DOCSLIB.ORG

Why the West Should Relinquish Mubarak

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Why the West Should Relinquish Mubarak > > POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667 Nº 46 - MAY 2010 Why the West should relinquish Mubarak Kristina Kausch Egypt is at a critical juncture. In the run-up to the election >> marathon of 2009–10, destined to determine both the future role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics and succession to the incumbent autocratic president Hosni Mubarak, the country is sim- HIGHLIGHTS mering with anger and civil disobedience. Following the Shura Coun- cil (upper house) elections in May 2010 and parliamentary elections in November, at the presidential elections in September 2011 the ageing • Although Mohamed Mubarak is expected to cede power to a groomed heir. The appearance ElBaradei’s chances of taking of former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head and possi- over the Egyptian presidency ble Mubarak rival Mohamed ElBaradei on the domestic scene spurred are slim, the mobilisation hopes that political change in Egypt is within reach. A real power shift for his candidacy may pave is practically impossible – the authoritarian power structures are too the way for a real power shift entrenched, the opposition too weak and divided and the pressures in the future. from the outside too insignificant. With or without ElBaradei, Mubarak’s reign will soon be over. The West, with great stakes in Egypt • With or without ElBaradei, as a regional power hub, would be well advised to forge new alliances. Mubarak’s reign will soon be over. THE MEANING OF ELBARADEI • The West, with great As an internationally respected figure and Nobel Peace Prize winner, stakes in Egypt as a regional ElBaradei has a profile that the Mubarak regime will find very hard to security hub, urgently needs discredit. The same state media that celebrated ElBaradei as a national to forge new alliances hero when he received the Nobel Prize in 2005 now stress his lack of before it is too late. political experience and his long absence from Egypt. ElBaradei’s lengthy absence from the country also means that his file at the Egypt- ian secret service is thin and the regime has little material to incriminate him. The ‘National Association for Change’ (NAC), a loose coalition of academics, activists and opposition parties supporting his candidacy, WHY THE WEST SHOULD RELINQUISH MUBARAK 2 >>>>>> has launched a signature campaign to gain sup- radei campaign of meaning. The increased mobil- port for compliance with international electoral isation is likely to push boundaries further, form standards, which ElBaradei has put forward as a new alliances and leaders, and may thereby pave precondition for his candidacy. the way for a real power shift in the future. More- over, the former IAEA head’s image and campaign Their demands include the end of the three- draw domestic and international attention to the decade-long state of emergency; allowing electoral tremendous shortcomings of the Egyptian elec- monitoring by local judges and international toral process and the undemocratic constitutional monitors; the right to vote for Egyptians abroad; framework. term limits for the presidency; and eliminating official obstacles to an independent presidential candidacy. The changes demanded by the coali- AGAINST ‘SUCCESSION’, tion would need three constitutional articles to be DIVIDED WE STAND amended. Without such amendments, ElBaradei’s only way of running for the presidency would be The mobilisation and dynamism surrounding to join one of the already licensed (toothless ElBaradei is the latest mushrooming of popular and/or co-opted) opposition parties, an option he unrest in Egypt in recent years. Not all of these has firmly rejected. ElBaradei thus faces a dilem- movements have been political. Due to the eco- ma: by joining one of the licensed parties he nomic crisis, the government is finding it increas- would implicitly accept the rules of the game pre- ingly difficult to pay off hungry rioters and determined by the Mubarak regime and renounce discontented workers angered over poverty, dete- his current credibility. But having explicitly riorating living and working conditions and esca- declared that he would only run if the Constitu- lating food and fuel prices. The largest tion was amended, he has given the regime an demonstrations have been organised by the extra reason not to do so. dynamic labour movement. Since the riots of April 2008, during which tens of thousands of Egypt is riding the wave of ElBaradei euphoria. textile workers across Egypt protested over work- ElBaradei’s ‘fans’ on Facebook skyrocketed in a ing conditions, the labour movement has become few months to over 150,000, contrasting with a massive, nationwide grassroots movement. Con- Hosni Mubarak’s 240 and his son Gamal’s 6000. sciously staying aloof from political parties and For the time being, however, the former IAEA more explicit political activity, it has started to head campaigns mainly on his demands for con- voice demands not only concerning concrete stitutional reform, but has yet to formulate a sub- social and economic working conditions but also stantial presidential platform. Moreover, the political rights such as labour rights and freedom coalition still needs to build a popular grassroots of association. base to ensure that demands for broader change do not remain an elite concern. ElBaradei’s cre- The degree to which the current wave of mobili- dentials will not nurture him forever, and simply sation will have a real impact on Egypt’s political being the ‘anti-Mubarak’ does not offer any solu- panorama depends above all on the different tions to the Egyptian people’s pressing concerns. opposition and protest movements uniting to form a common front. As its demands explicitly Even if ElBaradei’s campaign was to gain in sub- address workers’ daily concerns, the labour move- stance and grassroots support, few people in ment strikes a chord with the broader population Egypt – probably including ElBaradei himself – at grassroots level – something which neither truly believe that he or any other potential oppo- ElBaradei’s NAC campaign nor previous move- sition candidate will be able to override the ments for political reform such as Kefaya have regime’s grip on power in the near future. That managed. What are a few hundred intellectuals does not, however, deprive the current pro-ElBa- and NGO representatives holding up signs at the POLICY BRIEF - Nº 46 - MAY 2010 3 airport compared to tens of thousands of workers pensable partner. Destabilising this reliable part- besieging entire industrial towns? Aware that the ner, so the reasoning goes, would risk losing a key idea of an alliance between broad political reform supporter of Western security interests. This argu- demands and the nation-wide grassroots scares ment is highly flawed, for several reasons. the Mubarak regime, labour leaders have careful- ly avoided just such a link. One, the Egyptian regime shares the West’s main regional security and trade interests and will not The prospect of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) cease to back these causes if the West strengthens joining a broad coalition for democratic change its support to democratic participation. Unlike is even bleaker. The MB, while increasingly being Europe and the US, Egypt is within reach of forced by the regime to retreat from political both Iranian and Israeli missiles, which makes contestation, remains the only political opposi- nuclear disarmament in the region a pressing tion group in the country with both an articulate Egyptian priority. Bordering Gaza, Egypt has a programme and a broad grassroots connection. number of tangible interests in a peaceful solu- A popular coalition tion to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the current for change that stalemate in Gaza. Due to age, excludes the Broth- erhood’s Islamist Two, the assumption of a trade-off between dem- sickness or both, constituency would ocratic governance and security in the MENA is a whole generation be unlikely to suc- wrong. The fragile kind of ‘stability’ that Western ceed. Despite the powers have played on in the region is coming to of North African MB’s attempts to an end. Mubarak is not the only long-standing mend fences with autocratic leader in the region who will soon dictators will have some of the secular leave his post. Due to age, sickness or both, a to yield power soon opposition parties whole generation of North African dictators will and rumours of a have to yield power soon. In Egypt, Tunisia and presumed backdoor Algeria, debates on ‘successions’ to a designated deal with the regime to guarantee the MB’s con- heir are underway. tinued presence in parliament, it is widely expected that the Brotherhood’s new conserva- Three, the West’s clinging on to old Arab auto- tive leadership and its predicted losses in the crats’ flawed regional stability trade-off perpetu- upcoming legislative elections will shift the ates the West’s (and especially the US’s) group’s focus away from political contestation. credibility deficit in the region. International rights groups and experts recently warned that continued Western support to authoritarian gov- THE WEST: ernments in the Arab world will only worsen the IN MUBARAK’S STABILITY TRAP ‘cycle of suspicion and discord’ between the US and Muslim peoples, which Obama vowed to Western governments’ efforts to support democ- break in his Cairo speech. racy in Egypt have had a limited impact. Probably more than any other country in the region, US Four, the short-sighted conception of stability has and EU governments’ bilateral relations with already begun to oust Islamist groups (including Egypt are deeply embedded in the regional con- the Egyptian MB) from political participation, text, focusing on Egypt’s role as a regional power possibly heralding the reversal of a trend of mod- broker. US and EU concerns with Egypt’s domes- eration and participation of political Islam across tic situation are routinely overshadowed by secu- the Arab world over the last decade.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Arabs Want Redistribution, So Why Don't They Vote Left? Theory And
    Arabs Want Redistribution, So Why Don’t They Vote Left? Theory and Evidence from Egypt Faculty Research Working Paper Series Tarek Masoud Harvard Kennedy School April 2013 RWP13-007 Visit the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper series at: http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications The views expressed in the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or of Harvard University. Faculty Research Working Papers have not undergone formal review and approval. Such papers are included in this series to elicit feedback and to encourage debate on important public policy challenges. Copyright belongs to the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. www.hks.harvard.edu Arabs want redistribution, so why don’t they vote left? Theory and evidence from Egypt Tarek Masoud∗ Abstract Though Egyptian voters clearly evince a desire for Islamic law (however defined), public opinion research shows that they also want robust welfare states and significant redistri- bution. Though the application of Islamic law is the special province of Islamist parties, it is left-leaning, labor-based parties who are the primary champions of the economic poli- cies that Egyptians seem to desire. Why, then, do Egyptian voters select the former over the latter? This article argues that the answer lies not in the political unsophistication of voters, the subordination of economic interests to spiritual ones, or the bureaucratic and organizational shortcomings of leftist parties, but in the ways in which the social landscape shapes the opportunities of parties in newly democratized systems to reach potential vot- ers.
    [Show full text]
  • Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt
    Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Alaa Al-Din Arafat HOSNI MUBARAK AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT Copyright © Alaa Al-Din Arafat, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in hardcover as The Mubarak Leadership and Future of Democracy in Egypt in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above compa- nies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-33813-5 ISBN 978-1-137-06753-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137067531 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ‘Arafat, ‘Ala’ al-Din. Hosni Mubarak and the future of democracy in Egypt / Alaa Al-Din Arafat. p. cm. Pbk. ed. of: The Mubarak leadership and future of democracy in Egypt. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. With a new preface. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–33813–5 (alk. paper) 1. Mubarak, Muhammad Husni, 1928– 2. Mubarak, Gamal. 3. Egypt—Politics and government—1981– 4. Egypt—Politics and government—1970–1981. 5. Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (Egypt)— History. 6. Political leadership—Egypt—History.
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt Presidential Election Observation Report
    EGYPT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT JULY 2014 This publication was produced by Democracy International, Inc., for the United States Agency for International Development through Cooperative Agreement No. 3263-A- 13-00002. Photographs in this report were taken by DI while conducting the mission. Democracy International, Inc. 7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1010 Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: +1.301.961.1660 www.democracyinternational.com EGYPT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT July 2014 Disclaimer This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Democracy International, Inc. and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. CONTENTS CONTENTS ................................................................ 4 MAP OF EGYPT .......................................................... I ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................. II DELEGATION MEMBERS ......................................... V ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................... X EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................. 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 6 ABOUT DI .......................................................... 6 ABOUT THE MISSION ....................................... 7 METHODOLOGY .............................................. 8 BACKGROUND ........................................................ 10 TUMULT
    [Show full text]
  • In May 2011, Freedom House Issued a Press Release Announcing the Findings of a Survey Recording the State of Media Freedom Worldwide
    Media in North Africa: the Case of Egypt 10 Lourdes Pullicino In May 2011, Freedom House issued a press release announcing the findings of a survey recording the state of media freedom worldwide. It reported that the number of people worldwide with access to free and independent media had declined to its lowest level in over a decade.1 The survey recorded a substantial deterioration in the Middle East and North Africa region. In this region, Egypt suffered the greatest set-back, slipping into the Not Free category in 2010 as a result of a severe crackdown preceding the November 2010 parliamentary elections. In Tunisia, traditional media were also censored and tightly controlled by government while internet restriction increased extensively in 2009 and 2010 as Tunisians sought to use it as an alternative field for public debate.2 Furthermore Libya was included in the report as one of the world’s worst ten countries where independent media are considered either non-existent or barely able to operate and where dissent is crushed through imprisonment, torture and other forms of repression.3 The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Arab Knowledge Report published in 2009 corroborates these findings and view the prospects of a dynamic, free space for freedom of thought and expression in Arab states as particularly dismal. 1 Freedom House, (2011): World Freedom Report, Press Release dated May 2, 2011. The report assessed 196 countries and territories during 2010 and found that only one in six people live in countries with a press that is designated Free. The Freedom of the Press index assesses the degree of print, broadcast and internet freedom in every country, analyzing the events and developments of each calendar year.
    [Show full text]
  • Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance
    SSR PAPER 2 Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance Derek Lutterbeck DCAF DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law SSR PAPER 2 Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces Between Openness and Resistance Derek Lutterbeck DCAF The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre develops and promotes norms and standards, conducts tailored policy research, identifies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector governance, and provides in‐country advisory support and practical assistance programmes. SSR Papers is a flagship DCAF publication series intended to contribute innovative thinking on important themes and approaches relating to security sector reform (SSR) in the broader context of security sector governance (SSG). Papers provide original and provocative analysis on topics that are directly linked to the challenges of a governance‐driven security sector reform agenda. SSR Papers are intended for researchers, policy‐makers and practitioners involved in this field. ISBN 978‐92‐9222‐180‐5 © 2011 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces EDITORS Alan Bryden & Heiner Hänggi PRODUCTION Yury Korobovsky COPY EDITOR Cherry Ekins COVER IMAGE © Suhaib Salem/Reuters The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or
    [Show full text]
  • 'Bread, Dignity and Social Justice': the Political
    briefing paper page 1 ‘Bread, Dignity and Social Justice’: The Political Economy of Egypt’s Transition Jane Kinninmont Middle East and North Africa Programme | April 2012 | MENAP BP 2012/01 Summary points zz In Egypt’s 2011 uprising, political and economic grievances were closely linked in attempts to address complex problems of corruption and injustice. But the cross- class, cross-ideology coalition that united behind the uprising has predictably fragmented, and different groups now have divergent views on the applicability of liberal economic policies to Egypt. zz The Islamist parties which between them won a majority in the 2011–12 parliamentary election appear to favour the continuation of a broadly pro-market policy, although, like all parties, they have emphasized the need for greater ‘social justice’ and less corruption. Leftist groups and trade unions remain largely unrepresented in parliament and tensions may be brewing between labour and Islamist forces over economic policy. zz Uncertainty over future economic policy is currently deterring investment. Although economic policy was not the main focus in the parliamentary election campaign, there is a pressing need for all parties to develop their economic blueprints further. zz Debates over the role of the state, the free market and the nature of globalization are part of democratic self-determination. Rather than repeating old mantras about the intrinsic desirability of a smaller public sector, external actors need to remember that economic policy advice on the role of the state is not purely technical but value-laden. www.chathamhouse.org ‘Bread, Dignity and Social Justice’: The Political Economy of Egypt’s Transition page 2 Introduction and revealed the transformative potential of street protest, When a popular uprising overthrew President Hosni bottom-up coalition-building and mass campaigning.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward Muslim Democracies Saad Eddin Ibrahim
    Toward Muslim Democracies Saad Eddin Ibrahim Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 2, April 2007, pp. 5-13 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2007.0025 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/214438 Access provided by your local institution (27 Feb 2017 15:55 GMT) TOWARD MUSLIM DEMOCRACIES Saad Eddin Ibrahim Saad Eddin Ibrahim, founder and chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies and professor of political sociology at the American University in Cairo, delivered the 2006 Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on Democracy in the World (see box on p. 6). Dr. Ibrahim has been one of the Arab world’s most prominent spokesmen on behalf of democracy and human rights. His 2000 arrest and subsequent seven- year sentence for accepting foreign funds without permission and “tar- nishing” Egypt’s image sparked a loud outcry from the international community. In 2003, Egypt’s High Court of Cassation declared his trial improper and cleared him of all charges. He is the author, coauthor, or editor of more than thirty-five books in Arabic and English, including Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Critical Essays (2002). The late Seymour Martin Lipset was one of the greatest men I have known in my life as an academic and as an activist. He was the first person I was introduced to—through his seminal 1960 book Political Man1—during my first year of graduate school at UCLA, in 1963. As a matter of fact, I had thought that I was going to be his student before I learned, much to my disappointment, that he was teaching at another campus of the University of California.
    [Show full text]
  • Pre-Emption and Coercion – a Case Study of Syrian Disarmament Discourse
    97 PRE-EMPTION AND COERCION – A CASE STUDY OF SYRIAN DISARMAMENT DISCOURSE Waseem Iftikhar Janjua, Ahmed Saeed Minhas and Farhat Konain Shujahi* Abstract The notions of pre-emption and coercions have been part of the offensive security policies around the world. These tools have been continuously applied in international relations by the relatively powerful against the weak during and after the Cold War, more specifically in the domain of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The manifestation of these concepts played a more constructive role in preventing an all-out war among the belligerents. However, the application of these tools against the same country has been comparatively an infrequent phenomenon which makes the Syrian case unique and a valid area of inquiry. Examining the Syrian aspirations of achieving nuclear weapons and the use of chemical weapons against civilians, this paper finds an interesting concord between the applicability of both tools. The research further concludes that pre-emption could only achieve partial disarmament leaving chemical weapons and facilities intact which had to be subsequently removed through coercion. Finally, the paper emphasizes the need for diplomacy and persuasion before pre-emption or coercion be employed. Keywords: Syria, Disarmament, Pre-emption, Coercion, Weapons of Mass Destruction. Introduction or a long time, the greatest hurdle in declaring the Middle East as a Weapons of F Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) has been the selective implementation of disarmament regimes and regional realpolitik. While Israeli nuclear program is a taboo and remains completely defiant to any inspection or admission or denial, the US and the West are pushing other states to abandon their nuclear as well as conventional military aspirations especially if these programs are for military purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Policy of Egypt Under Hosni Mubarak
    Mubarak Matters: The Foreign Policy of Egypt Under Hosni Mubarak by Eric Fillinger SIS Honors Capstone Supervised by Professors Kristin Smith Diwan and Linda Lubrano Submitted to the School of International Service American University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with University Honors in International Studies Bachelor of Arts Degree May 2009 Abstract The goal of this research is to identify how Egypt defines its national interest and how it uses its foreign policy to promote this interest during the presidency of Hosni Mubarak. The capstone paper achieves this objective through an examination of three case studies—the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Neoclassical realism is the primary theoretical framework for the project, combined with insights from analyses of foreign policy decision making. The use of both research traditions provides a more complete understanding of how Mubarak executes foreign policy. Such a study is needed because available scholarly work on the topic of Egyptian foreign policy during Mubarak’s time in office is scarce and is not focused on Egypt’s definition of its national interest. Research for the project was conducted with primary sources, such as newspaper editorials and documents from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as scholarly articles that analyze and critique Egyptian foreign policy. The results indicate that Egyptian foreign policy is determined by Mubarak’s desire to guarantee the influence and power of Egypt throughout the region, as well as a need for Mubarak to guarantee the security of his regime.
    [Show full text]
  • Interview with Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim Daniel Benaim
    The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2006 Interview with Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim Daniel Benaim In the weeks leading up to Egypt's No. You can’t have democracy without being Presidential election, I had the opportunity to inclusive of everybody, so long as people are interview Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Dr. Ibrahim is respectful of the rules of the game. perhaps Egypt's best-known dissident intellectual and the Founder and Chairman of the Ibn Khaldun One critic worried that you were describing Center for Development Studies in Cairo, where I the Islamists that you wish for, rather than those was a Summer Fellow in 2005. In June 2000, Dr. that you see. How would you integrate the Ibrahim and two dozen of his associates were Muslim Brotherhood into Egyptian politics while arrested and jailed on charges ranging from assuring that they play by the rules of the game? defrauding the European Union to disseminating Isn’t there a danger that the process would be information harmful to Egypt's interests. After a irreversible? three-year ordeal during which Dr. Ibrahim (62 years old at the time) was sentenced to seven years The Egyptian Constitution includes all kinds of hard labor--all charges against him were of built-in safeguards. I suggested the armed forces dismissed by Egypt's highest court and he was and the constitution serve as the safeguards of released from prison in 2003. Sitting in his office in pluralism, of civil government, and of regular old a beautiful Islamic villa in Cairo's Mokattam democratic aims.
    [Show full text]
  • Youth Activism in the South and East
    YOUTH ACTIVISM IN THE SOUTH AND EAST MEDITERRANEAN Comprising 102 institutes from 32 European and South Mediterranean countries, the EuroMeSCo (Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) network was created in 1996 for the joint and coordinated strengthening of research and debate on politics and security in the Mediterranean. These were COUNTRIES SINCE THE ARAB considered essential aspects for the achievement of the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 2 UPRISINGS: CHALLENGES AND EuroMeSCo aims to be a leading forum for the study of Euro-Mediterranean affairs, functioning as a source of analytical expertise. The objectives of the network are to become an instrument for its POLICY OPTIONS members to facilitate exchanges, joint initiatives and research activities; to consolidate its influence in policy-making and Euro-Mediterranean policies; and to disseminate the research activities of its institutes amongst specialists on Euro-Mediterranean relations, governments and international S. Colombo (Ed.), N. Abdalla, O. Shaban, I. Schäfer organisations. STUDY POLICY JOINT The EuroMeSCo work plan includes a research programme with four publication lines (EuroMeSCo Joint Policy Studies, EuroMeSCo Papers, EuroMeSCo Briefs and EuroMeSCo Reports), as well as a series of seminars, workshops and presentations on the changing political dynamics of the Mediterranean region. It also includes the organisation of an annual conference and the development of web-based resources to disseminate the work of its institutes and stimulate debate on Euro-Mediterranean affairs. The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Founded founded in 1989, is a consortium comprising the by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, does research Catalan Government, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign in the fields of foreign policy, political Affairs and Cooperation and Barcelona City Council.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kefaya Movement
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. The Kefaya Movement A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative Nadia Oweidat, Cheryl Benard, Dale Stahl, Walid Kildani, Edward O'Connell, Audra K.
    [Show full text]