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UNIVERSITY OF READING British Defence Planning and Britain’s NATO commitment, 1979 – 1985 PhD Graduate Institute of Politics and International Studies Kenton White October 2016 Declaration I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged. Kenton White Acknowledgements I began my thesis to the sound of several respectable academics – leaders in their fields – telling me to do a different subject. I was told either to concentrate on statistics, or to look at the development of doctrine. I chose to do neither, and without the financial support of any charity, agency or other organisation, ploughed what was at times a lonely furrow. Despite the isolation, several people actively encouraged and helped me in my endeavours. I would like to thank those people who have helped me complete this work: Jane Greaves from Milton Keynes Library and Kevin Chambers from the National Archives in Kew were instrumental in finding and providing me with the source information for my research. The academic staff at the University of Reading. I had an outstanding mentor in Colin Gray who was wise enough to leave me to my own devices when necessary, and kind enough to answer some particularly stupid questions with equanimity. Geoffrey Sloane, Alan Renwick, Jonathan Golub, Catriona McKinnon and Adam Humphries have all influenced my work. My examiners, Beatrice Heuser and John Baylis were kind enough to complement the finished thesis – their words, and those of Colin Gray, persuading me that perhaps the effort had been worth it. The Armed Forces. Without the unstinting support of the following people, so much of this thesis would have remained unresearched: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Whitchurch MBE RE, Colonel Mike Crawshaw OBE, Major General Mungo Melvin CB OBE MA, Captain Dr David Reindorp RN, Major Michael Tickner and Air Vice Marshal Michael Harwood CB CBE MA Finally, my family provided me with not only psychological and physical support, but the time and space to enable me to work on what must have appeared to them to be something of a folly. Thank you Joel, Nathan, Christian, James, Elizabeth and William. To my wife, Rhona, without whom none of this would have been possible, thank you for your love and support. Abstract In 1979 Britain committed almost 120,000 ground troops and almost the entire Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to NATO’s defence of Western Europe. 100,000 troops were assigned to Home Defence, and Britain would acts as a staging post for foreign troops on their way to the front. Did Britain really have the means to mobilise, transport and supply these forces, and defend itself, in the event of war? This is an analysis of the conventional defence planning of the UK, its relationship to the policy, and their possible and actual execution. Deterrent plans were aimed at the perceived threat: planning for the manifestation of that threat, and implementing those plans, is analysed in detail. These plans relate intimately to NATO's "Flexible Response" strategy and the desire to raise the nuclear threshold enabling NATO to stop a WTO attack by conventional means. Analysing the plans for mobilisation, and comparing them to the forces and facilities available, this thesis seeks to understand if the UK fulfilled its obligation, not only to NATO, but also to the Armed Forces and British public. Following the end of the Cold War, the idea the ‘teeth’ could be sharpened at the expense of the ‘tail’ persisted, and has now grown to dangerous proportions. Pursuing the ‘efficiency’ thread the Armed Forces have been cut to the smallest level for 100 years, yet asked to do more. There is a large group, both military and political, who believe the policy worked and caused the fall of the Soviet Union. This thinking persists in policy even after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the increasing tensions in Eastern Europe and the Pacific, Page 1 and the British Armed Forces at their smallest for over a century, this post hoc analysis is dangerous. Page 2 British Defence Planning and Britain’s NATO commitment, 1979 – 1985 Planning, Practice and Policy. Page 3 Table of Contents CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 8 The Research ............................................................................................................................................ 10 The Context .............................................................................................................................................. 27 Conventional Deterrence ......................................................................................................................... 31 Previous Research .................................................................................................................................... 34 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 38 CHAPTER 2 - THREAT ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................... 39 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 40 1957 to 1967 ............................................................................................................................................ 44 1967 to 1978 ............................................................................................................................................ 46 1979 and beyond ...................................................................................................................................... 49 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 60 CHAPTER 3 - NATO POLICY ........................................................................................................ 62 Background .............................................................................................................................................. 63 NATO’s Politico-Military Structure ........................................................................................................... 66 NATO Strategy and the Force Planning ..................................................................................................... 68 Force Proposals and Force Goals .............................................................................................................. 70 Infrastructure and Facilities ...................................................................................................................... 72 Corrective Initiatives ................................................................................................................................ 73 Balance in NATO ....................................................................................................................................... 81 Defining Britain’s Commitment to NATO .................................................................................................. 85 The Original Commitment ........................................................................................................................ 86 Page 4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 90 CHAPTER 4 - BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY ..................................................................................... 93 Background .............................................................................................................................................. 94 The Politics of British Defence ................................................................................................................ 100 The Financial Constraints........................................................................................................................ 109 Influences on Policy ................................................................................................................................ 120 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 137 CHAPTER 5 - PLANNING .......................................................................................................... 142 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 143 The War Book ......................................................................................................................................... 144 NATO Alert System ................................................................................................................................. 145 British Planning - Transition to War ........................................................................................................ 147 Crises, Timescales and Scenarios ............................................................................................................ 150 Home Defence ........................................................................................................................................ 157 Surprise Attack