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News Coverage Prepared For: the European Union Delegation to Egypt

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News Coverage Prepared For: the European Union Delegation to Egypt News Coverage prepared for: The European Union delegation to Egypt . Disclaimer: “This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of authors of articles and under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of IPSOS or the European Union.” 1 . Thematic Headlines Domestic Scene Nour Party Denies Abandoning Abul-Fotouh Calls for Sabahi and Abul-Fotouh to Form National Commission Sunday Last Day for Challenges against Election Results MP Urges Morsi to Step Down for Sabahi Presidential Candidates Deny Supporting Morsi in Runoff Sabahi Campaign Prepares Report of Violations The Constituent Assembly Approved Preparations for the Run-off Round Resigned Officers Can Vote Egypt’s National Party Supports Ahmad Shafiq The Revolution Movements in Qalyoubiya Boycott the Runoffs The Revolution Front Supports Mursi Egypt’s National Party Supports Ahmad Shafiq Sabahy: I Will Not be Vice President 2 Newspapers (27/05/2012) Page: 1 Author: not mentioned Resigned Officers Can Vote Official sources declared that retired military officers had the right to vote in the presidential elections and practice all the other political rights enjoyed by the other citizens. The officials denied rumors about discarding retired military officers’ votes. Similar news was reported in al-Shurouk, p. 3 3 Page: 1, 3-5, 7, 22, 24-26 Author: many authors Preparations for the Run-off Round Communication between the different political parties and players started as soon as preliminary results of the presidential elections were announced. The run-off round is to be held between Ahmad Shafiq and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Mursi. A number of political powers have already announced their intention to back Mursi to resist what they called the counter-revolution and the reproduction of Mubarak’s regime. The Muslim Brotherhood called on the different political players and the presidential candidates who lost in the elections. Abd al-Munim Abu al-Futouh apologized for not being able to attend the meeting, stating that such meetings were not useful. Hamdeen Sabbahi did not attend either. Other political players called on the Muslim Brotherhood to offer guarantees in order to back its candidate. Judge Farouq Sultan, head of the High Presidential Elections Commission declared that the commission would consider contestations today before declaring the final results tomorrow. Secretary General of the commission Hatim Bagato stated that Ahmad Shafiq had filed a contestation against a polling station in Shubra al-Khaima where the judge who headed the polling station refused to allow Shafiq’s deputy to enter in the center to perform his tasks. Judge Zakaria Abd al-Aziz, former head of the Judge Club declared that the voting percentage was 45.6%. In his first declarations after the elections, Amr Mussa said he was not invited to the meeting held by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Mursi and the other political players 4 and presidential candidates. Mussa refused to comment on the elections results: “There will be a time when we will speak about everything.” Candidate Ahmad Shafiq held a press conference yesterday. Shafiq asserted that he was ready to cooperate with all the parties for the welfare of Egypt. Shafiq said it was impossible to reproduce the former regime, adding that the presidential elections were held thanks to the Jan 25 revolution. Shafiq declared that he would hold talks with the different trends. Al-Jamaah al-Islamiya is going to support Muhammad Mursi in the run-off round. Al- Jamaah called on Mursi to assign two vice presidents; namely Hamdeen Sabbashi and Abd al- Munim Abu al-Futouh. In Alexandria, Dr. Tariq Fahim, secretary general of Salafist al-Nour party declared that the party would accept Ahmad Shafiq if he won by people’s will, criticizing the calls to lead demonstrations in case Shafiq won. In a press conference, former American President Jimmy Carter declared that the presidential elections in Egypt were quite successful. Meanwhile, a number of the political players called on Muhammad Mursi to withdraw, giving the chance to Hamdeen Sabbahi to run the runoffs against Shafiq. The suggestion was by Issam al-Sharif, the general coordinator of the Free Front for Peaceful Change. Kifaya movement, the 6 of April movement and the Democratic Front approved the suggestion. MP Amr Hamzawi also called Mursi to withdraw to give Sabbahi a chance. Similar news was reported in al-Shurouk, p. 1, 5 5 Page: 1, 22 Author: Abd al-Jawad Ali The Constituent Assembly Approved The Legislative Committee at the People’s Assembly approved yesterday a draft law that sets down the criteria according to which the Constituent Assembly will be formed. According to the approved suggestion Mps will elect members of the Constituent Assembly who represent all the sectors of the Egyptian society. The suggestion also indicates drafting the constitution within a month. 6 Page: 1 Author: Mohmamed el-Sanhouri, Ahmed Youssef and Basma el-Mahdi Sunday Last Day for Challenges against Election Results Sunday will be the last final for receiving challenges against the results of the presidential elections, said a source at the High Presidential Elections Commission (HPEC). Electoral publicity activities for the runoff phase will start on May 30 and end on June 15, the source said. 7 Page: 1 Author: Alaa Sarhan, Mohamed el-Samkari and Mohamed Hamdi Sabahi Campaign Prepares Report of Violations The electoral campaign of presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi is preparing a report of violations committed against the candidate during the elections and would submit a challenge with the High Presidential Elections Commission, said campaign member Mahmoud Qandil. The campaign has collected evidence and photos of the violation to substantiate its legal status, Qandil said. Dozens of campaign members were discontent with the results of the elections and staged a protest on Saturday outside the campaign’s branches in several governorates. 8 Page: 5 Author: Adel el-Dargly, Mohsen Samika, Alaa Sarhan and Ahmed Allam Presidential Candidates Deny Supporting Morsi in Runoff With the preliminary results of the first round of the presidential elections showing that candidates Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq will reach the runoffs, the electoral campaigns of other candidates denied supporting Morsi. The campaign of Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh denied reports about its support of Morsi against Shafiq, who is tainted for serving the former president Hosni Mubarak. Meanwhile, the campaign of number three, Hamdeen Sabahi, also denied the reports about his support of Morsi as baseless. It also denied that Morsi had invited Sabahi and Abul-Fotouh to form a presidential team. Meanwhile, Amr Moussa’s campaign also refuted claims that Moussa was going to vote to Morsi, saying that Moussa will deliver an address to the people after the announcement of the final and official results of the polls. 9 Page: 5 Author: Hamdi Dabsh Nour Party Denies Abandoning Abul-Fotouh Salafist Al-Nour Party spokesman Yousri Hamad denied reports that the party, which had announced its support for presidential candidate Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh during the elections, has abandoned him and thus letting him land in the fourth place in terms of votes he garnered. Al-Nour Party members have been doing their best to support Abul-Fotouh and it was unreasonable to announce support for one candidate and vote for another, Hamad said. Al-Nour members have voted for Abul-Fotouh in the elections, he said, adding he has no idea how presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi managed to get all those votes from Alexandria, the stronghold of Salafists. Al-Nour has organized about 17 rallies in support for Abul-Fotouh, he noted. 10 Page: 5 Author: Hilmi Badr Egypt’s National Party Supports Ahmad Shafiq Egypt’s National Party hailed the presidential elections as democratic. The party will support Ahmad Shafiq in the runoffs. Head of the party Dr. Iffat al-Sadat declared that the party formed operation rooms in all the Egyptian cities to support Ahmad Shasfiq in the run-off round. 11 Page: 1. Author: Amr Badr. Sabahy: I Will Not be Vice President Hamdeen Sabahy held a meeting at his house yesterday with a number of politicians and intellectuals in his campaign. They all discussed Sabahy’s next move following the preliminary results of elections in which he came in third. The meeting resulted in Sabahy’s decision to refuse to be a part of a presidential council headed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate Dr. Mohamed Morsi. He also refused to run as vice president to Morsi during the runoff. The majority of Sabahy’s supporters completely refused any sort of alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. Sabahy filed an appeal with the Presidential Elections Commission to halt the announcement of elections results and re-count ballot papers in Al-Menoufia, Sohag, Al- Menia, Assiut and Al-Sharqiya governorates. 12 Page: 2. Authors: Hoda Abu Bakr and Hossam Khater. Political Isolation Law Could Exclude Shafik from Presidential Race Political Isolation Law is the last resort to exclude presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik, former prime minister, and allow Hamdeen Sabahy to face Mohamed Morsi in the runoff scheduled on July 16-17. Essam Al-Islamboli, lawyer, and Nasser Amin, lawyer and human rights activist, will both file an appeal to the Presidential Elections Commission to demand suspending the procedures of the runoff until the Supreme Constitutional Court issues its decision on the constitutionality of the Political Isolation Law. “It is not possible that a new president assumes power while he is threatened by a possible exclusion decision from the Supreme Constitutional Court. We must protect the revolution from the old regime remnants,” Al-Islamboli told Al-Tahrir newspaper. 13 Page: 6 Author: Ibrahim Jawdah The Revolution Movements in Qalyoubiya Boycott the Runoffs The Revolution movements in Qalyoubiya will boycott the runoffs of the presidential elections.
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