DOCSLIB.ORG

The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives by Vicken Cheterian

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives by Vicken Cheterian GCSP Policy Paper n°11 February 2011 The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives by Vicken Cheterian Key Points • The wave of Arab revolt, which started in Tunisia and then Egypt and Libya, is spreading at an unprecedented speed. This is the result of not only modern internet-based technolo- gies of communication, but also the deep socio-economic crisis of the region coupled with autocratic regimes that are not qualified to address the needs of the new generation. • The socio-economic malaise in the region is deep. Youth unemployment, degradation of natural resources, and demographic explosion are among the driving forces. Corruption and economic autocracy went hand in hand. There is a need for a complete socio-eco- nomic overhaul. Toppling autocracies is a necessary first step, but the success of the cur- rent will also depend on the possible creation of new political institutions, and a reformist agenda. • It is curious to see the different reaction of the West compared to the wave of the Color Revolutions a decade earlier. Western leaders, who closely collaborated with the auto- cratic regimes for decades, and did not come to the support of pro-democracy militants, need to revise their approach. They should also revise their policies towards the national questions of the region, including the situations in Palestine and Iraq. Lastly, for a stable Middle East and North Africa, the West, and especially Europe, needs to revise the posi- tion of the region on the global economic map, as oil-based economies of the region have failed to create the necessary jobs and sustainable development. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international training centre for security policy based in Geneva. An international foundation with over 40 member states, it offers courses for civil servants, diplomats and military officers from all over the world. Through research, workshops and conferences it provides an internationally recognized forum for dialogue on issues of topical interest relating to security and peace policy. he Arab revolt that started in Tunisia and over- Bank study, the region imports half of its food, and threw the reign of Zein El-Abedeen Ben Ali is spends the equivalent of 30 billion USD on food im- Ttaking the form of a huge wave. The regime of ports. With the on-going population explosion – the Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the central state of the Arab region’s population is growing at a rhythm of 2.3% World, followed suit. Uprising in Libya continues, in a year – and decrease in water availability as a result spite of attempts by the Kaddhafi regime to kill it in of climate change and increased damming of rivers, blood and fire. Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen declared the region will increasingly depend on food imports, that he will not seek a new mandate, a concession and therefore be exposed to international market which only emboldened both opposition and youth fluctuations. The situation of the industrial sector is revolt. King Abdallah of Jordan sacked the unpopular not better: the Arab Human Development Report in government of Samir Rifai, and named Maruf Bakhit 2009 notes that the domination of economies by as the new prime minister and asked him to bring oil has led to the weakening of other sectors: “the “true political reforms”. In a word, the entire Arab Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than World is facing an unprecedented wave of revolt. in 1970, almost four decades previously.”3 Lastly, the global crisis of 2008 had a deep impact on the Arab The contestation has already scored a number of vic- financial sector. According to one estimate, Arab tories: the 23 year-old autocrat of Tunisia promptly countries lost 2.5 trillion dollars as a result of the glo- left the country to exile in Saudi Arabia; in Egypt, bal financial meltdown.4 Hosni Mubarak abandoned long brewing plans to install his son Jamal in his seat, and was forced to The social consequences of those structural problems abdicate, handing power over to the military, after are deep: The existing political orders today are too trying to bring his loyal chief of the mukhabarat, or rigid, autocratic, corrupt, and militaristic, which does the secret services, Omar Suleiman, to the post of not qualify them to address mounting socio-econom- vice president. ic problems. One of the most explosive issues is youth unemployment: Arab Development Report estimates In case there is doubt about the importance of that within a decade Arab countries need to create the on-going Arab revolt, an animated debate has 51 million new positions to accommodate young emerged about its nature, and growing, sometimes people seeking jobs. 2 anxious prognostics about its possible outcome. On the one hand we have ardent embrace of yet anoth- The current socio-economic problems are not er “Twitter” or “Facebook” revolution, while others unique, but repetitions of periodic failings of regional underline the power of the internet and the satellite economies. The regional economic model, highly re- televisions in undermining autocratic regimes. Such sembling colonial era mono-export and dependent comparisons, consciously or not, create an emotion- economies, has failed. Today, not only the oil-rich al field where the demonstrators or rebels are like countries like Algeria or Saudi Arabia are dependent “us”, our Western, modern, middle-class, globalised on petrodollars, but the entire region is through labor “youth”. Comparisons of the fall of the Berlin Wall migration, remittances and direct investments from and the liberation of Eastern Europe with the current oil-rich economies. The most evident failures are Al- wave of Arab revolt are abundant. Is this “The Arab geria and Libya, which are in deep social and political world’s 1989 Revolution?” asks al-Jazeera, while the crisis in spite of rich oil deposits. Deutche-Welle finds similarities with the events in East Germany over two decades back?1 Lesser enthu- What is really peculiar is that the current revolt is tak- siasts fear the current popular mobilization will top- ing place when oil prices are relatively high, unlike ple pro-Western regimes, break the regional power the “bread riots” of the 1980’s, a result of a collapse balance in a way unfavorable to Israel, and eventu- of international oil prices. This is a clear sign that the ally open up the political space for Islamist forces, oil-based economic model is a failure, and a source be it the Muslim Brotherhood or more radical jihadi of regional instability. The best example of this failure groups. is Algeria, where oil-richness, corruption, military dic- tatorship and social problems coexist under one roof. Socio-Economic Malaise The current revolt in Arab countries is deep-rooted, Trigger and surpasses simply rebelling against political au- This wave of revolt started on a background of de- thoritarianism to aim at the heart of the socio-eco- teriorating social conditions: the rising prices of food nomic structure of the region.2 The Arab countries and basic services. This is not a surprise as global are some of the most exposed to rising food process, food prices are record high, and in Arab countries since the region is one of the dryest in the world, two-fifth of income is spent on food (see Table 1). flanked by the two greatest deserts on the globe: the Sahara and Rub’ al-Khali. According to a World Table 1: Percentage of household expenditure kind of rotation, but the simple disappearance of an on food from total budget aging dictator for the benefit of the army, which was never far away from the centre of power. Saudi Arabia 23.8% What is happening in Egypt, Tunisia and beyond is Tunisia 35.8% not simply a young, modern middle-class rebellion Egypt 38.8% against authoritarian rule anachronistic with recent Jordan 40.9% economic developments and social stratification. It Algeria 43.9% is rather social malaise that goes beyond the mid- Switzerland 10.3% dle classes to touch workers, the unemployed and Greece 14.5% agriculture laborers. This far the popular movements Turkey 24.8% have not brought about new political institutions, See Economic Research Service, USDA, 2007: or pushed hard enough to reform old ones. Yet, it http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/cpifoodandexpendi- is not clear whether we will be witnessing a regime tures/data/2007table97.htm change, or whether the ruling circles will be back to business once the wave of mobilization dies down. Widespread unemployment crossed with the rise of basic food prices made the situation untenable. Pro- Leadership tests against social conditions clashed with the rigid The on-going Arab revolt seems to be leaderless. The systems of autocratic rule which do not allow not first reaction by the local regimes, dissidents, and only mass protest but political action in general. The Western observers alike is that of surprise. No one other important element to the start of the rebellion saw this coming. It was hopelessness that ignited the is complete hopelessness: the symbolic act of 26- popular revolt, not organized and concerted politi- year old Mohamed Boazizi, the university educated cal action, symbolized by the series of self immola- but unemployed vegetable seller in Tunisia, whose tion starting with the desperate act of Mohammad self-immolation ignited the fire of the Tunisian revo- Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in De- lution. It is incredible the speed at which the fire in cember 2010. The Arab youth have initiated and led Tunisian provinces spread all around the Arab World. many of the political actions without the leadership Attempts at self-immolation were repeated in several or even the intervention of the traditional opposition 3 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Yemen, and forces.7 Near Tahrir Square in Cairo, young activists even Saudi Arabia.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Egypt: a Moment of Change and Challenge | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1754 Egypt: A Moment of Change and Challenge by J. Scott Carpenter, David Schenker Feb 7, 2011 ABOUT THE AUTHORS J. Scott Carpenter J. Scott Carpenter is an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Brief Analysis n February 2, 2011, J. Scott Carpenter, Dina Guirguis, David Schenker, and Robert Satloff addressed a special O Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute. Mr. Carpenter is the Institute's Keston Family fellow and director of Project Fikra: Defeating Extremism through the Power of Ideas. Ms. Guirguis is a Keston Family research fellow with Project Fikra. Mr. Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Institute. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks; Dr. Satloff's remarks were published separately as PolicyWatch #1751. Watch this event at C-Span.org J. Scott Carpenter P lacing Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution and Egypt's current unrest into historical context is important when discussing broader transition in the Middle East. In the 1990s, a phenomenon known as the Third Wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe, promoting democratic political transition throughout the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Latin America. The Middle East was notably absent from this global transformation. After the September 11 attacks, members of the Bush administration began asking why this political opening had failed to occur in the region. Many argued that such a transformation was simply impossible in Arab lands, but President Bush called these claims "the soft bigotry of low expectations." Today, many are asking whether this is truly a revolutionary moment in Egypt, one that might usher in an Islamist, theocratic takeover of a broad-based political movement.
    [Show full text]
  • Read Publication
    2018 ANNUAL REPORT DEFENDING, EDUCATING & EMPOWERING Vision Mission To be a leading advocate To enhance understanding for justice and mutual of Islam, protect civil rights, understanding. promote justice and empower American Muslims. CONTENTS 03 A Message from the Chair 04 Protecting Our Freedoms 06 Supporting Immigrants and Refugees 08 Challenging the Muslim Bans 10 Positive Change Through Civic Engagement 12 Our 25th Anniversary 14 Empowering Youth to Make Change 16 Amplifying Our Voices 18 Starting Conversations 20 Financial Report 21 Support Us 22 Our Team 2 MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Dear Friends and Supporters, CAIR California (CAIR-CA) is noting a special year in the history of our organization. Twenty-five years ago, CAIR came to the West Coast, opening the Northern California office - the organization’s first regional location. That location eventually became what is known today as the San Francisco Bay Area office, later expanding with three additional offices across the state. As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of CAIR-SFBA, it is really an anniversary for CAIR-CA. In this quarter-century of existence in California, we have continued to protect the civil liberties of American Muslims, educate our community, empower our youth and build coalitions that enhance the understanding of Islam. As we look back on 2018, I am proud to share some of our major victories: efforts by CAIR-CA and its partners to push legislation, signed into law by Gov. Brown, to protect our children from bullying in schools and encourage immigrant entrepreneurship; standing in solidarity with faith leaders and activists in support of asylum seekers and refugees; and expanded services throughout the state.
    [Show full text]
  • The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges
    The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges Editor Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges Editor Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman 1 The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan The Deposit Number at The National Library (2018/2/529) 277 AbuRumman, Mohammad Suliman The Prospects Of Political Islam In A Troubled Region / Moham- mad Suliman Abu Rumman; Translated by William Joseph Ward. – Am- man: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018 (178) p. Deposit No.: 2018/2/529 Descriptors: /Politics//Islam/ يتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولية القانونية عن محتوى مصنفه وﻻ ّيعبر هذا المصنف عن رأي دائرة المكتبة الوطنية أو أي جهة حكومية أخرى. Published in 2018 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Email: [email protected] Website:www.fes-jordan.org Not for sale © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editor. Translation: William Joseph Ward Cover and Lay-out: Mua’th Al Saied Printing: Economic Press ISBN: 978-9957-484-80-4 2 The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges Contributed Authors Dr. Mohammed Abu Rumman Dr. Khalil Anani Dr. Neven Bondokji Hassan Abu Hanieh Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Mobilization Under Authoritarian Rule
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Cadmus, EUI Research Repository Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity The Political Economy of Protest Mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia Jana Warkotsch Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Florence, August, 2014 submission European University Institute Department of Political and Social Sciences Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity The Political Economy of Protest Mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia Jana Warkotsch Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Examining Board Professor Donatella della Porta, (EUI Supervisor) Professor Philippe Schmitter, European University Institute Professor Jeff Goodwin, New York University Professor Emma Murphy, Durham University © Jana Warkotsch, 2014 No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people who accompanied me on the way to completing this thesis and who deserve my heartfelt gratitude. Institutionally, the EUI and my supervisor Donatella della Porta have provided me with the best environment in which to develop my research that I could have hoped for. Many of its scholars and students have provided valuable feedback along the way and its open academic culture allowed for exploring ideas across disciplinary boundaries. In addition, my jury consisting of Philippe Schmitter, Emma Murphy and Jeff Goodwin, provided insightful and thought provoking comments. Thanks also go to the many people that I have met and interviewed along the way, who have provided their time, insights, and personal stories.
    [Show full text]
  • From Hasan Al-Banna to Mohammad Morsi; the Political Experience of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
    FROM HASAN AL-BANNA TO MOHAMMAD MORSI; THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY AHMET YUSUF ÖZDEMİR IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES JULY 2013 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science Assoc.Prof.Dr. Özlem Tür Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev (METU,IR) Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı (METU, IR) Assis. Prof. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya (YBU, IR) I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name: Ahmet Yusuf Özdemir Signature : iii ABSTRACT FROM HASAN AL-BANNA TO MOHAMMAD MORSI; THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT Özdemir, Ahmet Yusuf M.S. Program of Middle East Studies Supervisor: Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı July 2013, 141 pages This thesis analyses the political and ideological transformation of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from its foundation in 1928 to 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • ARB 44 Egypt. V. Collombier
    Arab Reform Brief February 44 2011 Egypt: Before and After* Virginie Collombier ** Even before the current uprising began in Egypt, major changes in the political system had begun to threaten the stability of the Mubarak regime as the presidential succession became imminent. Electoral fraud and constitutional reforms could have resulted in a political deadlock in 2011. At the same time, the relative openness and freedom of expression that has emerged in Egypt since 2005 had laid the ground for new political movements to emerge and develop. Events in Tunisia, combined with a severe degradation of economic and social conditions in Egypt, and the growing perception that its citizens would have no say in the coming presidential succession, have created a favourable context for the unprecedented mobilization in Tahrir square. Uncertain transition A number of events forewarned that 2011 The presidential election planned for September would be a critical year for the Egyptian regime 2011 might have resulted in the designation of a – even before Tunisian protester Mohamed successor for Hosni Mubarak, in power for Buazizi burned himself in December 2010, thirty years. The stakes were high. Moreover, leading to a popular revolt and the flight of despite the efforts of the previous decade to try Tunisian president Ben Ali from his country and organize a smooth transition, it was not less than one month later, and before the 6 clear which scenario would prevail – just a few April Youth Movement in Egypt called for a months before this decisive deadline. Would massive demonstration on 25 January 2011. Hosni Mubarak’s younger son, Gamal, be “elected” president? This option, long deemed the most probable, had become more uncertain, * This brief is published in partnership with Noref (Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre) ** Researcher at The Arab Reform Initiative 2 notably because of the army’s perceived party capable of mobilizing people and winning opposition to it.
    [Show full text]
  • Bogdan SZAJKOWSKI*
    Alternative Politics, Vol.3, No.3, 256-419, November 2011 256 TIMELINE OF THE ARAB REVOLT: DECEMBER 2010 – JUNE 2011 Bogdan SZAJKOWSKI* December 17, 2010 Tunisia - Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old unemployed, sets fire to himself in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, protesting at the confiscation by police of his fruit and vegetable cart. He suffers third-degree burns across his entire body and is subsequently treated in the Traumatology Centre for Severe Burns in the town of Ben Arous. His self-immolation sparks demonstrations in which protesters burned tyres and chanted slogans demanding jobs. Protests soon spread to other parts of the country including the towns of al-Ragab and Maknasi in central Tunisia, and later the capital, Tunis. Videos of the Sidi Bouzid demonstrations are online soon after the protest began and the Twitter website carries extensive commentary of the protests. December 19, 2010 Tunisia - Protests spread to Kairouan (holy city located in north-central Tunisia), Sfax (city 270 km southeast of Tunis), and Ben Guerdane (town in south-eastern Tunisia, close to the border with Libya). December 20, 2010 Tunisia - Mohamed Al Nouri Al Juwayni, the Tunisian development minister, travels to Sidi Bouzid to announce a new $10m employment programme. But protests continue unabated. December 21, 2010 Tunisia - President Ben Ali carries out limited cabinet reshuffle and warns that protesters would be punished if rioting continued in the country. December 22, 2010 Tunisia - Lahseen Naji, a 22-year-old commits suicide in the midst of another demonstration over unemployment in Sidi Bouzid by climbing an electricity pylon and electrocuting himself on the cables, after shouting out ―No to misery, no to unemployment!‖ 257 Bogdan Szajkowski Ramzi Al-Abboudi, under the burden of business debt, ironically made possible by the country‘s micro-credit solidarity programme, commits suicide.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 a Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to Our Fellow Muslims in Egypt 5
    A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to Our Fellow Muslims in Egypt 5 [Please note: Images may have been removed from this document. Page numbers have been added.] Sheikh Ayman Al Zawahiri -may Allah protect him In the name of Allah, and praise Allah and prayer and peace upon the messenger of Allah, and upon his family, companions and allies. Muslim brothers everywhere: peace be upon you and Allah's mercy and blessings, and thereafter: This is the fifth episode of 'Message of Hope and Blessings for our People in Egypt,' and in the third and fourth episodes I discussed the popular, brave and dignified uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. And in them I sent greetings for the two righteous populaces in Tunisia and Egypt that have gotten rid of the corrupt and corruptive tyrants, Zain al-Aabideen bin Ali and Hosni Mubarak, and I asked the free, honorable Egyptians that their doctrine and Ummah gain victory through awareness towards deviational attempts in their march or loss of its fruits, and to continue the resistance, steadfastness, jihad and persistence to destroy the corruption and to establish the just system that rules with Sharia, spreads justice, applies the shura, and achieve the country's independence and political freedom and social equality. And I continue my talk today, and I say: In the beginning, I would like to send greetings to the free, honorable ones who are protective of their religion, honors, countries and dignity, from amongst the sons of our Ummah, who rose and keep rising against the injustice, oppression, tyranny, and dependency on the foreign, arrogant infidel that has launched on our Ummah and our Islam the contemporary crusade war in the name of war on terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Uprising in Egypt
    Uprising in Egypt Standard Note: SN/IA/ 5865 Last updated: 15 March 2011 Author: Ben Smith Section International Affairs and Defence Section Egypt’s remarkably peaceful and dignified popular revolt has been greeted as a historic moment that will have enormous consequences throughout the Arab world. This note describes the background to the crisis provides a simple account of events since 25 January. It profiles groups and individuals involved and considers some likely outcomes. Summary • The demonstrations that led to hundreds of deaths in Cairo and elsewhere led to the Egyptian army ending its support for Hosni Mubarak, who was forced to stand down on 11 February • Mubarak remained in Egypt and has been banned from leaving the country • Power in the country is in the hands of the Higher Military Council • The prime minister has been replaced twice since the unrest began; the post is now occupied by Essam Sharaf, a former transport minister in the Mubarak government • Changes to the constitution have been proposed to strengthen judicial oversight of elections and to curtail the government’s freedom to introduce states of emergency • The changes have been criticised as leaving too much power in the hands of the presidency, but could at least provide for more convincing elections before a definitive new constitution could be drawn up • The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt had a profound effect on the region, sweeping away any notion that Arabs do not want democracy and shaking autocratic regimes throughout the Muslim world • It is likely that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel would remain in place, at least in the medium term; the Muslim Brotherhood has said that it does not want to dominate politics in Egypt and that, even if it were in control, its policy would be to put the treaty to referendum This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual.
    [Show full text]
  • Dalacoura, the 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change
    The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications KATERINA DALACOURA The political upheavals in the Arab world during 2011 have irrevocably trans- formed the Middle East. Yet, as the year draws to a close and the euphoria subsides, it is clear that comparisons of the ‘Arab spring’ to the end of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 were premature. There has been—and there will be—no serial collapse of authoritarian regimes leading to a democratic future. Instead of ‘revolution’, the talk now is of ‘uprising’, ‘revolt’ or even simply ‘crisis’. One reason for the disagreement on how to label the events of 2011 is the inclination to think of the ‘Arab world’ as a unified entity. Arab societies and polities do indeed have tight interconnections and share at least some important characteristics. The potent myth of the Arab nation and the common public space pervaded by the idea of ‘Arabism’ has had complex effects since the beginning of the modern state system in the Middle East. It has been cultivated by powerful media, such as the satellite television channel Al-Jazeera. The contagious nature of the uprisings that started in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to a number of other Arab states, helped by these media (among other factors), is confirmation that the component parts of the ‘Arab world’ are linked by strong internal bonds. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of ‘Arab’ events—or even an Arab event—may also constitute a set of blinkers. First, by compelling us to search for common trends and characteristics, it prevents us from seeing the profoundly different causes, contexts and outcomes of the developments of 2011—from seeing that each uprising was different, focused on domestic, national issues and comprehensible in its own light.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 April 2012 Newsletter - Issue No
    13 -19 April 2012 Newsletter - Issue No. 8 1 Egypt Marzouk Egypt presidential elections is a low cost soap opera that we can't miss any of its' episodes David Kenner Egypt's electoral process increasingly reminiscent of pre-Erdogan Turkey, where free competition existed within constraints set by military Bassem Sabry A new Ahram Online Op-Ed by Bassem Sabry: "Why would many want to vote for Omar Suleiman "In fact, quite a few people seem to be coming to the disheartening conclusion that the country needs to be “ruled with an iron fist”. For those people, Suleiman (and to a lesser extent, Ahmed Shafiq) is seen as someone who knows the country enough to deal with its problems; he is seen as the kind of man who can “bring Egypt back from the brink”" Read More New Blog Post by Bassem Sabry: "One By One: Why Were These 10 Egyptian Presidential Candidates Disqualified" "10 candidates (out of a total of 23) have just preliminarily disqualified from the Egyptian Presidential Elections. These 10 candidates have 48 hours for their only chance to appeal their disqualification, but many of them seem to be certainly out of the race" Read More Another Great Piece by Bassem Sabry: "Who Will Become The President Of Egypt? (UPDATE 2)" "The "Revolutionary Candidate" initiative consisted mainly of bringing together all the candidates that were considered to be aligned with the revolution, and for them to agree on one main candidate that they would all unite around (with one or more other candidates serving as potential VPs).
    [Show full text]
  • After the Coup: Egyptian Public Opinion in the Summer of 2013
    AFTER THE COUP: EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SUMMER OF 2013 Alex Brezinski David Rae Sam Solomon American Association of Public Opinion Research May 17, 2014 POLITICS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN EGYPT Role of the public has expanded in Egyptian politics 2011: 25 January Revolution 2012: Protests against SCAF, first presidential elections and parliamentary elections 2013: Protests against Morsi, protests in support of coup 2014: TBD Even in current atmosphere, accurate measurement of attitudes of the Egyptian public is critical 2 EGYPT CATI PILOT CATI survey of the general public of Egypt, among households with landline or mobile telephones 1,001 adult Egyptian nationals, age 18+ Split into two phases to experiment with methodology Phase 1: June 27 – July 1, 2013 (n=501) Phase 2: July 5 – July 8, 2013 (n=500) Opportune timing allows for pre- and post- July 3rd coup comparisons Cross-national CATI allows for political surveys 3 METHODOLOGY 35 Arabic-speaking interviewers List-assisted random digit dialing (RDD) to pulse for working numbers Landline: list of known area codes and exchanges Mobile: list of known mobile provider codes Differences between Phase 1 and Phase 2 Mode distribution: 50/50 mobile to landline in Phase 1, 70/30 in Phase 2 Gender matching: None in Phase 1, respondents matched with interviewers of same gender in Phase 2 4 KEY FINDINGS Majority support for coup Optimism regarding security, economy Attitudes about the direction the country is going Attitudes towards leaders, parties, and institutions related
    [Show full text]