Too Much Is Never Enough: The Cautionary Tale of Soviet Illegal Whaling

YULIA V. IVASHCHENKO and PHILLIP J. CLAPHAM

“But thus do we waste our substance in riotous living. In the haste to get rich a great source of wealth is being wrecked, and it seems to be nobody’s business to take any steps to mend the matters.” (W. P. Pycraft, 1916:548)

“It is the impossibility of reconciling these two aspects, conservation of whale stocks and the economic interests of whaling, that constitutes the real reason why the Commission had not been in a position to carry out its task.” (Tønnessen and Johnsen, 1982:510)

“We should leave a desert behind us.” (Vice-Captain-Director on Sovetskaya Ukraina giving an in- struction for whaling, Berzin, 2008:42)

Introduction one of the 20th century’s more notori- thing bigger and better than other na- ous environmental crimes: the global tions, especially those in the capitalist In this article, we trace the history campaign of illegal whaling conduct- world. More than anything, this is a and details of what might be called ed by the U.S.S.R. between 1948 and cautionary tale of the failure of other 19721, a campaign that, together with whaling nations and the International the poorly managed “legal” whaling of Yulia Ivashchenko, corresponding author, is Whaling Commission (IWC) to re- with the National Marine Mammal Laboratory, other nations, devastated many whale act to mounting evidence of declining Alaska Fisheries Science Center, National Ma- populations. It is a story of the sprawl- whale stocks, and to adequately moni- rine Fisheries Service, NOAA, 7600 Sand Point ing Soviet planning system’s obsession Way NE, Seattle, WA 98115 (email: yu1ia. tor adherence to regulations and catch [email protected]) and with the Whale with attaining production goals despite limits2 as set through international Research Centre, Southern Cross University, limited and diminishing resources, and P.O. Box 157, Lismore, NSW 2480, Australia. agreements. Phillip Clapham is with the National Marine of the U.S.S.R.’s desire to do every- Mammal Laboratory, Alaska Fisheries Science 2The terms “catch limits” and “catch quotas” are Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, 1In 1972 an International Observer Scheme was both used, somewhat confusingly, in the IWC NOAA, 7600 Sand Point Way NE, Seattle, WA introduced and large-scale Soviet unrestricted annual reports to describe the number of whales 98115 (email: [email protected]). catches ceased, but some falsifi cations of catch that it was permitted to kill during a whaling data continued on at least some Soviet fl eets for season. Overall, “catch limit” means the total doi: dx.doi.org/10.7755/MFR.76.1_2.1 a few more years (Mikhalev et al., 2009). agreed catch for the year, while the term “quota”

ABSTRACT—Despite being a signato- sphere, the greatest impact of these catches resulting large catches. We trace the evo- ry to the International Convention for the was on humpback whales, Megaptera no- lution of the U.S.S.R.’s public stance at the Regulation of Whaling in 1946, the U.S.S.R. vaeangliae, where (mostly illegal) takes of IWC while the nation was illegally whaling, conducted a 30-yr campaign of illegal whal- more than 48,000 whales precipitated a and summarize its evolving positions on ma- ing which arguably represents one of the population crash and closure of shore whal- jor issues, including catch limits, national greatest failures of management in the his- ing stations in Australia and New Zealand. quotas, the status of whale populations, and tory of the industry. Here, using a variety The Southern Hemisphere also saw large the International Observer Scheme (which of sources including published literature, illegal catches of southern right whales, the U.S.S.R. opposed for many years, for formerly secret Soviet industry reports, Eubalaena australis. In the North Pacifi c, reasons that are now obvious). We examine and interviews with former biologists and the greatest impacts were on sperm whales, the ways in which the U.S.S.R. and other na- whalers, we provide an overview of the his- Physeter macrocephalus (where data on tions exploited weaknesses in the Conven- tory, scope, and economic origins of Soviet sex and length were routinely misreported tion to block or delay decisions unfavorable whaling and examine the domestic and in- together with falsifi ed total catches), as to the industry. ternational political context in which it was well as on the two already-small popula- It is clear that many at IWC knew that the set. tions of right whales, Eubalaena japonica, U.S.S.R. was whaling illegally, but they were At various times from 1933 into the across the North Pacifi c, and bowhead probably unaware of the large scope of this 1970’s, the U.S.S.R. operated a total of sev- whales, Balaena mysticetus, in the Okhotsk activity. It is also clear that the Soviets were en whaling factory fl eets and several shore Sea. not alone in falsifi cation of catch data, a whaling stations. We estimate that 534,119 Soviet whaling was driven by the state in- problem which underscores the inadequacy whales were killed, of which 178,726 were dustrial planning system, which frequently of the IWC’s existing procedures for inspec- not reported to the International Whaling set high production targets without regard tion and enforcement with regard to current Commission (IWC). In the Southern Hemi- to the ability of the resource to sustain the and possible future commercial whaling.

76(1–2) 1 Figure 1.—Signing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in Washington D.C., December 1946 (Source: Smithsonian Archives, A. Remington Kellogg Papers, record unit 7170).

The huge Soviet whaling fac- This landmark agreement followed ternational regulations for the use of tory fl eets that once plundered the several earlier attempts to regulate marine resources, and of whales in world’s oceans are now gone, and the whaling, primarily in the Antarc- particular. Suarez proposed the es- U.S.S.R.’s illegal whaling lies in the tic. Notable among those were the tablishment of a large sanctuary for past. But from this campaign—which Geneva Convention (1931) and the whales in the waters around Antarc- went undetected, or at least unac- Convention for the Regulation of tica, as well as protection of young knowledged, for three decades—im- Whaling (1937). All of these inter- whales and the elimination of waste portant lessons can and should be national agreements, including the in processing (Ruud, 1956). A num- learned with regard to the manage- ICRW, had loosely evolved in part ber of measures suggested by Suarez ment of whaling today, and indeed of from whaling regulations implement- were adopted in the Geneva Conven- the exploitation of natural resources in ed by individual countries, or from tion and then transferred into the later general. concepts previously articulated. The agreements. In December 1946 in Washington, fi rst of these was the “Whale Protec- The debate about the need to man- D.C., 15 nations signed the Interna- tion Act,” passed in Norway in 1880 age pelagic whaling (primarily in tional Convention for the Regula- in response to local fi shermen’s con- Southern Hemisphere waters) had ef- tion of Whaling (ICRW) (Fig. 1). The cerns that whaling was having a dis- fectively begun in the early 1900’s; the Convention, which took effect on 10 ruptive effect on local fi sh stocks scientifi c and political aspects of this November 1948, remains in force to- (Tønnessen and Johnsen, 1982). debate are covered in detail in Dorsey day and, through the IWC, still gov- In 1925, a few years before the (2013) and Burnett (2012). Among the erns the international management of draft of the Geneva Convention was main contributors to discussions of whaling. adopted, Professor Jose Léon Suarez possible regulations and conservation (an Argentinian lawyer) submitted a measures were a number of promi- was used to defi ne a share of this total, as in the memorandum to the League of Na- nent biologists of the period, including case of national quotas (see below). tions that proposed drawing up in- Remington Kellogg, Alfred Howell,

2 Marine Fisheries Review

Johan Hjort, Birger Bergersen, and Al- quired at various times to adhere to points of view. First, we briefly review ban Dobson. These individuals were regulations regarding various aspects the industry’s development, the scope involved in developing the first inter- of whaling: these included catch lim- of the catches (legal and illegal), and national whaling agreements in 1931 its, defined whaling seasons and ar- the sometimes lingering impact these and 1937. In some ways the ICRW eas, and prohibitions on the taking of have had on certain whale populations. was a product of U.S. and British con- animals of certain lengths, species, or We then describe the way in which the servation thinking in that scientists classes (notably lactating females and Soviet economic planning and politi- such as Kellogg had been involved in calves). In addition, whalers were re- cal system made the illegal catches in- other landmark agreements (e.g., the quired to submit accurate data on evitable, and examine the underlying Fur Seal Treaty of 1911) (Burnett, catches, including number, species, political strategies and positions, both 2012; Dorsey, 2013). sex, length, and location, to the Bu- domestic and international, adopted The stated aim of the new 1946 Con- reau of International Whaling Statis- by the U.S.S.R. to perpetuate its whal- vention was “to provide for the proper tics (BIWS). For the purpose of this ing. Finally, we show how flaws in the conservation of whale stocks and thus paper, we regard any infraction of IWC and its underlying Convention make possible the orderly develop- these requirements as “illegal” unless allowed the U.S.S.R. and other coun- ment of the whaling industry” (IWC, such infractions were reported to the tries to hide or ignore the illegal whal- 1950a:10). The implied goal was thus IWC; this would include any catch- ing and to effectively block attempts at sustainable whaling, although the term es that were entirely unreported or greater transparency in catch monitor- itself does not appear in the Conven- which were reported with deliberate ing. From this, we derive some basic tion text. However, this goal was al- inaccuracy. lessons for the regulation of industrial most immediately compromised by the For example, while it was permit- whaling today. unwillingness of the whaling nations ted to catch sperm whales, Physeter It is not the intention of this paper to to take a conservative approach to the macrocephalus, there was a prohi- analyze every aspect of Soviet whaling management of whale populations. As bition on taking animals that were ei- or the overall political system of the noted by Dorsey (2013), this was com- ther lactating or below the minimum U.S.S.R. Rather, our goal is to look at pounded by weaknesses in the final length (originally 11.6 m (38 ft) and the conditions and reasons that made draft of the Convention that would be- later reduced to 9.2 m (30 ft) for this possible the large Soviet catches with- come obvious in later years, and over- species), and whalers were expect- out regard to conservation of natural all the outcome was in some ways not ed to report accurately the data on resources, set within the framework of radically different from the situation in sperm whales caught. The U.S.S.R. international politics at the IWC. the previous century when no manage- frequently violated this requirement Our analysis is based upon research ment existed at all. by making large unreported catches into Soviet whaling using multiple Thus, in the first decade of the IWC, or by misreporting the sex and length sources of information. These include: it became increasingly obvious to ob- of animals taken. 1) annual IWC reports from 1949 to jective observers that whaling catch In other words, the U.S.S.R.’s whal- 2012 (including verbatim records for limits were set too high and that many ers largely ignored restrictions on some years); 2) published Soviet and whale populations were declining as a catch limits, protected species, op- other literature (much of it in Rus- result (IWC, 1955a). Within the sup- erational areas, and other rules set sian); 3) many formerly secret3 Soviet posedly transparent Convention frame- at various times by the IWC. From whaling industry reports, now declas- work in which legal whaling operated, 1948 to the end of its whaling op- sified and recently found in Russian whaling management was, in retro- erations, the U.S.S.R. secretly killed public archives; and 4) extensive in- spect, largely a failure. almost 180,000 more whales than terviews with former whalers and As is now known, the situation was were reported to the IWC, with se- scientists who worked on different So- actually far worse than was recog- vere impacts on several populations viet whaling fleets. Details of indus- nized at the time. This was because, (Clapham et al., 2009; Ivashchenko et try reports and interviews are given in beginning in 1948, the U.S.S.R.— al., 2011; Ivashchenko and Clapham, Ivashchenko et al. (2011). despite being a signatory to the 2012; Ivashchenko et al., 2013). The ICRW—began a secret global cam- operational details of this unrestrict- The History and Scope of Soviet Whaling paign of illegal whaling; this lasted ed whaling, and an accounting of the for three decades and was revealed true Soviet catches, have been sum- only after the end of the Cold War marized by Yablokov et al. (1995), The U.S.S.R. entered the business of modern industrial whaling com- (Yablokov et al., 1995; Yablokov and Berzin (2008), Clapham and Ivash-

Zemskiy, 2000; Clapham and Ivash- chenko (2009), and Ivashchenko et al. 3“Secret” here means formerly classified docu- chenko, 2009). (2011, 2013). ments or other materials that were not publicly available until after the Cold War. It was illegal Under the terms of the ICRW and In this paper, we provide an over- in the U.S.S.R. to reveal these reports or the data the IWC Schedule, whalers were re- view of Soviet whaling from several on which they were based.

76(1–2) 3 paratively late. Soviet whaling did not begin until 1932, when a former American cargo vessel was convert- ed into a whaling factory ship and renamed Aleut (Berzin, 2008). This whaling continued at a modest level for 14 years before the decision was made to expand operations, partly in response to the nation’s desperate need for fats and oil following the devastation caused by World War II. In 1946, the whaling was extended into Antarctic waters, following the U.S.S.R.’s acquisition, as a war repa- ration, of the former German factory ship Wikinger, renamed Slava (Bulke- ley, 2011). At the same time, several Japanese shore whaling stations were taken over by the U.S.S.R. when the Kuril Islands became Soviet territo- ries, and these began whaling opera- tions in 1948. Figure 2.—Increase in sperm whale catches in North Pacifi c during 1959–70. In 1959, Soviet whaling began a rapid expansion. Over the next 5 years, fi ve new whaling fl eets were intro- duced: three large fl eets (Sovetskaya the major players in worldwide whal- Taking Stock: Ukraina, Sovetskaya Rossiya, and ing. In the 1961–62 Antarctic whal- Total Catches Yuriy Dolgorukiy) for the Antarctic ing season, for example, the U.S.S.R. and two medium-sized fl eets (Vladivo- owned 4 of the total of 21 whaling Over the approximately 30-yr pe- stok and Dalniy Vostok, the last added fl eets then operating, and had volun- riod in which the Soviet catches were in 1963) to work in the pelagic wa- tarily set a quota at 20% of the total made, a great number of whales were ters of the North Pacifi c (Ivashchenko catch limit. The Soviets offi cially re- killed in both the Southern Hemisphere et al., 2011). This represented a very ported taking 18.5% of the total num- and the North Pacifi c (the North Atlan- late expansion compared to most other ber of whales killed for the 1961–62 tic was the only major ocean in which whaling nations.4 The delay in expand- season (Tønnessen and Johnsen, 1982) the Soviets did not operate). The total ing likely originated in the need to but in reality they took 28% (Allison, catch in the Antarctic was approxi- learn the business of building and op- 2011). mately 338,336 whales, of which only erating modern whaling factory ships Eventually, however, depletion of 185,778 were reported (Ivashchenko and catchers, together with the unique whale populations together with the et al., 2011). In the North Pacifi c, the characteristics of the Soviet planning age of some factory ships led to the U.S.S.R. killed an estimated 194,177 system. With the arrival of the new gradual closure of operations, or a whales and reported 169,615. Thus, the fl eets, which in some cases included refi tting of factory fl eets for fi sher- overall worldwide difference between more than 20 catcher vessels per fl eet, ies. All of the Kuril shore stations actual and reported catches by the the catches of whales soared; one ex- were closed by 1964; the Aleut fl eet U.S.S.R. was approximately 177,130 ample, that of the rapid increase in ceased operations in 1967, and Sla- whales (Table 1). sperm whale catches in the North Pa- va in 1969. Four of the remaining Modern whaling in the North Pacifi c cifi c, is shown in Figure 2. fi ve whaling fl eets were broken up was for a long time overshadowed by Indeed, despite having started slow- or retasked at various points between the huge catches in the Southern Hemi- ly with modest catches, by the early 1975 and 1979; only one whaling sphere, and the impact of whaling on 1960’s the U.S.S.R. had become one of fl eet (Sovetskaya Ukraina) was left whale populations in the North Pacifi c to work after 1980. With the passage was less immediately obvious. There 4The exception was Japan, which began to rap- by the IWC of a moratorium on com- was probably no signifi cant impact be- idly expand its Antarctic whaling fl eet in the mercial whaling in 1982, together fore 1948 (when the Kuril Islands were early 1950’s and continued to buy existing Brit- with the high cost of maintaining this annexed as Soviet territories), because ish, Norwegian, and Dutch fl eets (after 1962 pri- marily to obtain the catch quotas that came with large fl eet, all Soviet whaling came to the one small factory ship (Aleut) and such fl eets) through the late 1960’s. an end in 1987. its three catchers had a very limited

4 Marine Fisheries Review Table 1.—Total catches for all Soviet whaling fl eets in the Antarctic (A) and in the North Pacifi c (B), by species. duction targets or to products sold Note that actual catch totals are in some cases substantially larger than those reported by Yablokov et al. (1998) and by Clapham and Baker, (2009); they refl ect the most recent accounting by the IWC, as of 21 May 2012. on the international market. Dorsey

A: Antarctic, 1946–86 (2013) suggests that over-reporting during a whaling season would accel- Whale species Reported Actual Difference erate the apparent fulfi llment of the Blue & pygmy blue 3,651 13,035 +9,384 (357%) Fin 52,931 44,960 -7,971 (85%) season’s catch limit, prompting BIWS Sperm 74,834 116,147 +41,313 (155%) to order a cessation of hunting and Humpback 2,710 48,721 +46,011 (1798%) Sei 33,001 59,327 +26,326 (180%) thereby leave the U.S.S.R. in a posi- Minke 17,079 49,905 +32,826 (292%) tion to continue catches without com- Bryde’s 19 1,468 +1,449 (7726%) Southern Right 4 3,368 +3,364 (-) petition or oversight from other fl eets. Other 1,539 1,405 -134 (91%) Testing (with catch data) whether this Total 185,768 338,336 +152,568 (182%) explanation has validity is beyond the B: North Pacifi c, 1948–79 scope of this paper, although a cursory

Blue 858 1,621 +763 (189%) analysis does not indicate that over-re- Fin 15,445 14,167 -1,278 (92%) porting occurred to an extent suffi cient Humpback 4,680 7,334 +2,654 (157%) Sperm 132,505 157,6801 +25,175 (119%) to accomplish the goal of prematurely Sei 11,363 7,698 -3,665 (68%) shortening a whaling season. Gray 1 149 +148 (-) North Pacifi c Right 11 681 +670 (6,191%) Bowhead 0 145 +145 (-) Impacts on Populations: Baird’s beaked 148 146 -2 (99%) Some Examples Killer 401 401 0 (100%) Bryde’s 3,517 3,466 -51 (99%) Minke 686 689 +3 (101%) The impact of the illegal Soviet catches on different whale populations Total 169,615 194,177 +24,562 (114%) varied according to the size of the 1Includes a correction factor of 4,000 animals for 3 years in which true catch data are missing. Sources: Allison, 2011; Ivashchenko et al., 2013. catch and the extent to which a pop- ulation had already been reduced by “legal” whaling, but it is worth high- range and capability; until 1948, an- merous whales sighted by an- lighting some of the worst examples. nual catches ranged from 204 to 553 other Soviet vessel] to the area... Particularly egregious was the situa- whales (Sleptsov, 1955). Catches in and in less than a month killed tion with sperm whales in the North the pelagic North Pacifi c increased af- 1,500 humpbacks (from the west- Pacifi c. It was not merely that only ter 1948 but for some years remained ern Australian stock) [February– some of these catches were reported relatively low. Meanwhile, in just a few March 1958]. Continuing whaling (thus creating a biased view of total years the new Soviet fl eet Slava work- further east Slava reached the Ross removals), but also that the Soviet re- ing in the Antarctic increased its catch- Sea and the rest of the time was ports falsifi ed the sex and lengths of es from 386 (in 1947) to approximately spent working on the humpbacks the sperm whales caught (as noted be- 5,900 whales by the 1958–59 season of the eastern Australian stock. low, Japan was engaged in a similar (Allison, 2011). The number of killed whales dur- practice, albeit on a smaller scale). The major expansions began in ing this season was limited only While actually making large catches 1959 in the Antarctic and in 1962–63 by the ability to process them.” of undersized females (which was ille- in the North Pacifi c, with the introduc- (Berzin et al., 1962:80) gal under IWC rules), the Soviet fl eets tion of the new large whaling fl eets. reported instead taking large numbers In the North Pacifi c, catches of all With the exception of occasion- of males with very few females, thus species rose signifi cantly, and none al over-reporting of catches of cer- misleading other IWC members into more so than of sperm whales, where tain “legal” species, most catches believing that males were being ex- numbers increased from 3,269 taken were greatly under-reported in the cessively hunted in the North Pacifi c. by two whaling operations in 1961 to U.S.S.R.’s offi cial submissions to the Unfortunately, this deception led the 15,205 in 1966 when four Soviet whal- IWC (see Table 1). The exact reasons IWC to lower the minimum size limit ing fl eets were working (Ivashchenko for over-reporting of some species for sperm whale catches (from 11.6 to et al., 2013). At the same time, in the (notably fi n and sei whales), either to 9.2 m) in a misguided attempt to take Southern Hemisphere the four large the IWC or even in some internal re- pressure off males by encouraging Soviet fl eets were killing large num- ports, are not entirely clear. This may catches of the smaller females, when bers of all species of baleen whales as relate to a need to match the number in reality it was the females that had well as sperm whales. of whales killed with products ob- already been severely depleted (Ber- tained, but this problem would be dif- zin, 2008:45–46). Sperm whales in “The Slava whaling fl eet moved ferent in nature depending on whether the North Pacifi c were a target spe- [after receiving a report of nu- the mismatch related to internal pro- cies for whaling operations for almost

76(1–2) 5 two centuries; the intense and largely was put on the Dalniy Vostok whaling in 1963 complete protection was given illegal Soviet catches during the last fl eet to obtain a higher catch of baleen to all Southern Hemisphere popula- period of modern whaling effectively whales to mark the 50th anniversary tions (IWC, 1965a). removed much of the prime reproduc- of the October Revolution (Raskatov Despite this, during 4 years of large tive part of the population, thus further and Latishev, 1967). Because whalers catches from 1958–59 to 1961–62, inhibiting recovery. could not fi nd signifi cant numbers of some of the Soviet fl eets worked al- Two other species that suffered sig- baleen whales during the season else- most exclusively on humpbacks for the nifi cant impacts from the Soviet catch- where in the North Pacifi c, this result- entire whaling season. For example, es in the North Pacifi c were the right ed in a catch of 126 right whales killed during Slava’s 1959–60 season, 92% whale, Eubalaena japonica, and the in the Okhotsk Sea during September of the catch consisted of humpback bowhead whale, Balaena mysticetus, of that year. Although the size of the whales (Berzin et al., 1962), while in both of which had already been over- Okhotsk Sea population today is un- two seasons (1959–61) the Slava and exploited by historical (sail-based) clear, the catches likely represented a Sovetskaya Ukraina fl eets took an as- whaling beginning in the mid-1800’s signifi cant fraction of the existing pop- tonishing 25,000 humpbacks in Ant- (Clapham et al., 1999). Under the ulation at that time. arctic waters. These catches were so ICRW, right and bowhead whales in all intensive that shore whaling stations oceans were protected from any com- “[Moscow] constantly demanded in Australia and New Zealand were mercial whaling, but this was ignored that the fl eet administration in- forced to close as a result of a lack of by Soviet whalers. The best estimate of crease the catch of baleen whales, whales (Clapham et al., 2009), and 50 total North Pacifi c right whale catches even though baleen whale reserves years later the Oceania population re- in the North Pacifi c and the Okhotsk in the northern part of the Pacifi c mains at relatively low numbers and is Sea is 681, only 11 of which were re- Ocean are in poor condition. After not recovering as expected (Constan- ported (Ivashchenko and Clapham, a direct order to go to the Bering tine et al., 2012). 2012). In particular, the Soviets prob- Sea the fl eet [Dalniy Vostok] was Southern right whales, Eubalaena ably removed the bulk of the remain- hunting fi n whales, the major- australis, also suffered large illegal ing population in the eastern North ity of which were undersized or catches despite having been protected Pacifi c: a recent estimate puts the size lactating. in 1935 and again under the ICRW in of this population today at only 30 The necessity to increase the 1946. In total, the Soviets killed 3,368 animals (Wade et al., 2011). The cur- output of edible products and to right whales in various parts of the rent status of the second recognized compensate for a shortfall in Au- Southern Hemisphere while reporting population (the western stock, which gust catches forced the fl eet in the only 4 of these takes to the IWC. feeds in the Okhotsk Sea) is unknown, middle of September to catch right For other species of large whales, but is thought to number in the hun- whales off Sakhalin Island and un- the impact of catches was not as dra- dreds. Bowhead whales in the Okhotsk dersized sperm whales around the matic; however, under-reporting and Sea were killed during at least 2 years Kurils...” (Rakatov and Latishev, the consequent uncertainty regard- when Soviet whalers were in this area 1967:59). ing true catch totals greatly compro- and caught 145 whales (Ivashchenko mised later IWC assessments of some and Clapham, 2010; Ivashchenko et In the Southern Hemisphere, the populations. al., 2013). most dramatic example of the impact Although these numbers are relative- of Soviet illegal catches concerned Too Much is Never Enough: ly small compared to catches of some humpback whales, Megaptera novae- The Economics of Illegal Whaling other species, they were potentially angliae, of the eastern Australia and As detailed by Ivashchenko et al. devastating because of the already Oceania populations. IWC regulations (2011), the factors responsible for greatly depleted status and small size relating to humpback whale catches driving the high catches in the whal- of the populations concerned. Both in the Southern Hemisphere began in ing industry, and for pushing whal- bowhead and right whales were in the 1949 with a maximum permitted catch ers to take illegal whales, all had their initial stage of recovering from serious of 1,250 whales (IWC, 1950b). The origin within the Soviet economic depletion of their populations result- next year’s (1950) meeting agreed that system. The entire system—which ing from intensive whaling in the 19th humpback whaling should not begin transformed the U.S.S.R. from a large- century (Scarff, 1991; Clapham et al., before February 1st (IWC, 1951), and ly rural economy into an industrial 1999). However, the precarious state restricted this season even further, to giant—was focused upon fulfi llment of these stocks did not prevent Soviet just 3 days (1–3 Feb.), in 1952 (IWC, of production targets assigned by the whalers from trying to fulfi ll their pro- 1953). In 1961, humpback whaling ministries for all industries, including duction targets (see below) or to meet was prohibited in all regions of the whaling. These targets were set by the other demands of the Soviet system: Antarctic except IWC management State Planning Committee, and they in the 1967 season signifi cant pressure Areas I, III, and VI (IWC, 1962a), and were developed without regard to the

6 Marine Fisheries Review actual state of natural resources (a sit- describes the diffi culties of reaching below 10.7 m; and 42 (11.2%) uation which was certainly not unique the target and the actions that it led to: were whales 8 m and smaller. to the U.S.S.R. but represented a fail- During the period 5–13 January, ing of many fi shery industries around “[There were] very complicated 195 humpbacks were killed and the world: Pauly et al., 2002; Pauly whaling conditions during the 51 of them were 8.0–8.2 m (or and Palomares, 2005). Nonetheless, 1966 season, including unfavor- 26%)! On some days the number the Soviet management was publicly able weather conditions, a sharp of humpbacks with a body length characterized as a responsible system decline in the availability of re- of around 8 m reached 30%! Al- featuring appropriate use and preser- sources, lack of baleen whales most all of them were calves... It vation of resources for the future. One in areas south of the Aleutian Is- would not be quite right to blame of the tasks in the range of responsi- lands, and a large number of un- whalers for these catches—they bilities for the Ministry of Fisheries dersized sperm whales found in had no choice within the aggrega- (which also including whaling) was the areas south of 40 degrees N. tions they found. If they did not stated as follows: Even though 73.1% of all catches kill these under-sized whales, they [4,391 out of 6,006 whales] were would not fulfi ll the State target “To safeguard fi sh stocks, work in violation of the whaling regu- plan, which was the reason why out and implement measures to lations, the fl eet and four catchers they came to the Antarctic” (Ber- reproduce and regulate fi sheries could not meet the State plan tar- zin et al., 1962:82). in the water bodies of the U.S.S.R. get for catches and production. . . . To draw up proposals for lim- All departures from the rules Despite complaints and warnings its on catches of valuable commer- of whaling were allowed, with from scientists and some offi cers on cial fi shes [and] marine animals .” the goal of unconditionally meet- the whaling fl eets, populations of (Sysoev, 1974:106). ing the established State plan tar- whales were often hunted until they get for catches and production, were too depleted to be worth further In reality, however, targets were set since in the current whaling situ- search effort (i.e., economically ex- high, and meeting—and especially ex- ation catches of only those whales tinct). Here again is the voice of scien- ceeding—targets resulted in bonuses permitted under the whaling reg- tists writing in a fl eet report: as well as privileges, awards, and oth- ulations would not guarantee ful- er recognition. In whaling, those who fi llment of the targets set for gross “There could be only one conclu- met or exceeded these targets would output.” (Sviridenko and Raska- sion from all that has been said obtain a bonus ranging from 25% to tov, 1966:24). above: during the fi ve seasons of 60% of their salary. This situation was intense whaling with fi rst one, complicated by the fact that the Soviet The combination of the requirement then two, and fi nally three fl eets, system was aimed at full employment, to meet or exceed production targets, the three stocks (western and east- potentially resulting in the need to em- together with socialistic competition5, ern Australian and New Zealand ploy and pay more workers than may turned the business of whaling (and population) of humpback whales have been necessary. every other industry in the U.S.S.R.) were decreased in abundance to The production targets were high to into an often manic numbers game. a point that allows us to say that begin with, and the situation was fur- The resulting ever-increasing catches they are almost completely wiped ther exacerbated by the fact that the often consisted in substantial part of out” (Berzin et al., 1962:82). following year’s targets would often be illegally killed whales, either of pro- set at the level achieved the previous tected species, undersized whales, or Occasionally, the inspectors’ reports year; this forced whalers to catch ever both. As a scientifi c report for one of reveal a confl ict within the govern- more whales to qualify for new bonus- the largest Soviet factory fl eets noted: ment with regard to the impossibility es, a situation which the whale popu- of reconciling high production targets lations concerned inevitably could not “In January we [of the Sovetskaya with a perceived need to not violate withstand (Ivashchenko et al., 2011). Rossiya fl eet] killed 373 hump- whaling regulations. This is from the Work in the whaling industry was back whales, 136 (37.6%) of them Inspector’s Report for the 1968 season unusually well paid and therefore high- of the Dalniy Vostok fl eet (Latishev et ly competitive; consequently, workers 5The socialistic competition was a signifi cant al., 1968:7–28): who failed to attain high achievements and explicit part of the Soviet economic sys- could (with the exception of special- tem (see Ivashchenko et al., 2011). It featured “We found large numbers of un- competition at all levels, from individuals to the ized positions such as harpooners) be whaling fl eets, to obtain higher production out- dersized sperm whales, but hunt- easily replaced or demoted. A whaling put in order to receive special recognition and ing them was prohibited by awards. The socialistic competition thus served inspectors’ report from the 1966 sea- to further increase catches, beyond those set by the whaling inspection depart- son of the whaling fl eet Dalniy Vostok the often already high production targets. ment. Very few whales of le-

76(1–2) 7 gal size were found, and this put ings, fi nes and reports (written by political expediency rather than ra- the goal of meeting the plan tar- and verbal) could slow down the tional economics; and a sprawling bu- get at risk of failure.... After re- unrestrained killing of undersized reaucracy only added to the problems peated requests to Moscow about whales and lactating females, be- (Gregory, 2006). continuing whaling following cause otherwise the plan target Politics and Economics numerous observations of only would not be met.” undersized sperm whales, we re- Within the U.S.S.R. ceived a cryptogram signed by The report then summarizes the sit- The domestic politics of any coun- Comrade Studenetskiy6. This tele- uation for the season, reiterating the try are important to an understand- gram suggested that the State in- confl ict and outcome noted above: ing of its international actions, and spectors work together with the in this context we now examine the Captain-Directors and take all “The work of the State inspec- specifi c situation in the Soviet Union. measures necessary for the uncon- tors to regulate obedience to the Although not all of the characteristics ditional fulfi llment of the plan tar- “rules” of whaling in the last sea- described below were uniquely So- get... By the 23rd of May the fl eet son encountered many diffi culties. viet, the combination of factors made arrived at the appointed area and On one side we had to strictly con- it possible for the illegal activities to began large-scale extermination of trol the execution of all whaling be prosecuted on a large scale and for undersized whales.” rules, and on the other hand the an extended period without detection, target of raw output…undoubtedly or at least without acknowledgment of The narrative continues: had to be met. Whaling resources their existence. in the North Pacifi c are so deplet- After the October Revolution of “In the beginning of the month ed that there is no point talking 1917, and to an even greater extent we received, simultaneously, two about a hunt of “legal” whales. In after WWII, the Soviet Union be- cryptograms: 1. Comrade Ka- addition, the percentage of illegal came a politically, socially, and eco- mentsev7 and 2. Drozdov and whales taken, in numbers and in nomically isolated country (Bulkeley, Kogan. The fi rst noted unaccept- output, is increasing every year. In 2010, 2011, 2012). The U.S.S.R. had ability of continued whaling on the beginning of the whaling sea- a unique economic system that was illegal whales [i.e. undersized son the Inspection department im- based upon production, but not profi t sperm whales], while the second posed strict penalties on violators per se, and presided over by an exten- contained a suggestion for the of the “Rules of whaling”. De- sive bureaucracy under the control and fl eet to add 12 000 tons of raw spite this effort, raw output from leadership of the Communist Party products, over and above the ex- illegal whales made up 44.5% of (Gregory, 2006). All businesses be- isting plan target. The bluntness the total, while only 57.9% of the longed to the State and were thus man- of the telegram from comrade monthly target was obtained. Af- aged as one gigantic “corporation,” Kamentsev required us to issue ter that, the Inspection and the ad- where different departments were rep- the strictest warnings to the cap- ministration of the fl eet received resented by huge industries (such as tains and harpooners of the catch- instructions [from the Ministry] fi sheries, in the case of whaling). Be- ers, as a result of which the rate and it was subsequently decided to cause of the nature of this system, the of catches sharply declined.... The work together to take all measures industries were not constrained by any groups of sperm whales contained to ensure the unconditional fulfi ll- need for sustainability or profi t in or- up to 40% lactating females; the ment of the plan target” (Latishev der to survive (Chuksin, 2006; Greg- captains were careful and tried et al., 1968:7–28). ory, 2006). As noted above, provision to avoid them, and as a result the of full employment was also a major catch for 3 days equaled 0. It is not known what prompted cer- factor in economic planning. The southern region, in which tain offi cials to occasionally express A consequence of this is that any di- out of necessity we worked in Oc- concern for violation of IWC regu- rect comparison between the fi nancial tober and part of November, is the lations, but the ultimate resolution situation of the whaling companies of principal area of sperm whale re- of this rather schizophrenic confl ict other countries and the Soviet whal- production. No reprimands, warn- seems always to have been the same: ing fl eets becomes confusing and po- production targets trumped everything tentially inappropriate, with the need else. to incorporate the different price/cost 6Studenetskiy Sergey Alexandrovich was direc- tor of the VNIRO research institute, and dur- In addition to the peculiarities of the subsidies that existed in the U.S.S.R. ing 1967–77 was Vice-Minister of Fisheries for production target system, total control Tønnessen and Johnsen (1982) com- “studies of the world’s oceans”. over the nation’s economy was wielded piled a detailed analysis of whaling 7Vladimir Mikhailovich Kamentsev was fi rst Vice-Minister of Fisheries beginning in 1965 by the Communist Party. This often economics in different years, including and Minister of Fisheries in 1979–86. led to decisions that were determined calculations of the cost of production

8 Marine Fisheries Review for Soviet whaling in 2 years (1961– As some individuals interviewed by in the breeding areas! Even not 63). Based upon the prices established us have noted with regard to explana- just three times more, but rather elsewhere in Europe, and the falsifi ed tions for illegal catches, should any however many they can kill, be- catches reported by the U.S.S.R. (Tøn- overly curious scientist or whaler en- cause the whalers there work from nessen and Johnsen were unaware that quire, the answer given typically con- shore stations, where catches are these data were false), they concluded sisted of two arguments. First, “we” unlimited... that it was 2.4 times more expensive started whaling late and other countries All rules and laws are active for the Soviet whaling fl eets to pro- (namely Norway, the United Kingdom, only during the time when supply duce whale oil than to buy it (Tønnes- and the United States) have already is exceeding demand. As soon as sen and Johnsen, 1982:634). killed so many whales, so our catches the movers and shakers of the cap- However, for the reasons noted represent just a small fraction of the italist market increase the demand, above (in addition to the false total and cannot have much impact on all rules are immediately violated, catch data used), this is not a valid populations (Nikonorov, 2008). This and the concerns of biologists are comparison: Soviet whaling was a explanation sometimes further noted portrayed as unfounded and even state-owned, government-subsidized that less than 15% of the total number laughable. That is how it was and industry with no need to be self-suf- of whales killed during the period of will be in the world of capitalism, fi cient as long as production targets modern whaling in the Antarctic were where the highest law is the larg- were being met. Some internal So- taken by the U.S.S.R.; however, this est profi ts.” viet reports use the terms “revenue” fi gure is misleading since it ignores and “profi t” (e.g. Anonymous, 1962, the fact that many of the Soviet catch- Certainly some would say that the 1965, 1966), and from this it appears es were concentrated in a short time Soviet system had admirable charac- that, given the high catches in the period, and thus they severely impact- teristics. As noted above, the system in early years of the industry’s opera- ed some populations, especially those the U.S.S.R. was designed to provide tions (until the end of the 1960’s), the which had already been reduced by full employment, as well as to guar- large new Soviet fl eets were actually other nations’ whaling. antee support and care for every citi- “profi table” enterprises. The second argument was to say that zen. In another book on whaling, the However, while “profi t” is clearly all other whaling countries are whal- prominent Soviet whaler Alexei Soly- the excess of revenue over operational ing illegally, and if we do not kill this anik (1952:31) explains the major dif- costs, “revenue” is harder to defi ne in whale (and use it for a good social- ference between the Soviet Union and the context of the socialist economy of ist cause) it will be killed anyway by all capitalist countries regarding the the U.S.S.R., which set its own prod- some other fl eet, thus creating profi t way their citizens are treated, and in so uct prices and somehow transferred for a few capitalists (Zenkovich, 1954; doing he articulated the need to always money between ministries and indus- Tormosov8). All foreign countries/ support the U.S.S.R. because its very tries. Understanding the true costs and companies were characterized as “our nature meant that all actions were un- the nature of revenues within this in- enemies”—and from outside it was dertaken by it for the sake of improv- dustry is beyond the scope of the pres- clear that the feeling was mutual, and ing the lives of all common people: ent paper and requires a separate study that the Soviet Union was often per- by an expert in Soviet economics. ceived the same way (Bulkeley, 2010, “Our State takes care of its citi- The political and social isolation of 2011). The offi cial Soviet literature zens, including seamen... We do the Soviet Union, and the inability of clearly stated that all that was done not have and cannot have unem- its citizens to readily access alternative was just and for the noble cause of so- ployment, and in case of sickness sources of information, created ideal cialism, which was not the case with you will be treated for free and conditions for the authorities to dis- the capitalist countries and companies. your salary will be paid for this tribute any information they deemed Here is Zenkovich (1954:353), railing time. In our country nobody has useful. The resulting propaganda against the evils of capitalism: black days and never will.” sometimes contained carefully chosen portions of real information or used “Unfortunately, it is impossible in Economic contacts with the U.S.S.R. fabricated or distorted facts in order to capitalistic conditions to imple- were also severely limited, sometimes manipulate the public view of an issue ment laws that infringe the ap- owing to obstacles set by the West. In and to justify the international and do- petites of the monopolists. For 1950, the Soviet Union unsuccessfully mestic actions of the state (Nikonorov, example: an annual quota is estab- tried to purchase the Dutch whaling 2008; Tormosov8; Doroshenko9). lished for humpback whale catch- factory ship Willem Barendsz and was es in Antarctic waters (in the last apparently willing to pay a high price 8Tormosov, retired, interview in Odessa, Oct. 2008. few years this number has been (Tønnessen and Johnsen, 1982). When 9Doroshenko, retired TINRO, Vladivostok, in- 1,250 animals). Yet it is permit- it became clear that the Dutch would terview Nov. 2009. ted to kill three times more whales not sell, the U.S.S.R. recognized that

76(1–2) 9 “The Soviet delegation expressed the view that without suffi cient scientifi c investigation of this problem, and taking into account the need to conserve the stocks of whales, they could not support a recommendation by the Sub- Committee to open the sanctuary” (IWC, 1955a:19).

“The Soviet representatives con- sider that the reduction to 14,500 units represents a correct and a progressive step toward the con- servation of the whale stocks and were surprised that seven coun- tries found it necessary to lodge objection” (IWC, 1956a:24).

When the Soviets had only one out of the then-total of 16–20 fl eets that were operating, and therefore could not kill and process very many whales, it was easy to publicly support all con- Figure 3.—Captain Alexey Solyanik (second from right) during the traditional servation measures while catching as celebration of crossing the equator on the deck of the factory ship Slava. Photo: many whales as they could. I. P. Golovlev. But as the Soviets expanded their whaling industry, the situation changed. The U.S.S.R. ignored the the only way to expand was to build its Overall, while the industry un- continued discussion regarding the own fl eets. Furthermore, given the un- doubtedly also employed many honest depletion of whale stocks and the low- derlying Soviet mentality that (as not- people, the system exerted complete ering of the total catch limit, while ed by Cherniy, 2003) “we should have control and could easily suppress or adding three large fl eets to its Ant- the biggest... the fastest... the highest”, ignore the actions of individuals that arctic operations. At the end of the this inevitably resulted in the Soviets disagreed with the practices or politics 1950’s, it is unlikely that either the constructing not just the largest facto- of whaling. Soviet delegation to IWC or those of ry ship ever built, but several of them. other nations could have imagined that It is noteworthy that the expansion of Public Stance at the IWC in just a few years the total catch limit whaling was relatively timid compared The positions and opinions of would be reduced from 16,000 Blue to the development of Soviet fi sheries, the U.S.S.R. delegation to the IWC Whale Units10 (BWU) to 9,000 BWU where hundreds of large-sized vessels evolved signifi cantly during the fi rst in the 1963–64 season, and then to were operating (Cherniy, 2003; Chuk- 20 years of the organization’s history. 4,500 BWU in 1965–66 (IWC, 1965a, sin, 2006). Annual IWC meetings had started in 1967, 1968a). The obvious decline Even if it were known that whales 1949, and for the fi rst few years (un- in whale stocks and these relatively were being killed illegally and in high til the early 1960’s) the U.S.S.R. was rapid changes in the catch limit, to- numbers, this would not have been a offi cially standing on the side of con- gether with the diminishing number concern for the majority of people. It is servation and appropriate management worth noting that, in the major domes- actions in order to preserve the stocks 10The Blue Whale Unit (BWU) was a unit with tic scandal of Soviet whaling, which of whales. While falsifying the true which to set total catch. Introduced in 1931 to limit production of whale oil for the market, the led to the downfall of the former so- catches beginning in 1948 (starting BWU was based upon the assumption that the cialist hero Captain Solyanik (Fig. 3), with the Antarctic), the Soviet Union’s amount of oil obtained from one blue whale is the main focus of discussion was his commissioner sometimes vocally op- similar to that from 2 fi n, or 2.5 humpbacks, or 6 sei whales. Therefore, 1 BWU = 1 blue = 2 tyrannical mistreatment of fl eet whal- posed the opening of the Antarctic fi n = 2.5 humpback = 6 sei whales. In working ers (Sakhnin, 1965); the huge illegal Sanctuary to whaling (IWC, 1955a) under the BWU catch limit, whalers were not re- stricted in the species makeup of the catch; as catches that Solyanik oversaw were and fully supported a lower total catch noted below, this represented a huge fl aw in con- never mentioned (Berzin, 2008). limit (IWC, 1956a): servation management.

10 Marine Fisheries Review of countries engaged in whaling, all 15,500, despite the fact that the IWC’s and in the Ross Sea a few months in forced the Soviet Union to become a Scientifi c Sub-Committee was recom- a row. While they certainly took large more prominent player in the discus- mending a cut to 14,500 BWU (IWC, animals when they were encountered, sions and decisions made at the IWC. 1955a). At the next year’s meeting they killed everything else too, re- The evolution of the Soviet position on (1955) the lower catch limit of 15,000 gardless of age or size, and including various issues is discussed in more de- BWU was agreed, but a proposal for calves. tail below. a further reduction for 1956–57 to The continued failure of the Com- 14,500 BWU met strong opposition mission to reach agreement on the size Catch Limits and from a few whaling nations, and, as of a total catch limit provided an op- Abundance Estimates noted above, the Soviet commissioner tion for every country to set voluntary Discussion at IWC meetings on was the fi rst one to criticize them for limits (IWC, 1960a). While Norwe- the potentially deteriorating status of their behavior. gian, Dutch, and English fl eets could whale populations began in the mid By 1957 the IWC expressed “a not reach the limits that were set, the 1950’s (IWC, 1953; 1955b). Already unanimous view that fi n whales are in total catch for the 1959-60 season was before WWII all whaling nations were the process of being seriously deplet- 15,512 BWU, well above a previously aware that blue and humpback whales ed.” There was actually no unanimity, set 14,500 BWU limit. This occurred were depleted, with the main whal- because the Netherlands saw no signs despite “the views expressed by the ing pressure having switched to fi n of depletion nor any need to reduce majority of the members of the for- whales (Ruud, 1956). For many years the catch; on the contrary, in 1958 the mer Scientifi c Sub-Committee that the arguments continued to center on the Dutch commissioner proposed that stocks were declining and the rate of uncertainties in abundance estimates, the catch limit be increased to 16,000 catching was excessive. It was felt that with this being used as an excuse to BWU. In the end, a compromise lim- drastic restrictions were called for... It delay management actions. it of 14,500 BWU was agreed (IWC, was felt the combined evidence leaves As whaling effort continued to ex- 1958:22). no room for doubt of a decline of the pand from the late 1940’s to the ear- The situation at the IWC was further fi n whale stocks in the Antarctic, and ly 1960’s, the depletion of fi n whale complicated by discussions between in principle the Committee were unan- stocks and continued declines in blue the fi ve main whaling nations, begin- imously agreed on this conclusion” and humpback whales were discussed ning in 1958, regarding the splitting (IWC, 1960a:5). to varying degrees at each IWC meet- of the total catch limit into national This unfortunate situation persisted ing, beginning in 1953 (IWC, 1953). shares (or quotas), in an effort to halt despite an obvious decline in whale At that time the Soviet delegation the ongoing and unregulated competi- stocks and catches generally. There played no prominent role besides vot- tion for the largest share on the whal- followed a suggestion to form a small ing in support of a few conservation ing grounds. For reasons relating to a group of independent experts “to carry measures proposed at the meetings, provision in the Convention, these dis- out an independent scientifi c assess- as noted above. There was no need cussions were held outside of the IWC ment of the conditions of the whale for the U.S.S.R. to intervene on any of forum; this is discussed further below. stocks in the Antarctic which would these matters because other whaling In 1958, despite surprising other provide a scientifi c basis for the con- countries, and in particular the Neth- whaling nations with their announce- sideration of appropriate conservation erlands11, were preventing (or at least ment of a planned large expansion in measures by the Commission” (IWC, arguing against) any restrictions on the operations, the Soviet Union was rel- 1962a:6). This group, the so-called catch limit. Heazle (2006) describes atively quiet and even offered a posi- Committee of Three (known more in- this political move as use of “scientifi c tive comment in the Chairman’s report formally as the “Three Wise Men”) uncertainty” that at the IWC meetings (IWC, 1959a:18): “the number of un- consisting of Sidney Holt, Doug Chap- found wide use fi rst by the Dutch sci- der-sized whales taken by the U.S.S.R. man, and Kay (Kenneth) Radway Al- entists and commissioners and which was less in 1957/58 than in the previ- len, was duly constituted and set to was later employed by other countries. ous season; this being attributable to work; the result would be the fi rst for- At the 1954 meeting, the Commis- the larger number of catchers afford- mal assessments of whale stocks by sion did not agree to lower the catch ing the gunners a chance of selecting the IWC (and this only for the Ant- limit by 500 BWU from the original whales more carefully.” arctic—no such assessments were This was partly true, but it did not conducted for the North Pacifi c until 11From that time on, different Dutch scientists, tell the whole story. A formerly se- comparatively recently). notably Professor E. J. Slijper, consistently re- cret Soviet whaling industry report During all of this time, the U.S.S.R. fused to accept any stock assessments that showed a decline in populations and objected to mentioned extensive catches starting delegation was content to remain on any lowering of the catch limit. This resistance that year, with the Slava fl eet work- the sidelines of the debate, while of- signifi cantly slowed the progress of management actions by the IWC (IWC, 1955a, 1957a, 1958, ing on large aggregations of hump- fi cially agreeing to limit its catch to 1959a). back whales off the Balleny Islands 3,000 BWU (a 20% share of the total

76(1–2) 11 catch limit) during three consecutive objections from the Soviet Union and Netherlands withdrew from the Con- seasons from 1959–60 to 1961–62. Japan on anything related to reducing vention for a few years, making it im- At the same time, paradoxically, the catches (IWC, 1966a, 1967, 1969a). possible to agree upon a catch limit. number of Soviet whaling fl eets in the In turn, this led to voluntary limits Antarctic increased from two to four National Quotas Allocation set by each whaling country, as a re- (IWC, 1962a). It is curious that there Article V of the ICRW specifi cally sult of which the catches were higher was no offi cial discussion at IWC of prohibits the division of catches into than the previously agreed total catch any suspicions raised by this expan- national quotas (IWC, 1950a). This limits and much higher than had been sion, given that the U.S.S.R.’s quota was intended to prevent monopoliza- recommended by the Scientifi c Com- could easily have been taken by just tion of the whaling resources by al- mittee (IWC, 1960b, 1961b, 1962a). the existing two fl eets. Somehow the ready established whaling countries The resulting shares agreed for the U.S.S.R. managed to avoid any con- (Tønnessen and Johnsen, 1982). Ac- 1962 whaling season were as follows: frontations regarding this paradox, cordingly, it was impossible to estab- Japan 33%, Norway 32%, U.S.S.R. and it is possible that other countries lish any national quotas within the 20%, United Kingdom 9%, and the assumed that this situation was due to framework of the IWC, and if any Netherlands 6% (with the number of the unique nature of the Soviet eco- such quotas were to be established fl eets being seven, seven, four, two, nomic system and thus believed that they would have to be agreed volun- and one, respectively) (IWC, 1962d). the U.S.S.R.’s whaling was simply un- tarily outside the IWC forum. This agreement, as we now know, was profi table (Tønnessen and Johnsen, It quickly became obvious that the effectively irrelevant to the U.S.S.R.’s 1982). lack of IWC-sanctioned national quo- whaling because the true Soviet catch- The Soviet position on catch limits tas created a race between the fl eets es signifi cantly exceeded 20% of the changed very quickly when the fi rst to kill as many whales (i.e., to take as total: during the 1962–63 season the results of the Committee of Three’s much of the quota) as possible, a situ- Soviet whalers actually caught 4,353.3 analysis were published (IWC, 1962b). ation that IWC members termed “the of the total 12,844 BWU, or almost As a result of the Committee’s work, Whaling Olympics”.13 In 1958, “un- 34% (Allison, 2011). the catch limit was reduced to 9,000 offi cial” discussions among the fi ve Prolonged arguments on this topic BWU for the 1963–64 season, and main whaling countries began (IWC, among the other countries ensured that subsequently to 4,500 BWU for the 1959b) to divide the IWC’s annual little progress could be made with oth- following years (IWC, 1965a, 1966a, catch limit of 15,000 BWU (note that er important issues (one of them being 1967, 1968a). the Scientifi c Committee, mindful of the International Observer Scheme, It became increasingly diffi cult for what many saw as a decline in stocks, which we discuss below). Already in the U.S.S.R. to explain how four large suggested 10,000 BWU for that year). 1964–65, the situation regarding the whaling fl eets could be employed The announcement by the Soviet number of fl eets operating changed in taking only a 20% share of 4,500 delegation in 1958 of their planned ad- signifi cantly: there were seven whal- BWU; but of course in reality the in- dition of four new large fl eets in the ing fl eets for Japan, four for the Soviet ternal Soviet production plan targets Antarctic was followed by an offer Union, and four operated by Norway. were secretly being set without any that the U.S.S.R. be allocated 20% of The catch shares at this point were: concern for the IWC’s catch limit.12 the total catch limit on the condition Japan 52%, Norway 28%, and the So- Accordingly, in just a couple of years that no more than three fl eets could be viet Union 20% (IWC, 1966b). The the Soviet position changed from one added in the next 7 years; the Soviets Japanese portion increased as a result that was mildly conservation oriented agreed, and did not participate in dis- of Japan buying a number of British, to an almost permanent state of dis- cussions regarding the remainder of Norwegian, and Dutch fl eets primar- agreement regarding assessments and the catch limit (IWC, 1959b, 1961a). ily to secure their catch shares, thus catch limits (an exception being more This allocation represented the investing a large amount of money favorable assessments conducted by easiest part of the national quota in continued whaling (IWC, 1964a, the Japanese), and the U.S.S.R. then agreement. Arguments regarding the 1965a, 1966b). began to follow the long-established division of the remaining 80% be- The Soviet Union insisted on a new contrary position of the Dutch and tween Norway, England, Japan, and share agreement prior to the intro- Japanese delegations. From then on, the Netherlands dragged on with lit- duction of an International Observer every meeting was characterized by tle success for 3 years before shares Scheme (IWC, 1966b). It is not clear were fi nally agreed (IWC, 1960a, whether this demand was an attempt 12The actual production and catches of the 1961a, 1962c). This inability to reach to actually obtain a larger share of the Sovetskaya Rossiya whaling fl eet in 1965–66 season was higher than in 1961–62 (5,824 and an agreement on national quotas was catch limit or (probably more realisti- 4,068 whales, respectively, with the production the reason that Norway, Japan, and the cally) represented a strategy to delay target exceeded in both years at 114% and 110% of the plan) (Berzin et al., 1962; Anonymous, the implementation of international 1966). 13Sidney Holt, personal commun., Sept. 2010. observers on board factory ships. Ja-

12 Marine Fisheries Review pan, having invested heavily in new control on all whaling fl eets in the main outside of the Convention. The whaling fl eets for their catch share, very near future. U.S.S.R. confi rmed their readiness to was unwilling to readily consent to a Should international inspec- take part in any discussion when all new quota share agreement. tion occur, the whaling would the countries were equally bound...” Nonetheless, a new national catch be based upon some fi n and blue (IWC, 1960a:7). quota agreement was eventually whales, with a majority of the A few years later, once this isse reached in 1966, dividing the total catch consisting of sei and sperm was resolved and the catch shares catch of 3,500 BWU into 1,633 BWU whales. Humpbacks will disap- agreed, the Soviet Union indicated (46.6%) for four Japanese fl eets, 800 pear from the catch completely, that “no useful discussion on the IOS BWU (22.9%) for two Norwegian, as it is pointless to talk about any could be held until after the Arrange- and 1,067 BWU (30.5%) for three reasonable level of catch within ments for the Regulation of Antarc- Soviet fl eets (IWC, 1968b). In reality, the [regulations regarding] time tic Pelagic Whaling signed in London the whaling fl eet Sovetskaya Rossiya and size established by the Con- in June 1962 had been ratifi ed by the production report for 1966–67 season vention given the current condi- fi ve governments concerned14” (IWC, notes that this fl eet alone killed 7,373 tions of stocks... 1964a:7). whales (=1,017.8 BWU +3,487 sperm One can give the following Even before the national quotas whales) and exceeded that year’s plan number from data presented dur- were agreed, the Soviet commissioner target by 36.4% (Anonymous, 1967). ing the whaling meeting in Mos- (at that time this post was held by the None of these catch numbers seemed cow in September of this year: Minister of Fisheries, Alexander Ish- to be suffi cient for large whaling fl eets. 60% of whales killed by the Soviet kov15) stated that observers for the So- Similar arrangements (with constantly whaling fl eets in the Antarctic rep- viet whaling fl eets should come only decreasing shares) were reached in resented violations of the whaling from communist countries, thus intro- the following years before the BWU regulations. All of these whales ducing an additional obstacle to any system was abandoned in favor of in- would be excluded from the catch agreement (Tønnessen and Johnsen, dividual species quotas (IWC, 1969b, [with the introduction of interna- 1982; Berzin, 2008). 1970a, 1971a). tional observers].” Draft rules for an IOS had been agreed at the IWC’s 1963 meeting The Politics of Delay: During that season the total catch (IWC, 1965a); however the scheme it- the International Observer for the Sovetskaya Rossiya whaling self did not materialize. As we noted Scheme Debate fl eet was 5,046 whales and consisted in the “National Shares” section, the The IWC discussions surrounding of 131 blue, 796 fi n, 2,176 humpback, Soviet Union insisted upon renegotia- the proposed development of an In- 646 sei, 1,274 sperm, and 23 right tion of catch shares before they would ternational Observer Scheme (IOS) whales (Anonymous, 1962). In other accept anything else: were to go on for many years before available reports, the topic of the IOS this scheme was fi nally implemented is not even mentioned, while discuss- “The Soviet Government could in 1972. The IOS represented one of ing possible changes in catches and a not see their way to implement the the main confrontation points for the continuing increase in plan targets. Scheme without prior revision of U.S.S.R., and the IWC record shows For many years, often assisted by the arrangement governing nation- strong participation by the Soviet del- other countries (notably Japan), the So- al quotas on a basis satisfactory to egation on this issue (IWC, 1962a, viet Union was able to delay the intro- them, while the Japanese Govern- 1964a, 1966b). Indeed, in retrospect duction of the IOS. The fi rst proposal ment were not willing to discuss it is clear that the potential introduc- regarding an IOS came from Norway such matters until implementation tion of international observers was the at the IWC meeting in 1954, but due rules and the voluntary catch limit most critical issue facing the U.S.S.R. to procedural requirements it was not for the 1964–65 season had been at IWC, given its reliance on illegal offi cially included on the agenda un- accepted by all the parties” (IWC, catches to meet its production targets. til the 1957 meeting (IWC, 1956b, 1966b:9). Already in 1961 a secret Soviet 1958). During the next few years whaling report was considering the (1959–61) the discussion was hindered 14This was an agreement of catch shares be- change in catches that would result if by the withdrawal from the Conven- tween fi ve whaling countries, and its ratifi cation the IOS was introduced (Berzin et al., tion of Norway and the Netherlands took another year (IWC, 1964a). 1962:82): (IWC, 1960a, 1961a, 1962a), and the 15Alexandr Ishkov was the U.S.S.R. Minister of U.S.S.R. declined to join meetings to Fisheries for many years (1940–50 and 1954– 79) and was the driving force behind the expan- “Discussing the prospects of whal- discuss the matter “on the ground that sion of Soviet whaling and fi sheries with many ing is impossible without taking such a scheme would be valueless so large factory ships that swept the world’s oceans. He was also the main protector and advocate of into account the real possibility of long as any of the countries engaging Captain Solyanik during the latter’s infamous the introduction of international in pelagic whaling in the Antarctic re- scandal in 1965 (Sakhnin, 1965).

76(1–2) 13 The same reason was used by the egations were in favor of separating was fi rst discussed and its eventual Soviets at the following IWC meeting the regulation of these two branches implementation—as noted by Tønnes- in 1965. Meanwhile, the Commission of the industry (IWC, 1969c). Be- sen and Johnsen (1982), a number of “strongly requested” that an IOS be cause the IOS scheme represented an countries showed a “remarkable de- implemented as quickly as possible, amendment to the IWC Schedule, and gree of inventiveness in evading this fearing that when the agreement on in- because the amendment process was issue”—the fi nal scheme still failed ternational observers expired after the lengthy (see details below), the IWC to ensure complete compliance with 1965–66 season the scheme would not decided to postpone further discussion IWC regulations. come into existence at all (IWC, 1967). until the following year (IWC, 1969a). Flaws in the Convention Progress on implementing an IOS and the Mismanagement of Whaling “With regard to the assurances in came to a halt for another 4 years, in the resolution invited from the ac- large part due to the lengthy process The Whaling Convention of 1946 tive pelagic whaling nations, two involved in enacting any amendment was created with at least nominally were able to give these but the to the schedule. However, it was fi nally good intentions to better manage the delegation of the Union of So- accepted in 1971 (IWC, 1950b, 1970b, whaling industry, and it stemmed from viet Socialist Republics stated 1971b, 1972, 1973). During the in- a recognition by the parties of the that, while they were in favor of terminable discussion of the IOS, the need for conservation measures to pre- implementation of the scheme in Soviet Union had three large whaling serve whale populations for some sort the coming season, their assur- fl eets operating in the Antarctic with a of sustainable hunting, and to protect ance must be qualifi ed by the res- catch quota of less than 1,000 BWU, them from the fate that had occurred ervation that both the quota of the and the Soviets were probably aware to other species many times before in whole catch and the International that these would be the fi nal years of different parts of the world. In the ef- Observer Scheme should be ex- unrestricted illegal catches. The ac- fort to create an agreement and keep tended to both factory ships and tual catches for the three Soviet fl eets all of the whaling countries a part of to all land stations catching Ant- were as follows: 1968–69: 2,674.3 the Convention, a number of Articles arctic whales, and that to imple- BWU +5,441 sperm whales; 1969–70: and defi nitions were created in such ment the International Observer 2,569.8 BWU +7,424 sperm whales; a way that these later served as loop- Scheme it would be necessary to 1970–71: 2,404.6 BWU +6,742 sperm holes with which whalers could evade solve on a just basis the problem whales; and in 1971–72: 2,133.7 almost any IWC decision (Tønnessen of re-allocation of national quotas BWU +11,221 sperm whales (Allison, and Johnsen, 1982). between the countries concerned. 2011). A number of authors, including It was agreed that talks on these Once international observers were some writing in the early years of matters would be continued but no introduced onto each whaling factory the IWC (e.g., Ruud, 1956) described solution had been worked out by ship and at all land stations, the belief weaknesses in the Convention (Tøn- the end of the Commission’s meet- was that no illegal catches could now nessen and Johnsen, 1982). Almost all ing” (IWC, 1967:22). be made. However, according to an of these were used by the Soviet Union agreed arrangement, the Soviet whal- and other whaling countries. The two Meanwhile, the four Soviet whal- ing fl eets had Japanese observers and utilized the most by the Soviet Union ing fl eets working in the Antarctic dur- vice versa. While the U.S.S.R.’s illegal were Article VIII of the ICRW, which ing the 1964–65 season were catching whaling was revealed in 1994 (Yablo- permitted “special permit” whaling for large numbers of blue (1,018), hump- kov, 1994), it took even longer to dis- scientifi c research (outside any quotas back (4,489), and right (350) whales, cover that some illegal catches and or other restrictions), and the so-called all of which were protected by that data falsifi cations continued on the So- “objection” procedure. time (Allison, 2011). viet fl eets despite implementation of Article VIII was used often by After all the discussion, the exist- the IOS. the U.S.S.R. in the Antarctic (IWC, ing IOS agreement expired “without At least some of these catches were 1960a, 1962a, 1964a), yet none of being brought into operation” at the made with the knowledge and com- these scientifi c takes resulted in pub- end of the 1965–66 season, and at the plicity of Japanese observers, at a lications.17 The objection procedure eighteenth meeting (1966), a work- time when the Soviet Union was sell- ing group was established to develop ing whale meat to Japan (Mikhalev 17It is worth noting here that since 1987 Japan a new scheme (IWC, 1968a). In the et al., 2009; Veinger16). Thus, despite has used special permit whaling to kill thou- following year different schemes were the absurdly protracted 17-year peri- sands of whales in the Southern Ocean and the North Pacifi c (Clapham et al., 2007). That these discussed at special meetings. The So- od between when the idea of an IOS catches were driven not by scientifi c need but by viet delegation supported a proposal a desire to circumvent the IWC’s moratorium on whaling was affi rmed in March 2014 by the In- that included both land stations and 16Veinger, G. TINRO Vladivostok, personal ternational Court of Justice (http://www.icjcij. pelagic operations, while the other del- commun. March 2008. org/docket/fi les/148/18136.pdf).

14 Marine Fisheries Review permits a member state to lodge, was too late. Here, the major players was even smaller, at 457 BWU (IWC, within 90 days, an objection to any were Japan, the Netherlands, and Nor- 1964a). IWC decision and thus not be bound way (IWC, 1966a, 1967). Another major gap in achieving a by it (IWC, 1950a). This loophole For many years, starting in 1955, the desired balance between catches and was used by the Soviet Union (togeth- catch level recommended by the Sci- preservation of resources was a pro- er with others) many times to evade entifi c Committee was routinely voted tracted refusal to switch from a total decisions such as lowering of the total down (or not even seen as an option), catch limit expressed in BWU to spe- catch limit (IWC, 1966a, 1967, 1973), and the total catch limit (if agreed at cies-specifi c catch limits (IWC, 1955a, protection of blue whales in different all) was set much higher, mainly in 1965b, 1970b). This proposal would oceans (IWC, 1956c, 1957b, 1961a, consideration of the economic inter- have done away with one of the more 1962a), and fi nally passage in 1982 of ests of the whaling countries (IWC, disastrous decisions ever made by the the Moratorium on commercial whal- 1956c, 1958, 1960a, 1961a). Dur- IWC, since the BWU system allowed ing (IWC, 1983). Indeed, the latter ing discussions about national shares, whalers to expend their share however objection was never withdrawn; con- one country managed to hold up any they chose to, regardless of the vary- sequently, if Russia should so desire agreement with demands regarding ing conservation status of particular they could offi cially resume commer- the share that, ironically, they were not species or populations. The discussion cial whaling at any time, as Norway even able to catch: on switching to catch limits set by spe- continues to do under the same objec- cies began in 1956, and the idea was tion clause. “Every time a solution was round vigorously opposed by Norway and In addition to major weaknesses of the corner, it was postponed in the the Netherlands. the Convention, the political or (pri- face of new demands. In the end, In 1969, 13 years after the start of marily) economic interests of many the dispute revolved around a mere that discussion, the IWC Chairman’s countries made the initial intentions 70 units, for the sake of which the Report describes the situation as fol- of the Convention and any conserva- Netherlands was prepared to jeop- lows (IWC, 1971b:20): tion efforts ineffective for many years. ardize the entire agreement... It also ensured a persistent failure to When the Netherlands was of- “The Scientifi c Committee reaf- place signifi cant limitations on the fered a “bonus” of 80 units, which fi rms its opinion that from the whaling industry in order to preserve it would have to catch within the viewpoint of maintaining all whale resources and thus to maintain season fi xed by the IWC, this, too, stocks, it was desirable to set sepa- the long-term existence of this indus- was turned down, with a demand rate quotas by species for the Ant- try for the future. for 90 units, and on this difference arctic catch rather than in terms As noted by Holt18, in 1957 “the of 10 units the Conference was of blue whale units. The Techni- USA considered that the balance be- deadlocked! There is no doubt that cal Commission did not recom- tween scientifi c and moral consider- as far as the Netherlands was con- mend any action in regard to the ations had deteriorated in this meeting cerned the size of the quota was Schedule but felt the Commission and that governments were losing not the most important matter: the should keep a watchful eye on the sight of what had been their prime important thing was to ensure that situation.” objectives in drawing up the ICRW. no agreement was reached, so that Conservation had taken second place the company could carry on with Only in 1971 did the Commission to national interest.” The reality of the unrestricted catching for as many fi nally agree to set separate catches, situation was that the desire for imme- seasons as possible” (Tønnessen fi rst in the North Pacifi c and then in diate profi t in the face of large capital and Johnsen, 1982:602–603). 1972 for the Antarctic (IWC, 1972, investments was invariably favored 1973). In the words of Sidney Holt18 over any science-based population es- The irony here was, that having put “The BWU argument had at last been timates or the resulting conservative the IWC through all of this, the Dutch won—when there were hardly any management recommendations. whaling fl eet was unable to catch any- ‘BWUs’ left in the ocean.” Besides the discussions in which thing close to the share on which they Frequently when discussion on a Soviet participation stalled progress, had so forcefully insisted. The fi nal particular topic was reaching a stale- a few topics in the IWC agenda were agreement allocated the Netherlands mate, the temporary solution was to discussed for many years among oth- 6% of the total catch limit (or 900 of put off consideration of any deci- er countries. First, there was endless 15,000 BWU); yet the year before the sion until the following year. Yet lit- disagreement on the total catch limit shares were agreed (1961–62), the tle change or progress was made at with a consequent inability to rein in Dutch whalers caught only 615 BWU, the next meeting, and as a result the catches to an acceptable level until it with a much earlier start to the season situation remained deadlocked year and no restrictions (IWC, 1962a). The after year, thus keeping the old reg- 18Holt, S. manuscr. in prep., 2014. next season the Netherlands’ catch ulations comfortably in place (IWC,

76(1–2) 15 1960a, 1961a, 1962c, 1970b, 1971b, Shortly afterwards the concern was es, but the regularity of such reports 1972). echoed by Chittleborough (1965), might have suggested that these re- who, while not naming the country fl ected a systematic program of ille- Did Anyone Suspect? involved, provided a hint of who was gal takes. The Soviets explained the It is extremely diffi cult to believe responsible based upon the return of early arrivals and late departures of the that, during the three decades in which two Discovery tags that had been fi red fl eets from the region by claiming that the U.S.S.R. was illegally plundering into humpback whales but which were they were making stops in the tropics whale populations, no one realized or reported to the IWC as having been in order to train harpooners.20 suspected that these catches were tak- recovered in a sperm whale and a fi n While many seemed to be suspicious ing place. In reality there were a num- whale. These tags had been reported of the way that Soviet whaling had op- ber of hints regarding the truth of the (probably as an oversight) by Soviet erated, others had a different view. In situation, and many indirect accusa- whaling fl eets. However, no further a paper on North Pacifi c humpback tions regarding the Soviet whaling discussion or investigation followed. whales, the Japanese scientist Masa- industry ignoring the regulations on Sidney Holt, a member of the Com- haru Nishiwaki (1959:76) noted (with whaling; however, these suspicions mittee of Three, spoke with Soviet fl eet naïve optimism): never resulted in any effective action, captain Alexey Solyanik at one of the and while there was much discussion IWC meetings in the early 1960’s.13 In “Although there is an opinion that and criticism behind the scenes, objec- that conversation, Solyanik confi ded it is much better to catch as many tions were never formally raised at the to Holt that the Committee of Three whales as possible than to leave IWC. “should not waste too much time” at- them to the unregulated opera- Dorsey (2013) claims that there was tempting to fi gure out the Soviet data. tion by U.S.S.R. whaling industry, frequent discussion of Soviet “cheat- The Committee early on saw that the author believes that U.S.S.R. ing” in the early 1950’s, and states that the Soviet whaling data had strange would not deplete the whale stock the prominent British whaler H.K. Sal- characteristics, such as that the Catch on which her industry depended.” vesen attempted (unsuccessfully) to Per Unit of Effort (CPUE) data for the persuade others to protest this behavior U.S.S.R. were clearly wrong, as was Nishiwaki did not explain where this by boycotting the 1954 IWC meeting, the distribution of length measure- opinion originated, but it is apparent which was hosted by Moscow. These ments. Simply put, all other nations from this that suspicions about Soviet suspicions were prompted primar- showed a consistent decline in CPUE whaling already existed in the 1950’s. ily by observations of Soviet whalers as well as in average length, but the In 1960, a series of meetings was killing animals out of season (Dorsey, Soviet data were, in the words of Holt, held in Norway in which whaling 2013). Nonetheless, given that Soviet “all over the place.”19 Data from oth- companies and authorities discussed under-reporting was at that time rather er countries also had inconsistencies different conditions under which they minimal (far below the large Antarctic but the deviations could be explained, might rejoin the Convention (Tønnes- catches which began later in that de- so the Committee of Three simply ig- sen and Johnsen, 1982:601). One of cade), this may have in part refl ected a nored most of the Soviet catch and ef- the main topics at these meetings was general (perhaps even ideological) dis- fort data while analyzing the rest of the Soviet whaling: trust of the U.S.S.R. catches.13Holt18 also describes that: Dramatic signs that something un- “The serious charge was directed toward was happening were seen in “there were many comments made against the Russians that, when the early 1960’s when populations of both at the IWC Committee and they voted against all proposals for humpback whales off eastern Austra- in the corridors about the Soviet extending catching and the catch- lia and Oceania collapsed in just a few factories whaling where and when ing period, and against a suspen- years, forcing a closure of land whal- they should not have been: after sion of the maximum limit, ‘the ing stations in eastern Australia and the close of the season, before its reason must be that the Russians New Zealand (Clapham et al., 2009). opening, in temperate waters... do not adhere to the Convention During its 1963 meeting the Commis- Few of these observations got into and that this is merely regarded by sion “took note” of a very sharp in- fi nal reports, but some of them the Russians as imposing restric- crease in humpback whale mortality in are in the unpublished reports tions on their competitors’.” Groups IV and V (those feeding in the of the Technical and Infraction Antarctic south of Australia); the only Committees.” However, none of these charges were plausible explanation was that large voiced at the IWC meetings out of fear illegal catches were being made. The Apparently no one at the time that the Soviet Union would withdraw data for this came from the fi nal re- guessed the extent of the illegal catch- from any agreements, and that no ac- port of the Committee of Three (IWC, 1964b). 19Holt, Sidney, personal commun., Mar. 2013. 20Holt, Sidney, personal commun., May 2012.

16 Marine Fisheries Review cord could be reached if Norway was “The Committee have on several whales (Kasuya, 1999; Kasuya and to accuse them of blatant violations of occasions called the Commission’s Brownell, 1999, 2001; Kondo and Ka- the Convention (Tønnessen and John- attention to the regrettable fact suya, 2002). It is signifi cant that the sen, 1982; Dorsey, 2013). that size frequencies as reported latter included Bryde’s whales taken Another, and probably more sig- to the BIWS, often seem unnatu- even after the introduction in 1986 of nifi cant, problem was that there was ral, because very many whales the IWC’s moratorium on commercial no system within the ICRW to allow are reported at or just above the whaling. for reporting of violations of others; minimum lengths in force. This The way this was accomplished is the only mechanism concerned self- has been the case especially for described by Watase (1995, not seen, reporting of infractions. There was sperm whales in various parts of cited by Watanabe, 2009): during a considerable resistance from whaling the world... Until such effective working day a catcher would kill a countries to anything that would allow management is attained it is very number of whales but would deliver inclusion of others’ observations of important that minimum lengths only the largest animals to the facto- infractions.19 Overall, it appears that should be retained and enforced. ry ship; each catcher had “individual others held strong suspicions that the Unfortunately, it is all too clear quotas”23 and more bonus money was U.S.S.R. was violating whaling regula- that they are not being enforced.” paid for large whales than small ones. tions, but with little sense of the scale The result was that Japan was greatly on which illegal catches were being The problem of violating the mini- under-reporting baleen whale catches made. mum size limit continued (IWC, (with blue and fi n whales being the 1967:19): main species), leading to signifi cant Was the U.S.S.R. Alone? under-estimates in the BIWS statis- The fi rst scandal regarding illegal “while the minimum size lim- tics. Watanabe (2009) estimates that whaling began with Aristotle Onassis’ it—38 feet—should be enough to the number of under-reported animals whaling factory ship Olympic Chal- save the great majority of females, amounted to several hundred per fl eet, lenger and its fl eet, which operated massive evidence was available to and therefore potentially thousands for outside the IWC. The Japanese delega- the Commission to show that this the Japanese industry as a whole. tion presented documents proving the regulation was being broken on a It is worth noting that during the illegal catches by this fl eet, which in- large scale.” 1960’s–70’s Japan was involved in a cluded catches of whales in prohibited number of joint whaling operations times and places (IWC, 1956b).21 After the truth regarding the Soviet with non-IWC countries, from which A few years later this discussion illegal catches was revealed, Yablokov all the meat and whale oil would go to was renewed in Norway, mainly with informed Sidney Holt that: Japan. This appears to have been a way regard to Soviet fl eets. However, suspi- of conducting whaling without the re- cions were also voiced by Norwegian “Unoffi cial communications from strictions of the Convention (Tønnes- whalers regarding similar actions by Japanese colleagues showed that sen and Johnsen, 1982). the Japanese, at least concerning vio- the Japanese whaling fl eets were To date, no evidence has come to lations of minimum length restrictions also involved in a large-scale falsi- light of other illegal catches by Japa- in catches of certain species. Certainly, fi cations similar to those described nese pelagic whaling fl eets, although this would at least partly explain the ‘regarding the USSR’, and the of- given that whaling in Japan continues strong resistance on the part of Japan fi cials in the USSR were also to be controlled by the government to implementation of the IOS (Tønnes- aware of this” (Holt18). within a society that is traditionally not sen and Johnsen, 1982). open (Hirata, 2005; as indeed was the At the 1964 IWC meeting, the Sci- Similar opinions regarding Japa- case, to a much greater extent, with the entifi c Committee highlighted the like- nese violations were expressed by former U.S.S.R.), signifi cant political lihood that whalers were misreporting other Soviet scientists that worked and cultural changes may be needed length data, specifi cally by adding on the Soviet whaling fl eets (Mikha- before this can be investigated further. a few feet to the reported lengths of lev22). Beginning in 1999, a prominent The extent to which the pelagic fl eets animals below the minimum size lim- Japanese scientist and former whaling of Japan (or others) were engaged in it to make them look “legal” (IWC, station manager published papers de- illegal catches or data falsifi cation is 1965c:28–29): scribing routine falsifi cations of length unclear. However, the revelations of and sex data in sperm whale catches at Kondo and Kasuya (2002), together Japanese land stations, together with with the extensive violations of the 21Technically, this was “pirate whaling” rather than “illegal whaling,” because the Olympic falsifi ed data on catches of Bryde’s Challenger, which operated between 1950 and 23Such “individual quotas” were set because, in 1956, was registered in Panama and operated the early years after the World War II, the pro- by the Olympic Whaling Company of Uruguay, 22Mikhalev, retired, interview in Odessa, Oct. cessing capacity of Japanese factory ships was which was not a member of the IWC. 2008. limited, as were catch limits after 1964.

76(1–2) 17 U.S.S.R., provide abundant evidence termed “ecosystem overfi shing” (Teg- depletion, overfi shing is widespread that, if a whaling nation wished to ner and Dayton, 1999); such effects on (Clark, 2009). break the rules, there was little within ecosystems of the removal of predato- These, and other, examples demon- the framework and procedures of the ry fi sh has been well documented else- strate that commercial fi sheries share IWC to stop them from doing so. where (e.g., Pauly et al., 1998). many common management problems A fi nal point is that the development Also in the North Atlantic, stocks with whaling, including under-re- and expansion of Soviet whaling, in- of bluefi n tuna, Thunnus thynnus, porting, uncertainty regarding assess- cluding the campaign to make large- have greatly declined from overfi sh- ments, failure to heed evidence of scale illegal catches, was overseen and ing, a situation that Safi na and Klinger declines, and lack of enforcement of promoted by a relatively small group (2008) attribute to “the scientifi c part rules and quotas leading to often ex- of people, with Fisheries Minister of the [management] process [being] tensive illegal catches. Alexander Ishkov being the princi- corrupted by short-term economics As with many fi sheries, the failure pal driver of the industry’s actions. A and political lobbying.” Scientists had to adequately regulate whaling was somewhat similar situation occurs to- sounded the alarm on Atlantic tunas as especially likely, given the fact that day in Japan: it is primarily because of early as 1981, when the International heavy capital investment in the in- the activities and advocacy of a limited Commission for the Conservation of dustry at its outset, when whales were number of people within the Japanese Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)’s Standing abundant, provided a powerful incen- government that this highly subsidized Committee on Research and Statistics tive for the perpetuation of denial industry continues to exist (Clapham recommended that catches from the when stocks went into decline. While et al., 2007; Morikawa, 2009). western Atlantic stock “should be re- the U.S.S.R.’s three-decade campaign duced to as near zero as feasible” (IC- Conclusions: Lessons for Today of illegal whaling was one of the most CAT, 1981). dramatic failures of the Convention, “Fisheries management is inter- Although North Atlantic tuna quotas this simply compounded other major minable debate about the condi- were initially reduced by ICCAT, there problems with the IWC’s efforts to tion of fi sh stocks until all doubt is followed inevitable pressure from in- manage whale populations. removed. And so are all the fi sh.” dustry, and from scientists hired by in- The ease with which countries could (John Gulland) dustry to refute the more conservative delay or block progressive manage- assessments (e.g. Hester, 1983). As a ment measures; the consistency with John Gulland’s famously sardonic result, fi shing quotas once again in- which scientifi c uncertainty was used summary of the failures of commer- creased despite abundant evidence of to justify excessive catch limits (with cial fi shery management could be as severe depletion (ICCAT, 1982), and easily applied to whaling. Certainly, lack of enforcement compounded the the benefi t of the doubt invariably the ICRW represents a textbook case problem through illegal fi shing. given to the industry rather than the of how a nominally well-intentioned, Southern bluefi n tuna, Thunnus mac- whales); the ability to object to and convention-based system began with coyii, which like other tuna are a high- thus not be bound by any decision; all major fl aws that, given human nature, ly lucrative commercial species, have these problems ensured that even “le- essentially guaranteed failure. been similarly over-fi shed (Miyaki et gal” whaling proceeded without due There are obvious parallels between al., 2004). The issue of inadequacy of regard to the true status of the resource whaling and the collapse, through monitoring was again highlighted in on which the long-term future of the mismanagement, of major commer- 2006 when Japan was shown to have industry depended. cial fi sheries. A few prominent exam- illegally taken or imported bluefi n for As is apparent from the above, ples will suffi ce to illustrate the point, at least 20 years (Darby, 2006). whaling under the ICRW has been and various case studies are reviewed Finally, there is the example of characterized by a wide and frequent by Myers and Worm (2003), among deepwater fi sh such as orange roughy, range of infractions. These included others. Hoplostethus atlanticus, and Pata- frequently “adjusting” the lengths of The fi shery for Atlantic cod, Gadus gonian toothfi sh, Dissostichus elegi- some whales to comply with minimum morhua, off eastern Canada repre- noides. Beginning in the 1960’s, size regulations, systematic falsifi ca- sents one of the most dramatic stock advancing technology permitted access tions in the Japanese coastal fi shery collapses in history, with biomass de- to the habitats of these species (includ- and in pelagic blue whale catches, and clining by two orders of magnitude ing seamounts), a development that co- the huge illegal catches of the U.S.S.R. over the period 1962–92 because of incided with the depletion of coastal Despite strong suspicions by some that overfi shing (Hutchings, 1996; Myers fi sheries (Roberts, 2002). Despite ma- the U.S.S.R. was engaged in illegal et al., 1997). Indeed, the collapse of jor uncertainty regarding stock size, catches, IWC members chose never to the stock precipitated a trophic cas- and indications that the life history of tackle this issue head-on (and had no cade (Frank et al., 2005), and serves some species (such as orange roughy) appropriate procedure to do so), and as a prime example of what has been make them particularly vulnerable to thus they ignored it.

18 Marine Fisheries Review Yet today, as some nations discuss duplicity by Japan and others in independent, transparent system of the lifting of the Moratorium and a catch reporting (and their dra- inspection and enforcement, and this possible return to IWC-sanctioned matic parallels in illegal fi shing), must occur at every stage from catch commercial whaling, the nature of it is not surprising that the ‘anti- to market. If it is not, then lessons whaling inspections and oversight re- whaling nations’ view such recal- from the U.S.S.R.’s illegal whaling—a mains essentially where it was 40 citrance with suspicion.” global campaign that secretly and il- years ago. Flaws in the observer sys- legally killed almost 180,000 whales, tem that allowed both the U.S.S.R. and The refusal to allow independent and pushed some stocks to the brink of Japan to operate illegally and falsify sampling of whale products sold in extinction—will not have been learned catch data on various scales have still domestic markets could reasonably be at all. not been addressed in the years fol- viewed as evidence that the whaling lowing the revelations of these major nations know full well that their in- Acknowledgments violations of IWC rules. spection scheme is fl awed, since in an We are most grateful to Bob In addition, there is presently still honest, truly transparent whaling in- Brownell, Dmitry Tormosov, Aleksey no provision for effectively enforcing dustry, the only products that would be Yablokov, Nikolay Doroshenko, and whaling regulations or punishing vio- available for sale would be those from the late Vyacheslav Zemskiy for their lations, other than within and by the whales taken under agreed catch limits considerable assistance over the years whaling nations concerned. Nonethe- (whether set by the IWC, or by a par- in clarifying details of Soviet whaling. less, the whalers today continue to in- ticular nation under either Article VIII We also thank Cherry Allison at IWC sist that their proposals for inspection or the Convention’s objection clause). for assistance and discussions regard- and enforcement are adequate. The Yet in recent years genetic-based mar- ing the IWC database. Alex Zerbini, problems with this were summarized ket surveys in Japan and Korea have Peter Harrison, and Bob Brownell by Clapham et al. (2007) in a response consistently found species taken il- provided valuable comments on the to a pro-whaling article published by legally or other inappropriate prod- manuscript. While Sidney Holt did not Morishita (2006): ucts for sale (Baker et al., 2000, 2007; always agree with some of the opin- Clapham et al., 2007). ions expressed here, his input regard- “Morishita tells us that existing in- Put simply, the principal lesson ing the history of the IWC and other ternational and domestic oversight from all this seems to be that, giv- procedures ‘are adequate to en- matters was invaluable. This work was en the opportunity to deceive, and in funded by the International Fund for sure sustainable whaling’ and that the absence of a genuinely effective the Revised Management Scheme Animal Welfare, the Marine Conser- 24 monitoring system, cheating will in- vation Institute, the North Pacifi c Re- (RMS) ‘has not been agreed by deed occur to a greater or lesser ex- the IWC because of delaying tac- search Board, and NOAA’s National tent—whether it be in whaling or any tics of anti-whaling governments.’ Marine Fisheries Service. This study is other industry based on exploitation of Yet one of the biggest delays in part of the Memoirs of Soviet Catches a common resource. We are certainly implementation of the RMS has of Whales (MOSCOW) project: www. not the fi rst to make this point; numer- arisen from the refusal of Japan moscowproject.org. ous scholarly articles have discussed and other whaling nations to ac- the consequences of absent enforce- Literature Cited cept true transparency in the mon- itoring of whaling. ment, but the heart of the issue was Allison, C. 2011. International Whaling Com- rather more succinctly summarized mittee summary database, version 5.2. Avail. Both Norway and Japan have from the International Whaling Commission, established DNA databases to ar- by a French tuna boat captain named Cambridge, U.K. chive reference material from le- Roger Del Ponte after he was arrested Anonymous. 1962. Promisloviy otchet kito- for illegal fi shing of Atlantic tuna: boynoy fl otilii Sovetskaya Rossiya za prom- gally killed whales as a check on isel 1961–62 goda. [Whaling production the origin of products found in the report of the whaling fl eet Sovetskaya Rossi- “Everyone cheated. There were ya for the 1961–62 season.] Upravlenie proiz- market. However, both countries vodstvennikh fl otiliy >Dal’moreprodukt’, refuse to allow independent over- rules but we didn’t follow them. Vladivostok, 198 p. [In Russ.]. sight or third-party monitoring It’s like driving down the road. If I ______. 1965. Otchet po dobiche i realizat- know there are no police, I’m go- sii productsii kitoboynoy fl otilii Dalniy Vostok of such databases and sampling 25 za promisel 1965 goda. [Report on catches schemes, and both take the posi- ing to speed.” and products realization from the whaling tion that market oversight lies out- fl eet Dalniy Vostok in 1965.] Upravlenie kito- If the IWC’s current moratorium on boynikh fl otiliy, Vladivostok, 33 p. [In Russ.]. side the jurisdiction of the IWC. ______. 1966. Promisloviy otchet kitoboynoy Given the quite recent history of commercial whaling is ever to be lift- fl otilii Sovetskaya Rossiya za promisel 1965– ed, it must be accompanied by a truly 1966 goda. [Whaling production report of 24The RMS includes the set of controls and in- the whaling fl eet Sovetskaya Rossiya for the spection procedures to be put in place should 25See http://www.icij.org/project/lootingseasi/ 1965–1966 season.] Upravlenie kitoboynikh commercial whaling recommence. overviewblackmarketbluefi n. fl otiliy, Vladivostok, 327 p. [In Russ.].

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