NUMBER 20 NOVEMBER 2011 RECALIBRATING A RELATIONSHIP THE SINAI ATTACKS HAVE BROUGHT TO LIGHT THE NEW DYNAMICS OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP. IT’S TIME FOR SOME REASSESSMENT AND READJUSTMENT. Mirette F. Mabrouk INTRODUCTION The relationship between Egypt and Israel has changed and both countries will have to navigate new waters There is an Egyptian proverb that says those who worry carefully and wisely. about demons will tend to run into them. Like much folk wisdom, it has solid psychological foundations; the LIFE WITH MUBARAK: EGYPT-ISRAEL likelihood of a problem rearing its head often appears to RELATIONS UNDER THE OLD REGIME be exacerbated by constantly fretting about it. Ever since Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt on The relationship between Egypt and Israel that existed February 11, 2011, the demon named “Now What?” has under Hosni Mubarak was a complex one that is per- been keeping the Israeli government up at night. On haps best examined in the context of its most friction- August 18, it finally leapt up at them. inducing factor: the Palestinian issue. That day, a group of armed men attacked Israeli buses, The Palestinian problem tends to produce a deeply vis- as well as civilian and military vehicles north of Eilat, ceral reaction in most Arabs. To ignore that fact is to near the Egyptian border. Eight Israelis, both civilians ignore generations of regional public protest on the and soldiers, were killed. The Israel Defense Forces matter and any number of international pulse-taking (IDF) set off in hot pursuit, shooting at the attackers polls. James Zogby, of the Arab American Institute, from a helicopter. The helicopter crew either failed to which regularly conducts polls on Arab issues, wrote in notice, or ignored, that they were shooting over the September, “The importance of Palestine to Arabs is Egyptian side of the border. In the pursuit, three Egyp- not exactly news. Our public opinion polls across the tians—an officer and two enlisted men—were killed and Middle East have consistently demonstrated the central another three later died of their wounds. Israeli minister role this issue plays in shaping the Arab world view.”2 of defense Ehud Barak, while blaming Palestinian groups for the assault, made comments to the effect that The 1978 Camp David Accords, signed between Egypt the attacks were largely Egypt’s fault as there had been a and Israel, takes into account the Palestinian issue by major security collapse in Egypt since the former regime referring to the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinian had been ousted six months earlier.1 people, a framework entailing a just resolution to the regional conflict, and, among other things, a withdrawal The way matters unfolded over the next few days poin- of Israeli armed forces from Gaza and the West Bank.3 tedly illustrated the answer to a question that had been Having accomplished a partial withdrawal (to question- asked repeatedly both by international media and the able effect) both Egypt and Israel have seen fit to rest Israeli government since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster: What on their laurels. The years since have seen one succes- did Egypt’s January 25 Revolution mean for Israel? The sive U.S. president after another run his ship aground simplest answer is that it is no longer business as usual. on the cliffs of the so-called peace process. Innumera- Mirette F. Mabrouk is a Nonresident Fellow with the Saban Center and Director of Communications at the Economic Research Forum (ERF). ble photo ops attest not only to the stagnation of the enabled vital supplies of food and medicines, but they peace process, but also to the absence of democracy in also saw a brisk traffic in weapons that created prob- Egypt: a procession of U.S. presidents have been photo- lems for Israel and, in a more complicated manner, for graphed with Mubarak, recording iterative, failed at- Egypt. The weapons smuggled out of Sinai allegedly tempts at peace. found their way to Palestinians, to the obvious distress of the Israelis. Correspondingly, weapons smuggled However, as long as Mubarak was in power, Israel could into Sinai—according to the Egyptian government— continue to say that it was pursuing a course of peace, were used to train and arm anti-regime militants and since it had the legitimacy of Egypt’s participation be- terrorists.5 hind it. And Egypt could say that it was doing its part to bring about peace to the region. As a piece of not-so- Egyptians were not pleased that their government amateur theatrics, it worked well. However, as the peace helped Israel enforce the blockade of Gaza. Things process steadily lost credibility, the Egyptian government reached an unpleasant climax in January 2010, when the proceeded to look worse in the eye of its citizens. This Egyptian army clashed with demonstrators on the Pal- was especially true during the Israeli bombardment of estinian side of the Gaza border. The demonstrators Gaza in December 2008. Then-Israeli foreign minister pelted the Egyptians with rocks and were met with tear Tzipi Livni visited Egypt directly before the attacks gas. It didn’t help public perceptions that Egypt was started, which made it look as if Egypt were complicit. constructing an underground steel barrier to block off the tunnels. Comparisons with what was known as the The image that the Egyptian gov- Israeli-built “Apartheid Wall” were ernment was not helping the Pales- inevitable. The cherry on top was the tinian was painted many times. Fol- As long as Mubarak was in pow- army’s clash with international activ- lowing Hamas’s electoral victory in er, Israel could continue to say that ists who had accompanied a convoy 2006, Egypt’s involvement in Israe- it was pursuing a course of peace, that had originally set out from the li-Palestinian peace negotiations since it had the legitimacy of United Kingdom. The convoy was rarely seemed to support the Pales- Egypt’s participation behind it. led by British member of Parliament tinian positions. The Egyptian re- George Galloway, who was uncere- gime didn’t like Hamas any more And Egypt could say that it was moniously deported from Egypt on than the Israelis did. In fact, that doing its part to bring about peace. January 9, 2010.6 Hamas had won a democratic elec- tion clanged several warning bells in Undemocratic or not, the regime still Cairo, where there was not much official enthusiasm for had to nominally explain to its people why it was de- democratic elections of any sort, let alone ones that priving beleaguered Palestinians of aid and, worse still, ushered in an Islamist winner. The Egyptian regime had colluding with the Israelis. The state press went into been busy keeping the Muslim Brotherhood under its overdrive, attempting to justify the situation. Abdel thumb for decades and bearing in mind the success that Monem Said Aly, then head of the state-run Ahram the Brotherhood had had at the polls in 2005, when it Centre for Strategic and Political Studies and later won 20 percent of the seats in Parliament, the regime Chairman of the Board of Al-Ahram (until he was re- was keen on keeping it there. placed in late March 2011, following the January 25 revolution,) laid out the reasons for Egypt’s concerns: Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007 made Egypt’s distaste for the group more salient. Egypt has always had some- The geographic link generates risks and chal- thing of a complicated relationship with Gaza. The area lenges for Egyptian security, the safety of the was under Egyptian administration from 1948 until the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the economic 1967 War, when Israel gained control of the territory. prosperity of Sinai and, of no less importance, When the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed in 1979, the relationship between Hamas and the Mus- Gaza remained under Israeli occupation. There is a lim Brothers in Egypt. common misconception that the network of tunnels that run from Gaza to Egypt was not built until 2007, when Three additional security risks from Gaza were Israel blockaded Gaza following Hamas’s takeover of added in the last few years. The first involved Gaza. In fact, those tunnels were first active in 1999– smuggling of arms into Sinai and contributing 2000, but it was only after 2007 that both the Israelis and to the training of terrorists who carried out the Egyptians began to take notice.4 Following the June deadly operations in Taba, Sharm al-Sheikh 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas, Israel blockaded the and Dahab on the Gulf of Aqaba coast. The Gaza Strip to put pressure on the group. The tunnels second was the demographic invasion of Sinai RECALIBRATING A RELATIONSHIP| MEMO NUMBER 20 | 2 by three quarters of a million Palestinians in doubtedly would have reconsidered. As it turned out, January 2008. This alerted Egyptians to the pos- Egyptians were used to turning out to support Palestine sibility of a Palestinian takeover of Sinai, wheth- and, almost by default, voice their displeasure at both er under pressure from Israel or by Hamas Israel’s actions and their own regime’s perceived com- planning to create strategic depth for its very plicity. Those demonstrations, attended by otherwise small territory. The third, a much more strategic disparate groups united in their displeasure at Israeli security risk, involves Hamas becoming part of treatment of the Palestinians, provided training in orga- a much larger coalition of radicals that are tar- nizational logistics which would later prove useful in geting Egypt for having changed its posture to toppling a regime.