February 2011 Noref Article

Egypt: before and after

Virginie Collombier

Summary Even before the current uprising began in Egypt, Uncertain transition major changes in the political system had begun A number of events forewarned that 2011 would be to threaten the stability of the Mubarak regime a critical year for the Egyptian regime – even before as the presidential succession became imminent. Tunisian protester Mohamed Buazizi burned him- Constitutional reforms and electoral fraud could self in December 2010, leading to a popular revolt have resulted in a political deadlock in 2011. At the and the flight of Tunisian president Ben Ali from his same time, the relative openness and freedom of country less than one month later, and before the 6 expression that has emerged in Egypt since 2005 April Youth Movement in Egypt called for a massive had laid the ground for new political movements to demonstration on 25 January 2011. emerge and develop. Events in Tunisia, combined with a severe degradation of economic and social The presidential election planned for September 2011 conditions in Egypt, and the growing perception might have resulted in the designation of a succes- that its citizens would have no say in the coming sor for Hosni Mubarak, in power for thirty years. The presidential succession, have created a favourable stakes were high. Moreover, despite the efforts of the context for the unprecedented mobilization in previous decade to try and organize a smooth transi- Tahrir square. tion, it was not clear which scenario would prevail – just a few months before this Virginie Collombier is a researcher associated with the Arab Reform decisive deadline. Would Initiative. An expert in Middle East politics, she received a PhD in Political Hosni Mubarak’s younger Science from the University of Grenoble and a Master in Political Science son, Gamal, be “elected” from Sciences Po Paris. She has worked extensively on Egyptian politics, president? This option, long focussing on the role of the National Democratic Party in contemporary deemed the most probable, Egypt and Gamal Mubarak’s political strategy. She has published: had become more uncer- “‘Modernizing’ political parties: The National Democratic Party of Egypt tain, notably because of the on the path of British New labor?”, in Kienle E., Democracy Building and army’s perceived opposi- Democracy Erosion:Political Change North and South of the Mediterranean, tion to it. Would the military London, Saqi, 2009. She also worked as an analyst specializing in Middle seize power? This option, East issues for the French administration. which seemed to conform to Egypt’s recent history, had Noref Article February 2011 been made more difficult by the 2007 constitutional ideal scenario, the NDP candidate would have had at amendments. Could there be a transition government least one credible competitor, representative of a non- headed by Omar Suleiman, the chief of the intelli- Islamist party – the Wafd for instance. gence services, or another military officer?

All these questions remained unanswered. At the Growing opposition to corruption same time, despite what still appeared to be the ex- Yet, by late 2005, after the first presidential election clusive domination of the presidential party over the was organized (and orchestrated by Gamal Mubar- political scene, the regime was finding it more and ak and a team of so-called “reformers” within the more difficult to preserve its stability in a period of NDP), it progressively became clear that this strat- decisive change. egy would be difficult to implement. The task was huge and the opposition fierce, even coming from within the party itself. Those who had joined the Ten years preparation for the presidential NDP after 2002, hoping that the time had come for succession… in vain more democracy, gradually realized that their hopes Not that the overall political picture had fundamen- would be dashed. tally changed: the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) was still monopolizing representation in par- Those who were responsible for modernizing the liament at the expense of several very weak opposi- party and improving its image soon came to embody tion parties (such as the Wafd, the Tagammu or the the most detestable profiteering and were seen as a Nasserist party), and it was struggling to curb the corrupted elite by the citizens. Those who had joined influence of its only real rival, the officially banned Gamal hoping that this would help their ambitions Muslim Brotherhood. The December 2010 parlia- of power began to realize they might have made the mentary elections had even exacerbated this situa- wrong choice, and some of them started distancing tion: the NDP had won 420 seats out of 508, whereas themselves from the party. Finally, at the end of 2010, only 15 seats had gone to opposition parties and one the constitutional amendments adopted in 2007 com- to the Muslim Brotherhood – the party had secured bined with electoral fraud resulted in the NDP being the election of 88 of its members in 2005. The re- the only political party able to field a candidate in maining 70 seats had gone to candidates who were the 2011 presidential election. As the deadline ap- allegedly “independent”, but in reality often related proached, a ten-year strategy was failing, and there to the NDP. was no clear alternative to it.

Beyond this apparently dominant grip on power, however, these results signalled that the strategy im- “If the door is closed, let’s get in through plemented by the Egyptian regime during the past the window.” ten years or so had failed. From 2002 onwards, as a At the end of 2010, the Egyptian political landscape result of growing American pressure and aware that was very different from the early 2000s. The tradi- the political system had to be modernized if it was to tional opposition parties remained very weak, incapa- remain stable, President Mubarak had chosen to pro- ble of realising change or articulating a clear political mote his son Gamal and several of his close business platform that would go beyond saying “no” to Presi- associates within the ruling party. He had entrusted dent Mubarak and hereditary succession. Yet the rela- them with the mission to modernize the organization, tive opening of the political system initiated in 2005 turn it into a genuine political party capable of mobi- had had an impact on Egyptian society. The creation lizing people and winning elections. of several private televisions and newspapers and the interest they raised in the public revealed public un- At the same time, the whole political system was to ease. Movements such as Kefaya contributed to free- be modernized and liberalized. The objective was a dom of speech on political matters, even though they smooth transition, so that Gamal (or any other candi- were severely repressed by security forces and their date chosen by the ruling party) should be able to win impact remained very limited in the population – the presidential election in a way that would appear demonstrations rarely gathered more than a few hun- perfectly constitutional – not to say legitimate. In this dreds of persons. It became common for demonstra- - 2 - Virginie Collombier. Egypt: before and after tors to use slogans attacking the regime and President the streets and acting collectively. The fact that so- Mubarak personally, whereas this had never been the cial networks could build bridges, making it possible case before the demonstrations against the Iraq war to go from virtual mobilization to real mobilization, in 2003. went unnoticed.

From 2006 on, the regime had also been confronted Events in Tunisia, combined with a severe degrada- by unprecedented waves of social unrest. Emerging tion of economic and social conditions, and the grow- in industrial cities such as Mahalla al-Kubra, these ing perception that the citizens would have no say protests – mostly centred on salaries – had rapidly in the coming presidential succession, thus created a expanded and mobilized thousands of workers and favourable context for unprecedented mobilization in employees from all sectors. The unrest had spread in Egypt – both in the means used and the scope. Many the country, which proved that far from creating apa- of those who have been standing in Tahrir Square for thy, the increasing deterioration of social conditions the past week are “newcomers” in Egypt’s political was mobilizing Egyptians. landscape. Rather than holding specific ideological positions, their engagement stems mainly from their will to take part in political decision-making: they Young people decide to act do not want others to decide for them anymore, they Yet protests remained localized and sporadic, fail- want to participate. ing to develop into a coordinated movement across Egypt. Moreover, there was no clear connection between socio-economic and political movements. Whither now? From 2008, groups such as the 6 April Youth Move- In this context, their reactions to the concessions an- ment – which called for the January 25 demonstration nounced recently by President Mubarak and the new- – had unsuccessfully tried to fill this gap. However, ly appointed vice-president, Omar Suleiman, remain they have played a central role in the emergence of to be seen. Having secured that Hosni Mubarak will new instruments of political expression and mobili- not run for another mandate nor his son will be a can- zation – the most important being the use of internet didate, and that the results of last parliamentary elec- and social networks – and contributed to the emer- tions will be reviewed, many Egyptians may consider gence of a new political generation in Egypt. that time has come for an orderly transition. How- ever, not all the demonstrators will be satisfied with It thus became increasingly clear that at least one part such a compromise, and it is far from clear how the of society was becoming aware that it could not – and army will deal with their demands. should not – remain out of politics and let the regime decide in its place. Most of them were young people; The military has now become the key actor in Egypt. they had not known any president other than Hosni Regardless of when and in what manner President Mubarak, had no voter registration cards, and would Mubarak finally leaves office, they will play a central lose the opportunity to take their destinies into their role in the political transition. Among them, Omar hands if they did not act. Suleiman, as the vice-president, will certainly be at the forefront during this period. In the longer term however, and when a presidential election is organ- Social networking as a political tool ized, other figures may appear as better candidates, In this context, new forms of political awareness have especially those less close to the Mubarak regime and gradually emerged among younger Egyptians, under less directly involved in the management of the cur- the very noses of the authorities. Until the January rent demonstrations. An army officer would be an op- 25 demonstration, the means of communication and tion, but only one among others. An important condi- action used by young people were not considered to tion may be that the candidate is seen as trustworthy be politically significant. Internet was not taken seri- by the military. ously as a potential instrument of political mobiliza- tion. Even though young Egyptians were exchanging slogans, ideas and videos through their computers, it was felt that this would not result in people taking - 3 -