GCSP Policy Paper n°11 February 2011 The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives by Vicken Cheterian Key Points • The wave of Arab revolt, which started in Tunisia and then Egypt and Libya, is spreading at an unprecedented speed. This is the result of not only modern internet-based technolo- gies of communication, but also the deep socio-economic crisis of the region coupled with autocratic regimes that are not qualified to address the needs of the new generation. • The socio-economic malaise in the region is deep. Youth unemployment, degradation of natural resources, and demographic explosion are among the driving forces. Corruption and economic autocracy went hand in hand. There is a need for a complete socio-eco- nomic overhaul. Toppling autocracies is a necessary first step, but the success of the cur- rent will also depend on the possible creation of new political institutions, and a reformist agenda. • It is curious to see the different reaction of the West compared to the wave of the Color Revolutions a decade earlier. Western leaders, who closely collaborated with the auto- cratic regimes for decades, and did not come to the support of pro-democracy militants, need to revise their approach. They should also revise their policies towards the national questions of the region, including the situations in Palestine and Iraq. Lastly, for a stable Middle East and North Africa, the West, and especially Europe, needs to revise the posi- tion of the region on the global economic map, as oil-based economies of the region have failed to create the necessary jobs and sustainable development. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international training centre for security policy based in Geneva. An international foundation with over 40 member states, it offers courses for civil servants, diplomats and military officers from all over the world. Through research, workshops and conferences it provides an internationally recognized forum for dialogue on issues of topical interest relating to security and peace policy. he Arab revolt that started in Tunisia and over- Bank study, the region imports half of its food, and threw the reign of Zein El-Abedeen Ben Ali is spends the equivalent of 30 billion USD on food im- Ttaking the form of a huge wave. The regime of ports. With the on-going population explosion – the Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the central state of the Arab region’s population is growing at a rhythm of 2.3% World, followed suit. Uprising in Libya continues, in a year – and decrease in water availability as a result spite of attempts by the Kaddhafi regime to kill it in of climate change and increased damming of rivers, blood and fire. Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen declared the region will increasingly depend on food imports, that he will not seek a new mandate, a concession and therefore be exposed to international market which only emboldened both opposition and youth fluctuations. The situation of the industrial sector is revolt. King Abdallah of Jordan sacked the unpopular not better: the Arab Human Development Report in government of Samir Rifai, and named Maruf Bakhit 2009 notes that the domination of economies by as the new prime minister and asked him to bring oil has led to the weakening of other sectors: “the “true political reforms”. In a word, the entire Arab Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than World is facing an unprecedented wave of revolt. in 1970, almost four decades previously.”3 Lastly, the global crisis of 2008 had a deep impact on the Arab The contestation has already scored a number of vic- financial sector. According to one estimate, Arab tories: the 23 year-old autocrat of Tunisia promptly countries lost 2.5 trillion dollars as a result of the glo- left the country to exile in Saudi Arabia; in Egypt, bal financial meltdown.4 Hosni Mubarak abandoned long brewing plans to install his son Jamal in his seat, and was forced to The social consequences of those structural problems abdicate, handing power over to the military, after are deep: The existing political orders today are too trying to bring his loyal chief of the mukhabarat, or rigid, autocratic, corrupt, and militaristic, which does the secret services, Omar Suleiman, to the post of not qualify them to address mounting socio-econom- vice president. ic problems. One of the most explosive issues is youth unemployment: Arab Development Report estimates In case there is doubt about the importance of that within a decade Arab countries need to create the on-going Arab revolt, an animated debate has 51 million new positions to accommodate young emerged about its nature, and growing, sometimes people seeking jobs. 2 anxious prognostics about its possible outcome. On the one hand we have ardent embrace of yet anoth- The current socio-economic problems are not er “Twitter” or “Facebook” revolution, while others unique, but repetitions of periodic failings of regional underline the power of the internet and the satellite economies. The regional economic model, highly re- televisions in undermining autocratic regimes. Such sembling colonial era mono-export and dependent comparisons, consciously or not, create an emotion- economies, has failed. Today, not only the oil-rich al field where the demonstrators or rebels are like countries like Algeria or Saudi Arabia are dependent “us”, our Western, modern, middle-class, globalised on petrodollars, but the entire region is through labor “youth”. Comparisons of the fall of the Berlin Wall migration, remittances and direct investments from and the liberation of Eastern Europe with the current oil-rich economies. The most evident failures are Al- wave of Arab revolt are abundant. Is this “The Arab geria and Libya, which are in deep social and political world’s 1989 Revolution?” asks al-Jazeera, while the crisis in spite of rich oil deposits. Deutche-Welle finds similarities with the events in East Germany over two decades back?1 Lesser enthu- What is really peculiar is that the current revolt is tak- siasts fear the current popular mobilization will top- ing place when oil prices are relatively high, unlike ple pro-Western regimes, break the regional power the “bread riots” of the 1980’s, a result of a collapse balance in a way unfavorable to Israel, and eventu- of international oil prices. This is a clear sign that the ally open up the political space for Islamist forces, oil-based economic model is a failure, and a source be it the Muslim Brotherhood or more radical jihadi of regional instability. The best example of this failure groups. is Algeria, where oil-richness, corruption, military dic- tatorship and social problems coexist under one roof. Socio-Economic Malaise The current revolt in Arab countries is deep-rooted, Trigger and surpasses simply rebelling against political au- This wave of revolt started on a background of de- thoritarianism to aim at the heart of the socio-eco- teriorating social conditions: the rising prices of food nomic structure of the region.2 The Arab countries and basic services. This is not a surprise as global are some of the most exposed to rising food process, food prices are record high, and in Arab countries since the region is one of the dryest in the world, two-fifth of income is spent on food (see Table 1). flanked by the two greatest deserts on the globe: the Sahara and Rub’ al-Khali. According to a World Table 1: Percentage of household expenditure kind of rotation, but the simple disappearance of an on food from total budget aging dictator for the benefit of the army, which was never far away from the centre of power. Saudi Arabia 23.8% What is happening in Egypt, Tunisia and beyond is Tunisia 35.8% not simply a young, modern middle-class rebellion Egypt 38.8% against authoritarian rule anachronistic with recent Jordan 40.9% economic developments and social stratification. It Algeria 43.9% is rather social malaise that goes beyond the mid- Switzerland 10.3% dle classes to touch workers, the unemployed and Greece 14.5% agriculture laborers. This far the popular movements Turkey 24.8% have not brought about new political institutions, See Economic Research Service, USDA, 2007: or pushed hard enough to reform old ones. Yet, it http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/cpifoodandexpendi- is not clear whether we will be witnessing a regime tures/data/2007table97.htm change, or whether the ruling circles will be back to business once the wave of mobilization dies down. Widespread unemployment crossed with the rise of basic food prices made the situation untenable. Pro- Leadership tests against social conditions clashed with the rigid The on-going Arab revolt seems to be leaderless. The systems of autocratic rule which do not allow not first reaction by the local regimes, dissidents, and only mass protest but political action in general. The Western observers alike is that of surprise. No one other important element to the start of the rebellion saw this coming. It was hopelessness that ignited the is complete hopelessness: the symbolic act of 26- popular revolt, not organized and concerted politi- year old Mohamed Boazizi, the university educated cal action, symbolized by the series of self immola- but unemployed vegetable seller in Tunisia, whose tion starting with the desperate act of Mohammad self-immolation ignited the fire of the Tunisian revo- Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in De- lution. It is incredible the speed at which the fire in cember 2010. The Arab youth have initiated and led Tunisian provinces spread all around the Arab World. many of the political actions without the leadership Attempts at self-immolation were repeated in several or even the intervention of the traditional opposition 3 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Yemen, and forces.7 Near Tahrir Square in Cairo, young activists even Saudi Arabia.