Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

6 s. A. AR~OUREI) I)IVISIO~ I~ ITALY

WINTER '1944 - 1945 On the Divisional left flank the CCB, (the American Battle Group operating under 6 Di- The period 20 - 23 October was the climax of vision's command), had been fighting their the offensive, not only on 6 SA Armoured way forward up Highway 64. Supported by Divisional sector, but on the front of the whole the fire of 4/22 Field Regiment and 3/24 Anti- Fifth Army. II US had been attacking Tank Battery, SA Artillery, the CCB attacked with great determination east of Route 65, a ridge west of the Reno and captured Catell and on 23 October 34 Division captured Mt Accio on 29 October. Heavy German counter- Belmonte, only 9 miles from the centre of Bo- atacks developed on subsequent days, and logna. "This was II Corps finest effort, and the 4/22 Field Regiment was called on for de- it was destined to be their last. The Germans, fensive fire. B Company Royal Natal Car- now under the supreme command of Gen Von bineers was put under American command, Vietinghoff for Kesselring had been seriously and sent across the Reno to stiffen the de- wounded in an air attack, took desperate fence. After suffering considerable casualties measures to ensure the defence of . the enemy abandoned his counter-attacks on From the Eighth Army front Von Vietinghoff 2 November. On 4 November the CCB passed brought over 90 Panzer Grenadiers and 1 out of 6 Division's command, and were Parachute Division, both famous for the de- shortly afterwards relieved by a Brazilian unit. fence of Cassino. II Corps was exhausted and these strong enemy reinforcements turned the On 4 November a Divisional Operation Order scale. No further advance North-West could announced that the Division was again under be made and on 27 October, Fifth Army went command of IV US Corps and gave instruc- over to the defensive. To be robbed of a de- tions for holding the front. 24 Guards Brigade cisive success after so long and sanguinary held the right flank, 12 Brigade the centre, a struggle was the more bitter in that the and 11 Brigade the left. Aggressive patrolling price already paid would have been heavy was ordered with a view to an eventual at- even if paid for victory.'" tack on Mt Sole. It had been intended that 24 Guards Brigade On 5 November the first frost occurred. Most should attack and capture Mt Sole as soon of the men had now received battle dress but as 12 Motor Brigade had secured Mt Salvaro. not a few individuals were still without it. The Guards attempted to carry out the pro- Winter equipment, including rubber boots and gramme, and crossed the flooded Setta on 25 leather jerkins, began to arrive. October. An elaborate fireplan was drawn up Each battalion worked out a scheme for rest- for an attack on point 501, which lies on a ing the troops. The plan generally favoured ridge jutting out from the Sole - Caprara was to hold the line with three companies massif. The enemy yielded the point without forward, and give one company a five day's fighting, and the menacing height of Sole lay rest. directly in front of the Guards Brigade, as though inviting an attack. But torrential rain Leave started, and as Florence and Pistoia played havoc with communications and the were virtually American cities, Prato became attack was temporarily postponed. On 31 Oc- the Divisional leave centre. The Union Defence tober word was received of Gen Mark Clark's Force Institute established an Outspan club in intention to relinquish offensive operations for Castiglione and arranged cinema shows and at least a month. In this decision he was

strengthened by a grave shortage of ammuni- 1. Operations of British, Indian, and Dominion tion for the Allied Armies of Italy. Forces in Italy, Part III, page 14.

58 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

concert parties. Supply problems were acute but the artillery took advantage of suitable tar- on the ice-coated roads and in the perpetual gets. The guns also shot off a good many rain. Hitherto the Division had been assisted propaganda shells. The enemy's artillery by the 10 Pack Transport Company, whose caused few casualties, but considerable an- muleteers were Italians. The Commander Q noyance and used a number of rocket pro- Service Corps formed 6 SA Armoured Divi- jectiles which had terrific blast effect. Even sion Mule Pack Detachment, whose muleteers the Luftwaffe put in an occasional appearance were mostly men released by the during the full moon, and one raid on Castig- Q Service Corps Companies. lione caused 12 casualties. Detailed plans Reinforcements arrived and personnel from were worked out for the attack on Mt Sole. 43 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SA Air Force The task was entrusted to 24 Guards Brigade were absorbed in infantry battalions. Through- and on 1 December 5 Grenadier Guards began out November the Divisional patrols continued a series of attacks designed to secure the to operate well forward. A number of clashes outworks of the Sole - Caprara massif. The occurred but 60% of the patrols had nothing operations met with little success. The enemy's to report. Ammunition supply was restricted, positions were very strong, his mortar and

59 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

machine-gun fire was heavy, and the ground deal. Leaky boots and lack of waterproof was held by those redoubtable opponents - trousering added to the difficulties of moving 16 SS Division. 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles across naked snow on clear nights. One Wits were put under 24 Guards Brigade and re- Rifles/De la Rey Regiment patrol took seven lieved the Grenadier Guards. The Battalion hours to cover a mile across snow and ice. opened its attack on 8 December and stub- The Division passed under command of II US born fighting continued throughout the week. Corps on 15 January. This Corps instructed The Indians gained some ground, and the Di- the Division to take a prisoner every three visional Artillery gave support. But the ene- days. Battalions were required to make raids my's counter-attacks were very determined, 30 to 50 strong to secure identifications. On and his artillery fire extremely heavy. On 15 the night of 3 February the Wits Rifles/De la December 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles with- Rey Regiment had a sharp clash with an ene- drew to their original positions, and the fight- my party near Salvaro church, and secured a ing died down on the slopes of Mt Sole. Snow badly-wounded prisoner. By 10 February ade- fell on 21 December, and on the 28th the cap- quate identifications had been obtained of the ture of Mt Sole was indefinitely postponed. enemy on the Divisional front. Deserters be- gan to come in daily, and there was no longer From now on administration became the chief any necessity for raids. problem of the Division. By 10 January the snow on Point 826 was thigh deep, and the It was decided to rest the Division before the temperature had dropped to 20 degrees below great offensive in the spring. The relief by the freezing. Snow ploughs and bulldozers were 1 US Armoured Division began on 19 Februa- called on to clear the roads, and pioneer com- ry and was completed on the 24th. The Q panies and troops laboured to chip the ice off Companies were kept very busy backloading road surfaces. The recovery sections were ammunition and supplies. particularly busy, and on January 31 Light Re- covery Section recovered 547 vehicles, and THE BREAKTHROUGH IN APRIL 1945 back-loaded 144. Tanks were incapable of The first months of 1945 saw important moving unaided on the iced roads, and 30 changes in the organisation of 6 SA Armoured Heavy Recovery Section was called on to as- Division. It was known that 24 Guards Brigade sist them. would pass out of command after relief, and it was essential to have another SA Infantry Winter clothing came forward in good quan- Brigade in the Division. On 13 January 1945, tities, including snow-shoes and white snow- 13 SA Motor Brigade came into being and Lt suits with hoods for use on patrol. Hot baths Col J. Bester, DSO, Battalion Commander of were provided by the mobile bath units. the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment, was ap- As in 12 Brigade position at St Ella, mules pointed Brigadier. The infantry battalion of the and porters had to be used to get rations up brigade was provided initially by the Royal to the forward positions. The food, although and Natal Mounted mostly tinned, was good and was carried up Rifles/SA Air Force, who switched to an in- to forward companies in hotboxes. fantry establishment and began training in in- fantry tactics. Artilery support was provided Skiing and tobogganing were popular recrea- by 15 Field Regiment SA Artillery which was tions, but on 28 January rain fell and the tem- formed from elements of the Divisional Ar- perature rose sharply. Then came the thaw, tillery and reinforcements from the Union. 5 adding greatly to the general inconvenience. Field Squadron, SA Engineer Corps came un- Dugouts filled up with water and mud and der command, and the Brigade commenced slush made many men wish that winter would training in the Prato-Pistoia area. return. The conversion of the Natal Mounted Rifles/ The health of the troops remained good in SA Air Force to infantry deprived the Division these conditions, although there were many of its Reconnaissance Unit, and accordingly cases of trench foot. Some blamed the boots, an infantry company was drafted to the Preto- other considered that foot-discipline was a ria Regiment. One infantry platoon was allot- fault. The front remained static, but patrolling ted to each squadron, to enable the Regiment in the bitter cold of January was a grim or- to serve in a reconnaissance role.

60 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

The medium machine guns and mortars of Allied Air Force had not played such havoc the Royal Durban Light Infantry were distribut- with communications in Northern Italy, that ed among infantry battalions, and each bat- it took weeks to move a division through the talion was now equipped with three 4.2 inch Alpine passes. mortars, four 3 inch mortars and six medium By comparison with their forces on other machine guns. In January 4/22 Field Regiment fronts, the Germans' army in Italy was still a completed its conversion from Priests to Sex- formidable fighting machine, and on 10 April tons (25 pr guns mounted on a Ram Chassis) Von Vietinghoff had under his command twen- and the armoured regiments were equipped ty-one German divisions of all types, supported with a new Sherman tank, mounting a 76 mm by a powerful force of artillery. Although the gun. Allied armies were now pouring into Germany, The Division concentrated in the Lucca area morale was still high. The greatest weakness at the end of February. The men were de- was an almost total lack of air support. Von lighted with their new quarters, situated in a Vietinghoff had only 260 tanks, and the petrol lovely countryside, and took advantage of the shortage compelled him to rely excessively on opportunity of having some leave and re- animal transport. The Allies planned to attack creation. Enthusiasm waned, however, when along practically the whole Italian front. Pre- an intensive training programme began. liminary blows along the shores of the Adriatic and the Tuscan sea were to be followed a On leaving the line the Division bade farewell week later by an all-out assault by Eighth Ar- to its comrades in 24 Guards Brigade, and it my in the marshy country between Lake Com- was with genuine regret that the South Af- machio and the Appenines. Three days later ricans saw these splendid troops depart to Fifth Army was to unleash II and IV US Eighth Army. Brig Erskine, who had taken Corps in an offensive aimed at Bologna and over from Brig Olive in November, said the the plain to the north west. 6 SA Armoured Guards would always be proud to have serv- Division was given an important role in Fifth ed in 6 SA Armoured Division. Army plan. The leave and training programme had been During the night 31 March/1 April 12 Mortar planned on a six weeks cycle, but this had to Brigade began its movement back into the be curtailed. On 28 March the Division issued line, and on 4 April took over command of the detailed orders for the relief of 1 US Armour- brigade sector from Combat Command A of ed Division in the old sector between the 1 US Armoured Division. 11 Armoured Brigade Reno and the Setta. The great offensive which took over their sector from Combat Command was to destroy the German armies in Italy E on 5 April. was about to begin. The Divisional sector lay between the rivers Kesselring's successer, Gen Von Vietinghoff, Reno and Setta and was held with 12 Mortar was under no illusions about the coming Brigade on the right and 11 Armoured Brigade storm, and the possibility of resisting it. He on the elft. The river Torricella was the inter- would have preferred to withdraw. to the line Brigade boundary. of the PO. The German High Command, so 11 Armoured Brigade had the 4/13 Frontier far from agreeing to this, would not even al- Force Rifles and two American units (19 Re- low Von Vietinghoff to carry out a limited connaissance Squadron and 1 Battalion 135 withdrawal on Eighth Army Front, which would RCT) under command. The Americans were have effectually frustrated the Allied air and serving as infantry. 13 Meter Brigade was to artillery programme. By insisting on the reten- move up later on 12 Brigade right. Certain tion of the Appenine Line, Hitler had tied the regrouping would then take place between German Army in Italy to an anvil. the two brigades.

During January and February four German di- Early in March the enemy had withdrawn his visions were drawn from Italy to attempt to line to the crest of the Sole-Caprara massif, dam the Russian tide, and these included and the South African Forward Defence Lines those old opponents of the South Afri«;:ans- were now about 1000 yards nearer the enemy. the 16 SS and 356 Infantry Divisions. More The 77 Eastings Grid was the boundary line of would probably have been demanded, if the two German divisions. The 94 Infantry Division

61 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

held the sector to the west, and there was his defensive fire tasks. The second and third little activity apart from some scattered shell- objects were certainly not achieved, and the ing and harassing fire. An outline plan had enemy showed little interest in the elaborate been drawn up by Maj Gen Poole at the end bombardments on the 7th, 8th and subse- of March. The initial attack was to be made quent nights. on Mt Sole-Caprara by 12 Motor Brigade, which was to exploit to Mt Abelle. On the Meanwhile the great offensive had already capture of the Sole-Caprara-Abelle area, 12 begun on other sectors of the front. On 1 Motor Brigade was to advance along the ridge April a brilliant commando attack on the An- running north-east of Mt Sole, and capture driatic coast threw 162 Turkoman Division into Mt Santa Barbara. 13 Motor Brigade was to disorder. On 5 April the Japanese-Americans cover the right flank. Thereafter 13 Brigade opened an offensive along the shore of the was to take Mt Giovule and Mt Baco and de- Tuscan sea. The attack met with great suc- stroy any German forces remaining between cess, and the threat to the naval base of Spe- the Setta and the Reno. When this phase had zia brought German reserves from the valley of been completed 12 Motor Brigade was to be the PO. On 10 April an artillery and air bom- prepared to cross the Reno. All attacks were bardment surpassing anything seen in Italy, to be supported by the Divisional Artillery heralded the advance of the Eighth Army. The and air support was promised on an unpre- enemy made the mistake of anticipating an cedented scale. attack along Route 9, while the main weight of the Eighth Army fell in the area south of 6 SA Armoured Division was the left-flanking Lake Commachio. The enemy was shaken by formation of II US Corps. IV Corps was to the intense air and artillery bombardment, and open the battle on fifth Army front by at- disconcerted by the use of large numbers of tacking in the mountains west of the Reno, flame-throwing tanks. On 10 April Eighth Army and then II Corps was to launch its assault. made deep penetrations and although the Ger- Detailed planning for 6 Division's attack began mans rallied, and fought back with their usual on 5 April. The Divisional Commander met his skill and tenacity, yet they were never able staff and brigade commander, and they in to recover from the initial shock or amend turn had full discussions with their subordi- their faulty dispositions. Retreat to the much nates, and the commanders of supporting vaunted Genghis Khan Line brought no se- arms. 12 Motor Brigade report says:-"When curity, and on 15 April Eighth Army captured all the details of the operations had been tho- Bastia, and threatened the flank of all the Ger- roughly discussed and finalised verbally, the man forces in Italy. main Brigade Operation Order was issued, and It had been intended that IV US Corps should that completed the planning. This method open the Fifth Army attack on 12 April, but worked extremely well - there was no un- the weather was unfavourable for bombers due rush, no flood of documents, no confu- and the offensive did not begin until the 14th. sion and no possibility of anyone not being By the evening of that day advance units of fully in the picture. On the Staff side, the the 1 US Armoured Division, on the left of planning for the operation went off extremely the South Africans, had entered Vergato. Fur- smoothly". ther to the west 10 US Mountain Division had 12 Motor Brigade carried out detailed patrol- taken its objectives, and was thrusting forward ling to reconnoitre the enemy's outpost posi- with great determination. On 15 April " US tions, and to decide on suitable lines of ad- Corps began its attack, and 12 Motor Brigade vance. There was little interference from the was launched against Sole and Caprara. enemy, but the area had been heavily mined, Although not as high as Mt Stanco or Mt and a number of casualties were suffered. Salvaro, the extremely steep, bush-covered On the night of 7/8 April the first of a series slopes of Sole and Caprara presented a most of full scale artillery shoots was carried out formidable obstacle. The ridge running along against enemy positions on 6 Division's front. the crest of Sole and extending north east to The intention was to deceive the enemy re- Collina was a complete razorback, with no garding the time of the main assault. to shat- facilities for deployment. Mt Abelle was con- ter his morale and to induce him to disclose siderably lower than Sole or Caprara, but it

62 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

gave depth to the defence, and enemy posted to meet the expected attack, and orders had here could shoot up any troops advancing been given to fight to the last man. down the northern slopes of these two moun- On the night of the 14th the 4/13 Frontier tains. Force Rifles made a successful two platoon at- The positions in front of 12 Motor Brigade tack on an enemy post (Casa Poggiolo) were held by 111 Battalion of 296 Regiment. which would have threatened the left flank This Battalion had a company on Sole, another of the attack on Caprara. on Caprara, and a third on Abelle. The troops 15 April was fine and clear. An observer not- were Austrians and Bavarians of good type ed:- "It is a lovely Sunday morning. The and steady morale. The enemy's line ran north church bell rings out the masses, and the east along the ridge to Nuvoleta, and then villagers of Lagaro (site of Divisional Head- down to the Setta to cover Vado. Reserves of quarters) flock post the Armoured Command approximately battalion strength were in the vehicles into the church. It is difficult to as- Mt Santa Barbara area. Beyond the Reno was sociate the atmosphere with that on an at- the Genghis Khan Line, a reserve position to tack. " which the enemy could retreat if necessary. Intelligence reports indicated that it had been The blue sky augured well for the air bom- strongly fortified, but in fact very little had bardment and at 1300 hours the heavy bom- been done. bers started to come over. For an hour and a 6 SA Armoured Division regrouped for the at- half a steady stream of bombers in line abreast tack. On 9 April, 13 Motor Brigade moved up, or Vic formation passed across the sky, but with its headquarters located at La Torre. On they dropped their loads well north of the Di- 10 April the Royal Natal Carbineers came un- visional front. At 1615 hours the first fighter- der command of 13 Brigade, and the Brigade bombers appeared and dropped special liquid took over the sector between Mt Sole and the fuel type bombs on the slopes of Mt Caprara. river Setta, to protect the right flank of 12 There was a terrific flash of flame in each case Motor Brigade. 13 Brigade now consisted of followed by billowing black smoke. Every fif- the Natal Mounted Rifles/SA Air Force and the teen minutes six aircraft swooped down on Royal Natal Carbineers with one squadron of Sole and Caprara, coming in extremely low the Special Service Battalion under command. and letting lose a mixture of fire-bombs and On 8 April, the Royal Durban Light Infantry high explosives. Some aircraft used rockets relieved two companies of the First City/Cape and cannon-shell. Apart from a little machine- Town Highlanders in the centre of 12 Brigade gun and cannon fire there was no reaction front, thus releasing the latter battalion for the from the enemy. Indeed, although the bom- atack on Mt Sole. On the same day 4/13 bardment was most spectacular and did much Frontier Force Rifles came under 12 Brigade to encourage the troops, the results achieved condnand, and relieved the Wits Rifles/De la were negligible. A few Germans suffered Rey Regiment in the Brigade left sector. The burns, but the enemy was well concealed in latter were now available to attack Mt Capra- caves and dug-outs and the attacks made ra. 12 Field Squadron was ordered to support little impression. One fighter-bomber straffed 12 Brigade, which had one squadron Prince the First City/Cape Town Highlanders dump Alfred's Guard under command. area, nearly exploding the mortar ammunition. Casualties were caused and a panic started On 11 April Maj Gen Poole addressed officers among the Italian porters. and men of 12 Brigade down to platoon ser- geants und put them "in the picture". On 13 At 2230 hours the artillery of II US Corps and April the enemy broke contact on Eighth Ar- the Divisional Artillery supported by selected my front south east of Bologna and it was troops of tanks, opened the most violent bom- suspected that a general withdrawal had been bardment which the South Africans had seen ordered. Patrols were sent out, and one from in the campaign. The fire was so concen- the Royal Durban Light Infantry got within trated that it seemed more impressive than 200 yards of the crest of Sole. A blaze of Alamein or Cassino. Under cover of the guns fire established that the enemy was holding the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment and First the position. Deserters confirmed this, and City/Cape Town Highlanders went into the stated that extra ammunition had been issued attack.

63 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

It was about a mile from the First City/ losses were so heavy, that at midnight C Cape Town Highlanders assembly area to the Company received orders to take over their crest of Sole, and the axis of advance lay task. Throughout the night the Start Line was along a ridge leading up to the mountain. C subjected to intense mortar and artillery fire, and D Companies led the attack and crossed and the Italian stretcher-bearers became de- their Start Line at 2300 hours. The enemy moralised. Cape Corps batmen were impro- fired his mortar Defensive Fires, but casual- vised into stretcher-bearing parties. B Com- ties were light, and at 2350 hours C and D pany was soon reduced to 17 men, and D Companies started to climb Mt Sole. Nearing Company moving up in support, had 32 casu- the crest C Company was held up by mines, alties between the Start Line and the First but 2/Lt Mollett, without waiting for the mines Bound. to be cleared, dashed through them with a At 0200 hours, A and C Companies skirted party of five men and reached the summit. Caprara village and began the assault up the One of the men was killed, but the party precipitous mountain. The Wits Rifles/De la caught the enemy coming out of his deep Rey Regiment official report says:-" At this shelters, and used their bayonets and gre- stage communications became almost impos- nades with good effect. 2/Lt Mollett received sible. A and C Companies for a time lost an immediate award of the DSO, a rare dis- contact with each other but continued the ad- tinction for a platoon commander. Passages vance meeting stiff resistance; wire obstacles were cleared through the minefields and C were encountered and casualties suffered on and D Companies both got platoons on to the Shu mines causing A Company to move over summit. By 0430 hours Mt Sole was firmly to C Company. Halfway up the mountain held. All this time the German mortar fire was both companies were pinned down by ma- increasing in intensity, but the artillery and chine-gun fire emanating from a pill-box. As 4.2 inch mortars brought down counter-mor- further progress could not be made after se- tar fire and broke up weak attempts to veral attempts, and as daylight was fast ap- counter-attack. proaching, which event would leave the com- Meanwhile a grim struggle was being waged panies in a precarious situation, the Company for Mt Caprara. So steep are the slopes of Commanders decided to join forces and storm Caprara that the only suitable approach is the obstacle. This they did, making a desperate from the direction of Caprara village. This bayonet charge up the steep almost preci- meant that the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regi- pitous slopes, and rooted the enemy out of ment had to make a long march from the As- the pill-box and out of his foxholes and dug- sembly Areas in the Mt Termine area, skirt the outs." The sucess of this final asault was due southern slopes of Mt Caprara, take Caprara mainly to the efforts of Maj D. G. William MC, village, and then assault up the steep, shaly who was primarily responsible for organising slopes of the mountain. it. The majority of German positions were on the reverse slope of the mountain, and owing At 2030 hours A and B Companies moved off to difficulties of crest clearance had been from their assembly area to the Forming Up quite untouched by the terrific bombardment Point, situated in a valley south of San Mar- which had pulverised the forward slope and tino. The companies had not yet arrived at made it very difficult for the Wits Rifles/De the Forming Up Point when their difficulties la Rey Regiment to ascend. Indeed artillery began: advance parties, laying lamps to indi- preparation played no part in the success of cate the Start Line, were fired on by 4/13 the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment on Capra- Frontier Force Rifles on the left flank. As soon ra. as the artillery barrage opened, the German artillery and mortars came to life, brought The area round the crest was found to be down their Defensive Fire tasks, and laid alive with mines, and small arms fire came searching fire along the gullies. B Company from the Mt Sole direction. By 0800 hours the was caught in heavy concentrations of artil- firing died down, and A and C Companies dug- lery and mortar fire when moving up from the in on their objectives. Throughout the morning Forming Up Point, and suffered many casual- the enemy continued to mortar the axis of ties. The advance of A and B Companies con- advance. Three Prince Alfred's Guard tanks tinued on Caprara village, but B Company's succeeded in getting on to the neck between

64 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

Sole and Caprara but another troop which toon commanders. The artillery support was followed the track through San Martino ran heavy and accurate, but the German dug-outs into mines, and two tanks were immobilised. were so deep and well-constructed that the enemy suffered little from artillery fire. The attack on Mt Caprara cost the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment 168 casualties of On the night of the 16th/17th the Royal Dur- whom 24 were killed. 20 Enemy dead were ban Light Infantry began their task of exploit- counted, and 39 prisoners taken. ing along the ridge running north east from Mt Sole. In their advance to the Start Line A The enemy still contested the north west and C Companies engaged and drove back an slopes of the mountain, but the battalion held enemy counter-attack force advancing on Mt positions providing observation over Mt Cas- Sole. tellino and the Caprara-Abelle valley. It was now possible for the First City/Cape Town Confusion was caused by having to fight for Highlanders to exploit to Mt Abelle. At 0500 the Start Line and considerable machine-gun hours on the 16th the First City/Cape Town fire was encountered. Points 606 and 551 Highlanders sustained a grievous loss when were occupied, but Collina was not reached. Lt Col Duncan was killed by a mine. Towards dawn a counter-attack on Point 606 was repulsed, while the First City/Cape Town Maj Sholto Douglas took over command. The Highlanders beat off a raid on the north west morning of the 16th passed quietly with only slopes of Sole. During the night the Royal intermittent mortaring by the enemy. At 1730 Durban Light Infantry took 30 prisoners for a hours A and B Companies moved to the at- loss of 12 wounded. Subsequent information tack on Mt Abelle, supported by artillery and showed that the advance of the Royal Durban mortar fire. A dangerous cross-fire developed Light Infantry had dislocated a strong at- from Point 606 to the north east of Sole, and tempt to recapture Mt Sole. this position was engaged by the artillery and battalion 3 inch mortars. Mt Abelle was cap- During the afternoon of 17 April patrols of tured after slight resistance, but machine-gun the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment got across fire from Point 606 continued to be trouble- to Mt Castellino and reported that it was clear some. During the operation B Company Royal of the enemy. The Royal Durban Light Infan- Durban Light Infantry moved on to the east- try, however ,failed in attempts to reach Col- ern crest of Sole to give flank support. To- lina. The enemy held the position in strength, wards last light an enemy counter-attack on and his mortar fire was heavy. 12 Brigade the Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment came in narrative says:- "Exploitation along the ridge from the direction of Campodello. The artille- towards Nuvoleta was proving an extremely ry brought down Defensive Fire and the 4.2 difficult undertaking in the face of strong op- inch mortars, which had been brigaded for the position." action, joined in with their heavy bombs. The The ridge was a complete razor-back with no infantry then charged down the slope and put opportunities whatsoever for deployment, the enemy to flight. while the enemy positions along the very Thus by the evening of 16 April the capture of crest of the ridge were largely immune to the three main features - Mt Sole, Mt Abelle artillery and mortar fire which was ineffective and Mt Caprara - had been successfully if it fell either slightly short or slightly over. completed. The American Division of II US At 2040 hours on the night of the 17/18th C Corps were not so fortunate in their attacks Company Royal Durban Light Infantry launch- east of the Setta. After violent fighting on the ed a set-piece attack on Collina. Despite con- 16th the Germans still held Monterumici and centrated artillery and mortar support, the at- Mt Adone. On the other hand, west of the tack was repulsed. The enemy's fire was Reno, both Vergato and Mt Pero were now heavy and he launched a number of rockets in American hands. at close range. One of these wounded the Company Commander and knocked out a The success of the South African attack was whole platoon. due to the sheer determination of the assault- ing infantry coupled with the sound tactical It seemed as though the 6 Division was in judgement of the battalion, company and pla- for a long and bloody struggle on the ridge

65 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

leading to Mt Santa Barbara, but the morning THE PURSUIT TO THE ALPS of the 18th brought a miraculous change. On 19 April an observer at Divisional Head- On 17 April the II US Corps had warned that quarters noted:- "No guns can be heard to- a breakdown of enemy resistance might take day: all is quiet". 6 SA Armoured Division place at any moment, and preparations should was re-organising for the pursuit, but delay be made for a rapid follow-up. The stern re- was inevitable while II US Corps adjusted its sistance to the Royal Durban Light Infantry dispositions. On the evening of the 18th, 13 seemed to disprove this optimistic theory, and Motor Brigade had occupied Mts Giovule and plans were considered for pushing the Preto- Baco without resistance. Reinforced by ria Regiment and the Imperial Light Horse/ 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles and with the Spe- down the Reno, in the cial Service Battalion temporarily under com- hope of attacking the Collina - Santa Bar- mand this brigade was ordered to secure a bara ridge from the rear. At 0800 hours on the bridgehead over the Reno, and continue the 18th, however, two deserters on 13 Brigade advance until relieved by II Armoured Brigade. front brought news that 157 Mountain Divi- The latter brigade, with the First City/Cape sion had received orders to withdraw during Town Highlanders under command, was to the night. Reports from 88 US Division stated act as the main thrust of the Division. 12 Mo- that Monterumici and Mt Adone had been tor Brigade with the Prince Alfred's Guard abandoned. under command, was to support the main The Royal Durban Light Infantry at once th rust. pushed forward patrols and first Nuvoleta and The situation was so fluid that it proved im- then Mt Santa Barbara were reported clear. possible to adhere to pre-arranged plans. Four A number of prisoners were picked up, who American divisions, and 6 SA Armoured Di- confirmed orders to retreat to the Genghis vision, were all trying to debouch into the PO Khan Line. It was fairly certain however, that valley west of Bologna, and mines and demo- the Germans would have to fall back to the litions blocked the few available roads. It PO. says much for Fifth Army engineers and staff, The enemy had no alternative to a rapid with- that traffic congestion did not become acute, drawal on II Corps front. On 17 April the and that 34 US Division was able to enter Eighth Army captured Argenta and threatened Bologna on 21 April. a breakthrough to Ferrara. On IV Corps front 6 SA Armoured Division had virtually no more 10 US Mountain Division had made a remark- fighting in the Appenines. The one aim of the able advance and reached Mt Pastore, thus enemy was to get to the PO crossings, but he outflanking the so-called Genghis Khan Line. left a considerable number of stragglers in During the Sole-Caprara-Collina battle 12 Mor- the mountains, and several hundred prisoners tar Brigade suffered the following casualties:- were picked up during the thrust down Route Royal Durban Light 64. They seldom showed fight. Infantry...... 6 killed 45 wounded The Special Service Battalion leading the ad- First City /Cape vance of 13 Brigade reached the outskirts of Town Highland- Casalecchio on the evening of 20 April, and ers 31 killed 70 wounded then 11 Armoured Brigade with the SSB back Wits Rifles/De la under command, passed into the van on the Rey Regiment 24 killed 144 wounded 21st. The long bloody struggle in the moun- Frontier Force Rif- tains was over, and the fertile plains of North- les 9 killed 50 wounded ern Italy lay ahead. 70 killed 309 wounded 6 SA Armoured Division was given the task of leading the advance of II US Corps. To quote from 6 Division Operation Instruction During the whole operation 170 prisoners of 21 April:- "The advance of SA Armoured were taken. Division will be carried out with the utmost The enemy was on the run. The pursuit to speed and boldness on a broad front. Enemy the Alps had begun. rearguards and delaying positions will be by-

66 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

passed. Important road centres, stream cross- dykes and canals, and the going was by no ings, etc., will be held until relieved by infan- means easy. try divisions." II Armoured Brigade was di- rected through San Giovanni to Finale Nel San Giovanni was occupied by American Emillia and 12 Motor Brigade to Camposanto. troops on the night of the 21/22nd, and the Both brigades were to seize crossings over advance of the 6th Division was resumed on the Panaro river. 13 Brigade was to concen- the 22nd on a two brigade front. 11 Armoured trate north of Route 9 in Divisional reserve. Brigade moved on Finale Nell Emilia while 12 The Pretoria Regiment was detached from 11 Motor Brigade advanced on Camposanto. The Brigade command, and was ordered to pro- orders to the Division were to seize the cross- tect the Division right flank, and contact ings over the Panaro river at all costs. Eighth Army in the vicinity of Bondeno. The The Special Service Battalion, with B Com. American units under command had now left pany Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regi- 11 Brigade. ment under command, met considerable op- position just north of San Giovanni. The ene- By-passing Bologna, the tanks of the Special my had organised very strong anti-tank de- Service Battalion rumbled off at 7030 hours fence with guns and tanks concealed among on the 21st. After many weary months 11 Ar- houses and hayricks. B Squadron executed a moured Brigade had returned to mobile war- flanking movement, and after severe fighting fare. The tank crews were filled with tremen- the enemy withdrew. Another strong rear- dous enthusiasm and were determined to guard position was encountered at Decima. make the most of the opportunity. B Squadron again moved to a flank, while Sweeping up the long straight road to San the Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment assisted the tanks to "winkle out" snipers Giovanni, the Special Service Battalion soon started to collect prisoners and stragglers. At and bazookamen. At nightfall the column was still some 5 miles south of Finale. The Special 1100 hours shots were exchanged with ene- Service Battalion claimed the destruction of my tanks, supported by self-propelled guns 7 German tanks, but 8 Shermans and 3 and bazookas. The Special Service Battalion was confined to a strip of ground on both Stuarts were destroyed or disabled. sides of the road, bounded by a railway line The Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment with C on one flank and a dyke on the other. After Squadron of Prince Alfred's Guard and one a severe fire-fight the Special Service Battalion battery 1/6 Field Regiment under command, tanks fought their way forward to within 11- led the advance of 12 Brigade, and moving miles of San Giovanni, but further progress very fast through San Giovanni and Creval- was barred by a blown bridge. The Special core, reached the outskirts of Camposanto at Service Battalion knocked out 2 Mark 4 tanks 1245 hours. There was no opposition, and and 5 guns, for a loss of 3 tanks disabled. progress was not impeded by demolitions or Meanwhile the Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley mines. Endless columns of American march- Regiment and A Squadron Special Service ing troops were passed on the road. Battalion struck opposition at Calderara Di Reno to the east of the railway line, and the The Panaro has high banks overgrown by village was bombarded by 4/22 Field Regi- grass, and the river is unfordable on foot. B ment. An enemy tank was put out of action Company, Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment, and the place was occupied that evening. 11 leading the advance, reached the bridge at Armoured Brigade rounded up 300 prisoners Camposanto at about 1030 hours and found on the 21st, and identifications from many it intact. Camposanto lay on the northern battalions illustrated the confusion of retreat. bank of the Panaro. American troops had al- Further to the east the Pretoria Regiment ready reached the river, but drew back in the reached Longara at nightfall, after meeting con- face of heavy small arms fire. siderable opposition from bazookas and los- ing two tanks. The regiment rounded up 150 The Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment made an prisoners. attempt to rush the bridge with an infantry platoon, but the platoon was driven back by It had been a successful day for the South machine-gun fire along a fixed line. For two Africans, but the country was badly cut by hours nothing was achieved, and it was im-

68 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

possible for the troops to show themselves ing of the 22nd, the Germans in that area without being shot at. The enemy had no had already felt the weight of the 6th Division. cable to enable him to demolish the bridge The 7/23 Medium Regiment narrative says from a distance and tried to send parties on that on the evening of the 22nd their observa- to the bridge to destroy it. These were driven tion posts reported great numbers of vehicles back by the fire of the Wits Rifles/De la Rey moving along the roads into Finale, where- Regiment. upon the Regiment, and the 4/22 Field Regi- Finally Prince Alfred's Guard tanks were ment put down a series of concentrations brought up to give supporting fire and artillery "and did tremendous damage". concentrations were laid on. Covered by this The advance of 12 Motor Brigade was led fire, three carriers loaded with troops rushed by the Royal Durban Light Infantry with B the bridge. 46 prisoners were taken in Cam- Squadron Prince Alfred's Guard under com- prosanto. mand. The Royal Durban Light Infantry column The Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment had advanced rapidly along the south bank of the achieved a notable success. On the evening Panaro, and by 2045 hours on the 22nd the of 22 April 12 Motor Brigade received orders troops were within a mile of Finale. Here they to hand over Camposanto to an American struck against the flank of an enemy column unit, and to move with all speed along the of vehicles and tanks which was moving into south bank of the Panaro to Finale Nell Emil- the town. Confused fighting broke out in the lia. The plan was designed to trap consider- darkness, and two Prince Alfred's Guard tanks able enemy forces caught between the con- were destroyed. But the Royal Durban Light verging Fifth and Eighth Armies, and still south Infantry maintained positions within 500 yards of the Panaro. of the road, and the Prince Alfred's Guard tanks and battalion mortars fired steadily into The German army in Italy was now in its the column. During the proceedings the stone death-throes. The pace of withdrawal was li- bridge was demolished, but how, or by whom, mited to that of animals and infantry, all the is obscure. It seems probable that most of reserves had been engaged, and allied air- the Germans opposing the Royal Durban Light craft speedily turned the PO crossings into Infantry then betook themselves to the deathtraps. On 21 April an Eighth Army ar- wooden bridge and crossed the Panaro by moured column burst out from the Argenta this means. At any rate the fighting died down area, and driving along the Reno occupied at dawn, and a patrol of the Royal Durban Reggio Renaticio that night. Sweeping on in Light Infantry entered Finale and found the a north westerly direction Eighth Army spear- place clear of the enemy. The Royal Durban heads reached the outskirts of Bondeno on Light Infantry had 8 wounded during the ac- the evening of the 22nd. This dramatic ad- tion, and Prince Alfred's Guard lost 2 killed vance out off the retreat of the greater 'part and 1 wounded. of 1 Parachute Corps and four other German divisions. A battle of annihilation began be- At 0705 hours on the 23rd 12 Brigade re- tween the Panaro and the Reno. ceived orders to concentrate and resume the advance through Camposanto to the PO. The Both 12 and 11 Brigades were now directed Royal Durban Light Infantry was ordered to on Finale. This small town lay on the northern relieve the Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Re- bank of the Panaro River, and now that Bon- giment. 11 Armoured Brigade was ordered to deno was lost, the bridges across the Panaro clear up the Finale area and during the day at Finale were virtually the only escape route the Special Service Battalion, Imperial Light for the numerous German forces in the Cento Horse/Kimberley Regiment and First City /Cape area. The Panaro is not a formidable obstacle, Town Highlanders rounded up some 900 but is to deep for wading, and its steep banks prisoners south of the town. The Germans form an impassable obstacle for vehicles. had a number of trenches in the area, and There were two bridges at Finale - a stone considerable opposition was encountered from bridge leading into the town, and a wooden snipers and Spandau posts, but organised bridge some hundreds of yards to the east. resistance broke down during the day. The ut- Although the Special Service Battalion had ter confusion of the enemy is shown by the halted about 5 miles from Finale on the even- fact that prisoners were taken from no less

69 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

than eight divisions. During the morning con- same area. The Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regi- tact was made with 6th British Armoured ment column harboured some five miles from Division of Eighth Army. the PO. During the advance they noted that the northern sky was black with smoke, and The road leading into Finale was choked with that fighter bombers were continually over- vehicles of every description all jammed toge- head. ther in a shattered mass. The Divisional re- cording officer notes - "From the bridge over On the afternoon of the 24th 12 Brigade reach- the canal to the Panaro there had been a solid ed the PO in the Felonica area. Large numbers mass of carts, oxen, mules and horses; and of stragglers were trapped on the south bank trucks, guns towed and self-propelled and and the area was littered with guns, tanks, tanks. A way had that morning (the 24th) transport and war material of all sorts. The been bulldozed through the mass. We walked Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment rounded up through in avenue of destruction. Many of the 487 prisoners and the Royal Durban Light In.. vehicles were still smouldering. We followed fantry over 250. The latter battalion captured the line of wreckage and came to the river. a complete German hospital and staff. The Here there had been a low-level camouflaged Pretoria Regiment, which was acting in an in- wooden bridge, some half a mile east of the dependent role, also reached the PO that day main concrete at Finale. The 10 Foot span and took 363 prisoners. Opposition was spo- nearest to the southern bank had burnt, and radic and unorganised. was in fact still smouldering - Two lines 11 Armoured Brigade completed the c1earing- of traffic stretched away from the bridge along up of the Finale area on 24 April, while 13 a cutting, along the levee top, and down the Motor Brigade concentrated south of the Pa- levee to the road. Here and there Volkswagens naro ready to support 12 Brigade. had crept up to form three lines of traffic. In the 600 yards between the canal bridge and Further to the west 10 US Mountain Division the river bridge, there must have been the re- had crossed the PO in the San Bennetto area. mains of 100 carts, 50 trucks, half a dozen On the night of the 24/25th a Royal Durban Self-Propelled, and a dozen 20 mm guns." A Light Infantry patrol swam the PO and report- similar stream of destruction approached the ed that the north bank was only lightly held. Panaro bridge from the east -. It was a This was fortunate for the PO at this point staggering sight to see all this devastation. was over 150 yards broad, and a very diffi- One felt it was ample retribution for the Ga- cult obstacle. Bridging material was not imme- zala Gallop". diately available but five assault boats were brought up during the night. A and B Com- Prisoners stated that the initial block was panies Royal Durban Light Infantry crossed caused by fighter bombers, and then the ar- the river the next morning and established tillery took full advantage of the congestion. a bridgehead against slight opposition. 12 Field German aircraft put in an appearance on the Squadron operated a raft for jeeps and car- nights of the 21/22nd and 22/23rd and in- riers, and 10 DUKWS (amphibious lorries) flicted some casualties on the Division. A were used to ferry troops over. 12 Brigade Stuka was shot down by B Troop of 1/12 Group concentrated on the south bank to Light Anti-Aircraft Battery. follow up the crossing. More rafts arrived on 26 April but heavy rain made the banks of the On the morning of the 23rd 12 Motor Brigade river soft and muddy and greatly impeded began its drive to the PO. After a delay of loading operations. The crossing of 12 Brigade some hours caused by the bridge at Campo- was completed on 27 April. The greater part santo being blocked by American traffic the of the Brigade crossed by the ferries but 240 Wits Rifles/De la Rey Regiment crossed the vehicles were sent over a bridge at Ostiglia. Panaro at 1030 hours. The advance was press- ed during the afternoon and C Squadron Prince Wholesale disaster was overtaking the Ger- Alfred's Guard which accompanied the ad- mans in Northern Italy. On 25 April 88 US vance guard, got in some effective shooting Division made a remarkable advance from the at disorganised groups. 150 prisoners were Ostiglia bridgehead and reached Verona. All collected, but progress was hampered by American units moving along the roads in the 2. This is a conservative estimate.

70 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

lateral communication between the German Regiment tanks moved to a flank and broke forces in the plain was cut, and the retreat of the German defences west of the Legnaro - German forces west of the Tyrol was finally Vicenza road. Barbed wire obstacles and anti- closed when Fifth Army spearheads took Co- tank ditches were not covered by fire. Pill- mo on 28 April. "Army Group C was now a boxes were found unoccupied. 13 Brigade mere skeleton force and of its experienced and continued its drive to the Bacchiglione River, well trained divisions there was not one left which was reached that evening. Pretoria Re- worth the name. All their energy had been ex- giment tanks advancing up the main Vicenza pended south of the PO and without weapons road were held up by a canal and a blown and ammunition retreat had become a rout. bridge, and were received with heavy fire. - South of the PO practically all the tanks, Accordingly the Royal Natal Carbineers with assault guns, and heavy anti-tank guns were Pretoria Regiment reconnaissance tanks under lost or stranded for lack of petrol and there command, were ordered to move to Monte- was little left of the artillery"." galdella. The Royal Natal Carbineers collected a number of prisoners but failed to capture In these circumstances it was hopeless for the bridge at this point in the face of machine- the German command to hold a line along gun fire. The enemy blew the bridge in the the Adige, or even to put up a serious de- early hours of the 29th. During the day 88 US fence in the Tyrol. Strong defences had been Division captured Vicenza after stiff fighting constructed during the winter east of the and 2 New Zealand Division reached the out- Adige River, but neither troops nor guns were skirts of Padua. available to hold them. On the night of the 28th 6 Division Head- On 27 April the Royal Durban Light Infantry quarters ordered the advance to continue on led the advance of 12 Motor Brigade to the a two brigade front. 11 Armoured Brigade was Adige, and the river was reached in the Cas- to advance on Treviso and assist the Ameri- tagnaro area. At 1420 hours D Company cans in capturing that important town, while commenced a crossing using a boat supplied 13 Brigade was to maintain touch with Eighth by partisans. These were soon supplemented Army and follow a route south of the main by American DUKWS, and during the evening Vicenza - Treviso axis. Both 11 and 13 Bri- the whole battalion crossed the river, together gades succeeded in capturing bridges across with a troop for Prince Alfred's Guard tanks. the Bacchiglione. Early on the 29th carriers of The crossing was unopposed and a number the Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment of stragglers were collected on the East bank. occupied Longare and found the bridge un- On the morning of the 28th the Royal Durban damaged, while the Royal Natal Carbineers Light Infantry occupied Boschi, and at this crossed by a bridge south east of Monte point 12 Brigade passed into reserve. 13 Mo- Galdella. tor Brigade with the Pretoria Regiment under command, was ordered to take the lead, with Both brigades drove on to the Brenta against 11 Armoured Brigade moving in close sup- slight opposition. They collected hundreds of port. The task of 6 Division was to maintain prisoners, and reached Brenta that evening. contact with Eighth Army, and protect the D Company Royal Natal Carbineers was in- right flank of II US Corps. volved in a sharp action at Limena, and the enemy's resistance was not overcome until On the morning of the 28th 13 Brigade cross- the battalion mortars and the guns of 15 Field ed the Adige near Legnago, on a bridge laid Regiment had been brought into action. A by American engineers. The Natal Mounted Pretoria Regiment tank was destroyed here. Rifles/SA Air Force led the way without wait- A Royal Natal Carbineers patrol crossed the ing for the Pretoria Regiment tanks to cross Brenta at Curtarolo using a captured raft, and the river. No resistance was encountered un- 8 Field Squadron threw a Bailey Bridge over til Noventa was reached, some 15 miles from the river during the night of the 29/30th. the Adige. Pretoria Regiment tanks were While reconnoitring the bridging site the Com- called up and the advance continued until the manding Officer 8 Field Squadron and two head of the column struck the strong defences Other Ranks were killed by bazooka fire. of the Venetian Line, and came under heavy anti-tank fire. A Sherman was destroyed, and 3. Operations of British Indian and Dominion Forces two others immobilised. A group of Pretoria in Italy, Part IV, page 10.

71 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

11 Armoured Brigade crossed at Curtarolo on Armour the morning of the 30th, and by nightfall was Prince Alfred's Guard within three miles of Treviso. 500 prisoners Pretoria Regiment (Princess Alice's Own) were collected during the day, and it was clear Special Service Battalion that the war in Italy was virtually over. The Motor Battalion New Zealanders were in Venice, and the Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment Americans had taken Treviso.

On 1 May 6 Division received orders to 12 Motorised Brigade suspend its advance into Ventia, and move to Headquarters, 12 Motorised Brigade Milan.

There were still considerable German forces Infantry in Piedmont, and it was necessary to send 1 Royal Natal Carbineers reinforcements to that area. On 2 May while Royal Durban Light Infantry the long columns of divisional transport First City/Cape Town Highlanders trundled westwards across the Lombard plain, Witwatersrand Rifles/Regiment De la Rey news was received of the unconditional sur- Divisional Troops render of the German forces in Italy. Armour (Reconnaissance Regiment) Divisional casualties in April and May 1945 Natal Mounted Rifles/SA Air Force totalled 605. The Division captured 4,366 prisoners during the period. Artillery

During the final phase of the Italian campaign, 1/6 Field Regiment, SA Artillery 6 SA Armoured Division had an opportunity 4/22 Field Regiment, SA Artillery of revering to its true role. Admitedly opposi- 7/23 Medium Regiment, SA Artillery tion soon collapsed, but the Division certain- 1/11 Anti-tank Regiment, SA Artillery ly acted with the "speed and boldness" laid 1/12 Light Anti-aircraft Regiment, SA Artillery down in its Operation Instruction of 21 April. A feature of the fighting south of the PO was Engineers the way in which artillery, infantry and ar- 8 Field Squadron, SA Engineer Corps mour acted in close co-operation. 12 Field Squadron, SA Engineer Corps The decisive factor during the German retreat 17 Field Park Squadron, SA Engineer Corps. was undoubtedly the overwhelming Allied air superiority, and the merciless attacks of the Signals fighter bombers. 6 Armoured Divisional Signals Squadron, SA Corps of Signals ORDER OF BATTLE - 6 SA ARMOURED 6 Armoured Divisional Artillery Signals Squa- DIVISION dron, SA Corps of Signals (As at the time of arrival of 6 SA Armoured 17 Armoured Brigade Signals Squadron, SA Division in Italy) Corps of Signals Headquarters, 6 SA Armoured Division 14 Motorised Brigade Signals Squadron, SA Headquarters, SA Artillery Corps of Signals Headquarters, SA Engineer Corps Headquarters, SA Corps of Signals Q Services Headquarters, Services Q 55 Q Company, Q Services Corps Headquarters, T Services 56 Q Company, Q Services Corps 66 SA Field Security Section 57 Q Company, Q Services Corps Air Photograph Interpretation Section 58 Q Company, Q Services Corps Meteorological Section, SA Air Force 59 Q Company, Q Services Corps 6 SA Armoured Divisional Headquarters Squa- 73 Bulk-breaking Platoon, Q Services Corps dron. 74 Bulk-breaking Platoon, Q Services Corps 75 Bulk-breaking Platoon, Services Corps 11 Armoured Brigade Q 136 Tank-transporter Company, Q Services Headquarters, 11 Armoured Brigade Corps

72 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 3, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

Medical Natal Mounted Reserve Group 19 Field Ambulance, SA Medical Corps Reserve Armoured Regiment 20 Field Ambulance, SA Medical Corps Reserve Motorised Battalion 6 Field Hygiene Section, SA Medical Corps Reserve Artillery Regiment, SA Artillery 6 Armoured Divisional Dental Unit, SA Medi- Reserve Field Squadron, SA Engineer Corps ca/ Corps. Reserve Signals Squadron, SA Corps of Sig- nals T Services Reserve Q Company, Q Services Corps Reserve Field Ambulance, SA Medical Corps 3 Armoured Divisional Workshop, T Services Reserve Workshop, T Services Corps Corps Reserve Company, Cape Corps 11 Armoured Brigade Workshop, T Services 6 SA Armoured Division began reorganising Corps in the Lucca area on 13 January 1945, when 10 Motorised Brigade Workshops, T Services 13 Motorised Brigade was formed. Corps Its organisation is given below. 14 Armoured Divisional 2 Line Transport Workshops, T Services Corps 6 Armoured Divisional Q and T Stores Field 13 Motorised Brigade Par:<,T Services Corps. Headquarters, 13 Motorised Brigade.

Provost Infantry 6 Armoured Divisional Provost Company, SA Corps of Military Police. Royal Durban Light Infantry Natal Mounted Rifles/SA Air Force Postal

6 Armoured Divis:onal Postal Unit Additional Division Troops

Reserve Group 15 Field Regiment, SA Artillery 5 Field Squadron, SA Engineer Corps Headquarters, 6 SA Armoured Divisional Re- 18 Motorised Brigade Signals Squadron, SA serve Group Corps of Signals.

73