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Egypt After Mubarak DATELINE Egypt after Mubarak by Lee Smith The Middle East Quarterly is pleased to inaugurate a new section dedicated to the region’s current affairs. Written by scholars, journalists, and practitioners, Dateline offers succinct analyses of recent trends. Its main focus will be capitals and flashpoints, but it will offer regular reporting from the United States where many of the Middle East’s political issues are played out, and from Europe where Muslim communities have an increasingly promi- nent role. This feature begins with an article by Lee Smith on the imminent succession problem in Egypt as seen from Washington.—The Editors As the Obama administration crosses its fingers in the hope that an Iraq currently with- out a government will somehow stabilize and justify the American blood and money spent over the last seven years, Washington has started to turn its attention to what has historically been one of Baghdad’s rival centers of Arab power—Cairo. cratic Party’s (NDP) ticket for next September’s A DEMOCRATIC presidential elections, or that Husni Mubarak HEREDITARY will not last that long and the constitutional pro- SUCCESSION? cess will kick in, paving the way for Gamal’s nomi- nation and election. Things are changing in Egypt as well, for Another Mubarak would spell continuity barring any last-minute surprises, the ailing 82- of a sort even if it meant an end to nearly six year-old president, Husni Mubarak, is report- decades of military rule by the “Free Officers” edly on the verge of enjoying the highest privi- regime. While it is true that Gamal has relation- lege afforded Arab rulers—to die in bed of natu- ships with the military establishment not only ral causes. It seems almost certain that he will be through his father but also by way of intersect- succeeded by his second son, Gamal, the 46- ing business interests—some Egyptian indus- year-old, one-time London financier.1 The specu- tries are essentially military-run concessions— lation inside the Beltway is that either Gamal will the fact remains that he is not a military man. “To replace his father on the ruling National Demo- be part of the military establishment is not just about your connections or family,” says Mu- hammad Elmenshawy, Washington bureau chief Lee Smith is a senior editor at The Weekly Stan- dard and the author of The Strong Horse: Power, 1 Daniel Sobelman, “Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2001, pp. 31-40; “Gamal Politics and the Clash of Arab Civilizations Mubarak: ‘We Need Audacious Leaders,’” Middle East Quar- (Doubleday, 2010). terly, Winter 2009, pp. 67-73. Smith: Egyptian Succession / 79 also included Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas along with Jordan’s King Ab- dullah II, was read as a signal that the succes- sion issue had been resolved. Until now, Mubarak has not only declined to appoint a successor, or even name a vice president who would assume the presidency in the event of an emergency, but has also avoided discussing the political prospects of his sec- ond son. According to officials from the Bush administration, whenever the president asked after Gamal, the Egyptian ruler would quickly change the subject. It is widely believed that the Egyptian president is less eager to have his son inherit the post than is his mother, the first Gamal Mubarak may not be entirely lady Suzanne Mubarak. interested in following his father Husni as Egypt’s president. His background is in finance and economics, and some DOES GAMAL EVEN analysts suggest that politics leave him WANT THE JOB? cold. Other U.S. policymakers are not sure that Gamal himself is entirely interested in the job. for the independently owned Egyptian daily His background is in finance and economics, newspaper Al-Shorouk. “It means that you’ve subjects that seem to elicit his passion. And worn a uniform, or you’ve fought in a war. Gamal indeed, thanks largely to Gamal and his cadre is a complete outsider.” of technocrats in the NDP, the Egyptian This perhaps raises a historical analogy: The economy has enjoyed a period of growth for Mamluk sultans (1260-1517) tried to get their non- half a decade or more. Even as little of the wealth slave sons to succeed them and sometimes man- has trickled down to improve the lot of the aged it, but they were not from the military slave poor—20 percent of Egyptians live in abject caste and eventually petered out, to be replaced poverty, and 60 percent live on $2 a day—the by a proper Mamluk. The bulk of Gamal’s task, at thriving economy has changed middle-class least early on, may be to ensure that history does perceptions. Egyptian parents, Elmenshawy ex- not repeat itself. plains, are less impressed these days when Most Washington officials are comfortable their daughters are courted by members of the with Gamal and see no fundamental change in military and security establishment and more the U.S.-Egyptian relationship on the horizon or apt to be swayed by young men who have adverse effects on the Egyptian-Israeli peace ac- made careers in banking, telecommunications, cord that is the foundation of the U.S. position or the big real estate deals taking place in New in the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, the fact Cairo. that Gamal accompanied his father to the pre- If Gamal cares about the economy, this seems Labor Day peace summit in Washington2 that to come at the expense of his interest in politics, a topic that leaves him cold or, in the words of some- one who has been in the room with him, brain dead. This is a dangerous liability for a man re- 2 Ha’artez (Tel Aviv), Aug. 31, 2010. quired to keep in check competing centers of do- 80 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010 DATELINE The Muslim Brotherhood mestic power—including is unlikely to mobilize and rallied people. These the Muslim Brotherhood, an opposition to things inspired imitators the Egyptian military, and around the region. Egypt the intelligence services Gamal’s succession. is still an important coun- (mukhabarat)—and re- try that other Arabs look gional actors while also accommodating his U.S. up to, but its energies ensue not from the gov- benefactors without aggravating an Egyptian ernment but from those that are opposed to population that has always been, at best, wary government.” of U.S. influence in the Middle East. On the other hand, it is possible he has just learned well from his father, the stone-faced former Air COMPETITION FROM Force commander who has steered the Free Of- MOHAMED ELBARADEI ficers’ regime on a steady course for almost thirty years between the radicalism that devas- To be sure, one of the biggest stories sur- tated Nasser’s Egypt and the then-startling ac- rounding the succession issue is Mohamed commodations with the United States and Is- ElBaradei’s decision to challenge the regime with rael that got Sadat killed. And so the question his unofficial campaign. Even as the Nobel Peace in Washington is, what will this transitional Prize winner and former International Atomic En- Egypt look like? ergy Agency (IAEA) chief is not—not yet any- “The physical decline of Husni Mubarak way—a member of a political party and thus not coincides with the decline of Egypt as a re- eligible to run in next fall’s elections, his pres- gional actor,” says David Schenker of the ence has generated attention both inside and Washington Institute for Near East Policy. outside Egypt. Never mind the fact that Iran sets the region’s “There’s a weird infatuation with Baradei,” political tempo while Qatar and Dubai’s satel- says Steven Cook at the Council on Foreign lite TV networks have eclipsed Cairo’s as the Relations, referring to fawning notices in U.S. region’s media capital. “Egypt can’t even get a press outlets including The Washington Post veto on upstream Nile development projects and The New Yorker. “But in a fairly bleak po- anymore from upstream African riparian states, litical environment lacking charisma, Baradei like Ethiopia.” shakes things up. He says, ‘I am not going to Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endow- run unless I can be assured of free and fair elec- ment for International Peace agrees that the tions,’ and this really throws a monkey wrench Cairo regime is not what it once was. “Domes- into the system and shakes up Gamal’s claims to tic affairs take up so much time that Egypt is far legitimacy.” less able to play an effective role in regional “I like the idea of Baradei,” says Schenker. affairs. Even the succession issue itself preoc- “I like the idea of an ostensible liberal. Baradei cupies them and absorbs energy. Egyptian in- came along and said things openly, and no one fluence is much less than it was even twenty could touch him. He seems to be in the van- years ago though part of that is because other guard of a political culture that is less fearful of Arab states have caught up in terms of educa- the government.” Nonetheless, explains the tion and communication and moved past Egypt former Bush administration Pentagon official, in terms of development. But Egypt just can’t ElBaradei wouldn’t be particularly palatable in present a compelling model, a compelling argu- Washington. “He politicized the IAEA, oversaw ment, or philosophy that other Arabs want to the nuclearization of Iran, and maintains that Is- imitate.” rael is the most dangerous state in the Middle The Egyptian opposition, says Dunne, is East,” says Schenker.
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