Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Volume 2 Issue 2 2013 Why International Catch Shares Won't Save Ocean Biodiversity Holly Doremus University of California, Berkeley Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal Part of the Environmental Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons Recommended Citation Holly Doremus, Why International Catch Shares Won't Save Ocean Biodiversity, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 385 (2013). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol2/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013 4:24 PM WHY INTERNATIONAL CATCH SHARES WON’T SAVE OCEAN BIODIVERSITY Holly Doremus* Skepticism about the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory approaches has produced a wave of enthusiasm for market-based strategies for dealing with environmental conflicts. In the fisheries context, the most prominent of these strategies is the use of “catch shares,” which assign specific proportions of the total allowable catch to individuals who are then free to trade them with others. Catch shares are now in wide use domestically within many nations, and there are increasing calls for implementation of internationally tradable catch shares. Based on a review of theory, empirical evidence, and two contexts in which catch shares have been proposed, this Article explains why international catch shares are not likely to arrest the decline of ocean biodiversity.