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Home , Havildar, Kargil War, Operation Gibraltar

INDO-PAK 1965 September 2015 1965 War: ’s Strategic Blunder n By Maj Gen PK Chakravorty (Retd)

HE STATE of J&K acceded to on October 26, 1947. Pakistan did not accept the accession and, since then, has sought to wrest the state from India by any means, mostly foul. Pakistan has repeatedly made efforts to win the J&K, one of the primary stated reasons being J&K’s water resources. To get contemporary weapons, Pakistan became military ally of the US, in the name of fighting communism, and joined the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and South Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Between 1956 and 1962, the United States gave massive military aid to Pakistan which considerably increased its offensive capability. Pakistan was happy at India’s humbling in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, and took opportunity to befriend . Islamabad and Beijing had a common adversary. Pakistan went to the extent offered advantage to Pakistan. of gifting the Shaksgam valley of J&K to As a strategic response, the Indian China under a border agreement of March Army deployed on the border in Punjab 2, 1963. and captured three posts in on May Pakistan had then both the US and China 16 and 17, 1965. A Ceasefire agreement on its side. was signed on July 1, 1965. The Pakistanis inferred incorrectly about the offensive PLANNING AND CONDUCT capability of the and started A Pakistani army’s ops in were planning on their cherished goal to seize preceded by the operations in Kutch, Kashmir. It is important to note that which commenced in February. The terrain the Kutch issue was resolved and India

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withdrew from the three posts. 1962 War was in full swing. And India also But Pakistan was conspiring. Pakistan started receiving military aid from the US, President Ayub felt which gradually narrowed the qualitative that the Indian leadership after the death edge that Pakistan possessed. of Nehru was weak and would not be able l There was unrest in J&K due to the loss to withstand a Pakistani offensive. Also, of a Holy Relic (a strand of hair believed to Pakistan was prospering economically and be of the Prophet called Moe-e-Muqaddas) recording food surpluses while India was from the Hazratbal shrine on December facing local famines and serious economic 27, 1964. Though the relic was found difficulties. and certified as authentic, Pakistan tried l India’s reequipping programme after the to create disturbances about the issue in

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the state. Further, Sheikh Abdullah was following: interned in May 1965 by the Government l Operation which commenced of India, adding to the unrest. with infiltration across the Ceasefire l Ayub had won the Presidential elections Line on August 1, 1965. It failed to by rigging against Ms Fatima Jinnah in create consternation and the Indian Army January 1965. The dubious result could Commander in the west, Lt Gen Harbaksh best be forgotten by launching operations Singh, launched counter-infiltration against Kashmir as this would divert operations. This led to capture of posts attention. in the Kargil and Kishanganga sectors as l The international situation favoured also the prized possession of Haji Pir Pass Pakistan, tied in military alliances with the by Ranjit Singh Dayal (later Army US, and a de facto alliance with China. The Commander ) on was less hostile to Pakistan August 28, 1965. than for many years. l Op Grand Slam was launched by Pakistan approved the military on September 1, 1965 with the aim of planning for a limited war in Kashmir capturing Akhnoor. Pakistan captured by the early summer of 1965, despite Chhamb but failed to reach Akhnoor due opposition from the Chief of Army Staff, to strengthening of the sector held by Gen Mohammad Musa, and some other 191 Brigade by the newly raised officers. Headquarters 10 Infantry . The war plans primarily comprised the l Op Riddle was an offensive launched by

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India in the and sectors by War are important even today and need 1 and 11 on the night of September attention. These are: 5, 1965. Indian Army’s 1 Corps with 1 l Pakistan believes in infiltrating its soldiers Armoured Division successfully fought in into Kashmir with the aim of creating an the tank battles of Phillaura and Chawinda. uprising and pressure India. It has done In the 11 Corps Sector, 15 Infantry Division that in 1947-48, 1965 as also in 1999 (the advanced to the Ichhogil canal on the ). outskirts of Lahore, and in a daring move, l Pakistan needs to be appreciated for its 3 JAT commanded by Lt Col Desmond intelligence capability. India was not aware Hayde (later ) crossed it with two of Op Gibraltar. The Indian intelligence of his companies. However, Indian Army’s agencies must attain the ability to provide 15 Infantry Division and 11 Corps did not Actionable Intelligence in real time to fully exploit this gain. enable the to hit back. l Audacious operations launched by l Pakistan launched its next Operation Grand Pakistan with 11 Infantry Division and Slam on September 1 which enabled India 1 Armoured Division in the Khem Karan to stabilise and be prepared for an offensive Sector with the aim of capturing the bridges while taking steps to counter infiltration. at Harike and Beas were designed to give Ops in Rear Areas would have made greater them multiple options of threatening difference had the main offensive been Amritsar and Jullundur (now Jalandhar). launched by August 15, 1965. The offensive commenced on September l Lt Gen , the great Army 8, 1965. But Indian Army’s 4 Mountain Commander, was able to read the battle Division fought gallantly with Deccan correctly thereby synergising the move of Horse, 3 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry Armoured security forces in a balanced manner and Regiments in the sugarcane fields of Asal defeating the saboteurs. He could hold Uttar, causing 97 Pakistani tank casualties. the nerves of the Corps Commanders. He It was a credit to the Indian Army’s tank successfully captured Haji Pir, launched hunting teams, one of which was led by Operation Riddle and blunted the offensive Company Quarter Master (CQMH) of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division at Asal who was posthumously Uttar. Pakistan awarded a Param . He destroyed l Joint Operations are the order of the day failed to three Pakistani Patton tanks before being and greater synergy between the Services felled by heavy tank fire specifically aimed would pay rich dividends. attain its at his position. l There is a need to modernise equipment objectives regularly to effectively match our USE OF AIR FORCE adversaries. Unfortunately, this is not during the The (IAF) played an active happening. 1965 War. It role in the War with effect from September 1, 1965 when 12 Vampires and 14 Mysteres CONCLUSION is creditable were used in the Battle of Chhamb. Pakistan failed to attain its objectives for the Indian IAF launched Counter Air, Bombing and during the 1965 War. It is creditable for Offensive Air Support missions. Numerically, the Indian Army to have captured Haji Army to have IAF had 26 fighter squadrons and four Pir Pass, crossed the Ichhogil canal and captured bomber squadrons, while Pakistan had blunt Pakistani armour at Asal Uttar. Air eight fighter squadrons and two bomber operations helped the Army to blunt the Haji Pir Pass, squadrons. Qualitatively, Pakistani F-86 Pakistani offensive in Akhnoor. The lessons crossed the Sabres and F-104 Star Fighters were superior that the Indian armed forces learnt from to our Gnats, Hunters, Mysteres and the 1965 War led to a great victory in 1971. Ichhogil canal Vampires. During the war that lasted 22 In the negotiations that followed at and blunt days, IAF undertook a total of 3937 sorties Tashkent, India agreed to give back Haji which paved the way for India to undertake Pir Pass and 13620 in Kargil while Pakistan Pakistani a ceasefire creditably. gave back Chhamb. All territory captured armour at across the International Boundary in the LESSONS LEARNT Punjab and Rajasthan sectors was returned Asal Uttar Major lessons learnt during the 1965 by both the countries. n

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