Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.10

A.10 – 2010 – Earthquake Keywords: Returns, Unplanned camps, Planned and managed camps, Urban neighbourhoods, T- Overview: shelter, Rental support, Housing repair and retrofitting, Cash / vouchers, Mass communications.

Summary In October 2010, ten months after the Haitian earthquake, a humanitarian organisation began a project to close a small camp of around 200 families. Families were given rental support cash grants to cover the costs of renting accommodation for one year and to support the transition from camps to their new accommodation. The project succeeded in its aims and became a test case for a much wider programme of rental support. Promoted by a small number of organisations, the rental support approach relied on donors’ willingness to take a risk on a project-type with few precedents. By mid 2011, rental support cash grants had become a key part of the return strategy and by November 2012 over 23,000 households had received grants. Early indications are that rental support cash grants have been successful. A survey of households that have completed their year of rental subsidy found that all of the respondents (90% of the total caseload) had been able to organise their own housing for the foreseeable future. None had returned to camps or moved to informal settlements.

Le Marron Inconnu (the unknown slave)statue surrounded The statue in April 2012 after the camp by shelters in the Champ de Mars camp in early 2012. closure. Photo: IOM Photo: IOM Background • Permanent housing plots in the managed camps were The Haiti earthquake of January reconstruction: Rebuilding taken by others moving in from 2010 caused massive loss of life and irreperably damaged houses. spontaneous settlements. damaged or destroyed 180,000 The lack of buildable space in Camps were not only bad for houses. (See Section A.4 Shelter densely-populated urban areas the displaced people but they also Projects 2010 for more background and complex issues over land rights prevented occupied public spaces on the Haiti response) meant that the three main responses from being rehabilitated. Responses generally took one of would only benefit those with land rights or those who owned houses. In this context some Haitian three forms following the distribu- officials began suggesting that tion of non-food items in the initial Those displaced in camps over- displaced people should be paid emergency phase: whelmingly did not own either land to leave camps. These proposals • T-shelters: This was the main or housing before the earthquake. were dropped due to protection response by many organisations. Consequently, only a quarter of T- concerns as it would be impossible Transitional shelters (T-shelters) shelters built went to Haitians who to verify if the families had found a were built using basic frames were living in camps. Not only did durable solution. However, interest which could later be adapted this mean that camp populations in properly planned rental support into more permanent structures. were being reduced at a slow rate cash grants grew and presentations • Yellow House repair: Buildings but it proved almost impossible to were made to donors to encourage were assessed by engineers close camps completely. If only a adopting the approach. and classified as Green (safe), small proportion of a camp had a Yellow (to be repaired) or Red durable solution available for them (to be demolished). it wasn’t long before the empty

www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 31 A.10  Natural Disaster

An edition of Chimen Lakay, a graphic newspaper, featuring the 16/6 program and a newly cleared market place. Designed by: Chevelin Pierre, Script: Mike Charles. Neighbourhood approach ing neighbourhood businesses to • Protection and assistance: Rental support was closely start-up or expand in order to offer Identification of vulnerable combined with the neighbourhood those returning real income genera- families who qualify for approach to reconstruction. tion opportunities. The grants were additional help available to anyone with a business • Beneficiary communication: The concept of the neighbour- idea and not restricted to those Facilitation of informed choices hood approach is that projects returning from camps. by beneficiaries using wide such as rubble clearance, rebuild- range of multi-media and face- ing, water, sanitation and liveli- The 16/6 programme relied to-face communications hoods programming should be heavily on the use of rental support • Choosing a housing option: joined together across sectors and cash grants to offer all families living Either T-Shelter, Yellow-house that agencies create a coordinated in camps a realistic housing option. repair or rental support cash and efficient response support- grant ing families to move from camp to Rental support • Choosing a rental property: community. As of December 2012, Rental support projects differed Family chooses a property this goal had not been fully realized, between agencies but largely (independently assessed for but efforts were being made to take followed the same pattern: safety) and negotiates the rent a more holistic approach. • Registration: Emphasis on • Cash grant transferred: The This approach minimises the obtaining accurate beneficiary year’s rental cost of US$ 500 possibility of families “rebound- lists through other health is transferred directly to the ing” back into camps. For example, or distribution activities, in landlord and the family receives “rebounding” could be caused by collaboration with Haitian the money left over a lack of employment opportuni- authorities ties or extremely poor sanitation standards in the neighbourhoods to which people return. The 16/6 program The 16/6 program, led by the Haitian government, targeted income regeneration in sixteen neighbourhoods coupled with the closure of six camps. The programme focus on neighbourhoods meant that liveli- hoods grants were not allocated to families leaving the camps. Instead, a targeted livelihoods program was Graph to show completed and planned housing solutions, November 2012 implemented, aimed at support- Source : E-Shelter and CCCM Cluster

32 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.10

• Camp closure: Families are given a US$ 25 cash grant to help in transporting their possessions to their new home • Surprise visit: Agency awards a US$ 125 bonus to families continuing to live in their chosen rental accommodation following a surprise visit made a few months later. In addition to the US$ 650 grant costs, the relocation of one household incurred an additional US$ 350 in programming costs, making a total cost of the return of one household rise to around US$ 1,000. Programming costs include beneficiary registration, commu- The ruined National Palace surrounded by shelters nication of activities and protec- before the Champ de Mars camp closure. tion activities such as providing Photo: IOM two-years rental for vulnerable families. In comparison, a T-shelter costs around US$ 2,000 and a permanent house around US$ 6,000. Concerns and safeguards There have been vigorous dis- cussions around the appropriate- ness of a rental support approach as a durable solution. Some of the key concerns and corresponding safeguards were:

• Cash distributions can act The ruined National Palace after the Champ de Mars camp closure. as a pull-factor to camps: Photo: IOM Announcements about rental • A survey of households who support programs were made Lessons rented for one year achieved a publicly only after accurate • Rental support could have been 90 per cent response rate. Out of beneficiary lists were made. implemented earlier if it had those households responding, Negligible pull-factors were been considered or picked up by all had found their own housing noted. other donors. solutions and none had been • Rental properties may not • Better links to livelihoods forced to return to camps or meet minimum standards: All programmes could be made informal settlements. rental properties were assessed to further support families to • Nearly 100 per cent of for safety and sanitation issues. continue to cover rental costs respondents reported that The emphasis was therefore on themselves in the future. their situation is better or much moving people out of the much • The neighbourhood approach better than it was in camps. worse conditions in camps. offers more chances for better • 77 per cent of landlords used • Cash grants would inflate coordination between sectors two-thirds of the rent money rents: Rents were monitored by and organisaitons as well to improve the standards of organisations using the prices as between emergency and the properties that they were agreed between families and development actors. renting out. landlords. Rents had not risen • The approach has been popular by the end of 2012. with the general public, particularly as it emphasises Indicators beneficiaries’ rights to actively The rental support approach choose where to live. Haitian shows the following early indicators politicians have been keen to of success: promote and be involved in rental support programs.

www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 33 A.11  Natural Disaster

A.11 Haiti – 2010 – Earthquake Keywords: Returns, Unplanned camps, Urban neighbourhoods, T-shelter, Rental support, Housing Case Study: repair, Cash, Training.

Country: Project timeline Haiti Project location: Port au Prince Disaster/ conflict: 33 months – –– Project completion Earthquake Disaster/ conflict date: January 2010 Total number of houses damaged or destroyed: 180,000 Project target population: 1,208 families relocated from 5 IDP camps 10,518 T-shelters built with services and support 22 months – –– Project start Occupancy rate on handover: 21 months – –– Project agreed 95 per cent Project cost per household: Approximately US$ 990 / family T- shelter programme costs Haiti were higher

Port au Prince January 2010 – –– Earthquake

Project description The project offered several service packages, including rental assistance, transitional shelter construction and repairs to damaged homes, to incentivise families to leave camps and find suitable housing solutions. Central to this project were life skills training, household livelihood planning, temporary health insurance and psychosocial services. Over one year, the project closed all five camps that were targeted and helped more than 1,200 families resettle.

Strengths and weaknesses service to families. 99 The organisation fully achieved its target of closing 88 Early beneficiaries could have been better prepared five camps. for the risks of receiving cash. 99 Life-skills training was delivered in time to prepare 88 Staff safety was a serious concern due to the families for their resettlement. challenging sites chosen (site selection based on level 99 Effective mechanisms to prevent fraud and to of need rather than ease of implementation). minimise inflation of rent prices. 88 With a large part of camp residents making a living 99 Participants were given a choice in their resettlement from small commerce, there was an opportunity to option. work with IDPs before they relocated to improve their 99 Good mechanisms for preventing programme abuse small commerce activities. This component was not and to reduce the chance of housing price inflation. added until the second phase of the project. 99 Use of mechanisms such as a hotline improved the -- The rental subsidy lasted one year which gave the organisations accountability. family time to save and plan for their future and recover 99 Strong support from local government. from living in a camp for two years. 88 Some landlords canceled contracts due to the -- Despite early sceptisicm from many humanitarian organisation making late payments. staff, rental subsidy programmes did not noticably lead 88 Personnel costs were comparatively high due to the to rental price inflation. large number of staff required to provide a personal

34 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.11

The project offered various options, including cash for rent, and provided additional support to help close camps. Photo: Jack Reybold (CRS) Background given photo ID cards to prevent Most families moved to houses (See the overview section A.10, further disputes. in neighbourhoods near the camps, Haiti – 2010.) while others moved to areas with Coordination more open spaces such as Carrefour The organisation created the In line with government and Croix des Bouquets. Ann Ale Lakay project (meaning strategy, the project offered a “Let’s go home” in ) standardized package of resettle- The rental subsidy was worth in September 2011. The project ment options. The goal was for all US$ 500 and if the family could aimed to support families remaining agencies engaging in camp closure negotiate a lower price with a in camps to leave those camps. The projects to operate using a standard landlord they were able to “keep project was a response to the fact approach, as this prevented families the change”. For example, if they that pull factors alone (the setting from refusing the services of one or- find a place for US$ 400, they could up of services in return neighbour- ganisation in the hope of receiving keep US$ 100. This helped prevent hoods) were not sufficient to get a better deal from another. rent price inflation as project partic- families to relocate. ipants had an incentive to negotiate the best deal possible The project began as a 6-month, “With the conflict resolution US$ 600,000 pilot project to close [training], I can find Although the housing market three camps (460 families). It was solutions to all my other in Haiti had not even begun to extended for six more months to recover, it was flexible enough to problems” close an additional two camps. absorb more people capable of paying rent. The project was aligned with Project beneficiary the Haitian government’s “16/6” Around 60 per cent of the programme. This programme aimed people receiving rental subsidies at closing six camps and rehabilitat- Implementation found accommodation for less that ing sixteen return neighbourhoods. The project offered households US$ 500. The median rental price three choices: one year’s rental was US$ 375. In informal inter- Selection subsidy, construction of a transi- views, the majority of beneficiaries The five camps were chosen in tional shelter or support to repair a reported using the remaining funds coordination with other actors and damaged house. from the rental subsidy to support had been identified as priority sites their activities in small commerce, for closure. Some camp dwellers Of the 1,205 families supported, 98 per cent chose to take the such as purchasing a small quantity were “renting” tents from those of goods for resale. who have moved out of the camp. one-year rental subsidy and 2 per The organisation ensured that cent chose to receive a t-shelter. There was a risk that people these families, rather than the tent As few of the families living would be harassed and pressured “owners”, received project services in the camps had owned a house to give the money to groups such as by conducting a “surprise census” before the earthquake, there the police and the camp committee. to ensure that the genuine residents were no housing repair services As a result the money was trans- were registered. Beneficiaries were requested. ferred directly to the landlord

www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 35 A.11  Natural Disaster

Life skills trainings were a an essential component of the Camps were slowly turning into permanent shanty towns and project, preparing residents for life outside the camps. many had poor sanitary conditions. Photos: Nathan Jayne Photos: Nathan Jayne via a money transfer service. The organisation’s Code of Conduct contracts greater legal weight remainder was transferred to the • field teams based within the in favour of the family. The aim head of the household via a mobile camps was that this would help to phone base transfer system. • an official, organisation-wide prevent evictions and reinforce accountability framework. the government's leadership in Some tent “owners” pressured this project. the “renters” to share the leftover Protection money from the rental. In later Protection issues were dealt Trainings phases of the project, it was with in different ways: Cash transfers were accompa- suggested that everyone should nied by a life-skills training module. • Training included a family keep information to themselves According to participant interviews communication and conflict- on whether or not they received and focus groups, this training was management module, which leftover money. It was suggested crucial to the success of the project. focused on positive ways to solve that renters immediately moved out problems (including disciplining These six-module trainings of the camp, and that they should children) without resorting to prepared camp residents with life not share their address with the physical punishment. skills they would need for a suc- tent “owner”. • Social workers checked the cessful transition. To help people The project team had 19 people: safety and adequacy of all develop a sense of responsibility for an international programme houses before families moved their future, families developed a manager, a project manager, two in. The families who chose to “family plan”, a personal road map project officers, a monitoring and receive rental support were for resettlement and recovery. The evaluation officer, two psycholo- not allowed to choose houses plan not only helped families think gists and twelve social workers. marked as damaged, nor homes about their goals for the future but located in or along a ravine. also helped them plan for potential Accountability • The municipality signed all setbacks. The organisation took some rental agreements to give the specific steps to provide accounta- bility to service recipients, including setting up: • notice boards in all communities Summary of Training modules with information about the Module Details organisation and the project Family communication Interpersonal skill development and conflict • a free telephone hotline to deal resolution with any questions Personal responsibility and problem solving Role within the country of Haiti, larger community, neighborhood and family • regular community meetings – Prioritising needs, planning for the future Helps families to identify needs and create a for information dissemination family plan. and feedback to the organisation Financial planning Banks, savings, lending options, health and • contracts with Beneficiaries, other insurance, negotiation outlining mutual responsibilities Small business management Key concepts to improve the profitability of a • posters and trainings for small business all project staff on the

36 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.12

A.12 Haiti – 2010 – Earthquake Keywords: Dispersed, Construction materials, Housing repair and retrofitting, Training, Guidelines and Case Study: training materials .

Country: Project timeline Haiti 31 months – –– Phase 2 starts Project location: Rural south-eastern Haiti Disaster: 29 months – –– Completion of 300 Earthquake houses Disaster date: 12th January 2010 22 months – –– Phase 1: 28 houses Number of houses damaged / repaired destroyed: 180,000 17 months – –– Repair project starts Project outputs: 500 completed houses Occupancy rate on handover: More than 90 per cent Shelter size: 22 m2 reconstructed houses –– Starting of the re- 22 - 42 m2 repaired houses construction project 7 months – –– First prototype for Materials cost per household: repair US$ 3,190 (Including US$ 740 local contribution) Haiti 5 months – –– Feasibility study, US$ 1,000 (including US$ 300 local assessment 4 months – –– First prototype for local contribution) for repairs Petit reconstruction Project cost per household: Goave US$ 4,000 reconstruction 1 month – –– Partners request US4 2,000 for repairs support –– Pilot phase started 12 January 2010 – –– Disaster date

Project description This project worked in rural areas of Haiti beginning with an in-depth assessment of local building practices. Builders were then trained in improvements to existing construction. This was followed by building assessment and repair construction programme resulting in the construction of 500 houses to date. The overall project goal was to improve local communities’ resilience to hazards and to improve living conditions through housing improvements and construction-based economic stimulus.

Strengths and weaknesses housholds which were not provided with construction 99 The project was designed to be replicable by Haitians support. without external support. 88 There is a low visibility of improvements as they are 99 A detailed assessment of cultural practices meant difficult to identify by a non-professional. that social structures were enhanced instead of ignored 88 It was difficult to persuade local partner by the project. organisations to repair more houses as they considered 99 Good ownership by local stakeholders. repaired houses to be less safe than new houses. 99 The project strengthened the capacities of existing 88 Technical, management and administrative local organisations and created jobs linked to local capacities of partner organisations were not properly market. assessed. 99 Construction skills training enhanced livelihoods -- This project is ongoing and has received some opportunities and has improved the general safety of interest from other organisations following positive construction. impacts on other projects and national strategies. 88 Detailed assessment of local capacities meant that -- The Ministry of Public Work, Transport and the construction phase started relatively late. Communications gave its agreement for the use of the 88 Slow to demonstrate impacts. There was no designs and technical recommendations for housing significant impact in the first years of the project on reconstruction in Haiti.

www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 37 A.12  Natural Disaster

The project approach was adopted by other organisations. Left: shelter built by the project, Right: An adaptation by another organisation in an urban area of Port au Prince. Photo: Left: PADED / MISEREOR Right: CRAterre. Before the earthquake Lists of affected people were Approach (See the overview section A.10, drawn up by the local organisations Affected people were involved Haiti – 2010) immediately after the earthquake. as much as possible, and five A community meeting at the start partner organisations implemented In many of the rural communi- of the project was attended by 200 the project. ties in south-eastern Haiti incomes people from all the project areas, are low and there is no access to The following steps were and the following selection criteria power or running water. The public followed: were decided upon: infrastructure that existed was in a • Local organisations defined and poor state of repair. Compulsory: managed the reconstruction Most people in the region • The house of the beneficiary was projects. owned their own houses, grouped damaged by the earthquake. • Specific designs and technical or dispersed over a large territory. • The beneficiary is the owner of solutions were developed Many houses were in a poor the house plot. depending upon the context. condition, and homeowners • The beneficiary agrees to the • An external expert was often lacked the knowledge and rules of the project. embedded in each local resources to maintain them. Regular Preferred: organisation for one month to damage was caused by cyclones. build up their training capacity. • The household hosts displaced • Building models were monitored After the earthquake families. and evaluated. If necessary, In south-eastern Haiti, more • The household head is female. changes and adaptations were than 50 per cent of rural houses • The household head is a widow. made. were partially damaged by the • The household includes many earthquake. However, very few children and the adults have Implementation people were injured or killed by limited income-generating Households were put into building collapse As the affects of opportunities. groups of 5 or 6 households. These the earthquake were relatively less • Households are committed groups had to work together to severe in rural areas compared to members of the local repair their houses. urban areas, there was a migration organisation (this was a Existing administrative staff to rural areas immediately after the condition of the partner from partner organisations worked earthquake. organisations). on the project. A social mobiliser • The beneficiary is regarded Selection of beneficiaries was hired to assess up to 50 house- as having a good behavioural holds. Two engineers were hired Project areas were selected record. per partner organisation. according to level of damage and Land issues were resolved by the whether partner organisations had local partner organisation. a presence before the earthquake.

House owners bore part of the responsibility for monitoring on-site construction. Photo: PADED / MISEREOR

38 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.12

There were two monitoring and evaluation missions each year, and the project was managed by a full time foreign expert based in Haiti. During the house repairs, the inhabitants were given a guided tour of a damaged house to point out defects and reasons for failure. With this new knowledge, people were able to take on part of the responsibility for the quality of con- struction and repairs to their own houses. The project included repairs and had a strong social mobilisation component. A registration card was Photo: PAPDA/ VEDEK / Secours Catholique. completed for each household. To resist high winds, houses Logistics This included: identification were built with a low profile, and Each partner organisation details; reason for their selection; households were encouraged to procured construction materials ownership of the land; access to grow high vegetation surrounding from local suppliers, though these water; proposed repairs; beneficiary the house to reduce potential suppliers imported part of their contributions to the shelter and impacts of cyclones. materials. construction completion dates. An agreement was then signed with Houses were built with four In some cases the partner or- the householder. roof slopes to prevent there being ganisations formed a procurement a weaker gable end. In some areas, collective in order to negotiate Households selected a builder, people preferred a traditional roofs better prices. paid for by the organisation, from a design with two slopes as they list of craftsman who had completed could use the space under the roofs Broader impacts the training programme. Local site for storage. Most of the newly built houses supervisors made technical checks in the project area that were not on each building. Training funded by this project had small New houses were constructed in The project involved three stages improvements to bracing, stone groups, while repairs were made on of training: a training of trainers, masonry, and stone foundations. a house by house basis. a training of artisans and a more Although it is too early to really un- basic training for house owners. derstand the broader impact of this Technical solutions project, it is hoped that it has led As many of the families were Participants were trained on the to a change in construction culture. poor, technical shelter solutions different ways hazards can affect Other organisations have had to ensure low maintenance buildings. adopted this project approach and costs. As part of the repairs are conducting their own trainings The core technical criteria was programme, each household group in other areas. that shelter failure would not lead was given training on water and to further injury and death. sanitation issues and provided with Materials list a community water tank. Materials Quantity Traditional local houses were Repairs (for 100 houses) built on wooden posts dug directly Trainings materials included printed illustrations of best practice Corrugated iron sheet (34 2,000 into the ground which were quickly guage) weakened by rot. The new design in Créole. Cement Bag 1,500 added a proper foundation. Artisans were trained in groups Local wooden pole 1,500 Masonry skills were very basic in of 20 for 2 to 4 weeks, during Roofing nails 100 lbs the area and filling this knowledge which they constructed a prototype Reconstruction (for 100 houses) gap was an important part of the house. Payment for participants to Corrugated iron sheet (34 3,000 construction training. attend trainings depended upon the partner organisation. In some guage) Cross-bracing was used in the case, only food was provided, in Cement Bag 1,100 walls. This reduced the risk of the other case, full salaries were paid. Wooden rafter imported 4,600 wall collapsing in cyclones and Wooden plank imported 1,500 earthquakes. Roofing nails 700lbs

www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 39 A.13  Natural Disaster

A.13 Haiti – 2010 – Earthquake Keywords: Returns, Unplanned camps, Urban neighbourhoods, Infrastructure, Community Case study: engagement

Country: Project timeline Haiti Project location: Port au Prince 24 months – –– Construction of 300m canal Disaster/ conflict: –– Construction of Earthquake market place Disaster/ conflict date: 23 months – –– Presentation of outcomes 12 January 2010 22 months – –– Community action Number of houses damaged / plans destroyed: –– PASSA Process 180,000 21 months – Project target population: 18 months – –– Community sensiti- 700 families sation 17 months – –– Training project Project outputs: team on PASSA Increased awareness on safer construction, 15 months – –– Relocation of most Cadastral map, at-risk shelters Community Action Plan, 14 months – –– Neighbourhood assessment 300m of canals 10 months – –– Recovery phase Community Market Place starts Haiti 8 months – –– Livelihoods grants 7 months – –– Return starts Port au Prince 5 months – –– Assessment –– Project start 12 January 2010 – –– Earthquake

Project description The organisation used the Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) process to support the community make the transition to neighbourhood recovery. A range of participatory activities were carried out to decide both a comprehensive community plan for reconstruction, and a detailed list of related programme activities by the organisation. The identification of problems and solutions enabled the community to make plans for their own long-term recovery activities.

Strengths and weaknesses technical skills are required for safer construction. 99 A participatory planning approach promoted a 88 More time was needed to explain that participatory high level of engagement by the community which tools only informed planning, and expectations for led to a programme that responded to people's self- concrete results needed to be managed. determined needs. -- PASSA was developed in rural contexts, the focus 99 The process empowered and gave a voice to on ‘shelter’ needed to be adapted to ‘habitat’ to members of the community who are not often heard. encompass the infrastructural and social aspects of 99 The plans that were developed cut across a number living in an urban context. of different sectors which resulted in an integrated -- "PASSA" can be carried out simultanously with approach to settlement planning. other assessment techniques. 99 The project built on relations with camp residents -- GIS mapping weas essential to monitor progress. early in the response to support recovery. -- Considerable time is required to plan the participatory 99 Enabled the community to directly act in their process and analyse the information from workshops. neighbourhood to improve their quality of life. -- Local terms needed to be used to ensure a full 88 PASSA was not used in the first year of the response understanding of issues. leading to delays in the recovery planning. -- Participatory tools developed for rural contexts can 88 Participatory tools are only the first step for be adapted for urban contexts. reconstruction. Additional training, planning and

40 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.13

People returned to crowded areas The organisation used a PASSA process: residents identified their own with limited services. problems and the actions needed to address them. Photo: Amelia Rule Photo: Mandy George

Before the earthquake molished houses, makeshift shelters not include the existing committee After land was reclaimed from and a lack of services. members. However, all activities the marshes in the 1980s, an were carried out in coordination The groups with the highest informal settlement developed in with the committee members. shelter vulnerability were renters Delmas 19, Port au Prince. The and those who lived next to PASSA comprised eight partici- houses were self-built structures the canal on land that could be patory activities, which were carried made with poor-quality materials reclaimed by local authorities. out over two to three months: such as concrete blocks, corrugat- Those facing possible eviction had ed iron and wood, and construct- 1. historical profile and everyday a broad range of backgrounds in ed with little knowledge of safe problems terms of education levels, livelihood building techniques. 2. community mapping and visit strategies and home ownership. 3. frequency and impact of Infrastructure was poor with Direct support was given to hazards limited water and sanitation specific households based on vul- 4. safe and unsafe habitat services, and the site was badly nerability assessments developed 5. options for solutions drained with limited access. with the community, while the 6. planning for change After the earthquake whole community benefited from 7. problem box (future planning) The earthquake destroyed half improvements to site drainage and 8. monitoring plan (future of the houses in the settlement public spaces such as the market. planning) and damaged half of the remaining Implementation After each activity, the group structures. The main drainage canal shared their work with family and The participatory process began was also damaged and blocked by neighbours to encourage under- with an explanation to participants rubble and debris. standing of the process across the of how a detailed planning process community. Many water reservoirs belonging would result in the best solutions to individual households and com- for reconstruction. The coordina- At the end of the process, all mercial suppliers were damaged tion of different sectoral projects, the work, findings and plans were and pit latrines were inaccessible such as solving drainage issues shared firstly with the committee or broken. There were more than before providing shelter solutions , members for feedback and input, 100 families, with only one public achieved a joint approach to settle- and secondly presented to the latrine, living in makeshift shelters. ment rehabilitation. whole community at an open day held in the community centre. The The organisation used the “Par- Selection of beneficiaries PASSA group members shared ticipatory Approach for Safe Following the earthquake the what they had done and received Shelter Awareness” (or PASSA organisation provided emergency their participation certificates. assistance in the targeted camp, see - PASSA, Participatory Approach and identified the clear need for for Safe Shelter Awareness, IFRC The main problems faced by the joint livelihoods and shelter support. 2011). PASSA was a relatively new, community were: and formally structured approach • weak infrastructure and In June 2010, the private to participation in shelter projects. flooding landowner offered US$ 200 to It was based on a tool commonly • public health, water, sanitation families to leave the site. Conse- used in WASH programming. quently two-thirds of the camp and waste management issues population relocated. The majority The PASSA process involves • safe access routes and personal were from the adjoining neighbour- working with a group of 40 rep- safety hood, and the organisation followed resentative people. This group was • unsafe shelter and settlement. them as they returned home to de- selected by the community and did

www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 41 A.13  Natural Disaster

Both the market (left) and the path (right) were identified needs and both were built by residents with the support of the organisation. Photo: Amelia Rule The identified solutions were to: ment with relevant authorities. The Poor waste management and projects also aimed to improve skills lack of upkeep of the canal lead to • construct the canal for the housing construction and serious blockages and subsequent • install solar street lighting repairs which would follow. flooding of low-lying houses with • construct shared latrines waste and sewage. • improve waste management Challenges with PASSA • improve housing and planning The community had raised ex- To mitigate against these • improve technical expertise pectations about what PASSA could problems the PASSA process helped through supervision and provide. They thought they would participants to identify simple training. immediately receive the solutions actions that they could conduct. These included improved construc- Community projects they identified. The facilitators tion and environmental manage- Planning for change started spent a lot of time explaining that ment, and how to prepare, plan with mapping the issues in the the participatory approach would and respond to a natural disaster. neighbourhood and understand- help to identify priorities and the ing their relationships. This enabled solutions that the community them- Technical solutions selves could achieve. It would also the community to take into account When provided with the analyse where support was needed issues, including gender, protec- materials and technical support from the organisation and the local tion and security. Once the issues necessary to carry out the recon- authorities. had been identified the groups struction the PASSA process had discussed each problem in turn. The PASSA tool was developed ensured that the community was Working groups, called ‘cells’, in a rural context with a specific highly motivated. focus on ‘Shelter’. As a result, some took on each subject and carried At the end of 2012, Haiti had no limitations were found using the out further work, before creating official building codes and material tool in an urban context and within an overall Plan of Action. standards were not enforced. an integrated approach. The team The general level of understand- A security cell positioned solar adapted the activities to take into ing by architects and builders of lighting while a community waste account the wider issues of infra- seismic construction techniques management group cleared waste. structure, water sanitation, urban was limited. A great deal of time issues such as spatial planning and Community contracts were was spent with engineers, seismic security problems. written for people from the neigh- specialists and construction profes- bourhood to build the canal. This DRR components sionals to ensure that the shelter employed over 300 people. The area was suffering from solutions were safe and that the Materials and technical supervi- poor drainage, poor waste man- community understood the reason sion were provided by the organi- agement, poor housing construc- behind the application of new tech- sation and fifteen shared latrines tion and poor infrastructure. All niques. were constructed by the families these aspects made the population This knowledge was trans- themselves. vulnerable to flooding, the effects ferred outside of the participatory of hurricanes, outbreaks of disease Community construction teams planning sessions, delivered instead and earthquake risks. that had received training before through on-site practical training working on the canal also built the PASSA raised understanding of sessions. market. how risks to health and safety were caused not only by natural disasters All of these activities started but also by the everyday practices with awareness raising and engage- of the community.

42 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.13

Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) is a participatory method of disaster risk reduction (DRR) related to shelter safety. It is a variation of Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Trans- formation (PHAST), which has been used by many Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies in water and sanitation programmes since the late 1990s. The aim of PASSA is to develop local capacity to reduce shelter related risk by raising awareness and developing skills in joint analysis, learning and decision-making at community level. PASSA is a process, facilitated by volunteers, that guides community groups (called PASSA groups in this manual) through eight participa- tory activities which enable the participants to do the following pro- gressively: • Develop their awareness of shelter safety issues in their community • Identify hazards and vulnerabilities that create risk related to shelter • Recognize and analyse causes of shelter vulnerability ÌÌIdentify and prioritize potential strategies to improve shelter safety • Make a plan to put those shelter safety strategies into place, based on local capacities • Monitor and evaluate progress.

Source PASSA, Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness, IFRC 2011

“PASSA helped us to see Defining the community: that many problems in our In this complex urban area are not complicated context, the community to fix, they are small things was defined by: housing that can have a large typologies, level of poverty, negative impact – such physical boundaries of as the rubbish blocking roads (making the area a the canal and causing pedestrian community), a flooding.” representative committee and the familial and PASSA participant neighbourly networks that Delmas 19 were already in place.

Drainage was identified aswww.ShelterCaseStudies.org a key safety issue. 300m of drains were cleared and covered to make a path.43 Photos: Amelia Rule