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Egypt's Business Elite After Mubarak. a Powerful Player Between SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Stephan Roll Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak A Powerful Player between Generals and Brotherhood RP 8 September 2013 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They express exclusively the personal views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Meredith Dale (English version of SWP-Studie 14/2013) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Recommendations 7 The Business Elite and the End of the Mubarak Regime 7 Background: Oligarchisation of the Economy under Mubarak 8 Cracks in the Edifice: The Business Elite, Gamal Mubarak and the Military 10 “Fat Cats” behind Bars? 13 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Established Business Elite 13 The Economic Policy Agenda and Its Implementation 15 Entry into the Formal Economy and Expansion of Networks with the Established Business Elite 17 Dealing with Mubarak-Era Fraud and Corruption 18 Limits of Rapprochement: Members of the Business Elite in Opposition to the Brotherhood 18 Party Finance and Election Campaigns 20 Funding Mass Media 23 Investment Boycott and Capital Flight: The Case of OCI 25 Outlook and Conclusions Appendix 27 Tables 28 Abbreviations Dr. Stephan Roll is an Associate in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the trans- formation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. Problems and Recommendations Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak A Powerful Player between Generals and Brotherhood During the last decade of the Mubarak era a handful of leading Egyptian entrepreneurs gained control over large sections of their country’s economy. That also made them part of the politically relevant elite, whose members wield influence over fundamental strategic decisions. This begs the question of the role of the business elite in the Egyptian transformation process that began with the toppling of Hosni Mubarak in early 2011. Will it succeed in defending its leading position in Egypt’s economy? And above all: Will it continue to play an important political role in the post-Mubarak era? As the following analysis shows, Egyptian top- entrepreneurs to date has been extremely successful in preserving both economic power and political influence. Although the anger of many Egyptians who took to the streets to protest against the regime in ear- ly 2011 was also directed against a business elite they regarded as corrupt, most entrepreneurs managed to hang on to their business empires through the tur- moil. Very few leading businessmen were taken to court in the months following the political transfor- mation. Most profited from the lenient stance on fraud and corruption taken by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which initially took charge, and the associated lack of transparency and legal rigour. The Muslim Brotherhood continued the same course. Even before its candidate Mohammed Morsi won the 2012 presidential elections, it was working towards an alliance with the established business elite and did nothing to support demands from civil society for thorough investigation of wrongdoing by business figures. Instead, the Brotherhood prioritised out-of- court settlements and sought to integrate the estab- lished business elite into its own power networks. But above all it built its economic policies on principles inherited from the Mubarak era, such as a focus on growth and the private sector. This course, which the international donor community never tired of prais- ing, especially benefited the country’s wealthiest business owners. But the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempt to co-opt Egypt’s business elite failed, along with the efforts of certain Brotherhood members to significantly expand SWP Berlin Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak September 2013 5 Problems and Recommendations their own business activities. Only a handful of lead- ing entrepreneurs came to terms with the Brother- hood and accepted its claim to political power. Most supported its adversaries by funding opposition parties and politicians and via private-sector media. Much of the mostly secular-minded business elite was fundamentally mistrustful of the proponents of polit- ical Islam, who do not belong to their social circles. Their wariness deepened during the course of Morsi’s presidency, as his government exhibited a grave lack of professionalism in its economic policy and sent in- creasingly contradictory signals to the business camp. Its conflict with sections of the business elite con- tributed to the Brotherhood’s failure to consolidate the power acquired through elections. Morsi’s removal by the armed forces at the beginning of July 2013 came about under pressure from the streets. However, behind the scenes entrenched interest groups includ- ing the business elite had been working for months to ensure the Brotherhood’s political downfall. The Morsi government, whose political manoeuvring found ever- diminishing support in the population, lacked the strength to push back against the resistance of these groups, including the business elite. The influence of big business on the political pro- cess is likely to remain considerable. The transitional government is composed largely of politicians and technocrats who are close to business interests. This in itself suggests that the interests of the business elite are likely to be protected as the transformation process progresses. Regardless of the current political turmoil, Germany and the European Union should therefore shape their long-term cooperation in such a way as to counteract the foreseeable negative con- sequences of such influence. Firstly, they should do more to promote reform of the regulatory framework of the Egyptian economy, particularly enhancing transparency in relation to state activity in the econ- omy and reforming the competition laws. Profession- alisation of the Egyptian media sector should also be advanced, to permit it to exercise an independent con- trol function. Secondly, Germany and Europe should help Egypt to establish a more equitable tax system and a more efficient revenue service. Egypt cannot achieve social peace if the one-sided growth policy of the late Mubarak era is simply continued. For without more active state-led redistribution policies, economic devel- opment is unlikely to achieve a broader impact. SWP Berlin Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak September 2013 6 Background: Oligarchisation of the Economy under Mubarak The Business Elite and the End of the Mubarak Regime The protests that led to the fall of Mubarak in 2011 At the same time, the widely held belief that a were directed not only against political repression and small business elite had gained significant control despotism, but also against social injustice and ram- over the country’s economy was certainly not far pant corruption. The lead-up was marked by growing from reality. During Hosni Mubarak’s three decades popular anger against the Egyptian business elite, in power the private sector transformed fundamen- which had profited greatly from the privatisation tally in two respects. policies of the previous decades. Its members, popu- Firstly, private companies came to play an in- larly known as “fat cats”, were accused of having creasingly important role in the Egyptian economy. acquired their wealth principally through networks Through his policy of economic opening (infitah), with the political leadership. The large number of Mubarak’s predecessor Anwar al-Sadat had already businessmen who occupied important political func- begun improving the general conditions for private tions during Mubarak’s last decade was regarded as entrepreneurship in the late 1970s. At first, Mubarak evidence of this. Putting an end to this system of only cautiously continued this policy, launching a “crony capitalism” and reining in the powerful busi- policy of economic structural adjustment in the early ness families became a central demand of the protest 1990s. However, from 2004 on, the privatisation pro- movement.1 Cracks also appeared within the regime cess was intensified. Between 2004 and 2008 alone itself. Especially among the generals, there was dis- the Egyptian state more than doubled its privatisation approval of the growing political influence of certain revenues compared to the preceding decade.3 The business leaders. However, the business elite’s loss of growing importance of the private sector relative to influence during the months following Mubarak’s the still weighty public sector was reflected above all removal was only marginal. in the development of employment and domestic in- vestment. While the private sector’s share of employ- ment rose by more than 10 percentage points to 73 Background: Oligarchisation of the percent, its share of investment almost doubled to Economy under Mubarak 62 percent (see figure, page 8).4 Secondly, a noteworthy concentration of capital During the Mubarak era many Egyptians felt excluded took place within the private sector. While at the from the country’s economic development and saw beginning of the 1980s there were no major private the divide between rich and poor expanding. Indeed, businesses to speak of, by the end of the Mubarak the high economic growth rates since the millennium era numerous sectors were dominated by individual often stood in contradiction to the country’s social privately-owned companies. This concentration of development. Between 2005 and 2008 GDP grew at an capital was a direct consequence of Mubarak’s priva- average annual rate of more than 6 percent while the tisation policies.
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