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Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Alaa Al-Din Arafat HOSNI MUBARAK AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT Copyright © Alaa Al-Din Arafat, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in hardcover as The Mubarak Leadership and Future of Democracy in Egypt in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above compa- nies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-33813-5 ISBN 978-1-137-06753-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137067531 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ‘Arafat, ‘Ala’ al-Din. Hosni Mubarak and the future of democracy in Egypt / Alaa Al-Din Arafat. p. cm. Pbk. ed. of: The Mubarak leadership and future of democracy in Egypt. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. With a new preface. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–33813–5 (alk. paper) 1. Mubarak, Muhammad Husni, 1928– 2. Mubarak, Gamal. 3. Egypt—Politics and government—1981– 4. Egypt—Politics and government—1970–1981. 5. Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (Egypt)— History. 6. Political leadership—Egypt—History. 7. Democracy— Egypt—History. 8. Political stability—Egypt—History. 9. Islam and politics—Egypt—History. I. ‘Arafat, ‘Ala’ al-Din. Mubarak leadership and future of democracy in Egypt. II. Title. DT107.87.A73 2011 962.05Ј5092—dc23 2011034403 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First PALGRAVE MACMILLAN paperback edition: November 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 To Professor Stephen Chan Distinguished scholar and great teacher CONTENTS Preface to the 2011 Edition ix List of Acronyms xiii Introduction: Chronic Survival 1 One It Just Looks Like a Party 9 Two Addicted to Hegemony 21 Three The Tug of War 43 Four The Business of Politics 61 Five Keeping Reform at Bay 87 Six The Illusion of Reform 105 Seven The Tipping Starts 123 Eight Scaling the Eight Walls 137 Nine On the Bright Side 157 Ten Is Islam the Solution? 171 Epilogue: Succession or Success? 185 Appendix 203 Glossary of Arabic Terms 209 Notes 211 Bibliography 251 Index 263 PREFACE TO THE 2011 EDITION This book was originally published in 2009, in anticipation of Egypt’s 2011 elections, and a year and a half before the protests that captured the attention of the world and ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. While its analysis does not go beyond 2009, it provides a comprehensive historical and political examination of the rise of Hosni Mubarak and the National Democratic Party (NDP), and a snapshot of the situation as it stood in Egypt prior to the remarkable events of 2011. At the beginning of 2011, a call for an Egyptian general strike and a “Day of Anger” on January 25 was issued by the organizers of a Facebook page entitled “We Are All Khaled Said,” sparking mass pro- tests and demands for Hosni Mubarak’s resignation.1 For months they worked loosely in coordination with four other online movements: the April 6 Movement,2 Youth for Justice and Freedom, HASHD,3 and the Popular Front for Freedom, as well as Mohamed Al-Baradei’s cam- paign, the Muslim Brotherhood (who have subsequently kept a re- markably low profile despite playing a very significant role in the protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square), and the Democratic Front Party.4 Since 2007 at least, digital modes of communication like Facebook and Twitter have been used to promote democracy by mobilizing and encouraging the public. Their anonymous and decentralized character have made them a safe means of political mobilization. As a matter of fact, in the words of Foreign Policy’s Blake Hounshell: There’s no question that social networking was a critical factor in Mubarak’s overthrow . But the popular explosion that led to Mubarak’s overthrow was not simply a matter of calling for protests on Facebook; it was the product of years of pent-up rage x Preface to the 2011 Edition and frustration at the corruption and abuse of power that had become the hallmarks of the Egyptian regime.5 The 2011 protests were sparked by a combination of economic and political factors. Politically speaking, Mubarak’s regime had monopo- lized politics for the interests of the NDP and its allies within the business community. To do so, the NDP had used state security intel- ligence to fix the 2010 election and facilitate a hereditary succession. In the summer of 2010, amid rumors of President Mubarak’s ailing health, some NDP figures had reportedly backed a movement in support of his son Gamal Mubarak’s candidacy. Dubbed the “Popular Coalition/ Campaign for the Support of Gamal Mubarak,” the initiative received attention for hanging campaign posters in poor Cairo neighborhoods with such slogans as “Gamal Mubarak: dream/hope of the poor,” “Egypt is calling on you,” and “Gamal Mubarak: a new beginning for Egypt.” These provocative slogans helped to undermine the regime by di- rectly motivating political mobilization. Most Egyptians now felt that Mubarak, his son, and NDP functionaries held them in contempt, which encouraged them all the more to take to the streets—not only in opposition to rigged elections and dynastic succession, but also against all regime policies. As NDP6 Secretary General Mohamed Ragab put it, “[Ahmed] Azz’s7 manipulation of parliamentary elections8 and the exclusion of all opposition forces from the People’s Assembly was the straw that broke the camel’s back.”9 The 2010 election was the begin- ning of the end for the NDP and Mubarak. For this reason, following Mubarak’s departure, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael H. Posner was wise enough to urge the interim Egyptian government to make the September 2011 presi- dential elections transparent, free, and fair.10 Similarly, Egypt missed several opportunities to grow economically. Egyptians have long faced economic constraints, lack of jobs, and growing disparity between the rich and the poor. Over time, two Egypts had emerged—the Egypt of the rich with its lavish gated com- munities and the Egypt of the poor with its overcrowded and suffering cities.11 By 2011 there was a strong sense that the economic hardships were caused by the Mubarak regime, and that the government hadn’t done anything to remedy the situation.12 Protesters in Tahrir Square cited this as another reason for demonstrating. As one protestor put it, “I prefer to be run over by tanks than to live as a slave to Mubarak. I will not move from here unless Mubarak is toppled.”13 Preface to the 2011 Edition xi However, there were a number of other interrelated factors that led to the success of the 2011 revolution: First, the success of the Tunisian people’s ouster of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in mid-January had a tremendous effect on the Egyptian revolution. It served as an inspiring example for Egyptian protestors to follow. Second—and perhaps most importantly—the revolution had no centralized leadership. No single player stood out as a potential leader who could negotiate with the Mubarak regime. Neither the secular parties nor the Muslim Brotherhood were directly in control, and the protests were supported by a broad cross-section of Egyptian society. Third, the organizers’ choice of January 25 was strategic: it was a state holiday dedicated to the police. This found a response in the oppressed public and further generated support.14 Fourth, the regime responded to the demonstrations in a stubborn and clumsy manner. The protestors were determined to achieve suc- cess—for if they did not, they would be jailed or worse. The regime’s intransigence contributed to its downfall. The more violence it inflicted upon the demonstrators, the more committed they became. This was captured by one of the demonstrators’ favorite refrains: “Leave! We won’t go. He should go.” Finally, Mubarak compounded the ineffectiveness of his regime’s initial response with decisions that only further inflamed the protests. His inability to understand the demands of the movement again made indirect but valuable contributions to the protesters’ cause. In partic- ular, he attempted to satisfy calls for his resignation by ceding select powers to Vice-President Omar Suleiman, but this was utterly ineffec- tive—most protesters saw this as a manipulation of their demands and an attempt to hang on to power, not any kind of concession or reform. One protester expressed his dismay by saying, “It is a manipulation. If not, what is it? Mubarak sends his close friend and ally to govern us in behalf of him. Suleiman is just an extension of the Mubarak regime. We are not children to be laughed at.”15 Suleiman showed no inclination to relinquish the regime’s three-decade-old emergency powers, and like Mubarak he dismissed the protestors by claiming that they were pawns of foreign powers.16 The deployment of Suleiman at that junc- ture, along with the selection of Dr. Ahmed Shafiq as prime minister, helped to speed up the collapse of the regime. The question of who will be the winners or losers of the 2011 revo- lution remains unsettled.
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