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Chatham House, October 2, 2006 European Defence – Myth or Reality? Constanze Stelzenmüller Field Marshall Sir Nigel Bagnall Memorial Lecture (on invitation by the British-German Association) Chatham House, October 2, 2006 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour to have been asked to deliver the Field Marshall Sir Nigel Bagnall Memorial lecture on behalf of the British-German Association here at Chatham House. I feel the honour all the more because I am not only a civilian of the female persuasion, but, as a former journalist, a member of a tribe generally held in deep contempt by the military. Certainly my only encounter with the Field Marshall’s regiment, the Green Howards, in a visit to the UK-run Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-i-Sharif in the fall of 2004, reminded me of this essential fact, – although perhaps it was a mistake to present the press officer with a marijuana plant I had picked during a day trip to a local warlord’s residence. And I hasten 2 to add that the Green Howards’ officers were exquisitely courteous to me, and the PRT’s mess food was the best I have ever eaten in any military operation, bar none. Unlike some in the audience, I have never had the privilege of meeting Sir Nigel Bagnall, although reading his obituary on the internet made me rather wish I had. Certainly the qualities of “ruthless energy” mentioned in his Military Cross citation, combined with the intellectual honesty, independence of mind and kindness to others attributed to him as well, are attractive not just in a senior officer, but in any leader. I feel that the best I can do to honor his legendary forthrightness is to offer to you some fairly forthright views about European Defence. It is a truth universally acknowledged, at least in Great Britain, that there is no chimera more appalling than the notion of a European Defence. Possibly the only thing more disturbing to a British sensibility is the – it is hoped, only marginally more likely – spectre of the Germans winning the World Cup. True, the European Union’s present efforts at establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy leave much to be desired. And a European Army, that hardy perennial of backbencher speeches at Conservative Party conferences, would indeed be a Bad Thing. In fact, it would be quite easy to fill this half-hour with a list of all the weaknesses and shortcomings of European Defence, and possibly not a few of you here would applaud me for it. I would therefore like to do something a little more difficult and ambitious: I will defend the project of a European Defence. I will 3 argue that Europe – and this means the United Kingdom, too – will not be able to defend its values, its interests or indeed itself, if it does not learn to join forces and to pool its resources intelligently; and that it has already begun to do so. How and to what end European Defence can, should, and will become reality; and why Great Britain should not merely not thwart or stand aside from, but engage energetically in this effort, is the subject of my speech tonight. A note on terminology is called for here: I use the term European Defence advisedly, for to speak only of Europe’s military capability would be to exclude some of the most important issues connected with the issue today: strategy, foreign policy, political will, public opinion. I am not advocating a fully integrated single European armed force, nor am I interested in other frameworks where European armed forces act together – in that case, we would be talking about much of NATO, and almost all of the NATO Response Force NRF. I do, however, advocate more pragmatic integration, and in more imaginative ways than we are seeing now. You may find some of my points controversial, even hair-raising; at least I hope so. Let me begin by examining five myths about European Defence – and contrasting them with reality. I will end with a list of recommendations. 4 Myth # 1: We don’t need European Defence, because our security needs are met by NATO This is a sentiment most often heard in the new NATO and EU members of Eastern Europe. Yet it has its diehard defenders in Old Europe as well, who appear undeterred by the fact that it has been refuted by events for quite a while. NATO quietly went global at the 2002 Reykjavik Summit, and America is closing down European bases. Reliance on American protection is referred to sternly as “free- loading” in Washington, and viewed as a cheap excuse for not modernizing European forces, or protecting defence budgets against raids by cash-strapped governments battling with the competing demands of education, welfare and health. Of course the collective defence clause in Article V of the Washington Treaty still stands, and European Defence will not soon replace NATO as a supplier of hard security for Europe. But U.S. forces, deployed worldwide and reeling under the vicious onslaught of Taliban and Iraqi resistance, are exhausted and overstretched. We have been told, in no uncertain terms, to get our act together and be more self-reliant. That said, there are security needs which NATO cannot supply, but the Europeans and the EU can: I mean civilian crisis management capabilities. In fact, the EU’s comparative advantage is that its broader scope permits it to do both at the same time. Which is why it might make sense to have a “Berlin plus in reverse” arrangement, by which NATO can borrow EU crisis management capabilities when necessary. A related point: NATO, for all the recent rhetoric about transatlantic democracy promotion, lacks the EU’s comprehensive toolbox for integrating and transforming young and fragile 5 democracies on Europe’s periphery. In that sense, the EU’s role as exporter of stability is an important complement to NATO’s role in Eastern Europe. Myth # 2: We shouldn’t have a European Defence, because it will destroy NATO and drive apart the transatlantic alliance Only three or four years ago, this was official opinion in Washing- ton’s policymaking circles. America’s then-Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, wasted no opportunity of making the point, whether in closed alliance meetings or at press briefings, with an insistence that is said to have tested the loyalty of even the most fervent advocates of the Special Relationship. American distrust was understandable in view of the more or less free rein given in French, German and Belgian official speeches to rhetoric about “multipolarity”, or Europe as a “counterweight” to U.S. hegemony. And, regardless of where one stood on the Iraq war, pretty much everybody’s nerves were strained by the spectacle of the German government planting its flag (or its towel) on the high ground and declaring itself not just grown-up, but a moral superpower for having said “no” to the Americans. Today, in contrast, cordiality and cooperation reign. The explanation is as simple as it is sobering: We are witnessing a pragmatic strategic rapprochement born out of failure. It is real and durable, because the failure was a double one. On the American side, the apologists of hard power über alles , their soldiers maimed and killed on faraway battlefields, have retreated in defeat. On the European side, humiliations such as the shambolic humanitarian reaction of the EU 6 to the Asian tsunami catastrophe, or the murderous April 2004 pogroms in Kosovo, have noticeably silenced the high priesthood of soft power. America now seeks a strong Europe that can not just defend itself, but defend Western values and interests elsewhere. Consequently, European Defence is being encouraged by the U.S. in order to strengthen Europe’s role in NATO – but also to enable us to stand on our own. Europe, for its part, has recognized that it could not defend its interests alone today, but that some day, it may have to. For, as America’s and Europe’s responsibilities go global, the likelihood of diverging interests will increase. A sensible division of labour between NATO and the EU will therefore not only not destroy NATO – it will help lighten its burden. In that sense, it may even help to save it. Myth # 3: There can be no such thing as European Defence, because we will never agree on common threats and risks, or on policy responses. As it happens, we seem to agree on far more than we disagree about. This is true both on the policymaking level and of that of public opinion; and it is becoming true both within Europe and between Europeans and Americans. Tonight is not the time for a learned dissertation on the similarities and differences between America’s National Security Strategies and the 2003 European Security Strategy, or different national security strategies in Europe; all the more because such documents are snapshots of moving targets. But it is worth noting that the latest iteration of the U.S. document has modulated its position on some of the points which set it apart (most notably preemption). The European Security Strategy, in whose drafting British thinking played a very important part, filled a void, 7 and filled it creditably, by stepping up to the plate on issues raised by the Americans (such as terrorism, WMD and regional conflicts). However, it also registers some uniquely European concerns, (such as organized crime) and notes that geography still matters – a point brought home to American strategists in recent debates about energy security, pipelines, tanker routes and infrastructure protection. The EU should consider instituting a regular review process for the European Security Strategy, much in the way that America does with its NSS.
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