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ANALYSIS PAPER Number 28, November 2012

ISRAEL’S VIEW OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS

Itamar Rabinovich The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

Copyright © 2012

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu Executive Summary

or decades, viewed as its most Heights on hold indefinitely. It may be a long time bitter Arab enemy. Syria’s Arab nationalist until Israel can readdress the prospect of giving the ideology was fiercely anti-Israel, and border back to , as many hawkish (and Fdisputes left the two nations perpetually on the in fact some dovish) have seen Bashar al- brink of conflict. After the war, Israel’s Assad’s actions in his domestic crisis as proof that occupation of the became the most past efforts at a Golan-for-peace deal were misguid- important issue separating the two countries, and ed. Israel’s efforts to challenge over its nuclear when Syria joined the peace process launched in program are also affected by the instability facing Madrid in October 1991, the future of the Golan Tehran’s ally in Damascus. If Israel or the U.S. were Heights became the main bone of contention be- to launch a military strike against Iran’s nuclear fa- tween the adversaries. The Israeli-Syrian negotia- cilities, a desperate and beleaguered Assad could tions came close to fruition but ultimately failed. conceivably seek to transform his domestic war into During the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s reign, another Arab-Israeli war by taking the opportunity relations with the became tense and to attack Israel on Iran’s behalf. However, the Syrian Israeli-Syrian contacts were severed. The Ehud Ol- conflict has the potential to bring the damaged Is- mert years in Israel saw renewed peace talks with raeli-Turkish relationship closer to normalcy; if the Syria via the Turkish channel, again raising hopes two nations can resolve their dispute over the Mavi of an end to hostilities but again ending in failure. Marmara incident, they can find common ground in seeking to foster a stable post-Assad government In early 2011, the outbreak of the Syrian crisis that in Syria. has since descended into civil war sparked a rethink of Israel’s policy toward its neighbor. While Israel Overall, Israel would prefer regime change in Syria, may have once preferred the Assad regime to re- but has concerns about what type of government main in power rather than take its chances with an would succeed Bashar al-Assad. It hopes for a secu- unknown successor, this “the devil we know” ap- lar regime to emerge, but due to limited influence proach is no longer valid. After Israel had found —and the likelihood that support for any faction itself frustrated by developments beneficial to Iran would backfire due to Israel’s toxic reputation in and its “Resistance Axis” throughout the Arab the —it is maintaining a passive stance. —most notably the fall of Zine el Abidine Without changing this greatly, however, Israel Ben Ali and —the increasing pres- should build discreet channels to the emerging ac- sure on the Syrian regime has represented a blow tors in Syria to prepare for future outcomes. And to Iran and its allies. Thus, while recognizing that with several neighbors—such as , , Israel has little to no influence on the course of and the Gulf states—sharing some common goals events in Syria, Israel’s leaders have largely reached for the outcome of the Syrian crisis, Israel must a consensus that Assad’s departure from power is seek to cooperate with them to advance its inter- preferable. ests, which requires building trust with those ac- tors. Thus, to avoid being a bystander in the Syrian As it rages on, Syria’s civil war complicates a variety crisis, it would serve Israel well to re-engage with of Israel’s foreign policy priorities. Clearly, the un- Turkey and earn good will in the Arab world by certainty in Syria has put the question of the Golan seriously restarting the Palestinian peace process.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings i Acknowledgements

he author and the Saban Center for Policy would like to thank Charles Bronfman for his generous support of the author’s research as the Charles Bronf- Tman Distinguished Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings ii The Author

Itamar Rabinovich is a Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Charles Bronfman Distinguished Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Pol- icy at the Brookings Institution. Between 1992 and 1996, Rabinovich served as Israel’s am- bassador to the United States and as chief negotiator with Syria. He is also professor emeritus of Middle Eastern history at University and distinguished global professor at NYU. He has recently completed an eight-year term as president of . Rabinovich has been a member of the faculty of Tel Aviv University since 1971 and served as chairman of the department of Middle Eastern studies, director of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, dean of humanities, and rector. He is the author of several Brookings publications, including the 2011 Saban Center book The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the , and the Middle East 1948-2011, and the 2009 Saban Center Analysis Paper, “The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue.”

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings iii I s r a e l ’ s V i ew o f t h e S y r i a n C r i s i s

Introduction civil war and the war’s future course and ultimate outcome. This analysis paper places Israel’s view The Israeli dimension of the unfolding Syrian cri- of the Syrian crisis in its bilateral, regional and in- sis has been one of its most curious aspects. Syria ternational contexts, and examines the manner in is surrounded by five neighbors:T urkey, , which Israel’s interests would be affected by pos- , Jordan and Israel. The first four have all been sible outcomes of the current crisis. significantly affected by the or have 1 played a significant role in it. Israel, Syria’s enemy The Background and intermittent partner in peace negotiations, has thus far been least affected by the storm raging north From 1948 to 1991 and under successive regimes, of its border and has had practically no impact on its Syria was regarded by Israel as its most bitter Arab course. But this could change swiftly. Israel’s interests enemy. While was its most formidable mili- in Syria and in the Syrian crisis are manifold: Israel tary foe, Syria’s position as “the pulsating heart of is interested first and foremost in peace and stability ,” its particular closeness to Pales- across its northern border, in preventing weapons of tine and to the Palestinian issue, and the complex- mass destruction from being delivered to or falling ity of Israeli-Syrian border issues accounted for the into the hands of or other terrorist orga- intensity of the bilateral conflict between the two nizations, and in preventing jihadi elements from es- countries. tablishing themselves north of the Golan Heights in a manner comparable to what happened in the Sinai. Over the years, several changes in the nature of the Israel is also interested in eliminating Iran’s influence conflict and its dynamics took place. In the 1967 in Syria and weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon and war Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights and Syria’s in preventing Iran from using Syria to deflect atten- determination to regain them became an important tion from its nuclear program. —eventually the most important—component of their conflict. The Syrian attempt to reoccupy Despite the present calm, Israel could suddenly the Golan Heights during the October 1973 war find itself involved in and affected by the Syrian failed, but in the war’s aftermath a disengagement

1 See: Itamar Rabinovich, The View From Damascus: State, Political Community and Foreign Relations in Modern and Contemporary Syria ( and Portland: Valentine Mitchell, 2011).

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 1 agreement was brokered by Henry Kissinger that Bashar al-Assad and Israel has since governed the relationship along the cease- fire line. Syria’s president, Hafiz al-Assad, kept the The death of the builder of theS yrian state and his agreement and consequently a quiet front, but he dynastic-style replacement by an ill-suited son was continued to wage the struggle against Israel indi- but one of the developments that converged in 2000 rectly through Lebanon and by supporting Pales- to change the course of Syria’s history (and in our tinian groups and promoting terrorist activity. context, its relationship with Israel). The U.S. presi- dential elections of November 2000 determined Assad’s ability to conduct this two-pronged policy that , a staunch believer in Syrian-Israeli was facilitated by his success in building the Syrian peace and American-Syrian rapprochement, would state and turning it into a powerful actor in Middle be replaced by George W. Bush, who entered office Eastern regional politics. Assad remained the close unenthused by the beleaguered Arab-Israeli peace ally of the , but he kept channels open process and was soon to mount a collision course to the West and impressed a number of U.S. presi- with Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. In Israel, ’s dents and Secretaries of State as a gifted, intriguing power was sapped by the failure of the Camp David leader, who it seemed could possibly be won over to conference and the outbreak of the second Palestin- Washington’s side of the line. ian Intifada, and he was finally defeated and replaced by leader Sharon. Thus ended a decade When decided in 1977 to make peace of a quest for an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement and with Israel, Assad led the campaign against what he a Lebanese policy based on the assumption that an viewed and denounced as a combination of treach- Israeli-Syrian deal would also provide the best solu- ery and stupidity. Fourteen years later, after the So- tion to Israel’s Lebanese dilemma. viet Union collapsed and in the aftermath of the first GulfW ar, Assad joined the U.S.-led Madrid Not much happened in the Israeli-Syrian relation- process. This launched a decade-long effort to re- ship during the next six years. Bashar al-Assad’s solve the Syrian-Israeli conflict. policy was three-pronged: he stated several times that he wanted to renew the negotiations with Is- During this decade, four Israeli prime ministers rael, he reinforced his military capacity for war in —, , Benjamin Ne- case the diplomatic option failed, and he intensified tanyahu and Ehud Barak—conveyed to Assad the strategic collaboration with Iran and Hezbol- their willingness in principle to withdraw from lah. While Hafiz al-Assad was an Iranian ally and the Golan in return for an acceptable package of treated Hezbollah and its leader, , peace and security. This policy reflected a belief as clients, over time Bashar became a client rather that Syria was a better partner to predicate the than a peer of the senior Iranian partner and treated peace process on than the . Assad in Nasrallah as an admired partner rather than a sub- turn agreed in principle to sign a peace treaty with ordinate. During the early 2000s, Hezbollah’s arse- Israel and to normalize relations. But for reasons nal of missiles and rockets was built up dramatically that will not be detailed here, the Israeli-Syrian as a deterrent against potential American and Israel peace settlement that was—or at least appeared attacks against either Iran or Syria. to be—tantalizingly close was not reached and the negotiations finally collapsed in March 2000. Ariel Sharon was absolutely uninterested in a Syr- Hafiz al-Assad died three months later and a new ian diplomatic option or in dealing with the poten- chapter in Syria’s history and its relationship with tial threat of Hezbollah’s swelling arsenal. Sharon Israel was opened. was fully focused on the Palestinian issue—first in

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 2 defeating the and then in the with- The 2006 war in Lebanon revealed the full extent drawal from Gaza—and refused to be diverted by of the threat posed to Israel’s national security by dealing with a “Syrian option.” When Bashar al- the trilateral cooperation between Iran, Syria and Assad, in an effort to alleviate GeorgeW . Bush’s Hezbollah. The war moderated Hezbollah’s con- pressure, tried to establish contact, he was rebuffed duct, but its arsenal of missiles and rockets was aug- by Sharon. But Sharon was careful not to be drawn mented and the future threat was exacerbated. In into a serious military conflict with Assad’s Leba- the course of the war, President Bush made no se- nese ally, Hezbollah. cret of his hope that Olmert would take on Syria as well, but Olmert declined. At the war’s end, Olmert When Hezbollah grew bolder, Sharon retaliated by accepted the dominant view in Israel’s national se- air against minor targets in Syria. The message was curity establishment that the best option for deal- clear: he held Syria accountable for Hezbollah’s ac- ing with the threat would be renewed negotiations tions and promised that, should they continue or and an eventual settlement with Syria. This, so the escalate, he would retaliate more forcefully against argument went, would be the most effective way Syria (it should be noted that Sharon chose not to of beginning to dismantle the axis led by Iran and act against the buildup of Hezbollah’s arsenal of to weaken Hezbollah and its hold over Lebanon. missiles and rockets by Iran and Syria). Olmert cleared the issue with President Bush, who was not happy with the idea, but did not veto it ei- Significantly—and by now famously—when the ther. Olmert chose to start the negotiations through U.S. president, irritated by the double games played Turkey and agreed to Assad’s insistence that they be by Assad in Iraq, spoke to Sharon about seeking to conducted, as least initially, as a Turkish mediation. remove him, Sharon replied by saying that he pre- The mediation was held in Ankara and culminated ferred “the devil we know.” In other words, he too in Olmert’s ill-fated visit to the Turkish capital in was not enamored of Assad and his policies, but December 2008 on the eve of Operation Cast Lead preferred a Syrian ruler who kept the line in Gaza. Syria’s foreign minister, , with Israel quiet and worried that the alternative was to join Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip to the Baath regime was the , Erdogan and Olmert but failed to show up. Given the only organized opposition group known to the the fact that Olmert was at that time on his way outside world.2 out of office, it is difficult to assess the degree of real progress made in those negotiations. ’s Syrian Policy When Israeli intelligence discovered the reactor Ehud Olmert, who succeeded Sharon when he fell being built by in northeastern Syria, ill in early 2006, initially continued with his Syrian and when Olmert found out that President Bush policy, or lack thereof. His close relationship with was not willing to destroy it, he undertook to do George W. Bush reinforced his reluctance to think of it himself in September 2007. Once the military Bashar al-Assad as a potential peace partner. But in operation was completed successfully, Israel’s main the course of 2006 and 2007, this and simple concern was to manage the political and media fall- view and policy was transformed by two main de- out in a manner that would minimize the pressure velopments: the 2006 war in Lebanon and the dis- on Assad to respond militarily. Assad did indeed re- covery of Syria’s joint efforts with North Korea to frain from any such retaliation. The whole episode develop a . underlined for Israel the question marks regarding

2 Itamar Rabinovich, The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East, 1948-2011 (Washington: Brookings, 2011), chapter 5.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 3 Bashar al-Assad’s persona: he was willing to gamble the Palestinian issue. The attempt at building a new on a far reaching, dangerous nuclear collaboration relationship between Washington and Damascus with North Korea, but displayed maturity and re- collapsed, but in 2010 the Obama administration straint once exposed and humiliated. After an ap- launched a new effort to restart the Syrian-Israeli propriate hiatus, the Turkish mediation between Is- negotiations. This was a familiar pattern: when rael and Syria was resumed (to no avail, as we saw).3 difficulties accumulated on one track of the peace process, the emphasis was shifted to the other. In Israel and the Syrian Rebellion late 2011, it was revealed to the Israeli press that the secret mediation between Netanyahu’s govern- The end of Ehud Olmert’s tenure spelled the end ment and Assad’s regime was quite serious and last- of the fifth futile effort since 1991 to resolve the ed until the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March Israeli-Syrian conflict. His successor as 2011. It is not known what Netanyahu’s ultimate leader, , failed to form a new govern- intentions were when he engaged the Obama ad- ment and in the ensuing general elections, the Is- ministration in this mediation effort.W as he will- raeli voters shifted to the right and gave power to ing to go the distance and make a deal with Bashar and a right-wing coalition. al-Assad based on full withdrawal from the Golan? His own Syrian gambit in 1998 notwithstanding, Or was he primarily interested in creating an ongo- Netanyahu the candidate and Netanyahu the prime ing alternative to the Palestinian track? The leak to minister in his second term was publically and ada- the Israeli press was probably intended to embarrass mantly opposed to the notion of Israeli withdrawal Netanyahu by exposing the discrepancy between from the Golan. America’s new president, Barack his rhetoric and practice, but anyone who expected Obama, did advocate “engagement” with Syria, but the revelation to have an impact on Israeli electoral in practice, during most of his first term, his invest- politics was disappointed. ment in the effort to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process was channeled to the Palestinian issue. It was against this backdrop that the rebellion against Bashar al-Assad’s regime broke out in March The Obama administration appointed Fred Hof, 2011. Several weeks later, when it became clear that a well-known Syria expert who had written exten- this was not a passing episode but a deeply rooted sively on issues of the Israeli-, popular rebellion that kept gaining support and as George Mitchell’s deputy with special responsi- strength, Israeli policymakers and analysts formed bility for the Israeli-Syrian track. Given the empha- the first serious response to the Syrian crisis. At sis placed by and his administration that point in time, around May 2011, it could still on the effort to restart an Israeli-Palestinian peace not be said with any certainty that the regime was process, the “Syrian option” was relegated to a sec- doomed. One could still envisage a bloody suppres- ondary place. Instead, Hof and his superiors tried sion of the opposition or, less likely, a significant to open an American-Syrian dialogue that would political reform in Syria. Israel’s attitude at that focus on improving the bilateral relationship. Se- time can be summarized along the following lines: nior State Department officials travelled to Damas- cus and Senator John Kerry was given—or took—a 1. Contrary to a myth current in the Middle special responsibility for cultivating a relationship East and elsewhere, Israel did not seek to with Syria and its president. This suited Netan- help keep Assad in power and did not seek yahu, whose plate was filled by controversies over to persuade the U.S. to follow the same

3 Ibid, chapter 6.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 4 policy. Ariel Sharon’s “the devil we know” would play into Assad’s hands by lending response to George W. Bush in 2005 was credence to this propaganda line. The ex- no longer relevant in 2011. Ehud Olmert’s pectation by some external observers that conclusion from the events of 2006 was Israel could use its military might to affect to seek an accommodation with Syria, the course of events in Syria through such but this policy led nowhere and vanished measures as concentrating forces on the when Olmert left office. From that point border was not and has not been consid- on, there was not a single Israeli view of ered seriously by the Israeli leadership. Syria and Bashar al-Assad, but Israeli per- ceptions of Syria and its president in the 3. Israel did note with satisfaction that not all aftermath of Olmert’s departure can best events of the were necessarily be described as ambivalent. The 2006 ex- beneficial to Iran and the “Resistance Axis.” perience in Lebanon and the North Ko- The fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, and the rean reactor affair had a negative effect, pressure on the conservative monarchies in but the sense that the most effective way of the Arab world were seen as Iranian gains, toppling the “Iranian Wall” was to start by but the Syrian rebellion was a significant pulling the Syrian brick out of it did not setback to Tehran. Syria was Iran’s prin- vanish. This ambivalence was apparent in cipal ally and increasingly its client in the the spring of 2011 when Israeli decision- , its land bridge to Lebanon, and its makers had to make up their minds on partner in supporting in Gaza. The whether they preferred Assad to stay or go. prospect of a regime change in Syria, and The Israeli leadership saw Assad as more the emergence of a pro-American successor harmful than beneficial. It was clear that to Bashar al-Assad, was abhorrent to Teh- a diplomatic option was off the table in ran. The repercussions of the Syrian crisis the short term. They were worried about were soon manifested among Iran’s other the identity of his successors, but they saw clients: Hezbollah in Lebanon shifted to a the damage to Iran that would be caused defensive mode and Hamas moved its ex- by his fall, and on the whole preferred his ternal headquarters away from Damascus. departure. From a zero-sum game perspective, Iran’s loss was Israel’s gain. 2. The Israelis realized that their view of events in Syria, as long as they did not af- 4. The repercussions for Iran were clearly just fect Israel directly, was rather academic. part of a larger regional and international Israel had no influence inside Syria and picture. As the rebellion continued and in- realized that any support it would wish to tensified, Syria became the arena of a re- extend to the would be gional conflict between Iran and its rivals counter productive and play into the re- as well as between (and to a lesser gime’s hands. Bashar al-Assad’s initial and extent, ) and the U.S. and its West- persistent response to the rebellion was the ern allies. Events in Syria also had specific claim that this was not a genuine domes- effects on such neighbors asT urkey and tic uprising, but a plot hatched from the Iraq (Israel’s view on these effects will be outside, primarily by the U.S. and Israel. discussed in some details below). If Israel were to extend support to the reb- 5. Israel drew a clear distinction between the els (or even offer humanitarian help), it immediate and longer term ramifications of

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 5 the Syrian crisis. Rebellion, civil war, and A few days later, on Day, thousands of Pal- the prospect of regime change in a hostile estinians gathered along the fence separating the neighboring country require watchfulness Golan Heights from Syria near the village and close attention. Except for a single of in the Golan Heights. Unlike the incident (that will be discussed below), security fences along Israel’s other borders, that eighteen months of rebellion in Syria had fence was not a real barrier and several hundred remarkably little impact on Israel. But this Palestinians managed to break though it and cross reality has been fragile and could change into Majdal Shams. Four of them were killed and swiftly. The regime’s collapse, if it material- several dozens wounded by a small, surprised and izes or seems to be imminent, could trans- ill-prepared Israeli military force. form the present calm into a major Israeli- Syrian crisis and so could the launching The incident reflected a sense of Israeli complacency, of an Israeli or an American raid on Iran’s a byproduct of decades of quiet along the ceasefire nuclear facilities. The long-term ramifi- line with Syria. Israelis became used to a state of af- cations for Israel of the Syrian crisis will fairs whereby whatever the Baath regime was inflict- naturally depend on the future course of ing on Israel in other fronts, it implemented the terms events. They will be analyzed further below of the 1974 disengagement agreements scrupulously according to several scenarios. and kept the Golan front quiet. The May incident in Majdal Shams was but one of several Palestinian The May 2011 Events and the issue efforts to mark Nakba Day along Israeli frontiers. In of WMDs the Syrian case, it may not have been sponsored, just permitted, by the regime. Nontheless, it was a wake In mid-May 2011, nearly two months after the up call for Israel that the Golan front might no lon- outbreak of the rebellion, , Bashar ger remain quiet and that the unrest could quickly al-Assad’s cousin, gave an unusual interview to ignite the Syrian front whether as a deliberate policy . Makhlouf is a businessman, (as threatened by Rami Makhlouf) or as a byproduct charged with building and managing the ruling of the Syrian rebellion. family’s illicit fortune and a member of the regime’s innermost circle. It is not known whether his state- Israel took the necessary precautions, beefing up the ment was cleared or coordinated in advance with fence and boosting its military presence in the Golan. his cousin, but it was clearly significant and pre- A second Palestinian attempt to cross the fence was scient. The main import of the interview was the nipped in the bud. The Golan front remained quiet message that the regime was determined to hold but there was a reinforced sense in Israel that the Syr- onto power and was willing to fight to the bitter ian civil war could spill into Israel or draw it in from end. But Makhlouf chose also to include a specific one day to the next. In November 2012, a number warning directed at both and Washing- of incidents occurred along the Syrian-Israeli ceasefire ton: “If there is no stability here, there is no way line and in the Golan Heights. They were probably an there will be stability in Israel […] and nobody can unintended consequence of the fighting between the guarantee what will happen after, God forbid, any- and the opposition and did not reflect a thing happens to this regime […] don’t push Syria decision by either side to extend the fighting into the to do anything it is not happy to do.”4 Golan Heights or try to draw Israel into the conflict.

4 New York Times, May 10, 2011.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 6 During the next thirteen months, as the Syrian against Hezbollah, this could easily develop into a crisis deteriorated into a full-fledged civil war, the full-fledged conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli-Syrian front remained calm. It was stirred again in the late summer of 2012 by two issues. The Obama administration issued a stern warning One was Syria’s arsenal of weapons of mass de- to the Assad regime lest it contemplate using chem- struction (WMDs). As talks of the regime’s final ical weapons against its own population. President collapse intensified and became more relevant, the Obama warned Assad that “there would be enor- potential ramifications of Syria’s possession of bal- mous consequences if we start to see a movement listic missiles and chemical and biological warheads on the chemical weapons front […] that could and stockpiles came to the fore. The U.S. and its change my calculus.”7 Western allies were alarmed by a confluence of in- telligence material and published statements by the The second issue was the higher profile of Iran’s di- Syrian regime. Would Assad and his cohorts, their rect participation in the Syrian civil war. In earlier backs to the wall, use them against their own popu- phases of the Syrian crisis, Iran was openly support- lation? Would they transfer part of the stockpiles ive of its Syrian client, but it tried to conceal the to such terrorist organizations as Hezbollah? Would active part played by Iranian troops in the fighting. they be tempted to exit the stage in a blaze of pre- This changed in the summer of 2012 as part of a sumptive glory by firing their missiles at Israel and larger Iranian effort to cast Iran as a proactive, pow- other detested neighbors?5 erful regional actor, rather than the passive target of a much discussed American or Israeli raid. Thus Israel responded by threatening to intercept any Mohammad Ali Aziz Ja’fari, Commander of the Is- transfer of WMDs. Defense Minister Barak, For- lamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, admitted that eign Minister , and Israeli De- members of the were present in Syria.8 fense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff , all warned that this was in fact a “red line,” and It was against this backdrop that Israel announced according to the foreign minister, “a casus belli.” in early September 2012 that the IDF conducted The professionals were more nuanced than the a military exercise in the Golan Heights and that politicians. Reserve General Amos Gilad, Head of it had notified the Syrian government though “ap- the Political-Military Division in the Ministry of propriate channels” in advance so as to avoid both Defense, explained in July 2012 that thus far the alarm and misrepresentation. There may well have regime maintained control of its WMD arsenal. been other reasons for holding this exercise at this Chief of Staff Gantz warned that it might be diffi- particular time, but it was bound to be interpreted cult to pinpoint such Israeli action “and if you work as a message to both Iran and Syria. broadly you may find yourself soon enough in a larger campaign than the one you had planned. We The Israeli Public Discourse should take into account what would remain after the act and into what hands it might fall.”6 What For a country known for the loquaciousness of its the IDF chief of staff probably wanted to say was political and policy elites, the Israeli public dis- that should Israel intercept the transfer of WMDs course regarding the Syrian crisis has been quite by the Assad regime to Hezbollah, or launch a raid restrained. The Israeli policy community and

5 See interview with four former commanders of Israel’s Northern Command: Ma’ariv, July 27, 2012 (in Hebrew). 6 Ma’ariv, July 24, 2012 (in Hebrew). 7 New York Times, August 20, 2012. 8 , September 17, 2012.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 7 media have followed the unfolding of the Syrian I couldn’t help but think what would be crisis closely and covered it extensively, but in the happening today if the ideological position context of such a major event with major potential I had long held—peace in return for the repercussions for Israel, Israeli politicians and policy Golan—had been accepted. I couldn’t help makers have made relatively few, and on the whole, but think what would be happening today careful statements. The combined sense that Israel if Ehud Barak had not frozen before Hafez had little influence in the course of events, that that Assad in 2000, or if Ehud Olmert had not course was uncertain, and that the ultimate impact been interrupted as he faced Bashar Assad on Israel was unclear accounts for this reticence. in 2008. […]

Two significant themes emerge most prominently […]Meretz wasn’t the “peace with Syria” from the Israeli discourse on Syria during this pe- party - the was. riod. The first concerns the issue of an Israeli-Syri- an peace settlement and the related issue of Israeli On an individual scale, so was I. I wrote withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Needless to incessantly in the newspaper and spoke say, the two issues have been suspended for the time on television about the need to reach a being. The civil war in Syria will have to end and a peace-for-Golan deal. I pushed for peace- suitable regime will have to be formed before these with-Syria-now with all my strength. The issues are placed back on the agenda. But the Israeli opposing view looked unreasonable and opponents of these notions, and critics of the will- immoral. Those opposed looked like - ingness of four Israeli prime ministers to withdraw gerous men. I expressed fury with Yitzhak from the Golan as part of a peace deal with Syria, Shamir and Ariel Sharon for blocking a wasted no time in trumpeting the wisdom of their dialogue with Syria and blocking Israel position in view of the civil war in Syria. from peace. I was convinced that one day history would condemn them for their re- It was not surprising to hear and read the articu- jectionism and treat them as it treats Golda lation of this position from the right wing of the Meir, and Yisrael Galili. Israeli political spectrum, but the most eloquent retrospective denunciation of the deal that was And now, everything has been upended. not made with Syria was written by the influential It’s all been reversed. centrist columnist, Ari Shavit. It merits quoting at some length: If we’d had peace in the 2000s, then today we’d already have bloodshed. If we had No one likes to admit they were wrong. I gone to bed with Assad a decade ago, today don’t, either. But sometimes you have no we’d be waking up with jihad. If we had choice. given up and Snir, we would have terror in Dan and Dafna. Strange substanc- I recently went up north for . I es would be flowing into the spent hours just looking at the mountains tributaries. Frequent gun battles would be of the Golan Heights as they reddened to- breaking out at Tel Katzir and Ha’on. ward evening. But slowly the pure pleasure I was getting out of their amazing beauty The Syrian Golan would be turned into was replaced by a deep discomfort. a black hole far more dangerous than the

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 8 black hole of the Sinai desert. The idea of and . These efforts yielded mea- peace, which may have been correct in its ger results and the set of assumptions that under- time, would turn into a nightmare reality lined them seemed to have been obviated by the that would be difficult to tolerate. Sooner peace treaty with Egypt and the peace process of or later, Israel would have been forced to the 1990s. If Israel was becoming acceptable to the once again ascend to Tel Faher and Nafah mainstream in the region, what was the point of and continue to . But this time reaching out to minority groups? such an operation would bring ballistic missile barrages on Tel Aviv. The peace I Such views are closely related to the sense that Syria had believed in and fought for would have is just one of the states in the that turned into an enormous war in which it’s may be disintegrating under the weight of ethnic, possible thousands would have been killed. religious and sectarian conflicts. Thus, one senior […]9 Israeli commentator said, after a briefing by “a se- nior IDF officer,” who “described the situation in The public mood reflected in Shavit’s article was not which Syria would be divided into a few areas un- shaped by the Syrian crisis alone. The impact of the der different control”: Syrian civil war on the Israeli public’s attitude on the notion of “Land for Peace” was magnified by What is significant is the fact that Syria is the simultaneous turn of events in Egypt. The new becoming the most extreme example of the regime in Egypt did not abrogate the peace treaty surrounding Israel. National with Israel, as some of its supporters demanded, but states, some of which (Lebanon, for exam- it did introduce a measure of ambiguity with re- ple) were artificial colonial creations while gard to its future. Furthermore, the , others had a long history, are weakening originally an effective security barrier between Israel and some are disintegrating. The danger and Egypt, now hosted a population out of “large-scale” war, involving capture of of ’s control and jihadi elements who carried Israeli , disappears together with out several terrorist attacks against Israel. As part of the dismantling of these countries. But the larger trends generated by the Arab Spring these new dangers are created instead: dangers developments reinforced the preference of the Israeli that are, by nature, grey, decentralized, government and a large part of the Israeli public to much harder to decipher. Yet the intensity hold on to the territorial status quo. of these [new] perils is just as great as the dangers we became accustomed to viewing On the margins of the Israeli public discourse the as existential threats for many decades.10 Syrian civil war revived a traditional interest in the “politics of minorities” that dates back to pre-state But the stalling of the peace process and the impact Zionist policy. Having despaired of finding an ac- of the Arab Spring as well as the apparent fragmen- commodation with the Sunni-Arab political estab- tation of such states as Iraq and Lebanon raised the lishment in the region, Zionist and subsequently prospect of a fresh reshuffling of the of Israeli policy makers tried to build partnerships the Fertile Crescent. Against this background, the with ethnic and religious minorities such as , talk of Alawi and Kurdish separatism in Syria led

9 Ari Shavit, “Soul-searching on Syria.” Ha’aretz, September 8, 2012. 10 Ofer Shelah, “The limits of power.” Ma’ariv, October 7, 2012 [in Hebrew]. The author’s familiarity with Lebanon’s history is another matter. Read more: Ofer Shelah, “A Question for Israel: What If Syria Becomes the Next Lebanon?” Almonitor, October 7, 2012. See: http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/the-limits-of-power.html#ixzz28msAy7uq (accessed on November 11, 2012).

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 9 Israeli and other analysts to ponder the prospect of a calculus may be more complex. The beleaguered new regional order.11 Such thinking is still marginal Assad, hard put to cope with his own opposition, and it would take the breakup of the Syrian state to might well calculate that he need not and cannot bring it into the mainstream of Israeli thinking and meddle in a war with a powerful IDF that could policy planning. Israeli military and policy planners inflict the coup de grace on his rule. It could also may be preparing for the prospect of a fragmented be the trigger for external military intervention in Syria, but at this point there are no feasible indica- Syria that has thus far been avoided. But he might tions of Israeli efforts to reach out to such minority also calculate that this would be a golden oppor- groups as Kurds and in order to build op- tunity to transform Syria’s domestic civil war into tions for such an eventuality. another Arab-Israeli war.

Israel, Iran and the Syrian Crisis The issue of a preemptive strike against Iran’s nu- clear installation was the subject of a fierce debate There are several levels to the linkage between Is- in Israel and between Netanyahu’s government and rael’s most important national security challenge, the Obama administration during much of 2012, Iran’s quest for a nuclear arsenal, and the Syrian when it seemed that the former was keen to launch civil war. it prior to the U.S. presidential elections. The po- tential negative impact on the Syrian arena of such As has been mentioned above, the Syrian civil war a raid was one argument—though not the most is among other things a war by proxy between Iran important one—used by the opponents of the raid. and its rivals. Iran makes a large (and, recently, self The issue has subsided now, but is likely to resur- advertised) investment in shoring up Bashar al- face as a major issue and bone of contention, and so Assad while such rivals and competitors as the U.S., will its Syrian dimension. its Western allies, Turkey, and support the opposition. Bashar al-Assad’s fall would The Iranian leadership and the other parties to the be a major blow for Iran and its Lebanese proxy, conflict with Iran have been fully aware that the Hezbollah. But as long as Israel persists—correctly events in Syria benefitedT ehran by diverting atten- —in its determination to avoid direct involvement tion from the Iranian nuclear issue. This in itself in the Syrian crisis, its impact on the outcome re- has probably not been an important consideration mains limited. for the Iranian leadership in supporting Assad and prolonging the civil war. As discussed, they had The calculus changes and becomes more complex ample reasons to try to keep their principal ally in when Israel contemplates the pros and cons of an the region in power and have regarded the Syrian attack by itself or by the U.S. on Iran’s nuclear in- civil war as an arena in their conflict with a variety stallations. One of the cons concerns the regional of rivals. The Iranian leadership must be aware of repercussions of such an attack. Iran, in addition to the animosity created in a large part of the Arab a direct retaliation, would be likely to get Hezbol- Sunni world against their support of Assad’s re- lah in Lebanon and possibly the Assad regime in gime and their active participation in the bloody Syria to launch their missiles against Israel. Of the repression of the opposition, but they must see the two, Hezbollah, given the nature of its relationship interest in the regime’s survival as paramount. Be with Iran, is the more likely to join the fray. Assad’s that as it may, there was not much Israel could do

11 Ofra Bengio, “ reaches toward the sea.” Ha’aretz, August 3, 2012; Nikolas Gvosdev, “The Realist Prism: Syria Crisis Could Redraw Middle East Map.” World Politics Review, September 21, 2012.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 10 about this aspect of the linkage between the two Minister Olmert tried to stem this tide by using crises.12 Turkey as the mediator between Israel and Syria, but the collapse of the mediation, Israel’s Opera- Israel, Turkey and the Syrian Crisis tion Cast Lead in Gaza, and subsequently the Mavi Marmara incident served to exacerbate the bilateral From Israel’s perspective, the Turkish dimension of tension and turned it into a crisis. the Syrian crisis seems almost like the flip side of the Iranian one. It was against this backdrop that the Syrian rebel- lion broke out in March 2011 and resulted among Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria during the first other things in another reversal of Turkish-Syrian decade of this century was an important compo- relations. As a would-be mentor, Erdogan tried to nent of Erdogan’s new regional policies. The policy persuade Bashar al-Assad to respond to the chal- dubbed “Zero Problems” by Foreign Minister Ah- lenge by offering real political reforms. Assad’s re- met Davutoglu and “New Ottomanism” by oth- jection of his advice angered the famously irascible ers sought to compensate for Turkey’s rejection Turkish premier. The personal pique was aggravat- by the by building a position of ed by more substantive considerations and forces at influence in its immediate environment.T urkey’s work: genuine sympathy for a Sunni majority re- unique geopolitical position enables the country belling against of the tyranny of a sectarian minor- to operate in several arenas—the , Central ity and concern with the potential impact on Tur- , the and the Middle East—but it was key. TheT urkish government was primarily worried the Middle East where the ambitions and potential by the repercussions on its own Kurdish population of an ascendant Islamist Turkey could be pursued of the Syrian Kurdish minority’s relationship with most effectively. the Syrian state, and by the prospect of a large-scale flight of refugees across its border. The impact of In a Middle Eastern context, the transformation of these considerations was magnified by the develop- Turkey’s relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s Syria ments in Iraq, the increased competition with Iran, was the most dramatic. The previous hostility was and a sense that what seemed to be a very successful replaced by friendship and cooperation. Syria final- foreign policy investment in the Arab Middle East ly gave up the irredentist claim to the province of was turning sour. Alexandretta. Large-scale investments were made in the Syrian economy and Erdogan acted as a mentor With some twists and turns, the Turkish policy that to the young Bashar al-Assad. emerged in mid-2011 turned Turkey into a major critic and opponent of Bashar al-Assad and his re- Israel was clearly concerned by the general drift of gime. Turkey objects to a direct military interven- Turkey’s new regional policy, by Erdogan’s cham- tion, but it afforded a territorial base and facilities pioning of the Palestinian cause (and more specifi- to the military and political opposition and supply cally of the Islamist Hamas), by the deliberate use routes for weapons and money provided to the Syr- of the distancing from Israel in order to gain influ- ian opposition by such countries as Saudi Arabia ence and popularity in the Arab street, and by the and Qatar. A large number of Syrian refugees also impact of these policies on the Arab mood. Prime found shelter in southern Turkey.

12 Amos Yadlin, “‘Iran First’ or ‘Syria First’: What Lies between the Iranian and Syrian Crises.” Strategic Assessment, vol. 15, no. 2 (July 2012), pp. 7-18.

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 11 All this could be the basis of significantT urkish-Is- 4. Regime victory, which is least likely but raeli cooperation. A return to the intimate strategic cannot be ruled out. alliance of the 1990s is not conceivable as long as Erdogan and the AKP are in power, but common There is not a single optimal and feasible scenario interests in Syria and other parts of the region could that could serve all its interests, but Israel’s best op- be well served by modest coordination and collabo- tion is for Assad’s regime to be replaced by a pro- ration. But even this level of cooperation cannot be Western secular regime, though Israelis know full achieved as long as the dispute over the after effects well that this option is not very likely. At the same of the Mavi Marmara incident is not settled. time, Israeli opponents of the notion of an Israeli- Syrian settlement and withdrawal from the Golan Scenarios, Interests and should bear in mind that such a regime is likely to Preferences turn to Washington and ask to repeat the pattern established by Kissinger and Sadat in the 1970s. In As Israel watches and reflects on the future course other words, it would tell Washington that it would of the Syrian crisis and its ramifications on its own like to turn away from Iran and join Washington’s national security, it looks at a number of potential orbit, but would also insist on regaining the Golan scenarios:13 as part of the package.

1. A protracted continuation of the status It is difficult to see how Israel’s current passive stance quo under which the regime’s control of regarding the course of events in Syria will change, the army and security apparatus and the except in a context of a crisis produced by the trans- major institutions of the central govern- fer of WMDs to terrorist hands or by jihadi or other ment is maintained, fighting with the op- radical elements launching terrorist attacks against position continues with ups and downs, Israel. Needless to say, a sharp turn in the course of and large parts of the country remain out- events in Syria will in all likelihood force Israel to side effective government control. make fresh decisions. But while avoiding open and direct intervention in the Syrian crisis, Israel should 2. Regime change. This could come about build discreet channels to the forces at work in Syria as a result of the opposition’s victory or in preparation for the new reality that is most likely Western success in persuading part of the to emerge. Such Israeli policy with regard to Syria regime’s hard core and part of the opposi- cannot be conducted in isolation from a larger shift tion to join forces (it can be expected that in its regional policy. The changes in the region, the after the U.S. presidential elections, and Arab Spring in particular, have confronted Israel, given the growing international pressure to as we saw, with severe national security challenges, end the carnage, a more vigorous Western but they have also created new opportunities. Is- policy would be pursued). In either case, rael shares interests in the course of events in the transition is unlikely to be smooth. Middle East with such countries as Turkey, Jordan 3. Regime collapse followed by chaos—Alawi and the Gulf states. Together with them, it does not retreat to the mountains along the coast, have to accept the turbulence produced by the Arab Kurdish autonomy in the northeast, ongo- Spring and the risks and opportunities created by ing violence and external intervention. the Syrian civil war as givens, but can formulate new

13 See: Udi Dekel, “Whither Syria? Recommendations for Israeli Policy.” INSS Insight, No. 359 (August 6, 2012); Wikistrat, “Syria’s Turmoil Explored”—Crowdsourcing Scenarios and Policy Options on Syria’s Future.” (September 10, 2012). See: http://www.wikistrat.com/geopolitical- analysis/syrias-turmoil-explored-crowdsourcing-scenarios-and-policy-options-on-syrias-future/ (accessed October 3, 2012).

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 12 policies to deal with the unfolding situation. Israel position and conversely, what influence Israel has can participate in the new diplomatic game in the helped on U.S. policy. It seems that the mutual in- Middle East, but in order to do that it has to buy a fluence has been limited.W ashington conducted dual entry ticket: normalize its relations with Tur- its policy vis-à-vis the Syrian rebellion based on key and revive a peace process with the Palestinians. its own considerations and interests. The same is As has been noted above, settling the current crisis true of Israel’s policy. It is quite likely that in the with Turkey will not restore the Israeli-Turkish alli- aftermath of the American elections of November ance of the 1990s but will enable the two countries 2012 a more vigorous U.S. policy will be adopted to collaborate on or coordinate policies, primarily towards the Syrian civil war. No rush to military with regard to the Syrian crisis. As for Arab coun- intervention is likely, but the anxiety that even lim- tries, such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, ited steps could draw the U.S. into an involvement they cannot be expected to cooperate openly with risky in political terms on the eve of the elections Israel. But even tacit cooperation requires progress is off the agenda. As the U.S. becomes more active on the Israeli-Palestinian front and will clearly be- and a substantial change more likely, Israel’s own come harder should the current tenuous relation- outlook and Washington’s expectations of Israel ship with the Palestinian Authority deteriorate. may very well change.

It has often been asked to what extent Israel’s policy in the Syrian crisis has been affected byW ashington’s

Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis The Saban Center at Brookings 13 The Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Saban Center for Middle East is the center’s Director of Research; Kenneth M. Policy was established on May 13, 2002 with an Pollack, an expert on national security, military inaugural address by His Majesty King Abdullah II affairs and the Persian Gulf; Bruce Riedel, a spe- of Jordan. The creation of the Saban Center reflects cialist on counterterrorism; Suzanne Maloney who the Brookings Institution’s commitment to expand focuses on Iran and economic development; Mi- dramatically its research and analysis of Middle chael Doran, a specialist in Middle East security is- East policy issues at a time when the region has sues; Khaled Elgindy, an expert on the Arab-Israeli come to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda. conflict; Natan Sachs, an expert on Israeli domestic politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict; Stephen R. The Saban Center provides Washington policymak- Grand, Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. ers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely Relations with the Islamic World; Salman Shaikh, research and policy analysis from experienced and Fellow and Director of the Brookings Doha Center; knowledgeable scholars who can bring fresh per- Ibrahim Sharqieh, Fellow and Deputy Director of spectives to bear on the critical problems of the the Brookings Doha Center; Shadi Hamid, Fellow Middle East. The center upholds the Brookings and Director of Research of the Brookings Doha tradition of being open to a broad range of views. Center; and Shibley Telhami, who holds the Sadat TheS aban Center’s central objective is to advance Chair at the University of Maryland. The center is understanding of developments in the Middle East located in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at through policy-relevant scholarship and debate. Brookings.

The center’s foundation was made possible by a The Saban Center is undertaking path breaking generous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of research in five areas: the implications of regime Los Angeles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Vice change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building President of Foreign Policy at Brookings, was the and Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domes- founding Director of the Saban Center. Tamara tic politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; Cofman Wittes is the center’s Director. Within the mechanisms and requirements for a two-state so- Saban Center is a core group of Middle East experts lution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for who conduct original research and develop inno- the war against terrorism, including the continuing vative programs to promote a better understand- challenge of state sponsorship of terrorism; and po- ing of the policy choices facing American decision litical and economic change in the Arab world, and makers. They include Daniel Byman, a Middle East the methods required to promote democratization. terrorism expert from Georgetown University, who

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