DOCSLIB.ORG

The Quest for Manoeuvre the English Manoeuvre Warfare Theories and British Military Thought 1920–1991

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Quest for Manoeuvre the English Manoeuvre Warfare Theories and British Military Thought 1920–1991 NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE THE QUEST FOR MANOEUVRE THE ENGLISH MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES AND BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT 1920–1991. Thesis Major Juha Mälkki General Staff Officer Course 49 Army June 2002 ii THE QUEST FOR MANOEUVRE THE ENGLISH MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES AND BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT 1920–1991. 1 MODERN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORICAL THEORIES 1 1.1 Definition of Concepts 5 1.2 Sources, Hypotheses and Questions 9 1.3 The Duality Within the Western Military Thought 16 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD 20 2.1 Two Apostles of Armoured Warfare 25 2.2 The Tactical Level Thoughts 33 2.3 The Strategic Level Ideas 38 2.4 Psychological Factors Inside the Tactical and Strategic Level Considerations 42 3 THE PROCESS OF THE BRITISH ARMY MECHANISATION AND ITS FOREIGN “COMPETITORS” UNTIL THE SECOND WORLD WAR 45 3.1 The Triumph of Mobile Firepower during the 1920s 48 3.2 The Prospering Tactical Ideas and the Mechanisation Process during the 1930s 53 3.3 The Simultaneous Development of Armoured Warfare Ideas in Other Countries: Some Observations 59 4 THE SECOND WORLD WAR – THE FOCAL TRAITS OF THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE 64 4.1 The Policy of Limited Liability – The Way to Dunkirk? 67 4.2 British Army Implications of Manoeuvre Warfare During The First Years of War 71 4.3 British Respond to the Threat of Deutsches Africa Korps – Montgomery of Alamein 77 iii 4.3 Operation Market-Garden – An Application of Indirect Approach? 84 4.4 The Features of the “British Fashion of War” During the Second World War 88 4 THE NUCLEAR ERA AND THE CHALLENGED OF THE NATO DEFENCE 93 5.1 The Final Form of Liddell Hart’s Ideas 98 5.2 Nuclear Weapons and New Demands on Mobility 103 5.3 New Ideas in Conventional Warfare 112 6 THE REBIRTH OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES 118 6.1 The Concept of Air Land Battle Doctrine – The American Way in Warfare? 121 6.2 NATO’s Doctrine of Follow-On-Forces Attack 126 6.3 The First British Army Doctrine During the Year 1989 131 6.4 The Gulf War - Land Campaign and the Need of Adaptability 134 6.5 Manoeuvre Warfare Ideas and the Weight of History 140 7 CONCLUSIONS: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES AND THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE 142 BIBLIOGRAPHY 148 APPENDICES 162 iv GLOSSARY BAOR British Army of the Rhine CBAA Cavalry Brigade, Air Attack CENTAG Central Army Group (NATO) CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CINC Commander-in-Chief FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area FLOT Forward Line of Troops JRUSI Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (From June 1971, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies). NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical NORTHAG Nothern Army Group (NATO) RAF the Royal Air Forces RTC the Royal Tank Corps RUSI or R. U. S. I., Royal United Service Institution (From June 1971, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies). TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command OODA Observation-orientation-decision-action –cycle (OODA loop) ROAD Reorganization Objective, Army Divisions WW I First World War WW II Second World War v APPENDICES Appendix 1 Affecting Parametres to the British Army Organisations and the Art of War Appendix 2 The Comparison of Liddell Hart’s and Fuller’s New Model Division Appendix 3 The Experiments with the Organisation of Armoured Division Appendix 4 Two Applications of Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach Appendix 5 Different Adaptations of Manoeuvre Warfare Theories in Norhern Africa from the Late 1940s Until the Late Late 1942 Appendix 6 Main Lessons of the Battle of El Alamein Appendix 7 Field Marshal B. Montgomery’s Plan for Operation Market - Garden; September 1944 Appendix 8 Extracts from the British Postwar Organisational Ideas Appendix 9 Major-General H. E. Pyman's Concept of the Future Methods of Nato Defence in Europe (1954) Appendix 10 The Idea of Deep Strikes Against Advanding Soviet Echelons (Air Land Battle -doctrine) Appendix 11 Ideas of NATO Defence During the 1980s Appendix 12 The Gulf War in the Early 1990s 1 1 MODERN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORICAL THEORIES “Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.” Michael Howard, 1974 What is the actual reason in trying to gather information from such a wide sphere of military action, even thought each age has its own strategic thought and “a man must be judged by the conditions and tools of his time”. The strategies of 1806, 1914 and 1939 were products of their own time. They were amalgamated with a varying degree of success to use and respond to the economic, social, technological and political conditions.1 Naturally, the napoleonic era had in broad outlines specific battlefield conditions and armament technology. The muzzle- loading flintlock musket was the principal infantry weapon in the mid-nineteenth century. By 1870, the breech-loading rifle had become the standard infantry weapon. In addition, significant alteration had occured within the areas of strategy and tactics. According to Paul Dyster, military innovations have inspired vigorous effects at counter-adaptation. There is no doubt that antitank weapons from guns to missiles have changed the methods of battle. Whether one single technological innovation constitutes a revolution in wafare, is a matter of disagreement. Rather perhaps, as suggested by Dyster, “the revolution comes to fruition only when complementary organisational and doctrinal forms evolve that allow maxium expression of the military virtues of the new technology.” And this naturally takes time.2 The relationship between inspiration and influence, as evaluated by Peter Paret, is a matter of my interest. “Inspiration derives from the suggestive quality of the past”, which may stimulate and extend our thinking about the past. Influence, on the other hand, must “connote a degree of specifity”.3 According to Richard E. Simpkin, the twentieth century contained two intesive periods of military innovations in mobility and in military theories. The first period included the discoveries of the powered wheel, track and wing during the early twentieth century. The 1 Paret, Peter (1990a): Napoleon and the Revolution in War. In Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, p. 141. 2 Dyster, Paul A.: In the Wake of the Tank: the twentieth-century evolution of the Theory of Armoured Warfare. A dessertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 1984, p. 544. 3 Paret (1990a), p. 140. 2 second contained the discovery of the rotary wing aircraft during the early second half of the twentieth century.4 I consider any inspirations and influences within the area of the art of war interrelated, as they greatly depend on one other. The battles fought in history must be treated as a unique chain of events. Still, there is always influence, ideas and exceptional and inspirational brainwork, which have produced occurrences and new innovations. Naturally, I tried to avoid any quotations from the past, which should be kept strictly in their original context and where I could not find any coherent continuation of military thought. I understand the idea of doctrine according to modern British definition as “the function of the Military Doctrine is to establish the framework of understanding of the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application”.5 It is a substitute for thought and a common background for training. More detailed, but also viable determination is given by I. B. Holley’s definition. He specified that the doctrine is a generalization of intellectual process. This means the combination of recorded experiences and further analysed data. Therefore, doctrine is what is officially taught, and a combination of theory and practice. It is an authorative rule, a precept. Although I am investigating both military thinking and the doctrines, I do not consider them to be synonymous. Military thought has more to do with people, and the doctrines with institutional basis. It became clear to me that Britain lacked a clear and suitable doctrine almost throughout the whole twentieth century. Therefore, I decided to use the word doctrine very carefully, because it might cause some unnecessary misunderstanding. Doctrines can be based upon different laws or theories. Nevertheless, no theory can or should reach the standards of “hard” mathematical science, but it can reach the standards of social and political science with ease.6 Hence, as Thomas Edward (T. E.) Lawrence pointed out, nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books. The irrational tenth is the test of the generals.7 Obviously, the art of war should be studied in a scientific way.8 Michael Howard 4 Simpkin, Richard: The Heavy Force/ Light Force Mix-Up. In Armor, number 4, vol XCIV. July - August 1985, p. 9. Brigadier Simpkin had an extensive responsibility for armoured vehicle development during his long career with the British Army. 5 Design for operations – the British military doctrine (1989). Army Code No 71451. Printed in the United Kingdom for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, p. 3; Design for operations - British military doctrine (1996), Army Code No 71451. 6 Lind, William S.: The Theory and Practice of Maneuver Warfare. In Maneuver Warfare. An Anthology. Edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Novato CA 1993, p. 3. 7 T. E. Lawrence (from The Evolution of a Revolt) in the Sword and the Pen. Selections from the world’s greatest military writings. Edited by Adrian Liddell Hart, prepared by Sir Basil Liddell Har. Cassell & Company limited 1976, p. 243. 8 Lider, Julian: Towards a Nuclear Doctrine. Essays on British military thought 2. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • FUTURE WARFARE Anthology
    FUTURE WARFARE Anthology Revised Edition Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. U.S. Army War College Carlisle barracks, pennsylvania ***** The views expressed within this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** ISBN 1-58487-026-5 ii CONTENTS Foreword General Donn A. Starry U.S. Army, Retired ............................. v Prologue Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr . .............. ix Revised Acknowledgements ........................ xi Introduction to the First Edition Dr. Williamson Murray ....................... xiii Preface to the First Edition Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. ............. xix 1. Speed and Power: Primal Forces in the New American Style of War .......................... 1 2. Cycles of War ................................. 9 3. Preparing For War in the 21st Century with Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, Retired ............................... 23 4. Adaptive Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic Threat after 2010 ............................. 41 5. A Sword with Two Edges: Maneuver in 21st Century Warfare .............. 65 6. From Korea to Kosovo : How America’s Army Has Learned to Fight Limited Wars in the Precision Age: ......................... 89 7. Clashes of Visions: Sizing and Shaping Our Forces in a Fiscally Constrained Environment .......... 111 8. America’s Army: Preparing For Tomorrow’s Security Challenges ......................... 125 9. The Dawn of a New Age of Warfare: And the Clarion Call for Enhanced Maneuver Capabilities ........................ 145 iii 10. The Annual Report for The Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army ......... 153 11. The Army After Next: Intertwining Military Art, Science, and Technology Out to the Year 2025 with Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright by John Michael Meyer 2020
    Copyright by John Michael Meyer 2020 The Dissertation Committee for John Michael Meyer Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation. One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) Committee: Ami Pedahzur, Supervisor Zoltan D. Barany David M. Buss William Roger Louis Thomas G. Palaima Paul B. Woodruff One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) by John Michael Meyer Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2020 Dedication To Ami Pedahzur and Wm. Roger Louis who guided me on this endeavor from start to finish and To Lorna Paterson Wingate Smith. Acknowledgements Ami Pedahzur and Wm. Roger Louis have helped me immeasurably throughout my time at the University of Texas, and I wish that everyone could benefit from teachers so rigorous and open minded. I will never forget the compassion and strength that they demonstrated over the course of this project. Zoltan Barany developed my skills as a teacher, and provided a thoughtful reading of my first peer-reviewed article. David M. Buss kept an open mind when I approached him about this interdisciplinary project, and has remained a model of patience while I worked towards its completion. My work with Tom Palaima and Paul Woodruff began with collaboration, and then moved to friendship. Inevitably, I became their student, though they had been teaching me all along.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of British Tactical and Operational Tank Doctrine and Training in the First World War
    The evolution of British tactical and operational tank doctrine and training in the First World War PHILIP RICHARD VENTHAM TD BA (Hons.) MA. Thesis submitted for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy by the University of Wolverhampton October 2016 ©Copyright P R Ventham 1 ABSTRACT Tanks were first used in action in September 1916. There had been no previous combat experience on which to base tactical and operational doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited. Despite mechanical limitations of the early machines and their vulnerability to adverse ground conditions, the tanks achieved moderate success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank. Two years later, tanks had gained the support of most senior commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved both within the Tank Corps and at GHQ and higher command. Despite dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to ground conditions and enemy counter-measures. Competing demands for materiel meant there were never enough tanks to replace casualties and meet the demands of formation commanders. This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right time to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battles of the ‘Hundred Days’.
    [Show full text]
  • Suez 1956 24 Planning the Intervention 26 During the Intervention 35 After the Intervention 43 Musketeer Learning 55
    Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd i 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East Louise Kettle 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iiiiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © Louise Kettle, 2018 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12(2f) Jackson’s Entry, Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/1 3 Adobe Sabon by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain. A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 3795 0 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 3797 4 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 3798 1 (epub) The right of Louise Kettle to be identifi ed as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498). 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iivv 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Contents Acknowledgements vii 1. Learning from History 1 Learning from History in Whitehall 3 Politicians Learning from History 8 Learning from the History of Military Interventions 9 How Do We Learn? 13 What is Learning from History? 15 Who Learns from History? 16 The Learning Process 18 Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East 21 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Airpilotdec 2017 ISSUE 24
    AIR PILOT DEC 2017:AIR PILOT MASTER 29/11/17 09:25 Page 1 AirPilot DEC 2017 ISSUE 24 AIR PILOT DEC 2017:AIR PILOT MASTER 29/11/17 09:25 Page 2 Diary DECEMBER 2017 7th General Purposes & Finance Committee Cobham House AIR PILOT 14th Carol Service St. Michaels, Cornhill THE HONOURABLE COMPANY OF JANUARY 2018 AIR PILOTS 10th AST/APT meeting Dowgate Hill House incorporating 16th Air Pilots Benevolent Fund AGM RAF Club Air Navigators 18th General Purposes & Finance Committee Dowgate Hill House 18th Court & Election Dinner Cutlers’ Hall PATRON: His Royal Highness FEBRUARY 2018 The Prince Philip 7th Pilot Aptitude Testing RAF Cranwell Duke of Edinburgh KG KT 8th General Purposes & Finance Committee Dowgate Hill House 20th Luncheon Club RAF Club GRAND MASTER: His Royal Highness The Prince Andrew Duke of York KG GCVO MASTER: VISITS PROGRAMME Captain C J Spurrier Please see the flyers accompanying this issue of Air Pilot or contact Liveryman David Curgenven at [email protected]. CLERK: These flyers can also be downloaded from the Company's website. Paul J Tacon BA FCIS Please check on the Company website for visits that are to be confirmed. Incorporated by Royal Charter. A Livery Company of the City of London. PUBLISHED BY: GOLF CLUB EVENTS The Honourable Company of Air Pilots, Please check on Company website for latest information Cobham House, 9 Warwick Court, Gray’s Inn, London WC1R 5DJ. EDITOR: Paul Smiddy BA (Eco n), FCA EMAIL: [email protected] FUNCTION PHOTOGRAPHY: Gerald Sharp Photography View images and order prints on-line. TELEPHONE: 020 8599 5070 EMAIL: [email protected] WEBSITE: www.sharpphoto.co.uk PRINTED BY: Printed Solutions Ltd 01494 478870 Except where specifically stated, none of the material in this issue is to be taken as expressing the opinion of the Court of the Company.
    [Show full text]
  • LWD 3-3-4, Employment of Armour 2016
    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Contents Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-4 Employment of Armour 2016 This publication supersedes Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-4, Employment of Armour, 2009. Contents Contents ©This work is copyright. Contents Contents Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour 2016 © Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army) 2016 11 November 2016 Issued by command of Chief of Army MJ Constable Colonel Commandant Combined Arms Training Centre Contents Contents Preface Aim The aim of this publication is to describe the capabilities of armour in order to provide an understanding of their contribution to the comprehensive range of military activities within a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to national security. Level This publication is written for new members of the Army. It provides corps non-specialists with an understanding of the capabilities of the organisation and its raise, train and sustain role. This publication is a useful reference for government and non-government agencies working with the Army. This publication provides application-level doctrine. This is the capstone publication for armour as part of the Land Warfare Doctrine Operations series. This publication describes the employment of this corps. This publication complements Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations and Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics. Detailed tactics, techniques and procedures are provided in the Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Mounted Combat) series. Scope This publication provides
    [Show full text]
  • The Rhodesian Crisis in British and International Politics, 1964
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Birmingham Research Archive, E-theses Repository THE RHODESIAN CRISIS IN BRITISH AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1964-1965 by CARL PETER WATTS A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Historical Studies The University of Birmingham April 2006 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract This thesis uses evidence from British and international archives to examine the events leading up to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965 from the perspectives of Britain, the Old Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and the United States. Two underlying themes run throughout the thesis. First, it argues that although the problem of Rhodesian independence was highly complex, a UDI was by no means inevitable. There were courses of action that were dismissed or remained under explored (especially in Britain, but also in the Old Commonwealth, and the United States), which could have been pursued further and may have prevented a UDI.
    [Show full text]
  • Rifle Divisions on 22Nd June 1941 There Were 15 Rifle Divisions in the Leningrad Military District
    The Actual Strength of all Soviet Land Combat Units in a Deployed (D) State on 22nd June 1941 Part IV 6 The Leningrad Military District (Northern Front from 24th June 1941) In this section we will focus on the actual manpower and equipment strength of the land combat units deployed in the Leningrad Military District on 22nd June 1941. We will examine the strength of the individual combat units and reconcile this with the actual strength in the whole of the military district. Rifle Divisions On 22nd June 1941 there were 15 rifle divisions in the Leningrad Military District. On 1st June 1941 the average personnel strength in these divisions was 11 985 men, or 83% of the wartime authorised TOE.1 In terms of personnel this made the rifle divisions in this district the strongest of any in the Western Military Districts when the Germans attacked. Three of the 15 rifle divisions (the 237th, 177th and 191st) were new and in the process of forming. The average strength of the 12 older established divisions was over 13 100 men, which made them close to full strength. Perhaps the Soviets maintained these divisions at higher than average strength due to the recent hostilities with Finland. Table Len MD Divs 1 shows the actual strength of the rifle divisions in the Leningrad Military District on 22nd June 1941. Most of the rifle divisions were well established divisions with six formed before 1939, five formed in 1939, one in 1940 and three in 1941. The average rifle division in the Leningrad Military District on 22nd June 1941 had an inventory containing: up to or over 100% of their authorised MGs and mortars, around 93% of their authorised AT guns, 73-89% of their authorised light artillery and infantry guns (76mm), 78-102% of their authorised medium to heavy artillery, and all their authorised heavy AA guns.
    [Show full text]
  • Brazilian Tanks British Tanks Canadian Tanks Chinese Tanks
    Tanks TANKS Brazilian Tanks British Tanks Canadian Tanks Chinese Tanks Croatian Tanks Czech Tanks Egyptian Tanks French Tanks German Tanks Indian Tanks Iranian Tanks Iraqi Tanks Israeli Tanks Italian Tanks Japanese Tanks Jordanian Tanks North Korean Tanks Pakistani Tanks Polish Tanks Romanian Tanks Russian Tanks Slovakian Tanks South African Tanks South Korean Tanks Spanish Tanks Swedish Tanks Swiss Tanks Ukrainian Tanks US Tanks file:///E/My%20Webs/tanks/tanks_2.html[3/22/2020 3:58:21 PM] Tanks Yugoslavian Tanks file:///E/My%20Webs/tanks/tanks_2.html[3/22/2020 3:58:21 PM] Brazilian Tanks EE-T1 Osorio Notes: In 1982, Engesa began the development of the EE-T1 main battle tank, and by 1985, it was ready for the world marketplace. The Engesa EE-T1 Osorio was a surprising development for Brazil – a tank that, while not in the class of the latest tanks of the time, one that was far above the league of the typical third-world offerings. In design, it was similar to many tanks of the time; this was not surprising, since Engesa had a lot of help from West German, British and French armor experts. The EE-T1 was very promising – an excellent design that several countries were very interested in. The Saudis in particular went as far as to place a pre- order of 318 for the Osorio. That deal, however, was essentially killed when the Saudis saw the incredible performance of the M-1 Abrams and the British Challenger, and they literally cancelled the Osorio order at the last moment. This resulted in the cancellation of demonstrations to other countries, the demise of Engesa, and with it a promising medium tank.
    [Show full text]
  • Cavalry: an Optimized Capability for Ado
    CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO Maj R.M.R. Morin JCSP 41 PCEMI 41 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 41 – PCEMI 41 2014 – 2015 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO Maj R.M.R. Morin “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • M. Philippe Gros Research Fellow Fondation Pour La Recherche Stratégique 27 Rue Damesme, 75013 Paris
    M. Philippe Gros Research Fellow Fondation pour la recherche stratégique 27 rue Damesme, 75013 Paris July 27th, 2011 NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE FRENCH CASE STUDY This case study 1 proposes an overview of the conceptual background and the various information and communication programs implementing in France the network-centric or network-enabled operations. It does not develop the basic tenets of the NCW concept, assuming it has been extensively covered by existing literature. Executive Summary The French armed forces, as British and other European forces, followed the trend initiated by the US to exploit the new information technologies in order to enhance dramatically the operational effectiveness. From a conceptual standpoint, the French concepts of “infovalorisation ” and “ opérations en réseaux ” (OR), are close to UK NEC concept, that is a networking supporting the control of effects. French share the intellectual foundations of Adm Cebrowski’s NCW (shared awareness leading to self-synchronisation leading to a leap in operational effectiveness). Nevertheless, while OR constitute a pillar of the French approach to transformation, their implementation are not seen as a tremendous revolution in warfare. The OR are enabled at the joint level by several key communication systems, notably the Syracuse satellite communication system and new software radios programs. Regarding information systems, French joint strategic and operational level HQs used the SICA since the last decade. This system is currently transforming Around 5 years behind the US Army, the French Army launched in 1999 its own program of digitisation, the numérisation de l’espace de bataille (NEB). NEB is allowed by the Army signal architecture including RITA 2G communication network and PR4G radio system.
    [Show full text]
  • Defense at the Forward Edge of the Battle Or Rather in the Depth? Different Approaches to Implement NATO’S Operation Plans by the Alliance Partners, 1955-1988
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 15, ISSUE 3, 2014 Studies Defense at the Forward Edge of the Battle or rather in the Depth? Different approaches to implement NATO’s operation plans by the alliance partners, 1955-1988 LTC Helmut R. Hammerich Military historians love studying battles. For this purpose, they evaluate operation plans and analyze how these plans were executed on the battlefield. The battle history of the Cold War focuses first and foremost on the planning for the nuclear clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although between 1945 and 1989-90 the world saw countless hot wars on the periphery of the Cold War, the “Cold World War,” as the German historian Jost Dülffer termed it, is best examined through the operational plans of the military alliances for what would have been World War Three. To conduct such an analysis we must consider Total War under nuclear conditions. Analyzing the war planning, however, is far from easy. The main difficulty lies in access to the files. The records of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO are still largely classified and therefore relatively inaccessible. Nor is access to the archives in Moscow two decades after glasnost and perestroika at all encouraging. At the request of historians, NATO has begun to declassify some of its key documents. Nonetheless, the specific details of the nuclear operational planning will continue to remain inaccessible to historians for the foreseeable future. As an alternative, historians then are forced to rely on collateral documents in the various national archives or on the compilations of ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2014 ISSN : 1488-559X VOLUME 15, ISSUE 3, 2014 diverse oral history projects.
    [Show full text]