Why the West Should Relinquish Mubarak

> > POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667

Nº 46 - MAY 2010

Why the West should relinquish Mubarak

Kristina Kausch

Egypt is at a critical juncture. In the run-up to the election >> marathon of 2009–10, destined to determine both the future role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics and succession to the incumbent autocratic president Hosni Mubarak, the country is sim- HIGHLIGHTS mering with anger and civil disobedience. Following the Shura Coun- cil (upper house) elections in May 2010 and parliamentary elections in November, at the presidential elections in September 2011 the ageing • Although Mohamed Mubarak is expected to cede power to a groomed heir. The appearance ElBaradei’s chances of taking of former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head and possi- over the Egyptian presidency ble Mubarak rival Mohamed ElBaradei on the domestic scene spurred are slim, the mobilisation hopes that political change in Egypt is within reach. A real power shift for his candidacy may pave is practically impossible – the authoritarian power structures are too the way for a real power shift entrenched, the opposition too weak and divided and the pressures in the future. from the outside too insignificant. With or without ElBaradei, Mubarak’s reign will soon be over. The West, with great stakes in Egypt • With or without ElBaradei, as a regional power hub, would be well advised to forge new alliances. Mubarak’s reign will soon be over. THE MEANING OF ELBARADEI • The West, with great As an internationally respected figure and Nobel Peace Prize winner, stakes in Egypt as a regional ElBaradei has a profile that the Mubarak regime will find very hard to security hub, urgently needs discredit. The same state media that celebrated ElBaradei as a national to forge new alliances hero when he received the Nobel Prize in 2005 now stress his lack of before it is too late. political experience and his long absence from Egypt. ElBaradei’s lengthy absence from the country also means that his file at the Egypt- ian secret service is thin and the regime has little material to incriminate him. The ‘National Association for Change’ (NAC), a loose coalition of academics, activists and opposition parties supporting his candidacy, WHY THE WEST SHOULD RELINQUISH MUBARAK

>>>>>> has launched a signature campaign to gain sup- radei campaign of meaning. The increased mobil- port for compliance with international electoral isation is likely to push boundaries further, form standards, which ElBaradei has put forward as a new alliances and leaders, and may thereby pave precondition for his candidacy. the way for a real power shift in the future. More- over, the former IAEA head’s image and campaign Their demands include the end of the three- draw domestic and international attention to the decade-long state of emergency; allowing electoral tremendous shortcomings of the Egyptian elec- monitoring by local judges and international toral process and the undemocratic constitutional monitors; the right to vote for Egyptians abroad; framework. term limits for the presidency; and eliminating official obstacles to an independent presidential candidacy. The changes demanded by the coali- AGAINST ‘SUCCESSION’, tion would need three constitutional articles to be DIVIDED WE STAND amended. Without such amendments, ElBaradei’s only way of running for the presidency would be The mobilisation and dynamism surrounding to join one of the already licensed (toothless ElBaradei is the latest mushrooming of popular and/or co-opted) opposition parties, an option he unrest in Egypt in recent years. Not all of these has firmly rejected. ElBaradei thus faces a dilem- movements have been political. Due to the eco- ma: by joining one of the licensed parties he nomic crisis, the government is finding it increas- would implicitly accept the rules of the game pre- ingly difficult to pay off hungry rioters and determined by the Mubarak regime and renounce discontented workers angered over poverty, dete- his current credibility. But having explicitly riorating living and working conditions and esca- declared that he would only run if the Constitu- lating food and fuel prices. The largest tion was amended, he has given the regime an demonstrations have been organised by the extra reason not to do so. dynamic labour movement. Since the riots of April 2008, during which tens of thousands of Egypt is riding the wave of ElBaradei euphoria. textile workers across Egypt protested over work- ElBaradei’s ‘fans’ on Facebook skyrocketed in a ing conditions, the labour movement has become few months to over 150,000, contrasting with a massive, nationwide grassroots movement. Con- Hosni Mubarak’s 240 and his son Gamal’s 6000. sciously staying aloof from political parties and For the time being, however, the former IAEA more explicit political activity, it has started to head campaigns mainly on his demands for con- voice demands not only concerning concrete stitutional reform, but has yet to formulate a sub- social and economic working conditions but also stantial presidential platform. Moreover, the political rights such as labour rights and freedom coalition still needs to build a popular grassroots of association. base to ensure that demands for broader change do not remain an elite concern. ElBaradei’s cre- The degree to which the current wave of mobili- dentials will not nurture him forever, and simply sation will have a real impact on Egypt’s political being the ‘anti-Mubarak’ does not offer any solu- panorama depends above all on the different tions to the Egyptian people’s pressing concerns. opposition and protest movements uniting to form a common front. As its demands explicitly Even if ElBaradei’s campaign was to gain in sub- address workers’ daily concerns, the labour move- stance and grassroots support, few people in ment strikes a chord with the broader population Egypt – probably including ElBaradei himself – at grassroots level – something which neither truly believe that he or any other potential oppo- ElBaradei’s NAC campaign nor previous move- sition candidate will be able to override the ments for political reform such as Kefaya have regime’s grip on power in the near future. That managed. What are a few hundred intellectuals does not, however, deprive the current pro-ElBa- and NGO representatives holding up signs at the POLICY BRIEF - Nº 46 - MAY 2010

airport compared to tens of thousands of workers pensable partner. Destabilising this reliable part- besieging entire industrial towns? Aware that the ner, so the reasoning goes, would risk losing a key idea of an alliance between broad political reform supporter of Western security interests. This argu- demands and the nation-wide grassroots scares ment is highly flawed, for several reasons. the Mubarak regime, labour leaders have careful- ly avoided just such a link. One, the Egyptian regime shares the West’s main regional security and trade interests and will not The prospect of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) cease to back these causes if the West strengthens joining a broad coalition for democratic change its support to democratic participation. Unlike is even bleaker. The MB, while increasingly being Europe and the US, Egypt is within reach of forced by the regime to retreat from political both Iranian and Israeli missiles, which makes contestation, remains the only political opposi- nuclear disarmament in the region a pressing tion group in the country with both an articulate Egyptian priority. Bordering Gaza, Egypt has a programme and a broad grassroots connection. number of tangible interests in a peaceful solu- A popular coalition tion to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the current for change that stalemate in Gaza. Due to age, excludes the Broth- erhood’s Islamist Two, the assumption of a trade-off between dem- sickness or both, constituency would ocratic governance and security in the MENA is a whole generation be unlikely to suc- wrong. The fragile kind of ‘stability’ that Western ceed. Despite the powers have played on in the region is coming to of North African MB’s attempts to an end. Mubarak is not the only long-standing mend fences with autocratic leader in the region who will soon dictators will have some of the secular leave his post. Due to age, sickness or both, a to yield power soon opposition parties whole generation of North African dictators will and rumours of a have to yield power soon. In Egypt, Tunisia and presumed backdoor Algeria, debates on ‘successions’ to a designated deal with the regime to guarantee the MB’s con- heir are underway. tinued presence in parliament, it is widely expected that the Brotherhood’s new conserva- Three, the West’s clinging on to old Arab auto- tive leadership and its predicted losses in the crats’ flawed regional stability trade-off perpetu- upcoming legislative elections will shift the ates the West’s (and especially the US’s) group’s focus away from political contestation. credibility deficit in the region. International rights groups and experts recently warned that continued Western support to authoritarian gov- THE WEST: ernments in the Arab world will only worsen the IN MUBARAK’S STABILITY TRAP ‘cycle of suspicion and discord’ between the US and Muslim peoples, which Obama vowed to Western governments’ efforts to support democ- break in his Cairo speech. racy in Egypt have had a limited impact. Probably more than any other country in the region, US Four, the short-sighted conception of stability has and EU governments’ bilateral relations with already begun to oust Islamist groups (including Egypt are deeply embedded in the regional con- the Egyptian MB) from political participation, text, focusing on Egypt’s role as a regional power possibly heralding the reversal of a trend of mod- broker. US and EU concerns with Egypt’s domes- eration and participation of political Islam across tic situation are routinely overshadowed by secu- the Arab world over the last decade. Widespread rity concerns in the region’s many hotspots, for Western fears that Islamist forces might come to which the Mubarak regime is considered an indis- rule the EU’s immediate neighbourhood have >>>>>> WHY THE WEST SHOULD RELINQUISH MUBARAK

>>>>>> halted any impetus to support alternative power ian government’s veto of foreign funding to schemes in the region. Political analysts’ mantra- Egyptian NGOs. This self-constraining policy like urge that Western policy-makers must engage stands in stark contrast to an October 2009 with alternative political actors, including USAID internal audit which ascribed direct civil Islamists, were largely in vain. By stubbornly society funding the greatest impact among all clinging to a short-term vision of stability in the USAID governance programming in Egypt. It is region, the West has very likely missed its oppor- particularly unfortunate in light of the regime’s tunity to empower the moderation of Islamist plan further to tighten restrictions on NGO forces and help to forge broader societal integra- activities via a new draft Associations Law. While tion, away from the current secular-Islamist other US agencies and programmes (MEPI, divide promoted by Arab regimes. DRL) still directly fund local NGOs, their funding levels are negligible compared to USAID’s.

OBAMA DISAPPOINTING, USAID’s budget for democratic governance has EU SITTING IT OUT been halved since 2009. USAID is the most important foreign donor in Egypt in terms of Surely, few of those who shouted ‘we love you’ funding. The agency’s budget for democracy and from the audience in response to Obama’s governance fell from an annual average of USD remarks on democracy and human rights at his 51 million in 2006–2008 to USD 20 million in Cairo speech in June 2009 would have imagined 2009 (later increased to 25 million for both 2010 then that, one year on, they would remember and 2011). According to USAID officials, this George W. Bush’s Egypt policies with a certain reduction is proportional to the overall gradual melancholy. Under Barack Obama, the con- reduction of US development assistance to Egypt. frontational Bush approach has given way to a Cuts in direct civil society funding, however, are decidedly partnership-based one. As initial enthu- especially severe (73 per cent compared to 2008). siasm for Obama is wearing off, Egyptian democ- Total US annual bilateral assistance going to racy activists sharply criticise the US’s stronger Egypt amounts to USD 1.56 billion, 1.3 billion focus on regional issues, to the visible detriment (84 per cent) of which is military and security aid. of US democracy support in Egypt. Finally, the US government is considering its Egyptian counterpart’s request to pay US aid to Open US criticism of Egyptian human rights and Egypt into an endowment directly administered democracy shortcomings is largely a thing of the by the Egyptian government. The creation of past. In the new US-Egyptian relations, criticism is such a ‘Mubarak endowment’ would remove mainly voiced behind closed doors. The timely direct US Congress oversight over the use of US release of opposition politician Ayman Nour was economic aid to Egypt. seen by many observers as a tacit asset swap in the run-up to Mubarak’s official visit to Washington, Europeans have not been much more useful than meant to bring Egypt back in from the cold after the US when it comes to supporting Egyptians’ frosty relations during the Bush years. Beyond strive for change. The EU is seen by Egyptian emblematic individual cases, however, discernable activists as a quiet, bureaucratic funding source, a pressure to end oppression of political activists has good listener with decent intentions but little been negligible or, in the case of Islamists, inexistent. political clout. EU member states, it is common- ly argued, see Egypt as a business and security In 2009 USAID bowed to the Egyptian govern- hub, to the detriment of a stronger focus on ment’s pressure and decided to stop funding any human rights and democracy. While EU bilateral NGOs that are not registered under the Egyptian policies towards Egypt are based on a far-reaching Associations Law. In practice, this amounts to positive conditionality rationale, in practice they acceptance of a funding clearance and the Egypt- are only incoherently applied. Bilateral deals with POLICY BRIEF - Nº 46 - MAY 2010

specific member states (such as Italy) on visas or EC officials are pessimistic about both the out- trade often outweigh EU community policies and look for political change in Egypt and their own torpedo the latter’s conditionality rationale on a leverage over the Egyptian government. Europe, regular basis. Under the European Neighbour- they admit, is ‘waiting for succession’. hood Policy (ENP) that governs bilateral relations between Egypt and the EU, the Egyptian government has been keen to obtain an upgrade similar CONCLUSION to the ‘advanced status’ recently granted to Morocco. In doing so, however, the Egyptian gov- Western democracy programmes nominally ernment resisted any EU attempts to link this meant to strengthen Egyptian democratic reform upgrade to greater commitments to political barely scratch the surface of the entrenched reform. The Mubarak regime’s hesitance to for- authoritarian power structures. For Egyptian mulate its vision of the content of such an activists, the reason for this is clear: the overarch- upgrade suggests that its main incentive is the ing interests of Western governments and the symbolic acknowledgement of the ‘strategic rela- Egyptian government match. Both sides want to tionship’ between Egypt and the EU, rather than keep the Mubarak regime stable, implement a the actual policy substance. minimum political liberalisation and broad economic and social modernisation, and avoid In terms of funding, EU assistance for human Islamist rule by any means. Western governments’ rights and democratic governance is mainly chan- leverage in Egypt is higher than US and EU offi- nelled through the European Commission (EC). cials admit, yet they are not willing meaningfully EU member states’ separate activities in this area to employ this leverage to support grassroots have been very limited in volume and ambition. political change in Egypt. Against the background Through bilateral programmes, EUR 39 million of the upcoming leadership transition in Egypt has been earmarked for human rights and good and elsewhere in the region and the increasing governance issues for 2007–2010, accounting for risks inherent in the authoritarian time bomb, 7 per cent of total bilateral assistance to Egypt this is a grave strategic mistake. (EUR 558 million). All bilateral EC funding is going to or channelled through the Egyptian gov- The perceived trade-off between security and ernment, and supports semi-governmental struc- democracy in the Middle East only exists in the tures such as the National Council of Human heads of short-sighted Western politicians inca- Rights. The only funding instrument under pable of looking beyond their horizon of their which the EC is able to fund NGOs directly and electoral mandate. In their own immediate strate- without government clearance is the European gic interest, the EU and US must abandon their Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights old stability paradigm of relying on ageing dicta- (EIDHR). Funding under this instrument is, tors in the region before it is too late. however, very limited (EUR 900,000 to Egypt in both 2008 and 2009) and will be further reduced Kristina Kausch is researcher in coming years. at FRIDE

EC officials complain of the Egyptian government’s unwillingness to commit to deeper reforms, and the EU’s limited scope to press any further. They partly blame the huge US development and military aid levels to Egypt, which sub- stantially reduce EU leverage with the Mubarak regime. But of course, EU member states would e - m a i l : [email protected] also have to deliver a more consistent message. www.fride.org