NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE THE QUEST FOR MANOEUVRE THE ENGLISH MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES AND BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT 1920–1991. Thesis Major Juha Mälkki General Staff Officer Course 49 Army June 2002 ii THE QUEST FOR MANOEUVRE THE ENGLISH MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES AND BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT 1920–1991. 1 MODERN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORICAL THEORIES 1 1.1 Definition of Concepts 5 1.2 Sources, Hypotheses and Questions 9 1.3 The Duality Within the Western Military Thought 16 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD 20 2.1 Two Apostles of Armoured Warfare 25 2.2 The Tactical Level Thoughts 33 2.3 The Strategic Level Ideas 38 2.4 Psychological Factors Inside the Tactical and Strategic Level Considerations 42 3 THE PROCESS OF THE BRITISH ARMY MECHANISATION AND ITS FOREIGN “COMPETITORS” UNTIL THE SECOND WORLD WAR 45 3.1 The Triumph of Mobile Firepower during the 1920s 48 3.2 The Prospering Tactical Ideas and the Mechanisation Process during the 1930s 53 3.3 The Simultaneous Development of Armoured Warfare Ideas in Other Countries: Some Observations 59 4 THE SECOND WORLD WAR – THE FOCAL TRAITS OF THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE 64 4.1 The Policy of Limited Liability – The Way to Dunkirk? 67 4.2 British Army Implications of Manoeuvre Warfare During The First Years of War 71 4.3 British Respond to the Threat of Deutsches Africa Korps – Montgomery of Alamein 77 iii 4.3 Operation Market-Garden – An Application of Indirect Approach? 84 4.4 The Features of the “British Fashion of War” During the Second World War 88 4 THE NUCLEAR ERA AND THE CHALLENGED OF THE NATO DEFENCE 93 5.1 The Final Form of Liddell Hart’s Ideas 98 5.2 Nuclear Weapons and New Demands on Mobility 103 5.3 New Ideas in Conventional Warfare 112 6 THE REBIRTH OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES 118 6.1 The Concept of Air Land Battle Doctrine – The American Way in Warfare? 121 6.2 NATO’s Doctrine of Follow-On-Forces Attack 126 6.3 The First British Army Doctrine During the Year 1989 131 6.4 The Gulf War - Land Campaign and the Need of Adaptability 134 6.5 Manoeuvre Warfare Ideas and the Weight of History 140 7 CONCLUSIONS: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORIES AND THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE 142 BIBLIOGRAPHY 148 APPENDICES 162 iv GLOSSARY BAOR British Army of the Rhine CBAA Cavalry Brigade, Air Attack CENTAG Central Army Group (NATO) CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CINC Commander-in-Chief FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area FLOT Forward Line of Troops JRUSI Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (From June 1971, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies). NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical NORTHAG Nothern Army Group (NATO) RAF the Royal Air Forces RTC the Royal Tank Corps RUSI or R. U. S. I., Royal United Service Institution (From June 1971, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies). TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command OODA Observation-orientation-decision-action –cycle (OODA loop) ROAD Reorganization Objective, Army Divisions WW I First World War WW II Second World War v APPENDICES Appendix 1 Affecting Parametres to the British Army Organisations and the Art of War Appendix 2 The Comparison of Liddell Hart’s and Fuller’s New Model Division Appendix 3 The Experiments with the Organisation of Armoured Division Appendix 4 Two Applications of Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach Appendix 5 Different Adaptations of Manoeuvre Warfare Theories in Norhern Africa from the Late 1940s Until the Late Late 1942 Appendix 6 Main Lessons of the Battle of El Alamein Appendix 7 Field Marshal B. Montgomery’s Plan for Operation Market - Garden; September 1944 Appendix 8 Extracts from the British Postwar Organisational Ideas Appendix 9 Major-General H. E. Pyman's Concept of the Future Methods of Nato Defence in Europe (1954) Appendix 10 The Idea of Deep Strikes Against Advanding Soviet Echelons (Air Land Battle -doctrine) Appendix 11 Ideas of NATO Defence During the 1980s Appendix 12 The Gulf War in the Early 1990s 1 1 MODERN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORICAL THEORIES “Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.” Michael Howard, 1974 What is the actual reason in trying to gather information from such a wide sphere of military action, even thought each age has its own strategic thought and “a man must be judged by the conditions and tools of his time”. The strategies of 1806, 1914 and 1939 were products of their own time. They were amalgamated with a varying degree of success to use and respond to the economic, social, technological and political conditions.1 Naturally, the napoleonic era had in broad outlines specific battlefield conditions and armament technology. The muzzle- loading flintlock musket was the principal infantry weapon in the mid-nineteenth century. By 1870, the breech-loading rifle had become the standard infantry weapon. In addition, significant alteration had occured within the areas of strategy and tactics. According to Paul Dyster, military innovations have inspired vigorous effects at counter-adaptation. There is no doubt that antitank weapons from guns to missiles have changed the methods of battle. Whether one single technological innovation constitutes a revolution in wafare, is a matter of disagreement. Rather perhaps, as suggested by Dyster, “the revolution comes to fruition only when complementary organisational and doctrinal forms evolve that allow maxium expression of the military virtues of the new technology.” And this naturally takes time.2 The relationship between inspiration and influence, as evaluated by Peter Paret, is a matter of my interest. “Inspiration derives from the suggestive quality of the past”, which may stimulate and extend our thinking about the past. Influence, on the other hand, must “connote a degree of specifity”.3 According to Richard E. Simpkin, the twentieth century contained two intesive periods of military innovations in mobility and in military theories. The first period included the discoveries of the powered wheel, track and wing during the early twentieth century. The 1 Paret, Peter (1990a): Napoleon and the Revolution in War. In Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, p. 141. 2 Dyster, Paul A.: In the Wake of the Tank: the twentieth-century evolution of the Theory of Armoured Warfare. A dessertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 1984, p. 544. 3 Paret (1990a), p. 140. 2 second contained the discovery of the rotary wing aircraft during the early second half of the twentieth century.4 I consider any inspirations and influences within the area of the art of war interrelated, as they greatly depend on one other. The battles fought in history must be treated as a unique chain of events. Still, there is always influence, ideas and exceptional and inspirational brainwork, which have produced occurrences and new innovations. Naturally, I tried to avoid any quotations from the past, which should be kept strictly in their original context and where I could not find any coherent continuation of military thought. I understand the idea of doctrine according to modern British definition as “the function of the Military Doctrine is to establish the framework of understanding of the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application”.5 It is a substitute for thought and a common background for training. More detailed, but also viable determination is given by I. B. Holley’s definition. He specified that the doctrine is a generalization of intellectual process. This means the combination of recorded experiences and further analysed data. Therefore, doctrine is what is officially taught, and a combination of theory and practice. It is an authorative rule, a precept. Although I am investigating both military thinking and the doctrines, I do not consider them to be synonymous. Military thought has more to do with people, and the doctrines with institutional basis. It became clear to me that Britain lacked a clear and suitable doctrine almost throughout the whole twentieth century. Therefore, I decided to use the word doctrine very carefully, because it might cause some unnecessary misunderstanding. Doctrines can be based upon different laws or theories. Nevertheless, no theory can or should reach the standards of “hard” mathematical science, but it can reach the standards of social and political science with ease.6 Hence, as Thomas Edward (T. E.) Lawrence pointed out, nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books. The irrational tenth is the test of the generals.7 Obviously, the art of war should be studied in a scientific way.8 Michael Howard 4 Simpkin, Richard: The Heavy Force/ Light Force Mix-Up. In Armor, number 4, vol XCIV. July - August 1985, p. 9. Brigadier Simpkin had an extensive responsibility for armoured vehicle development during his long career with the British Army. 5 Design for operations – the British military doctrine (1989). Army Code No 71451. Printed in the United Kingdom for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, p. 3; Design for operations - British military doctrine (1996), Army Code No 71451. 6 Lind, William S.: The Theory and Practice of Maneuver Warfare. In Maneuver Warfare. An Anthology. Edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Novato CA 1993, p. 3. 7 T. E. Lawrence (from The Evolution of a Revolt) in the Sword and the Pen. Selections from the world’s greatest military writings. Edited by Adrian Liddell Hart, prepared by Sir Basil Liddell Har. Cassell & Company limited 1976, p. 243. 8 Lider, Julian: Towards a Nuclear Doctrine. Essays on British military thought 2. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.