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6 S.A. AR~OUREI) I)IVISIO~ I~ ITALY Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za 6 s. A. AR~OUREI) I)IVISIO~ I~ ITALY WINTER '1944 - 1945 On the Divisional left flank the CCB, (the American Battle Group operating under 6 Di- The period 20 - 23 October was the climax of vision's command), had been fighting their the offensive, not only on 6 SA Armoured way forward up Highway 64. Supported by Divisional sector, but on the front of the whole the fire of 4/22 Field Regiment and 3/24 Anti- Fifth Army. II US Corps had been attacking Tank Battery, SA Artillery, the CCB attacked with great determination east of Route 65, a ridge west of the Reno and captured Catell and on 23 October 34 Division captured Mt Accio on 29 October. Heavy German counter- Belmonte, only 9 miles from the centre of Bo- atacks developed on subsequent days, and logna. "This was II Corps finest effort, and the 4/22 Field Regiment was called on for de- it was destined to be their last. The Germans, fensive fire. B Company Royal Natal Car- now under the supreme command of Gen Von bineers was put under American command, Vietinghoff for Kesselring had been seriously and sent across the Reno to stiffen the de- wounded in an air attack, took desperate fence. After suffering considerable casualties measures to ensure the defence of Bologna. the enemy abandoned his counter-attacks on From the Eighth Army front Von Vietinghoff 2 November. On 4 November the CCB passed brought over 90 Panzer Grenadiers and 1 out of 6 Division's command, and were Parachute Division, both famous for the de- shortly afterwards relieved by a Brazilian unit. fence of Cassino. II Corps was exhausted and these strong enemy reinforcements turned the On 4 November a Divisional Operation Order scale. No further advance North-West could announced that the Division was again under be made and on 27 October, Fifth Army went command of IV US Corps and gave instruc- over to the defensive. To be robbed of a de- tions for holding the front. 24 Guards Brigade cisive success after so long and sanguinary held the right flank, 12 Brigade the centre, a struggle was the more bitter in that the and 11 Brigade the left. Aggressive patrolling price already paid would have been heavy was ordered with a view to an eventual at- even if paid for victory.'" tack on Mt Sole. It had been intended that 24 Guards Brigade On 5 November the first frost occurred. Most should attack and capture Mt Sole as soon of the men had now received battle dress but as 12 Motor Brigade had secured Mt Salvaro. not a few individuals were still without it. The Guards attempted to carry out the pro- Winter equipment, including rubber boots and gramme, and crossed the flooded Setta on 25 leather jerkins, began to arrive. October. An elaborate fireplan was drawn up Each battalion worked out a scheme for rest- for an attack on point 501, which lies on a ing the troops. The plan generally favoured ridge jutting out from the Sole - Caprara was to hold the line with three companies massif. The enemy yielded the point without forward, and give one company a five day's fighting, and the menacing height of Sole lay rest. directly in front of the Guards Brigade, as though inviting an attack. But torrential rain Leave started, and as Florence and Pistoia played havoc with communications and the were virtually American cities, Prato became attack was temporarily postponed. On 31 Oc- the Divisional leave centre. The Union Defence tober word was received of Gen Mark Clark's Force Institute established an Outspan club in intention to relinquish offensive operations for Castiglione and arranged cinema shows and at least a month. In this decision he was strengthened by a grave shortage of ammuni- 1. Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion tion for the Allied Armies of Italy. Forces in Italy, Part III, page 14. 58 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za concert parties. Supply problems were acute but the artillery took advantage of suitable tar- on the ice-coated roads and in the perpetual gets. The guns also shot off a good many rain. Hitherto the Division had been assisted propaganda shells. The enemy's artillery by the 10 Pack Transport Company, whose caused few casualties, but considerable an- muleteers were Italians. The Commander Q noyance and used a number of rocket pro- Service Corps formed 6 SA Armoured Divi- jectiles which had terrific blast effect. Even sion Mule Pack Detachment, whose muleteers the Luftwaffe put in an occasional appearance were mostly Cape Corps men released by the during the full moon, and one raid on Castig- Q Service Corps Companies. lione caused 12 casualties. Detailed plans Reinforcements arrived and personnel from were worked out for the attack on Mt Sole. 43 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SA Air Force The task was entrusted to 24 Guards Brigade were absorbed in infantry battalions. Through- and on 1 December 5 Grenadier Guards began out November the Divisional patrols continued a series of attacks designed to secure the to operate well forward. A number of clashes outworks of the Sole - Caprara massif. The occurred but 60% of the patrols had nothing operations met with little success. The enemy's to report. Ammunition supply was restricted, positions were very strong, his mortar and 59 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za machine-gun fire was heavy, and the ground deal. Leaky boots and lack of waterproof was held by those redoubtable opponents - trousering added to the difficulties of moving 16 SS Division. 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles across naked snow on clear nights. One Wits were put under 24 Guards Brigade and re- Rifles/De la Rey Regiment patrol took seven lieved the Grenadier Guards. The Battalion hours to cover a mile across snow and ice. opened its attack on 8 December and stub- The Division passed under command of II US born fighting continued throughout the week. Corps on 15 January. This Corps instructed The Indians gained some ground, and the Di- the Division to take a prisoner every three visional Artillery gave support. But the ene- days. Battalions were required to make raids my's counter-attacks were very determined, 30 to 50 strong to secure identifications. On and his artillery fire extremely heavy. On 15 the night of 3 February the Wits Rifles/De la December 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles with- Rey Regiment had a sharp clash with an ene- drew to their original positions, and the fight- my party near Salvaro church, and secured a ing died down on the slopes of Mt Sole. Snow badly-wounded prisoner. By 10 February ade- fell on 21 December, and on the 28th the cap- quate identifications had been obtained of the ture of Mt Sole was indefinitely postponed. enemy on the Divisional front. Deserters be- gan to come in daily, and there was no longer From now on administration became the chief any necessity for raids. problem of the Division. By 10 January the snow on Point 826 was thigh deep, and the It was decided to rest the Division before the temperature had dropped to 20 degrees below great offensive in the spring. The relief by the freezing. Snow ploughs and bulldozers were 1 US Armoured Division began on 19 Februa- called on to clear the roads, and pioneer com- ry and was completed on the 24th. The Q panies and troops laboured to chip the ice off Companies were kept very busy backloading road surfaces. The recovery sections were ammunition and supplies. particularly busy, and on January 31 Light Re- covery Section recovered 547 vehicles, and THE BREAKTHROUGH IN APRIL 1945 back-loaded 144. Tanks were incapable of The first months of 1945 saw important moving unaided on the iced roads, and 30 changes in the organisation of 6 SA Armoured Heavy Recovery Section was called on to as- Division. It was known that 24 Guards Brigade sist them. would pass out of command after relief, and it was essential to have another SA Infantry Winter clothing came forward in good quan- Brigade in the Division. On 13 January 1945, tities, including snow-shoes and white snow- 13 SA Motor Brigade came into being and Lt suits with hoods for use on patrol. Hot baths Col J. Bester, DSO, Battalion Commander of were provided by the mobile bath units. the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment, was ap- As in 12 Brigade position at St Ella, mules pointed Brigadier. The infantry battalion of the and porters had to be used to get rations up brigade was provided initially by the Royal to the forward positions. The food, although Durban Light Infantry and Natal Mounted mostly tinned, was good and was carried up Rifles/SA Air Force, who switched to an in- to forward companies in hotboxes. fantry establishment and began training in in- fantry tactics. Artilery support was provided Skiing and tobogganing were popular recrea- by 15 Field Regiment SA Artillery which was tions, but on 28 January rain fell and the tem- formed from elements of the Divisional Ar- perature rose sharply. Then came the thaw, tillery and reinforcements from the Union. 5 adding greatly to the general inconvenience. Field Squadron, SA Engineer Corps came un- Dugouts filled up with water and mud and der command, and the Brigade commenced slush made many men wish that winter would training in the Prato-Pistoia area.
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