Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.10 A.10 Haiti – 2010 – Earthquake Keywords: Returns, Unplanned camps, Planned and managed camps, Urban neighbourhoods, T- Overview: shelter, Rental support, Housing repair and retrofitting, Cash / vouchers, Mass communications. Summary In October 2010, ten months after the Haitian earthquake, a humanitarian organisation began a project to close a small camp of around 200 families. Families were given rental support cash grants to cover the costs of renting accommodation for one year and to support the transition from camps to their new accommodation. The project succeeded in its aims and became a test case for a much wider programme of rental support. Promoted by a small number of organisations, the rental support approach relied on donors’ willingness to take a risk on a project-type with few precedents. By mid 2011, rental support cash grants had become a key part of the return strategy and by November 2012 over 23,000 households had received grants. Early indications are that rental support cash grants have been successful. A survey of households that have completed their year of rental subsidy found that all of the respondents (90% of the total caseload) had been able to organise their own housing for the foreseeable future. None had returned to camps or moved to informal settlements. Le Marron Inconnu (the unknown slave)statue surrounded The statue in April 2012 after the Champ de Mars camp by shelters in the Champ de Mars camp in early 2012. closure. Photo: IOM Photo: IOM Background • Permanent housing plots in the managed camps were The Haiti earthquake of January reconstruction: Rebuilding taken by others moving in from 2010 caused massive loss of life and irreperably damaged houses. spontaneous settlements. damaged or destroyed 180,000 The lack of buildable space in Camps were not only bad for houses. (See Section A.4 Shelter densely-populated urban areas the displaced people but they also Projects 2010 for more background and complex issues over land rights prevented occupied public spaces on the Haiti response) meant that the three main responses from being rehabilitated. Responses generally took one of would only benefit those with land rights or those who owned houses. In this context some Haitian three forms following the distribu- officials began suggesting that tion of non-food items in the initial Those displaced in camps over- displaced people should be paid emergency phase: whelmingly did not own either land to leave camps. These proposals • T-shelters: This was the main or housing before the earthquake. were dropped due to protection response by many organisations. Consequently, only a quarter of T- concerns as it would be impossible Transitional shelters (T-shelters) shelters built went to Haitians who to verify if the families had found a were built using basic frames were living in camps. Not only did durable solution. However, interest which could later be adapted this mean that camp populations in properly planned rental support into more permanent structures. were being reduced at a slow rate cash grants grew and presentations • Yellow House repair: Buildings but it proved almost impossible to were made to donors to encourage were assessed by engineers close camps completely. If only a adopting the approach. and classified as Green (safe), small proportion of a camp had a Yellow (to be repaired) or Red durable solution available for them (to be demolished). it wasn’t long before the empty www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 31 A.10 Natural Disaster An edition of Chimen Lakay, a graphic newspaper, featuring the 16/6 program and a newly cleared market place. Designed by: Chevelin Pierre, Script: Mike Charles. Neighbourhood approach ing neighbourhood businesses to • Protection and assistance: Rental support was closely start-up or expand in order to offer Identification of vulnerable combined with the neighbourhood those returning real income genera- families who qualify for approach to reconstruction. tion opportunities. The grants were additional help available to anyone with a business • Beneficiary communication: The concept of the neighbour- idea and not restricted to those Facilitation of informed choices hood approach is that projects returning from camps. by beneficiaries using wide such as rubble clearance, rebuild- range of multi-media and face- ing, water, sanitation and liveli- The 16/6 programme relied to-face communications hoods programming should be heavily on the use of rental support • Choosing a housing option: joined together across sectors and cash grants to offer all families living Either T-Shelter, Yellow-house that agencies create a coordinated in camps a realistic housing option. repair or rental support cash and efficient response support- grant ing families to move from camp to Rental support • Choosing a rental property: community. As of December 2012, Rental support projects differed Family chooses a property this goal had not been fully realized, between agencies but largely (independently assessed for but efforts were being made to take followed the same pattern: safety) and negotiates the rent a more holistic approach. • Registration: Emphasis on • Cash grant transferred: The This approach minimises the obtaining accurate beneficiary year’s rental cost of US$ 500 possibility of families “rebound- lists through other health is transferred directly to the ing” back into camps. For example, or distribution activities, in landlord and the family receives “rebounding” could be caused by collaboration with Haitian the money left over a lack of employment opportuni- authorities ties or extremely poor sanitation standards in the neighbourhoods to which people return. The 16/6 program The 16/6 program, led by the Haitian government, targeted income regeneration in sixteen neighbourhoods coupled with the closure of six camps. The programme focus on neighbourhoods meant that liveli- hoods grants were not allocated to families leaving the camps. Instead, a targeted livelihoods program was Graph to show completed and planned housing solutions, November 2012 implemented, aimed at support- Source : E-Shelter and CCCM Cluster 32 Natural Disaster Shelter Projects 2011–2012 A.10 • Camp closure: Families are given a US$ 25 cash grant to help in transporting their possessions to their new home • Surprise visit: Agency awards a US$ 125 bonus to families continuing to live in their chosen rental accommodation following a surprise visit made a few months later. In addition to the US$ 650 grant costs, the relocation of one household incurred an additional US$ 350 in programming costs, making a total cost of the return of one household rise to around US$ 1,000. Programming costs include beneficiary registration, commu- The ruined National Palace surrounded by shelters nication of activities and protec- before the Champ de Mars camp closure. tion activities such as providing Photo: IOM two-years rental for vulnerable families. In comparison, a T-shelter costs around US$ 2,000 and a permanent house around US$ 6,000. Concerns and safeguards There have been vigorous dis- cussions around the appropriate- ness of a rental support approach as a durable solution. Some of the key concerns and corresponding safeguards were: • Cash distributions can act The ruined National Palace after the Champ de Mars camp closure. as a pull-factor to camps: Photo: IOM Announcements about rental • A survey of households who support programs were made Lessons rented for one year achieved a publicly only after accurate • Rental support could have been 90 per cent response rate. Out of beneficiary lists were made. implemented earlier if it had those households responding, Negligible pull-factors were been considered or picked up by all had found their own housing noted. other donors. solutions and none had been • Rental properties may not • Better links to livelihoods forced to return to camps or meet minimum standards: All programmes could be made informal settlements. rental properties were assessed to further support families to • Nearly 100 per cent of for safety and sanitation issues. continue to cover rental costs respondents reported that The emphasis was therefore on themselves in the future. their situation is better or much moving people out of the much • The neighbourhood approach better than it was in camps. worse conditions in camps. offers more chances for better • 77 per cent of landlords used • Cash grants would inflate coordination between sectors two-thirds of the rent money rents: Rents were monitored by and organisaitons as well to improve the standards of organisations using the prices as between emergency and the properties that they were agreed between families and development actors. renting out. landlords. Rents had not risen • The approach has been popular by the end of 2012. with the general public, particularly as it emphasises Indicators beneficiaries’ rights to actively The rental support approach choose where to live. Haitian shows the following early indicators politicians have been keen to of success: promote and be involved in rental support programs. www.ShelterCaseStudies.org 33 A.11 Natural Disaster A.11 Haiti – 2010 – Earthquake Keywords: Returns, Unplanned camps, Urban neighbourhoods, T-shelter, Rental support, Housing Case Study: repair, Cash, Training. Country: Project timeline Haiti Project location: Port au Prince Disaster/ conflict: 33 months – – Project completion Earthquake Disaster/ conflict date: January 2010 Total number of houses