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After the Coup: Egyptian Public Opinion in the Summer of 2013

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After the Coup: Egyptian Public Opinion in the Summer of 2013 AFTER THE COUP: EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SUMMER OF 2013 Alex Brezinski David Rae Sam Solomon American Association of Public Opinion Research May 17, 2014 POLITICS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN EGYPT Role of the public has expanded in Egyptian politics 2011: 25 January Revolution 2012: Protests against SCAF, first presidential elections and parliamentary elections 2013: Protests against Morsi, protests in support of coup 2014: TBD Even in current atmosphere, accurate measurement of attitudes of the Egyptian public is critical 2 EGYPT CATI PILOT CATI survey of the general public of Egypt, among households with landline or mobile telephones 1,001 adult Egyptian nationals, age 18+ Split into two phases to experiment with methodology Phase 1: June 27 – July 1, 2013 (n=501) Phase 2: July 5 – July 8, 2013 (n=500) Opportune timing allows for pre- and post- July 3rd coup comparisons Cross-national CATI allows for political surveys 3 METHODOLOGY 35 Arabic-speaking interviewers List-assisted random digit dialing (RDD) to pulse for working numbers Landline: list of known area codes and exchanges Mobile: list of known mobile provider codes Differences between Phase 1 and Phase 2 Mode distribution: 50/50 mobile to landline in Phase 1, 70/30 in Phase 2 Gender matching: None in Phase 1, respondents matched with interviewers of same gender in Phase 2 4 KEY FINDINGS Majority support for coup Optimism regarding security, economy Attitudes about the direction the country is going Attitudes towards leaders, parties, and institutions related to coup Difference of proportions tests used in analysis Complex sample design incorporated into test using design effects for individual statistics Significance at p < 0.05 5 WAS THIS A MILITARY COUP? 100% 80% 60% 64% 40% 20% 34% 0% Yes No 6 EGYPT DOES A 180° TURN Do you think that conditions in Egypt are generally headed in the right direction or are they headed in the wrong direction? 100% 80% 60% 67% 58% Right Direction Wrong Direction 40% 37% 30% 20% 7 0% Pre Post SUPPORT FOR COUP, BEFORE AND AFTER Pre Do you think it would be very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad for Egypt if the armed forces took over for the current government? 100% 80% 60% 70% 40% 20% 25% 0% Good Bad Post Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the action by the armed forces to remove President Morsi from power? 100% 80% 60% 73% 40% 8 20% 26% 0% Support Oppose SUPPORT FOR COUP EXTENDS BEYOND MORSI’S REMOVAL Please tell me whether you have very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinions of the following actions. 100% 80% 72% 71% 60% 65% Favorable 40% Unfavorable 20% 27% 28% 15% 0% 9 The removal of The suspension of the The installation of the President Morsi constitution interim government PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION UNCHANGED How serious of a problem is corruption in Egypt? 100% 80% 76% 70% 60% Very serious problem Somewhat serious problem Not very serious problem 40% Not a serious problem at all 20% 15% 8% 12% 5% 7% 6% 10 0% Pre Post PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IMPROVE How would you rate the security situation in Egypt? 100% 80% 60% 65% Good 52% Bad 40% 46% 35% 20% 11 0% Pre Post PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMY IMPROVE How would you rate the economic situation in Egypt? 100% 80% 68% 60% 55% Good Bad 40% 44% 30% 20% 12 0% Pre Post POLITICAL LEADERS (NET FAVORABILITY) 70% 50% 30% 10% -10% -5% -15% -13% -23% -30% -50% -70% Pre Post Pre Post Muhammad Morsi Hisham Qandil* 13 POLITICAL LEADERS (NET FAVORABILITY) 70% 50% +47% +51% 30% 10% -10% -13% -9% -30% -50% -70% Pre Post Pre Post Hosni Mubarak Omar Suleiman 14 POLITICAL LEADERS (NET FAVORABILITY) 70% +71% +68% +63% 50% +49% +42% 30% 10% +18% -5% -5% -10% -16% -7% -28% -30% -50% Opposition Religious Leaders Coup Leaders -70% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Mohammad Hamdeen Amre Pope Ahmed al- Adly Abdel- El Baradei* Sabahi Moussa* Tawadros II Tayeb Mansour Fattah al-Sisi 15 POLITICAL LEADERS (NET FAVORABILITY) 16 POLITICAL PARTIES (NET FAVORABILITY) 70% 50% 30% +6% 10% +19% +10% +4% +15% -10% -13% -8% -20% -26% -27% -30% Pro-Coup Anti-Coup -50% -70% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post The National Al-Nour Al-Watan The Muslim Freedom and Salvation Front Brotherhood Justice Party 17 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (NET FAVORABILITY) 100% +86% 80% +78% 60% +56% +54% 40% +42% +41% +39% 20% 0% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 18 The armed forces* The judiciary The police The interim government DISCUSSION The July 3rd coup was indeed popular Optimism regarding security and the economy improve Attitudes towards direction the country is going Support for coup associated with increased favorability 19 20 REFERENCES “Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.” The Telegraph. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10156681/Army-chief-Abdel-Fattah-al-Sisi- emerges-as-Egypts-strongman.html. “Adly Mansour.” Al Jazeera. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137322150549685.html. “Al-Nour Party.” Wikipedia. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Nour_Party. “Al-Watan Party.” Wikipedia. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Watan_Party_(Egypt). “Ahmed al-Tayeb.” BurNews. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.burnews.com/print/news/2013/11/26. “Amr Moussa.” Al Watan Voice. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/category/73/110.html. “Coup Press Conference.” Associated Press. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/egypt-turmoil-grows- army-deadline-expire “Fireworks Over Tahrir Square.” Tru News. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.trunews.com/army-deploys- commandos-across-egypt-morsi-supporters-promise-bitter-fight-after-coup/ “Freedom and Justice Party.” Egyptians News. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.egyptian- news.com/2012_11_26_archive.html. “Game Over.” The Star. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/07/02/egypt_president_morsi_defies_army_ultimatum_now_what.html. “Hamdeen Sabahi.” Egyptian Society. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.egyptiansociety.org.uk/come-and-ask-mr- hamdeen-sabahi-the-presidential-candidate/. “Hisham Qandil.” News24. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Egypts-PM-focuses-on- economic-growth-20120910. “Hosni Mubarak.” Wikipedia. Accessed 15 ay 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni_Mubarak. “It is Not a Coup.” BagNews. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.bagnewsnotes.com/2013/07/that-giant-laser- messaging-in-tahrir-square-its-not-a-coup/. “Mohamed el-Baradei.” Wikipedia. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_ElBaradei. “Muhammad Morsi.” Salon. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.salon.com/2012/12/23/whos_the_real_mohamed_morsi/. “Muslim Brotherhood.” Wikipedia. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_brotherhood. “National Salvation Front.” The Cairo Post. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://thecairopost.com/news/69475/news/divisions- inside-national-salvation-front-after-party-leader-departs. “Omar Suleiman.” Al Jazeera. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/imagecache/318/480/mritems/Images/2011/2/6/20112621261118427_20.jpg. 21 “Pope Tawadros.” The Orthodox Church. Accessed 15 May 2014. http://theorthodoxchurch.info/main/egypts-pope- mourns-slain-copts-calls-for-wisdom-restraint/. .
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