WAITING FOR THE 'G' A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH CAVALRY ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1915-18 b~ MAJOR RICHARD L. BOWES A thesis submitted to the War Studies Cornmittee of the Royal hlilitary College of Canada in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Royal MSîtary Coliege of Canada Kingston, Ontario 20 May 2000 Copyright Q Richard Bowes, 2000 National Libfary Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 WeUington çtieet 395. nie Wellington Ottawa ON KtAON4 OîîawaON KlAûN4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Lïbmy of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, districbute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la fome de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othexwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. 1 would like to acknowledge rny indebtedness to the many personalities who supported and assisted me in the writing of this thesis. Of course, 1 would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Ron Haycock, who graciously took time out of his busy schedule as Dean of Arts at the Royal Military College of Canada to take on the extra responsibility of providing me with guidance and support throughout the research and writing phases of my journey. His wise counsel allowed me to refine and confii my compass bearing as 1 waded through the vast historiography of the First World War. 1 would also like to thank rny good friend Major Tom Putt (LdSH(RC)) for helping me to define a topic for my thesis. His perception that most of the published history of the war was writren from either the point of view of the trench or, conversely, frorn the perspective of the highest levels of command led me to conclude that there was still much to be examined and said about the conduct of the war on the Western Front especially at the brigade, division, and corps levels. In addition, 1 would also iike to thank a nurnber of other serving officers in the Canadian Forces who either dlowed me a considerable amount of time away from the coal face in order to permit me to properiy conduct my research and subsequently write the thesis, or were kind enough to review the final draft of the thesis and provide sage advice prïor to my defence: Colonel Jim Cdvin (PPCLI),Commander Harry Harsc h (Canadian Nav y ), Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Lessard (R22eR), Major Mike Minor (PPCLI), Captain Rick Harvie (Intelligence), Captain John Reiffenstein (PPCLI), Captain John Grodzinski (LdSH(RC)), and Captain Helga Grodunski (Logistics). 1 would be remiss if 1 did not thank Mr. Serge Campion, Chief Librarian of the Canadian Land Force Command and StafT College, whose landness and patience were tested to the limit with my constant requests for loan of rare sources and my sometimes tardy rem of such materials. His support was invaluable to the completion of this thesis. In the same vein. 1 would Iike to thank the helpful staff al the National Archives of Canada. Stauffer Library at Queen's University Kingston, and Massey Library at the Royal Miiitary CoIlege. Finally, and most importantly, ths entire undertalcmg would not have been possible without the continuing love and support of my wife Lise, and my two daughters Amelia and Faith. The many hours 1spent away from them I am sure made them feel like they, in fact, were the last casualties to be inflicted on the Western Front. To them and for them 1 am eternall y pteful. ABSTRACT This thesis aims to dispel the myth surrounding the perceived inability of the British cavalry to achieve a breakthrough on the Western front fiom 19 15 to 19 18. It demonsmes that within the context of the British efforts to achieve a brealahrough, the cavairy was not an obsolete amof the British Anny. By contrast, at least in intent, the cavalry was a vital component toward achieving a breakthrough because it was, despite its technological limitations, the only truiy mobile arm. In order to illusrrate and substantiate this assertion, the thesis examines three occasions (The Somme: July 14~.19 16: Cambrai: November 20&-21 ", 19 17; and Amiens: August srn. 19 18) on the Western Front when, in the conduct of the offensive, British forces succeeded in creating a gap in the German iine through which the British cavahy could have debauched and exploited the British success through a deep drive into the German rear areas. However, on all three occasions the cavalry could not achieve a breakthrough because of factors or conditions beyond its conûol. Those conditions had to do with the requirement to maintain a high degree of tempo throughout the whole of the offensive. As is demonsmted on ail three occasions, the maintenance of a high degree of tempo was necessary in order to be able to create the gap in the enemy's defences, and then break the cavalry through in order to conduct the exploitation phase deep in the enemy' s rear al1 in a tirne less than it took the enemy to bring up his reserves. In essence, the maintenance of tempo depended on a dexenmlkd command philosophy, on staff coordination, on d-arms cooperation, and on reliable communications. Unfortunately, in al1 the offensives Iaunched by the British on the Western Front during the war, and particularly during the offensives examineci in this thesis, these conditions were never fully met. Fially, the thesis concludes that contmry to the prevailing mytb in the historiography of the war surromding the perceived obsolescence of the cavalry, the cavalry, to the contrary, was really the Q& amwith the sense and means of mobiiity to achieve and sustain a bmdahrough should it have occmed. The cavairy's lack of success, therefore, was not to do with the capabilities and limitations of the arm itself, but rather with the inability of comrnanders, staffs, and the other anns of the British Anny to rapidly adapt and take advantage of the fleeting opportunities for mobile warfare. The reason 1 they could not achieve and sustain a breakthrough was not because the cavairy was obsolete, but because the above stated conditions necessary for the maintenance of a high degree of ternpo were never MyreaLzed in any of the offensives. FOREWORD The original ahof this thesis was to chronicle the operations of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade on the Western Front during the First World War. The idea came from the discovery or recognition chat comparatively little of the histonography of the war had to do with the histories of the various formations that fought and bled on the Western Front during those four long years. Most pubiished works either examine the experience of the war from the point of view of the man in the trenches; the 'Everyman at War' perspective of historical scholarship, or examine the conduct and direction of the war at the highest levels of military command such as the plethora of works that have attempted, and re-attempted, to ravage the reptational corpse of Fieid-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. In particular, very little attention has been paid to the various cavalry formations that continue4 throughout most of the four years of the smiggle, to remain a part of the British order of battle on the Western Front. Indeed, there is not, to this &y, a published history of any kind of the Canadian Cavairy Brigade while the history of the Canadian Corps, the other principal manoeuvre formation fielded by Canada during the war, has been examined and wrinen about to some depth especially in recent years. Therefore, 1 thought that writing a history of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade would be an interesting and original contribution to the historiography of the Canadian war effort. However, as my research progressed, a number of questions began to form in my mind. First, it became obvious to me that in much of the historiography of the British effort on the Western Front the role of the cavairy is easily dismissed as being obsolete especially with the advent of the tank in the latter years of the war. But given the accual conduct of the war and the fact that the British could never achieve a breakthrough and subsequent exploitation against the Germans, is it valid to assume or conclude that the cavalry's place on the battlefield of the Western Front had become archaic? Indeed, if the cavairy had become obsolete, what arrn or capability had replaced it especially with regard to the conduct of the breakthrough and exploitation? Furthermorc, if the cavairy still had a role to play with regard to the breakxhrough and exploitation, why was it unable to cmy out this roIe during any of the British offensives on the Western Front? As these and other questions fonned in my mind 1 came to the realization that a thesis examining the role of the British cavairy on the Western Front might constitute a much more interesting and much more significant contribution to the historiopphy of the war. Hence, the focus of this thesis was adjusted accordingly.