Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Co m ments 501962–2012

Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mohamed Morsi WP S Domestic Considerations and Economic Constraints Jannis Grimm and Stephan Roll

Since taking office, President Mohamed Morsi has clearly set himself apart from his predecessor Hosni Mubarak, as reflected in two trends: asserting a regional leader- ship role for Egypt and opening Cairo’s foreign policy to new potential partners. But although Morsi comes from the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, his foreign policy is not one of fundamental ideological reorientation. Instead, he seeks to boost popular support through foreign policy activism and thus compensate for lack of success in economic and social policy. However, given the lack of possibilities to exert influence, Egypt is in little position to fill out a regional leadership role. And in view of the diffi- cult economic situation neither the President nor the Muslim Brotherhood leadership backing him have any interest in alienating Egypt’s traditional partners.

Mubarak’s foreign policy was directed democratic leadership of the largest state above all at preserving the status quo. in the region would not be willing to let Proactive foreign policy, a regional leader- anyone dictate its choice of foreign policy ship role or engagement for the Palestinian partners any longer. cause were not on the agenda. Precisely Following this line, Morsi paid little Egypt’s geo-strategic restraint made it a heed to established relations during his guarantor of regional stability and a reli- first three months, whether in shaping able ally for Washington. Morsi, by con- the foreign policy agenda or in drawing up trast, declared restoring Egypt’s historical travel plans. His first trips were not to the predominance the foreign policy leitmotif United States or Europe, but to Ethiopia, of his presidency when he took office at the Saudi Arabia, China and Iran. At the Afri- end of June 2012. His authoritative appear- can Union summit in Addis Ababa Morsi ances at the Arab League, at the summit of underlined Africa’s outstanding impor- the Non-Aligned Movement and before the tance for Cairo. In Riyadh he evoked the General Assembly of the United Nations close ties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, reflected a new national confidence and as the two largest Arab nations. It was conveyed a clear message: The legitimate there that Morsi also launched an “Islamic”

Dr. Stephan Roll is an Associate, Jannis Grimm an intern in the project “Elite change and new social mobilisation in the Arab world”. SWP Comments 35 realised by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of November 2012 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant programme of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

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peace initiative to resolve the Syria con- 2011, however, the Foreign Ministry’s star flict, involving Iran alongside Saudi Arabia, waned again. His colourless successor, the Turkey and Egypt. Another step closer career diplomat Mohamed Kamel Amr, is to Iran was Morsi’s participation in the not attributed any foreign policy ambitions summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in of his own, nor did any substantive im- Tehran. His visit marked a turning point, pulses come from the military leadership. given that the two countries have been Although the Supreme Council of the without full diplomatic relations since Armed Forces appeared to be placing strict 1979, the year of Egypt’s recognition of limits on the newly elected president’s Israel and Iran’s Islamic Revolution. At the foreign policies, the Council reshuffle of same time Cairo intensified contacts to August 2012 seems to have given Morsi free Hamas, which further amplified the im- rein here. However, it must still be assumed pression of an “Islamisation” of Egyptian that the President keeps the interests of the foreign policy. After distancing itself from armed forces firmly in mind, above all the Bashar al-Assad, its longstanding host in army’s desire to retain annual US military Syria, Hamas is even considering moving aid of $1.3 billion. its Political Bureau to Cairo. Morsi secured diplomatic expertise by appointing Rifaa el-Tahtawi as head of the presidential office. El-Tahtawi is an experi- Who Sets the enced and respected career diplomat who Foreign Policy Agenda? formerly represented Egypt in Tehran and Another reason why Morsi’s foreign policy Tripoli and served briefly as deputy foreign assertiveness astonished many observers minister. However, el-Tahtawi, who is ru- was that he had been regarded as utterly moured to be close to the Muslim Brother- inexperienced in this field. Which makes hood, by no means formulates the foreign the question who is currently setting policy agenda alone. Instead decisions are Egypt’s foreign policy course all the more apparently made in close consultation with relevant. leading figures within the movement and Under Mubarak decisions were settled its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). This is within the president’s immediate circle. clearly reflected in the appointment of After the popular Foreign Minister Amr Essam el-Haddad as Presidential Assistant Moussa left in 2001 to lead the Arab League, for Foreign Relations and International the foreign ministry was reduced to a side Cooperation. El-Haddad, a member of the role. Instead the General Intelligence Ser- Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, has been vice (GIS), which answers directly to the seen as the group’s “foreign minister” due president, took charge of the central issues to his extensive network of contacts to of foreign policy. GIS chief Omar Suleiman Western actors. But above all al-Haddad is a was considered Mubarak’s most important close confidant of the Brotherhood’s deputy adviser, and was the number one Cairo spiritual leader (murshid) and strategic contact for foreign governments. mastermind Khairat el-Shater. El-Shater is After the military seized power at the regarded as the Brotherhood’s currently beginning of 2011 the foreign ministry most powerful functionary and a political initially gained ground at the expense of pragmatist. As a major business-owner he the intelligence service. Nabil al-Arabi, a represents particularly the interests of the popular figure from the foreign policy movement’s ascendant business wing, establishment, was appointed foreign which also has another voice in the presi- minister, initiating the rapprochement dential office in the shape of businessman with Iran and a limited opening of the Gaza Hassan Malek. In July 2012 Malek was border. When al-Arabi left to become sec- appointed spokesperson of a committee of retary-general of the Arab League in July business leaders set up by Morsi to mediate

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between the presidential office and the national partners certainly appears a private sector. He also led the high-ranking sensible way to enhance its negotiating business delegation that accompanied position. But especially in view of the dire Morsi to China on his first state visit. budget situation it is not in Egypt’s interest to rebuff its traditional partners. The coun- try is too dependent on financial assistance A Complex Web of Interests from the United States and the EU, and Despite the recognisable influence of the from international donor institutions dom- Muslim Brotherhood, the new Egyptian inated by the West. foreign policy is no “Islamist” project. In Alongside the budget problem, Morsi fact there is a rare consensus across Egypt’s and his advisers certainly weigh up foreign various political camps concerning the policy decisions in relation to the country’s country’s regional leadership role. And long-term economic development. More ending one-sided dependency on the West than 50 percent of Egyptian exports go to is also supported by most political actors. the EU and the United States. And until But above all, Morsi’s assertive foreign 2011 more than two thirds of net foreign policy is extremely popular in the broader direct investment originated from those population. And that is in all probability regions. The influential business wing of the main motivation for his course. For the Muslim Brotherhood is plainly keenly although Morsi campaigned primarily on aware of this dimension. That at least is economic and domestic social policy, he the implication of the numerous meetings has yet to record any noteworthy successes with representatives of Western corpora- in those fields, and was unable to keep his tions already held by Egypt’s new leader- promise that living conditions would im- ship. Besides, functionaries such as Khairat prove tangibly within the first hundred el-Shater and Hassan Malek will be inter- days of his presidency. Instead the country ested not only in the Brotherhood’s long- faces severe short- and medium-term cuts as term electoral prospects, but also their own long-overdue economic and social reforms financial opportunities in cooperation with are implemented. With an eye to the 2013 Western companies. parliamentary elections, Morsi is instru- mentalising foreign policy to distract from unpopular decisions that could endanger Successful Symbolic Politics the FJP’s electoral success. Given his limited means for dealing with This carefully orchestrated show of colliding interests, Morsi’s foreign policy foreign policy reorientation is, however, at remains largely symbolic. In fact, little has odds with Egypt’s limited possibilities. The changed since the Mubarak era. Warmer country lacks the financial resources and relations with Hamas have led neither to military means for regional power pro- a comprehensive opening of the Gaza jection. But above all, the new course at border nor to any detectable deterioration least partly contradicts the economic inter- in Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation. In- ests of the new leadership. Ultimately, in stead the Egyptian crack-down on criminal the short term, Morsi’s government needs and terrorist structures in the Sinai is plain- to keep the country solvent. Since the ly closely coordinated with Israeli. In Octo- political transformation began, its foreign ber Morsi also rejected the idea of a free- exchange reserves have more than halved, trade area with Gaza, announcing instead to currently about $15.5 billion. The coun- a further tightening of measures to stamp try faces the possibility of a currency deval- out cross-border smuggling of goods uation leading to sharp price increases. To through underground tunnels. The loudly avoid that it needs massive foreign finan- trumpeted regional leadership aspirations cial aid. In this context diversifying inter- remain largely devoid of substance too:

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Morsi’s Syria initiative has failed to produce results and he has conspicuously presented no further proposals beyond the suggestion of forming a Syria quartet. Morsi politics of symbolism have paid off nonetheless. On the one hand, he has been able to ramp up his popularity ratings, with national approval hitting 78 percent in October. The domestic press attributes this above all to his foreign policy performance. On the other hand, foreign financial and economic aid for Egypt has been stepped up. Saudi Arabia alone promised financial support amounting to $4 billion, of which

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und $1.7 billion has already been paid out in Politik, 2012 the form of central bank deposits and loans. All rights reserved Qatar has promised another $2 billion

These Comments reflect and announced plans to invest $3 billion in solely the authors’ views. Egyptian industrial and tourism projects.

SWP In September Turkey announced a $2 bil- Stiftung Wissenschaft und lion aid package. These bilateral deals and Politik German Institute for a prospective $4.8 billion IMF loan could International and create the financial leeway required to Security Affairs press through urgent structural reforms. Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 However, criticism is also increasing. 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 At home, nationalist and Salafist currents Fax +49 30 880 07-100 in particular call for Egypt to break com- www.swp-berlin.org pletely free from dependency on the West [email protected] and to terminate relations with Israel. And ISSN 1861-1761 in Western capitals there is growing im-

Translation by Meredith Dale patience with Morsi’s ambiguous twin-track course. Washington expressed sharp criti- (English version of SWP-Aktuell 58/2012) cism of the Egyptian leadership’s slowness to condemn the violent attacks on the US embassy in Cairo and presses for a clearer pro-Western alignment in Egyptian foreign policy. This will make Morsi’s maneuvering between domestic popular legitimation and economic constraints an ever trickier balancing act.

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