication between the Indian Army and IAF immediately following the initial detection of the NLI incursion. That failure was a remarkable fore- shadowing of US Central Command’s similarly flawed Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan three years later, in Indian airmen arm a MiG-27 with heavy general-purpose bombs. which the land component likewise sought to go it alone at first, with the well-concealed NLI positions in the Hi- The IAF rode a steep learning air component having been brought in malayas were nothing like conventional curve as pilots adapted to unfamiliar just in time to help ensure a satisfac- targets that fighters typically engage in conditions. MiG-21 pilots lacking tory outcome in the end. supporting friendly ground operations. sophisticated onboard avionics suites Once the Indian Army and IAF re- The IAF’s CAS efforts were ham- resorted to the use of stopwatches and solved their disagreements, harmony pered by numerous constraints on their Global Positioning System receivers prevailed. freedom of action. New Delhi’s refusal to conduct night interdiction bombing. In the going-in front-line fight- to countenance crossings of the LOC Another example: The IAF took to er balance, India enjoyed a marked was a limiting factor. Fighters were choosing weapon impact points that 750-to-350 advantage over Pakistan. forced to use tactics featuring ingress would create avalanches over NLI Pakistan’s fleet of some 30 F-16s was and egress headings that were not supply lines. greatly outclassed by the IAF’s 145 optimal or, in many cases, even safe. The IAF pioneered what has since high-performance aircraft (MiG-29s, Man-portable SAMs used by Paki- come to be called nontraditional in- Mirage 2000Hs, and Su-30s). That stan had a slant range sufficient to telligence, surveillance, and recon- asymmetry may well have been deci- require the IAF’s pilots to remain 6,000 naissance. It was the first to use sive in keeping the PAF out of the fight. to 8,000 feet above the ridgelines to electro-optical and infrared imaging However, Pakistan maintained the remain safely outside their threat enve- targeting pods for high-resolution initiative for most of the Kargil War. lopes. This degraded weapon delivery aerial reconnaissance. Both the nature of the challenge the accuracies. IAF faced in the Himalayan heights At such extreme elevations, the IAF’s The Kargil Experience and the targeting requirements that munitions did not perform as they did at The IAF expended only two LGBs ensued from it dictated a suboptimal lower release altitudes. The reduced air because it had so few in stock and use of India’s air weapon. temperature and density altered drag in- because few targets merited use of The IAF’s combat experience showed dices and other performance parameters such an important and costly munition. that innovation and adaptability un- that had never before been calculated Still, even this limited use dramatically der the stress of confining rules of for such conditions. Weapons did not altered the campaign’s dynamics. engagement is a hallmark of modern guide as predicted. IAF pilots had to After the successful LGB attacks, airmanship. It attested to the fact that adapt through real-time improvisation. targeting pod imagery showed enemy professionalism in campaign planning, The stark terrain folds tended to troops abandoning their positions at presentation of forces, and accom- obscure the enemy from aerial ob- the very sound of approaching fight- modating to new and unique tactical servation and to mask the effects of ers. Troop diaries later recovered challenges is scarcely a monopoly of bomb detonations, rendering even near by Indian Army units attested to the more familiar Western air arms. misses all but ineffective. They further demoralization caused by the IAF’s The experience demonstrated yet again served to canalize aerial approaches attacks, especially when precision that effective use of air-delivered fire- to targets, dictating ingress and egress munitions were introduced. power can generate success in a conflict headings and, in the process, render- Much of the IAF’s improved com- that might otherwise have persisted in- ing IAF fighters more predictable and bat effectiveness over time resulted definitely with less conclusive results. n susceptible to ground fire. NLI positions in deep ravines were Ben Lambeth is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- often immune to effective attacks by ments. He is the author of The Transformation of American Air Power (2000), which pilots attempting dive deliveries when won the Air Force Association’s Gil Robb Wilson Award for Arts and Letters in 2001. their LOC-driven roll-in points were His most recent article for Air Force Magazine was “Behind Israel’s 2006 War with not tactically ideal. Hezbollah,” in September 2011. 122 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012