DOCSLIB.ORG

1 the Sudden Collapse of Hosni Mubarak's Nearly 30-Year Presidency and the Implosion of His Ruling National Democratic Party (

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
1 the Sudden Collapse of Hosni Mubarak's Nearly 30-Year Presidency and the Implosion of His Ruling National Democratic Party ( COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2011: EGYPT 1 JOSHUA STACHER INTRODUCTION The sudden collapse of Hosni Mubarak‘s nearly 30-year presidency and the implosion of his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) in early 2011 came as a shock to Egyptians and international observers alike. Before the uprising occurred, few would have predicted that protesters could overwhelm and defeat Mubarak‘s extensive security apparatus, or that the military would turn on the president in an attempt to salvage parts of the old regime. However, there were many signs of an impending political impasse in the months and years leading up to the crisis, as the mounting grievances of the Egyptian people were consistently neglected by the government. The most visible strains on the system included unprecedented waves of collective industrial action—partly in response to aggressive economic reforms that almost exclusively benefited Mubarak and NDP insiders—as well as increasing political activism in the streets and online to voice the public‘s objections to blatantly rigged elections, the possibility of a hereditary presidential succession, and egregious cases of police brutality. The deterioration of the regime was particularly evident in the contraction of political freedoms and economic opportunities for those outside the political and economic elite. The Egyptian government frequently violated the civil and political rights of its citizens in the final years of Mubarak‘s presidency. Torture and arbitrary detentions became commonplace. The freedoms of assembly and association, which had always been subject to surveillance by the security services, were hampered by additional restrictions. The constitutional right to participate in elections as a voter or candidate became devoid of substance as the authorities imposed an array of legal and extralegal obstacles. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which assumed power after Mubarak‘s ouster, is set to remain in place until a presidential election can be held in 2012 or 2013. Egypt was not a military dictatorship during Mubarak‘s presidency, however. The military was instead a key constituent member of the country‘s ruling coalition. While generals were regularly appointed as provincial governors,1 they were 1 Joshua Stacher is an assistant professor of political science at Kent State University. His book, Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria, is forthcoming from Stanford University Press in March 2012. 1 COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS infrequently named as cabinet ministers. According to a 2001 study, only 8 percent of Mubarak‘s ministerial appointees emerged from the military.2 This percentage was reduced further after a technocratic cabinet took over in July 2004. Compared with the tenures of former Egyptian leaders Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–70) and Anwar al-Sadat (1970–81), appointments under Mubarak demonstrated the military‘s declining role in ordinary governance. The percentages of military officers in Nasser‘s and Sadat‘s cabinets were 33 and 20, respectively.3 Some have argued on this basis that Egypt‘s military was ruling but not governing in recent years.4 Also included in Mubarak‘s coalition were the security services and a new class of businessmen with close ties to the president‘s son and rumored heir, Gamal Mubarak. The remaining component of the regime was the NDP hierarchy, which managed an important patronage network. When challenged by labor strikes, political activists, independent judges, leading journalists, or groups like the banned but partially tolerated Muslim Brotherhood, the regime‘s constituents united to safeguard the power of the president. Mubarak, a former air force general and Sadat‘s vice president, wielded centralized authority over the political arena, and regime elites worked in various ways to enable the president‘s office to encroach on other potential sites of contestation. The security services grew in importance during Mubarak‘s final years in power. Charged with disrupting expressions of dissent, the General Intelligence Service (GIS) and the Interior Ministry‘s State Security Investigative Service (SSIS) suppressed public anger and maintained a façade of political stability. The GIS, led by Omar Suleiman, was the more powerful of the two, though it was principally concerned with external threats. The SSIS and the 300,000-strong Central Security Forces were the agencies used most frequently to quash domestic unrest or criticism. The Egyptian government spent more on internal security than on housing or health,5 with the security apparatus employing approximately 1.5 million people by 2010.6 As the coercive arms of the regime penetrated society and worked ever harder to prevent the spread of dissent, police brutality expanded in scope. Cases such as that of Khalid Said, a young man who was beaten to death by police in 2010, became matters of national public outrage. Even as the use of force increased, the legal manipulation that characterized Mubarak‘s presidency grew more sophisticated. New laws restricted the space in which opposition elements could organize and enabled state officials to silence dissenting voices in a variety of ways. Key opposition demands such as the cancelation of emergency rule, in place since 1981, remained unfulfilled. Popular objections to domestic and foreign policies were disregarded. Redundant courts and the restriction of judicial autonomy also became more pronounced in the late Mubarak period. The judiciary, which had once been a meaningful arbiter of political disputes, was emasculated after a surge of judicial activism in 2006 (see Rule of Law).7 Physical and legal attacks on journalists also became a fact of life in Egypt. The regime‘s initial response to the popular uprising in early 2011 consisted of extreme coercion. However, when this failed, a change in the ruling coalition became the most preferable option for the regime‘s surviving elites. The military returned to the apex of power, while the privileged business class and the NDP were sacrificed as the security forces were at least superficially dismantled. Leading figures—with the notable exception of Omar Suleiman—were charged or fled into exile, but the security apparatus is being reconstituted. Despite a name change from State Security to National Security, there is 2 COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS little evidence of meaningful structural reforms in the country‘s most reviled security agency.8 While the future course of the ongoing transition remains uncertain, it is now possible to illuminate the breakdown in governance that occurred during Mubarak‘s last years in power. ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC VOICE National and local elections were held regularly during Mubarak‘s 30-year rule, but the state orchestrated the results, leaving the NDP with little electoral legitimacy. As in many authoritarian regimes, the leadership was generally hostile to the notion of election monitoring by independent organizations,9 and the electoral framework was so decidedly skewed toward the ruling party that vote rigging on election day itself was often superfluous. Law No. 173 of 2005 stipulates that there is universal suffrage, but voter lists and balloting procedures were so deeply flawed that most Egyptians declined to participate. This low turnout served the interests of the NDP by increasing the influence of fraudulent ballots and loyalist voters who could be mobilized through the misuse of administrative resources. Opposition-oriented voters were frequently exposed to violence. It was not unusual, particularly in hotly contested areas, for gangs of hired thugs (baltagiya) to prevent voting for an opposition candidate.10 Similarly, the state often deployed truncheon-wielding riot police to physically bar would-be voters from the polls.11 Nine people were killed in such confrontations during the 2010 parliamentary elections. Given the risk of violence, the citizenry overwhelmingly stayed home during elections, and official turnout figures were routinely dismissed as inflated. In 2010, the state claimed that 27.5 percent of the 41 million registered voters participated in the parliamentary elections,12 but this figure, even if accurate, would be one of the lowest in the world for national legislative balloting.13 The Egyptian Association for Community Participation Enhancement claimed that the actual turnout was around 10 percent, citing research by 1,000 monitors covering 40 of the 222 electoral districts across Egypt.14 The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights reported figures as low as 5 percent.15 Previous parliamentary elections in 2005, 2000, 1995, and 1990 all had similarly low rates of voter participation. Those who did vote were often enticed or compelled to do so by the state. In addition to the small number of people who directly benefited from the status quo, rank- and-file state employees were bused to polling stations and instructed to vote for their director‘s chosen candidate, inevitably an NDP member. The poor were also drawn to the polls by direct payments or threats that their limited public services and state assistance would be cut off if they failed to turn out for the ruling party.16 A major exception to the trend of low participation pertained to supporters of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, whose candidates ran as independents. Critics accused the Islamist group of exploiting religion to win electoral support, but the 83-year-old organization was the only true grassroots entity in Mubarak‘s Egypt. It has offices and members spread across much of the country, particularly in the Nile Delta, and most of its candidates actually lived in their constituencies.17 When the state chose to ease its repression of the group, it fared well at the polls. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood won 3 COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 88 of the 150 legislative seats it contested in the parliament‘s 444-seat lower house, the People‘s Assembly. With this 20 percent bloc, the group was able to influence the behavior of NDP lawmakers, though not how they voted.18 The People‘s Assembly grew in 2010 under a new law that set aside 64 new seats for women.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Corruption Trends in the Middle East and North Africa Region (2007-2011)
    www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Corruption trends in the Middle East and North Africa Region (2007-2011) Query What do anti-corruption indexes and experts say about the levels and types of corruption in MENA countries over the last five years? What are the main areas and sources of corruption? Are there specific themes and issues that are common to a number of countries? What record do governments have in tackling corruption? Are there any examples of successful anti-corruption reforms in countries in the MENA region over the past five years? We are especially interested in country based issues - rather than regional – for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Libya. Purpose Summary This Expert Answer is to assist with developing a new anti-corruption strategy in the MENA region. In Revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and particular, the donor is interested in approaches it can North Africa (MENA) region during 2011 have shone take to reduce corruption in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, light on widespread corruption, particularly political Tunisia and Libya. The aim is to pursue effective anti- corruption in the form of stolen assets by seemingly all corruption strategies in order to contribute to peace and the deposed leaders. There also has been widespread stability in the region. evidence of prolific patronage, nepotism, and collusion between the public and private sectors that has Content contributed to the heightened levels of civil unrest and public protests. 1. Corruption trends in the MENA region (2007 – 2011) The key anti-corruption indexes — namely Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 2. Country specific themes, issues and anti- Index, the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation corruption reforms Index, Global Integrity’s Report, Freedom House’s 3.
    [Show full text]
  • First: One-Party Rule (1953-1976)
    Emergence of the political parties in Egypt in the 19th century was a reflection of social, eco- nomic and cultural interactions as well as certain historical, national and political circum- stances, leading to the creation and development of modern institutions of government adminis- tration and society in Egypt such as the parliament, the cabinet, political parties, syndicates, etc. Emergence of the political parties in Egypt has been gradual and gone through successive stages. Political parties have firstly been formed as secret societies that were followed by formation of political groups. The National Democratic Party (NDP) was the first party formed in 1907 by Mostafa Kamel. In less than ten years, there was a great variety in these parties; in their nature, formation, organization, power, their popular base and platforms. There were national parties, groups dom- inated by the royal palace, others formed by the occupation authority as well as ideological par- ties expressing certain ideologies. In 1907-1920, the already formed political parties in Egypt were a starting signal for the dis- semination of political parties in Egypt; however, they were restricted due to the British occupa- tion and the Egyptian subordination to the Ottoman Empire. The February 1922 Declaration acknowledging Egypt’s independence and the issuance of the 1923 Constitution have led to establishing a royal constitutional rule based on party pluralism and principles of liberal democracy. During 1923-1952, Egypt witnessed a remarkable experience rich in political and democratic practices, however, such an experience was marked with many defects such as the British occu- pation, foreign intervention in Egypt’s affairs and the royal palace’s interference in political life.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption Threats & International Missions
    PE ACE& PEACE & CONFLICT Corruption Threats & International Missions CONPractical guidance for leaders FLICT "Corruption threatens international missions, and countering it is a strategic necessity—it’s hard-nosed common sense and militaries need to know how to do it." Rear Admiral Bruce Williams Deputy Director General and Chief of Staff European Union Military Staff Foreword Corruption is a feature of all practical guidance that can be conflicts, playing a key role in used in daily work. the power-struggle between competing groups for The considerations in this resources and power. handbook will be relevant to almost all international This places mission leaders in operations and missions. a challenging situation because it means engagement with Corruption undermines corrupt entities is frequently credibility. We have no doubt inevitable. The choice is often that, with the right whether to deal with one understanding and guidance, corrupt entity, or another even mission leaders and their staffs more corrupt entity. can limit the threat corruption poses, and have a greater In places such as Afghanistan, chance of achieving stability the Democratic Republic of and security for citizens. Congo, Haiti, Iraq, and Mali, we have seen how corruption can We hope that this handbook is threaten mission success and helpful to you. We welcome all long-term stability. Yet mission feedback and comments on leaders, national officials and how it can be improved in their civilian and military staffs future editions. charged with leading, planning, and implementing international missions often lack the understanding and skills to tackle the corruption issues that can have such a devastating impact on operational goals.
    [Show full text]
  • Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt
    Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt Alaa Al-Din Arafat HOSNI MUBARAK AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT Copyright © Alaa Al-Din Arafat, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in hardcover as The Mubarak Leadership and Future of Democracy in Egypt in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above compa- nies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-33813-5 ISBN 978-1-137-06753-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137067531 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ‘Arafat, ‘Ala’ al-Din. Hosni Mubarak and the future of democracy in Egypt / Alaa Al-Din Arafat. p. cm. Pbk. ed. of: The Mubarak leadership and future of democracy in Egypt. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. With a new preface. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–33813–5 (alk. paper) 1. Mubarak, Muhammad Husni, 1928– 2. Mubarak, Gamal. 3. Egypt—Politics and government—1981– 4. Egypt—Politics and government—1970–1981. 5. Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (Egypt)— History. 6. Political leadership—Egypt—History.
    [Show full text]
  • RELATIONSHIP THERAPY RELATIONSHIP THERAPY Making Arab Police Reform Work
    CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT 160 RELATIONSHIP THERAPY RELATIONSHIP THERAPY RELATIONSHIP Making Arab police reform work | MAKING ARAB POLICE REFORM WORK REFORM POLICE ARAB MAKING By Florence Gaub and Alex Walsh CHAILLOT PAPER / 160 November 2020 RELATIONSHIP THERAPY Making Arab police reform work By Florence Gaub and Alex Walsh CHAILLOT PAPER / 160 November 2020 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2020. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9198-970-6 online ISBN 978-92-9198-969-0 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-004-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-004-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/645771 DOI 10.2815/791794 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. Cover image credit: Hussein Malla/AP/SIPA The authors Florence Gaub is the Deputy Director of the EUISS. She specialises in strategic foresight, as well as security and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. Alex Walsh has worked on police reform and stabilisation programming in Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Syria. He currently works with the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAF) in Geneva. Acknowledgements This publication was informed by two events co-organised with the Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung, the first in Tunis in December 2018, and the second in Amman in March 2019 The EUISS Chaillot Paper series The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéro area of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building oc- cupied by the Western European Union (WEU).
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Syria's Urban Poor
    THE RISE OF SYRIA’S POOR The Rise of Syria’s Urban Poor: Why the War for Syria’s Future Will Be Fought Over the Country’s New Urban Villages BY DAVID KILCULLEN AND NATE ROSENBLATT The divisions between town and country or between the main cities and the country towns are very old social and cultural divisions and, historically, their interests have tended to be intrinsi- cally at variance. For long the peasants lived at the mercy of the cities. –Hanna Batatu Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics yria’s urban poor fight the Assad regime for the soul of Syria’s cities. Syrian government troops have abandoned large swaths of countryside to a fractured opposition, focusing Sresources on key loyalist leverage points: keeping connected the big four cities Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, and Hama, and maintaining a path to the coast. This intensely urban conflict is a byproduct of over ten years of rural village migrations into the outskirts of Syria’s ancient Men march during the funeral of Mohamed Ammar, who was killed by the Syrian Army in Al Qusayr, February 28, 2012 cities. Fueled by economic necessity and a persistent drought, these villagers created vast, insulated neighborhoods of urban poor. Three things characterize these communities: they are predomi- nantly controlled by the opposition, they have been among the hardest hit during the conflict, and their guns and recent political activism mean they will be a key power broker in the post- conflict order. Syria’s ancient cities long reigned over the surrounding villages.
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt Presidential Election Observation Report
    EGYPT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT JULY 2014 This publication was produced by Democracy International, Inc., for the United States Agency for International Development through Cooperative Agreement No. 3263-A- 13-00002. Photographs in this report were taken by DI while conducting the mission. Democracy International, Inc. 7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1010 Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: +1.301.961.1660 www.democracyinternational.com EGYPT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT July 2014 Disclaimer This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Democracy International, Inc. and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. CONTENTS CONTENTS ................................................................ 4 MAP OF EGYPT .......................................................... I ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................. II DELEGATION MEMBERS ......................................... V ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................... X EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................. 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 6 ABOUT DI .......................................................... 6 ABOUT THE MISSION ....................................... 7 METHODOLOGY .............................................. 8 BACKGROUND ........................................................ 10 TUMULT
    [Show full text]
  • In May 2011, Freedom House Issued a Press Release Announcing the Findings of a Survey Recording the State of Media Freedom Worldwide
    Media in North Africa: the Case of Egypt 10 Lourdes Pullicino In May 2011, Freedom House issued a press release announcing the findings of a survey recording the state of media freedom worldwide. It reported that the number of people worldwide with access to free and independent media had declined to its lowest level in over a decade.1 The survey recorded a substantial deterioration in the Middle East and North Africa region. In this region, Egypt suffered the greatest set-back, slipping into the Not Free category in 2010 as a result of a severe crackdown preceding the November 2010 parliamentary elections. In Tunisia, traditional media were also censored and tightly controlled by government while internet restriction increased extensively in 2009 and 2010 as Tunisians sought to use it as an alternative field for public debate.2 Furthermore Libya was included in the report as one of the world’s worst ten countries where independent media are considered either non-existent or barely able to operate and where dissent is crushed through imprisonment, torture and other forms of repression.3 The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Arab Knowledge Report published in 2009 corroborates these findings and view the prospects of a dynamic, free space for freedom of thought and expression in Arab states as particularly dismal. 1 Freedom House, (2011): World Freedom Report, Press Release dated May 2, 2011. The report assessed 196 countries and territories during 2010 and found that only one in six people live in countries with a press that is designated Free. The Freedom of the Press index assesses the degree of print, broadcast and internet freedom in every country, analyzing the events and developments of each calendar year.
    [Show full text]
  • Africathlète Août 2004
    Partenaires Officiels de la CAA Official AAC Partners 2 • africathlete - août 2004 Sommaire Contents Edito Citius, altius, fortius Jeux olympiques d’Athènes 2004 Que brillent les “ Etoiles “ d’Afrique ! Athens 2004 : Let african’s stars shine at athens olympic games ! 14e Championnat d’Afrique à Brazzaville L’Afrique du Sud en force, les performances au rendez-vous 14th African Championship in Brazzaville Performances galore as Shouth Africans rule the roost 15e championnat d’Afrique Rendez-vous à Maurice en 2006 African senior championships See you in Mauririus 2006 Circuit Africain des meetings Un véritable coup d’éclat African meet circuit : Is a remarkable feat Championnats du monde Juniors Les promesses de la jeune sève World junio championships : Africa’s promising young talents La confejes et la CAA à l’air du temp Confejes and CAA keep up with progress août 2004 - africathlete • 3 Editorial Citius, altius, fortius ’Afrique qui gagne, c’est bel et bien l’athlétisme. Vainqueur des quatre dernières éditions de la L Par/by Hamad Kalkaba Malboum Coupe du monde des Confédérations, l’Afrique peut Président de la CAA / AAC President aussi exhiber avec fierté ses multiples champions du monde, détenteurs de records du monde et cham- pions olympiques. Aucune discipline sportive, sur le continent, ne peut encore étaler un pareil palmarès. Et Citius, altius, fortius cerise sur le gâteau, les deux meilleurs athlètes du monde en 2003, en l’occurrence la Sud-Africaine frica is winning through athletics. In addition to win- Hestrie Cloete et le Marocain Hicham El Guerrouj, Aning the last four editions of the Confederations sont des fils de l’Afrique.
    [Show full text]
  • Mints – MISR NATIONAL TRANSPORT STUDY
    No. TRANSPORT PLANNING AUTHORITY MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT MiNTS – MISR NATIONAL TRANSPORT STUDY THE COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON THE MASTER PLAN FOR NATIONWIDE TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT FINAL REPORT TECHNICAL REPORT 11 TRANSPORT SURVEY FINDINGS March 2012 JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS CO., LTD. ALMEC CORPORATION EID KATAHIRA & ENGINEERS INTERNATIONAL JR - 12 039 No. TRANSPORT PLANNING AUTHORITY MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT MiNTS – MISR NATIONAL TRANSPORT STUDY THE COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON THE MASTER PLAN FOR NATIONWIDE TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT FINAL REPORT TECHNICAL REPORT 11 TRANSPORT SURVEY FINDINGS March 2012 JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS CO., LTD. ALMEC CORPORATION EID KATAHIRA & ENGINEERS INTERNATIONAL JR - 12 039 USD1.00 = EGP5.96 USD1.00 = JPY77.91 (Exchange rate of January 2012) MiNTS: Misr National Transport Study Technical Report 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS Item Page CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1-1 1.1 BACKGROUND...................................................................................................................................1-1 1.2 THE MINTS FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................1-1 1.2.1 Study Scope and Objectives .........................................................................................................1-1
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt: a Moment of Change and Challenge | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1754 Egypt: A Moment of Change and Challenge by J. Scott Carpenter, David Schenker Feb 7, 2011 ABOUT THE AUTHORS J. Scott Carpenter J. Scott Carpenter is an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Brief Analysis n February 2, 2011, J. Scott Carpenter, Dina Guirguis, David Schenker, and Robert Satloff addressed a special O Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute. Mr. Carpenter is the Institute's Keston Family fellow and director of Project Fikra: Defeating Extremism through the Power of Ideas. Ms. Guirguis is a Keston Family research fellow with Project Fikra. Mr. Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Institute. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks; Dr. Satloff's remarks were published separately as PolicyWatch #1751. Watch this event at C-Span.org J. Scott Carpenter P lacing Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution and Egypt's current unrest into historical context is important when discussing broader transition in the Middle East. In the 1990s, a phenomenon known as the Third Wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe, promoting democratic political transition throughout the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Latin America. The Middle East was notably absent from this global transformation. After the September 11 attacks, members of the Bush administration began asking why this political opening had failed to occur in the region. Many argued that such a transformation was simply impossible in Arab lands, but President Bush called these claims "the soft bigotry of low expectations." Today, many are asking whether this is truly a revolutionary moment in Egypt, one that might usher in an Islamist, theocratic takeover of a broad-based political movement.
    [Show full text]
  • Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism and New Testament Interpretation
    Grace Theological Journal 8.2 (1987) 195-212 Copyright © 1987 by Grace Theological Seminary. Cited with permission. NAG HAMMADI, GNOSTICISM AND NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION WILLIAM W. COMBS The Gnostic heresy alluded to in the NT and widely repudiated by Christian writers in the second century and after has been in- creasingly studied in the last forty years. The discovery in upper Egypt of an extensive collection of Gnostic writings on papyri trans- formed a poorly known movement in early Christianity into a well documented heresy of diverse beliefs and practices. The relationship of Gnosticism and the NT is an issue that has not been resolved by the new documents. Attempts to explain the theology of the NT as dependent on Gnostic teachings rest on ques- tionable hypotheses. The Gnostic redeemer-myth cannot be docu- mented before the second century: Thus, though the Gnostic writings provide helpful insight into the heresies growing out of Christianity, it cannot be assumed that the NT grew out of Gnostic teachings. * * * INTRODUCTION STUDENTS of the NT have generally been interested in the subject of Gnosticism because of its consistent appearance in discussions of the "Colossian heresy" and the interpretation of John's first epistle. It is felt that Gnosticism supplies the background against which these and other issues should be understood. However, some who use the terms "Gnostic" and "Gnosticism" lack a clear understanding of the movement itself. In fact, our knowledge of Gnosticism has suffered considerably from a lack of primary sources. Now, however, with the discovery of the Nag Hammadi (hereafter, NH) codices, this void is being filled.
    [Show full text]