Report of the International Group of Experts. the Catalan Independence Referendum : an Assessment of the Process of Self-Determination Irai

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KNOWLEDGE, EDUCATION AND DIALOGUE

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS. THE CATALAN INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM : AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IRAI

Nina Caspersen Professor, University of York

Matt Qvrotrup Professor, Coventry University

Daniel Turp Professor, University of Montreal

Yanina Welp No 01 Professor, University of Zurich SEPTEMBER 2017 www.irai.quebec TABLE OF CONTENT

Summary ...... 1

Acknowledgements ...... 2

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ...... 3

Introduction ...... 4

The Right To Decide? The Catalans’ Dilemma – Yanina Welp ...... 5

The Catalan Independence Referendum: Conflicting Claims and Interna- tional Responses— Nina Caspersen ...... 21

A Comparative Perspective on Referendums on Independence and the The views expressed in this publica- Proposed Catalan Referendum of October 1st, 2017 – Matt Qvortrup tion are those of the guest authors ...... 37 and do not necessarily represent those of the IRAI or its board of directors. Catalonia’s “Right To Decide” under International, European,Spanish, Cat- alan and Comparative Law – Daniel Turp ...... 55 The IRAI’s Reports of Experts are written by reputable researchers. Conclusion ...... 73 Based on a scientific approach, their goal is to examine a current issue Annex— The Law On The Self-Determination Referendum (project)...... 75 related to the self-determination of peoples and national independence. About the Report of the International Group of Experts ...... 88 They are subject to a rigorous evaluation process. About the IRAI ...... 89

For more information about our publications, please contact us at [email protected] or visit our website www.irai.quebec.

ISBN 978-2-9817016-3-3 • Online ISBN 978-2-9817016 • Printed Edition 1 IRAI SUMMARY

This report addresses different aspects of the proposed referendum in Catalonia. In chapter one, Profes- sor Yanina Welp analyzes and presents a political sociological perspective on the respective evolutions TABLE OF of the Catalan support for or rejection of independence. This chapter also summarizes the events that led to the demand for a referendum. In chapter two, Professor Nina Caspersen presents a comparative and historical overview of the political context of the demand for independence for Catalonia and draws up a number of scenarios for the future, depending on the outcome of the referendum. In the subse- CONTENT quent chapter, Professor Matt Qvortrup analyzes when referendums are held and what determines their outcome; as well, he analyzes the legislation governing the conduct of the proposed referendums. He concludes, with some reservations, that the current legislation meets international standards. Finally, Professor Daniel Turp analyzes and assesses the legality of the proposed referendum. Professor Daniel Turp examines the right to decide of the people of Catalonia in light of rules found in international, Eu- ropean, Spanish, Catalan and comparative law.

Le présent rapport aborde les différents aspects du référendum annoncé en Catalogne. Au chapitre un, la professeure Yanina Welp analyse et présente un point de vue politique et sociologique des évolutions respectives du soutien et du rejet catalans relativement à l’indépendance. Ce chapitre résume aussi les événements qui ont mené les Catalans à demander un référendum. Au chapitre deux, la professeure Nina Caspersen présente un aperçu comparatif et historique du contexte politique lié à la demande d’indépendance de la Catalogne et établit un certain nombre de scénarios pour l’avenir, selon les résul- tats du référendum. Dans le chapitre suivant, le professeur Matt Qvortrup analyse les moments où des référendums sont organisés et les facteurs qui déterminent les résultats; de plus, il analyse la loi qui régit la tenue des référendums proposés. Il conclut, avec quelques réserves, que la loi actuelle répond aux normes internationales. Enfin, le professeur Daniel Turp analyse et évalue la légalité du référendum proposé. Il étudie le droit de décider des habitants de la Catalogne à la lumière des règles que l’on re- trouve dans le droit international, européen, espagnol, catalan et comparé.

L’informe aborda diferents aspectes relatius al referèndum proposat a Catalunya. Al primer capítol, la Doctora Yanina Welp analitza i presenta una perspectiva política i sociològica de l’evolució del suport o l’oposició a la independència per part del poble català. Així mateix, el capítol s’encarrega de resumir la cronologia d’esdeveniments que han propiciat la petició d’un referèndum. Al segon capítol, la catedràtica Nina Caspersen exposa una visió de conjunt comparativa i històrica del context polític de la demanda d’independència de Catalunya i formula una sèrie d’hipòtesis de futur en funció del resultat del referèn- dum. Al capítol que segueix, el catedràtic Matt Qvortrup estudia quan i en quines condicions se celebren els referèndums i què en determina els resultats; alhora, analitza la legislació que regeix els elements clau dels referèndums proposats. Conclou, amb algunes reserves al respecte, que la legislació actual compleix els estàndards internacionals. Per últim, el catedràtic Daniel Turp analitza i avalua la legalitat del referèndum proposat, i examina el dret a decidir del poble català tenint en compte la legislació inter- nacional, europea, espanyola, catalana i el dret comparat. 2

ACKNOWLEGMENTS

On behalf of the Institute for Research on Self-Determination of Peoples and National Independence (IRAI), I would like to express my appreciation to all those who have been involved in the preparation of this report. The IRAI is particularly grateful to the three academics who have agreed to be associated with our new Institute: Nina Caspersen, Yanina Welp and Matt Qvortrup, and with whom I had the pleasure, as their rapporteur, to write this report. I would like to express special thanks to our researcher Anthony Beauséjour, who participated in the deliberations of the group and competently assisted its members and the rapporteur in the preparation of their contributions.

The group also expresses its deep appreciation to the IRAI Research Coordinator, Frida Osorio Gonsen, for the phe- nomenal work she devoted to the preparation of the present report. The revision and translation of the report fall under her responsibility, a responsibility which she has exercised with great efficiency.

I would also like to thank the IRAI’s Director General, Geneviève Baril, who also played a decisive role in defining the mandates of the members of the group of international experts and in implementing a project of which she is, in the end, the ideator. She must also be thanked for organizing the dissemination of this report, both in Catalonia and in Québec, in conjunction with the invaluable assistance of Philippe Leclerc and Élisabeth Émond of Nestor Stratégie.

Daniel Turp Rapporteur 3 IRAI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc PCE Communist Party of Spain Cs Citizens PDC Democratic Pact for Catalonia CC Canarian Coalition PDeCAT Catalan European Democratic Party CDC Democratic Convergence of Catalonia PNV Basque Nationalist Party CiU Convergence and Union S.C. Statutes of Canada CSQP Catalonia Yes We Can S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports (Canada) CQLR Compilation of Québec Laws and Regulations Sess. Session CUP Popular Unity Candidacy Supp. Supplement DC Democrats of Catalonia TC Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Doc. Document TFUE Treaty on the Functioning of the European ERC Republican Left of Catalonia Union ICJ International Court of Justice TS Treaty Series (United States of America) ICV-EUiA Initiative for Catalonia Greens-United and Al- TUE Treaty on the European Union ternative Left UCD Union of the Democratic Centre IU United Left UK United Kingdom ILM International Legal Materials UN United Nations MES Left Movement UNGAOR United Nations General Assembly Official Re- OJ Official Journal (European Union) cords PP Popular Party UNTS United Nations Treaty Series PSC Catalan Socialist Party PPC Catalan People’s Party PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers Party 4 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

I. INTRODUCTION

As an independent research institute whose mandate is to produce research accessible to all citizens of Quebec and the world on the issues relating to self-determination of peoples and national independence, the IRAI considers the process of determination of Catalonia’s political status which is currently underway and the referendum to be held on October 1, 2017 as deserving of particular attention.

This referendum is part of a larger process that explicitly invokes the right of peoples to self-determination en- shrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international treaties and instruments. This right is referred to in the draft Law on the Self-Determination Referendum (Llei del Referèndum d’autodeterminació) that was presented to the Catalan Parliament on July 31, 2017, and which was therefore made public at the midpoint of the group’s work. This draft law provides that the Catalan people will be invited to exercise this right by choosing the path of independence. The question to which the voters will be asked to answer will be the following: “Do you want Catalonia to be an independent State in the form of a republic?”

Due to the importance of the issues surrounding this forthcoming referendum, the IRAI has considered it appropri- ate to form an international group of experts and has given it the mandate to examine the historical, political and legal aspects of the self-determination process initiated by the Parliament and the Government of Catalonia, and to look in particular into the norms and rules contained in the draft Law on the Self-Determination Referendum.

The international group of experts is composed of four academics, of several nationalities and different back- grounds, with diverse expertise on issues of self-determination and independence. The general terms of reference for the group were to examine the context in which the process of self-determination of the Catalan people has been taking place. The specific terms of reference of the four experts were as follows:

Yanina Welp (Argentina, University of Zurich): examination of the historical context of Catalonia’s process of self-determination in Catalonia and the issue of the popular support to such process; Nina Caspersen (Denmark, University of York): examination of the the conflict surrounding the process of self-determination in Catalonia, the international responses to this conflict as well the possible impacts of the proposed referendum; Matt Qvortrup (United Kingdom, University of Coventry): examination of international referenda experiences and assessment of the Catalan draft Law on the Self-Determination Referendum in the context of such experiences; and Daniel Turp (Québec-Canada, Université de Montréal): examination of the legal context underlying the process of self-determination of the Catalan people, from the perspectives of international, European, Spanish, Catalonian and comparative law.

The IRAI expresses the hope that this report will contribute to the ongoing debate on self-determination and independence in Catalonia in a constructive manner. 5 IRAI

II. THE RIGHT TO DECIDE ? THE CATALANS’ DILEMMA

Yanina WELP Professor, Department of Politics, University of York

1. Introduction 2. The Spanish Transition to Democracy and the New Territorial Arrangement 3. The Electoral Arena 4. The End of the Accommodation Strategy 5. The Social Support for Independence and/ or a Referendum 6. Economic Crisis, Corruption Scandals and International Support 7. On the Way to October 1 8. Conclusions

1. Introduction

The scenario created after the regional elections of 27 September, 2015, defined by the Catalan pro-independence parties as “plebiscitarian,” radically changed the political options available for Catalan citizens. The pro-independence platform Together for Yes (Junts pel si), the result of the electoral alliance among the centre-right Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the left-wing Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), the Democrats of Catalonia (DC) and the Left Movement (MES), won the election, obtaining 62 seats. But, contrary to their expectations, they failed to gain an absolute majority. Then, Together for Yes arrived at an agreement with the radical left-wing grassroots and pro-independence Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP), which had a historical election this September, winning 10 seats at the regional level. All the pro-independence parties together came to 72 seats out of a total of 135, leaving room to start the process of “disconnection” (desconnexió) from Spain promised by these parties during the electoral campaign.

Accordingly, on November 9, 2015, the parties presented the Declaration of the Initiation of the Process of Indepen- dence of Catalonia, which “won’t be subject to Spanish institutions’ decisions, particularly those from the Spanish Constitutional Court” (see Catalan News, November 9, 2015). All the other groups voted against the declaration: Ci- tizens (Ciutadans, Cs), the Catalan Socialist Party (Partit Socialista de Catalunya, PSC), the Catalan People’s Party (Par- tit Popular de Catalunya, PPC) and the alternative-left coalition Catalunya Sí que es Pot (Vilaweb, November 9, 2015).

This report focuses on the evolution of the Catalan support of independence and/or the demand for a referendum on the topic, both rising in Catalonia since the early 2000s and becoming a real political challenge for the Spanish government since 2010. If, in the past, support for independence was just a matter of speculation or based on future potential scenarios, since January 2016—when the new government of the Generalitat headed by Carles Puigdemont finally assumed office—it became part of the political agenda with a unilateral referendum that was not interna- 6 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

tionally recognized announced for October 1, 2017. Even if is hard to anticipate the short-term success of such a movement, it allows us to explore the likely electoral support of a referendum in case it happens. Or, in other words, what could be expected in terms of turnout and options for the Yes and the No side under these specific conditions?

Political preferences are shaped by many factors. The Spanish legal framework particularly, as well as historical patterns, is key to framing citizens’ support or rejection of the right to self-determination and the option for independence. As concerns the legal framework, a referendum on self-determination is not allowed by the Spanish Constitu- tion of 1978 and there has been neither an agreement nor the international support to call such a referendum on a legal basis. Even if a legal framework could be eventually discussed and agreed upon, as happened in similar democratic settings, such as Quebec (1980 and 1995) and Scotland (2014), the strong rejection by the Spanish government makes it unlikely at the moment. Beyond the international recognition of a referendum on self-determination in Ca- talonia and the discussion of the legal framework (see Caspersen, Qvortrup and Turp on these topics, in this report), my focus here is on the drivers or main reasons explaining the citizens’ increasing preference for a referendum on self-determination and the possible outcome of the consultation announced for October 1.

This paper is structured as follows: First, the role of the territorial dimension and the Catalan actors during the transition to democracy is briefly presented. Second, the evolution of political parties (positions, alliances and electoral support) is analyzed. This is followed by a section focused on the end of the accommodation strategy. Then, the social support for independence and the right to decide in a referendum is analyzed through data from different surveys and connected with main political events. Section five focuses on the most recent events. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

2. The Spanish Transition to Democracy and the New Territorial Arrangement

Spain is considered to be a classic case of rapid transition to and consolidation of democracy. The death of General Francisco Franco on November 22, 1975, (who had been in power since 1939, after the long civil war initiated in 1936 ended) brought his successors into contact with a Europe that no longer found dictatorship acceptable. In such a scenario, the Spanish case is sometimes described as a case of regime-initiated transition that occurred under pressure from society (Linz and Stepan 1996). After Franco’s death, Juan Carlos de Borbón became head of state and played a key role by driving forward change while simultaneously representing continuity with the Francoist institutions. Adolfo Suárez, head of government in the post-Franco transition (after the removal of Rodríguez Arias) convinced the Cortes to pass the Law for Political Reform, which envisaged its own dissolution and the creation of a new bicameral legislature. The law, which also convened the first free elections and opened the door to the legal- ization of all political parties, was approved with 425 votes in favour and 59 against. It was put to a referendum on December 15, 1976, in the first free vote for decades.

In Catalonia, the campaign in the mass media was organized in Catalan, forbidden under the dictatorship, under the slogan “In the big decisions, one has to be present. If you vote today, tomorrow you can decide” (“En les grans decisions, cal ser-hi presents. Si votes avui, demà podràs decidir”). The final result was 94 percent in favour of the reform with a turnout of 77 percent; in Catalonia, 97 percent in favour with a turnout of 74 percent (Spain Interior Ministry). After the referendum, the process of dismantling authoritarian structures accelerated.

1 Catalan nationalism has a long history with different readings, which have been extensively studied. See, for instance, Fontana 2014, Miley 2006, Balcells 1991, Serrano 2013. 7 IRAI

In April 1977 the Communist Party was legalized, and in June the same year the first open and competitive elections were held for a parliament that also served as a constituent assembly. After the elections power was distributed among various forces, including Suárez’s centre-right Union of the Democratic Centre (47.4 percent of seats), the right-wing Popular Alliance (4.6 percent); the left-leaning Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (33.7 percent) and the Communist Party of Spain (5.4 percent). Regionalist parties were represented by Democratic Pact for Catalonia (3.1 percent), and the Basque Nationalist Party (2.3 percent) (Spain Interior Ministry).The political parties with parliamentary representation acted as channels of information between the discussions held at Moncloa and civil society, and this set the scene for the constitution-making process. The institutional framework chosen allowed for the representation of all key actors and an inclusive balance of forces, but at the same time it largely relegated civil society to the status of observers in a process that was led and steered by parties, parties backed by high levels of legitimacy (Welp 2013).

During the constitution-making process, both parliamentary deputies and the Spanish government were involved in long conversations in private and in public about defining the future political institutions. The territorial-administra- tive arrangement of the country and the recognition of the historic nationalisms were among the most controversial topics, given, on the one hand, the actors who had at various times demanded self-determination for their territories and, on the other, the radical position of the centralist parties. Catalan and Basque nationalisms, in particular, sought to create a new decentralized territorial organization, but the violence of the armed Basque organization ETA (Euskadi and Freedom) strengthened opposition from the military, who equated regional nationalism with ter- rorism. Notice that in the period previous to constitution making, several members of the armed forces were killed by ETA, including the successor selected by Franco, Carrero Blanco (Linz and Stepan 1996). For some people, the territorial conflict had the potential to escalate into civil war. For both historical reasons and contextual ones (the presence of ETA), the issue deeply divided the different groups, so it is especially remarkable that consensus was reached on the creation of a new decentralized power structure, based on 17 regions, and on the unprecedented transfer of power to the peripheral nations.

The Spanish Constitution was submitted to a referendum on December 6, 1978, when it was approved by 91.8 percent of those casting a valid ballot on a turnout of 67.1 percent. It was also approved in those territories in which peripheral nationalism was strong. In Catalonia, 95.1 percent approved the constitution on a turnout of 67.9 percent, while in the Basque Country it was approved by 74.6 percent, although on a much lower turnout (44.7 percent) (Spain Boletín Oficial del Estado 1978).

Once the Constitution entered into force, the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia (Estatut d’autonomia) was discussed, written and submitted to a referendum. Of all the parties with parliamentary representation in Catalonia, only one was against, New Force (Fuerza Nueva), an extreme-right party that was against autonomy in general, arguing that it would destroy the unity of Spain. The Statute was supported by all other parties under the argument that autonomy would resolve the problems that centralism had not resolved. In the referendum, the Statute was supported by 88.1 percent of voters with a turnout of 59.3 percent (Ollero Butler 1979-1980). This result meant the approval for the creation of the Catalan Parliament and the executive government, the Generalitat de Catalunya. In 1980 the first

2 Despite the fact that, during the transition process, the referendum was chosen as a mechanism to give popular legitimation to elite decisions, the Spanish constitution forbids citizens from initiating direct-democracy mechanisms at the national level as is possible in Switzerland and Italy or at regional levels in the United States and Germany. This is undoubtedly linked to the historical lack of political response to sovereignty conflicts. Nonetheless, under the previous 1931 constitution, citizens had the right to submit laws passed by parliament to a referendum if backed by 15 percent of the electorate. It also foresaw the need for referendums to validate autonomy issues. 8 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

elections of the Catalan Parliament took place.

3. The Electoral Arena

According to Keating (1994), there are three explanations of the emergence of nationalism. The first is mainly based on an ethnic dimension, which has a stronger presence in past times and a lesser presence in consolidated democracies. The second is based on the will of the people. The third explains the emergence of nationalism as an instrument of a political elite seeking to create or reinforce a state through a nationalistic appeal. As Keating himself stresses, there are different factors and combinations of conditions, and quite commonly mixed situations are found when analyzing a given case. These are evident in Catalonia. Even if there is a long history behind the construction of a Catalan nationalism, its foundations are not ethnic, but were strongly developed during the early stages of the industrialization and modernization of Catalonia, and the role of political elites has been key. Strategic or genuine (see Carpensen’s argument in this report), Catalan nationalism is inclusive in ethnic terms and does not support any primacy of race. However, the defense, protection and promotion of the Catalan language has been one of its main drivers, developed as a reaction against the Franco period, when the Catalan language was forbidden, and other aspects of life restricted (Skerret 2007).

Jordi Pujol, founder in 1974 of the political party Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, CDC), which was legalized in 1977, came to power in 1980 in the first free Catalan election held after the transition. He was elected by a coalition of his party and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Democràtica per Catalunya), giving place to the long-standing coalition Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió, CiU), which would be broken in June 2015 after 37 consecutive years running together by the pro-independence turn of the the first and resistance to it by the second. The end of the coalition also meant the end of a period in which both parties defended a federal model for Spain (i.e., neither independence nor the issue of holding a referendum was part of their program). Between 1980 and 2003 CiU was the main political actor in Catalonia. But things had started to change in 1999 (see Graph 1). In that year CiU won the election in seats but not in votes, and, without a majority, the party needed an agreement to form government. This came with the Majestic Pact, the agreement between the Catalan party and the centre-right wing Spanish Popular Party (PP).

In 2003 the parliamentary elections in Catalonia made room for a new leftist alliance, the “Tripartit,”among the Catalan Socialist Party, the Republican Left of Catalonia and Initiative for Catalonia Greens–United and Alternative Left (the PSC, the ERC and ICV-EUiA). The new president of the Generalitat, Pasqual Maragall, led the elaboration of a New Statute to replace the one approved in 1979. By then, the political-party system expressed more transforma- tions: UCD disappeared and a new party was created, Ciutadans, a pro-Spain Catalan party, which, later on, in 2015, would have a role in the national elections.

More or less in parallel with the arrival of the Tripartit in the Catalan government, the former Basque president Juan José Ibarretxe (1999-2009) presented a controversial plan to transform the Basque region into a state “freely associated” with Spain. The Ibarretxe Plan, as it was known, would be achieved via peaceful and democratic means, including a referendum. But on November 28 of the same year, the Spanish government, led by the Popular Party’s José María Aznar (1996-2004), reacted, initiating a characteristically PP style of response to nationalist claims: by appealing to the Justice to ban any attempt of popular consultation. Accordingly, the Penal Code was modified to 9 IRAI

include an article punishing anyone who organizes elections or referendums without the parliament’s authorization with prison sentences or disqualification from public office (El País, December 11, 2003). The Basque parliament approved the Ibarretxe Plan, which then passed to Madrid, where it was presented, but blocked at the national parliament level and not allowed discussion.

Graph 1: Political parties and electoral results (1980-2015)

Source: http://www.historiaelectoral.com/heauto2.html

Shortly after, the general elections of 2004 changed the distribution of power, giving the Spanish government (in a minority) to the PSOE. Led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011), the period paved the way to a less confron- tational climate. Then, in Catalonia the Tripartit—whose biggest party, the PSC, is a Catalan branch of the PSOE— announced the plan of elaborating a new Statute that was theoretically supported by President Zapatero (El País, November 14, 2003). Zapatero probably miscalculated when he expressed strong support for the Statute at a campaign meeting in Barcelona in November 2003, given that it was out of his control to give such guarantees, as the future legal controversies would prove.

On September 30, 2005, the Catalan Parliament approved the New Statute with 120 votes (all the parties represented—CiU, the PSC, the ERC and ICV-EUiA—excepting the Popular Party, 11 votes). The text was submitted to the Spanish Parliament, where the deputies introduced several changes. It was also submitted to the Constitutional Tri- bunal. This led to a new round of negotiations ending in a revisited proposal of the Statute agreed upon by CiU and the PSOE, and which passed with the votes of the PSOE, CiU, the PNV, IU, BNG and CC; it was rejected by the PP, ERC 10 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

(despite the party having been one of the Statute’s main promoters, it did not accept the changes made in Madrid) and EA with the abstention of Chunta Aragonesista and Nafarroa Bai.

Once approved in Madrid, the Statute had to be ratified by the Catalan Parliament, which it was, although with less support than the original version, given that this time not only the PP but also ERC voted against it (making a total of 28 percent of the parliament against). Finally, the text was submitted to referendum on June 18, 2006. With a low turnout (48.9 percent), the Yes option received 73 percent of the votes and the No, 20 percent. ERC campaigned against.

On June 28, 2010, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled against the Statute, cutting most of its crucial articles. The sen- tence supported the claim of the PP and other six recusals presented by the governments of the autonomous communities of Aragón, Baleares, Comunidad Valenciana, La Rioja and Murcia, all controlled by the Popular Party. These sentences had strong effects. On July 10 the Catalan civil-society organization, Xarxa Òmnium organized a demonstration under the slogan “We are a nation, we decide” (Som una nació, nosaltres decidim), which received the support of labour unions, civil-society organizations, several political parties and the participation of an esti- mated half a million to one and a half million people, according to different sources (BBC News, July 10, 2010). The president of the Generalitat, José Montilla (PSC), had to leave the street (Carrer de Casp) under protection, given the rejection by the demonstrators (RTVE, July 10, 2010). The growing social discontent was even more evident when the Tripartit could not be replicated anymore.

In November 2010 CiU returned to power. The economic crisis was showing the first effects then, and the new Ca- talan government initiated a process of cutting social expenditures. In a scenario of polarization, the Popular Party won the general elections in November 2011 with an absolute majority. President of the Generalitat, Artur Mas, went to Madrid to negotiate a new fiscal agreement. He came back with a rejection and the decision to promote a referendum. At this time the launching of a grassroots social movement to support independence was also on the move with the first wave of informal referendums La( Vanguardia, September 25, 2012).

In November 2012 new elections were called but, contrary to what Mas expected, CiU lost support at the hands of the left-wing, strongly pro-independence party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. ERC had been a central actor in the Tripartit and became a key actor again. The party decided to enter in government on the condition of holding of a referendum on self-determination. On September 27, 2012, the Catalan Parliament approved a motion to call a referendum, and on December 19 of that year CiU and ERC signed an agreement called “Pact for Freedom” (Pacte per la Libertad), which created the foundation for the next steps (the departure of the Unión from the 37-year coalition and the agreement resulting in Together for Yes).

4. The End of the Accommodation Strategy

The previous section summarizes the complexity and flexibility of the agreements among parties (excepting the PP and later on Cs, owing to the same Unionist position). If from the transition to the early 2000s the main political preference was the accommodation within the framework of the autonomous communities, in the period between 2003 and 2006 an attempt to extend this agreement dominates the scenario. Since 2010 changes in preferences are reflected in both general and Catalan elections—programmatic changes developed by parties as well as by civil-so- 11 IRAI

Table 1. Elections of representatives, 1999-2016

DATE TYPE WINNER MAIN ISSUES TURNOUT

CiU (in agreement with the 17/10/1999 Catalan Majestic Pact (PP-CiU) 59.2% PP)

12/04/2000 General PP (absolute majority) Ibarretxe Plan (Basque Country) 68.7%

16/11/2003 Catalan Tripartit (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA) Proposal of a new Statute 62%

14/04/2004 General PSOE (minority government) Support for the Statute 75.6%

Tripartit (PSC, ERC and New Statute approved on October 30, 01/11/2006 Catalan 56.7% ICV-EUiA) 2005

The TC rules against several articles. 09/04/2008 General PSOE (minority government) 73.8% Economic and political crisis

28/11/2010 Catalan CiU Wave of informal referendums 58.7%

20/11/2011 General PP (absolute majority) Wave of informal referendums 68.9%

CiU and ERC form govern- A referendum is announced for No- 25/11/2012 Catalan ment. The condition for ERC vember 9, 2014. Nonbinding informal 67.8% is the call of a referendum. consultation process. After the “plebiscitarian” election, the “Junts pel Si” (Convergèn- new government starts a unilateral 27/09/2015 Catalan 77.5% cia-ERC) process towards declaring independence.

20/11/2015 General No government for a year 69.7%

National Pact pro referendum (Decem- 26/06/2016 General PP (minority government) ber 23, 2016) Referendum announced 66.5% for October 1, 2017

Source: Author’s synopsis 12 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

ciety demonstrations. Table 1 shows how these dynamics interact.

By 2006 the new Statute promoted by the Tripartit (the PSC, ERC and ICV-EUiA) was passed by the Spanish Parliament with the agreement of CiU and the PSOE. ERC promoted it within the government of the Tripartit and campaigned against it in 2006 after the amendment backed by CiU. At this time, political parties emphasized the necessity of fully developing the potentialities of the new Statute, including ERC, which had eventually opposed its final version and campaigned for a No in the referendum. It is noteworthy that for the 2006 elections CiU did not even mention the “right to decide” in its electoral program, yet instead emphasized policy issues that could be developed under the new Statute (Serrano 2015). The accommodation strategy was still hegemonic in the political arena. Interestingly, Keating and Bray (2006) have suggested that the failure of the Basque effort to formulate a third way between sepa- ratism and unionism in 2004 would have the ironic effect of reaffirming that actor’s language of traditional sovereignty. Something similar could apply to the understanding of the Catalan case, when all the doors to negotiate a new agreement were closed, while the distance between the political preferences in Spain and the political preferences in Catalonia were also growing.

Since 2010, the party formerly known as Convergencia has been the party doing the most radical (electorally driven?) work. Unió has almost disappeared while Convergencia has changed its name to Catalan European Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català, PDeCAT), moving from supporting federalism to strongly supporting independence. In this regard, ERC already made an explicit reference to the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence if the party obtained a sufficient majority in the parliament (ERC, 2010, p. 9 and p. 154, quoted by Serrano 2014).

Since 2012 the idea of holding a referendum has had a central place in Catalonia, with some parties in favour (within this group there is also a division between the unilateral or negotiated options) and some parties against. The first attempt at holding a referendum was legally blocked and ended in a non binding informal consultation on November 9, 2014 (for details, see the next section). The following year, the general elections were announced as plebiscitary for the pro-independence forces ERC and the then-named Convergencia, under the pact “Junts pel Si.” However, they did not reach the expected results, falling short of an absolute majority. Then, the 10 seats achieved by the grassroots radical left party Popular Unity (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP) became crucial

Former president Mas expected to lead the coalition, but CUP rejected supporting a leader linked to the corruption scandals faced by Jordi Pujol’s family and CiU (The Independent, July 29, 2014; Vilaweb, March 1, 2017). After hard negotiations, in which agreement seemed impossible, Mas had to step down and Carles Puigdemont was elected president. Then, the process of disconnection was scheduled to be developed over 18 months, creating the structures of a new state, a new constitution, a new fiscal system and so on. Most of the plan has not been fulfilled, but the idea of holding a referendum has gained momentum since then, parallel to the rejection of the Spanish government and of the parties on the non-nationalistic side of the spectrum in Catalonia (the PPC, the PSC, Cs) and in Spain (the PP, the PSOE, etc.). The judicial contention has also increased to the level that many representatives from Catalonia who were engaged in the process of consultation made in November 2014 are facing the possibility of disqualification from public office and jail penalties. 13 IRAI

Graph 2: Election results 2015

5. The Social Support for Independence and/or a Referendum

This section focuses on the evolution of civil society’s preferences regarding the territorial status of Catalonia. To this end, several surveys are analyzed. Even if there are some differences between them, it is possible to identify a trend. It can be fairly suggested that citizens’ discontent grew with the failed experience of the new Statute and this increased the electoral support for the pro-independence parties. This had a side effect of polarizing positions (the PSC turned against independence while Convergènciamade the opposite movement). It is interesting that the right- wing pro-Spain parties (the PP and Cs together) never gained the support of more than a third of the electorate (see Graph 1).

An earlier opinion poll launched by the Spanish Center for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Soci- ológicas, CIS) in 1996 found that 33 percent of Catalans supported independence while 53 percent were against it (CIS nº 2228). Surveys tend to agree in locating this high, which is still clearly far away from majority support for independence, approached in 2003 (e.g., in 2000 a survey conducted by ICPS located the support for independence at 32 percent, while in 2001 CIS found a slight increase, locating the support for independence at 35.9 percent) (see Belzunces 2008). In 2003 ICPS shows a new increase, with the support for independence arriving at 43 per cent. However, the trend observed by the same source is not constant, oscillating around 30 percent during the period from 2004 to 2009. In 2010 the support clearly went up, explained by the dissatisfaction produced by the outcome of the Constitutional Tribunal, the waves of informal referendums (which are an answer to the TC, but also play a role in disseminate the claim), the effects of the economical crisis (increasing the feeling in favour of an independent state within Europe) and the reinforcement of the pro-independence parties. In June 2010, El Periódico identified a 47 percent support for independence (El Periódico, June 19, 2010).

The main events backing the growing social preference for independence in Catalonia had a starting point shortly after the referendum to ratify the new statute (June 18, 2006). The legal judicial controversies that started after the ratification led to the first wave of informal referendums. The first one took place on September 13, 2009. Between September and December 2009, 167 municipalities organized informal consultations. A second wave of informal

3 As an example, on March 13, 2017, the Constitutional Tribunal condemned the former president of the Generalitat to two years of disqualification from public office. 14 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

referendums was organized in at least 80 municipalities on February 28 and a third one in 211 municipalities on April 24, 2010. On June 20, 48 municipalities joined the group. On July 10, 2010, a massive demonstration against the resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal was organized. On October 6, informal referendums took place in L’Ametlla de Mar, Tarragona, Rubí, Gavà and the United States. On April 10, 2011, an informal referendum was organized in the city of Barcelona (Guardian, April 10, 2011).

The previous wave of popular demonstrations resulting in unofficial but officially backed referendums (i.e., supported and organized by civil-society organizations backed by local governments) led to the strengthening of two main activist civil-society organizations, the Catalan National Assembly (ANC, created in March 2012) and Òmnium Cultural. The aim of the ANC is to reach independence through democratic and peaceful means. It is made up of over 500 regional groups comprising thousands of volunteers and has played a key role in organizing the informal referendums.

Another important event showing the power of the pro-independence/pro-referendum movement is the Diada. Since 1986, each year the National Day of Catalonia is celebrated on September 11—an event known as “Diada.” It remembers the fall of Barcelona during the Spanish War of Succession when the Catalan troops supported the Hapsburg dynasty until they were defeated by the army of the Bourbon King Philip V of Spain in 1714. In recent years it has become a big event supporting the claim for independence and/or a referendum on self-determination. This happened in 2012, when the Diada became a massive demonstration in favour of independence. Graph 3:

Graph 3, with data from the Catalan Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO), shows that until 2010 the support for an independent state was always below 20 percent, while support for a new model of a state within Spain was greater, and support for the existent model (autonomous communities) was even bigger. After 2012 the picture changed radically, with a peak in 2014 (see Graph 3). In 2012 and 2013 many sources reported support for independence at over 50 15 IRAI

percent. Although a comparison of sources reveals differences, the support for independence increased during this period, arriving at the maximum registered by surveys: e.g., 53.6 percent (El Periódico, October 2012); 54.8 percent (La Vanguardia, September 2012); 57.8 percent (El Periódico, May 2013); 52.3 percent (Cadena Ser, September 2013). Since 2015 surveys have identified a decrease (around 44 percent of support for independence).

On June 26, 2013, the agreement on the “right to decide” (Dret a decidir) was signed in the Parliament of Catalonia, with the support of civil-society organizations, and with the ANC playing the key role. When the decision to hold a Ca- talan referendum was eventually suspended by the Constitutional Tribunal, local pro-independence forces teamed up to develop the “participatory process.” After over two million people took part in the November 9, 2014, symbolic vote, the president of the Generalitat Artur Mas declared the participatory process a “complete success” and announced he would push for a meeting with Rajoy to negotiate a legally binding referendum. But Rajoy called the vote an “undemocratic and useless exercise, which has no legal effect.” (El diario, November 9 2014). In this context, the 36 percent who participated in the symbolic vote felt their democratic rights to have been violated, while many Ca- talans who did not take part were frustrated with both the central government and the Catalan government, which used their resources on a project that didn’t give sufficient guarantees or space to opponents.

It is interesting that a survey published by La Vanguardia in January 2017 shows how the support for a referendum goes beyond the support for independence and reflects a value cutting across Catalan society. According to the poll, 76.6 percent of the population is in favour of a referendum while only 19 percent is against it. 59.1 percent of the sample defends a consultation agreed upon with the Spanish government while 37 percent would also support a unilateral process.

6. Economic Crisis, Corruption Scandals and International Support

The Catalan preferences for or against independence are not only shaped by the relation with Spain and the territorial model. There are other conditions worth mentioning, particularly the economic crisis, the corruption scandals and the (future) role of Catalonia within the European Union in the event that a referendum succeeds. The economic crisis started in 2008 when Lehman Brothers, a global financial service, went bankrupt. This played a major role in the unfolding of the global financial crisis in the late-2000s, when global markets plummeted and systemic risk was uncorked. The crisis did not affect Spain immediately, but by mid-2010 unemployment was extensive. The governments in Catalonia and Spain reacted trying to reduce the deficit by cutting social spending. This prompted citizens’ dissatisfaction. In Catalonia as well as in Spain Corruption also has played a role. In Catalonia, in June 2009, a corruption scandal known as “the Palau Case” drew attention to the illegal funding practices of the Convergence Party. Together with the scandal of corruption affecting the Pujol family, the crisis of the party was evident (and for many it explains the turn towards independence, as a strategy to keep supporters).

Related to the crisis, the constitutional reform agreed on by the PP and the PSOE in September 2011, which would introduce a law of budgetary stability prioritizing debt over any other expenditure (and accordingly giving priority to the markets over the social crisis), generated a growing citizen dissatisfaction (Guardian, August 26, 2011). In particular, considering that the PP’s main argument for banning a Catalan referendum was that the Constitution does not allow for it, the quick amendment of the constitution in 2011 contributed to eroding Catalan confidence in the general government even more. 16 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

By 2011 the citizens’ discontent was growing everywhere, along with political discontent. The movement known later as 15M or Indignados (the origin of the new political party Podemos) spread, with demonstrations across the whole country. In Catalonia, the Party would play a role offering a way to resolve the Catalan problem, supporting a referendum but defending the permanence of Catalonia in Spain. In Barcelona the left-wing coalition in the government has also played a role in reinforcing the association of a referendum and/or the right to decide with democratic values, even for the ones who support the permanence of Catalonia in Spain.

Beyond domestic politics and especially the process of approval of a new Statute explored in previous section, other factors affect the Catalan preferences regarding independence. According to Serrano, the possibility of independence raises the question of whether Catalonia would be a viable state and of what impact it may have on welfare and in economic terms (see a detailed discussion by Caspersen in this report). It is also related to contemporary European affairs, from the fiscal austerity promoted by the central institutions to the question of whether an independent Catalonia would remain as a member state of the European Union or would be considered as a candidate that would have to reapply to become a full member (Serrano 2014). While it seems that a state of the dimensions and structure of Catalonia could be easily integrated into the EU, the political (dis)agreements regarding its permanence or incorporation are matters of public discussion.

7. On the Way to October 1

But what can be expected if on October 1 the referendum takes places? One key issue refers to the organization of the vote. Qvortrup (in this report) has analyzed the challenges faced by the Catalan government in organizing a fair vote under such complicated conditions.

According to a new poll by CEO, 62.4 percent would vote Yes in the independence referendum set for October 1. With a projected turnout of 67.5 percent for the vote, the poll says that some 37.6 percent of those who intend to vote would vote against independence. Normally, independence referendums that are not sanctioned by the central government result in overwhelming support for independence. However, a surprising suggestion of the CEO survey refers to the No vote, which would play a role in legitimizing the referendum (CEO, July 2017).

It is interesting that the same survey suggests that a new election would not lead to a radical change in favour of the pro-independence parties. In the hypothetical case of a Catalan parliamentary election, the pro-independence coalition Together for Yes would win again, with 60 to 63 seats (currently 62), followed by opposition party Citizens, with 20 to 22 seats (currently 25). The third strongest party would be the PSC, which would win 17 to 20 seats (currently 16). Catalonia Yes We Can (CSQP) would also be one of the winners, with 15 to 17 seats (currently 11) and the Catalan People’s Party (PPC) would get 11 to 13 seats (currently 11). The anticapitalist CUP party would lose support, dropping from 10 to between 6 and 8 seats (Vilaweb, July 21, 2017). This means that the unilateral option for independence would lose fuel while there would be more power in the hands of the CSQP, a coalition openly in favour of a referendum and the promotion of direct citizen participation, but internally divided along Yes/No support for independence (Guardian, September 24, 2015). The conditions for holding a referendum on a legal basis have not been fulfilled, but a new participatory process with a higher level of participation could open room for negotiations.

5 On May 24, 2015, in the election for the mayor of the city of Barcelona, Ada Colau, from Barcelona en Comú, achieved a simple majority and won the government. 6 However, after the terrorist attacks in Barcelona (August 18, 2017), the question remains open. 17 IRAI

8. Conclusions

After the transition to democracy in 1978, the new political agreement based on the creation of the 17 autonomous communities seemed to work as a framework for a federal understanding of Spain. It was only later, and particularly after 2006, that the feeling in favour of independence increased. Since then, a combination of social feelings favou- rable to independence generated from the grassroots, massive but not clearly majoritarian, with a strong political leadership from the top gave place to an incredible tension. My argument in this paper defended the thesis that the Catalan support for independence and/or a referendum on self-determination—preferences for these two different options are not equally distributed—is explained by three main political tendencies:

(i) A legitimate claim for more self-government has been expressed since the early 2000s with the proposal of making a new Statute (Estatut d’autonomia), promoted by a new coalition (the so-called Tripartit government, formed by the PSC, the ERC and Initiative for Catalonia Greens–United and Alternative Left), which arrived in the Catalan Government (Generalitat) in 2003, ending the hegemony of Convergence and Union, in power since 1980.

(ii) A strong Catalan social reaction has formed against the limits imposed by the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional, TC) on the Statute approved in 2006 by the Catalan Parliament, modified by the Spanish Parliament and ratified by referendum in Catalonia. The TC declared 14 articles unconstitutional and another 27 subject to interpretation (STC 28 June 31/2010). This process boosted both the social preference for a referendum on self-determination and the rejection of the Spanish government led by the Popular Party, always reluctant toward any process of negotiation.

(iii) A unilateral process of “disconnection” (desconnexió) has opened, which, despite the efforts made by the Catalan government, did not gain international support or recognition, has the majority in government (seats in parliament) but not in votes (the pro-independence alliance was backed by 47 percent of votes). During the short but intensive process (January 2016-early September 2017, when this work was being written), the unilateral activity, oriented toward building the structures of the new state, has redefined political preferences again, introducing an incredible level of polarization.

As far as the legitimacy of the process goes, it can be said that the “right to decide” is strongly supported by a majority of Catalans, however, when it comes to unilateral decisions, the figures change substantially. In other words,sup - port for independence (i.e., mainly based on a nationalistic grounds) and demands for a referendum (i.e., although not exclusively, but mainly based on a democratic grounds) are not equally distributed among Catalan voters—nor is the attitude regarding a unilateral, internationally unrecognized process. The majoritarian Catalan support for the “right to decide” (translated into a request for a referendum) and the reduced support for the Popular Party in Ca- talonia, together with the new forces emergent in the country and particularly in the city of Barcelona, suggest that the Catalan problem won’t be resolved in October, but what happens then will pave the way either for a (negotiated) democratic solution or for the escalation of the conflict. 18 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

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From Autonomy to Independence Arguments and Counterarguments Responses Post-referendum Scenarios

An independence referendum does not come out of the blue; it is preceded by a period of, usually gradual, rad- referendum does not come out of the blue; it is preceded by a period of, An independence aimed to increase Cata- For many years, Catalan nationalists tensions. of increasing and demands of icalization Catalan voters 11). 2015, Gillespie 85; framework (see Elias 2015, constitutional the existing lan autonomy within 2. From Autonomy to Independence The paper argues that the lack of central-government acceptance of the referendum is likely to prove crucial; it has The paper argues that the lack of central-government acceptance of the referendum gain will independence of declaration a that unlikely it makes and debate the of sides both on dynamics the affected political decision, and the turnout in the widespread international recognition. However, recognition is ultimately a important factors. referendum and the reactions of the Spanish Government could be potentially This paper first analyses the evolution of the demands made by the Catalan nationalist parties: what spurred the movements? self-determination other compare with this does how and independence, to from autonomy change and for and against Catalan inde- The paper then examines the arguments made for and against the referendum ones the compare with arguments these do how comparative evidence: on draw again will section This pendence. we find in other self-determination conflicts? The international responses will be then analyzed. Finally, the likely expect we can what and vote No a of implications likely are the what discussed: be will referendum the of outcomes to happen if the outcome is a Yes? termination conflicts: have they made similar claims and how have they been received internationally? termination conflicts: have they made what will be the likely fallout from the Catalan referendum, if it indeed goes ahead? Should we expect independence goes ahead? Should Catalan referendum, if it indeed what will be the likely fallout from the be will what and Catalonia, of president the by announced as vote, Yes a of case in hours 48 within declared be to the a declaration? In order to answer these questions, we need to examine the likely international response to such po- Spanish the among and Catalonia within both find we that divisions the well as sides, both on made arguments responses to date. Lessons can moreover litical parties, and analyze the international from other self-de be drawn 1. Introduction AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSESAND INTERNATIONAL Nina CASPERSEN of York Professor, Department of Politics, University REFERENDUM: CONFLICTING CLAIMS III. THE CATALAN INDEPENDENCECATALAN III. THE 3. 4. 5. 1. Introduction 2.

21 IRAI 22 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

overwhelminglysupported the new Spanish Constitution in the 1978 referendum and the regionalization of Spain appeared to be consolidating in the 1980s (Gillespie 2015, 9). However from the mid-1990s, Catalan demands for a new kind of political and financial relationship emerged (Elias 2015, 92-93), culminating in widespread demands for independence. Following the 2015 regional elections, which were won by the pro-independence Together for Yes coalition, the Catalan regional parliament passed a resolution that proclaimed “the initiation of the process to create an independent Catalan state” and established that the Catalan government should obey legislation enacted only by the Catalan Parliament. The resolution explicitly stated that the Spanish Constitutional Court was no longer competent to pass judgment on the validity of Catalan laws (Comella 2015). This therefore marked a significant step towards the proclamation of independence and a binding referendum was announced for October 1, 2017. The draft referendum law mandates that if Yes wins, the Catalan parliament will declare independence from Spain within 48 hours of the vote (Torres 2017a).

What explains this fairly rapid evolution of demands? Two factors will be discussed below: (1) the relationship with the Spanish government, including the effects of the autonomy arrangement, and (2) intra-Catalan developments. These dynamics are fairly typical for self-determination movements and affect the types of demands made by the two sides in the conflict, as well as the likely international responses.

Relationship with the Centre

The actions, or inactions, of the Spanish Government constitutethe factor most often mentioned by the Catalan Gov- ernment as the reason for the independence referendum, and also the one that has received most attention in the media and the academic literature. Gillespie (2015, 12, 15) argues that increased support for Catalan independence has mostly been driven by political and economic grievances, as well as a widespread perception among Catalan nationalists of a resurgent Spanish nationalism. Guibernau (2013, 380) similarly points to the Aznar Government’s (2000-2004) lack of response to demands for greater autonomy for Catalonia “at a time when secession was not even mentioned.”

In 2003, the hitherto dominant force in Catalan politics, Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió, CiU) lost power to a coalition thatpromised a new enhanced autonomy statute (Gillespie 2015, 11).Elias (2015, 89) argues that there was growing frustration in Catalan society with the existing autonomy arrangement, which was found “in- creasingly wanting in the face of new policy challenges,” including immigration, slow economic growth and declining public services.

The new autonomy statute was watered down to ensure the necessary support of both two-thirds of the Catalan parliament and the Spanish parliament (Gillespie 2015, 12). Yet it still went too far for the main Spanish opposition party, Partido Popular, which took legal proceedings, challenging over half of the statute’s text (Guibernau 2013, 381).Four years later, the Constitutional Court found several provisions unconstitutional; 14 were suspended and a further 30 were modified (Guibernau 2013, 384). This decision is described as a key turning point. It was interpreted by many as a direct attack on Catalan sovereignty and Artur Mas, the CiU leader, argues that this was the moment when he shifted from supporting Catalan autonomy within Spain to supporting Catalan secession (Elias 2015, 93).

Divisions were deepened further by the rejection of a new financing modelin 2012 (Gillespie 2015, 13).The CiU 23 IRAI

framed the 2008 economic crisis, which had hit Catalonia hard (Guibernau 2013, 385), in explicitly territorial terms (Elias 2015, 94), but the Spanish Government used the crisis to introduce recentralization measures (Muro 2015). Gillespie argues that the crisis gave the ruling Partido Populara rare opportunity to alter the centre-periphery con- figuration of power (2015, 17).

Thereduction of autonomous powers, or the perception thereof, led to significant bottom-up pressures. In 2009, civil society organised a series of “non-binding symbolic referendums” (Guibernau 2013, 384).The constitutional court ruling further fuelled this popular mobilization; it was met with mass demonstrations, organized by civil-society organizations (Gillespie 2015, 8),and polls pointed to a dramatic rise in popular support for independence (Elias 2015, 93).In 2012, the discourse of CiU shifted decisively when it began prioritizing calls for an independence referendum (Gillespie 2015, 7).On January 23, 2013, the Catalan parliament approved a declaration thatrecognized the sovereignty of the Catalan people and asserted the nation’s right to decide on the nature of Catalonia’s relationship with the rest of Spain. This paved the way for an “unofficial consultative referendum” in 2014 (Elias 2015, 83).

Catalan politicians can therefore argue that they responded to the expressed will of the people and to their dissatisfaction with the actions of the Spanish state. However, internal political calculations also appear to have played a role.

Intra-Catalan Factors

Gillespie argues that positions on autonomy and independence have been used tactically in the electoral competition, especially between CiU and the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC), and describes this as a “competitive process of mutual outbidding” (Gillespie 2015, 8, 10).Elias similarly contends that CiU changed strategy after it lost power in 2003; it abandoned its goal of seeking to maximize Catalan self-government within the constitutional framework, and instead made several proposals that implied a revision of the Spanish Constitution (Elias 2015, 89).However, CiU was constrained by internal divisions,and Elias argues that its pro-independence stance may have lacked credibility in the eyes of the voters, due to the party’s history of supporting autonomy (Elias 2015, 98). The issue of independence finally led CiU to dissolve into its component parts, and the larger Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, CDC) created the Together for Yes alliance, and in 2016 changed its name to the Catalan European Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català, PDeCAT). While the ERC is part of the Together for Yes alliance, it is not part of the PDeCAT and both parties state that they would not be natural alliance partners in an independent Catalonia.

The academic literature generally holds that such internal divisions and competition lead to a radicalization of politics; leaders will be constrained by their rivals who would take advantage of any wavering on the issue of independence (see, e.g., Mitchell 1995).However, it could also suggest that the demand for independence may not be as absolute as it seems—that there may be some room for pragmatism should the political calculations change. In any case, such political calculations are likely to affect the specific formulation of the demand for a referendum, and for independence. This is explored below. 24 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

Comparative Perspective

Central governments do in some cases agree to the holding of independence referendums in their constituent regions. The British Government agreed to the Scottish independence referendum, while the Canadian Govern- ment implicitly consented to Quebec’s referendum. Independence referendums have also been included in a few peace agreements, such as Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which paved the way for South Sudan’s independence. But central governments usually reject such demands and Catalonia is by no means the first autonomous region to hold an independence referendum without central-government acceptance. Other examples include Crimea (Ukraine), Kosovo (Yugoslavia) and Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan). In fact, some scholars argue that autonomy is an important factor in the radicalization of demands—that it provides the means and the motives to pursue independence (see, e.g., Erk and Anderson 2009).Roeder contendsthat autonomy traps politics “between two perils—centralization and dissolution—with no stable equilibrium between these two extremes” (2009, 208).Propo- nents of autonomy may be willing to concede that autonomy has a “terrible track record” (Snyder 2000, 327),but they counter that the major failures, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, were largely “sham or pseudo-federations” (McGarry and O’Leary 2009, 9), which provide limited lessons for autonomy in consolidated democracies.

In any case, recentralization seems to be a more frequent trigger of instability in cases of territorial autonomy than secessionist attempts. For example, the abolishment of autonomy either triggered or significantly strengthened secessionist movements in cases such as Kosovo, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh. Similarly, my analysis of post-Cold War peace agreements showed several examples of increasing tensions, and in some cases renewed violence, when either autonomy arrangements were not implemented or provisions were undermined at a later stage (Caspersen 2017).The Catalan case shows that a change in popular support for independence does not necessarily require the wholesale abolishment of autonomy, or even the unequivocal reduction of devolved powers. The perception that autonomy is being undermined, that autonomy no longer allows for internal self-determination, and the refusal to address such grievances may be enough to radicalize demands.

As will be shown below, the autonomy arrangement features heavily in the arguments made by both proponents and opponents of Catalan independence. When it comes to the legitimacy of the demands made by the opposing side of a conflict, one problem is that it is often difficult to determine whether autonomy is indeed being eroded or whether promises remain unfulfilled. This is especially the case if the autonomy arrangement is deliberately vague or flexible, such as in the case of the Spanish Constitution. This may however not matter much to the international response to the conflict. Autonomy is usually treated as a domestic matter, which has no bearing on the right to (external) self-determination.

Another factor the Catalan case has in common with other self-determination conflicts is the relative flexibility of the demands made.Self-determination claims are rarely static and we often see a movement between demands for autonomy, of varying degrees and forms, and independence. This is also evident in the Catalan case where the ERC has, for example, gone from a goal of independence to autonomy and back to independence (Elias 2015, 91). Moreover, the emphasis on the “right to decide” allows for greater flexibility than a determined campaign for independence. Self-determination movements often make use of a form of constructive ambiguity in order to increase their room for manoeuvre. For example, in the case of Abkhazia, independence was not declared until 1999, even though the territory had been de facto independent since 1993. The declaration of sovereignty that preceded it still left some room for a solution that maintained the existing state (Caspersen 2012). Once an unambiguous demand 25 IRAI

for independence is made, it can, however, be difficult to backtrack, especially if the leaders are faced with the risk of outbidding from more committed rivals. What this means for the Catalan case will be explored below.

3. Arguments and Counterarguments

Although the demand for an independence referendum in the Catalan case was in large part a response to popular pressure, the arguments made do not simply address a domestic audience. International support is crucial for separatist movements and this need significantly affects the claims made (Caspersen 2012).Moreover, the pro-independence arguments also have to reflect the demographic reality of Catalonia. The central government, on the other hand, will be more reluctant to internationalize the conflict, especially since it has not accepted the legitimacy or indeed legality of the referendum. This will shape the strategies adopted by the political forces opposed to independence and the arguments they are making.

Pro-Independence Arguments

The first argument made by the pro-referendum and pro-independence Catalan parties is focused on Catalonia as a historic nation. For example, when the president of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, announced the holding of the referendum, he referred to “the legitimate right to self-determination that a thousand-year-old nation like Catalonia has” (Catalan News Agency 2017). His predecessor, Artur Mas, similarly stressed that Catalonia is “one of the oldest nations of Europe” and has “one of the oldest parliaments in the world...its own culture, its own language, its own identity, its own civil law” (Catalonia Votes 2014a).

This is a classic claim to national self-determination. As Puigdemont argues, “Catalonia is a nation with the right to decide” (Al Jazeera 2017).In 2014, Mas similarly contended that Catalonia, “as all the nations in the world..., has a right to decide its political future” (TV3 2014).This claim is founded on the assertion of a historic right to statehood, based on Catalonia as one of the founding nations of Spain with a history of independence. As the website Catalonia Votes argues, “Catalonia has always had a distinct culture and language and a strong desire for self-government. Though Catalonia lost its independence in 1714, there was a political and cultural renaissance in the 19th century which eventually led to the proclamation of the Catalan Republic in 1931”(Catalonia Votes 2017b).

Unlike many self-determination claims, this is not an ethno-national claim. Mas presented Catalonia as “a sort of melting pot” and notes that “70% of our people have a non-Catalan origin” (Catalonia Votes 2014a).Puigdemont similarly argues that it is a “political conflict” and stresses that “Catalonia does not want an identity-driven state” (Al Jazeera 2017).

The demographic realities of Catalonia in part dictate such a strategy. The pro-independence parties know that they will not be able to secure a majority for independence if they appealonly to ethnic Catalans. This is similar to the Montenegrin case where the lack of an ethnic Montenegrin majority compelled the pro-independence forces to create a broader alliance for their independence referendum that included the country’s non-Serb minorities (see, e.g.,Deloy 2006). In the case of Catalonia, there is a similar attempt to reach out to the region’s sizeable immigrant population and convince them of the benefits of independence (Saeed 2017a).Such a broad appeal requires an inclusive nonethnic definition of the nation which is to exercise its right to self-determination. 26 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

Another reason for the reluctance to make an ethnic claim is likely to be the need to attract international support. Ethno-nationalist claims are largely discredited and are unlikely to garner much international sympathy, and an overtly ethno-nationalist agenda would also sit uneasily with the leftist programme of some of the pro-independence parties. Gillespie argues that many “soberanista political actors insist that they are not nationalists due to fear of being associated with ethnic nationalism or the nationalism of the far right in Europe” (2015, 12).

The problem with such an inclusive claim to self-determination is that it makes it harder to define the nation: what constitutes this historic nation, if not ethnic origin? The fallback option in the Catalan case appears to be the Catalan language and,more amorphously, Catalan culture. However, the former can also be exclusive and has led to complaints of discrimination against Castilian speakers. For example, Blanco (2017) argues that Catalonia is “the only regional government in the world to deny the majority of its population the right to be educated in their mother tongue.” In other self-determination conflicts where the core ethnic group does not constitute a majority—such as Abkhazia andTransnistria—we have seen the difficulties that may be associated with a more inclusive claim to self-determination: the tensions it creates between the need for majority support for independence and the need for a cohesive narrative, and the particular difficulty of encompassing the community that constitutes a majority in the state as a whole (Caspersen 2012).

Integral to the Catalan claim to self-determination is a claim to democracy. National self-determination is about allowing the people to decide their political future, and the discourse of democracy features heavily in the pro-independence argument. Mas,for example, pointed to the popular demonstrations and argued that “a large majority of the Catalan people want to vote” (Catalonia Votes 2014a)and at his court appearance in 2015 he stated that “the people were pushing the Catalan institutions to...let people have their say, to let people vote” (Harris 2015).Jordi Turull concurs, “This is democratic, this is legal, this is peaceful” and asks “who is afraid of democracy in Europe in the twenty-firstcentury?” (Catalonia Votes 2014b).Such arguments are to reinforce the legitimacy of the self-determination claim: it is not a top-down, elite-manufactured process, but an expression of popular will.

However, the claim to national self-determination does not stand alone. This is again similar to other cases: addi- tional arguments are needed, given the strong international bias against secession outside of the context of de- colonization (Caspersen 2015).The main argument here refers to the actions of the Spanish Government and the Constitutional Court decision. Puigdemont describes the ruling as “hugely offensive”and argues that at this point, “We said, enough is enough, they have no right” (Al Jazeera 2017).Turull strikes a similar note when he argues that “for some years now, the Spanish state breaks the agreement on the self-government of Catalonia” (Catalonia Votes 2014b).The Catalan Government’s website, Catalonia Votes also points to the constitutional court decision and the rejection of the proposal for greater fiscal autonomy and adds that “attacks against Catalonia’s education system and linguistic rights have also increased and more and more recentralisation measures are being taken”(Catalonia Votes 2017b).This does not constitute a claim to a remedial right to secession, which would normally require severe human rights violations to have been committed by the central state (Caspersen 2015), but it implies that self-determination cannot be realized within the existing state, thus presenting a case for external self-determination. As Puigdemot argues, Catalonia is “tired of the state not complying and of having to renounce Catalan to be Spanish” (Al Jazeera 2017).

Finally, the referendum is presented as a means to solving a conflict, as a necessary but pragmatic measure. Puig- demont argues that he called a referendum “because there is a conflict between Catalonia and Span that can be 27 IRAI

resolved only as Western democracies resolve their problems: voting, listening to the people” (Al Jazeera 2017). Thisfinal argument suggests some ambiguity as to the goals of the referendum, but such ambiguity has otherwise been reduced in the run-up to the referendum. Gillespie (2015, 13-14)argues that Catalan nationalists use “loose terms” such as sovereignty, which reflects a widespread ambivalence and political flexibility. This, he argues, allows them to appeal to voters with different constitutional preferences. The 2013 declaration from the Catalan parliament, for example, recognized the sovereignty of the Catalan people and its right to decide (Elias 2015, 83).Catalan sovereignty does not necessarily imply independence, but could be exercised within the existing state. However, the position appears to have become less ambivalent with the draft referendum law, which states that independence will be declared within 48 hours in case of a Yes vote (Torres 2017a). Such a position does not leave a lot of room for manoeuvre (see also Qvortrup in this report).

There is still the possibility that divisions within the pro-independence camp could create greater flexibility. Although the parties making up the current governing coalition all share the goal of independence, they do not otherwise have much in common. Moreover, Puigdemont has found divisions within the cabinet when it comes to the best way to further this goal. Thus, in early July, he sacked his business minister, Jordi Baiget, after he publicly expressed doubts over whether the referendum would take place as planned: “The [Spanish] state is so strong that we probably won’t be able to hold the referendum” (Hedgecoe 2017a).The Spanish Government has long hoped that such internal divisions would undermine the secessionist project, but this shake-up of the cabinet was interpreted as a point of no return (Torres 2017b).

That leaves the effect of the obstacles put in place by the Spanish Government. It has relied heavily on a legal strategy to stop the referendum from happening. As a result, the regional budget for the referendum has been taken down in the courts, the Catalan Government has so far been unable to buy ballot boxes, and some city halls have refused to let their facilities be used as polling stations. Moreover, the Catalan government does not have its own official voter register (Torres 2017b). Like the internal divisions, these obstacles may not lead Puigdemont to abandon the referendum, but it could affect what happens after the result. The possible implications of (limited) ambiguity, internal divisions and legal obstacles will be further explored below.

In conclusion, the arguments made by the pro-independence parties are classic national self-determination arguments. However, unlike most self-determination movements, they adopt a non-ethnic definition of the nation. This is not without tensions, but it allows for a broader appeal. The claim to a right to self-determination is combined with a more limited claim to a remedial right to secession, although this is based on the argument that self-determination cannot be fully exercised within the existing state rather than on any allegation of human-rights violations.

Arguments against Independence

The arguments against the holding of the referendum and against Catalan independence are also similar to the arguments we find in other self-determination conflicts. It is argued that such a move violates the constitution, that Catalonia is not a self-determination unit, that such a referendum would be undemocratic and that the pro-independence parties have ulterior motives. However, the Spanish Government has primarily focused on the illegality of the referendum. For example, State Secretary Ayllón has stated that “there won’t be a referendum, because 28 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

the [Spanish] government won’t allow it and because they don’t have any capability to organize it” (Torres 2017b). Unlike its Catalan counterpart, the Spanish Government does not seek international attention, preferring to keep this a domestic matter. Moreover, the lack of government acceptance of the referendum has resulted in a lack of well-developed No campaign, since such a campaign would imply that the legality and legitimacy of the referendum are accepted. We therefore have to turn to Spanish scholars and others to find a more articulated and developed argument against independence.

The argument for national self-determination is rejected—for example, by Nacho Martin Blanco, who argues that Catalonia has never been “an independent political nation or a state in modern terms,” and that the Catalan people have enthusiastically supported the Spanish state. The Spanish Constitution, he argues, “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”; it was the result of a broad consensus and “received support from over 90 percent of the Catalan voters in a referendum” (Blanco 2017).He also argues that there is a lack of precedent for such self-determination: “There is no democratic state in the world that gives its constituent regions the right to self-determination. The indissoluble unity written into the Spanish constitution is also a part of the Italian, French, German and U.S. constitutions” (Blanco 2017).

This rejection of Catalonia as a unit of self-determination leads to a rejection of the democracy argument. As in other self-determination conflicts, it is argued that the legitimate demos is the entire population, not just the population of Catalonia, and the referendum is seen as disregarding the existing legal order, “an order that derives from a dem- ocratically enacted Spanish Constitution” (Comella 2015).Parts of the Spanish press followed this argument in their coverage of the draft referendum law, which was described by El Paísas a “fraudulent law,” which erodes democracy and essential freedoms, while ABC characterised it as a “a delirious law that tramples on the rights, guarantees and liberties of Catalans themselves,” and La Razón argued that it was a “blow to democracy”(all quoted inSaeed 2017b).

The anti-independence forces similarly reject the argument that Catalonia is denied internal self-determination. The leader of the Catalan opposition, Inés Arrimadas from the Ciudadanos party, for example, argues that Catalonia is “already one of the regions in Europe with the highest degree of self-government” (Hedgecoe 2017b; see also Blanco 2017).

Finally, the Catalan opposition have questioned the motives of the pro-independence parties. Alberto Fernandez Diaz, from the People’s Party of Catalonia, for example, argued that they “hide a long tradition of corruption and ill-management of public money” (Press TV News 2017), while Arrimadas points to what she sees as their exclusion- ary policies: “It’s nationalism, plain and simple. Nationalism also means saying ‘Only those who think like me or who speak my language are Catalans’—it’s a totally segregationist project” (Hedgecoe 2017b).

However, the unionist side is divided—not so much over the arguments against independence as over the best response to the referendum. The leader of the PSOE, Pedro Sánchez, has pledged support for Prime Minister Marian- oRajoy in opposing the referendum, but the two appear divided over whether or not article 155 of the Constitution could be triggered. This never-used article could suspend, in part, Catalonia’s autonomous powers. The government has been careful not to rule this out, as a last resort (Hedgecoe 2017c),but the Socialists are calling on Mr. Rajoy to engage more seriously in dialogue with Catalonia, instead of threatening legal action. The PSOE formally supports the concept of Spain as a “pluri-national” country and has warned that they will present legislative reforms if the government fails to resolve the conflict (Hedgecoe 2017a).The Unionists in Catalonia are even more divided and the campaign to keep Catalonia in Spain is “small and fractured.” There is no common position on whether to oppose 29 IRAI

the referendum, or on whether Catalonia should be given more autonomy (Torres 2017c).

The arguments made by the political actors opposed to the referendum and to independence are very similar to what we find in other self-determination conflicts. However, divisions on the Unionist side concerning the best form of response could affect the aftermath of the referendum, if it does indeed go ahead.This will be discussed below. Moreover, it is important to note the difficulty in campaigning for a No vote in a referendum that is deemed illegal. The dynamics are different than in cases such as Scotland, where the referendum was accepted by the central government. This also affects international responses to the referendum and its likely aftermath.

4. Responses

The intended audiences for the arguments for and against the referendum, and for and against independence, are both domestic and international actors. The responses of domestic audiences can be assessed through opinion polls. These have tended to show declining support for independence as the referendum approaches:in June 2017, 41.1 percentof those polled supported Catalan independence, down from 44.3 percent in March (Cerulus2017)and down from 57 percent in November 2012 (Guibernau 2013).This would point to a No vote, but turnout looks likely to be decisive. Thus, a more recent poll by the Catalan Centre for Opinion Statistics (CEO), which includes only those who actually intend to vote,finds that 62.4 percentwill vote Yes (ACN 2017). Public opinion can shift drastically in the run-up to a referendum and turnout is hard to predict, which serves as a caution against any attempt to predict the outcome.

Independence referendums that are not sanctioned by the central government often result in overwhelming support for independence. In some cases, such as Crimea’s 2014 referendum, this undoubtedly owed something to manipulation and intimidation. However, it also reflects a reluctance of voters opposed to independence to partake, since this would legitimize the referendum. It is therefore also important to look at the percentage of votes who support the referendum, regardless of their position on the issue of independence. This percentage has consistently been higher than the percentage of voters who support Catalan secession (Telegraph 2017),which suggests that at least some No voters will turn out, thereby making for a closer and less predictable result.

Polls covering Spain as a whole are a lot less equivocal: the opposition to Catalan independence is strong, suggesting that the PP and the PSOE are in tune with the majority of their voters: in 2012, only 9.4 percent of Spaniards backed the right of the autonomous regions to become independent states (Guibernau 2013).

The response of domestic audiences isclearly crucial for the outcome of the referendum, but the attitude of Catalan voters to independence is likely to be affected by international responses, by the likelihood of international support for an independent Catalan state. The position of the EU, in particular, has been a crucial issue in the debate, with the pro-independence parties arguing that Catalonia would remain a member, and the anti-independence parties denying this.

So far, the response from states and intergovernmental organisations has been disappointing for the Catalan government. The EU Commission has gone out of its way not to comment on the referendum (Heath 2017),and the attempt by CarlesPuigdemont to involve the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (also known as the Venice Commission) was rejected: the Commission’s President replied that both the referendum and any cooper-

1 See scanned letter from Gianni Buquicchio, http://www.venice.coe.int/files/Letter%20to%20the%20President%20of%20the%20Govern- ment%20of%20Catalonia.pdf 30 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

ation with the Commission had to be carried out in agreement with the Spanish authorities and emphasized that the referendum has to be carried out in full compliance with the Spanish Constitution and the applicable legislation. This suggests that the issue is regarded as a domestic matter by the EU. Moreover, senior EU representatives have warned that secession “would imply at least temporary exclusion from the Union” (Gillespie 2015, 4).Responses from the US do not offer any support either. A 2012 petition to the White House to support the people of Catalonia in their effort to decide their own future elicited the following response: “We are confident that the Government and the people of Spain will resolve this issue in accordance with their laws and Constitution (Guibernau 2013, 373). It thereby stressed the importance of respecting the constitution and designated the whole population of Spain as the relevant demos.

This is not really surprising. The international bias against secession remains strong, and the creation of new states outside of the colonial context is always portrayed as the exception (see more below). Nevertheless, pro-independence politicians argue, or hope, that a strong vote in favour of independence willlead to more pragmatic responses, especially at the European and member-state levels (Gillespie 2015, 4).Puigdemont argues that “if there is a clear will and a clear message, recognition comes.” He notes that the European Union has not taken an official stance on whether an independent Catalonia would need to apply for membership and argues that Europe always reacts late: “It threatened pre-independence Slovenia that it would never recognise it and after a few months it recognised it and it is now a member state.” He furtherpoints out that “Catalonia has always been a region that contributes posi- tively to the European Union” (Al Jazeera 2017).

On the website Catalonia Votes, a range of international notables, ranging from actors to heads of state, are listed as supporting the Catalan referendum and in some cases independence(Catalonia Votes 2017a).But,with a crucial distinction, all the state leaders quoted support the general right to national self-determination and do not argue that it applies to the Catalan case. The hope of the pro-independence parties is that, following a successful referendum, they can be persuaded to extend this principle to Catalonia. The pro-independence side has also taken note of debates held in some national parliaments, such as the one organized by the UK’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Catalonia, which supports the vote (Catalan News 2017).

5. Post-referendum Scenarios

In case of a No vote, Puigdemont has declared that he will dissolve parliament and call parliamentary elections, “so that a new political majority can manage and apply that result with the utmost respect”(Al Jazeera 2017). A Nocould also be expected to weaken the pro-independence parties and the case for independence. If we look at Scotland, then we see that the Scottish National Party (SNP) has remained in power and has not abandoned the goal of independence. However, the SNP faced a setback in the 2017 general elections and there are signs that the Yes side is starting to splinter (Torrance 2017).But the Scottish experience may not be repeated in Catalonia, and the effects of a No on the pro-independence side likely depend on, firstly, how decisive the outcome is, and secondly,how the Spanish government responds—whether they choose to try to improve relations through dialogue orwhether they rely on punitive measures. Moreover, there is a crucial difference between the two cases: the Scottish referendum was sanctioned by the Westminster government. This made it easier for Scotland to gain concessions and also meant that the pro-independence forces did not face the threat of legal sanctions. 31 IRAI

Unilateral independence referendumsare almost always won by the pro-independence side. One exception would be the 1980 and 1995 referendums in Quebec, but these were at least implicitly accepted by the Canadian Govern- ment, which affected the turnout of No voters. This data does not signify that a Yes vote is inevitable in the absence of central government acceptance, since such unilateral referendums have generally been held in non-democratic contexts, but we lack comparative evidence of No votes on which to draw. However, what would happen after a Yesvote in Catalonia is even more uncertain. The two main options would be: (1) that the referendum is used as a bargaining chip to negotiate a better autonomy arrangement and (2) that Catalonia is declared an independent state. Let me examine those two scenarios in turn.

A decision to use a Yes vote as leverage against the Spanish Government could reflect the lack of international support for the referendum and a realization that recognition will be very difficult to secure. Independence referendums have had this effect in a few other cases: Tatarstan (Russia) held an independence referendum in 1992 and Crimea (Ukraine) held one in 1994, and these referendums were in both cases used to negotiate wider autonomy from the central government. There are speculations that the independence referendum announced in Iraqi Kurdistan in September this year serves a similar purpose. The argument for Catalan independence has, as noted above, always been marked by some ambiguity, which could make such an outcome more likely.

There is some indication that the Catalan government, or parts thereof, would be willing to consider such an option. Puigdemont has stated that a “third way” proposal that“secures Catalan competencies, and addresses complaints like language, finances, infrastructure and education” would obtain widespread popular backing, but he argues that such a proposal has never been put on the table (Torres 2017b). Therefore, this outcome would depend on the Spanish Government being willing to offer significant concessions. So far, Rajoy has not been very conciliatory, and he may not be willing, in effect, torecognize the legitimacy of the referendum and propose an arrangement that is far-reaching enough to satisfy the pro-independence parties. Gillespie (2015, 7) also points out that it may be difficult for the Catalan nationalists to return to the politics of accommodation. Divisions within the pro-independence camp present the risk of outbidding, especially in case of strong support for independence in the referendum.

The second option is that Puigdemont follow the draft referendum law and declareCatalonia an independent state within 48 hours of a Yes vote. I would consider it unlikely that a declaration will bemade so quickly. Even if prepa- rations for independence are apparently underway, the Catalan government is likely to first sound out possible external backers, which could lead to some delay. Once a declaration of independence is made, the fallout crucially depends on the reaction of the Spanish Government: if it accepts Catalonia’s secession, then international recognition is likely to follow shortly, as in the cases of Montenegro and South Sudan. However, this is highly unlikely and we would therefore find ourselves in uncharted waters: a unilateral secession from a consolidated democracy.

The Spanish Government is initially likely to downplay the referendum result (Torres 2017b) and may react in a similar way to a declaration of independence, describing it as an act of protest, which is of no legal consequence. International actors may well take the same position and at first maintain that this is a purely domestic matter and urge the parties to reach a solution through dialogue.

International recognition is unlikely as long as the central government is opposed: previous cases of post-World War Tworecognition outside of a colonial context have been deemed to be cases of state dissolution (USSR and Yugoslav republics) or so-called unique cases based on the presence of an international administration (Kosovo) or severe 32 THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONALTHE REPORT GROUP OF EXPERTS.

human rights violations (Bangladesh) (see,e.g.,Fabry 2010). However, recognition is a political act and some of these arguments are clearly open to (re)interpretation; for example, Russia’s recognition and subsequent incorporation of Crimea was justified in part by the alleged threat of future human rights violations. As Coggins (2014) argues, great power politics and strategic interests have been decisive for the recognition of new states. Nevertheless, international recognitions are still legitimized, and justifiedby the right to national self-determination. Therefore, I would expect the arguments and the conduct of the opposing sides to be of importance, at least when it comes to widespread recognition.

This makes the conduct of the referendum of potential significance, and in this regard the Catalan government faces two important problems: (1) the lack of a voter register, and (2) a possible low turnout. These two factors make it easier for the Spanish Government to deny the legitimacy of the vote. The Catalan Government needs a high turnout, including by those who oppose independence, in order to make a stronger case for national self-determination. The reaction of the Spanish Government could also be significant. Although the use of force against a secessionist region is generally considered compatible with international law—and regimes that have used it have faced few repercussions—it is hard to reconcile with a consolidated democracy. For an international actor already poised to recognize an independent Catalonia, it could strengthen the argument for a remedial right to secession.

Nevertheless, nonrecognition remains the more likely outcome. Where would that leave Catalonia? The Catalonia Votes website quotes Joseph Stiglitz as saying, “In the current context of open markets, I’m sure things would work out for Catalonia as an independent country. Small countries find it easier to operate independently in the present globalisation environment” (Catalonia Votes 2017a).But this depends on recognition. Although globalization makes it easier for unrecognized entities to survive, nonrecognition comes at a cost (Caspersen 2015). The exact cost, however, varies significantly from case to case. Experience from other cases tells us that the extent of international links will depend on a number of factors, most notably: (1) the position of the Spanish government (how strongly will it resist “engagement without recognition”?);(2) the willingness of the Catalan government to tone down its claim to independent statehood;(3) the extent of external actors’ interests in Catalonia;and (4) the number of states that recognize Catalan independence (see, e.g., Caspersen 2015; Berg and Pegg 2016). Even as an unrecognized or only partially recognized state, Catalonia would not face complete isolation. In some cases, such as Kosovo, we have seen a great deal of international pragmatism and willingness to engage, even by states that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. And Catalonia will undoubtedly be helped by the extensive links that already exist and which make it a case very different from most unrecognized entities. That said, nonrecognition will undoubtedly come at a cost and will create a political headache for international actors worried about setting a precedent and encouraging other would-be secessionists. 33 IRAI

References

ACN. 2017. “‘Yes’ Vote Ahead in Catalan Referendum, with 67.5% Turnout, Says Poll,” VilaWeb, July 21. http://www. vilaweb.cat/noticies/yes-vote-ahead-in-catalan-referendum-with-67-5-turnout-says-poll-independence-ceo/.

Al Jazeera. 2017. “Talk to Al Jazeera—Puigdemont: What Goes for Scotland, Goes for Catalonia.” YouTube video, 25:38, posted April 1,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9eI5yfQkFE.

Berg, Eiki, and Scott Pegg. 2016. “Scrutinizing a Policy of ‘Engagement without Recognition.’” Foreign Policy Analysis (early view).

Blanco, Nacho Martín. 2017. “Why Catalonia’s Call for Independence Is Unfounded.”Politico, January 20. http:// www.politico.eu/article/why-catalonias-call-for-independence-is-unfounded-carles-puigdemont-speech-brussels/.

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