For the study of Liberal, SDP and Issue 72 / Autumn 2011 / £10.00 Liberal Democrat history

Journal of LiberalHI ST O R Y

Liberals in coalition Vernon Bogdanor Riding the tiger The Liberal experience of Ian Cawood A ‘distinction without a difference’? Liberal Unionists and Conservatives Kenneth O. Morgan Liberals in coalition, 1916–1922 David Dutton and the National Government, 1931–1940 Matt Cole ‘Be careful what you wish for’ Lessons of the Lib–Lab Pact Liberal Democrat History Group group

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2 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 new bookFor fromdetails, t see back page Journal of Liberal History Issue 72: Autumn 2011 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. ISSN 1479-9642 Riding the tiger: the Liberal experience of 4 Editor: Duncan Brack coalition government Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl Assistant Editor: Siobhan Vitelli Vernon Bogdanor introduces this special issue of the Journal Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Coalition before 1886 10 Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, Membery Whigs, and Liberals: Angus Hawkins examines coalitions before 1886

Patrons A ‘distinction without a difference’? 14 Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; Ian Cawood analyses how the Liberal Unionists maintained a distinctive Professor John Vincent identity from their Conservative allies, until coalition in 1895

Editorial Board The coalition of 1915–1916 26 Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr Barry Doyle; Prelude to disaster: Ian Packer examines the Asquith coalition of 1915–16, Dr David Dutton; Prof. David Gowland; Prof. Richard which brought to an end the last solely Liberal government Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; Dr J. Graham Jones; Dr Tudor Jones; Tony Little; Prof. Ian Machin; Dr ; Dr Ian Packer; Dr John Powell; Ed Randall; Liberals in coalition, 1916–1922 32 Jaime Reynolds; Dr Andrew Russell; Dr Iain Sharpe Kenneth O. Morgan analyses the history of the last Liberal–Conservative coalition government Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and Liberalism and the National Government, 1931–40 38 book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed David Dutton examines the impact of the National Government on the Liberal publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to: Party

Duncan Brack (Editor) 54 Midmoor Road, SW12 0EN Crisis, coalition and cuts 44 email: [email protected] Peter Sloman draws parallels between the formation of the coalition governments in 1931 and 2010 All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History.

Advertisements Coalition in the archives 52 Full page £100; half page £60; quarter page £35. Nick White uses the papers of Liberal activist Frances Josephy to examine the Discounts available for repeat ads or offers to readers attitudes of ordinary Liberals to coalitions in the 1920s and 1930s (e.g. discounted book prices). To place ads, please contact the Editor. ‘Be careful what you wish for’ 58 The lessons of the Lib–Lab Pact for the Lib–Con coalition; by Matt Cole Subscriptions/Membership An annual subscription to the Journal of Liberal History costs £20.00 (£12.50 unwaged rate). This includes The history of the ‘triple lock’ 64 membership of the History Group unless you inform Where it came from, how it worked and its future; by Mark Pack us otherwise. Non-UK subscribers should add £5.00.

The institutional rate is £50.00, which includes online Reviews 69 access. As well as printed copies, online subscribers Donoughue, Diaries Volume Two: with in are able to access online copies of current and all past Number 10, reviewed by Archy Kirkwood; Bogdanor, The Coalition and the Journals. Online subscriptions are also available to Constitution, reviewed by Julie Smith group individuals at £40.00. Cheques (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) should be sent to:

Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; history email: [email protected] e Payment is also possible via our website, Liberal Democrat History Group www.liberalhistory.org.uk. h The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of topics relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone Group organises discussion meetings and produces the Journal of Liberal History and other Published by the Liberal Democrat History Group, occasional publications. c/o 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues Printed by Kall-Kwik, of the Journal, and archive and other research sources, see our website at: 18 Colville Road, London W3 8BL www.liberalhistory.org.uk. September 2011 Chair: Tony Little Honorary President: Lord Wallace of Saltaire new bookFor fromdetails, t see back page Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 3 Riding the Tiger the Liberal experience of coalition government ‘There was a young lady of Riga Who smiled as she rode on a tiger; They returned from the ride With the lady inside, And the smile on the face of the tiger.’ Coalitions between unequal partners can end up like the relationship between the tiger and the young lady of Riga. In March 2011 the Liberal Democrat History Group and British Liberal Political he story begins with Britain] does not love coalitions.’ Studies Group organised Disraeli’s famous com- But whether or Britain ment in the House does or does not love coalitions, two seminars to learn of Commons on 16 we have had three peacetime from the Liberal December 1852, in the coalitions in the last 120 years: Tmidst of a thunderstorm, in which the 1895 coalition between the experience of coalition he said this: Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists; the Lloyd George coali- The combination may be success- governments. Vernon tion between the Conservatives and ful, a coalition has before this been one wing of the Liberal Party; and successful, but coalitions, though Bogdanor introduces the National Government of 1931. successful, have always found All have been coalitions between this special issue, this – that their triumph has been Conservatives and Liberals, or brief. containing papers from between Conservatives and one ‘This, too, I know,’ he concluded, wing of the Liberal Party. In the the seminars. ‘that England [he meant, I suppose, case of the Lloyd George coalition

4 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 Riding the Tiger the Liberal experience of coalition government

and the National Government, and the past three: the 2010 coali- In the current, coalition, if the there were also other small par- tion is the only one that occurred Liberal Democrats were to decide ties involved. But there have been after a . After the to leave the government, there does no coalitions between the Liberals 1895, 1918 and 1931 elections, the not, admittedly, in consequence of and the Labour Party, although the Conservatives, had they wished to the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, Liberals have supported Labour do so, could have governed with- have to be a general election. But governments from the outside – in out the support of any other party. there would be a different sort of what would now be called a confi- Clearly, after 2010, that could not government – either a Conservative dence and supply agreement – in the have been the case. But, after previ- minority government or, possibly, a 1929 Labour government and, with ous hung parliaments, including the coalition of the left. That, of course, the Lib–Lab pact of 1977–78, the next most recent, in February 1974, makes it easier for the Liberal Callaghan government. the outcome was not coalition but Democrats to leave the coalition. There is, however, a fundamen- minority government. The fact that If the three previous coalitions tal difference between the three the 2010 coalition was, as it were, did not owe their existence to a previous peacetime coalitions and a coalition of necessity, alters its hung parliament, to what did they the present one. It is that the past dynamics very considerably. In pre- owe their existence? If one had to three coalitions were formed before vious coalitions the non-Conserv- grossly oversimplify and answer general elections and endorsed by ative elements were expendable. In in one word, that word would be the electorate in those general elec- 1918, , the Conservative ‘fear’. In 1895, the fear was of Irish tions – by landslide majorities, in leader, told his followers: , which many otherwise fact. They were not, as the current intelligent people felt would mean by our own action we have made coalition has been, formed after a the disintegration of the United Mr Lloyd George the flag-bearer general election. In 1895, 1918 and Kingdom, and a surrender to ter- of the very principles on which 1931, governments went to the rorism and violence. The 1895 coa- we should appeal to the country. It country as coalitions and electors lition was founded on a negative is not his Liberal friends, it is the knew that they were voting for a proposition concerning home rule; Unionist Party which has made coalition. In 2010, the voters did not as soon as the coalition had to con- him prime minister and made it vote for a coalition and had to guess sider a positive policy, tariff reform, possible for him to do the great what coalition might ensue in the it began to disintegrate. work that has been done by this event of a hung parliament. Many In 1918, there was a positive government.1 guessed wrong, including The element as well as a negative – to Guardian, which advocated a vote But, if the Conservatives could create a new world after the First for the Liberal Democrats to create make Mr Lloyd George, they could World War, with a new alignment a progressive coalition of the left. also break him, as in fact they did Left: David of parties in a society in which This is important since it means that in 1922. Similarly, after 1932, the Cameron and the old issues – church disestab- the 2010 coalition lacks the legiti- Conservatives could have got rid of at lishment, , home rule, macy of the past three peacetime Ramsay MacDonald, but decided the formation etc. – had disappeared. But there coalitions. to keep him as a fig leaf to cover up of the coalition was also a negative element – fear There is a further interesting what might otherwise appear as a government, of the trade unions, fear of a gen- difference between this coalition nakedly Conservative government. May 2010 eral strike, and, above all, fear of

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 5 riding the tiger: the liberal experience of coalition government

‘Bolshevism’, sometimes equated, It was this element of fear that It was this personalities, and were in large part odd though it may seem today, with helped the Conservatives in 1895, responsible for breaking up the coa- the Labour Party. But, following 1918 and 1931, because, of course, element of litions in which they were domi- the Russian revolution in 1917, and when people are frightened, they nant. In Baldwin’s famous words, Communist uprisings in many of tend to vote Conservative. Indeed, fear that used at the meeting in the countries of central and eastern the Conservatives have benefited 1922, Lloyd George was a ‘dynamic Europe, there was a feeling, how- more than Liberals from coalitions. helped the force’ and a dynamic force was ‘a ever, misplaced, amongst mem- The Conservatives might well have very terrible thing’. There is a strik- bers of the governing class, few of won the elections of 1895, 1918 Conserva- ing contrast with Baldwin him- whom had any close understanding and 1931 even without their coali- self, who, as leader of the National or knowledge of the labour move- tion partners, but their partners tives in 1895, Government in the 1930s proved an ment, that Britain too might be on strengthened them, enabling them 1918 and 1931, emollient figure capable of holding the brink of revolution, and that to win seats in areas that were not the disparate elements of a coalition the forces of order should combine naturally Conservative. because, of together. A coalition does better together to defeat this threat. In As late as 1965, , who with an emollient head of govern- February 1920, the Deputy Cabinet was to become a minister in the course, when ment rather than a dynamic one. Secretary, Thomas Jones, recorded governments of and The Liberal Democrats hope that a meeting of Lloyd George with , came to be: people are the 2010 coalition will institutional- his advisers at which the Home ise recognition of a multi-party pol- selected as the National Liberal Secretary ‘outlined his proposals itics in which they can play a hinge and Conservative candidate for St frightened, to raise a special temporary force role, as the Free Democrats used to Ives – not the Conservative candi- of 10,000 soldiers for the national they tend do in Germany. But previous coali- date. I was told by the local associ- emergency’, the existing police tions proved to be a prelude, not to ation that St Ives could not be won force being inadequate. ‘There are’, to vote Con- multi-party politics, but to realign- by a Conservative – but that as the the Food Controller insisted, ‘large ment and the restoration of a new National Liberals had supported groups preparing for Soviet gov- servative. two-party system of a different sort, the Conservatives and had done so ernment’. Walter Long, the First helping primarily the Conservative since 1931, I should not fret about Lord of the Admiralty, was wor- Indeed, the Party. In 1975, the label. ried that ‘The peaceable manpower declared, perhaps with tongue in of the country is without arms. I Nott did not drop the National Conserva- cheek: have not a pistol less than 200 years Liberal label until the general The last purely Conservative old’. Bonar Law, the Conservative election of 1974, even though the tives have government was formed by Mr leader, summed up the discussion party wound itself up in 1968. The benefited Disraeli in 1874. It is the fact that saying that ‘All weapons ought to accumulated funds of the party, we have attracted moderate peo- be available for distribution to the amounting to £50,000 were then more than ple of a liberal disposition and friends of the Government’. Sir given to the Conservatives ‘who, of thought into our ranks which Auckland Geddes, the President course, blew it in an afternoon on Liberals from makes it possible to maintain a of the Board of Trade, ‘pointed to some futile advertising campaign’.3 Conservative government today.4 the universities as full of trained It was useful for the coalitions. men who could co-operate with Conservatives to have the sup- Coalitions have been of much less clerks and stockbrokers. (During port of Liberals and other group- benefit to the Liberals. Indeed, the the discussion Bonar Law so often ings because it gave them a national Liberals entered each of the three referred to the stockbrokers as a appeal over and above their purely peacetime coalitions as a disunited loyal and fighting class until one party appeal. And the landslide vic- party. The coalition of 1895 was felt that potential battalions of tories of 1918 and 1931 were assisted a product of Liberal disunion; the stockbrokers were to be found in by the fact that the coalitions were coalition of 1918 caused Liberal dis- every town.)’2 Perhaps the bankers led by non-Conservatives with union; while the coalition of 1931 are an equivalent ‘loyal and fight- the implication that their previous widened Liberal disunion. And after ing class’ today. parties – the Liberals in 1918 and two of those coalitions, one wing With regard to the coalition of Labour in 1931 – were irresponsi- of the Liberal Party came to merge 1931, it is easy to underestimate the ble and could not be trusted with with the Conservatives: the Liberal element of panic at the possibility power. The 1895 coalition was, of Unionists in 1912, and the Liberal of financial collapse amongst those course, led by a Conservative, Lord Nationals in 1968. The Lloyd who remembered the German infla- Salisbury, but the dominant fig- George Liberals nearly merged tion of 1923. When, in the previous ure in it was a non-Conservative – with the Conservatives, and the Labour Cabinet, Philip Snowden, . Many things Conservatives wanted them to, the Chancellor, was asked what have been said about Chamberlain, but, in the end the Lloyd George would happen if we were pushed off Lloyd George and MacDonald – Liberals decided against it. The the gold standard, he threw his arms some of them not particularly com- Liberal Nationals, who remained in up in despair and replied, ‘The del- plimentary – but one thing never the National Government through- uge.’ During the 1931 election cam- said about them was that they were out the 1930s, were, after the war, paign, Ramsay MacDonald held up Conservatives. They nevertheless called ‘Vichy Liberals’ – traitors worthless German marks and said helped to provide the Conservatives to Liberalism – by Lady Violet that Britain would face the same with landslide majorities. Bonham-Carter, Asquith’s daugh- fate if the National Government Chamberlain and Lloyd ter.5 And when Lord Samuel retired were not returned. George were, however, disruptive as leader of the Liberals in the

6 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 riding the tiger: the liberal experience of coalition government

House of Lords in 1955, Lady Violet At the next general election, the candidate, this creates a problem for wrote to him the following enco- Liberal Democrats may face a prob- coalitionists. If a Conservative con- mium, Samuel having preserved lem which has also faced previous stituency association has to choose Liberal independence by leaving the coalitions. How can they maintain between two candidates, one of National Government in 1932: at the hustings the cooperation whom believes that the coalition they had enjoyed in government? ought to be continued, and another Joe Chamberlain became the Can a coalition in government be who believes that the party should mainspring of protection and replicated at the grass roots? In choose a candidate prepared to sup- imperialism. Lloyd George sold 1920, Bonar Law told Balfour, his port ‘real’ Conservative policies on the Liberal Party to the Tories predecessor as Conservative leader, Europe, immigration and crime, in 1918. Such things are possible ‘We cannot go on as we are, that is it is possible that the constituency for so-called ; impossible with a united party in the House association will choose the latter for any Liberal – you, my father, of Commons, but with no such candidate. This is roughly what Edward Grey.6 union in the constituencies.’8 As happened in Conservative constitu- The coalitions of 1918 and 1931 is well known, in 1918 a Coupon ency associations between 1918 and helped to ruin the Liberal Party. was arranged which proved to be, 1922. Liberal Democrat constitu- Kenneth Morgan has argued that as it were, a complimentary ticket ency associations may be faced with the coalition of 1918 destroyed There is, to Westminster: of 322 couponed a similar dilemma, of choosing the Liberals as a party of govern- Conservatives, 294 were elected, between a candidate who favours ment, while the coalition of 1931 however, one and of 159 couponed Liberals, 133 continuation of the coalition and destroyed them as a party of oppo- were elected; but of the Asquithians, another who declares that coalition sition. Will the coalition of 2010 important only twenty-eight were elected. In with the Conservatives is a betrayal destroy the Liberal Democrats as a 1931, there was no centrally directed of the Liberal tradition. third party? difference coupon, but great efforts at local and Local constituency bodies are Both in 1918 and 1931, fears of regional level were made to ensure, autonomous bodies, and the more socialism and Bolshevism drove between as far as possible, that there was only that the parties have developed as the Liberals into the arms of the one National Government candi- membership-based organisations, Conservatives. Coalitions between the Liberal date in each constituency. The main the more constituency parties two unequal parties, as David consequence was to ensure that have come to prize their autonomy Butler has argued, can turn out to Democrat Labour did not win seats through a and to resent interference by their be like the relationship between split in the vote of the parties sup- party leaders. Selecting a candi- the tiger and the young lady of position in porting the National Government. date is the only reward that many Riga.7 Both coalitions confirmed In 1931, the Labour vote did not fall constituency activists have for the the fragmentation of the Liberals the 2010 coa- by very much from its 1929 level – hours of hard work they put in can- and proved to be stages on the lition and the from roughly 33 per cent in 1929 to vassing, addressing envelopes, and way to the development of a two- 30 per cent in 1931 – but, whereas conducting voluntary activity for party system in which the Liberals position of in 1929, Labour had won 123 of its their party. were to have no place. And on 288 seats on a minority vote, in 1931 An electoral pact involving the each occasion the Liberals found the Liberals the Conservative national agents reciprocal withdrawal of candidates it impossible to maintain a secure declared that there was only one cannot be imposed by party leaders identity, and found themselves the in previous constituency where a split in the alone, but must be agreed by local victims of the binary assumptions National vote had prevented the constituency parties. The cri de coeur, which lay behind British politics. coalitions. Conservatives from winning a seat. in the case of the attempt by the Left-leaning Liberals thought that This question of local coopera- Liberals and SDP to form an elec- the Conservatives were the main It is that the tion has always been a fundamen- toral pact in 1982, of a Liberal candi- enemy; right-leaning Liberals – tal problem for a coalition, and the date who was asked to stand down, such as in the 2010 coali- reason is that under the first-past- was this: 1920s and the Simonites in the 1930s the-post system, party headquar- Seven years ago, when I became – regarded Labour as the enemy. tion is the ters cannot impose an electoral prospective parliamentary candi- Proportional representation would pact, because this requires that one date for this constituency, we sold have helped the Liberals, but the only one in of the candidates of the two coali- a home that we all dearly loved to Liberals did not support that until tion parties stands down, and that move into this constituency. Our 1922. The first time that propor- peacetime requires agreement at constituency youngest left her school and all tional representation appeared in a level. The current Conservative three children eventually went to Liberal manifesto was in the mani- in which a Party constitution requires every school locally. My wife changed festo of the Asquithian Liberals in to put united Lib- her job to teach in the local 1922. But by then it was too late. up a candidate – although the comprehensive school. And we There is, however, one impor- Conservatives are currently try- eral party accepted this upheaval because we tant difference between the Liberal ing to alter these arrangements. both believed that for me the only Democrat position in the 2010 coali- At the next general election, every has joined way to nurse the constituency was tion and the position of the Liberals constituency will be a new con- to live in it and become part of it.9 in previous coalitions. It is that the the Con- stituency, since the number of 2010 coalition is the only one in seats is being reduced from 650 to It is therefore not easy for central peacetime in which a united Liberal servatives in 600, and there is to be a boundary headquarters to dictate to a con- party has joined the Conservatives review to be completed by 2013. If stituency party. When it tries to in coalition. coalition. every constituency is to reselect its do so, the constituency party may

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 7 riding the tiger: the liberal experience of coalition government

up to this point, in a number of simply ignore headquarters. That is who remained in the government, cases at least, no sooner would the what happened in 1918 in Asquith’s were, for all practical purposes, official candidate be withdrawn, constituency of East Fife. Although dependent on the Conservatives when out of the undergrowth an Asquith was not, of course, a sup- for their survival. In both cases the unkempt figure would emerge porter of the Lloyd George coali- fundamental purpose animating calling himself, as the case might tion, Lloyd George and Bonar Law the coalition had disappeared. The be, an Independent Liberal or decided, out of respect, not to put Lloyd George coalition, indeed, Conservative, or, in the case of up an official Conservative against had always been widely distrusted some Welsh or Scottish constitu- him. But the Conservative constitu- because of the whiff of corrup- encies, a Nationalist, and carry off ency association decided to ignore tion surrounding it, and one wag all the votes which had been bar- this edict from the centre and put described the government as ‘a deal gained and sold as a result of this up a baronet with a distinguished between a flock of sheep led by a arrangement. The supporters of a war record, Captain Sir Alexander crook [the coalition Liberals] and a political party, therefore, are not Sprot, who defeated Asquith in the flock of crooks led by a sheep [the like members of an army whose seat which he had held since 1886. Conservatives].’12 It seemed to have votes can be transferred at their Indeed, in 1918, of forty-five uncou- no purpose except to perpetuate party leader’s wish. They will poned Conservatives, twenty-three itself. Similarly, once the immediate only transfer their votes if there is were returned. panic of 1931 was over, the Liberals some overriding cause there.10 Even if an electoral pact can be led by Samuel no longer saw the agreed and there are no unofficial preservation of the coalition as an candidates, it does not follow that That overriding cause was found overriding purpose. the electors will necessarily follow in 1895 in the desire to defeat Irish In 1922, the revolt which the dictates of party headquarters. home rule; in 1918 in the desire to destroyed the government came Would Liberal Democrats necessar- The fun- defeat candidates who had sup- not from the Conservative leader- ily vote Conservative if their can- posedly shown themselves to be ship, which wanted to maintain the didate had stood down, or would damental unpatriotic during the war; and in coalition, but from the backbenches they vote Labour or Green? Would 1931 to ensure that the pound was and from parliamentary candi- the Conservatives vote Liberal point is that not destroyed by the financial crisis. dates. All the great figures of poli- Democrat if their candidate stood On each occasion, the nation had tics – Churchill, Lloyd George, F. E. down, or would they vote UKIP or coalitions to be ‘saved’. That is what gave the Smith and – some other party? Lord Hailsham, dynamic to pacts which, if they are wanted the coalition to continue. chairman of the Conservatives from depend, to be successful, must go with the Only two obscure members of the 1957 to 1959, summed up the dif- grain both of constituency opinion Cabinet were opposed to it. The ficulties of electoral pacts, having not so much and also of public opinion. revolt which destroyed the coali- been frequently enjoined to seek on those The fundamental point is that tion came from the grass roots. such a pact with the Liberals: coalitions depend, not so much on Many historians have emphasised those at the top but on the grass the meeting of Conservative MPs I can think of no more certain at the top roots; and coalitions come to an at the Carlton Club in 1922, which way for a party in office to ensure end, not because those at the top voted against the coalition, but, its own defeat than to be seen but on the necessarily want to break them up, long before that, the coalition had to make an arrangement of this but because of opposition at the been repudiated by Conservative kind before holding an election. grass roots; grass roots. That grass roots support constituency associations, who It must be remembered that on in turn depends on some overrid- had been adopting candidates withdrawal of either a Liberal or and coali- ing purpose which seems to tran- opposed to its continuation. By Conservative candidate the votes scend everyday party battles – the the time of the general election of he would otherwise have won are tions come defeat of home rule, the defeat of 1922, 180 Conservatives opposed not automatically transferred. A to an end, Bolshevism or saving the pound. to the coalition had been chosen by number of voters would abstain As soon as that overriding purpose constituency associations. These in disgust; a number of Liberals not because is lost, the coalition comes to be candidates were opposed to the would almost certainly vote unstable. policies of their party leadership, socialist in the absence of a Liberal those at the What is remarkable about the but the party leadership could not candidate. Reciprocal withdrawal Lloyd George coalition is how repudiate them because they had would be impossible unless there top neces- quickly it collapsed after its land- been chosen by perfectly proper was already a feeling of cordiality slide victory in 1918, when Bonar methods. If the party leadership sufficient to make the association sarily want Law had said of Lloyd George, ‘He ignores its grass roots, the leader- lined up for sacrifice willing to can be prime minister for life, if he ship will be repudiated. Austen withdraw its candidate. Such feel- to break likes.’11 But, after just four years, Chamberlain, the Conservative ings of self-sacrifice cannot nor- the coalition collapsed, and Lloyd leader who had replaced Bonar mally be imposed from above, and them up, but George was never to hold office Law in 1921, when the latter retired on a level of constituency organi- again. The National Government owing to ill health, thought that he sations nothing can be more dis- because of won a large landslide in 1931. But could destroy the rebels by a show heartening or destructive for years the only really independent element of force and he called a meeting at afterwards with morale than such opposition in it other than the Conservatives the Carlton Club to try and pre- a request coming from national – the Liberals led by Sir Herbert empt them. But had the Carlton headquarters. Finally, and most at the grass Samuel – left the coalition just one Club meeting voted to continue the ludicrous of all, if it went through roots. year later. The National Liberals, coalition, the Conservatives would

8 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 riding the tiger: the liberal experience of coalition government have split as they had in 1846. The fundamental principles of liberty Coalitions perhaps they are more loved in rejection of the coalition was inevi- and equality could be made com- and . Coalitions table. One leading Conservative, patible through the idea of ‘one can be cohe- can be cohesive and enjoy a solid as he was going up the steps of the person, one vote’. In the twentieth basis in wartime, when there is Carlton Club, when asked ‘What is century, when the political agenda sive and a single overriding aim, but in going to happen?’, answered, ‘a slice has come to be dominated by social peacetime they tend to be uneasy, off the top’.13 What he meant was and economic issues, the two prin- enjoy a solid nervous and insecure after the situ- that local constituency parties had ciples of liberty and equality come ation that produced them has been already decided against the coali- into conflict. Some Liberals, there- basis in war- resolved. And it is for this reason, tion and the only choice left for the fore, will be drawn to the left, on as Disraeli predicted, that although leadership was whether to accept the grounds that liberty is best time, when coalitions triumph, their triumph that decision or to see the party secured through an extension of there is a sin- has often been brief. Perhaps the split. In the event, every major fig- social welfare. Others, fearful of binary assumptions of British poli- ure in the Tory party organisation the growth of the state, will swing gle overrid- tics are stronger than many of us voted against continuation of the to the right. This tension existed at had previously believed. That is coalition. the beginning of the twentieth cen- ing aim, but the conclusion I reached, somewhat In 1932, also, pressure from the tury, with the growth of the New unwillingly, when considering the grass roots was important in the Liberalism, an attempt to reconcile in peacetime history of coalitions for my book, decision of the Liberals to leave the Liberalism and social democracy. The Coalition and the Constitution. National Government and then, in Many of the New Liberal reforms they tend to 1933, to move on to the opposition involved compulsion. For example Vernon Bogdanor is a Research Professor benches. Liberal Party members the National Insurance Act of 1911 be uneasy, at the Institute of Contemporary British were suspicious of the 1932 ‘agree- required compulsory insurance History, King’s College, London, and ment to differ’ on the introduction contributions from employers and nervous and author of The Coalition and the of a tariff, and the 1932 conference employees; the Trade Union Act of Constitution, published by Hart in of the National Liberal Federation 1913 required trade unionists specif- insecure March 2011. condemned it. The Liberals, in an ically to contract out if they did not odd compromise, continued to sit wish to contribute to the Labour after the 1 Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime on the government benches until Party. In addition, the Liberal con- Minister (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1933, saying that they would sup- stitutional agenda had come to be situation 1955), pp. 387–8. 2 Thomas Jones, Diary: vol. port the National Government on broadly accepted by the other par- that pro- 1, 1916–1925, ed. Keith Middlemas ‘national’ matters, but oppose it on ties. What, then, was the purpose ( University Press, 1969), pp. ‘Conservative’ matters – an odd dis- of the Liberal Party? The Liberals duced them 99–101. tinction. But they were pressed to came to be inherently divided: some 3 John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: end the compromise, again by the of them were becoming, in effect, has been Recollections of an Errant Politician (Polit- National Liberal Federation which social democrats. By the late 1970s, ico’s, 2002), pp. 125–6. 4 Harold Macmillan, The Past Masters declared that the ‘appropriate place’ social democrats, too, came to be resolved. (Macmillan, 1975), pp. 18–19. for the Liberals ‘is on the opposi- divided: in 1981, one wing, led by 5 David Dutton, A History of the Liberal tion benches’.14 Lloyd George said , David Owen and Party in the Twentieth Century (Palgrave that the undignified position of the , left the Labour Macmillan, 2004), p. 147. Liberals resembled that of a cat that Party and helped form the Alliance; 6 John Bowle, : A Biogra- ‘has pushed its head into a cream the other, led by and phy (Gollancz, 1955), p. 357. jug and cannot get it out without 7 David Butler (ed.), Coalitions in British , remained with the Politics (Macmillan, 1978), p. 118. either breaking the jug or hav- Labour Party. Now some social 8 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and ing someone pull it out by the tail. democrats have moved back into Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition It is the latter process that is going the Labour Party. Social demo- Government 1918–1922 (Clarendon on at the moment and I hope it will crats, therefore, are still divided and Press, 1979), p. 184. succeed’.15 Liberals are also divided. Liberal 9 Jeremy Josephs, Inside the Alliance: An The longevity of the current Democrats find it difficult to answer Inside Account of the Development and Prospects of the Liberal/SDP Alliance coalition will, therefore, depend whether their main enemy is on (John Martin, 1983), p. 155. not primarily on relations between the left – perhaps that is what Nick 10 Lord Hailsham, The Door Wherein I Cameron and Clegg, but on reac- Clegg and believe Went (Collins, 1975), pp. 174–5. tions at the grass roots. For this – or on the right – which is per- 11 Hugh Purcell, Lloyd George (Haus, reason, the 2010 coalition may be haps what and Tim 2006), p. 73. somewhat less stable than many Farron believe? That is the Liberal 12 Michael Kinnear, The Fall of Lloyd George (Macmillan, 1973), p. 4. commentators suggest. Democrat dilemma in a binary 13 Rhodes James, Memoirs of a Conserva- political system. ~ tive: J.C.C.Davidson’s Memoirs and I have found it salutary to con- Papers, 1910–37 (Weidenfeld and Nicol- The dilemma facing the Liberal sider the history of coalitions, son, 1969), p. 127. Democrats in coalitions is not, I since the conclusion that I have 14 Trevor Wilson, Downfall of the Liberal think, contingent, but inherent in been forced to draw from this brief Party, 1914–1935 (Collins, 1976), p. 376. 15 Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel: the nature of modern Liberalism. historical survey goes somewhat A Political Life (Clarendon Press, 1992), In the nineteenth century, when against my political prejudices. p. 360. politics was dominated by constitu- My conclusion is that Disraeli may tional issues, Liberalism had a clear well have been right, that England and coherent ideological basis. Its does not love coalitions, although

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 9 Coalition before 1886 Whigs, Peelites and Liberals Coalition as a political term has decidedly mixed connotations. The word coalition entered English usage in the early seventeenth century in a religious context, denoting the growing together of parts, or coalescence – as in ‘God and Humanity by coalition becoming one nature in Christ’. By the later seventeenth century it was used in scientific discourse, meaning coalescence in one body or mass. It became a political term in the early eighteenth s a political term it also compromise of principles in order century denoting the acquired the immedi- to secure power continued into the combining of distinct ate connotation of a Victorian age. So, for example, the mutual compromise or Conservative leader Lord Derby parties without sacrifice of principles declared to parliament in 1866: forA the object of securing power. By a government of coalition incorporation into one These negative implications were one understands a government of affirmed by the unhappy experience body. Angus Hawkins men of different parties, in which of the eight-month Fox–North coa- each, to a greater or less extent, lition ministry of 1783. examines Liberal sacrifices his individual opin- The inference that coalition ions for the purpose of obtaining coalitions before 1886. involved a mutual sacrifice or

10 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 Coalition before 1886 Whigs, Peelites and Liberals

united political strength. We all ultra-Tory minister was not com- of the British public. While coali- know that it is always exceedingly monly referred to as a coalition, tions in the twentieth century were repugnant to an Englishmen to but a government brought together often formed to prosecute wars, as sacrifice his private opinion for in the ‘national interest’ in order to in 1915 and 1940, the Aberdeen coa- expediency.1 secure a necessary reform of par- lition was brought down by war. liament. This resonated into the Moreover, one prominent minis- This echoed ’s twentieth century when Ramsey ter in Aberdeen’s Cabinet, William famous dictum of December 1852, MacDonald’s coalition ministry of Gladstone, preferred to describe pronounced in the Commons 1931 was described as a ‘National the ministry as ‘a mixed govern- against the background of a violent Government’, bringing Labour, ment’, rather than a coalition. The thunderstorm, that ‘England does Conservative and Liberal politicians formation of a ‘mixed govern- not love coalitions’.2 together at a moment of economic ment’, Gladstone wrote, was only So coalition was a term more crisis. The recent often lurid and warrantable when ministers had often used in the nineteenth cen- sometimes tawdry experience of the most thorough confidence in tury by hostile opponents to decry Lloyd George’s coalition of a decade the honour, integrity and fidelity ministerial arrangements than a before had done little to displace the of each other; when they were in badge of honour. A more positive, negative connotations of coalition agreement upon all the great ques- patriotic and principled descrip- government; in 1922 the Daily Mail tions of the day; and when a great tion was that of a ‘broad-based’ or talked of ‘the poison of coalition’. and palpable emergency of state ‘broad-bottomed’ government: an Only one of ’s called for it.3 Lasting a little over eighteenth-century term mean- ministries acquired the commonly two years, the Aberdeen coalition, ing the coming together of differ- accepted label of a coalition, and with the exception of Gladstone’s ent politicians in support of the that was Lord Aberdeen’s govern- landmark budget of 1853, did not ‘national interest’ and the monarch. ment of 1852–5, in which Whigs, go down to posterity as a great suc- The Younger Pitt’s ministry after Liberals, some prominent Peelites cess. As Gladstone again observed in junction with the Portland Whigs and a small number of radicals, February 1855, the majority against in 1794; the ‘Ministry of All the united by the advocacy of free it ‘not only brought us down, but Talents’ of 1806–7; Liverpool’s trade, came to form what was ini- sent us down with such a thwack government after the adherence tially perceived as a distillation of that one heard one’s head thump as of the Grenvillites in 1822; and executive talent. This perception it hit the ground’.4 Canning’s short-lived Cabinet of did not survive the mismanage- Left: the Yet the notion of coalition, its 1827 with four Whig members ment of the Crimean War, and the Aberdeen relation to government by party were perceived in these terms. graphic reports of cor- coalition cabinet before 1886, and how this bears Likewise, Grey’s Reform minis- respondent W. H. Russell which in 1854, as on the genesis of the parliamen- try of 1830–4, containing Whigs, brought descriptions of appalling painted by Sir tary Liberal Party requires further Huskissonites, Reformers and one ineptitude to the breakfast tables John Gilbert unpicking. Here it is important to

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 11 coalition before 1886: whigs, peelites and liberals understand the nature and function political science as an academic field should be seen in this context. Here of parliamentary parties between in Britain after 1945 reinforced the lies its relevance to the formal foun- the Reform Act of 1832 and the Irish perception of the binary structure dation of the parliamentary Liberal of 1886. Parties in of a national two-party system in Party in 1859. Ministerial relations Westminster, particularly in the Britain as ‘natural’. The historical within Aberdeen’s Cabinet were Commons, were seen as essential distortion produced by this para- often strained and difficult. Many to the authority and survival of digm is twofold. First, it suggests Whigs at Brooks’s were infuriated governments. Ministries were sus- anachronistically that earlier parlia- at so many Peelites being given tained or removed by Commons mentary parties were or should be Cabinet office. Aberdeen himself votes, rather than the outcome of more united and ideological homo- was an indifferent speaker who had general elections as became the geneous than in fact they were. never sat in the Commons, though norm after 1867. But parties were Secondly, it conceals the extent to his good relations with the Queen not rigid blocs of homogeneous which governments prior to 1945 bolstered his authority. It is worth votes bound by ideological unity, were in fact coalitions or minority noting that in coalition govern- MPs acting as the division fodder ministries. During the sixty years ments the constitutional role of the of the front bench leadership. This between 1885 and 1945, for example, monarch is brought to the fore: as was a notion of party behaviour only ten governments commanded in 1852 so in 1931. The prima donna which became more familiar in the Victorian a Commons majority, all others of Aberdeen’s Cabinet, the Whig early twentieth century. Rather, were coalition or minority minis- leader Lord John Russell, disrupted Victorian parliamentary parties parliamen- tries. Clear-cut single-party gov- ministerial relations with his com- were more loose-limbed associa- ernment was far less the norm prior mitment to further parliamen- tions of MPs and were of a mutable tary parties to 1945 than the post-war paradigm tary reform. Palmerston, as Home nature. They safeguarded the sov- allows. Shedding the distortions Secretary, who privately referred ereignty of Westminster against were more of this post-1945 paradigm is par- to Aberdeen as an example of the dangerous exertion of the royal ticularly relevant to understanding ‘antiquated imbecility’,5 exploited prerogative, and equally impor- loose-limbed the party politics of pre-1886 and, disagreements over foreign policy tantly resisted the notion of a direct in particular, the extent to which to enhance his popular stand- electoral mandate. MPs were not associations all parliamentary parties pre-1886 ing, while also refusing to being instructed delegates, sent to vote were fluid associations of differing ‘dragged through the dirt by Lord as their constituencies demanded, of MPs and opinion. While the word coalition John’ over parliamentary reform.6 but were representatives exercising carried negative connotations, in Patriotic denunciations of the a discretionary judgement on the were of a reality all governments comprised coalition’s Crimean policy by the ‘national interest’. These fluid party an alliance of varied shades of polit- Conservative opposition and radi- connections, moreover, embraced mutable ical feeling. cal critiques of either the feebleness differing shades of opinion. Intra- nature. They Self-avowed government coali- of Aberdeen’s diplomacy by John party differences were as marked tions come into being in a variety Roebuck or the misguided nature as inter-party divisions. The min- safeguarded of circumstances. Often they are of national policy by istries of Grey and Melbourne formed in the context of a national exacerbated ministerial divisions. during the 1830s comprised Whig, the sover- emergency, such as war; and in In the face of Cabinet differences, Reform, Liberal and certain sec- such a case they are usually seen as a the minister the Duke of tions of radical support. Party lead- eignty of temporary expedient in dire times. Argyll complained in October 1854 ership was a matter of brokering The historical warnings associated that the coalition was prevented between sections of supporters, Westminster with the experience of such coali- from pursuing ‘any definite course’, rather than dictating a line of policy tions should give a lesson to David leaving it at ‘the mercy of the tides; which MPs were expected compli- against the Cameron and Nick Clegg. The and our motion becomes a mere antly to endorse. Thus the mutable prospect of the next general elec- drift’.7 When Disraeli represented party connections of the early and dangerous tion hangs over such coalitions like the Whigs as the subservient pawns mid-Victorian Commons were, by the sword of Damocles. Exiting of the Peelites, and the radicals as their very nature, combinations of exertion of gracefully from such coalitions is the unwitting tools of both, it was ‘a political sentiment; fluid alliances far harder than entering into them. most skilful and ingenious rubbing of opinion being inherent to the the royal The dynamics of such coalitions, up of old sores’.8 character of parliamentary parties. moreover, operate differently at Yet the Aberdeen coalition was So, while self-avowed government prerogative, different political levels, depend- an alignment of executive talent coalitions were rare, all early and ing on whether one is looking at the which anticipated that alliance mid-Victorian governments rep- and equally Cabinet, parliament or the elector- of ministerial experience which resented shifting alliances of party importantly ate. The further from the political came together in Palmerston’s sentiment. This adds a necessary centre one moves the harder harmo- second ministry in June 1859, fol- nuance to an overly simple distinc- resisted nious coalition politics are to main- lowing the Willis’s Rooms meet- tion between single-party govern- tain; retribution seeps in from the ing of earlier that month. In 1859 ment and coalition ministries. the notion grass roots. non-Conservative MPs almost uni- Our understanding of British On other occasions coalitions versally adopted the label Liberal politics is still dominated to a great of a direct portend a fusion of parties, marking as a common description of their extent by a paradigm characteristic a profound process of party realign- party affiliation; older designa- of the party politics of post-1945 in electoral ment. Here temporary arrange- tions such as Whig, Reformer and which rigidly aligned national par- ments cast a far longer shadow. Peelite rapidly falling into abey- ties alternate in power. The rise of mandate. The short-lived Aberdeen coalition ance. Under Palmerston, Whigs and

12 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 coalition before 1886: whigs, peelites and liberals

Liberals shared ministerial office standing as a nation of lawful toler- In 1859 the coalition, underlining its signifi- with a small minority of promi- ance and moral decency, a bulwark cance in Liberal history. After 1859 nent Peelites, notably Gladstone, against intolerance and dogmatism. foundation the Liberal Party won four unam- Herbert, Newcastle and Cardwell, The historic constitution, civil lib- biguous and clear electoral victo- the great majority of Peelite erty, fiscal accountability, free trade of the Liberal ries (in 1865, in 1868, in 1880, and having returned and Christian humanitarianism in 1885), affirming its dominance to Derby’s Conservative Party. grounded the Liberal commitment Party as a of Victorian politics as the embodi- What the rich ministerial blend of to stable and ordered progress. This ment of progressive and dynamic Palmerston’s 1859 government also was a moral political creed support- lasting par- social values. Though coalition enjoyed, and what the Aberdeen ing a patriotic belief in Britain’s retained its negative connotation coalition had lacked, was significant status as a civilised and enlight- liamentary as a description of government radical support. Palmerston, unsuc- ened polity, superior to corrupt and alignment, arrangements, the Aberdeen coali- cessfully, even invited Richard repressive regimes abroad. During tion is notable for anticipating the Cobden to join his Cabinet. As the early 1860s, Palmerston’s Liberal under Palm- crucial political coalescence of those Palmerston acknowledged, in 1859 government also drew to itself the ideas and beliefs which defined the he was forced ‘to reconstruct the dynamic popular forces of militant erston’s lead- great Liberal Party of Gladstone and government upon a different prin- Nonconformity, organised labour his successors. ciple and … out of a larger range of and an expanding press. ership rather political parties’ – what Gladstone Not that the path between the Angus Hawkins is a Professor of History referred to as ‘our strangely con- end of Aberdeen’s coalition in 1855 than that of at Oxford University, a Fellow of the structed Cabinet’.9 The prominent and the formation of Palmerston’s Royal Historical Society, and Fellow Whig Lord Clarendon described it Liberal government of 1859 was Russell, was of Kellogg College, Oxford. His latest as ‘a great bundle of sticks’.10 It was straight or smooth. The radicals’ book is The Forgotten Prime Minister, a large span of political opinion, relations with Palmerston were merged with a two-volume biography of the 14th Earl however, that assumed the common ambiguous and often hostile. Deep of Derby. label of Liberal. enmity between them erupted dur- Liberalism as When, in late March 1859, ing the general election of 1857. 1 Lord Derby, 9 July 1866, Hansard, 3rd Palmerston drew up a list of pos- Gladstone’s career between 1855 a doctrine. Series, CLXXXIV, 730. sible Cabinet appointments it con- and 1859 was especially fraught and 2 Benjamin Disraeli, 16 Dec. 1852, Han- sard, 3rd Series, CXXIII, 1666. tained no radicals or advanced his political trajectory shrouded 3 Gladstone memorandum, 18 Dec. Reformers. The Cabinet he was in uncertainty. In many ways his 1852, cit. H. C. G. Matthew, The Glad- actually required to form in June natural political home seemed stone Diaries (Oxford University Press, under the banner of Liberalism was to be with Derby’s Conservative 1974), vol. iv, p. 478. far broader. Thus Palmerston’s min- Party, but in June 1859, to the sur- 4 Arthur Gordon journal, 30 Jan. 1855, istry proved a rich blend of those prise of many, he agreed to serve in cit. J. B. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coali- tion, 1852–1855 ( University parliamentary ingredients compris- Palmerston’s Cabinet as Chancellor Press, 1968), p. 548. ing Victorian Liberalism, Whig of the Exchequer. Russell’s ambi- 5 The Duke of Argyll, Autobiography and legislative reform and disinterested tion to reclaim the Whig/Liberal Memoirs, 2 vols., ed. Dowager Duchess governance, Peelite morality and leadership also stirred up fractious of Argyll (John Murray, 1906), vol. i, administrative expertise, and radi- and bitter feelings, his genuine p. 379. cal notions of economic and effi- Liberal instincts compromised by 6 Lord Palmerston to Lord Lansdowne, cient government. Political parties 8 Dec. 1853, cit. Angus Hawkins, Brit- a perceived selfish impetuosity and ish Party Politics, 1852–1886 (Macmillan, are united by shared animosities as reclusive temperament. In February 1998), p. 53. much as by common aspirations. 1858, Clarendon despaired that 7 The Duke of Argyll to Lord Claren- Prior to 1859 Whigs displayed an Whigs, Liberals and radicals were don, 25 Oct. 1854, cit. David Brown, anxious disparagement of radical- ‘split into factions more bent on cut- Palmerston: A Biography (Yale Univer- ism, radicals found common pur- ting each other’s throats than dis- sity Press, 2010), p. 371. pose in decrying the oligarchic and posed to unite against the Tories’.11 8 Lord Stanley journal, 17 Feb. 1853, cit. J. Vincent (ed.), Disraeli, Derby and the pious assumptions of Whiggism, Nonetheless, in 1859 the founda- Conservative Party: The Political Jour- and Peelites assumed a self-adula- tion of the Liberal Party as a lasting nals of Lord Stanley, 1849–69 (Harvester tory sense of superiority enshrined parliamentary alignment, under Press, 1978), p. 99. in the cult of their dead leader. After Palmerston’s leadership rather than 9 Palmerston to Bruce, 26 Nov. 1859, 1859, as Whigs, former Peelites and that of Russell, was merged with cit. E. D. Steele, Palmerston and Liberal- radicals shared office, such antipa- Liberalism as a doctrine, whose ori- ism, 1855–1865 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 94; Gladstone memo- thies were replaced by a common gins lay in the political economy of randum, 20–5 May 1860, cit. The Prime Liberal vision of effective and fair the 1820s, the Whig cry of civil and Ministers’ Papers: W E. Gladstone, III: government resting upon liber- religious liberty, Nonconformist Autobiographical Memoranda 1845–1866, ties protected by the rule of law; of pressure for humanitarian reform, ed. John Brooke and Mary Sorenson government being in the interest of the radical demand for retrench- (HMSO, 1978), p. 228. the nation as a whole, rather than a ment in government expenditure, 10 Lord E. Fitzmaurice, The Life of the Sec- ond Earl of Granville, 2 vols. (Longmans particular section of society; of free and the belief in efficient disinter- & Co., 1905), vol. i, p. 487. trade, government economy and ested administration serving the 11 Lord Clarendon to Lord Howard, 26 low taxation encouraging individ- whole of society. This coalescence Feb. 1858, Clarendon Mss. C. 541, cit. ual liberty, self-improvement and of Liberal values and a Liberal Angus Hawkins, Parliament, Party and moral responsibility. This power- parliamentary party was briefly the Art of Politics, 1855–59 (Macmillan, ful Liberal vision affirmed Britain’s foreshadowed by the Aberdeen 1987), p. 115.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 13 A ‘Distinction without a Difference’? The Liberal Unionist – Conservative Alliance

The Liberal Unionists had their origins in the disastrous split within the Liberal Party over Irish home rule in 1886. They participated in coalition governments with the Conservatives in 1886–92 and 1895– 1905, and eventually, in 1912, merged entirely into the Conservative Party. How close was ollowing the home philosophies. An examination of the relationship between rule election of 1886, and the troubled relationship between reluctantly at first, a dis- the two branches of the Unionist the Liberal Unionists parate group of Liberal alliance from 1886 until 1895, while and Salisbury’s aristocrats, wealthy busi- redolent of the political culture of nessmenF and radical professional the late nineteenth century, reveals Conservatives between politicians gradually coalesced the ideological and operational dif- into a political party of sorts and ficulties of maintaining a sustained 1886 and 1895? Ian attempted to maintain an independ- period of cross-party collaboration Cawood argues that ent policy whilst remaining part of in the British political system. It the Unionist alliance. After 1895 the also challenges the perception that the Liberal Unionists Liberal Unionists quickly became Liberal Unionism was a mere ‘rest- socially and politically allied with ing-place’ for Liberals en route to managed to maintain the Tories, and ever since there has the Conservative party or that the a distinct and separate been a tendency to forget that they Liberal Unionists disappeared into were a separate party. This arti- ‘a political wilderness’.1 identity until the cle intends to examine whether The origin of the Unionist alli- the absorption of the Liberal ance has conventionally been seen formation of the Unionists into the Conservative as the issuing of the ‘Hawarden coalition government in and Unionist Party was inevita- Kite’ simultaneously in the Standard ble, given the historic differences and the Mercury in December July 1895. that existed between their political 1885. The shock and surprise caused

14 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘Distinction without a Difference’? The Liberal Unionist – Conservative Alliance

by this event, the ‘earthquake and The splits within the party that If the Liberal Unionist move- eclipse’ as J. L. Garvin has it, goes had been problematic before 1886 ment was to be anything more some way to explaining the nature became intolerable once the elec- than a refusal to vote for a par- of the opposition that emerged once tion result of December 1885, which ticular measure by disgruntled Gladstone’s commitment to home gave the balance of power to the backbenchers, it needed a leader rule was confirmed. 2 Gladstone’s Nationalists, became known. Lord of national reputation and unques- sudden public conversion to home Derby wrote in his diary: tioned political seniority around rule, in December 1885, actually whom dissenting Liberals could The state of things I imagine to came from his long-term, tradi- coalesce. Although the Marquess be this – Gladstone has no time tionally Liberal attitude to national of Hartington’s position as this to spare and wants to get back self-determination. He had been leader may seem to have been to Downing St. The Whigs or troubled by his own government’s inevitable, due to his early denun- moderate section, incline in that actions in Egypt in 1882 and later in ciation of the policy of home rule direction, but with less eagerness. Sudan. By adopting a policy of home at Waterfoot on 29 August 1885, On the other hand, the Radicals, rule while in opposition, he felt he he had, in fact, been more inclined Chamberlain and co., are not in a was returning to a truer, more moral to consider resignation and retire- hurry. They had rather wait to get form of Liberalism, with which to ment from politics.5 The task of rid of Gladstone, Granville and appeal to the newly enlarged elec- persuading Hartington to take on the Whig party in general, think- torate. He had not, however, shared the task of leadership of a rebel- ing themselves strong enough to his moral struggle with his Cabinet lion fell to George Goschen, who form a purely Radical cabinet.4 colleagues, many of whom con- was unable to take on the role of sequently interpreted the Liberal Most Liberals felt ambivalent about leader due to his distance from the duty towards Ireland (and the wider Gladstone’s method of announcing Liberals since 1874 and because of Empire) in a very different fashion, the new policy, even if they sup- his unstinting opposition to any although he was supported by Earl ported the principle. However, as aspect of Chamberlain’s . Spencer who had, as Lord Lieutenant the announcement had been quite so Queen Victoria herself was united in Ireland, implemented a coercive unexpected, those who felt inclined with Goschen in her suspicion of regime from 1882 to 1885. to resist the home rule strategy took Gladstone, who she regarded as ‘a On the other hand, the sup- a long time to organise their forces half-mad … ridiculous old man’6 port that Parnell had offered to as they needed to assess the policy Left: election and she now bombarded Goschen the Conservatives in the general itself and the best cause of affecting, poster for a with letters demanding that he per- election of 1885, meant, in Angus adjusting or aborting it. Secondly, Liberal Unionist suade Hartington to act decisively. Hawkins’ memorable phrase that Liberals of all hues needed time to candidate, She encouraged Goschen to appeal ‘an extraordinary fluidity prevailed assess the attitudes of their allies. featuring (left– to ‘moderate, loyal and patriotic over the political situation.’3 In these Even Chamberlain, who might right) Salisbury, men’ and urged him to consider ‘an circumstances, with Randolph have been expected to have lead the Hartington, amalgamation or rather juncture Churchill and Lord Carnarvon revolt openly, given his role as the Chamberlain of Conservatives and Whigs.’7 She wooing Parnell, while Joseph alternative figurehead of Liberalism and Balfour never forgave the Nationalists for Chamberlain floated his Central between 1880 and 1885, chose to (reproduced their refusal to participate in the Board Scheme, some type of politi- bide his time and actually to join with permission Prince of Wales’ Irish tour of April cal reorientation seemed inevitable. Gladstone’s third Cabinet, while of Lord Clifford, 1885, when he had been abused and The only question was the extent promoting his own alternative Ugbrooke Hall, threatened. Salisbury now encour- and origin of the alteration. approach to the Irish problem. ). aged her as well, describing home

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 15 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance rule to her as ‘a concession to the One Con- Salisbury was clearly keen, see- concerns of the Liberals who did not forces of disorder’ and ‘a betrayal ing an opportunity of ending a wish to be publicly associated with of the Loyalists of Ulster.’8 Edward servative period of nearly forty years in ‘their hateful allies’, and were keep- Watkin, maverick Liberal MP for which there had been only one ing their profile as low as possible.16 Hythe, now urged Hartington to demanded, Conservative majority govern- After the Bill was defeated by form an alliance with Salisbury, ment, and he dissuaded his party thirty votes (ninety-three Liberals with the rousing (if rather self- ‘let no mem- from interfering in the home rule voted against it), Salisbury wrote serving) exhortation, ‘while you debate at Westminster, so that the to Goschen on 20 June to make will have saved your country, ber of the opposition to Gladstone’s bill would arrangements for the forthcom- you will be Prime Minister by come from within his own party. ing election. On the following day, the summer.’9 Henry Ponsonby, Tory party Salisbury then met Hartington on Salisbury wrote directly to Lord on the queen’s behalf, began float- assist in 2 March, and proposed a full alli- Hartington asking for his interven- ing a scheme to keep Gladstone ance between Conservatives and tion in seats where Conservatives from office, in which Salisbury returning moderates, but, as Henry James were fighting Gladstonians. would resign the premiership, but recorded, ‘Hartington declined to Although Hartington was reluc- remain , while to Parlia- do more than express the hope that tant to endorse Conservatives with Hartington took over at No. 10. they might act together in defeating whom he disagreed on a myriad Derby, described this as ‘eccen- ment any any proposition for a separate Irish of historic issues, against Liberals tric’ and suggested that Salisbury Parliament’.13 When Chamberlain with whom he disagreed on one, was behind it, in order to separate Liberal’, but and George Trevelyan resigned he did respond to Salisbury’s pleas Hartington and Chamberlain.10 from the government in March, and eventually agreed to advise There was however a possibil- it appeared Hartington was spurred into action Liberal Unionist voters to support ity that the campaign against home to prevent the radical Unionists Conservatives in seats where no rule might become associated with that in taking charge of the revolt. The Liberal Unionist was standing. the landowning elite in Ireland, Earl of Radnor recommended that Prominent Liberal Unionists, or at least fall into the hands of most con- Hartington should establish a com- such as Edward Heneage in the Conservatives. On 9 January, mittee of consultation between Grimsby, were supported by the Colonel Edward Saunderson, a stituencies the Conservatives and the Liberal local Conservatives and felt no former Liberal MP, and the Duke Unionists to discuss tactics, with restrictions on their expression of Abercorn, a leading Irish land- the Liberal a large public meeting in the west of Liberalism. One Conservative owner, re-founded the Irish Loyal end of London and a series of fur- demanded, ‘let no member of the and Patriotic Union, and organ- Unionists ther meetings across the country. Tory party assist in returning to ised a series of cross-party demon- enjoyed As a result, Salisbury wrote to Parliament any Liberal’,17 but it strations in favour of the Union. Hartington in early April propos- appeared that in most constituen- The first of these was at Chester considerable ing ‘conversations’ on future tac- cies the Liberal Unionists enjoyed on 29 January 1886, when Tories, tics.14 Derby advised Hartington to considerable Conservative support Whigs and Radicals condemned Conservative support a Conservative Cabinet but for their principled stand against home rule. He liaised with Duke to avoid a coalition, on the grounds home rule. Under the terms of the of Westminster to find ‘how far the support for that they ‘were always unpopular informal agreement, a few lead- Whigs will go with us’ – the result and seldom lasted long.’ Instead ing Liberal Unionists were forced had been a united platform and the their princi- he recommended that Hartington to stand aside for Conservatives. meeting was deemed ‘a great suc- should ‘come to an understanding The nascent alliance did man- cess.’11 Once Salisbury’s govern- pled stand with Chamberlain.’15 The future age a more cooperative approach ment fell on 25 January 1886, and Unionist alliance was thus begin- in four double constituencies, Gladstone became prime minister against ning to take shape. running Conservatives in har- again, the initiative passed back to In early May, in an attempt ness with Liberal Unionists in the dissenting Liberals and, in refus- home rule. to secure the votes of the waver- Newcastle-upon-Tyne, York, ing office, Hartington became the ing Liberals, Goschen’s close ally Northampton and . de facto leader of the revolt, some- Albert Grey began negotiations Some Liberal Unionists, and all what against his will. with the Conservative whip, Aretas the radical Unionists, managed to On 2 February Goschen began to Akers-Douglas, in order to secure carry their constituency associa- sound out Salisbury on the oppor- a promise that Liberals who voted tions with them, but others, such as tunity for an electoral truce. against the Home Rule Bill would Hartington were rejected by their not face a Conservative opponent caucuses and had to rely almost I acknowledged the importance in the subsequent general election. exclusively on Conservative sup- of coming to an understanding On 16 May, Salisbury and Hicks port in electioneering. In this way on the point and said it would Beach unveiled the electoral truce some Liberal Unionists emerged not be worth our while unless when they told the from the election with a strong they would break definitely with of Conservative Associations that sense of independence and free- Gladstone. He admitted this: Conservatives must support Liberal dom of action in the forthcoming and further limited his proposal Unionist candidates in constituen- parliament, while others were well to those places, where, without cies where the Conservatives would aware of their position as political a split, our chances were hope- have had no chance of defeating a debtors and adjusted their rhetoric less. Without pledging myself Liberal in normal circumstances. accordingly. I gave him general hopes of an The Conservatives were there- Once the 1886 election had pro- understanding.12 fore carefully responding to the duced a hung parliament (albeit

16 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance with a Unionist majority), the keep Liberal Unionist influence to a in favour of it. For many Liberals Liberal Unionists held the position minimum, warning that ‘he could , this was the issue which finally of kingmakers. When Hartington not whip up the [Conservative] men made the breach in the Liberal asked Chamberlain his advice on for Hartington.’20 The perception Party irreversible. Henry James in whether or not to join a coalition, that the government was tottering Bury had managed to weather the Chamberlain was quite adamant was quelled by the appointment storm of criticism that followed his in his refusal and was supported of Goschen as Chancellor of vote against the Home Rule Bill by Lord Derby, who distrusted the Exchequer in January 1887, in 1886 and had been re-adopted as the Conservative leader. When he encouraged by Queen Victoria, the Liberal candidate. However, a met Hartington on 24 July, Lord Hartington and Heneage, Goschen meeting to condemn the Crimes Salisbury found that the Liberal was chosen because, although a Bill in April 1887 produced ‘sulphur Unionist leader was determined Liberal, he was barely distinguish- in the air’ and the sight of Liberal not to enter a government, as it able from the Conservatives in his Unionists ‘hissing at old friends’.24 would jeopardise his standing as economic outlook. For some Liberal Unionists who a Liberal. Hartington had to con- Of course, this was actually had made pledges against coercion, sider the effect that twenty years of another coup for Salisbury, and the alliance had served its purpose Conservative–Liberal antagonism another blow for Chamberlain. in defeating the Home Rule Bill, had had on his own supporters. The Now the leader had but it was now being distorted by Liberal Unionists were determined lost his most useful ally in the the Salisbury–Hartington alliance. that they should be an independ- Conservative Cabinet, one who Arthur Winterbotham spoke out ent Liberal group and resolved at had expressed sympathy with for this group during the debate an executive committee meeting the idea of a new party compris- in March 1887, and led three other on 24 July to maintain a separate ing the ‘advanced’ sections of both radicals back to the Liberals. It headquarters, with subscriptions Unionist parties. He was also now a looked as if Chamberlain would be to local Liberal Associations to be member of a party which was in an left completely isolated, until W. S. broken off. Chamberlain, Lord alliance with the previously derided Caine, the champion of the temper- Wolmer, James and Derby also Conservatives, and one that would ance movement, came to his res- advised Hartington that the party most likely last for the remainder of cue and stood firm. Others, such as should continue to sit with the the parliament. As he put it, ‘we may F. W. Maclean, MP for Woodstock, Gladstonians, now on the opposi- be face to face with a Tory govern- voted in favour of the Crimes Bill, tion benches. [Fig. 1] ment whose proposals no consistent for the solidly liberal reason that it The Liberal Unionists’ Liberal will be able to support’.21 was ‘paving the way for the intro- choice masked serious ideologi- The fall of Churchill meant that a duction of remedial measures cal divisions, as Chamberlain Crimes Bill, which Chamberlain [including] a very wide measure of and Hartington held diametri- had openly denounced, would now self-government’.25 Salisbury real- cally opposed interpretations of be introduced. William Harcourt ised that he had tested the patience Liberalism and they had previously spotted that Chamberlain’s posi- of his allies too far and as a token of been the bitterest of rivals in the tion was uncomfortable, if not his constructive intentions, intro- government of 1880–85. As early untenable, and responded posi- The alli- duced a hastily devised Land Bill. as May 1886, the Birmingham Post tively to Chamberlain’s suggestion The bill was only allowed to pass described Chamberlain’s faction of a meeting at the end of 1886, ance that the Lords having been emascu- as ‘for Mr Gladstone, if he will but which eventually led to the ‘Round lated, however, leaving the land modify his plan’ and Hartington’s Table’ conference which has been emerged issue largely unresolved until the as those who ‘would refuse, at any described in such minute detail by Wyndham Act of 1903. time or under any circumstances, Michael Hurst.22 [Fig. 2] between The alliance that emerged to concede autonomy to Ireland’. When the Crimes Bill was intro- between the parties after 1887 was The article concluded, pessimisti- duced in March 1887, Hartington the parties then one of electoral and political cally, ‘the two sections … can have began to write to Salisbury, not to convenience, not born out of any no continuous ground of common criticise the measure, but to ensure after 1887 natural affinity between the par- action.’18 Hartington himself con- the distribution of honours among ties. In the subsequent eight years of fided to James that he could ‘never Liberal Unionists in exchange for was then one the alliance, before the two parties … be sure how far Chamberlain and their support. Chamberlain and his finally formed a coalition govern- I will be able to go on together’.19 followers were the crucial problem, of electoral ment in 1895, a number of ideo- Once appointed as Chancellor and but here Hartington and Salisbury logical and operational difficulties Leader of the Commons, Randolph had a rare moment of good fortune. and political therefore challenged a relationship Churchill attempted to appease John Bright roused himself to offer convenience, that had been forged by party lead- the Liberal Unionists’ conscience his support of the Crimes Bill to ers at Westminster. over Ireland, promising to imple- Wolmer on the grounds that ‘Mr not born out ment local government reform in Gladstone ought to have suppressed Ireland. When Churchill unex- the Land League five years ago’.23 As of any natu- Division pectedly resigned in December the Liberal Unionists had the choice Firstly, there were clear political 1886, the pressure for a Hartington- of whether to support the bill or ral affinity divisions between the parties. When led coalition government grew. bring the government down, the the Irish National League was However, the Tory chief whip, Conservatives could safely call their between the finally proscribed in 1887, the need Aretas Akers-Douglas, played his bluff and the bill was passed with to offer a constructive alternative first hand in his ongoing attempt to sixty-four Liberal Unionists voting parties. to home rule became paramount.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 17 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

avoid association with the imple- mentation of the Crimes Bill. Prior to Chamberlain’s return, Hartington took the trouble to redefine the Liberal Unionists’ position in a speech at Ipswich on 7 March 1888. He finally stated that he could not see how a reconcilia- tion between the two branches of Unionism could be achieved, and therefore (nearly two years after the formation of the first party organi- sation) conceded that ‘we have no alternative before us except to do all that is in our power to constitute a 3rd party’. He made clear that ‘while we adhere to the opinions we have always held on the we have not renounced one single Liberal opinion or Liberal principle’. Finally, to appease Chamberlain, he stated that ‘there is room within the … for the extremest radical as well as for the most moderate whig’ and that the Unionist policy was not ‘simply one of obstruction and resistance to reform’.27 The tactic appeared to have worked, for Chamberlain at least, as he wrote to Wolmer on his return to England later that month, ‘I shall be glad to be able once more to take my place amongst you’.28 The Liberal Unionist party would remain allied with the Tories, but they would remain Liberals as well. [Fig. 3] Writing in the party newspa- per, Ebenezer Le Riche blamed the party’s defeats in the 1892 election on the overly close relationship with the Conservatives. ‘At meetings the relative merits of the Conservative and Liberal parties were pointed out, the Conservative big drum was beaten, the party colours and sentiments flaunted wholly regard- Chamberlain attempted to pre- Fig. 1: ‘Cross- tried to put pressure on Hartington, less of the 10 to 40 per cent of radi- empt the damage this would cause Roads’. Salisbury: on the ground that ‘every day brings cals who were thereby alienated to the Radical Unionists by estab- ‘Hullo! Aren’t you me letters from Liberal Unionists in and whose votes lost us the seat.’29 lishing a national association dis- fellows going all parts of the country asking me Study of the work of the chief tinct from Hartington’s in London further with me?’ what the issue is and where we still ideologues of the party, the profes- and with a speech in which he sug- (Punch, 31 July, differ from our old colleagues … I sor of Law, A. V. Dicey, the scien- gested the formation of a national 1886) am at my wit’s end to know … what tist and banker, Sir John Lubbock, progressive party to implement Fig. 2: ‘The to say to prevent the disappearance and the Irish historian, W. E. H. land and local government reform temptations of of our followers in the country’. It Lecky confirms that Liberal prin- in Ireland. Of course, for Lord Joseph’. No. 2 was at this juncture, with his allies ciples were still championed by the Salisbury and , there The Sirens. Harty: deserting him and his constituents Liberal Unionist party long into the was nothing to gain and much to ‘Come away, questioning his stance on coercion, twentieth century. What motivated lose from such a reorganisation. Joe, come away, that Salisbury handed Chamberlain Liberal Unionists was more than a This issue was only resolved by they’ll be the a lifeline, or at least a breathing mere ‘fear of socialism’ and arose Hartington’s ex cathedra pronounce- ruin of you’. (St space. The opportunity to repre- from a contrasting interpretation ment at Greenwich on 5 August, Stephen’s Review sent Britain in the fisheries dispute of Liberalism and nationalism to when he announced ‘that the time is presentation between Canada and United States that of Gladstone. It took until 1895 not yet ripe for such closer union’.26 cartoon, 26 would give Chamberlain the chance for the Liberal Unionists to find an Constantly frustrated, Chamberlain February 1887) to prove his skill as a statesman and opportunity to portray themselves

18 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance as more authentically Liberal than saw an opportunity to make trou- under pressure from Balfour, and Rosebery’s shambolic government, ble. This reflected a distrust of John Bright’s son won the subse- and a strong case can be made that radicalism that was certainly still quent by-election with a majority it was the Liberal Unionists who felt by many local Conservatives. Fig. 3: ‘Is of nearly 3,000. made the decisive contribution to In the North Buckinghamshire marriage a To ease relations on a local the Unionist landslide of that year.30 by-election in October 1889, one failure?’ [Letter level, Wolmer now urged Liberal of Evelyn Hubbard’s Conservative from a Liberal Unionist Associations to regu- supporters ‘began his speech in Unionist]. late their relations with their Antagonism the following style. “Chapter XV, ‘Dear Sir – I was Conservative allies through the At a local level in Britain in the verse 7 of the book of common divorced from creation of joint committees. late nineteenth century, Liberal– sense – ‘never trust a radical.’”’32 a Party called In West Derbyshire, for exam- Conservative animosities were The rapidly shrinking radical Liberal, and am ple, a Joint Unionist Committee enforced by religious, social and Unionist section of the party felt now united in was organised, comprising two working allegiances and these that the Birmingham seat was a the bonds of members of the Liberal Unionist proved remarkably resilient, even vital test of the party’s credibility matrimony to a Association and three members when the cause of Union and empire as an independent force. A hast- Tory Party. I do of the Conservative Association. offered a bridge between them. The ily organised party conference not like it quite This committee became the chief first of many disputes which was to was held in Birmingham at the so much as I organising body in the constitu- hamper the Unionist alliance until end of April with Hartington, expected.’ Yours, ency, meeting in 1892 before the the ‘fusion’ of 1912, took place at Lord Camperdown and the Duke ‘Much-married election and in 1893 and 1895. Joint St Ives in June 1887. Here, as in so of St Albans all attending. The man’ (Fun, 29 Unionist meetings regularly took many of the later cases, the issue of Conservative candidate withdrew, August 1888) place within the constituency, and disagreement was disestablishment. Salisbury correctly commented ‘I generally find that it is that ques- tion that makes the difficulty’.31 Local party leaders, accustomed to a simple divide between Liberal and Conservative, became increasingly restive at having to support a local Conservative candidate. Clearly the problem was becoming more seri- ous, particularly as the position of the Liberal Unionists became more fragile as their membership haem- orrhaged back to Gladstone in the aftermath of the Crimes Bill. Some, who found their Liberalism under question, chose to remind their electorate of their principles by criticising their Tory allies. Henry James, still supported by the Liberal caucus in Bury, attended a dinner at the and gave a speech attacking the . Between 1887 and 1892, the Liberal Unionist party lost nineteen out of twenty three by-elections, including ones in their stronghold of western Scotland, and the Liberal Unionist Associations began to demand what they perceived as their side of the electoral bargain from the Conservatives. The growing divi- sions between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists at constitu- ency level finally found public expression in the dispute over the candidate for John Bright’s seat in 1889. Chamberlain regarded Birmingham Central as his to allocate, but the local Conservatives, bitter opponents of Chamberlain long before 1886,

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 19 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance at every election until 1900 a joint from the Conservative leader in Unionists were ‘soured at the muti- Unionist manifesto was issued by the commons, Balfour, a letter of nous spirit that the Conservatives the committee. support for his chosen candidate, are showing’.40 These quickly The problematic issue of dis- the speaker’s son, George.35 Alfred receded once the election campaign establishment resurfaced however Austin in the Standard and Gerorge of 1895 was under way, but the with the ill-advised attempt to Curzon in the New Review, with at antipathy between certain Unionist debate the position of the Welsh least the tacit consent of Salisbury, Associations continued to trouble church in 1891. On 1 January 1892 took the opportunity to launch the alliance even when the cen- a correspondent of The Times noted attacks on Chamberlain’s behaviour tral Associations merged in 1912. that, although ‘there is at the present and character.36 When a public meet- The Birmingham Liberal Unionist time complete harmony so far as ing was held at Leamington Town Association held aloof and refused the leaders are concerned’, this was Hall to launch Peel’s campaign, he to amalgamate until January 1918. not the case in the rank and file of was humiliated, and Chamberlain The parties’ both parties, amongst whom ‘there hurriedly dropped him and adopted managers is a certain amount of jealousy and Alfred Lyttleton, the sporting hero Bias suspicion’.33 Shortly after becom- and a friend of Balfour’s, as a com- and organis- The parties’ managers and organ- ing party leader in the Commons, promise candidate acceptable to the isers, imbued with far greater this jealousy was expressed in an local Conservatives.37 ers, imbued authority since the expansion of area doubly close to Chamberlain The crisis of Hythe is less well- the franchise in 1884, were charged himself. At East Worcestershire, the known. Sir , MP with far with enforcing a Westminster elec- unexpected resignation of Hastings, for Hythe, was seriously ill in toral pact in the constituencies and on a charge of fraud, had led 1894 and looked unlikely to stand greater they too proved less than enthu- Chamberlain to persuade his eld- again, and the Liberal Unionist siastic in working harmoniously est son, Austen, to stand as a Liberal chief agent, John Boraston, com- authority with those who had previously Unionist for the constituency that plained that the local Conservative been their bitterest enemies. After included the Chamberlain home leader had forced their candidate since the the 1886 election, in which there at Highbury. Unfortunately, the forward against the wishes of the were remarkably few disagreements chairman of the local Conservative local Liberal Unionists. When expansion of over candidatures, disputes over the Association, Victor Milward, Devonshire approached Salisbury, allocations of seats emerged, and insisted that Austen Chamberlain the Conservative leader was a lit- the franchise the Conservatives’ managers were must pledge not to vote for dis- tle taken aback. ‘Mr Boraston’s clearly intent on serving the inter- establishment in order to receive information to you is in hopeless in 1884, were ests of their own party. In the first the support of local Conservatives. disagreement with the information dispute at St Ives, Hartington wrote The Conservatives were eventu- which has been furnished to me charged with to Salisbury complaining about ally faced down when Chamberlain by Douglas.’38 As far as Salisbury enforcing a the behaviour of the Conservative suggested that if pledges against was concerned Bevan Edwards, chief agent, Richard Middleton. disestablishment were to be asked the chairman of the Hythe Westminster Middleton thought little of his new from Liberal Unionists, pledges in Conservative Association, was allies, observing in mid-1887, ‘with- favour of disestablishment might now adopted as the Unionist can- electoral out the Conservative party … no be asked from Conservatives by didate for Hythe. The rival Liberal Liberal Unionist can secure his seat Liberal Unionists. Following the Unionist was ordered to withdraw pact in the in any future election’.41 The actions crisis, Lord Salisbury held the first his candidature once a Unionist of the Birmingham Gazette in pro- joint meeting of the Unionist lead- coalition Cabinet had been formed, constituen- voking the crises in Birmingham ership that year, but the issue of dis- and Edwards won the seat at the in 1889 look particularly significant establishment continued to hinder general election. cies and they when one considers that Middleton the relations between the radical With the concatenation of was chairman of the syndicate that Unionists and the moderates and the Hythe, Leamington and too proved controlled the Gazette, a news- Conservatives. Birmingham disputes, it seemed a paper which was the rival of the At Leamington and Warwick, genuine Unionist crisis was under- less than pro-Chamberlain Birmingham Post. just outside Chamberlain’s duchy, way, and Boraston was keen to When Middleton was finally forced the most serious local crisis between encourage Chamberlain’s sense of enthusiastic to disown Randolph Churchill’s the parties of the Unionist Alliance grievance. He sent Chamberlain a attempt to contest the seat and order took place shortly before the fall letter from the honorary secretary in working the Birmingham Conservatives to of Rosebery’s ministry in 1895. 34 of a northern Association. ‘There back down, for the sake of future Here the Speaker, Arthur Peel, had is an intensely strong feeling as to harmoni- relations, the dispute was pre- represented the seat since 1865, and the questions which have arisen ously with sented as merely the work of the ill he had been counted among the at Hythe and Leamington. If the informed and malicious. Liberal Unionists as he had been matter is not settled soon and in those who In the wake of the crisis, how- opposed by the local Conservatives our favour you may rest assured ever, there was now a need to in 1885 (despite the speakership), that a good many Liberal Unionists had previ- define exactly what the relationship but not in 1886 or 1892. On the will not stir one peg at the next between the two Unionist parties announcement of his retirement in General Election’.39 Boraston con- ously been should be and to turn the verbal March 1895, the local Conservatives tinued to worry Chamberlain by ‘compact’ of 1886 into a more for- claimed the right to contest the seat. telling him of the experiences of their bitter- mal document. Hartington was Chamberlain stuck to the terms of Liberal Unionists in Barnstaple and forced to ask Wolmer, the newly the 1889 ‘compact’ and extracted Tavistock where the local Liberal est enemies. appointed party whip, whether

20 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance any agreement existed in writing. The precise Conservative majority in a future liberal achievements in the period, It clearly did not and Salisbury election, rather than a Unionist one with the introduction of free ele- only reluctantly agreed to extend nature of the and this appeared to cause little con- mentary education and the content the agreement to include the cru- cern to the Conservative managers. of the 1888 Local Government Act, cial issue of candidate vacancies. legislative As this likelihood drew nearer in both of which Chamberlain had Three heads were agreed so as to early 1895, the malicious influence demanded in the ‘unauthorised avoid any repetition of the Central programme of Akers –Douglas and Middleton programme’ three years earlier, Birmingham dispute. It is notable on the alliance became appar- but there was scant achievement that in the event of dispute over the that the ent in the Hythe and Leamington in Ireland and friction over the choice of candidate, the party lead- disputes. At Hythe, adjacent to Church. Hartington knew that ers in the Commons, W. H. Smith alliance Akers-Douglas’ Kentish fiefdom, Chamberlain could only demand and Hartington, would be con- wished to see the Conservative chief whip was so much, as ‘he knows too well sulted, not the party managers, who brazenly partisan. Devonshire that the Gladstonians hate him too were usually responsible for the enacted pre- wrote to Chamberlain complain- much ever to take him back again’.45 selection of candidates. Although ing that ‘A. Douglas seems to have When Hartington succeeded to the not explicit, it is possible to imag- sented the been acting in a very extraordinary Dukedom of Devonshire at the end ine that the Liberal Unionists now manner.’43 Chamberlain was clearly of 1891 however, the party took a distrusted Middleton to act in a most serious concerned about the behaviour of gamble, appointing Chamberlain as disinterested fashion, especially the Conservative whip, as he now leader in the Commons, in the hope where West Midland seats were challenge, began to keep detailed notes of of restraining his radical instincts, concerned. Akers-Douglas’ role in the crisis. whilst retaining his undoubted elec- Despite this document, real- especially Middleton’s role in stirring up toral appeal. At a meeting to endorse politik meant that the choice of the Conservatives in Leamington his leadership at Devonshire House candidate was largely determined with such was revealed in my article on the on 8 February 1892, rather than by Salisbury, no doubt advised by dispute,44 and he also played a role avoiding the difficult issue of dis- Akers-Douglas and Middleton to contrast in in stiffening Conservative resolve establishment, Chamberlain made give as little away as possible. In at Hythe. Less well known is that his position clear. ‘I stated my Cambridge in 1892, where there ideological a second dispute arose at his behest intention of continuing to support was a strong Liberal Unionist pres- in Central Birmingham in July by vote, and in any other way that ence among academics, Hartington heritage of 1895 when Lord Charles Beresford seemed fitting, the disestablishment tried to have Albert Grey adopted offered himself as a Conservative of the State church.’46 for the university and Montagu the parties. candidate, once Albert Bright’s Chamberlain attempted to Crackenthorpe adopted for the intention to stand down became exploit his association with radical- city constituency. Despite the aris- public. It was reported to ism in the few months before the tocratic lineage of the former and Chamberlain that Middleton took election in 1892, by returning to the strongly anti-socialist beliefs a keen interest in the affairs of the issue of social reform that had of the latter, Salisbury refused to Birmingham, and Powell Williams proved so successful at the Aston by- give way. In 1892, when the Liberal was in no doubt that the crisis was election the previous year. Bolstered Unionists lost 37 per cent of their once again of Middleton’s doing, by the increase in the majorities parliamentary strength overall, but all he could suggest was that of the six Liberal Unionist seats in while the Conservatives lost only Bright should fight the general elec- Birmingham and the four in neigh- 19 per cent of theirs, Chamberlain tion and then resign. In the end, a bouring areas in 1892, he stepped complained bitterly to Heneage, ‘I compromise Liberal Unionist can- up his attempts to persuade his am afraid we get put off with all the didate was selected, to demonstrate party and the Tories to accept a pro- hopeless seats and in this way we are Chamberlain’s willingness to meet gramme of social reform, writing to slowly edged out of existence as a the Conservatives’ concerns about James, ‘our Unionist programme of separate party’.42 the proposed candidate, Grosvenor the last 5 years is nearly exhausted The impact of the 1892 general Lee. Beresford was forced to with- … If we attempt to win on a policy election results distinctly altered draw his candidature after he came of negation, the fate of the mod- the relationship between the two under pressure from Salisbury, erates on the LCC will be ours’.47 parties. From Salisbury’s perspec- who was, as at Leamington, forced In November 1892 Chamberlain tive the result was perhaps as good to intervene to undo his principal published an article, ‘The Labour as he might have expected. His agent’s mischief. Question’ in the Nineteenth Century, party was in need of a rest after advocating an increasingly collec- the unusual experience of minor- tivist approach from the Unionists ity administration for seven years. Policy differences in order to prevent the emergence The Conservative dominance of the The precise nature of the legislative of class-based politics, which the and the small size of programme that the alliance wished election of Kier Hardie seemed to the Gladstonian majority (depend- to see enacted presented the most presage. Despite the clear dislike ent on Irish votes) told Salisbury serious challenge, especially with for collectivism that many Liberal that a second Home Rule Bill could such contrast in ideological herit- Unionist had previously voiced, the be successfully resisted and that any age of the parties. Without a docu- party, desperate to avoid political Liberal administration was likely ment of agreed policy, the struggle oblivion, fell into line behind their to be short-lived. The dramatic for influence continually unsettled leader in the Commons. Installed decline of the Liberal Unionists the alliance. The Liberal Unionist as chief organiser by Chamberlain, now raised the prospect of a party could point to two solidly Joseph Powell Williams had the

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 21 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

When, after the Second Home Rule Bill, Chamberlain demanded an alternative Unionist reform programme at Bradford on 2 June 1894, Balfour responded more positively, increasingly convinced by Chamberlain’s argument that such pledges were necessary for the Unionists to break through in the north and in Wales. By the time Chamberlain spoke to his con- stituents in West Birmingham in October, as well as an extension to the Artisans’ Dwellings Act, a House Purchase Act, employers’ liability and alien immigration, there was a call to enact temperance reform and a tribunal of industrial arbitra- tion. In his ongoing attempt to win Salisbury’s approval, the restric- tion of labour hours was explicitly limited to miners and shopkeepers (therefore excluding domestic serv- ants and agricultural labourers as Salisbury and his party wanted). As for old age pensions, Chamberlain now stated that ‘I do not propose to give everyone a pension as a matter of right; I propose to help the work- ing classes to help themselves’.50 The first response from Hatfield was eventually made public in a speech at at the end of October. Salisbury admitted that he had sympathy for Chamberlain’s ‘gen- eral objectives’ but claimed to have no knowledge of the detailed pro- gramme that the Liberal Unionists party’s publicity department print Fig. 4: ‘Juggler prejudice’.48 This could not disguise were preparing. [Fig. 4] posters, pamphlets and even song- Joe and his the fact that Rosebery was attempt- By contrast, Balfour appeared books endorsing social reform. vanishing ing to occupy the same collectiv- ever more eager to endorse Speakers operating the Union Jack programme’ ist ground as the Liberal Unionists Chamberlain’s proposals whole- vans took Chamberlain’s message (Westminster and that the actions of the Lords heartedly, claiming in November throughout the country and the Gazette, 9 July in blocking these reforms would that the Unionists would have ‘a more radical party Associations 1895) undermine Chamberlain’s own monopoly of [social] legislation’. such as that of the West of Scotland programme. When Rosebery’s Buoyed by this, Chamberlain sud- filled the local press with endorse- Employers’ Liability Act was denly ceased his caution, perhaps ments. Even Devonshire was thrown out by the upper house, realising that he would never win eventually persuaded to support it Powell Williams warned Wolmer over Salisbury and began to make (cautiously) as the election of 1895 of the consequences. ‘The effect a number of wild promises to the drew near. of the loss of the Bill on the north electorate. Speaking at Heywood At first the reaction from the is very bad indeed … This is not in Lancashire later that month, he Conservatives was lukewarm. an opinion. I can give you proof.’49 made the choice for working class Although Balfour expressed his Powell Williams, now the par- voters clear. sympathy in a speech at ty’s chief manager, encouraged You may as I have said, try to dis- in December, he was unwilling to local Associations in the north of establish the Welsh church, or you commit to specific policies. After England, the West of Scotland, may, on the other hand, try to Gladstone’s retirement, Rosebery Ulster and Cornwall to pledge become the owners of your own had signalled a new direction for their support for a sustained cam- houses. You may attempt to pass the party with the introduction of paign of Unionist reform. Although an Irish Land Bill, or you may an Employers’ Liability Bill in 1893, criticised in the Tory press continu- attempt to get old age pensions for swiftly followed by the Mines Eight ously, the campaign was supported yourselves.51 Hours Bill. Chamberlain firstly by such solidly liberal figures as strove to distance his programme , a prime mover Balfour continued to encourage from that of the Liberals, accus- in the Women’s Liberal Unionist Chamberlain’s campaign dur- ing them of issuing ‘appeals to class Association. ing a speech in January 1895 at

22 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

Liberal Unionist spokesman on this issue and it was left to an equally quiescent Devonshire, as Lord President, to attend a conference on the Poor Law at Derby in September 1895, where he stated that ‘a great proportion of even the industri- ous aged poor must be depend- ent for their support … [on] the Poor Law’.57 [Fig. 6] Chamberlain’s advocacy of social reform for the common good would only be res- urrected by the united party in the changed circumstances of the inter-war years, when it proved to be a valuable asset for Baldwin and in offering an alternative to the Labour party’s collectivist programme.

Conclusion The nine years of political manoeu- vring, between 1886 and 1895, Manchester in which he claimed manifesto, although he claimed Fig. 5: ‘On demonstrated the dangers of col- that social reform came second to that ‘Unionist leaders are absolutely the altar of laborating with the Conservatives. the maintenance of the Union in the agreed in their determination … the coalition’ In a warning that Nick Clegg might Alliance’s priorities. Emboldened to devote their principal attention (Westminster heed, Arthur Pease, who had stayed by this, Chamberlain became even to a policy of constructive social Gazette, 5 July loyal to Gladstone, gave his view of more open in his programme, even reform’, he no longer enunciated 1895) the compromises that the Liberal referring to social issues as ‘the pri- specific policies.54 [Fig. 5] It cannot Unionists had had to make in these mary policy’ in his response to the be denied, however, that support for years: Queen’s Speech in the Commons in elements of the social programme I have often thought of a story February.52 was widespread among Liberal vot- I was told as a child of a Russian The campaign to convince the ers and the party’s achievement of Fig. 6: ‘The cold family flying before a pack of Conservative leadership to accept seventy seats, including nine in the water cure’. wolves, in their sledge with four Chamberlain’s programme was north of England and one in Wales, (Westminster horses. To save themselves they terminated however by the local owed much to popular expectation Gazette, 21 tried sacrificing one horse, then crises at Hythe, Leamington and of substantial reform. September 1895) Birmingham which broke out in With the election over, Salisbury spring 1895 as the prospect of elec- made it clear that ‘the condition tion victory drew close. Having of England’ would not be eagerly realised that he was in no position confronted under his premiership. to make political demands after the The Queen’s Speech of August 1895 Leamington debacle, Chamberlain contained no mention of domes- was faced with an opportunity to tic reform at all, and he did noth- distance himself from his own pro- ing to prevent an amendment to gramme when it received the sup- the speech asking for measures port of Mrs Fawcett, who spoke to address unemployment from at a meeting of the Metropolitan being defeated by 211 votes to 79. Liberal Unionist Federation in May Speaking at Brighton in November, and who proposed a motion urg- he made his caution clear, ‘how- ing the party leadership to press ever much you may desire to ben- forward measures of social reform. efit your neighbour, you do not Chamberlain, chastened by his benefit him by taking money out treatment by the Conservative of the pockets of another man.’ In press, failed to respond to Mrs contrast to Chamberlain, he prom- Fawcett’s invitation and instead ised that ‘the sufferings under which spoke of his priority as ‘the expan- agriculture is groaning are the first sion of the empire’. On the same evils to which we must apply our- day, Salisbury spoke at Bradford, selves’.55 It is difficult to dissent making it clear that ‘nothing would from David Steele’s conclusion that induce me to adopt the socialistic unlike Gladstone and Devonshire, [sic] remedies’, but he acknowl- Salisbury had successfully tamed edged, ‘there is an evil’.53 When Chamberlain.56 Chamberlain at the Chamberlain issued his personal colonial office was no longer the

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 23 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

another, each victim reprieving ‘To be used schools in the Education Bill, he abandonment of the principle of free them for a short time from a ter- defended the Cabinet’s decision in trade, and of the legacy of Cobden rible fate, and in their desperation as the ladder a series of ill-tempered meetings and Bright, was one pill they would finally sacrificing their children, in Birmingham.59 Chamberlain’s not swallow under any circum- and all in vain … [Liberal] prin- up which Joe great achievement between 1886 stances. Between 1903 and 1906, ciples, their promises … all had and 1902 had been in secur- eight Liberal Unionist free trade to be thrown away to defeat the climbs into a 58 ing the affection of a substantial MPs left the party and rejoined the policy of conciliation and justice. body of Nonconformist Liberals Liberals.66 James, in common with Conservative though the agency of bodies such the remaining Liberal Unionist free In truth, some Liberal Unionists as the Nonconformist Unionist traders, refused to campaign for remained as committed to policies Government, Association, Now, as he wrote to Balfour and Chamberlain: such as temperance, non-denom- Devonshire, ‘our best friends are waving aloft We see the Unionist flag held inational education, state support leaving us by scores and hundreds aloft, but beneath it Protectionist for the poor, further franchise never to return.’60 This spread his banner forces are gathered. We free trad- reform and disestablishment as nationally until a major pro- ers have a right to say these are not they had been in 1885. Of course, test meeting was held at Queen’s of shoddy our friends, we will not fight on these policies posed a particular Hall, London on 10 June, where their side.67 threat to the party of the church, reform then Nonconformist Unionists were the farmer and the businessman described as those ‘who gave their The former governor of Ceylon, – the Conservatives – and were, to be thrown votes to the betrayal of their co- West Ridgeway, wrote an article as a result, a significant stumbling religionists’.61 Paul Readman has on the death of the Liberal Unionist block in the Unionist alliance. What ignomini- suggested that the Education Bill party in which he claimed that the emerged instead, was a commit- was valuable ammunition in the party had been ‘strangled by its own ment to the rule of law, a defence ously aside. A Liberal party’s post-war attempt to parent.’68 Beatrice Webb noted the of the benefits of the Union and regain ownership of liberal, patri- effect her former sweetheart had the historic mission of the British fit ending for otic constitutionalism, in the face of had upon ‘the poor, dear Liberal empire. The persistence of political the (alleged) denominational, sec- Unionists – that little company of sectarianism among party managers a company of tarian and anti-democratic bill.62 At upright, narrowly enlightened, well and among many local activists that the time, Edward Porritt considered bred men.’ was revealed by the events in Hythe, prigs!’ that ‘much of the disappearance of To be used as the ladder up which Leamington and Birmingham, led Liberal Unionism is traceable to the Joe climbs into a Conservative to the strategic decision to create a Education Act of 1902.’63 Government, waving aloft his coalition immediately prior to the Chamberlain was therefore banner of shoddy reform then to 1895 election. It was also a political desperate to reassert his Radical be thrown ignominiously aside. A decision on Chamberlain’s part, to credentials, and the tariff reform fit ending for a company of prigs!69 use the imperial mission between campaign, with its initial promises 1895 and 1903 to finally try to bring of social reform, certainly allowed a genuine affinity to the two wings him to consolidate his support in Ian Cawood is Head of History at of unionism. The party’s survival Birmingham.64 To take a more Newman University College and author was thus assured into the twenti- sympathetic view, the new policy of several articles on, and a forthcoming eth century, but eventual fusion can be seen as consistent with all history of the Liberal Unionist Party. with the Conservatives could only Chamberlain’s actions since 1886. be avoided with the active cultiva- Tariff reform was another attempt 1 V. Bogdanor, ‘Electoral pacts in Great tion of the local party’s separate to promote the interests of the Britain since 1886’, in D. Kavanagh identity by the leadership, even as nation above those of particular (ed.), Electoral politics (Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1992), pp. 165–187, at p. 179; they entered a Unionist coalition classes or national groups, just like W. C. Lubenow, Liberal Intellectuals and Cabinet. That this support was not the defence of the Union in 1886 and Public Culture in Modern Britain, 1815– forthcoming is clear from the party 1893, and the promotion of ‘con- 1914 (Boydell, 2010), pp. 192–193. records after 1895, which show little structive unionism’ in his social 2 J. L. Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain opposition to Middleton’s appro- programme of 1892–1895. The (Macmillan, 1932), vol. ii, p. 137. priation of former Liberal Unionist attempt to fuse patriotism with an 3 A. Hawkins, British Party Politics, 1852– 1886 (Macmillan, 1998), p. 246. constituencies, at least outside attack on ‘the condition of England’ 4 Derby’s diary, 10 Dec. 1885, The Later the area controlled by the West had motivated his negotiations Derby Diaries: Home Rule, Liberal of Scotland regional Association. with Unionism, and Aristocratic Life in late Vic- Some radicals and committed in the mid-1880s and his wooing torian England (University of , Liberals such as T. W. Russell and of Balfour after 1891 and helps to 1981), p. 44. Parry suggests that the Leonard Courtney refused to go explain his enormous popularity announcement of home rule, was, for in the Midlands.65 It also provided Gladstone, ‘a final, if flawed, attempt’ along with this and grumbled, to reconcile the disparate elements of resigned or returned to the Liberal an ideological glue to bind the two the Liberal Party. J. P. Parry, ‘Liber- Party, but Chamberlain no longer Unionist parties together as the alism and Liberty’, in P. Mandler (ed.) needed the Liberal Unionists as Conservative party had a long- Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain much as he needed to prove his standing protectionist instinct that (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 99. acceptability to the Tories. even Salisbury had occasionally 5 B. Holland, Life of Spencer Compton, 8th By 1902 despite being opposed indulged. To Liberals like Arthur Duke of Devonshire (Longman, 1911), vol. ii, p. 86; Hartington to Gladstone, to those clauses that provided rate- Elliot, Henry James and Sir John 8 November 1885, Devonshire Papers, payer funding for denominational Lubbock (now Lord Avebury) the Chatsworth House, 340.1826.

24 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

6 Quoted in H. C. G. Matthew, Glad- action as ‘a colossal blunder’. 61 Quoted in S. E. Koss, Nonconformity in stone, 1875–1898 (Clarendon Press, 36 Standard, 3 April 1895; Anon. (‘Z’), Modern British Politics (Batsford, 1975) 1995), p. 240. ‘Two Demagogues: A Parallel and a p. 46. 7 Queen Victoria to Goschen, 28 Jan. Moral’, New Review, 12 (April 1895), 62 P. Readman, ‘The Liberal Party and 1886, Royal Archive, Windsor Castle, pp. 364–70. Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century B66/8. 37 “Emergency” Council Meeting, 26 Britain’, Twentieth Century British His- 8 S. Lee, Queen Victoria: A Biography April 1895, Warwick and Leaming- tory, 12/3 (2003), pp. 273–281. See also A. (Smith, Elder & Co., 1904), pp. 492–493. ton Conservative Party Association Sykes, The Rise and Fall of British Liberal- See also D. Steele, Lord Salisbury: A Politi- minute book, Warwick Record Office, ism, 1776–1988 (Longman, 1997), p. 150. cal Biography (UCL Press, 1999), p. 197. CR1392. 63 E. Porritt, ‘Party Conditions in Eng- 9 E. Watkin to Hartington, 25 Dec. 1885, 38 Salisbury to Devonshire, 3 March land’, Political Science Quarterly, 21 DP 340.1871 1895, Chamberlain Papers, University (1906), p. 213. 10 Later Derby Diaries, 14 Jan. 1886, p. 55. of Birmingham, JC6/1E/6. 64 See R. A. Rempel, Unionists Divided: 11 A. Jackson, Colonel Edward Saunderson: 39 J. H. Cooke to Boraston, 25 March Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain and Land and Loyalty in Victorian Ireland 1895, JC6/6/1F/17. the Unionist Free Traders (David and (Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 90. 40 Boraston to Chamberlain, 26 March Charles, 1972) for a detailed account 12 Salisbury to Akers-Douglas, 2 Feb. 1895, JC6/6/1F/18. of the divisions between the Tariff 1886, Centre for Kentish Studies, 41 Middleton to Akers-Douglas, 9 July Reformers and Free Traders. Akers-Douglas Papers, U564 C18/6. 1887, quoted in E. Alexander, Chief 65 G. R. Searle, Country before Party: Coa- 13 Henry James, 4 March 1886, quoted in Whip: The political life and times of Are- lition and the Idea of ‘National Government P. Marsh, Discipline of Popular Govern- tas Akers-Douglas, 1st in Modern Britain, 1885–1987 (Longman, ment: Lord Salisbury’s Domestic Statecraft (Routledge and Paul, 1961), p. 135. 1995), pp. 49–50. 1881–1902 (Harvester, 1978), p. 109. 42 Chamberlain to Heneage, 6 July 1892, 66 T. W. Russell, J. Wilson (February 14 Salisbury to Hartington, 5 April 1886, JC5/41/30. 1904), I. Guest (April 1904), G. Kemp, DP 340.1961 43 Devonshire to Chamberlain, 3 March E. Hain (August 1904), E. Mitchell, J. 15 Later Derby Diaries, 23 March 1886, pp. 1895, JC5/22/85. Wood (March 1905), R. Cavendish (Jan- 64–5. 44 Cawood, ‘Joseph Chamberlain’, pp. uary 1906). E. J. Reed, MP for 16 The Times, 30 April 1886. 568–571. Boroughs, defected from the Liberals 17 Scottish News, 13 May 1886. 45 Hartington to Wolmer, 1 Feb. 1890, in support of tariff reform in December 18 Birmingham Daily Post, 25 May 1886. Selborne MS II (4) 65–69. 1904. Russell’s defection largely handed 19 Hartington to James, 15 Dec. 1886, 46 Joseph Chamberlain’s ‘Memoir’ dated the Ulster Liberal Unionist party to Hereford Record Office, Henry James 1892, JC/8/1/1. Saunderson and , who Papers, M45/242. 47 Chamberlain to James, 2 Oct. 1892, founded the Ulster Unionist Council in 20 L. Courtney to A. R. D. Elliot, 31 M45/1718. 1905 to bring all the Unionist factions Dec.1886, Courtney Papers, London 48 Liberal Unionist Association Memoranda, under their centralised control. A. Jack- School of Economics, V/43. 2:3, March 1894. son, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in 21 Quoted in Garvin, Life of Joseph Cham- 49 Powell Williams to Wolmer, 4 March the House of Commons, 1884–1911 (Oxford berlain, vol. ii, pp. 277–278. 1894, Selborne MS II (13) 140–143. University Press, 1989), p. 104. 22 L. Harcourt’s journal, 28 Dec. 1886, P. 50 LUAM 2/11, Nov. 1894. 67 The Times, 1 Jan. 1906; 3 Jan. 1906. Elliot Jackson (ed.), Loulou: Selected extracts 51 LUAM, 2/12, Dec. 1894. and James even went as far as to attempt from the journals of Lewis Harcourt (1880– 52 LUAM, 3/3, March 1895. (unsuccessfully) to persuade Devon- 1895) (Fairleigh Dickinson University 53 LUAM, 3/6, June 1895. shire to issue a manifesto calling on vot- Press, 2006), p. 143; M. C. Hurst, Joseph 54 LUAM, 3/8, Aug. 1895. ers to support Liberal candidates, but Chamberlain and Liberal Reunion: The 55 LUAM, 3/12, Dec. 1895. Balfour had already secured a prom- round table conference of 1887 (Routledge 56 Steele, Lord Salisbury, p. 374. ise from him ‘to do as little damage to and Paul, 1967). 57 LUAM, 3/10, Oct. 1895. Unionism as possible.’ G. R. Askwith, 23 Bright to Wolmer, 24 April 1887, Bod- 58 A. E. Pease, Elections and Recollections Lord James of Hereford (Ernest Benn, leian Library, Selborne Papers, MS II (John Murray, 1932), p. 274. 1930), p. 291; Elliot to James, 23 Nov. (13) 28. 59 In particular, see reports of the meet- 1905, M45/1414; Balfour to Devonshire 24 Bury Guardian, 18 April 1887; Bury ing of the Birmingham, Aston and (copy), 27 Oct. 1905, M45/1399; Devon- Times, 30 April 1887. Handsworth LUA, 16 May 1902, The shire to James, 12 Dec. 1905, M45/1419. 25 Hansard, 3rd series, 29 March 1887. Times, 17 May 1902; Birmingham Lib- 68 J. W. Ridgeway, ‘The Liberal Union- 26 Liberal Unionist, 20 (Sept. 1887). eral Unionist Conference, 9 Oct. 1902, ist Party’, The Nineteenth Century and 27 Liberal Unionist, 27 (April 1888). The Times, 10 Oct. 1902. After, August 1905, p. 182. 28 Chamberlain to Wolmer, 13 March 60 J. Chamberlain to Devonshire, 22 69 B. Webb, Our Partnership (Longmans, 1888, Selborne MS I (8) 1. Sept. 1902, DP 340.2998. Green & co, 1948), p. 125. 29 Liberal Unionist, 80 (Sept. 1892). 30 P. Readman, ‘The 1895 general elec- tion and political change in late Vic- torian England’, Historical Journal, 42 Liberal Democrat History Group on the web (1999), pp. 467–493, at pp. 473–481; M. Pugh, ‘Working-class experience and Email state social welfare, 1908–1914: old age Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest pensions reconsidered’, Historical Jour- way to find out what we’re doing. To join the list, fill in the form at:http://bit.ly/LDHGemail . nal, 45 (2002), pp. 775–796, at p. 795. 31 Salisbury to Hartington, 23 May 1887, Website DP 340.2131. See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of History Group activities, records of all past Journals and 32 Liberal Unionist, 46 (Nov. 1889). 33 The Times, 1 Jan. 1892. past meetings, guides to archive sources, research in progress and other research resources, together 34 I. Cawood, ‘Joseph Chamberlain, the with a growing number of pages on the history of the party, covering particular issues and periods in Conservative party and the Leaming- more detail, including lists of party leaders, election results and cabinet ministers. ton Spa candidature dispute of 1895’, Historical Research, 79 (Nov. 2006), pp. page 554–577. See us on Facebook for news of the latest meeting, and a discussion forum: 35 Wolmer to Salisbury, 18 & 25 April www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup 1895, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House. Wolmer described Balfour’s

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 25 The coalition of 1915 – 1916 prelude to Liberal disaster

The coalition of 1915– 1916 has not had a very good press. Liberals have traditionally disliked it because it signalled the end of the last Liberal government to hold power in the . Conservatives have not been much happier with it, seeing it as still dominated by the Liberal ‘old gang’ headed by Asquith, and insufficiently willing to take drastic action to support the army and organise the economy during the First World War. Ian Packer analyses the record of the 1915–16 coalition.

Does it represent a bove all, the coalition to form a new coalition, which health warning against did not deliver mili- did emerge triumphant in 1918. tary victory and it col- In these circumstances, not many Liberal coalitions with lapsed in acrimony in historians have had a kind word to December 1916, leav- say for the first wartime coalition Conservatives? ingA the field free for Lloyd George of 1915–1916.1 However, it was not

26 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 The coalition of 1915 – 1916 prelude to Liberal disaster

necessarily a particularly incompe- Edwardian politicians were, there- this could be read as implicit sup- tent administration, nor one that fore, scarcely averse to cross-party port for a coalition, if necessary.4 demonstrated that Liberals were cooperation. However, Asquith’s skillful han- unable to adapt their ideology to In August 1914, a Liberal– dling of his Cabinet banished the winning a modern war – it was just Conservative coalition was, for a spectre that the Conservative lead- in power during some of the most moment, a distinct possibility. The ers’ letter had summoned up. While desperate times of the First World leading figures in the Liberal gov- the Conservatives had twenty- War. The coalition did, though, ernment, particularly the prime five more MPs than the Liberals in prove disastrous for Liberalism minister, Asquith, and the Foreign August 1914, the Liberals retained by paving the way for the power Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, were a secure parliamentary majority struggle between Asquith and determined that Britain must inter- through the support of the thirty- Lloyd George which destroyed the vene in a continental war on the seven Labour MPs and eighty-five Edwardian Liberal Party. If the side of Russia and France.2 But a Irish Nationalists. Both Labour Liberal Party needs a warning that few other Cabinet members were and the Irish, under the leadership coalitions can be dangerous for your implacably opposed to this conti- of John Redmond, supported the health than the experience of 1915– nental ‘entanglement’, while the decision to declare war, though 1916 provides a salutary example. majority wavered in between. Until both parties, like the Liberals, con- That the First World War would two tense Cabinet meetings on 2 tained opponents of this decision.5 lead to a coalition government was August decided to support a dec- But once they had decided to sup- a possibility that hung over British laration of war if German troops port the Liberals they became bound politics from the very beginning invaded Belgium or German ships even more tightly to the govern- of the war. The political era before entered the Channel, it was pos- ment. If the Liberals were replaced 1914 is often seen as the classic time sible that the Liberal government by the Conservatives or a coali- when the ‘swing of the pendulum’ would collapse. In fact, only two tion government that contained ensured alternating Liberal and Cabinet ministers, Lord Morley Conservatives, then Labour and the Conservative governments, with and , resigned in protest Irish Nationalists feared that objec- secure parliamentary majorities. at this decision, while a maximum tives they held dear would be threat- But the existence of other parties of about twenty MPs harboured ened. Labour was worried that trade ensured that the picture was actu- serious doubts about entering the union privileges would be eroded ally far more complicated. The war.3 This outcome allowed the and particularly disliked the pos- Conservative government of 1886– Liberal government to survive vir- sibility of industrial conscription; 1892 relied on the Liberal Unionists tually intact and direct Britain into the Irish hoped above all to protect for its majority and the government the war. But if there had been an the Home Rule Act that was put on of 1895–1905 was a formal coali- avalanche of resignations from the the statute book in September 1914, tion of Conservatives and Liberal Liberal government it was possible though suspended until no later than Unionists. The Liberals relied on the that Asquith and the pro-interven- the end of the war. Irish Nationalists to support them tion ministers would have tried The Liberal government seemed in power in 1892–1895 and again in to survive in power by forming a safe for the time being. In wartime 1910–1914, with the infant Labour coalition with the Conservatives. the Conservative opposition could Party also providing help on the Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, not even criticise the government, latter occasion. In the whole period the Conservative leaders in the for fear of seeming unpatriotic, 1886–1914, only the Liberal govern- House of Commons and House of Left: especially when Asquith pulled ment of 1906–1910 was not either a Lords respectively, had written to H. H. Asquith, off the political masterstroke of coalition or reliant on another party Asquith on 2 August pledging their Liberal Prime appointing the leading general, for its majority. Late Victorian and full support for intervention and Minister 1908–16 Lord Kitchener, as Secretary of

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 27 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster

State for War.6 Divisions of course What under- lead to coalition was amply dem- of the ‘sudden curves’ in politics arose about how to conduct the onstrated in the early days of the he liked to think he had a special war, but they were not fatal to the mined the war in France. When German aptitude for spotting.12 On 17 May, Cabinet’s unity, which had been troops threatened Paris the out- Bonar Law called on Lloyd George built up over nine years of suc- Liberal gov- come was a national coalition under to confirm that Fisher had resigned. cessful peacetime administration. René Viviani on 28 August 1914. In the course of their conversation The crucial dispute was about how ernment and Many British politicians of course the idea of an all-party coalition much of the country’s economic hoped the war would be ‘over by government seems to have arisen and manpower resources should be paved the Christmas’ – and Liberal politicians (though who initiated the idea and committed to the war.7 A group of believed no doubt that a grateful in what context has remained a Liberal ministers, centred around way for the electorate would reward them for matter of dispute).13 When Lloyd McKenna, Runciman and Harcourt coalition was leading the nation to victory. But George reported his conversation took a cautious approach, fear- this prediction proved an illusion. to Asquith, the latter summoned ing that massively disrupting the simply its The decisive battle on the western Bonar Law to 10 Downing Street economy would lead to Britain’s front never came and was replaced and, in a conversation that alleg- financial collapse. Lloyd George, inability to by the stalemate of a line of trenches edly lasted only fifteen minutes, on the other hand, rapidly associ- from Switzerland to the North Sea. the termination of the last Liberal ated himself with a policy of ‘total win the war. In early 1915 the Liberal govern- government was agreed. Asquith war’, calling for a massive expan- ment still remained hopeful of an probably felt the need to strike a sion of munitions production and early victory, but these predictions, deal as quickly as possible, before his increasing government interven- too, came to nothing. Instead, a Cabinet’s authority and the Liberal tion in the economy. This was series of military and diplomatic Party’s popularity waned any fur- partly a temperamental difference, setbacks rattled the Cabinet’s opti- ther. A coalition would force the but it also reflected, to a certain mism. The spring Anglo-French Conservatives to share responsibil- extent, pre-war attitudes. Lloyd offensive on the Western Front ity (and blame) for wartime deci- George had been an advocate of failed to break the German lines. sions. It was, for this very reason, expanding the state’s role in social Instead it backfired on the govern- distinctly unpopular with many reform, while McKenna and his ment, when reports, inspired by Conservative leaders, but they felt allies had been much more dubious. military figures, appeared in The they could not refuse for fear of In wartime, Lloyd George merely Times on 14 May 1915, suggesting seeming to run away at a moment expanded his enthusiasm for state that British troops were being held of supreme national crisis.14 Labour, intervention to include organising back by a shortage of ammunition. too, accepted a Cabinet post to pro- the country for victory. This was At the same time, Churchill’s brain- tect trade union interests, while the certainly not a dispute between one child of a landing at the Dardanelles Irish Nationalists declined as they approach that was Liberal and one merely provided another military did not wish to be too closely associ- that was not: Liberalism before 1914 stalemate and neither forced the ated with a British government, or had accommodated itself to a great Ottoman Empire out of the war nor face taunts at home that they had deal of state intervention, espe- brought the neutral Balkan states accepted paid posts from the British cially in the field of social welfare.8 into the war on Britain’s side. On Crown.15 But it did lay the basis for some of 15 May Lord Fisher, the head of the The government that was the most acrimonious quarrels that Admiralty, resigned in opposition formed, though, reflected the real- rocked the 1915–1916 coalition and to the whole Dardanelles policy.10 ity of the parliamentary situation a lasting enmity between McKenna Under these circumstances, and the continued majority in par- and Lloyd George (though they Asquith had to accept that it was liament of Liberals, Labour and Irish had been rivals long before 1914).9 very unlikely the war could be Nationalists. Asquith remained However, McKenna’s approach, won in the near future. His govern- prime minister; in a Cabinet of whatever its merits, was gradu- ment had to bear the responsibil- twenty-two members there were ally being superseded in 1914–1915 ity for this situation. Its reputation twelve Liberals, plus Arthur because of Kitchener’s decision to was also constantly battered by the Henderson as the representative of train a volunteer army of millions. Conservative press, which hounded Labour, while the Conservatives This started to seriously warp the the government as insufficiently held only eight posts (the remain- economy as munitions and engi- patriotic in its attitude towards ing minister was the non-party neering expanded, while other sec- enemy aliens and even hinted that Kitchener).16 Bonar Law was rel- tors of the economy shrank, starved ministers like Haldane, who was egated to the lowly post of Colonial of manpower and resources. Prices known for his links to Germany Secretary and several Conservatives rose by 40 per cent by May 1915 as before 1914, were secret traitors.11 received non-executive jobs, shortages appeared, and the Cabinet The combination of the ‘shells including Curzon as Lord Privy was increasingly drawn into man- scandal’ and Fisher’s resignation Seal and Lansdowne as Minister aging the economy in an attempt to threatened to seriously damage the without Portfolio. No Conservative supply both the army and the home government’s already waning cred- had a central role in the direction of front. ibility. It was certainly unlikely that the war, other than Balfour, who However, what undermined the Bonar Law would be able to restrain was given the Admiralty. Asquith Liberal government and paved the his backbenchers from openly criti- could feel he had achieved his aim. way for the coalition was simply cising the government. The Conservatives were compelled its inability to win the war. That In this worrying situation to share responsibility for the con- military crisis would probably Asquith took advantage of one duct of the war and any future

28 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster disasters would not just damage the that Asquith could be displaced as Liberal Party under strain. The Liberals. But it was still very much prime minister, as no Conservative most significant of these was how Asquith’s government. Many other could take the job, given the party’s the nation’s manpower should be Liberals outside the leadership were minority status in the Commons. directed. The army was demand- dismayed though. The last purely In May 1915 this kind of specula- ing more and more recruits and Liberal government had been dis- tion must have seemed very tenu- it was increasingly clear that the mantled without any consultation, ous. But, by December 1916, it system of volunteering could not and of course most Liberals con- had become a reality and the coa- provide these recruits. Moreover, tinued to see the Conservatives as lition had fallen, and with it the the army was competing for men their main political enemies and had Edwardian Liberal Party. who were desperately needed in no wish to cooperate with them. A number of factors pushed the munitions factories and on the Asquith had to be at his very best to events in this direction. The first land, as Lloyd George well knew convince a meeting of Liberal MPs was that, as part of the coali- from his experience at the Ministry on 19 May to back the new coali- tion arrangements, Asquith had of Munitions.23 He had come to tion: ‘Some of the members were intended to remove Kitchener the conclusion that only conscrip- moved even to tears, as was the P.M. from the War Office, where he was tion could solve these difficul- himself’, as Christopher Addison widely perceived to be obstructive ties and he made his views public wrote.17 But in the end Liberal MPs and unimaginative, and replace in September 1915.24 For the first had no choice but to go along with him with Lloyd George. When time in a great public controversy, their leaders, especially as Asquith clear evidence of the general’s Lloyd George aligned himself with pleaded that the very survival of the popularity made this impossible, the Conservatives, who strongly country was at stake. he appointed Lloyd George head Cooperation supported conscription, while the The real difficulty that Asquith of a new Ministry of Munitions, views of his own party were much created for himself in May 1915 was charged with increasing production between less enthusiastic. The forty or so one that he may not have foreseen. and avoiding any future ‘shells scan- Liberal MPs organised in the Liberal He was the unchallenged leader dals’, like that of May 1915.20 Lloyd Lloyd George War Committee enthusiastically of the Liberal Party. No competi- George would have been happy supported Lloyd George’s views tor had emerged since his unop- to remain as Chancellor of the and the as the only way to secure victory.25 posed coronation in 1908. It was Exchequer, but his new role gave But some Liberal Cabinet ministers, certainly very unlikely that Lloyd him the opportunity to immensely Conserva- headed by Reginald McKenna, who George could replace him. While enhance his reputation as a success- had been installed as Chancellor of the Welshman was very popu- ful wartime leader. It allowed him tives would the Exchequer in May 1915, were lar with the Liberal rank and file, to tackle one of the greatest crises bitterly opposed. McKenna argued he had no supporters or friends confronting Britain’s participation have seemed that conscription would be a disas- in the Liberal Cabinet other than in the war and, in the judgment of unthinkable ter. The country could not afford Churchill, whose reputation had his contemporaries and most histo- an even bigger army and, by tak- been temporarily eclipsed by rians, he did so successfully.21 Lloyd before 1914. ing more men from industry, con- the Dardanelles fiasco anyway.18 George’s role at Munitions suited his scription would ruin the economy Many of the leading Liberals, like temperament ideally. Rather than But in war- and prevent the army, and Britain’s McKenna, openly despised Lloyd being faced by a huge bureaucracy allies, from being properly sup- George and he had been unable to he created his own organisation, time it might plied. Outside the Cabinet, most build up a core of supporters at the exercising his considerable talents Liberal MPs were reluctant to highest level – all his acolytes like for picking the right man for the be feasible, accept conscription – some on prag- Rufus Isaacs or job. The famous ‘men of push and matic grounds, others because they who had reached Cabinet rank had go’ undertook the detailed admin- as Lloyd felt it breached fundamental Liberal been failures.19 But once a coali- istration (never Lloyd George’s principles of freedom of conscience. tion was formed, it was no longer strong point), while he inspired his George’s However, perhaps only about necessary to be Liberal leader to be subordinates, fought their battles in thirty Liberal MPs were implac- prime minister. If Lloyd George Whitehall and planned out grand plans for ably opposed to conscription in all could attract at least a modicum of strategy. The only yardstick by circumstances.26 If pressed hard, Liberal support he could add this which the ministry’s success would organis- the rest were prepared to accept the to the Conservative MPs (and pos- be judged was its ability to increase policy as the necessary price to win sibly Labour as well) and form a new munitions production, and, as Lloyd ing the the war. But the conscription issue majority government. Cooperation George boasted in his War Memoirs, caused tremendous soul-searching between Lloyd George and the this meant it was a resounding suc- economy and and disquiet in Liberal circles at Conservatives would have seemed cess. Britain produced 70,000 shells increasing the same time as it started to seal unthinkable before 1914. But in a week in May 1915, but by January Lloyd George’s growing reputation wartime it might be feasible, as 1916 the total was 238,000 a week.22 munitions among Conservatives. Lloyd George’s plans for organising This huge increase in production The policy of conscription was the economy and increasing muni- kept the British war effort going. production eased through in stages in 1916, tions production were shared by But it also made Lloyd George a with united backing from the most Conservatives. In May 1915 potential alternative to Asquith as were shared Conservatives and increasingly soft this must have seemed a very far- war leader. opposition from within Liberalism. fetched possibility. But the creation Lloyd George’s success at by most Con- Legislation to conscript single men of the coalition meant it was possi- Munitions also raised crucial ques- aged 19–41 was passed in January ble. In fact it was about the only way tions that put the coalition and the servatives. 1916, and extended to married men

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 29 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster in May 1916.27 With a huge offensive crush the need for such discussions. Conservative leaders and that he planned for the summer of 1916, The Conservative backbenches and could ride out Lloyd George’s resig- conscription had become crucial to press were awash with this sort of nation, as he had withstood so many replace British losses in the field. In a criticism by the autumn of 1916, political storms. This was a fatal sense, passing conscription was one and plans began to circulate about mistake, as Lloyd George’s resigna- of Asquith’s last great parliamen- the need for a small to tion was swiftly followed by indica- tary triumphs. He sensed the inevi- take over the direction of the war. tions that he, not Asquith, had the tability of the measure and used his But the Conservative leaders could support of the Conservative leaders. cautious approach to bring most not act on this kind of criticism. As a last throw of the dice, Asquith Liberals with him. Only Sir John If they threatened resignation it dissolved his own government by Simon resigned from the Cabinet would look like desertion in war- resigning himself on 5 December, over the issue, with McKenna and time, and, as the minority party, challenging his critics to see if they his allies refusing to go with him. they could not hope to replace could put together an administra- But, ironically, Asquith’s triumph Asquith with a Conservative. If he tion. This too was a miscalcula- also weakened him. Lloyd George was to be toppled it had to be by a tion. asked Bonar Law to was willing to admit Asquith member of his own party, and the see if he could form a government was ‘the only man who can get only person who was both promi- as leader of the next biggest party Compulsion through the House of nent enough to attempt this and in the Commons. He swiftly con- Commons at present’, but once he acceptable to the Conservatives was cluded this was impossible and the had piloted conscription through Lloyd George. baton passed to Lloyd George. In parliament he was no longer so In late 1916 Lloyd George was a few days he put together a new useful to the Conservatives as increasingly amenable to some sort coalition of the Conservatives, war leader. 28 Moreover, his cau- of reconstruction of the government, Labour and some Liberal support- tious, conciliatory approach alien- in particular one that might exclude ers (though none from the previous ated both many Tories and Lloyd his enemies like McKenna from the Cabinet). The coalition of 1915–1916 George, who complained ‘[I]f he centre of power. He may also have was dead. were in the pay of the Germans he been worried that his move from the This outcome was not inevita- could not be of more complete use Ministry of Munitions to Secretary ble even after the December cri- to them’.29 The idea that he might of State for War in July 1916 had not sis began – after all Lloyd George need to be replaced started to circu- been a success. Lloyd George had to had not planned to replace Asquith late more freely. take some responsibility for the fail- as prime minister. But it was a Events later in 1916 pushed this ure of the Somme offensive, and he reformulation of politics that was idea further forward. The crucial had been unable to politically out- The fatal determined by the peculiar politi- context, as at the creation of the manoeuvre the generals, such as Sir step in cal circumstances of 1915–1916, coalition in May 1915, was mili- William Robertson and Sir Douglas which had brought the Liberals and tary and diplomatic.30 The great Haig.32 Lloyd George may have felt ending the Conservatives together in coalition. Somme offensive of July 1916 came the need to reassert his role in the Its impact on the Liberal Party was to nothing; Britain suffered a major conduct of the war and his standing coalition of catastrophic. The party was cut in reverse when its invasion of central in the Cabinet. In November 1916 two from top to bottom and one Iraq was defeated by the Ottoman he started to turn increasingly to the 1915–1916 section of it was in alliance with Empire; and Rumania collapsed idea of a War Cabinet that would the Conservatives – a disaster it had on the eastern front. Food produc- direct strategy. In Lloyd George’s was taken on sedulously avoided since the split tion remained perilously close to version, Asquith would be excluded with the Liberal Unionists in 1886. the minimum needed to feed the from this body (as would McKenna), 1 December In 1918 the Liberals would suffer an population while conscription had but would remain as prime minister electoral catastrophe even greater not solved the basic shortage of and leader of the Liberal Party. Lloyd 1916, when than that of 1886, when Asquith’s manpower needed for the army, George’s key ally was Bonar Law, followers were annihilated, while industry, agriculture and transport. who was equally keen to reconstruct Lloyd George Lloyd George’s emerged as prison- Meanwhile, the whole economy the government, if only to show his ers of the Conservatives. The end was increasingly dependent on backbenchers and the Conservative met Asquith, of the 1915–1916 coalition also put loans from the United States and press that something was being done a full stop to the ‘progressive alli- thus the goodwill of the American to try and turn around the dire stra- put the War ance’ with the infant Labour Party. government and financial sector. tegic situation.33 Henderson had functioned more Some senior politicians came to The fatal step in ending the coa- Cabinet plan or less as part of the Liberal group believe victory was impossible and lition of 1915–1916 was taken on 1 to him, and in the 1915–1916 Cabinet, but in Lord Lansdowne circulated a mem- December 1916, when Lloyd George December 1916 he refused to act orandum, calling for a compromise met Asquith, put the War Cabinet suggested with Asquith and his ministers and peace, which the Cabinet dis- plan to him, and suggested he Labour took on an enhanced role cussed on 22 November 1916.31 The would resign if the proposal was not he would in Lloyd George’s new coalition Cabinet rejected the idea as imprac- accepted.34 Initially, Asquith was government.36 This development tical and an admission of defeat. cautious and seemed to be willing to resign if the helped ensure that there would be But it made Asquith increasingly negotiate around the proposal. But an independent successor waiting vulnerable to the accusation that then he backtracked.35 Possibly he proposal was in the wings once the Liberal Party he was not providing the leadership came to believe that Lloyd George suffered electoral disaster in 1918, needed to inspire the nation and did not have the support of the not accepted. rather than a friendly ally.

30 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster

Chamberlain memorandum, 1–5 But if the 1915–1916 coalition Ingenious controls and rationing in 1918, des- August 1914. paved the way for a set of disas- perately engaging in crisis man- 5 D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, (2nd ters for the Liberal Party, it also as it was, it agement, only gradually accepting edn., Richard Cohen Books, 1997), slaughtered a number of Liberal radical new forms of state interven- pp. 164–85; A. Jackson, Home Rule: an sacred cows. In addition to enact- could only tion and constrained all the time by Irish History, 1800–2000 (Weidenfeld & ing conscription the famous party bickering and sectional inter- Nicolson, 2003), pp. 142–48. ‘McKenna duties’ were included in produce ests.40 In other words, it behaved 6 J. Pollock, Kitchener (Robinson, 2002), pp. 371–74. the September 1915 budget, impos- political much as Asquith’s government had 7 The terms of this debate are set out in ing exceptionally high duties on done. Behind the rhetoric there was D. French, British Economic and Strate- various luxury imports, includ- a great deal of continuity and, if gic Planning 1905–1915 (George Allen & ing motor cars.37 Their intention stability if Lloyd George’s regime took a more Unwin, 1982), esp. pp. 98–123. was obviously protectionist and the govern- active role in organising the econ- 8 I. Packer, Liberal Government and Poli- no pretence could be maintained omy, it was in the winter of 1917– tics, 1905–15 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 142–56. that free trade had survived in ment could 1918, under the impact of a series of 9 For McKenna see M. Farr, Reginald wartime. The coalition also failed crises, rather than as a result of any McKenna: Financier among Statesmen, to enact some crucial Liberal poli- actually start new vision. 1863–1916 (Routledge, 2007). cies, especially Irish home rule. With a great deal of hindsight it 10 The military and strategic back- After the of April to produce is possible to take a more balanced ground to these events is dealt with 1916 the Liberals within the gov- view of the 1915–1916 coalition. in D. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914–1916 (Allen & Unwin, 1986), ernment insisted there should be military suc- Its birth had been inauspicious. pp. 78–99. The classic account of the a concerted attempt to keep Irish Neither Conservative nor Liberal political struggle in May 1915 remains Nationalist opinion behind the war cess. Without MPs or activists had wanted it and M. Pugh, ‘Asquith, Bonar Law and the effort by trying to reach an agreed its real author, Asquith, hoped to First Coalition’, Historical Journal, 17 settlement on home rule. Lloyd this crucial use the Conservatives as a sort of (1974), pp. 813–36. George took on a central role in the human shield for the Liberals, or at 11 D. Sommer, Haldane of Cloan: His Life negotiations and suggested that the factor, the least make them share the blame for and Times (George Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 317–22, 384. Home Rule Bill, enacted but sus- the government’s inability to win 12 Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. pended in September 1914, might call for new the war. This was a scheme of some c.6990, papers, H. H. be implemented immediately, but ingenuity, probably conceived on to Margot Asquith, 25 Feb. 1909. not in the six counties of Northern men and new the spur of the moment. But, ingen- 13 R. J. Q. Adams, Bonar Law (John Mur- Ireland. Necessarily, there was ious as it was, it could only produce ray, 1999), pp. 184–86 summarises vir- some ambiguity about whether measures political stability if the government tually all that is known of these events. 14 Austen Chamberlain to Bonar Law, this exclusion would be temporary would not could actually start to produce mili- 17 May 1915, in Sir Charles Petrie, The or permanent. But this eminently tary success. Without this crucial Life and Times of the Rt Hon Sir Austen Liberal policy was undermined by go away, and factor, the call for new men and new Chamberlain, 2 vols. (Cassell, 1939–40), the Conservatives in the Cabinet measures would not go away, and in vol. ii, pp. 50–1. who disliked any notion of home in Decem- December 1916 it destroyed the coa- 15 C. Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (GPC rule. By insisting on clarification lition and ultimately the Edwardian Books, 1990), pp. 89–90; Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 148–50. of the future status of Northern ber 1916 it Liberal Party. 16 From a Liberal point of view Haldane, Ireland they killed the scheme and Samuel, Montagu, Pease, Emmott, the last chance of implementing destroyed Dr Ian Packer is Reader in History at Lucas, Hobhouse and Beauchamp all Gladstone’s home rule policy.38 the University of Lincoln and author lost their places in the Cabinet to make So – one verdict on the coalition the coalition of a number of works on Edwardian room for the new arrivals, though the might be that not only did it lead to Liberalism, including Lloyd George, Conservatives had only specifically disaster for the Liberals, it was not and ulti- Liberalism and the Land: the Land insisted that Haldane be sacked. 17 Addison’s Diary, 19 May 1915 in C. even very successful in protecting issue and Party Politics 1906–1914 Addison, Four and a Half Years, 2 vols. Liberalism. But from a wider per- mately the (Royal Historical Society, 2001) and (Hutchinson, 1934), vol. i, p. 80. spective, does it deserve its repu- Liberal Government and Politics 1905– 18 Churchill was demoted to Chancellor tation of lack of competence in Edwardian 1915 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). of the Duchy of Lancaster in the coa- pursuing the war effort? Here, the lition government and resigned alto- coalition’s reputation has started to Liberal Party. 1 This approach goes all the way back gether in November 1915. to Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and 19 Rufus Isaacs had resigned from the rise, if only because it has become Cabinet in 1913 and Masterman in Feb- increasingly clear that the distinc- the War, 1914–1916 (Thornton Butter- worth, 1928). For a later example, from ruary 1915. tion between the coalition and its a Lloyd Georgian perspective, R. J. Q. 20 S. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Politi- successor of 1916–1918 has been Adams, Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd cal Press in Britain (Fontana, 1990), pp. overdrawn. The new War Cabinet George and the Ministry of Munitions, 716–17. of five that Lloyd George set up to 1915–16 (Cassell, 1978). 21 Adams, Arms and the Wizard. 2 These matters are dealt with succinctly 22 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2 vols. conduct the war gradually grew (Odhams, 1938), vol. i, p. 388. larger as more and more ministers in K. M. Wilson, ‘’ in K. M. Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War, 23 The conscription debate is dealt with and soldiers attended and it soon 1914 (Routledge, 2003), pp. 175–208. in R. J. Q. Adams and P. Poirier, The found itself just as clogged with 3 For these MPs see Bodleian Library, Conscription Controversy in Great Brit- details as Asquith’s old Cabinet.39 Oxford, Denman Papers, 4 (3), Minute ain, 1900–1918 (Macmillan, 1987), pp. On crucial issues like food distribu- Book 1914–1915. 89–110. tion Lloyd George’s new Cabinet 4 Birmingham University Library, stumbled gradually towards price Austen Chamberlain papers 14/2/2, concluded on page 51

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 31 LIBERALS IN COALITION, 1916 – 1922

The decline of the old Liberal Party was fundamentally affected by three crucial coalitions with the Conservatives, in 1895, 1916 and 1931. All three were thought to be unsuccessful: that of 1895 plunged Britain into the South African War; that of 1916 presided over economic recession; that of 1931 made the social impact of the recession on working- class communities even worse. All three were damaging for the Liberal Party; those of 1916 and 1931 catastrophically so. Of these coalitions, it is t was a prolonged partner- 2010. It came into being from the ship which lasted, in peace and backstairs manoeuvres of December the 1916 one, led by the in war, for almost six years 1916 which saw the replacement of and which, from the outset Asquith by Lloyd George as war- wartime premier, David involved a substantial part of time premier. It was reinforced Lloyd George, that is Ithe Liberal Party. It thus enables by the equally clandestine nego- one to analyse in most depth the tiations between the Unionist and the most important. problems and pitfalls confronting Liberal whips in July 1918 which led Liberals when in coalition with the to the notorious ‘coupon’, the pact Kenneth O. Morgan Conservative enemy.1 to distribute support variously to analyses the history Lloyd George’s coalition was coalition Unionists and coalition coloured throughout its six years by Liberals at the next general election, of the last Liberal– two basic facts. First, it was always assumed then to be a wartime elec- tarnished by its origins as a secret tion. Its dubious, even sinister, ori- Conservative coalition. deal, more secret even than the gins deeply coloured views of the post-election discussions of May coalition from the very start, and

32 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 LIBERALS IN COALITION, 1916 – 1922

gave it a reputation of being undem- in 1918 and giving false informa- (a precise total is impossible since ocratic and even illegitimate. It led tion about their numbers. In a very there was so much uncertainty as to divisions within the Liberal Party rough and ready way, this began a to which Liberals were government becoming all the more deep-rooted. process of greater clarification, of supporters, and those who were, Secondly, the coalition was cre- determining which Liberals were in the popular term, ‘Wee Frees’). ated artificially at the centre, in supportive of the government coali- They had a mandate, and also a smoke-filled rooms in Westminster tion and which opposed.4 There was manifesto. That document, writ- and London’s clubland. There was also a pro-government whips’ office ten in suitably classical prose by the no grass-roots or popular involve- set up with Captain Freddie Guest as historian, H. A. L. Fisher, Minister ment, especially on the Liberal chief whip. He it was who negotiated for Education, had an impressively side. The government emerged the fateful ‘coupon’ with Sir George Liberal ring to it, including support during a wartime political crisis, Younger, the Unionist party chair- for free trade, home rule for Ireland, when there was no clear alignment man, to give the seal of approval to disestablishment of the Church in of parties. A decisive event in early recognised pro-coalition candidates Wales, progress towards self-gov- December 1916, when negotia- at the next election. The coalition ernment in India, and enlightened tions between Asquith and Lloyd Liberals did remarkably well out of sentiment in foreign policy includ- George were at their most fraught, this arrangement, getting 150 ‘cou- ing support for a League of Nations. was the preparation of a list, appar- pons’, distributed on a very imprecise The general tenor of the manifesto ently on their own initiative, by basis, as against over 300 couponed was that of reconstruction, of a land three of Lloyd George’s supporters, Unionists. Guest wrote to Lloyd fit for heroes. It could be argued Dr Christopher Addison, David George, in suitably Napoleonic that these coalition Liberals were Davies and F. G. Kellaway, of about terms, of the 150 couponed Liberals, far from prisoners of the Tories, let a hundred backbench Liberals ‘100 of whom are our Old Guard’.5 In alone the Diehards. Their manifesto who, in a supreme crisis, would what turned out to be a post-armi- was an open and not ignoble docu- support Lloyd George rather stice election in December 1918, of ment, publicly known and popu- than the Liberal leader, Asquith.2 the coalition Liberals’ 150 candidates, larly approved. It followed a similar initiative 129 were elected. But it was a purely In the Cabinet, the coalition undertaken by Addison eight or artificial creation with no popular Liberals were clearly the weaker so months earlier during the par- foundations in the country. It had partner. They had seven Cabinet liamentary struggles over a mili- only one clear purpose: the retention ministries under the dominant tary conscription bill.3 In the tense of Lloyd George as prime minister. leadership of the great Liberal in 10 manoeuvres of 1–7 December, It was argued that, just as ‘unity of Downing Street. Of these seven, after which Lloyd George sup- command’ under Marshal Foch had several were manifestly weak planted Asquith in Downing brought victory during the war, so ministers and at least one (Hamar Street, it was decisive because it that transcendent principle should Greenwood, a disastrous Secretary gave the new premier the backing apply also in confronting the perils for Ireland), catastrophic. The of all major parties, or significant of peace, with Lloyd George as the most important Liberal minister parts of them, to go alongside the unifying commander in chief, ‘the was clearly Winston Churchill, a endorsement of the Unionists and man who won the war’. Liberal still, with a strong commit- (by one vote) the Labour Party. But There was, however, one clear ment to the grand old cause of free there was no nationwide attempt difference between the coali- trade. This was the rationale for his to organise Lloyd George’s Liberal tion of December 1918 and that of original defection to the Liberal supporters in 1917–18 and the party May 2010. Its existence was clearly Party back in 1904 and he fought organisation remained solidly in known to the electorate before hard against the extension of the Asquithian hands. they voted, since Lloyd George and Safeguarding of Industry Act. He Some clarity emerged after the Bonar Law had publicly proclaimed also sought (in vain) a more enlight- famous ‘’ of 9 May the existence of a post-war coali- ened financial policy from Unionist 1918, when Lloyd George repelled tion. In an unsavoury election, with Left: David Lloyd Chancellors. They should ‘budget an attack, led by Asquith, censuring much popular chauvinism, they George, Liberal for hope and not for despair’.6 But the government for holding back had a clear mandate, the coalition Prime Minister the advent of the Russian revolution reinforcements on the western front Liberals winning around 1,400,000 1916–1922 drew him into what Lloyd George

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 33 liberals in coalition, 1916–1922 called an ‘obsession’ with the men- coalitionist to Austen Chamberlain Lloyd George Guardian’s correspondent com- ace of Bolshevism.7 It unhinged his and Lord Birkenhead, lending his mented on the ‘curious languor’ judgement on international issues support to ideas of an anti-Labour veered of the proceedings.13 There was and saw him move rapidly to the far front, and the old Gladstonian to but one coalition Liberal newspa- right. Lloyd George told C. P. Scott, C. P. Scott. There were also many between per, the , acquired editor of the Manchester Guardian, in Liberal elements within the prime in a dubious Lloyd Georgian coup January 1922 that ‘Winston is not minister’s personal entourage, nota- insisting that in 1918 which saw the dismissal of a Liberal. His sympathies were all bly special advisers like Edward its famous editor, Robert Donald. with the Imperialists.’8 Grigg, and the private secretariat he remained There was also a weekly, The Another important Liberal in in the ‘Garden Suburb’. The main Outlook, purchased by Lord Lee of 1919, perhaps surprisingly, was the voice of the latter was Philip Kerr, a staunch Fareham in 1919. Most of the party eminent historian, H. A. L. Fisher, a powerful advocate of Liberal on all literature was Asquithian; so was the minister in charge of Education, towards Germany and conciliation the official publication, the Liberal and author of a widely applauded towards Russia in foreign affairs. issues from Magazine (a distinctly tepid Lloyd Education Act in 1918. Lloyd When Kerr switched to managing George Liberal Magazine was set up as George, at least at first, saw him as the pro-government Daily Chronicle disestab- a rival in October 1920).14 The party an important intellectual link with in 1921, Scott concluded that Kerr funds were in opposition Liberal the classic liberalism of pre-1914, was ‘a stronger Liberal than one lishing the hands – hence the creation of the ‘another Morley’ (a compliment, had supposed and that George & his Lloyd George Fund with which, apparently), a rare contact with the encourage are moving decidedly in Welsh Church through the sale of titles and other Liberal intelligentsia.9 He was much the same direction.’11 Even so, the unsavoury practices, to provide the used during the early stages of the prime minister, an old champion of to support- prime minister with the gunpowder Paris peace conference and with coalitions, was a volatile source and to bombard his enemies. negotiations with the new Russian an untrustworthy basis for Liberal ing Greek The coalition Liberals were also regime in 1919.10 More impor- policies and values. very vulnerable in by-elections. tant still, he chaired the Cabinet’s Whatever their strength at ambitions in There was virtually no coopera- Home Affairs Committee, where government level, elsewhere the tion with local Unionist parties, a stream of broadly liberal policies Liberals in the coalition were a rela- Asia Minor, most of which soon became disil- were processed. By 1922, however, tively frail reed. First, they had no lusioned with the coalition’s per- Fisher was a somewhat beleaguered clear membership, and their links to declar- formance. There were several figure, fighting to resist the educa- with their departed brethren who damaging contests in by-elections tional impact of the Geddes Axe followed Asquith remained impor- ing that the between rival Liberals, notably – admittedly with some success. tant. The ‘coupon’ in the 1918 gen- old pre-war in Spen Valley in December 1919, In a different category was the eral election had been a very rough where Sir John Simon ran against most socially radical member of and ready basis for sorting out issues had the government and where the seat the Cabinet, Christopher Addison. supporters and opponents of the was lost to Labour. Another, par- Created the first Minister of Health coalition. Most coalition Liberals vanished in ticularly wounding, contest was in in 1919, after serving as Minister felt a profound attachment to their Cardiganshire in February, in the of Reconstruction in the latter pre-war Liberalism. Many of them the brave very Welsh-speaking heartland of months of the war, he was the one yearned for Liberal reunion. It the prime minister’s own fiefdom, link with the social reform policies was somehow symptomatic that new world of where pro-government and anti- of pre-1914. He had worked closely the elected chairman of the pro- government Welsh Liberals fought with Lloyd George during the pas- coalition Liberals in the Commons 1919. it out, and where the shrewd cam- sage of the 1911 National Insurance was George Lambert, who had not paigning of Mrs Lloyd George Act. His Housing Act of 1919 first received the ‘coupon’ at all in 1918. helped the government candidate, launched a programme of pub- Similarly, there was no effective Ernest Evans, one of her husband’s licly subsidised housing. ‘Addison’ grass-roots organisation. Coalition secretaries, to prevail.15 A particular became the byword for the coalition Liberalism was very weak at the problem was that coalition Liberal government’s reforming commit- local level, with some strength seats often tended to be located in ment. When he left in 1921, with only in the prime minister’s own industrial or working-class areas his inflationary housing policies in Wales. Several local parties were such as mining constituencies, ruins, followed by the fierce cut- in Asquithian hands. Seats which which made them sitting targets backs of the Geddes Axe. It was a had returned coalition Liberals in for a rejuvenated Labour Party. As sign that the government’s social the 1918 general election selected a result, of nineteen seats defended liberalism was cast aside. known Asquithians as their candi- by coalition Liberals between 1919 The other major Liberal was, of date next time. Indeed, no formal and 1922, ten were lost. In addition, course, Lloyd George. His politi- pro-coalition Liberal party actu- by February 1920 five pro-govern- cal positioning was most erratic ally existed: the idea was in limbo ment Liberals had crossed the floor, in these years. He veered between after several Liberal ministers were including the former Air Minister, insisting that he remained a staunch expelled from an angry meeting General Seely (he later defected Liberal on all issues from disestab- of the National Liberal Federation back to the government benches). lishing the Welsh Church to sup- at Leamington Spa in May 1920.12 Long before the government fell, it porting Greek ambitions in Asia Only as late as January 1922 was a was clear that the Liberals were the Minor, to declaring that the old pre- somewhat unreal ‘National Liberal coalition’s weakest link. war issues had vanished in the brave Party’ founded at Westminster Liberal-inspired policies cer- new world of 1919. He played the Central Hall: the Manchester tainly made an impact early on,

34 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 liberals in coalition, 1916–1922 and claims of Liberal inspiration catastrophic.20 When the Irish The Montagu–Chelmsford behind the government appeared to Republican Army, led by Michael reforms, extending the principle of have some clear validity. This was Collins, rose up against the ‘dyarchy’, did mark some advance almost entirely due to the work of Government of Ireland Act of 1920 towards local self-government. Christopher Addison. His Housing which formally partitioned the Chelmsford was succeeded as Act of 1919 began with a flurry of island, the coalition government viceroy in 1921 by a clear Liberal, activity and visible programme of retaliated with ferocity. Something Lord Reading, Lloyd George’s old publicly subsidised housing.16 There akin to martial law was imposed. Liberal colleague Rufus Isaacs. But was also his work at Health, some The overwhelmingly Protestant the was soon busy energy in following up Fisher’s Royal Irish Constabulary was combating Gandhi’s campaign Education Act, and extended poli- reinforced with non-Irish auxil- of non-cooperative disobedience cies regarding unemployment iaries, many of them unemployed throughout the sub-continent, insurance. Here, perhaps, was the ex-servicemen. These were the and the temper of Indian nation- last hurrah of the pre-1914 New notorious Black and Tans; with alism, focused on Congress, rose Liberalism for which the prime their violent assistance, a policy of sharply. The departure from office minister had then been such a cen- retaliation was now pursued, which of the Secretary for India, Edwin tral and inspirational force. But all turned the resistance movement Montagu, already a target for this began to change in the summer into a national struggle fought by crude-anti-Semitism,23 in March of 1920, as the economy plunged rural and urban guerrilla warfare. 1922 was another nail in the coffin into post-war recession. Thereafter, One horror followed another – of the coalition’s Liberalism. He was there was Liberal disaffection, the death after a hunger strike by eventually replaced by an undis- amongst coalitionists and anti-coa- Terence McSwiney, the Mayor of tinguished Tory, Lord Peel, after litionists alike, on issue after issue. Cork; the murder of Kevin Barry three other Unionist peers (Derby, First, there were clear failures by British troops; worst of all, the Devonshire and Crawford) had of social policy, of which the loss machine-gunning of innocent spec- turned the job down, testimony to of the radical Addison in July 1921, tators by the ‘auxis’ at a Gaelic foot- Lloyd George’s waning powers of after a furious public exchange with ball match at Croke Park, Dublin, patronage. Lloyd George, was symbolic.17 The in November 1920, the first of the In foreign policy, Liberal aspi- right-wing Anti-Waste campaign, Irish ‘bloody Sundays’. This all hor- rations for a brave new world, obsessed by the post-war dimensions rified many Liberals. It was a Liberal resulting from the peace treaties at of the national debt, led to a power- minister, Hamar Greenwood, a Paris and subsequently, were soon ful crusade, in the press and in by- Canadian imperialist who took disabused. By 1920 there was wide- elections, against ‘waste’ in policies the place of the more moderate Ian spread dismay at the perceived injus- on housing, schools and hospitals. Macpherson, who directed affairs tices of Versailles, the reparations The undoubted financial misman- in Ireland: his considered view imposed unilaterally on Germany, agement of the Addison Housing was that ‘the Black and Tans had the national imbalances of fron- Act added fuel to the flames. really behaved extraordinarily tier arrangements, and the secret Chamberlain told the Cabinet’s well’.21 Lloyd George, in his most wartime treaties which carved out Finance Committee that every reactionary Chamberlainite vein, imperial domains for Britain and house built under the scheme cost declared that ‘we have murder by France in the Middle East. Keynes’s the taxpayer £50–75, and would do the throat’.22 Soon he was to reverse one-sided onslaughts on the peace so for the next sixty years.18 Those policy, as the British were later to treaties in The Economic Consequences with an animus against the trade In foreign do so often in India, Cyprus, Kenya of the Peace had immense polemical unions attacked the obstructive and elsewhere, to embark on a far effect. This dismay was, indeed, practices they detected within the policy, Lib- more congenial policy of negotia- shared by one of the peace settle- building trade unions. The Geddes tion with de Valera and Sinn Fein, ment’s great architects, the prime Axe, unavailingly resisted by Fisher eral aspira- and eventually to grant southern minister, but his attempts single- and Churchill, indicated a mania for Ireland a fuller degree of independ- handedly to revise and reverse the cutbacks in social spending, with tions for a ence than Parnell had ever asked peace treaties, cheered on by Keynes proposed cuts of £76m in public for. But by then the bloody horror by this time, collapsed at Genoa in expenditure, the bulk of it admit- brave new of ‘the troubles’ had had their effect. April 1922. tedly in the armed services.19 This Liberals turned against the govern- Finally, for doctrinal Liberals, coincided with a new bitterness in world, result- ment in their droves. Many, such there was the great totem of free the labour world after the govern- as Ponsonby, Trevelyan and others trade, their guiding principle since ment had turned down a majority ing from the prominent in the wartime Union the days of Cobden and Bright. It report from the Sankey Commission peace trea- of Democratic Control, moved was the Holy Grail for the Liberals to nationalise the coal mines and had over to the Labour Party. No aspect of the time, just as a referendum on used political manoeuvres to beat ties at Paris of policy did more damage to the electoral reform is today. There was down the Triple Alliance amongst humane, reformist credentials of immense dismay at the steady ero- the unions. The coalition, formed and sub- the coalition. sion of free trade in its purest form amidst some post-war idealism, had India was less damaging. General since 1919. It was an issue on which become a right-wing anti-Labour sequently, Dyer, responsible for the blood- Lloyd George himself seemed cas- front, bent on creating a world fit for bath of the Amritsar massacre, was ual to the point of irresponsibility, Diehards to live in. were soon duly sacked amidst Diehard oppo- ever since his quasi-protectionist Secondly, the government’s sition in 1920, though not court-­ measures at the Board of Trade policy in Ireland proved to be disabused. martialled or otherwise disciplined. in 1905–8. The coalition Liberals

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 35 liberals in coalition, 1916–1922 resisted, unavailingly in the end, power all on their own. They, unable to dissolve parliament and the anti-dumping proposals of the by contrast, felt that the govern- seek a new mandate from the peo- Imports and Exports Regulation ment was too Liberal in its policies, ple, the government simply drifted. Bill in late 1919. The Safeguarding driven by the whims of a presiden- Anger focused on Lloyd George’s of Industries Bill raised a far wider tial prime minister. They objected personal and irregular methods of 1 threat. It would impose a 33 /3 per in particular to two distinctively government which were leading cent duty on certain key imports Liberal policies. First they remained good Unionists down strange paths. with an additional duty on goods emotionally opposed to home rule His mass creation of peerages, and dumped below the cost of produc- for Ireland and objected strongly to the way in which they had a price tion or given a competitive advan- the self-government accorded the tag, was a powerful sign of this. The tage by depreciation of foreign new Irish Free State. Secondly, they government was now tainted not currency.24 Liberals voted against objected to the formal recognition just with unconstitutionality but or abstained in some numbers, but of Bolshevik Russia and success- with corruption, the worst since in vain. A motion by Wedgwood fully frustrated Lloyd George on Walpole. Benn (father of ) in this point in early 1922. On these It was Lloyd George’s highly per- February 1922 to repeal the Act points, allied to the anti-waste sonal conduct of foreign policy in astonishingly saw only eighteen campaign, Unionist opposition to relation to Turkey, bringing a clear ‘Coaly Libs’, all ministers, vote with the government steadily built up. threat of war, which led directly to the government, while nineteen There was much opposition voiced his downfall at the famous Carlton voted against, and a further eighty- at the Unionist annual party con- Club meeting on 19 . seven were absent or abstained. ference in November 1921, held, as The coalition Liberals were now These last included four ministers, ill-luck would have it in Liverpool, lost souls, orphans of the storm. Shortt, Munro, McCurdy and, sig- the very stronghold of anti-Irish They were coalitionists in a post- nificantly, Churchill. Baldwin’s Protestant Tory Democracy of coalition world. After a half- proposal to extend the Act to cover which Alderman Salvidge was the hearted campaign, they ended the import of fabric gloves, one prototype. A motion of censure by up with just fifty-four MPs after which infuriated Lancashire textile the ultra-right-wing John Gretton the 1922 general election (down interests, brought a further huge was debated and defeated. A dis- from 122 before the election). The revolt in July 1922. All this brought tinct weakness came when Bonar Asquithians ended up with perhaps dismay and despondence to coali- Law had to leave the government All these sixty-two (the identification now tion Liberal ranks; they felt they through ill health, and was fol- became very difficult). After the were nominally supporting a gov- lowed by Austen Chamberlain. disappoint- forced shotgun marriage with the ernment in which the leader was no Although he performed strongly Asquithians in the 1923 general elec- true believer in the grand old cause. at the Liverpool conference,25 ments meant tion, following Baldwin’s conver- At least, however, they could claim Chamberlain overall lacked Bonar that, long sion to , the ‘Coaly that, despite the Safeguarding of Law’s authority and political judge- Lib’ presence in politics petered out. Industries Act, Britain was still a ment. As the popular phrase went, before 1922, Twenty-one of their MPs eventu- free trade country. Austen always played the game and ally joined the Conservatives and All these disappointments meant always lost it. being a Lib- many of their leading figures moved that, long before 1922, being a The key figure here was the to the right – Alfred Mond, Hamar Liberal in this coalition seemed a party chairman, Sir George eral in this Greenwood, the two whips Freddie meaningless exercise. What was the Younger. In the wake of this nation- Guest and Hilton Young, Edward point of them? Were they partners wide mood of party rebellion, he coalition Grigg and, of course, Winston to the Unionists or rivals in contests became a powerful voice of dissent. Churchill whose last appearance to come? In 1920 they rejected Lloyd In January 1922 he openly defied seemed a at the polls as a Liberal was as the George’s proposals that they should Lloyd George, who wanted an unsuccessful candidate for Leicester ‘fuse’ with the Unionists (somewhat early general election after the Irish meaningless in 1923. There was one rare excep- on the lines of Nick Boles MP’s call treaty, the Washington naval treaty, tion – Christopher Addison who for an electoral pact in 2009). They and the Cannes conference with exercise. joined Labour in the mid-twenties did not believe there was ideological the French, on a platform of peace and became an important minister convergence. They were Liberals and recovery. Lloyd George fumed What was during the second MacDonald min- still, as Fisher, Montagu, Shortt, at Younger’s disaffection; Lord istry in 1930–1 and throughout the Addison and even Churchill vari- Birkenhead dismissed the chair- the point six years of the Attlee government ously told Lloyd George. It was all man as merely a ‘cabin boy’.26 But in 1945–51. He thus served in both very honourable, no doubt, but it the cabin boys had taken over the of them? the major post-war governments. left them with nowhere to go. They ship of state. Lloyd George found Were they But his was the last echo of the were supporting a coalition that was that Younger was too important a brave-new-world idealism which disintegrating from within, prop- figure to brush aside. This suggests partners to had led Liberals like the young ping up a prime minister in whom that Vernon Bogdanor’s view of would-be journalist Colin Coote to few Liberals now believed. the fall of the coalition as a revolt the Unionists rush to endorse the coalition gov- More important politically of the party in the country against ernment in December 1918. than Liberal disaffection was overt the leadership in Westminster is or rivals in What of its overall record? The discontent within the majority too superficial.27 Younger’s role coalition had perhaps more to its Unionist party. They dominated indicates the organic link between contests to credit than later commentators, the government and parliament, protest in the country and disaf- many of them Asquithians (includ- and could probably have won fection at the centre. Since it was come? ing Roy Jenkins, the biographer

36 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 liberals in coalition, 1916–1922

the Prinkipo talks with the Russian of Asquith) have allowed. There The Liberals in 1918, now fractured into three. Bolshevik leaders. were long-term legacies in Fisher’s Discredited as a party of govern- 11 C. P. Scott’s diary, 17–20 Jan. 1922, Education Act, the granting of in govern- ment in 1922, they were discred- British Library, Add. MSS. 50906, f. votes to women during wartime, ited as a party of opposition in 1931. 133. and in the long-term implications ment in There was a fatal ‘agreement to 12 Manchester Guardian, 8 May 1920; of Addison’s programmes for hous- differ’ over free trade in 1931, com- Addison to Lloyd George, Parliamen- ing and health. The peace settle- 1918–22, like parable to the similar agreement tary Archives, Lloyd George Papers, F/1/6/8. ments of 1919 and subsequently those in gov- to differ on voting reform in 2010. 13 Manchester Guardian, 21 Jan. 1922; have found much scholarly sup- The mass resignation of ministers C. A. McCurdy to Lloyd George, 5 and port from Margaret Macmillan in the autumn of 1932 was a further 6 Jan. 1922, Parliamentary Archives, and other historians.28 But, other- ernment in sign of collapse. The Liberal Party Lloyd George Papers, F/35/1/3–5. wise, the Liberals in government in 2010, had to embarked upon a rough, stony road 14 It was launched by the Lloyd George 1918–22, like those in government between the secret ‘coupon’ pact secretariat; 30,000 copies were printed. 15 See ‘Cardiganshire Politics, the Liberal in 2010, had to argue, rather tortu- argue, rather of July 1918 and the equally secret Ascendancy 1885–1923’, in Kenneth O. ously, that they had been effective Coalition Agreement of May 2010. Morgan, Modern Wales: Politics, Places in making a reactionary govern- tortuously, Its ultimate destination has yet to be and People (University of Wales Press, ment less reactionary than it would determined. 1995), especially pp. 242–7. Two Liber- otherwise have been. It did have that they als fought each other again in the gen- one notable personal achievement, Kenneth O. Morgan is Fellow of the eral elections of 1922 and 1923; in 1923, the old Asquithian Rhys Hopkin Mor- little regarded at the time. The had been British Academy, honorary fellow of The ris, heavily defeated Ernest Evans. defeat of ‘fusion’ in 1920 not only Queen’s and Oriel Colleges, Oxford, a 16 See Kenneth and Jane Morgan, Por- saved their party, it also saved Lloyd effective in former Vice-Chancellor, an eisteddfo- trait of a Progressive: the Political Career of George. It meant that, in spite of his dic druid, and a Labour peer. He is the Christopher, Viscount Addison (Claren- instincts at the time, Lloyd George making a author of thirty-two books, including don Press, 1980), pp. 90–102. remained a Liberal down to the end. Wales in British Politics 1868–1922 17 Addison to his wife, 15, 21, 23 June, He avoided the sad fate of Joseph reactionary 7, 12 July 1921, Bodleian Library, (University of Wales Press, 1963), Oxford, Addison Papers, Box 135. Chamberlain, still more that of Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd 18 Cabinet Finance Committee, 29 Nov. Ramsay MacDonald. He lived and government George Coalition Government 1920, National Archives, CAB 27/71. died as a man of left. 1918–1922 (Clarendon Press, 1979), 19 Report of the Committee on Economies in Otherwise, the coalition’s record less reaction- Rebirth of a Nation: Wales Public Expenditure, 1922 (Cmd.1581). was a poor one. It turned out to be a 1880–1980 (Clarendon Press, 1981), The eventual total of cuts amounted class-war government which alien- ary than it (University to £64m. Fisher successfully chal- lenged most of the £18m proposed for ated the unions and paved the way would oth- of Wales Press, 1981), Labour in education. towards a general strike. Force was Power 1945–51 (Clarendon Press, 20 See especially , given to Bernard Shaw’s advice to erwise have 1984), Callaghan: a Life (Oxford The British Campaign in Ireland 1919– the Labour Party in 1918 ‘Go back University Press, 1997), Michael Foot: 1921 (Oxford University Press, 1975). to Lloyd George and say “Nothing been. a Life (HarperPress, 2007) and Ages of 21 Lord d’Abernon diary, 21 Aug. 1922, doing”.’ The government waged Reform (I. B. Tauris, January 2011). British Library, d’Abernon Papers, Add. MSS. 48954B, f. 45. actual war in Ireland, it savagely 22 The Times, 11 Oct. 1920. cut back social spending, while 1 I discuss this government in detail in 23 Memorandum by Sir William Suther- deflationary Treasury policies, Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd George land to Lloyd George, July 1920, Par- designed to further a return to the Coalition Government of 1918–1922 liamentary Archives, Lloyd George (Oxford University Press, 1979, paper- Papers, F/22/2/5. Sutherland wrote, gold standard, made the impact of back edn., 1986). Also see my ‘Lloyd depression worse. The government ‘A strong anti-Jewish sentiment was George’s Stage Army: the Coalition shown by shouts and excitement left behind it the divided country Liberals 1918–1922 in A. J. P. Taylor among normally placid Tories of the and divided society of the inter-war (ed.), Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (Ham- backbench category’. He added that years. Its foreign policy was scarred ish Hamilton, 1971). Montagu ‘became more racial and by failure, and in the thirties it was 2 Christopher Addison, Politics from more Yiddish in screaming tone and Within, 1914–1919 (Herbert Jenkins, derided, somewhat unfairly, as cre- gesture’. This anti-Semitism was 1924), vol. i, pp. 270–2. reflected in The Times, 9 July 1920 – ating the background to another 3 Christopher Addison, Four and Half world war. For the Liberals it made ‘Montagu is a Jew and in excitement Years 1914–1919 (Hutchinson, 1934), has the mental idiom of the East.’ their party impotent for the next vol. i, pp. 202–3. 24 Liberal Magazine, July 1921, p. 348; eighty years and discredited the 4 Freddie Guest to Lloyd George, 17 William Edge to Lloyd George, 28 July whole idea of coalition for genera- May 1918, Parliamentary Archives, 1922, Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers, tions to come. George papers, F/35/1/48. F/21/1/22. 25 Letters from Magnus, Lane Mitchell, The Liberals split into two fac- 5 Guest to Lloyd George, 29 Oct. 1918, tions in 1918–22; and the existence Astor and Goulding, amongst oth- ibid., F/21/2/46. ers, in Austen Chamberlain papers, of Lloyd George’s troublesome, 6 Winston Churchill to Lloyd George, University of Birmingham library, if beguiling, Fund kept the mem- 12 April 1922, ibid., F/10/2/63. AC/32/12ff. ory of incipient civil war alive in 7 Lloyd George to Churchill, 22 Sept. 26 Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, pp. the minds of such men as Simon, 1919, ibid., F/9/1/20. 274–9. 8 C. P. Scott’s diary, 17–20 Jan. 1922, 27 Vernon Bogdanor, The Coalition and the Runciman and Hore-Belisha there- British Library, Add. MSS. 50906, f. after. Surely things could not get Constitution (Hart, 2011), chapter 3. 133. 28 Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers any worse? Indeed, they could. In 9 Ibid., 30 Nov.–1 Dec. 1919, British (John Murray, 2001). 1931, as another article in this issue Library, Add. MSS. 50905, f. 211. will show, the party, split into two 10 Fisher was much used in preparing for

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 37 Liberalism and the National Government, 1931 – 1940

The National Government of 1931 was formed as a result of the collapse of the Labour administration in the face of economic crisis. Politicians of the three main parties came together in an atmosphere of fear: fear of a collapse in the value of the ; fear of a repetition in Britain of the hyper- oalitions in the British the Lib–Lab Pact of 1977–78.1 The inflation that had system are most likely other type of situation is the coali- wrecked the German to be the product of one tion that grows out of a national of two very different emergency – the intrusion of exter- economy in the early sorts of situation. A coa- nal factors which compel parties to litionC can, as in 2010, be the result of put their parochial differences aside 1920s. The government arithmetical necessity. Only by two and unite in the face of a common so formed was to last or more parties coming together threat from beyond Westminster, can a parliamentary majority be usually war. The coalitions of 1915 until 1940. Dr David assembled and the hazards and and 1940 self-evidently fall into instability of minority administra- this category. But so too does the Dutton examines the tion be avoided. Sometimes such National Government of 1931–40.2 impact of the National an arrangement falls some way The external threat may not in this short of full coalition as in the case case have been war, but the leading Government on the of the Liberal Party’s generally actors in the drama appear to have benevolent attitude towards the believed that the economic crisis of Liberal Party. first Labour government in 1924 or 1931 was the most serious challenge

38 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 Liberalism and the National Government, 1931 – 1940

to have faced the country since the notwithstanding its dramatic elec- was achieved after the general elec- German spring offensive of 1918. toral setback in 1931. Even in that tions of 1923 and 1929, and, as has Politicians of the three main parties year, despite dropping to just fifty- often been pointed out, the Liberal came together in an atmosphere of two MPs, Labour held on to 30.6 per Party let itself down by failing fear: fear of a collapse in the value cent of the popular vote, marginally to use this position to extract an of the pound sterling; fear of a rep- higher than the percentage that had agreed programme of Liberal goals etition in Britain of the hyper-infla- brought the party to government from the minority Labour gov- tion that had wrecked the German after the general election of 1923. ernment that was formed on each economy in the early 1920s.3 Moreover, irrespective of the fig- occasion.8 Their problem, however, As Neville Chamberlain put it, ures, the events of 1931 confirmed was deeper and more fundamen- ‘the problem was to restore foreign a Conservative–Labour duopoly as tal. Liberals in the 1920s could not confidence in British credit. This the only two serious contenders for give a clear answer to the question could only be done by announcing power in the British polity after the of which of the two larger parties such a cut in national expenditure as brief experience of three-party pol- they would prefer to support in would convince him [the foreigner] itics in the 1920s. No, the real losers office. Indeed, not even individual that we had sufficient courage to of this time were the Liberals, even Liberal politicians of this era gave tackle the situation.’4 And, as this though the economic crisis and the consistent answers to this question. task proved beyond the capacity resulting formation of a National While Lloyd George moved from of Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour Government brought them back being the head of a Conservative– Cabinet, the three party leaders into government for the first time in Liberal coalition in the early 1920s, accepted the king’s suggestion of a almost a decade. to seeking an agreement to sustain National Government.5 For most of To understand the prob- Ramsay MacDonald’s minority its existence, however, the National lems experienced by the Liberal Labour administration at the end Government had a further, politi- Party in relation to the National Left: five Liberal of the decade, other Liberal lumi- cal, purpose – to keep the irrespon- Government, a word must be said ministers in naries moved in the opposite direc- sible Labour Party out of power. In about their experience of the previ- Downing Street tion. John Simon, who declared in some ways, therefore, it represented ous decade. During the 1920s, the in October 1931, 1922 that, when it came to practi- the belated triumph of the 1920s party, which had been the govern- just before the cal business, the immediate objects coalitionists, those who believed ing party of 1914, dropped rapidly calling of the he wanted to pursue were objects that only cooperation between to third place in the British politi- general election. which Labour men and women Conservatives and Liberals could cal system, scarcely having had From left: Sir also wanted to pursue,9 had by 1930 block Labour’s seemingly remorse- time to savour the status of being Donald Maclean, become the leading opponent of less rise – this, even though the two His Majesty’s Opposition. In such Lord Lothian, Lloyd George’s pro-Labour strat- leading Conservative architects of a position, though Liberals could Sir Archibald egy and was opening secret nego- the National Government, Stanley still talk optimistically of a future Sinclair, Sir tiations for a parliamentary pact Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, Liberal government, in their more Herbert Samuel, with the Conservatives.10 Though had both been in the anti-coalition- sober moments they understood Lord Reading the dilemma of 1931 and beyond ist camp in the Tory split of 1922.6 that their more realistic ambition (Manchester was not occasioned by the same Yet Labour was not the real loser of was to hold the balance of power in Guardian, 3 sort of parliamentary arithmetic the era of National Government, a hung parliament.7 This, of course, October 1931). as had existed in 1923 and 1929, the

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 39 liberalism and the national government, 1931–1940 problem was fundamentally the office, while the Labour govern- majority of Liberal candidates same. Opposition to Labour as the ment – which had caused such as National Liberals to indicate party which had run away from divisions in the Liberals’ ranks that they were supportive of the the economic crisis was not suffi- – was now consigned to history. National Government, a categori- cient to hold many Liberals within But this internal harmony did not sation which included almost all, a Conservative-dominated admin- last long, as the purpose and func- even if with varying degrees of istration. Indeed, by the time of the tion of the National Government enthusiasm, apart from the small, 1935 general election many Liberals, quickly changed. At its formation in largely family, group surround- Lloyd George included, were back August, noted Austen Chamberlain, ing Lloyd George, who unequivo- to seeing Labour as their partner of the idea was for ‘a national govt cally opposed the holding of an preference.11 to deal with the present financial election. For this minority the As I have written elsewhere, the emergency. Not a coalition but designation of ‘Liberal’ or ‘inde- chief problem for the Liberals in cooperation. Dissolved as soon as its Though pendent Liberal’ was reserved. their association with the National immediate task is accomplished and the previ- Samuel himself used the descrip- Government was the effect that it the following general election to be tion ‘Liberal and National candi- had on their unity.12 Indeed, the fought by the three Parties inde- ous period date’ in his address to the electors fragmentation of the Liberal Party pendently.’16 Within weeks, how- of Darwen in Lancashire.19 Lists did was, from the outset, an objective ever, the Tories, supported by those of Labour exist to differentiate the Samuelite of at least one leading Conservative. Liberals who looked to Simon for and Simonite camps, but even these Neville Chamberlain was deter- leadership, were pressing for a gen- government were not definitive and a few names mined that the Liberal Party should eral election fought by the National appeared on both. Samuelites were be made ‘to face up to the fiscal Government on the issue of tar- had served far more likely to be opposed by decision … The decision will split iffs. Around this proposition three Conservatives than were Simonites, it from top to bottom and … will separate Liberal factions began to to re-open but again this was not a hard and end it, the two sections going off coalesce. fast rule and there were excep- in opposite directions, and bring The Conservative Business and in some tions. Some MPs were remarkably us back nearly to the two party sys- Committee, the Shadow Cabinet of successful in misleading their elec- tem.’13 To begin with, of course, the the day, meeting on 24 September, cases to torates as to their true affiliation. entire Liberal Party gave its support were ‘all agreed as to the great Right down to 1935, Huddersfield’s to the National Government. Two importance of pitching our tariff reconfigure MP, William Mabane, managed to places in the Emergency Cabinet of demands high enough to make sure present himself as a Samuelite in ten, Herbert Samuel at the Home of getting rid of Samuel and, if pos- the divisions the constituency while behaving Office and the Marquess of Reading sible, Reading’.17 At the same time as a Simonite at Westminster.20 In a surprise appointment as Foreign Leslie Hore-Belisha took the lead in that had Dumfriesshire Dr Joseph Hunter Secretary, with additional senior organising a memorial to the prime plagued Lib- said little about his precise alle- posts for Donald Maclean, Lord minister, MacDonald, promising giance before suddenly announc- Lothian, Archie Sinclair and the unqualified support for any meas- eralism since ing in 1934 that he had accepted Marquess of Crewe, was a reason- ures necessary in the interests of the appointment as National Organiser able reward considering the respec- country. By 23 September this had the crisis for England and Wales for Simon’s tive parliamentary strengths of been signed by twenty-nine Liberal Liberal Nationals.21 Interestingly, the components to the coalition. MPs. The group invited Simon of 1916, the when these two MPs succeeded in Austen Chamberlain paid tribute to become their leader, an invita- taking their local associations with to Samuel’s efforts to look after his tion which he readily accepted. At formation of them into the Liberal National party, contrasting them with what the last moment the rupture which camp, neither association found it he regarded as Baldwin’s failure to the general election was expected, the National necessary to change name, remain- fight for his colleagues. But he did and in some minds designed, ing the Huddersfield Liberal so with the anti-Semitic bias that to precipitate was avoided. The Government Association and the Dumfriesshire was then more widespread than it is Cabinet decided on 5 October to Liberal Association respectively. now comfortable to recall. ‘Samuel’, seek authority from the electorate seemed In the year following the general he wrote, ‘like the Jew he is, grasps for whatever policies were needed election, however, the relationship all he can.’14 to restore the national finances, to offer between the two main wings of Though the previous period of the so-called ‘Doctor’s Mandate’. Liberalism and the relationship of Labour government had served The parties would be free to make hope that both to the National Government to re-open and in some cases to their separate and, in the case of was clarified. Meanwhile, the tiny reconfigure the divisions that had the Samuelite Liberals, different the party’s Lloyd George group drifted off plagued Liberalism since the cri- appeals to the country beneath the internecine into near irrelevance. The divisions sis of 1916, the formation of the umbrella of a general statement within Liberalism were confirmed National Government seemed to from MacDonald to which all min- disputes and the possibility of a Liberal Party offer hope that the party’s inter- isters would subscribe.18 of some seventy MPs giving some necine disputes could be relegated By the time of the general elec- could be rel- credence to the claim of Walter to the political long grass. A meet- tion on 27 October, the divisions Rea, the mainstream party’s new ing of MPs, peers and candidates on within the Liberal ranks were egated to the chief whip, that the Liberals were 28 August revealed ‘quite a remark- becoming somewhat clearer; but ‘now once more the second largest’ able demonstration of unity’.15 All confusion remained, not least in political long party in the land, rapidly evapo- could take pleasure in the return of the minds of the electorate. Many rated.22 With the election out of the Liberal ministers to governmental newspapers described the vast grass. way, the Samuelites took the lead

40 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 liberalism and the national government, 1931–1940 in trying to bring about reconcilia- Divisions organisations. Liberal National MPs hand in shaping policy; on the other tion with their Simonite colleagues. continued to be listed in Liberal side there is simply barren criticism Speaking in Scarborough on 11 over the his- publications. And sitting Liberal in the face of overwhelming odds.’30 November, Ramsay Muir insisted National MPs were almost never It was, in practice, no choice at all. that the Simonites were ‘genuine toric Liberal challenged by Liberals at elections What then of the relation- Liberals’ and claimed that the split before 1945. The effect of all this ship of the two Liberal factions to in the party was not ‘really as seri- gospel of was catastrophic for the orthodox the National Government after ous as it appears to be’.23 But rather party. At a stroke its parliamentary 1932–3, one firmly within its ranks than responding positively to these free trade strength was reduced by 50 per cent. and the other outside? The posi- overtures, the Liberal Nationals Just as importantly, in most con- tion of the Liberal Nationals was began to take steps which empha- quickly con- stituencies represented by Liberal at one and the same time both sised their separateness and inde- firmed what Nationals, the local organisation deceptively strong and appallingly pendence – declining the Samuelite was taken over lock, stock and weak. Their representation in the whip, setting up committees to con- was hap- barrel by the new party. In many upper ranks of government was sider a range of policy areas and tak- cases this led to the effective disap- generous. Simon held the Foreign ing the decision to create a Liberal pening. Lord pearance of organised Liberalism. Secretaryship from 1931 to 1935. National infrastructure outside par- Not until 1939 did the Liberals of Thereafter he was successively liament. Several leading Simonites Hailsham’s Huddersfield begin to get their act and Chancellor spoke privately, and often with con- together to counter Mabane’s take- of the Exchequer, becoming the siderable apprehension, of ‘crossing famous over.26 In Dumfriesshire the posi- acknowledged number two in the Rubicon’, recognising that the tion was even more difficult. ‘This Neville Chamberlain’s government reunion of the old party was now ‘agreement is a Liberal constituency’, the local from 1937 to 1940. Runciman was unlikely to be achieved and that newspaper repeatedly trumpeted.27 ensconced at the Board of Trade their own destiny lay firmly in close to differ’, But until the late 1950s there was until May 1937 and was recalled to parliamentary and electoral part- little in the way of infrastructure the Cabinet as Lord President fol- nership with the Conservatives.24 anticipating to support this contention. In the lowing his unsuccessful mission As is well known, divisions over country at large, a genuine battle to Czechoslovakia in the sum- the historic Liberal gospel of free by eighty took place between the two factions mer of 1938. After the resignation trade quickly confirmed what was to establish which of them had the of the Liberal free traders in 1932, happening. Lord Hailsham’s famous years the stronger claim to be the voice of was appointed to ‘agreement to differ’, anticipating traditional Liberalism, even if this the Scottish Office, bringing the by eighty years the leeway given to leeway battle was not fought at the polls. Liberal National contingent in the Nick Clegg’s MPs over raising uni- given to Nick If Liberals had been more success- Cabinet up to three, while several versity tuition fees, averted a split ful in the 1920s in establishing their others such as Leslie Hore-Belisha over the Import Duties Bill early in Clegg’s MPs own political identity, the outcome and Leslie Burgin secured promo- 1932.25 But the Ottawa Agreements of this contest might have been tion within the junior ministerial concluded later that summer proved over raising easier to predict. As it was, much ranks. The elevation of the Tory, too large a protectionist pill to depended on propaganda and the Baldwin, to the premiership in June for the gullets of most orthodox university power of the press. In Huddersfield 1935 was balanced by the addition Liberals. The Samuelites, already the Examiner under of an extra Liberal National, Ernest under much pressure from disgrun- tuition fees, held true to the mainstream party. Brown, to the Cabinet as Minister tled Liberal associations up and But in Dumfries the Standard, of Labour. As late as September 1939 down the country, resigned from averted a whose editor, James Reid, also there were two Liberal Nationals in the National Government at the end presided over the Dumfriesshire Neville Chamberlain’s War Cabinet of September 1932 and, after a year split over Liberal Association, was insist- of nine members. In the Commons, of fence-sitting which did nothing ent that not only Hunter, but also by contrast, the imbalance between to enhance their credibility, crossed the Import his two Liberal National succes- the partners to the coalition was to the opposition benches in the sors, Henry Fildes28 and Niall stark. Even after the 1935 general autumn of the following year. Duties Bill Macpherson29 were fully fledged election, which saw some reduc- With the benefit of hindsight Liberals. Coming from a newspa- tion of the massed Tory ranks, just we now know that, although Lloyd early in 1932. per whose radical credentials went thirty-two Liberal National MPs George and his band of followers back to its pro-Boer stance at the were set alongside almost 400 suc- returned to the mainstream party turn of the century and beyond, this cessful Conservatives. In the con- in 1935, the Samuelite–Simonite must have been a difficult claim for text of a hung parliament these split proved permanent. It was many Liberals to challenge. Above thirty-two Liberal Nationals could an outcome that the Samuelites all, the Liberal Nationals had a com- have exercised a decisive impact; seemed reluctant to accept. Though pelling argument that, with the but the overwhelming Tory major- many unkind words were now mainstream party seemingly set on ity meant that, in the last resort, exchanged, at heart Liberals con- a path that would lead eventually they were always dispensable. tinued to view Liberal Nationals to political extinction, the option After its first weeks the National as errant children who were bound of trying to influence a larger party Government developed into a one day to return to the family fold from within made sound sense. coalition of choice rather than of and for whose return the fatted calf The choice, suggested the Dumfries necessity. Yet, ironically, this was was waiting. Liberal Nationals such Standard, was clear. ‘On the one side also a source of Liberal National as Simon and Runciman retained there is the opportunity presented strength. Baldwin and, after honorary positions within Liberal to Liberal statesmen of having a some misgivings, Chamberlain

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 41 liberalism and the national government, 1931–1940 too saw in the preservation of Despite Few Liberal National MPs could it is not clear where Samuel is going National Government the means face the prospect of Conservative to crash in with a separate identity of locating the dominant strand of leaving the opposition in their constituencies and policy’.37 It might have been where they wanted with any degree of confidence. As different if the Liberals themselves it to be – on the centre-right of government observers across the political spec- had come up with a progressive and the . When in trum increasingly predicted, their imaginative range of policies, but 1936 Robert Bernays, himself in over a con- fate seemed destined to be the same the mini-intellectual renaissance of the process of transferring his alle- as that which had overtaken the the 1920s was not sustained. Short giance to the Liberal Nationals, crete issue Liberal Unionists in the last years of both money and ideas, the party expressed concern that a post-Bald- before the First World War – total tended to seek refuge in its success- win Conservative Party might veer of policy, absorption within the Conservative ful recipes of an earlier age. 1939 significantly to the right, The Times the Liberals Party.33 That fate was a long time in found J. L. Hammond commend- responded, reasonably enough, coming, delayed at least in terms ing Lord Crewe for his adherence that the Conservative right had struggled of the preservation of a name and to ‘Mr Gladstone’s principles’ with- been effectively sidelined and was nominal party organisation until as out apparently understanding that in no position to recover its former in the years late as 1968, but come it did. this ongoing commitment to the influence.31 Rather than seeking a What then of the relationship Liberalism of a previous century direct Liberal National influence that fol- between the independent Liberals was part of the party’s problems.38 over the politics and policies of the and the National Government? Later in the decade, Liberal oppo- National Government, therefore, lowed to Despite leaving the government sition to Chamberlain’s foreign we should see in that government’s over a concrete issue of policy, the policy did place some clear yellow doings a series of measures which establish Liberals struggled in the years that or orange water between the party the Conservative leadership could followed to establish their own and the government, but the pic- justify to its own right wing by their own distinct political identity. Even ture was not straightforward even reference to the need to keep the the apparently clear dividing line then.39 Criticism of appeasement Tories’ Liberal allies on board. Such distinct polit- between free trade and protection prompted further defections to the a situation gave rise, as is perhaps was misleading. For many Liberals Liberal Nationals, including the MP an inevitable consequence of coa- ical identity. who did not follow Simon into the Herbert Holdsworth, while not all lition government, to complaints Liberal National ranks, free trade of those who remained within the from the rank and file of both par- was not the litmus test of true faith party rallied behind its new stance. ties. Liberal Nationals complained that it had been before 1914. The Well-known figures such as the that they were given insufficient unrelated E. D. Simon, MP for journalist J. A. Spender and even credit for delivering the not incon- Withington in Manchester, was the former leader, Lord Samuel, siderable ‘Liberal vote’. Right-wing among the first Liberals openly to openly supported the prime min- Tories complained that the govern- question the prevailing orthodoxy. ister. Chamberlain even offered ment was pursuing an emasculated He was congratulated for doing so Samuel a seat in the Cabinet in his and effete Conservatism for which by the Liberal economist, Hubert post-Munich reshuffle.40 there was no need in terms of parlia- Henderson, while even Keynes was By the end of the decade, then, mentary arithmetic. That both sides ready by 1931 to explain that only Liberalism was in a bad way. If were dissatisfied suggests that, in tariffs offered the protection needed anything, the Liberal National some strange way, the coalition was against a falling exchange rate and contingent had more cause for working as it should. Certainly, at a collapse of business confidence.34 optimism, although, as has been its heart the National Government By the middle of the decade Lloyd seen, they too had their problems. did not operate in the manner of a George himself was dabbling with Outside the National Government normal party administration. At protection. As one scholar has put the mainstream party had largely least until the middle of the decade it, ‘the decline of Free Trade as a failed, as many of its members pri- and arguably beyond, there existed secular religion was well under way vately admitted,41 to establish a an informal group of six senior when the depression hit Britain and viable non-socialist alternative to ministers, acting as a sort of inner recovery after 1932 did not bring the Conservatives. Reduced by the Cabinet and drawn equally from it back’.35 More generally, Liberals 1935 general election to just twenty- the three component parts of the such as Ramsay Muir might rail one MPs, its local power bases administration – the Conservatives, against the performance of the crumbling away, devoid of funds the Liberal Nationals and the tiny National Government,36 but it was and lacking charismatic leadership, National Labour group.32 But per- never as bad and certainly not as only a combination of blind faith haps the greatest weakness of the illiberal as they suggested. In fact, and irrational optimism could con- Liberal Nationals was their lack for much of the decade the Liberals vince the dwindling band of Liberal of an exit strategy. The longer the experienced some difficulty in dif- adherents that better days would National Government lasted, the ferentiating themselves from the eventually return. more remote became the prospect government. The latter took over of Liberal reunion, and the harder it the traditional Liberal rallying cries David Dutton is the author of A was to justify the Liberal Nationals’ of retrenchment and sound finance, History of the Liberal Party in separate existence and to say pre- but without appearing unduly reac- the Twentieth Century (Palgrave cisely what it was that gave them tionary. As Lloyd George’s former Macmillan, 2004), a second edi- a distinct and definite identity. press secretary put it, ‘so long as tion of which, bringing the story up to Any attempt to ‘go it alone’ would Baldwin presses so far to the mid- the formation of the Cameron-Clegg probably result in electoral suicide. dle and is at war with his Diehards, Coalition, will be published in 2012.

42 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 liberalism and the national government, 1931–1940

1 D. Dutton, ‘Holding the Balance: the Thorpe, The British General Election of Liberal National MP for Dumfries- Liberal Party and Hung Parliaments’, 1931 (Clarendon Press, 1991). shire, 1935–45. Journal of Liberal History 48 (2005), pp. 19 R. Douglas, Liberals: The History of 29 Niall Macpherson (1908–87), Liberal 8–19. the Liberal and Liberal Democrat Parties National and (from 1950) National Lib- 2 There appears to have been a conscious (Hambledon & London, 2005), p. 228. eral-Unionist MP for Dumfriesshire effort to avoid describing the National 20 D. Dutton, ‘William Mabane and 1945–63. Created Baron Drumalbyn Government as a coalition – by the Huddersfield Politics, 1931–1947: “By 1963. Junior ministerial posts 1955–63. Conservatives because of memories Any Other Name a Liberal”’, Northern Minister without Portfolio (Conserva- of the Lloyd George Coalition which History, 43/1 (2006), pp. 137–53. tive) 1970–74. had ended in 1922, and by the gov- 21 Dumfries and Galloway Standard and 30 Dumfries and Galloway Standard and ernment’s opponents because of their Advertiser, 26 May 1934. Advertiser, 4 Nov. 1931. insistence that it was no more than a 22 Williamson, National Crisis, p. 483. 31 The Times, 20 May 1936. Conservative administration in dis- 23 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 12 Nov. 1931. 32 J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Bald- guise. But a coalition it was. 24 See, for example, University of win 1902–1940 (Longman, 1978), p. 326. 3 I am grateful to Professor Vernon Newcastle, Runciman MSS 254, G. 33 See, for example, Baldwin quoted in Bogdanor for this observation. Shakespeare to Simon, 23 Sept. 1932, the Scotsman 23 May 1936 and Samuel 4 University of Birmingham, Chamber- and Churchill Archive Centre, Cam- in the House of Lords, H of L Debs, lain MSS, NC2/22, diary 22 Aug. 1931. bridge, Hore-Belisha MSS, HOBE 1/1, vol. CLXIV, col. 254. 5 For the circumstances surrounding Hore-Belisha to N. Chamberlain, 23 34 R. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump the formation of the National Gov- Sept. 1932. (Macmillan, 1967), p. 292. ernment, see P. Williamson, National 25 D. Wrench, ‘The Needs of the Time: 35 F. Trentmann, Free Trade Nation Crisis and National Government: Brit- the National Government and the (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. ish Politics, the Economy and Empire “Agreement to Differ”, 1932’, Par- 333. 1926–1932 (Cambridge University liamentary History, 23/2 (2004), pp. 36 R. Muir, The Record of the National Gov- Press, 1992). For the disputed issue 249–64. ernment (Allen & Unwin, 1936). of the king’s role, see V. Bogdanor, 26 D. Dutton, ‘Liberalism Reunited: The 37 Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd George ‘1931 Revisited: The Constitutional Huddersfield Experience, 1945–47’, MSS, G/19/7/6, notes on the political Aspects’, Twentieth Century British His- Journal of Liberal History, 52 (2006), pp. situation, 26 Nov. 1933. tory 2/1 (1991), pp. 1–25 and P. Wil- 32–37. 38 Hammond to Crewe, 13 Jan. 1939, liamson, ‘1931 Revisited: The Political 27 When he stepped down as chair- cited in M. Hart, ‘The Decline of the Realities’, Twentieth Century British man from what was, in all but name, Liberal Party in Parliament and in History 2/3 (1991), pp. 328–38. the Dumfriesshire Liberal National the Constituencies’, Oxford D. Phil. 6 S. Ball, ‘The Legacy of Coalition: Fear Association in July 1947, James Reid (1982), p. 91. and Loathing in Conservative Politics, insisted that his ‘enthusiasm for Lib- 39 R. Grayson, Liberals, International 1922–1931’, Contemporary British History eralism had not waned in the slightest Relations and Appeasement (Frank Cass, 23/1 (2011), pp. 65–82. degree’. ‘The Liberal Party had glori- 2001). 7 For a debate on the pros and cons of ous traditions in Dumfries and it was 40 Parliamentary Archives, Samuel MSS, holding the parliamentary balance, see the desire and intention of the Asso- A/111/1, memorandum by Samuel, 26 R. Douglas and D. Brack, ‘Holding ciation … to see that tradition main- Oct. 1938. the Balance’, Journal of Liberal History, tained.’ (emphasis added), Dumfries 41 See, for example, Lord Lothian quoted 64 (2009), pp. 28–31. and Galloway Standard and Advertiser, 12 in T. Wilson, The Downfall of the Lib- 8 See, for example, C. Cook, A Short July 1947. Reid remained editor of the eral Party 1914–1935 (Collins, 1966), pp. History of the Liberal Party: The Road Standard until 1954. 377–8. Back to Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 28 Henry Fildes (1870–1948), Coalition 2010), pp. 94–5, 111–12. Liberal MP for Stockport, 1920–23; 9 Speeches in Cleckheaton, reported in the Cleckheaton Guardian, 10 Nov. 1922 and the Yorkshire Observer, 14 Nov. 1922. CELEBRATING JOHN BRIGHT 10 D. Dutton, Simon: a Political Biography A study day to consider the life and achievements of John Bright MP (1811–1889 ) of Sir John Simon (Aurum, 1992), p. 104. 11 A. J. Sylvester, Life with Lloyd George Saturday 19 November 2011, 1000 – 1700, Birmingham City Art Gallery (Macmillan, 1975), p. 134: ‘He is mov- John Bright was born on 16 November 1811, a Quaker son of a Rochdale mill-owner. He became ing heaven and earth to get electors to the most famous orator and politician of his day, a champion of the rights of the ordinary man, a vote Labour where there is no Liberal.’ (A. J. Sylvester diary, 13 Nov. 1935) peacemaker and parliamentary reformer, who was not afraid to take the unpopular view, sometimes at 12 D. Dutton, ‘1932: A Neglected Date in great personal cost. the History of the Decline of the Brit- This study day seeks to bring together some of the writers and politicians who are most knowledgeable ish Liberal Party’, Twentieth Century about John Bright’s life and career and to assess his importance as a reformer, with particular reference British History 14/1 (2003), pp. 43–60. 13 Chamberlain to E. Grigg, 16 Sept. to his time as Birmingham’s MP. We shall be looking at his work as a peace protagonist and its relevance 1931, cited in R. Self (ed.), The Neville for today and asking the question `How best can we build on his legacy?’ Chamberlain Diary Letters (Ashgate, Speakers include Cllr Paul Tilsley, Bill Cash MP, Chris Upton, Howard Gregg, Antony Wood, Ian Cawood, 2002), vol. iii, p. 30. Cllr Martin Mullaney and Rae Street. 14 A. Chamberlain to Ivy Chamberlain, 26 Aug. 1931, Chamberlain MSS, Booking AC6/1/803. 15 R. Bassett, 1931: Political Crisis (Mac- Venue: Gas Hall (AV room), Birmingham City Art Gallery (BMAG), Edmund St., Birmingham B3 3DH. The millan, 1958), p. 187. venue is within easy walking distance of New Street rail station. 16 A. Chamberlain to Ivy Chamber- The charge for the day is £10.00 per person, including refreshments mid-morning and afternoon. Lunch lain, 24 Aug. 1931, Chamberlain MSS, AC6/1/800. may be bought at the Edwardian Restaurant at BMAG or a number of cafes/restaurants nearby. 17 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Please send your booking and payment to Mrs Janet King, 110 Linthurst Newtown, Blackwell, Empire at Bay: the Diaries Bromsgrove, Worcs. B60 1BS (tel 0121 445 2802; email [email protected]) 1929–1945 (Hutchinson, 1988), p. 204. 18 For the 1931 general election, see A. Closing date for applications is 19 October.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 43 Crisis, Coalition and Cuts The Liberals and the National Government, 1931

In the coalition negotiations of 2010, the Liberal Democrats’ commitment to rapid deficit reduction was a key factor facilitating agreement with the Conservatives. There was a historical precedent for Liberals insisting on tough spending cuts in the context of a crisis of financial confidence. Britain’s last peacetime coalition government, the National Government formed in 1931, had come into being partly because he Conservative– political foundation, however, is of the Liberal Party’s Liberal Democrat coali- the coalition partners’ shared com- insistence on the tion government formed mitment to eliminating the struc- in May 2010 rests on sev- tural deficit over the lifetime of importance of sound eral foundations, includ- the present parliament. Indeed, the ingT the parliamentary arithmetic Liberal Democrats’ willingness to finance.Peter Sloman thrown up by the general election support in-year spending cuts, as a examines the parallels and the cordial working relationship first instalment of deficit reduction, between and Nick was crucial in facilitating the forma- between 1931 and 2010. Clegg. Perhaps its most important tion of the coalition.

44 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 Crisis, Coalition and Cuts The Liberals and the National Government, 1931

The 2010 Liberal Democrat man- debt crisis spreading to Britain ‘if a Ramsay MacDonald’s minority ifesto stated that the party’s ‘work- credible government with a credible Labour government, which had ing assumption’ was that deficit deficit reduction package could not been in office since 1929, failed to reduction would start in the finan- be agreed’ was ‘the spectre which agree on a programme of economies cial year 2011–12, with the aim of at loomed over’ the coalition talks.4 In and tax rises to eliminate the grow- least halving the deficit by 2013–14, due course, the negotiators signed ing deficit, and MacDonald and his and that any cuts made in the 2010– the party up to ’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip 11 financial year – such as the end- plan for £6 billion of spending cuts Snowden, retained their posts in the ing of government contributions to in 2010–11, as a first step towards new administration. The National Child Trust Funds – would be used eliminating the structural deficit Government was intended to last to finance a ‘jobs and infrastruc- within five years.5 only as long as was necessary to ride ture package’.1 Nick Clegg insisted The Liberal Democrats’ com- out the immediate financial crisis, during the televised debates that mitment to rapid deficit reduction and – in contrast to the detailed it would be crazy to begin cutting came as a surprise to senior Labour programme for government nego- public spending before economic figures, who had expected that they tiated in 2010 – the only written growth was restored. However, would prefer ’s coalition agreement which existed some senior Liberal Democrats more modest target of halving the was a set of manuscript notes, writ- evidently believed that earlier and structural deficit over five years.6 ten by Sir Herbert Samuel in the sharper cuts would be needed if the Perhaps, though, they should not meeting at Buckingham Palace British government was to retain have been so surprised. Not only at which the government was the confidence of the financial mar- had there been definite hints that formed.8 Moreover, the economic kets. argued strongly leading Liberal Democrats favoured situations which confronted the in internal party meetings that that deeper spending reductions – most politicians were far from identi- the need to reduce the deficit made obviously, Nick Clegg’s refer- cal, with the National Government a coalition arrangement in a hung ence to ‘savage cuts’ in a Guardian facing a smaller budget deficit than parliament a more attractive and interview the previous September, the present coalition but rather more viable option than a looser a comment which had featured higher unemployment and a ster- arrangement, such as ‘confidence- prominently on Labour leaflets in ling crisis which was not merely and-supply’.2 Nick Clegg seems to Lib–Lab marginals – but there was threatened but actually underway. have been convinced of the need for also historical precedent for Liberals The parallels between the two epi- early cuts during the election cam- insisting on tough spending cuts in sodes are nonetheless striking, and paign itself by the developing cri- the context of a crisis of financial an examination of the Liberal role sis of confidence in the Eurozone.3 confidence.7 Britain’s last peacetime in the formation of the National It was largely because of concern coalition government, the National Government provides an illumi- about the budgetary situation that Government formed in 1931, had nating perspective on the Liberal the Liberal Democrat negotiating come into being partly because of Democrats’ behaviour in 2010. team – Chris Huhne, David Laws, the Liberal Party’s insistence on the and Andrew importance of sound finance. Stunell – entered the post-election Of course, there were impor- The formation of the National negotiations willing to entertain tant differences between the proc- Left: Government the possibility of a full coalition esses of coalition formation in unemployment The course of events which led with the Conservatives. Laws has 1931 and 2010. In 1931 the National march during the to the formation of the National written that the risk of the Greek Government was formed after Great Depression Government is relatively well

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 45 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931 known. The 1929 general election The process by which the minor- The fiscal Samuel (who became Home had returned Labour to office as ity Labour administration was Secretary), Maclean (President a minority administration under replaced by a National Government consolida- of the Board of Education), Lord MacDonald, technically depend- depended on the conjuncture of Reading (Foreign Secretary), ent on the support of fifty-eight a number of factors, including tion under- Sir Archibald Sinclair (Scottish Liberal MPs led by David Lloyd the determined refusal of several Secretary) and Lord Lothian George.9 Lloyd George spent most Labour ministers and the Trades taken by the (Chancellor of the Duchy of of the parliament’s first year trying Union Congress to support ben- Lancaster). A meeting of Liberal to force MacDonald to acknowl- efit cuts and the willingness of the National MPs, peers, and candidates at the edge his reliance on the Liberals, Conservative leaders, especially on 28 August and much of its second year try- Neville Chamberlain, to serve in Government endorsed participation in the ing to construct an agreement by a National administration under was there- National Government with only which the Liberals would keep the MacDonald.11 The Liberal Party one dissentient.15 government in office in return for nevertheless played a pivotal role in fore smaller It is instructive to compare the the introduction of the Alternative the political crisis. Until the early scale and scope of the economy pro- Vote and the implementation of summer of 1931, Lloyd George than the gramme agreed by the party lead- some of the proposals for pub- seemed to be preparing to lead ers in August 1931 – and announced lic works on which the party had the Liberals into a Lib–Lab coali- present coa- by Snowden in his September 1931 fought the election.10 tion, a move which he justified to emergency budget – with that Ballooning unemployment in most of his colleagues by arguing lition’s, but enacted by the present coalition the wake of the Wall Street crash that, if the Labour government government. Though alarming to made the Labour government’s task fell, the Conservatives would take was imple- contemporaries, the prospective a difficult one, not least because fall- office and introduce protection.12 deficit of £120 million identified ing tax revenues and the rising cost However, Lloyd George was taken mented by the May Committee represented of unemployment benefit placed seriously ill in July, and spent only 3.1 per cent of 1931 GDP, and great strain on the public finances. August recovering from an opera- much more even this figure was swollen by the In February 1931, the Liberals tion to remove his prostate gland. inclusion of a sinking fund (which secured the establishment of a Samuel, his deputy, took over as rapidly. the National Government par- special committee, chaired by leader, and chose North Cornwall tially suspended) and the £40 mil- Sir George May of Prudential MP Sir Donald Maclean to accom- lion deficit on the Unemployment Assurance, to propose economies pany him to the meetings with Insurance Fund (which was not in public spending. When the May MacDonald, Snowden, and Neville normally included in assessments Committee reported in July 1931, Chamberlain and Sir Samuel Hoare of budgetary balance).16 By con- it projected that Britain faced a for the Conservatives (the Tory trast, the Conservative–Liberal budget deficit of £120 million in leader being Democrat coalition which took 1932–3, and recommended that a absent on holiday in Aix-les-Bains). office in 2010 was confronted by an package of measures to eliminate During the three-party negotia- overall deficit amounting to 7.5 per the deficit should focus on reduc- tions, Samuel and Maclean declared cent of GDP and a structural deficit ing the cost of the unemployment that a 10 per cent unemployment estimated at 5.3 per cent of GDP; insurance system, including a cut benefit cut was an ‘indispensable’ it is committed to eliminating the of one-fifth in benefit rates. Early component of an economy scheme, structural deficit over five years, action on the deficit was made lining up with the Conservatives and is trying to do so over four.17 imperative by a pan-European cri- and increasing the pressure on The fiscal consolidation undertaken sis of financial confidence, which MacDonald and Snowden to win by the National Government was began in Austria in May, spread to their Cabinet colleagues over to therefore smaller than the present Germany in July, and threatened this course of action.13 Later, when coalition’s, but was implemented to drive sterling off the gold stand- the Labour government fell, it much more rapidly. Snowden ard. Between 12 and 23 August, was Samuel who was the strongest divided the burden of deficit reduc- MacDonald and Snowden held advocate of a National Government tion roughly evenly between tax a long series of meetings in an with MacDonald at its head, so that rises and spending cuts, but the attempt to gain the agreement of political responsibility for the cuts cuts were concentrated heavily on their Cabinet colleagues for a defi- should be spread as widely as possi- unemployment benefit and public cit-reduction package which satis- ble – though subsequent scholarship sector pay: along with the 10 per fied the leaders of the Conservative has suggested that Samuel’s advice cent cut in unemployment ben- and Liberal parties and which the did not have quite as much influence efit, insurance contributions were believed was suffi- on King George V as Samuel him- raised, a means test for transitional cient to restore the confidence of the self believed.14 Moreover, since the benefit introduced, and the salaries markets. When it became clear that Liberals held the balance of power of ministers, judges, civil servants, the Labour Cabinet would not agree in the Commons, and the vast teachers, the police and the armed to the 10 per cent unemployment majority of Labour MPs refused forces reduced by 10–15 per cent.18 benefit cut which MacDonald and to support the new government, The incidence of the present coali- Snowden proposed, MacDonald a National Government without tion’s economies is rather different, formed a National Government on Liberal participation would not with spending cuts accounting for 24 August to carry through the cuts, have had a secure parliamentary roughly three-quarters of the deficit against the opposition of almost all majority. Sixteen Liberals received reduction programme and falling his former Labour colleagues. government office, including more heavily than the 1931 cuts on

46 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931 the number (rather than merely the the sacrifices required to reduce the production of food and raw mate- pay rates) of public sector workers. deficit should be spread as broadly rials, whilst Philip Oliver, MP for The vast majority of Liberals at and evenly as possible.22 This con- Manchester Blackley, lamented that all levels of the party – in govern- cern led Liberal MPs to press for the need ‘to go slow with schemes ment, in parliament, and in the teachers’ salaries to be cut by 10 of national reconstruction’ was the country – offered support to the per cent – in common with most Liberals’ ‘part of the sacrifice’.27 general thrust of Snowden’s emer- other public servants – rather than Ernest Simon, who represented gency budget and the National the 15 per cent originally proposed, Manchester Withington, agreed to Economy Bill which followed from a concession which the govern- take junior office at the Ministry of it. Indeed, in the general election ment granted on 21 September in Health only on the condition that which followed in October, most the wake of a vocal campaign by the government maintained the Liberal candidates insisted that the teachers’ unions, the naval mutiny existing system of house-building economy measures had been nec- at Invergordon, and the enforced subsidies.28 This concern to mini- essary and just, whilst many also departure of sterling from the gold mise cuts in public investment sug- criticised the late Labour govern- standard.23 It also led them to seek gests that the proposals for public ment for its profligacy or warned further sacrifices from the rich. works which had formed the basis that a Labour victory would lead to Lord Lothian advocated a capital of the party’s campaign at the 1929 national bankruptcy.19 The division levy to cancel £2 billion of Britain’s general election continued to influ- of the Liberal forces into Samuelite, war debt, which would ‘perma- ence Liberals’ thinking about the Simonite and Lloyd Georgeite nently balance … the budget’ (by relationship between government camps basically reflected divergent reducing the burden of interest pay- spending and unemployment. attitudes to free trade and to the ments) and facilitate some targeted Cabinet’s decision to call an early tax reductions ‘or an expanded election, rather than disagreements programme of national develop- Explaining Liberal support for over spending cuts. Among Liberal ment to absorb the unemployed’; cuts MPs, only the young Frank Owen he believed that such a measure was The Liberals’ insistence that the voiced outright opposition to the essential to show ‘that the rich as government should respond to economy programme, describ- well as the poor are going to bear the financial crisis in August 1931 ing the unemployment benefit cut their fair share of the burden’.24 with a stringent package of meas- as ‘iniquitous and inequitable’ and Lothian’s proposal was taken seri- ures to close the deficit, including declaring that he was ‘amazed’ at ously by Samuel and Chamberlain, a cut in unemployment benefit, Liberal ministers’ support for the but the Bank of England warned still requires explanation. After all, means-testing of transitional ben- that a capital levy might provoke a the proposed benefit cut was sure efit.20 Owen felt that the party’s Samuel new flight from sterling and would to split the Labour movement and complicity in these measures rep- was clearly also create a precedent for Labour destroy the opportunity for Lib– resented a betrayal both of its social to introduce a capital levy in the Lab cooperation to be consolidated reforming heritage and of the com- influenced future. The government settled into a progressive coalition which mitment it had made at the 1929 instead for increasing the differenti- could pursue Keynesian reflationary election to use the resources of the by a concern ation between earned and unearned measures, introduce the Alternative state to conquer unemployment. income in the tax system and reviv- Vote, and defend free trade. ‘On Although Owen’s hostility to the to main- ing plans to convert £2 billion of no plausible assumptions’, David benefit cut was not widely shared, war loan from 5 per cent to 4 per Marquand has argued, ‘did the Liberals inside and outside govern- tain party cent interest.25 Liberals stand to gain more from ment did seek to change the gov- A second focus of Liberal an alliance with the Conservatives ernment’s economy package in two unity. Lloyd concern about the National than from their existing alliance ways. Firstly, they sought to ensure Government’s economy pack- with the Labour Party.’29 Why then that the government’s rhetoric of George’s age was its treatment of the gov- did the Liberals, led by Samuel and ‘equal sacrifices’ was borne out by ernment’s capital investment Maclean, make this shift? Three the measures it enacted. Before the strategy of programmes, many of which had main reasons may be identified. National Government was formed, been set in train by the Labour gov- Firstly, Samuel was clearly prominent Liberals including Sir supporting ernment under pressure from Lloyd influenced by a concern to main- Walter Layton, Ernest Simon and George and his party. Commenting tain party unity. Lloyd George’s Ramsay Muir had taken an inter- the Labour from his sickbed shortly after the strategy of supporting the Labour est in the idea of a ‘national treaty’, National Government was formed, government had caused serious involving simultaneous (and govern- Lloyd George told Samuel that he unrest among right-wing Liberals, agreed) cuts in all wages, salaries, ment had had no objection to the unemploy- culminating in the resignation benefit payments, rents, dividends ment benefit cut, but he was furi- of the Liberal whip by Sir John and retail prices, which had been caused seri- ous at the proposed reductions in Simon, Sir Robert Hutchison and suggested by Keynes and imple- capital spending, especially on Ernest Brown in June 1931 in pro- mented in Australia in June 1931 as ous unrest smallholdings, land reclamation, test at the agreement which Lloyd a solution to that country’s financial and other agricultural projects.26 George had reached with the gov- crisis.21 Although it soon became among Lloyd George’s attitude was shared ernment over Snowden’s plans for apparent that an across-the-board by others: Lothian urged Samuel to a land tax.30 Simon hoped to lead a reduction of private sector wages right-wing try to maintain capital investment, large body of disaffected Liberals was not politically practicable, which would alleviate unemploy- into the Conservative fold on the Liberals remained determined that Liberals. ment and help increase domestic basis of a twin commitment to cut

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 47 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931 public spending and accept the The crucial decision to join with to be necessary for national recov- need for tariff protection, and had the Conservatives in pressing for ery without regard to fiscal theories been assured by Chamberlain that an unemployment benefit cut on and prepossessions’.43 Nevertheless, he would receive office in a future 18 August, confirmed on 21 August those Asquithians who were still Tory government if he pulled this when Samuel and Maclean rebuffed committed to free trade, such as manoeuvre off; though his repu- MacDonald’s efforts to detach them Maclean, the veteran journalist diation of free trade hampered his from the Conservatives, reflected Francis Hirst, and (more tenuously) ability to cultivate a following the strategy which Maclean Viscount Grey, remained in the among Liberal MPs and activists, had favoured from the outset.37 ranks of the official Liberal Party he remained a threat to Samuel and Although Samuel’s biographer, under Samuel’s leadership. Lloyd George.31 Most susceptible Bernard Wasserstein, contends that A second reason for the Liberals’ to Simon’s appeal was the party’s he ‘was constricted by an almost insistence on a severe retrenchment Asquithian old guard, which clus- Gladstonian financial orthodoxy programme was the party’s eco- tered around the anti-Lloyd George that dictated his actions in 1931’, nomic analysis. As is well known, Liberal Council and the Friends of Samuel showed himself willing Lloyd George had fought the 1929 Economy campaign launched by to support Keynesian reflationary election on a pledge to reduce Walter Runciman and Viscount projects in other political and eco- unemployment to ‘normal propor- Grey of Fallodon in January 1931 to nomic circumstances, especially in tions’ within two years, without champion strict retrenchment. 1929 and after the Liberals resigned additional cost to the taxpayer, by From the beginning of 1931 from the National Government means of a £250 million programme onwards, it was clear that Lloyd in September 1932.38 It seems more of loan-financed public works. George and Samuel would have to plausible to suggest that Samuel’s Lloyd George’s pledge drew heav- take a firm line on retrenchment if orthodox inclinations were rein- ily on advice from John Maynard they were to keep the traditionalist forced during the August negotia- Keynes, who argued that the mass Asquithians on board. In this effort, tions by Maclean’s influence and by unemployment which had per- the leadership found a valuable ally the need to retain the confidence of sisted throughout the 1920s resulted in Sir Donald Maclean, who was the party’s right wing. largely from a deficiency of invest- respected on the party’s right for Samuel succeeded in maintain- ment, and that deficit spending by his commitment to fiscal ortho- ing Liberal unity in the short term. the government on projects such as doxy but whose fear of ‘the prob- Indeed, Asquithians were delighted road-building, housing, electricity able result of an early Tory victory at the way in which Samuel and infrastructure and telephone devel- on Free Trade and disarmament’ Maclean had ‘concentrated on opment would reduce unemploy- led him to support Lloyd George’s economy as the keystone’: Viscount ment by bringing investment into strategy of keeping the Labour gov- Grey attended the National Liberal From the line with savings. As Peter Clarke ernment in office.32 It was Maclean Club meeting on 28 August to beginning has shown, Keynes felt his way dur- who moved the motion in February pronounce his blessing on the new ing the 1929 election campaign itself 1931 which brought the May government, and even Sir John of 1931 towards the idea of the multiplier Committee into being, and Samuel Simon sent a message of support.39 effect, whereby an initial govern- chose Maclean to accompany him to As Williamson notes, ‘the Liberal onwards, ment investment would itself gener- the negotiations at Downing Street Council now moved back into the ate new resources for consumption in August partly because of his rep- centre of Liberal party politics’.40 it was clear and investment through successive utation as a fiscal hawk.33 However, this rapprochement did rounds of spending.44 Maclean’s presence in the nego- not last. Simon himself was not con- that Lloyd Most historians have suggested tiations over the Labour govern- sidered for office, and Lloyd George that the Liberals’ behaviour in 1931 ment’s economy proposals was vetoed the appointment of some of George and showed that their conversion to highly significant. Even before the his lieutenants, including Ernest a Keynesian approach was shal- negotiations began, he had sig- Brown; Samuel intended that Samuel low or insincere. Wasserstein has nalled that he was inclined to work Walter Runciman should take the claimed that ‘Lloyd George no with the Conservatives to ensure War Office, but, when Runciman would have more believed in Keynesianism that the government made the could not be contacted, the post on principle than the Celt in him necessary cuts.34 By contrast, the was given to Lord Crewe, leaving to take a believed in leprechauns’, and that Liberal chief whip, Sir Archibald Runciman to fume at Samuel’s fail- Samuel’s thinking ‘remained fun- Sinclair, told Samuel that the party ure to pursue the matter further.41 firm line on damentally unaffected by Keynes’; should take ‘an absolutely inde- By mid-September 1931, Simon the late Duncan Tanner argued pendent line’ and try to support had resumed his efforts to construct retrench- that, ‘unhappy with proposals the Cabinet’s proposals for reduc- a separate group of Liberals who ment if for increased expenditure, most ing the deficit provided they were were willing to support a tariff, and Liberals dropped Keynes as quickly reasonably sound.35 Maclean was found a receptive audience among they were as possible after the 1929 election’ in also more sensitive than many MPs who feared losing their seats order to return to a more orthodox other Liberals would have been to to the Conservatives in an election to keep the approach.45 In fact, the reality was City opinion, and conceived his fought on the trade issue.42 The more complicated than this. Loan- task during the negotiations partly split was formalised on 5 October traditionalist financed public works enjoyed as one of ‘communicating the by the formation of the Liberal quite wide support within the party Liberal point of view to the Bank National group, with its own elec- Asquithians at the 1929 election, since even of England’ and keeping the Bank tion fund, committed to supporting those Asquithians who doubted in touch with ‘the real position’.36 MacDonald in ‘any measures found on board. whether Lloyd George’s pledge was

48 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931 achievable agreed that the policy on The financial for tax reforms, government assist- Labour ministers who rejected the which it was based was sound; and, ance for industrial rationalisation, proposal to cut unemployment ben- after the election, the Labour gov- crisis of the the extension of export credits, efit broadly approached the issue ernment’s failure to tackle unem- and a 10 per cent cut in government from the perspective of distributive ployment became the main ground summer of spending. Clearly, Liberals were justice and citizens’ rights to a cer- for Lloyd George’s criticism of it.46 increasingly thinking of national tain living standard. From this per- As the Liberals’ attempts to spare 1931 exacer- development as only one part of spective, any reduction in the living public investment from the full rig- a strategy for recovery, and were standards of the least well-off mem- ours of the National Government’s bated Liber- moving towards the view that cuts bers of the community was inher- cuts showed, the idea that national in public spending and taxation ently unjust. The Liberal approach development projects could stimu- als’ existing represented the best way of encour- to social reform was more ameliora- late demand and reduce unemploy- doubts as to aging job creation in the private tive. Whilst Liberals were generally ment was quite strongly embedded sector.49 strongly committed to the elimina- in Liberal political economy by whether a The financial crisis of the sum- tion of poverty, they tended to take 1931. mer of 1931 exacerbated Liberals’ the market distribution of incomes What happened after 1929 was Keynesian existing doubts as to whether a as their starting point, to regard that, as the economic climate dete- Keynesian strategy would work in unemployment insurance as a con- riorated, Liberals began to question strategy the prevailing economic circum- tractual arrangement which should whether loan-financed public works stances. Retrenchment became be put on an actuarial basis, and would create as many jobs Lloyd would not merely desirable but essential to to regard non-insurance forms of George had claimed, and to con- restore the financial markets’ confi- state welfare, including transitional sider the possibility that they might work in the dence in British government policy, benefit, as desirable in themselves damage private sector employment. keep sterling on the gold standard, but ultimately conditional on the The case for a public works pro- prevailing and facilitate a revival of trade and nation’s ability to generate sufficient gramme had been premised on the employment. The most plausible wealth to pay for them. assumption that it would create an economic cir- alternative courses of action, such as The Liberals defined the fair- atmosphere of expansion, encour- voluntary departure from the gold ness of the deficit reduction pack- aging businessmen to invest and cumstances. standard, the abandonment of free age by the way it spread the burden expand production in anticipation trade, and the imposition of controls of the cuts and new taxation across of future profits, but by the summer Retrench- on capital movements and currency the community as a whole. Like of 1930 even Keynes was no longer exchange, were largely ruled out by MacDonald and Snowden, Samuel confident this would be the case; ment the Liberals’ ideological commit- and Maclean held that the cut in instead, it was feared that the extra became ment to the idea and institutions of unemployment benefit was justified borrowing involved would damage an integrated global economy. The because prices had fallen sharply business confidence and discourage not merely parallel with 2010 is instructive. On over the previous two years, so that private investment.47 Lord Lothian both occasions, Liberal politicians the real incomes of the unemployed argued strongly that public invest- desirable who were sympathetic to Keynesian were merely restored to the level ment should ordinarily be financed reflationary measures in principle they had been at in 1929.52 Samuel by taxation rather than by borrow- but essential found their ability to apply them also believed that the benefit cut ing, and that government policy constrained by the instability of the was necessary in the interests of should focus mainly on stimulating to restore financial markets, and judged that equity and social harmony, argu- a recovery in the private sector: attempts to use public borrowing to ing that ‘the other classes who were the financial mitigate a slump were likely to be to be called upon to make heavy A programme of public works, counterproductive in the context of sacrifices would be indignant if however well devised, cannot save markets’ a crisis of financial confidence.50 no change were made’.53 Whereas or vitally improve the position Samuel and Maclean’s insistence Arthur Henderson and the TUC unless at the same time the main- confidence that the 10 per cent cut in unem- contended that sacrifices should springs of private enterprise are ployment benefit was an essential be apportioned according to abil- functioning freely. Public works in British element in any economy scheme ity to pay, Samuel and Maclean – can act as a balancing wheel and stemmed partly from an awareness along with the other party leaders can improve the general national government that foreign financiers regarded – interpreted the concept of ‘equal equipment in certain important this cut as symbolic of the govern- sacrifice’ to mean an equivalent and well defined fields. But the policy, keep ment’s ability to contain social wel- contribution from citizens in each vital thing is the buoyancy of the fare spending, and partly from a income group. Not all Liberal MPs great machine of private enter- sterling on determination to avoid the revenue and activists were comfortable with prise, which can absorb or throw tariff which some Labour minis- this notion, but the party as a whole out of work hundreds of thou- the gold ters had proposed as an alternative proved willing to accept it in the sands of men and women in a few means of making good the short- midst of the economic crisis. weeks, according to whether it is standard, fall.51 However, it also reflected an active or stagnant.48 and facilitate attitude to state welfare provision The October 1930 policy document and the idea of social justice which Conclusion How to Tackle Unemployment, based a revival of contrasted sharply with that held The consequences of the Liberal on proposals which Lloyd George by most of the Labour movement. Party’s participation in the National submitted to the government dur- trade and This may be regarded as a third Government for its future politi- ing the summer, combined revised reason why the Liberals backed the cal development are well known, public works plans with proposals employment. National Government’s cuts. The though they have sometimes been

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 49 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931 obscured by the fall-out from the The Samu- Moreover, some of the consid- Lords reform. It remains to be seen split into Samuelite, Simonite erations which shaped Sir Herbert whether these policy successes, or and Lloyd Georgeite groups dur- elites Samuel’s conduct in 1931 did not the results of the government’s eco- ing the October 1931 general elec- apply in 2010. Whereas the National nomic policies, will enable Nick tion.54 Although the total number remained in Government took shape during a Clegg and his colleagues to survive of Liberal MPs rose in that elec- period of exceptional fluidity in the experience of coalition in better tion, mainly as a result of local pacts the National the party system and endemic dis- shape than the Samuelites managed with the Conservatives, the Liberal sension within the Liberal ranks, in the 1930s. share of the popular vote more than Government the 2010 coalition was formed by halved, and the Samuelites – who two parties negotiating on equal Peter Sloman is a doctoral student at The left the National Government in for only thir- terms, with little immediate risk of Queen’s College, Oxford. His doctoral September 1932 in protest at the teen months. party splits. Equally significantly, thesis will explore economic policy devel- protectionist Ottawa Agreements contemporary Liberal Democrats opment in the Liberal Party, 1929–64. – would lose seats at every general The Conserv- have pressed much harder than their election for the next two decades. interwar predecessors to ensure that 1 Liberal Democrat manifesto, Change The Liberal National secession ative–Liberal the burden of deficit reduction falls That Works For You (London: Lib- and the breach with the National most heavily on those citizens who eral Democrats, 2010), pp. 97–8. See also Nick Clegg’s speech on deficit Government over Ottawa hit the Democrat are most able to bear it. reduction to the IPPR on 16 March Samuelite Liberals hard on the It is on the economic rationale 2010, available online at http://www. right, but among left-wing activ- coalition for balancing the budget that the libdemvoice.org/nick-clegg-win- ists and supporters it was the par- parallels between 1931 and 2010 ning-people-over-for-deficit-reduc- ty’s involvement in the economy has already are clearest. Certainly, no con- tion-18388.html. programme which did the most temporary Liberal Democrats are 2 David Laws, 22 Days in May: The Birth lasted longer of the Lib Dem–Conservative Coalition damage. A steady stream of young as enthusiastic about reducing the (London: Biteback, 2010), pp. 17–19, radicals – most notably Harry size of the state as Maclean and the 29–32. Nathan (MP for Bethnal Green than that, Friends of Economy were, and the 3 Rob Wilson, 5 Days to Power: The Jour- North-East), Ronw Moelwyn coalition does not share the rigid ney to Coalition Britain (London: Bite- Hughes, and Michael Foot – and Liberal commitment to Gladstonian princi- back, 2010), p. 168. defected to Labour during the 1930s, ples of sound finance which led the 4 Laws, 22 Days in May, pp. 109–10. despairing of the Liberal Party’s Democrat 5 Ibid., pp. 105–13. For a critique of the National Government to insist on approach taken by the Liberal Demo- ability to act effectively as a pro- ministers balancing the budget year-on-year. crat negotiators, see David Howarth’s gressive force; some older Liberals, However, both in 1931 and in 2010, review of Laws and Wilson’s books such as Ernest Simon, took the same have shown it was the turbulence of the financial in Journal of Liberal History, 70 (Spring view.55 White-collar public-sector markets which convinced Liberals 2011). workers, especially teachers, seem themselves that the task of deficit reduction 6 Andrew Adonis, review of Laws, 22 to have drifted away from the party could not be delayed, and that the Days in May in New Statesman, 2 Dec. 2010; Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, in view of its perceived failure to adept at national interest required the party Brown at 10 (London: Biteback, 2010), 56 stand up for their interests. The to join with the Conservatives pp. 453, 457–8. most emotive issue in the constitu- shaping (and, in 1931, with MacDonald and 7 , 19 Sept. 2009. encies, however, was the imposition Snowden) to implement unpleas- 8 This may be found in Parliamentary of the means test on transitional government ant cuts. There is also a signifi- Archives, Samuel papers, A/77/11, benefit, which Labour campaigned cant parallel between the present ‘Memorandum written at the Confer- ence at Buckingham Palace’, 24 Aug. against unceasingly; the unpopu- policy across government’s attempts to stimu- 1931. larity of the means test appears to late a private-sector-led recovery 9 Fifty-nine Liberal MPs were elected have been a major cause of Liberal the board. through an expansionary mon- in 1929, but their number was reduced losses to Labour in borough and etary policy, along with the export almost immediately when William county council elections, especially opportunities opened up by a weak Jowitt accepted appointment as Mac- in London in 1934, and also contrib- pound, and the policies pursued by Donald’s Attorney-General. 10 The most detailed recent account uted to the loss of Samuel’s own seat the National Government follow- of the crisis is Philip Williamson, of Darwen to the Conservatives in ing the September 1931 departure National Crisis and National Government: the 1935 general election, as work- from the gold standard.58 British Politics, the Economy and Empire, ing-class voters peeled away to The irreconcilability of the 1926–1932 (Cambridge: CUP, 1992). Labour.57 Liberal involvement in the Liberal free trade position with the 11 Williamson emphasises Chamberlain’s National Government’s economy Conservatives’ belief that protec- role: see ibid., pp. 299–303, 322–5, programme therefore accelerated tion would assist economic recovery 336–7. 12 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey: the party’s loss of radical and work- meant that the Samuelites remained Lloyd George, His Life and Times (Lon- ing-class support. in the National Government don: Hutchinson, 1954), p. 717; Man- The temptation to draw exag- for only thirteen months. The chester Guardian, 16 May 1931. gerated parallels between histori- Conservative–Liberal Democrat 13 Samuel papers, A/77/7, ‘Course of cal experiences and contemporary coalition has already lasted longer Events – August 20th–23rd, 1931’, mem- events is one which the historian than that, and Liberal Democrat orandum by Samuel, 23 Aug. 1931. 14 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 335–6. must avoid. In its composition, the ministers have shown themselves 15 Manchester Guardian, 29 Aug. 1931. The circumstances of its formation, and adept at shaping government policy dissentient was not an MP. its intended lifespan, the present across the board – from the citizen’s 16 Roger Middleton, ‘British monetary coalition differs significantly pension and NHS reorganisation and fiscal policy in the 1930s’, Oxford from the National Government. to Trident renewal and House of Review of Economic Policy, 26 (2010), p.

50 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931

431. Sinclair, 18 Aug. 1931. Maclean 49 Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump, Budgetary Situation’, memoran- 17 See HM Treasury, Budget 2010 had led the independent Liberal pp. 220–7; G. C. Allen, ‘Eco- dum by Sir Herbert Samuel, 3 (London: The Stationery Office, opposition to the Lloyd George nomic Advice for Lloyd George’, Aug. 1931, and A/77/7, ‘Course of June 2010), p. 89. Coalition in 1919–20, follow- in G. C. Allen, British Industry and Events’. 18 Middleton, ‘British monetary ing Asquith’s defeat at East Fife; Economic Policy (London: Macmil- 54 These issues are explored in David and fiscal policy’, p. 431; Robert a solicitor by profession, he had lan, 1979), pp. 196–207. Skidelsky Dutton’s article. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: become a company director when understates the centrality of the 55 Ernest Simon papers, M11/16/32, The Labour Government of 1929– out of parliament in the 1920s. proposed reduction in current Ernest Simon to Ramsay Muir 1931 (London: Macmillan, 1967), See Philip Williamson, ‘Maclean, government spending to the Lib- (copy), 2 Feb. 1934. p. 379. Sir Donald (1864–1932)’, Oxford erals’ new policy. 56 For an example of teachers’ disaf- 19 Andrew Thorpe, The British Gen- Dictionary of National Biography 50 Compare Sir Herbert Samu- fection with the Liberals, see Par- eral Election of 1931 (Oxford: OUP, (Oxford: OUP, 2004; online edi- el’s speech in the debate on the liamentary Archives, David Lloyd 1991), pp. 220–1. tion, Jan. 2008). National Economy Bill, Han- George papers, G/33/3/74, Haydn 20 Hansard, H.C. Deb., fifth series, 34 The Times, 13 Aug. 1931. sard, H.C. Deb., fifth series, 256, Jones to David Lloyd George, 12 257, 28 Sept. 1931, cols. 83–7, at 35 Thurso papers, THRS III 3/5, Sir 14 Sept. 1931, cols. 537–54, with Oct. 1932. Jones sat on the execu- col. 84. Archibald Sinclair to Sir Herbert , ‘Keynes would tive committee of the National 21 News Chronicle, 1 and 22 Aug. Samuel (copy), 14 Aug. 1931. be on our side’, New Statesman, Association of Schoolmasters. 1931; Trinity College Library, 36 Bodleian Library, Maclean papers 12 Jan. 2011, available online 57 On London, see Sir , Cambridge, Layton papers 101/4, (dep. c. 468), 121–2, Sir Donald at http://www.newstates- Forty Years In and Out of Parlia- Sir Walter Layton to Philip Snow- Maclean to Lady Maclean, 24 man.com/economy/2011/01/ ment (London: Andrew Melrose, den (copy), 11 Aug. 1931. Aug. 1931, and 127, Sir Donald investment-keynes-essay. 1947), p. 90, and Manchester Guard- 22 A group of Liberal activists Maclean to his family, 24 Aug. 51 Samuel papers, A/77/7, ‘Course ian, 6 March 1934; on Darwen, and economists led by Nor- 1931. of Events’; Maclean papers (dep. see Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, man Crump and E. A. Lessing 37 For MacDonald’s attempt to c. 468), 116, Sir Donald Maclean to pp. 370–1. A useful overview of attempted to revive the national persuade the Liberals to accept Lady Maclean, 18 Aug. 1931. local election trends in the 1930s treaty idea in September 1931, a smaller cuts package than the 52 Samuel papers, A/77/7, ‘Course appears in Chris Cook, ‘Liber- as a means of staving off an elec- Conservatives demanded, see of Events’. Lothian urged als, Labour and Local Elections’, tion fought on the tariff issue: Williamson, National Crisis, p. Samuel to emphasise this argu- in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook see National Archives of Scot- 325. ment in public: Lothian papers, (eds.), The Politics of Reappraisal, land, Edinburgh, Lothian papers, 38 Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert GD40/17/143/37–8, Lord Lothian 1918–1939 (London: Macmillan, GD40/17/144/57–67, ‘Liberalism Samuel: A Political Life (Oxford: to Sir Herbert Samuel (copy), 7 1975). and the Crisis of the £’, undated OUP, 1992), p. 312. For Samuel’s Sept. 1931. 58 Middleton, ‘British monetary and but probably 16 Sept. 1931. support for public works pro- 53 Samuel papers, A/77/1, ‘The fiscal policy’, pp. 436–8. 23 News Chronicle, 3 Sept. 1931; Wil- grammes after 1932, see Hansard, liamson, National Crisis, p. 424. H.C. Deb., fifth series, 274, 16 24 British Library, Reading private Feb. 1933, cols. 1242–56. papers (Eur. F118), 112–7, Lord 39 Maclean papers (dep. c. 468), Lothian to Sir Herbert Samuel, 25 143–6, Walter Runciman to Sir Aug. 1931. Donald Maclean, 25 Aug. 1931; 25 Williamson, National Crisis, p. Manchester Guardian, 29 Aug. 1931. 364–5. 40 Williamson, National Crisis, p. The coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to Liberal disaster 26 Samuel papers, A/77/12, David 354. continued from page 31 Lloyd George to Sir Herbert Sam- 41 Reading private papers (Eur. uel, 25 Aug. 1931. F118), 131–3, memorandum by 24 Lloyd George’s ‘Preface’ to his and the Generals (Associated Uni- 27 Lothian papers, GD40/17/143/12, Lord Reading on meeting with collected wartime speeches, versity Press, 1983). Samuel to Lothian, 21 Aug. 1931, David Lloyd George, 11 Sept. Through Terror to Triumph (Hodder 33 Adams, Bonar Law, pp. 220–9. and GD40/17/143/26–28, Lothian 1931; Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, and Stoughton, 1915), published 34 House of Lords Record Office, to Samuel (copy), 31 Aug. 1931; pp. 320–1. on 13 Sept. 1915. Bonar Law papers 53/4/27, Churchill Archives Centre, Cam- 42 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 25 M. Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Asquith to Lloyd George, 1 Dec. bridge, Thurso papers, III 3/5, 394–7, 413, 433–6. Committee and the Liberal Advo- 1916 (copy). Philip Oliver to Sir Archibald 43 MSS. Simon, 68 fo. 163, Sir John cacy of Conscription in Britain, 35 The literature on the December Sinclair, 27 Aug. 1931. Simon to Ramsay MacDonald 1914–1916’, Historical Journal, 51 1916 crisis is enormous. See in par- 28 Manchester City Archives, Ernest (copy), 5 Oct. 1931. (2008), pp. 399–420. ticular, M. Fry, ‘Political Change Simon papers, M11/11/5, Diary, 44 Peter Clarke, The Keynesian Revo- 26 Thirty-four Liberal MPs voted in Britain, August 1914 to Decem- 1929–35, entry for 21 Sept. 1931. lution in the Making, 1924–1936 against the first reading of the ber 1916: Lloyd George replaces 29 David Marquand, ‘1924–1932’, in (Oxford, 1988), pp. 95, 99. National Service Bill in January Asquith: the Issues Underlying David Butler (ed.), Coalitions in 45 Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, p. 1916. the Drama’, Historical Journal, 31 British Politics (London: Macmil- 312; Duncan Tanner, ‘The strange 27 J. Turner, British Politics and the (1980), pp. 609–27; J. M. McEwen, lan, 1978), p. 61. death of Liberal England’, His- Great War: Coalition and Conflict, The Struggle for Mastery in Brit- 30 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. torical Journal, 37 (1994), p. 975. A 1915–1918 (Yale University Press, ain: Lloyd George versus Asquith, 249–50. similar argument appears in Ross 1992), pp. 64–90. December 1916’, Journal of British 31 Bodleian Library, Oxford, MSS. McKibbin, Parties and People: Eng- 28 F. Stevenson Diary, 18 April Studies, 18 (1978), pp. 131–56. Simon, 249 fos. 45–6, Note by land 1914–1951 (Oxford: OUP, 1916, in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd 36 Wrigley, Henderson, pp. 107–11. Sir John Simon, 1 Dec. 1930. For 2010), pp. 66–7. George: a Diary by 37 French, British Strategy and War the continued attachment to free 46 The Times, 28 March and 11 April (Hutchinson, 1971), p. 107. Aims, pp. 124–6. trade of most of Lloyd George’s 1929. The distinction between the 29 Ibid., 12 Oct. 1915, Lloyd George: a 38 Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 152–74. critics, see Thurso papers, THRS pledge and the policy was coined Diary, p. 68. 39 J. Turner, ‘Cabinets, Committees I, Sir Archibald Sinclair to C. E. by Maclean. 30 French, British Strategy and War and Secretariats’ in K. Burk (ed.), Taylor (copy), 26 May 1931, and 47 L o t h i a n p a p e r s , Aims, pp. 220–43. War and the State: the Transforma- Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 29 GD40/17/140/456–8, ‘The Views 31 National Archives, Cabinet papers tion of British Government, 1914–19 June 1931. of Mr. J. M. Keynes’, memoran- 37/159/32, Lord Lansdowne, (Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 57–83. 32 MSS. Simon, 249 fos. 5–8, mem- dum by G. C. Allen, undated but ‘Terms on which a Peace might be 40 J. Harris, ‘Bureaucrats and Busi- orandum by Sir John Simon at summer 1930. considered’, 13 Nov. 1916. nessmen in British Food Control, meeting of leading Liberals, 20 48 Lothian papers, GD40/17/134/88– 32 Lloyd George’s fraught relations 1916–19’ in Burk (ed.), War and the Nov. 1930. 116, memorandum by Lothian on with the army are explored in State, pp. 135–56. 33 Thurso papers, THRS III 3/5, Sir the unemployment problem, 10 D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George Herbert Samuel to Sir Archibald June 1930.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 51 Coalition in the Archives a perspective from the papers of Frances Josephy

The papers of the Liberal activist Frances Josephy, held at LSE Archives, have recently been catalogued.1 The collection has much of interest to those studying Liberal history in the inter-war years.2 It is particularly useful as Josephy was a woman of forthright views which she was not afraid of expressing. Although she did not make it to parliament, her central role on the National League of Young Liberals (NLYL) is another reason to study these papers. Indeed, one of the stories of the or this paper the archive Andrews University and Newnham has been used to ask two College, Cambridge. By the mid- inter-war period is the questions regarding 1920s, Miss Josephy was already an her views, mainly for active member of the NLYL, speak- ever-growing number the period from around ing at events across the country and of Liberal activists who 1925–35.F First, does she have any moving resolutions at the League’s opinions on working with other annual meetings. Her speeches from did not become MPs. parties? Second, what views does 1925 were on various aspects of she express about the National industrial policy, but by the end of Nick White uses the Government, particularly in rela- the decade the range of topics wid- archives to tell the story tion to the Liberal Party? ens, from the need for free trade to Frances Louise Josephy was her defence of Liberalism. Josephy of Frances Josephy. born in 1900 and was educated at St also wrote articles, especially for

52 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 Coalition in the Archives a perspective from the papers of Frances Josephy

the Young Liberals’ newspaper, the of the papers relate to her European she had spoken at a women’s meet- Forward View. Her organisational work. However, ten boxes of mate- ing in Yatton on ‘F. M.’s [Frank skills were not wasted either, as rial do relate to Josephy’s political Murrell’s] work in parliament.’4 In she arranged conferences and other career from the 1920s through to the June 1925, there is a typescript ver- events for the Young Liberals and fifties. The political papers consist sion of an article Josephy wrote the International Young Liberals. of material such as: for the Weekly Westminster called, Josephy did not limit her involve- • Draft speeches (some are very ‘What is wrong with the Liberal ment in politics to the NLYL. In the rough notes, and others are more Party’.5 In it, she does point out mid-1920s, Josephy was also secre- detailed); that the party had started the reor- tary of the Parliamentary Radical • Press cuttings containing reports ganisation which was necessary for Group. The Manchester Evening News of speeches made by Josephy or any return to power. However, she (2 December 1926) reports that this on events attended by her; noted that there were other defi- was an ‘exacting’ position, ‘being • Typescript draft articles (many ciencies in the party, particularly responsible for much of the informa- annotated) on a variety of top- in relation to internal divisions. She tion which enables members of the ics, especially relating to politics, claims the party still had too many group to ask pertinent questions in industrial policy and interna- Tory sympathisers in it, and that the House of Commons and to make tional relations; pacts with the Conservatives at con- speeches supported by facts and fig- • Cuttings of published articles by stituency level were a sign of inher- ures.’3 She was secretary to Frank Josephy; ent weakness. This fear that some Murrell (Liberal MP for Weston- • Election ephemera, such as fly- Liberals were too close to the Tories super-Mare, 1923–24). She was also a ers, leaflets and posters; is a theme which Josephy frequently member of the Eighty Club and the • Liberal pamphlets and other returns to. League of Nations Union. publications, including speak- In the general election of May In 1929, she contested her first elec- ers’ notes published by the 1929, candidates from all three tion by standing as a Liberal candi- Liberal Publication Department main parties fought Winchester. date in Winchester during that year’s (1920s–30s). The Conservative candidate, Sir general election. She was to fight – In terms of its limitations, the George Hennessey, eventually won unsuccessfully – in various constitu- archive has little private material with 44 per cent of the vote; Labour encies, in all the general elections up such as correspondence or fam- came second (36 per cent); and Miss to, and including, 1951. However, ily papers. This means that there is Josephy came third with 18 per from the 1940s onwards, Josephy limited information on Josephy’s cent.6 focused more on European relations private life and family background. The views of several unsuccess- than Liberal politics. She was on the Also, most of the material was ful Liberal candidates in that elec- Federal Union Executive Committee meant to be made public, such as tion were aired during a discussion for over twenty years from February speeches and articles (or drafts of at the Liberal Summer School held 1940. She was also active in the them). So, for example, there is lit- at Cambridge later that year. On European Union of Federalists and tle about her private thoughts or Saturday 3 August, three women the European Movement. She died on about her personal links with other candidates (described as the 6 January 1985. Liberal politicians. ‘Three Graces’ by one admiring In total, her archive consists of Josephy’s political papers start Left: Election reporter7) addressed the conference over fifty boxes of documents. Most with a note that on 16 October 1924 leaflet, 1929 on the theme of ‘Young people

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 53 coalition in the archives: a perspective from the papers of frances josephy and the progressive parties’. One from her thoughts. She states that over policy. However, it could be of these unsuccessful candidates she has no liking for the three-party counter-argued that the influence was Josephy, who complained system but believes the Labour Liberals had on the minority Labour that campaigning in a three-party Party will split, leaving two great government was itself limited. political system was like fight- parties and a small ‘fanatical tail’ of Labour politicians would have been ing with an eel. She claimed that socialists. She says that the name of aware that Liberals were as unlikely younger voters were apt to go to the Liberal Party should be changed to want an election as themselves. the extremes of socialism or con- to encourage non-socialist Labour In August 1931, the National servatism: ‘Our difficulty, under politicians and voters away from the Government was formed. A gen- the three-party system, is that Labour Party: eral election was soon called and people cannot see the top peak for Josephy contested Basingstoke. I would rather see the Party that looking at the bottom two.’ In her election leaflet, Josephy stands for Liberalism called by During this address, Josephy claims to be the only ‘real’ National some other name – Radical, if argues that the Liberal Party must Government candidate. In another you like, or Progressive – than, for change and that activists should bold phrase, she makes it clear also the sake of a name, force the coun- work for the return to two-party that she is the ‘Free Trade’ National try to an eternal choice between politics. She states that a party could Government candidate. This sug- Conservatism and Socialism… be created if those two-thirds of the gests she sensed that the public were and personally I can see no other Liberal Party who were progres- in favour of some sort of coalition future for the Liberal Party than sives joined forces with the three- government to get the country as a body representing the radical- quarters in the Labour Party who out of its economic predicament. minded, non-Socialist alternative were moderates. This would leave However, she claims that the elec- to Conservatism.9 hardcore socialists as a ‘small fag- tion itself was unnecessary and was end … which does not count one In the first issue ofThe Liberal Whip called by Conservatives for purely way or another.’ She does not say (October 1929), a newsletter issued party political reasons, so they what the other third of the Liberal by the Winchester Division Liberal could impose protectionist meas- Party would do, nor does she pro- Association, Josephy writes about ures.12 Her electioneering did not vide details on how this party could the role of the small band of Liberal persuade the voters of Basingstoke be formed. She was clear, however, MPs. She claims that they have an and the Tory candidate won secur- that the Labour Party must come influence greater than their num- ing nearly 70 per cent of the poll. ‘our way; we are not going theirs.’ bers would suggest (she says fifty- In this three-way contest, Miss The Forward View article, makes eight10), for ‘unless the Government Josephy did at least manage to come it clear that Josephy’s opinions were have the Liberals on their side they second.13 not favourably received by all of the can do nothing.’ She adds that She calls for Josephy writes about her expe- delegates. In the discussion which MacDonald and his Cabinet: these Radical riences of the 1931 campaign in a followed the addresses she was sub- typescript article for Forward View are very well aware that only such jected to ‘sundry attacks’ and she felt called, ‘Unborn tomorrow and dead progressive measures as are in Remnants it was necessary to make a further yesterday’. In her article, written accordance with Liberal principles statement clarifying her position: within a month of the election, she will ever get through this House to rename writes: I do not want to suggest that we of Commons. In Parliament the should join Labour, or co-operate Liberal Party stands between themselves, ‘Le roi est mort! Vive le roi.’ The with Labour, or that there is any the country and out-and-out old Liberal Party is dead. Long question of alliance with Labour Socialism. In the country the to make it live the Radical Remnants! If in Parliament. What I did suggest Liberal Party gives to the elector- the mountain will not leave was that we should get rid of this ate the opportunity of expressing clear to vot- Mahomet, Mahomet must leave artificiality in politics. It should be at the same time their dislike of ers that they the mountain.14 made easier for those who think Conservatism and their distrust She calls for these Radical the same to work together. I want of Socialism. Undoubtedly the had nothing Remnants to rename themselves, to see that we do not fall at the Liberal Party is still a national to make it clear to voters that they fence of a name.8 necessity … in common had nothing in common with the Liberalism cannot die, nor the In this statement, Josephy makes Liberal Nationals or other Liberals Liberal Party, for it must exist as it clear that she does not want any with the Lib- with Conservative and protec- the national watch-dog to guard closer involvement with the minor- tionist leanings. Otherwise she the national interests, [and] pre- ity Labour government. Also, it eral Nation- predicted that at the next election vent revolutionary or reactionary can be deduced from her speech ‘the aforementioned apostates will legislation …11 als or other that Josephy would not be too hang like a millstone round our comfortable in a coalition with the In articles written before the Liberals with necks.’ She points out that even in Conservative Party. collapse of the Labour govern- the 1929 election Liberal candidates Her views on working with the ment in August 1931, Josephy Conservative had to answer ‘devastating ques- Labour Party are further clarified writes that any imminent elec- tions’ about the divisions within in an article written by her for the tion should be avoided as she pre- and pro- their party. She predicts that if the November 1929 issue of Forward dicted such a contest would result Radical Remnants did not take View. Josephy makes it clear that a in a strong Conservative govern- tectionist ‘a new title’, arguments over who merger between the Liberal and the ment. In that scenario, she believes, were the true Liberals would domi- Labour parties could not be further Liberals would have no influence leanings. nate the next election.

54 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 coalition in the archives: a perspective from the papers of frances josephy

Government, despite the fact that those circumstances, be only to glad she was a free trader. She believed to come in.’15 that by the time of the election, the Her hope that National Labour National Government had not yet and Baldwinian Tories could join firmly committed itself to protec- forces with progressive Liberals to tion, as MacDonald had called for create a Radical Party was not to an impartial inquiry into the matter. be. There appear to be many rea- Such an inquiry, Josephy thought, sons for this – one was that political would be on the side of free trade if momentum for the progressive vote really impartial. However, her sup- was still with Labour despite their port for the National Government setback in 1931. Another was that was questioned during the election the National Government did not campaign, as many voters believed split to the extent that Josephy had that the government was protec- predicted: although the Liberals did tionist and that that was what the leave the government, the mass of election was about. Conservative MPs and the Liberal Josephy also makes it clear Nationals stayed with it. Finally, in her article that she thinks the the Liberals themselves remained National Government is not a true deeply divided. coalition because it is overwhelm- In March 1932, a resolution ingly composed of Conservative calling for Liberal ministers to MPs. ‘The country voted resign from the government over National (as it thought) and has the issue of free trade was passed got a predominantly Conservative at the NLYL’s annual conference Government … and Conservatism at Bradford. The resolution was we shall get.’ However, as in supported by Josephy, who stated many of her pronouncements, that, ‘Opposition is the only way Josephy maintains her optimis- to rebuild the Liberal fortunes and tic outlook. She claims that this to give a sadder and wiser elector- Conservative domination would ate, who distrust the Socialists split the National Government, as and have found out the Tories, an the protectionists would see their opportunity for voting for a real opportunity to get their way with- party.’16 According to the Yorkshire out an impartial enquiry. Such an Observer, Josephy also attacked attempt, she predicted, would cre- Lloyd George in the speech by ate a split. Even Baldwin, ‘honest describing him as a liability inside man that he is, will come out of the the party and a danger outside the Government if the Tory Tariffists party.17 force Protection without an impar- Evidence in her writings sug- tial inquiry, having, as he says, gests that her view that the National no mandate from the country. So Government was really only a may Mr Macdonald. So – at least Conservative government do not we confidently expect so – will Sir change. Even when the Liberals Herbert Samuel.’ were part of that government, Josephy states that these lead- Josephy feels that they had no ers and their followers could form influence over it. For example, in the ‘nucleus of the new Radical ‘Seen from the gallery’ (May 1932), Opposition.’ However, ‘National Josephy writes of the futility of About the 1931 election cam- Election leaflets, Labour, Baldwinian Tory have no Sir Herbert Samuel’s speech in the paign itself, Josephy writes, ‘What 1931 and 1935 real organisation of their own.’ House of Commons in support of a dirty Election this has been.’ It elections. On There would need to be a party free trade. In fact, she points out, seems the Basingstoke campaign the 1935 election, structure behind it and, ‘That is his freedom to oppose protection was not fought in a friendly manner someone – where the Radical Remnants come was actually limited because he was by the two candidates who repre- presumably in, and there, I am convinced, is a minister in that government.18 sented parties who were both part writing rather where the National League must Josephy writes about her thank- of the same National Government. later – has take the lead.’ It is interesting to fulness when Liberal ministers do She states that she was beaten in crossed out note that Josephy believed it was the finally see the light and resign from her constituency ‘by three things ‘Peace and National League of Young Liberals the government in September 1932: (in the reverse order): – organisa- reconstruction’ who would provide this role rather ‘let us go ahead now and show the tion, intimidation, and misrepre- and written ‘and than the Liberal Party itself. As she people of this country that there is sentation.’ She does believe that full Beveridge’. says, ‘We have an organisation, we at any rate one party to which they some voters had been intimidated have always maintained our inde- can turn when the Hungry Thirties by landlords into voting Tory. She pendence from party headquarters have taught their bitter lesson.’19 states, however, that her greatest – now split from top to bottom – we In 1935, Josephy contested difficulty was in persuading voters have men within our ranks who can Devizes in Wiltshire. This time it that she did support the National lead, and more outside would, in was a straight fight with the sitting

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 55 coalition in the archives: a perspective from the papers of frances josephy

MP, Sir Percy Hurd (grandfather In the two local branches. Despite this, In the event though, a National of the future foreign secretary, Josephy and her colleagues man- Government was formed instead. ). The election leaf- mid-1920s, aged to hold seventy-two meet- Even though the Liberals were ini- lets for both candidates reveal a lot ings during the twelve days of the tially within this government, she about the difficulties Liberals had Josephy was campaign. All but one was well was convinced that in reality it was when contesting National candi- attended. She also records a visit so dominated by the Conservatives dates. Sir Percy’s leaflet proclaims stating that to the constituency from Sir John that it could not be considered a true he is the National Government can- Simon, who was campaigning in coalition. She believed the Tories didate: there is nothing on it which many Liber- support of Hurd. On the platform were very effectively using the label states that he is a Conservative. with him were all the Liberal can- ‘National’ to deceive the public Instead it highlights his coalition- als were didates who had fought in Devizes into believing that the government ist credentials, with brief state- too close since the war (excluding one). was acting in a non-partisan way. ments of support from Baldwin, She must surely have been bitter, She argued that Liberals had no Ramsay Macdonald and two erst- to the Con- although in her article the occasion influence on such a government, as while Liberals – Sir John Simon and is humorously dismissed by her not- proved by the passing of Tory pro- Sir James Currie (an ‘ex-President servatives – ing that a poster announcing that tectionist measures. Indeed, worse of the Devizes Division Liberal she was winning had been pinned than that, the Liberal Party suf- Association’). In his statement, whereas she up ‘in triumph just outside the Corn fered when it was part of that gov- Simon encourages electors to vote Exchange where everyone going ernment, as it could not effectively National, as the only possible alter- wanted the in to the Tory meeting must see oppose such legislation. Josephy native government would be an it.’23 So although Liberal National was one of the Young Liberals extreme socialist one. Meanwhile, Liberal Party candidates did not fight Liberals who called for Liberals to leave the Currie claimed that Hurd’s record in many seats in this election National Government at the NLYL in parliament since 1931 had showed to be the (except in two constituencies24), it annual conference in March 1932 clearly that he had abstained from is clear that Liberal Nationals were (less than six months after the 1931 partisan politics. Currie felt confi- non-socialist actively campaigning against the general election). dent that the majority of voters in ‘Samuelite’ Liberals. Josephy initially thought the for- the area would take the line he pro- opponent of The papers of Frances Josephy mation of the National Government posed to do – and vote for Hurd.20 are useful as they provide an indi- might be positive for progres- In her own leaflets, Josephy the Conserv- vidual perspective to add to the sive Liberals like her. For a start, highlights her view that the national and parliamentary view- some of the Conservative-leaning National Government is really a ative Party. point. In the mid-1920s, Josephy Liberals whom she had complained Conservative one, but under a dif- was stating that many Liberals about since the mid-1920s had now ferent name. She points out that the were too close to the Conservatives become Liberal Nationals. In addi- government is a threat to liberty – whereas she wanted the Liberal tion, she thought protectionists and is ‘moving along the road lead- Party to be the non-socialist oppo- would overplay their hand and split ing to dictatorship.’ This was partly nent of the Conservative Party. It the government. However, she did due to the huge majority it received is also apparent that activists such not believe the Liberal Party would in 1931: ‘A swollen majority, such as as Josephy realised by the end of benefit from that split as they were that given to the last Government, the 1920s that the party would need far too divided. Instead she hoped leads to stagnation and is the first to change if it was ever to form a that the Young Liberals could form step in the downfall of democracy.’ government again. At this time, the core of a radical party which Josephy claims that the National Liberals were considering how could challenge the Conservatives Government’s methods, too, were best to respond to the new real- for power. This was not to be, an attack on Liberalism. For exam- ity of three-party politics. Josephy mainly because Conservatives and ple, she points out that legislation thought the best outcome for the Liberal Nationals remained loyal to was often forced through without Liberal Party would be a return to the government. I think it is fair to adequate discussion. To Josephy, the two-party system. She thought say that from our vantage point, the these were hardly the actions of a this would come about because the creation of a Young Liberal-led rad- government who could justly claim Labour Party would split between ical or progressive party at that time to be Liberal.21 However, Josephy its socialists and moderates. She seems highly improbable. Without did not convince the electors of believed the latter grouping could more Liberals with the vision, opti- Devizes of the need to vote for her. join with Liberals to form the main mism and energy of activists like Yet again, the Conservative was party to oppose the Conservatives Josephy, surely it was impossible. victorious, and Sir Percy Hurd held – even if this meant changing the I will leave the final words of this on to the seat with almost 60 per Liberal Party’s name. article to Josephy, who writes about cent of the vote (down slightly from Josephy believed the Liberals how divided Liberals were in the 66 per cent in 1931).22 held some leverage over the second mid-1930s. In an article from 1937 There is some insight into minority Labour government, as it entitled ‘The insolence of office’, Josephy’s own views on the election could not function without Liberal she writes that the split between the campaign in a short typescript arti- support. However, Josephy pre- Liberals and Liberal Nationals: cle by her entitled, ‘Devizes’. She dicted that the next election would … is confusing in the extreme to notes that until the campaign there bring the Conservatives to power the ordinary man in the street and had been little organisation in the with a large majority. She thought heart-breaking to Liberal organ- constituency, with only a ‘W.L.A.’ that the Liberals would have little isers. In many constituencies the (Women’s Liberal Association) and influence on such a government.

56 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 coalition in the archives: a perspective from the papers of frances josephy

associations are genuinely reporter added that Miss Jose- (JOSEPHY/14/6). Nick White is Assistant Archivist phy ‘is a whirlwind of energy’ 15 Ibid. Liberal but feel bound in at the London School of Economics loyalty to their Simonite (JOSEPHY/17/1). 16 News Chronicle, Manches- and Political Science. He is currently 8 Forward View, September 1929 ter edition, 28 March 1932 Members. In others the offi- cataloguing the (JOSEPHY/17/1). (JOSEPHY/17/5). cial associations are no more papers. 9 ‘A reply to Mr Bernays’, type- 17 Yorkshire Observer, 28 March 1932 Liberal than their Members, script article for the For- (JOSEPHY/17/5). and such real Liberals as 1 The catalogue is available online ward View, November 1929 18 Typescript article for Forward survive in the division are at http://archives.lse.ac.uk (JOSEPHY/14/6). View, May 1932 (JOSEPHY/14/6). forced to seek political salva- 2 For a survey of papers held at 10 Fifty nine Liberal MPs were 19 ‘The real meaning of Ottawa’, elected in the 1929 general election. typescript article for For- tion in the League of Young LSE Archives relating to Liberals in the inter-war years see http:// However, one Liberal, William ward View, November 1932 Liberals or to start opposi- Jowitt resigned his seat (Preston) (JOSEPHY/14/6). tion associations for them- www2.lse.ac.uk/library/archive/ leaflets/liberal_party_1918_39. when he was appointed Attorney 20 Sir Percy Hurd’s election leaflet, selves. The worst cases are pdf General in the Labour govern- 1935 (JOSEPHY/13/4). those in which genuinely 3 LSE Archives, JOSEPHY/17/1 ment. Jowitt retained his seat as the 21 Frances Josephy’s election leaflet, Liberal associations are dom- 4 JOSEPHY/17/1 Labour candidate in the subsequent 1935, (JOSEPHY/13/4). inated by Simonite officers, 5 JOSEPHY/14/6 by-election on 31 July 1929. 22 Craig, Election Results, p. 496. 6 Liberals did not contest the seat 11 ‘The national watchdog’, in 23 ‘Devizes’, undated typescript and Liberalism is being lost the Liberal Whip, October 1929 (JOSEPHY/14/6). in a welter of Tory propa- again until 1964. Figures from F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British Par- (JOSEPHY/13/2). 24 Chris Cook, A Short History Of ganda. For the Simonite, liamentary Election Results 1918– 12 Frances Josephy’s general election The Liberal Party (7th edn., Pal- though he still finds virtue 1949 (3rd edition, Parliamentary leaflet, 1931 (JOSEPHY/13/3). grave Macmillan, 2010), p. 121. in the name Liberal, is quite Research Services, 1983), p. 368. 13 Craig, Election Results, p. 364. 25 Undated typescript article, c.1937 indistinguishable from his 7 ‘Crusader Junior’ in the Yorkshire 14 Typescript article for For- (JOSEPHY/14/6). ward View, November 1931 Conservative colleague.25 Evening News, 5 August 1929. The RESEARCH IN PROGRESS If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see ) for inclusion here.

Letters of Richard Cobden (1804–65) went from being the party of government to the third party of politics. Knowledge of the whereabouts of any letters written by Cobden in This research will use a wide range of sources, including surviving private hands, autograph collections, and obscure locations in the UK Liberal Party constituency minute books and local press to contextualise and abroad for a complete edition of his letters. (For further details of the national decline of the party with the reality of the situation on the Cobden Letters Project, please see www.uea.ac.uk/his/research/ the ground. The thesis will focus on three geographic regions (Home projects/cobden). Dr Anthony Howe, School of History, University of East Counties, Midlands and the North West) in order to explore the situation Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ; [email protected]. the Liberals found themselves in nationally. Research for University of Leicester. Supervisor: Dr Stuart Ball. Gavin Freeman ; [email protected]. The political career of Edward Strutt, 1st Baron Belper Strutt was Whig/Liberal MP for Derby (1830-49), later Arundel and ‘’ and the Liberal (Democrat) Party, 1937–2004 ; in 1856 he was created Lord Belper and built Kingston A study of the role of ‘economic liberalism’ in the Liberal Party and the Hall (1842-46) in the village of Kingston-on-Soar, Notts. He was a Liberal Democrats. Of particular interest would be any private papers friend of Jeremy Bentham and a supporter of free trade and reform, relating to 1937’s Ownership For All report and the activities of the and held government office as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Unservile State Group. Oral history submissions also welcome. Matthew and Commissioner of Railways. Any information, location of papers or Francis; [email protected]. references welcome. Brian Smith; [email protected]. The Liberal Party’s political communication, 1945–2002 Liberal Unionists Research on the Liberal party and Lib Dems’ political communication. A study of the Liberal Unionist party as a discrete political entity. Help with Any information welcome (including testimonies) about electoral identifying party records before 1903 particularly welcome. Ian Cawood, campaigns and strategies. Cynthia Messeleka-Boyer, 12 bis chemin Vaysse, Newman University Colllege, Birmingham; [email protected]. 81150 Terssac, France; +33 6 10 09 72 46; [email protected].

Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16 The political career of , Lord Steel of Aikwood Andrew Gardner, 17 Upper Ramsey Walk, Canonbury, London N1 2RP; David Steel was one of the longest-serving leaders of the Liberal Party [email protected]. and an important figure in the realignment debate of the 1970s and ‘80s that led to the formation of the Liberal Democrats. Author would like to Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935 hear from anyone with pertinent or entertaining anecdotes relating to Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an Steel’s life and times, particularly his leadership, or who can point me understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include towards any relevant source material. David Torrance; davidtorrance@ personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold of hotmail.com . the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. The Lib-Lab Pact The period of political co-operation which took place in Britain between Beyond Westminster: Grassroots Liberalism 1910–1929 1977 and 1978; PhD research project at Cardiff University.Jonny Kirkup, 29 A study of the Liberal Party at its grassroots during the period in which it Mount Earl, Bridgend, Bridgend County CF31 3EY; [email protected].

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 57 ‘Be careful what you wish for …’ The lessons of the Lib – Lab pact for the Lib – Con coalition

Much attention has focused upon the lessons to be drawn by Liberal Democrat– Conservative coalition ministers from previous arrangements between Liberals and Conservatives. However, the most recent relationship between Liberals and another party – and in some ways the relationship most similar to the current coalition – is the Lib- We must not give the impression of being afraid to soil our hands with the Lab Pact of 1977–78, responsibilities of sharing power … We must be bold enough to deploy the agreed by David Steel coalition case positively. (David Steel, , September 1976) when James Callaghan’s We are prepared to co-operate with other parties, even as we insist on the need for a fundamental break in Britain’s political habits. … We are pre- Labour government had pared to co-operate with whichever party will go with us some way along lost its parliamentary the same road. (The Real Fight is for Britain, Liberal manifesto, 1979) majority. What can this Electoral reform would enlarge [the parties’] choices and ensure an open coalition based on a public majority with authority to run our affairs … By episode tell us about the a chance, which I am glad we were able to take advantage of, the Lib–Lab effects of co-operation agreement provided a short but successful spell of majority government (David Steel, A House Divided: the Lib–Lab Pact and the Future of British Politics on Liberal identity and 1980, p. 161)

fortunes? Matt Cole We had now accepted that Parliament could work and – with a future Lib–Lab draws the lessons. coalition, stronger than the Agreement – the government could be effective in a hung Commons. (David Steel, Against Goliath: David Steel’s Story, pp. 147–48)

58 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘Be careful what you wish for …’ The lessons of the Lib – Lab pact for the Lib – Con coalition

avid Steel regarded The course of the Lib–Lab pact clear that Steel would accept a lower the Lib–Lab pact as The pact (Steel preferred to call it price for a longer agreement than more than an iso- an ‘agreement’) came into exist- many of his colleagues. Although lated chance event: ence because, following by-elec- the tension between these views he looked upon it as tion defeats and defections, James was present throughout the pact, Dan early experiment in a strategy Callaghan’s Labour government there were three phases in the devel- which would eventually see the had lost the parliamentary major- opment of the arrangement: the Liberals in a full coalition govern- ity of four which it had gained at first was one of relative harmony ment, and urged Liberals to draw the 1974 election. To secure the pas- within and between the partners; conclusions from the experience sage of legislation and stay in office, the second was one of crisis, which of it for that purpose. Although Callaghan offered the Liberal MPs – broke the trust underpinning the Steel’s preference and expectation then thirteen in total – consultation pact; and the latter period was one was for a working relationship over policy in exchange for support in which the spirit of the pact had with Labour, the Liberal mani- in the division lobbies. gone, though it lived on in prac- festo following the pact made The first arrangement by which tice – it was politically a ‘dead man clear the party’s readiness to work Liberal MPs supported Callaghan’s walking’. In all three phases Liberals with either main party under the government was a vote of ‘no confi- secured achievements, but they right circumstances. Steel himself dence’ tabled by Margaret Thatcher were of diminishing significance reiterated during the 2010 elec- on 23 March 1977; however, Steel and came at increasing cost. tion campaign that ‘Nick Clegg had looked forward to the opportu- As they secured the confidence is absolutely right to stick to his nity for some time, and his reaction vote of 23 March, Callaghan and argument that the electorate to it set the tone of Liberal politics Steel drew up an agreement for the must first decide the composition for years to come. The reasons for remainder of the parliamentary of the Commons, and that the going into a pact were both national session, which was accepted by all party leaders must thereafter act and partisan; tactical and strategic. Liberal MPs even though some responsibly in accord with their Even the Liberals most suspicious were surprised at its limited fruits. decisions.’1 He also confirmed of cooperation with other parties There would be a Joint Consultative his approval of the deal with the could see the attractions of sustain- Committee between Labour min- Tories after its publication.2 Thus, ing Callaghan in office: a general isters and their counterparts in the though it is dangerous to make election would expose the Liberals’ ‘Shadow Administration’, as the predictions from past events, it financial and political vulnerabil- Liberal MPs and peers involved is reasonable to take Steel’s cue ity, whereas an arrangement with Left: Jim came to call themselves; Liberal and consider what the experience Callaghan would provide stabil- Callaghan proposals on worker participation, of the Lib–Lab pact of 1977–78 ity for the nation at a time of eco- promises homelessness and small businesses might suggest about the situation nomic crisis on terms at least partly David Steel his were to be given a serious hearing, in which the Liberal Democrats determined by Liberals, and dem- reward (PR) and – most tantalising of all – the now find themselves. There are onstrate the practicality of the sort after his Labour issue of proportional representation certain similar features which of cooperation entailed by the elec- colleagues (PR) for elections to the proposed give the Lib–Lab pact a poten- toral reform promoted by the party. have voted devolved bodies in Scotland and tial value as a guide for observ- The questions were how long the on it (Gibbard Wales and for direct elections to the ers, if not actors, in the coalition cooperation should continue and at cartoon, European Assembly was to be put process. what price, and it was immediately Guardian) before the Commons. Steel was in

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 59 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition bullish mood about the opportunity exceptions, favourable’ and that who had defected to the Liberals and wrote to Liberal candidates on ‘the Party will stand solidly with three years earlier, convinced the 24 March: the Parliamentary Party and the Liberal Assembly at Brighton to Leader.’7 Shadow Administration pass a resolution demanding that Admire the photos of the Liberal and Joint Consultative Committee a ‘substantial majority’ of Labour MPs in the Daily Mail! When meetings went ahead and senior MPs must support PR for the did photographs of all the MPs Liberals in the Lords wrote to Steel European elections in order for the last appear on the front page of a calling for ‘a more stable and longer pact to continue. popular daily? You will have a dif- term agreement.’8 There was even October saw a reshuffle of the ficult time. You will have resigna- a remarkable historical continuum Shadow Administration in which tions in your constituency. (You provided by a letter from Sir George doubters made way for more solid would have had from others if we Schuster, who said: ‘in listening to supporters of the pact: Smith, who had sided with the Tories). Don’t what you said last night I felt for had resigned as employment spokes- be defensive. Be aggressive. Go all the first time that public expression man, was replaced by Baroness out to detail the bridling of social- was given to a true Liberal mes- Seear, and Grimond stepped down ism. Forget the textual analysis of sage.’9 Yet there remained amongst from his responsibility for energy the Agreement. It’s what we make Liberals a body of sceptical opin- policy, which was handed to Lord of it that matters.3 There ion which feared for Liberal inde- Avebury. In November, a Party However, little was guaranteed, pendence and by the summer Steel Council meeting at Derby insisted and the votes on PR were to be free remained recalled, ‘the Party was extremely that if Labour MPs did not endorse votes so that Labour MPs would restless’10 following very poor local PR for Europe, then a special be at liberty to oppose the meas- amongst election results in May, when three- Assembly would have to be called ure. From the outset there were quarters of Liberal county council to review the pact. Everything now Liberals who took ’s Liberals a seats were lost. depended upon the Commons vote view that ‘David was determined to During the autumn of 1977, on the introduction of PR on 13 do a deal at all costs’. Labour minis- body of scep- the pact was tested to destruction, December. ters agreed, as one source reported: though this would not be pub- The vote for PR in European ‘the “terms” were heard with some tical opinion licly evident until later. The deli- elections was lost by 319 to 222. incredulity by the Cabinet’ and cate balance of opinion within the Conservative whipping against ‘the [Labour] Party had simply which feared Liberal Party was reflected in the the bill did damage, but more sig- undertaken to do what it had any- Annual Report to the Assembly, nificant to the Liberals was Labour’s way intended to do and desist from for Liberal which argued that ‘the sudden re- lukewarm response. Though a what it could not do.’4 Cyril Smith emergence of the Liberal Party onto majority of Labour MPs voting – declared his opposition to the pact independ- the national stage as a result of the 147 to 122 – had supported the bill, early on, and from the outset former ence and Agreement with the Government fewer than half of the Parliamentary leader and David has enabled the Party to wield a Labour Party had cast their vote, Penhaligon, the MP for Truro, were by the sum- degree of real and immediate influ- and eleven ministers, four of them extremely sceptical and supported ence more in line with its electoral Cabinet members, had voted the project only out of loyalty to mer Steel support at the last election’ but against it. This was hardly the ‘best colleagues.5 Most of the anxiety at acknowledged that ‘it has strained endeavours’ of the government this stage, however, was about the recalled, ‘the our meagre resources to the limit.’ which Liberal MPs had been prom- details of policy or the length of the Cyril Smith’s attempt to have the ised in July. An immediate meeting agreement. Steel was able to per- Party was agreement renegotiated was voted of Liberal MPs decided to continue suade his colleagues at a weekend down by 716 delegates to 385 at the with the pact by only six votes to meeting of MPs in late June that extremely Assembly in September, but Steel four. To achieve this, Steel was ‘the results to date have been worth- was obliged by an Assembly resolu- obliged to pretend that Callaghan while and beneficial to the nation restless’ fol- tion to promise that in the coming was going to see the queen to call an but that any future agreement still vote on PR in European elections, election, a prank which made some depends on the government pursu- lowing very ‘we will be watching the division of his colleagues feel physically ing policies which will bring down lists most carefully. We have a right sick. The pact was now doomed, the rate of inflation and provide the poor local to expect the substantial majority of although the precise circumstances necessary economic stability for the Labour members – and especially of its demise were as yet unknown. country.’6 In July, Steel convinced election Ministers whose continuance in A Special Assembly was called to his fellow MPs to continue the pact office depends on us – to support the meet in Blackpool in January 1978 into another parliamentary session results in Government’s recommendation.’ to discuss the situation. based upon a ten-point agreement May, when The same month Liberal MPs were Conscious of the hostile reaction which promised a free Commons infuriated to see a study into the he was likely to face at Blackpool, vote on PR for European elections three-quar- grievances of small businesses – for Steel secured a long run-in of over and consideration of profit-sharing which they had pressed the govern- a month to the Assembly, care- in industry. ters of Lib- ment since the first days of the pact fully crafted a resolution for debate For four months Steel unques- – set up with no recognition of their which gave him discretion over tionably had the support of most eral county role in its establishment; Steel was the ending of the pact, and wrote of the party, and party head- obliged to release a retrospective a stern letter to Liberal candidates quarters noted confidently council seats press statement claiming the credit on 16 December on his view of the that ‘initial reactions we have for his colleagues. Former Labour best way forward: ‘I am not going received are, with relatively few were lost. Minister Christopher Mayhew, to change course now. I think the

60 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition

Party would be crazy to change of the motion nor the mood in the course but you are entitled to do so conference hall suggested that the if you wish at the Special Assembly.’ delegates were voting to continue it By 13 January a note of anxiety had indefinitely.’13 replaced the bravado of the previ- There were occasional minor ous month as he urged candidates triumphs over budget measures, or ‘please ensure if you or your con- opportunities to advertise Liberal stituency delegates are speaking novelties such as a land bank, but that nothing is said thoughtlessly few of these ideas came to fruition. which can be picked up and used One or two MPs, such as Sir Russell against ourselves in the future by Johnston, urged Steel to press on our enemies.’ Regretting that the with the pact, hoping that Labour discussion has taken him away would repent on PR for Europe from other activities he warned that and the proposed devolved bodies ‘there must soon come an end to this in Scotland and Wales, but these discussion of our strategy in favour measures were again defeated by of more effective promotion of it.’ Labour peers in April.14 The bal- On the other side of the debate, ance of party opinion had tipped Liberator argued that ‘somehow or in favour of the sceptics, and only other the Liberal Party must find a courtesy and electoral necessity way of deciding when to get out of had restrained the Liberals from the pact’, and complained that ‘the ending the pact straight away. The problem in all of this, of course, is to lesson for Steel was clear: much of ensure that David Steel listens to the the Liberal party would support party, rather than blindly pursuing his strategy of inter-party coopera- his obsession with coalition.’11 tion, but the circumstances had to The Blackpool Assembly be right, and the rewards had to be approved the continuation of the delivered. In particular, the promise pact by 1,727 votes to 520, but it of electoral reform – always cen- exposed publicly the divisions tral to the Liberals’ idea of politics within the party. Steel contin- – was sacrosanct. Publicly, the pact ued to insist that ‘I have to place ended with a whimper: in May Steel on record that the Prime Minister acknowledged that it would not delivered exactly what he under- continue beyond the parliamentary took to deliver on PR’, to dele- session;15 on 23 June 1978, he told gates’ cries of ‘Rubbish!’; but even Scottish Liberals wearily that ‘it has Richard Wainwright, who opened been an appallingly difficult time the debate with a speech supposed for Liberals. We face an electorate How the Sunday subject of clear legislative propos- to bridge the two factions, referred brainwashed into seeing politics as Times and the als, a situation upon which the party to the ‘perverse sectarian Labour a contest between a pair of mighty Daily Mail saw could build. Such was the oppo- vote in favour of gerrymander- adversaries’ and called for autumn the Pact sition to the Lib–Lab pact in the ing’, and the tone of the debate election. At the end of July, Liberal party that Steel has acknowledged was more important than the sub- opposition lost the government a recently that ‘it’s fair to describe it as stance of the resolution which was vote on the dock labour scheme; but a Steel/Callaghan Pact’ because ‘the agreed. Although Steel was granted it was not until August that Alan Liberals, as usual, were difficult and the freedom to continue with the Beith as chief whip gave notice that had to be cajoled along.’17 For Steel, pact for the remainder of the ses- all joint meetings were at an end. however, a precedent had been set: sion, most delegates regarded this For sceptics this experiment in he opened 1979 with a party politi- as allowing the pact a dignified cooperation had been costly and cal broadcast quoting Bill Rodgers demise in preference to administer- fruitless: electorally, not only did and Edward Heath on the virtues ing a lethal injection; it was not an they lose previously hard-won of inter-party cooperation and the encouragement to attempt to revive council representation, but the need for a statutory incomes policy, it. The exasperation that would Liberals also lost ground at every and went on to argue at the general continue to face Steel over the next parliamentary by-election during election in May that the Liberals had decade was expressed in Liberator, the pact, with the vote declining by ‘knocked sense into Labour’ and to which said ‘the Special Assembly over 10 per cent in half of the con- appeal for a ‘Liberal wedge’ to split showed that getting radicals elected tests between April 1977 and May the two main parties’ control of to positions within the party does 1978. The party’s Gallup poll rat- the Commons. The argument over little or no good if the majority ing fell into single figures for the cooperation would surely return. of constituency workers are pre- first time in five years in August pared to come along to Assemblies 1977, not to rise again until the 1979 and play “follow my leader”.’12 The general election campaign.16 The Similarities and differences Times (23 January 1978) however, tangible rewards in terms of policy between the pact and the was more accurate in its assessment had been thin, though a number of coalition of Liberal attitudes to the pact, com- Liberal demands had received seri- The relationships and circumstances menting that ‘neither the wording ous discussion and had been the of the parties involved in these two

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 61 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition arrangements can be compared in Liberals did in 1977–78. At by- The pact the government in the Upper the following ways: elections in traditional areas House. However, this entails the • Both arrangements are – as in of Liberal presence (Penistone avoided the reality that Lib Dem MPs, unlike 1924 and 1929 – the result of in July 1978, Oldham East in Liberal MPs of the 1970s, can- parliamentary arithmetic rather January 2011) the Liberal vote worse imme- not all rely on the sort of media than ideological convergence holds up, but there is no mid- exposure and personal vote (as would have been the case in term fillip; in other contests diate fate of which sustained all but three of 1997 had the Liberal Democrats (such as the Barnsley Central the thirteen Liberal MPs who joined Blair’s Cabinet) or eco- by-election of March 2011, the a renewed supported the pact from a drop nomic crisis or war (as in 1915–22 July 1977 Saffron Waldon by- of a third in their party’s nation and 1931–45). The motivation election, or the local elections electoral vote in 1979. holding the parties together is of 1977 and 2011) the tactical and contest, and • Most importantly the relation- the belief that the government strategic purpose of the Liberal ship in 2010 is a fixed one, unlike they have formed is better for vote is harder for the floating changed the temporary and spontaneous the nation and for their party voter to grasp whilst the Liberals relationship of the pact. There than the holding of another gen- support, but are not themselves, public per- is no obvious way of creating eral election. Any threat to that the main party of government. space for a recovery such as Steel analysis therefore jeopardises the ceptions of enjoyed between 1978 and 1979; arrangement. The differences between the pact Steel himself has been quoted • In both arrangements, the and the coalition which might the Liberal talking of the need to formulate Liberal Party and its successor give observers caution in drawing an exit strategy.19 are the junior partners, able and conclusions are as follows: Party and expected only to secure a limited • The current arrangement is with number of concessions from the a different, and historically less its role in Conclusions other party. tribal and more pragmatic, party. The conclusions which might be • Both arrangements have fea- The reluctance of the Labour such a way drawn from this comparison are: tured the establishment of for- Party to make meaningful con- • For observers, the ostensible mal negotiating machinery by cessions at times of tension in that when relationships between the par- which commitments are secured, 1977–78, and in the coalition ties do not necessarily reflect including policy promises from negotiations of May 2010,18 may the elec- the changing reality of attitudes the major partner party (a free be replaced by greater flexibil- within the parties, which are far vote on PR for European elec- ity in the pursuit of power by tion came more fluid and complex than the tions in 1977, for example, or the the Conservatives. This was it was less arrangement itself; and yet its referendum on AV in 2010). The apparently illustrated in the sub- continuation is dependent upon machinery in 1977 was the Joint stantial amendment of Andrew damaging the balance of those attitudes. Consultative Committee of six Lansley’s health reforms. • Needless to say, strategy for the leading figures in the Labour • The Liberal Democrats are than most 2015 election will depend heav- and Liberal Parties; in 2010 the now in office as members of the ily upon the display of ‘trophies’ machinery took the form of the executive, rather than merely had feared it from the coalition: key policy negotiating teams. supporting the party in govern- achievements that are held to • Both parties in the arrangement ment. They have lost opposition- would be. justify the arrangement and its contain now, as they did in 1977, party funding, and are now held adverse effects from the point a spectrum of opinion ranging directly responsible for govern- of view of former and poten- from enthusiastic support for ment policies. On the other hand tial Lib Dem voters. This can cooperation (on both occasions they have access to the civil serv- even be a general and negative found specifically in the lead- ice and have more direct control achievement like Steel’s ‘stop- ers of both parties) to grudging, over policy. One key effect is ping socialism’ or the progres- suspicious acceptance of the idea, that policy is made in coordi- sive lowering of inflation; but it and resistance to its individual nation with the other govern- has to be credible and electorally effects ( and Tony ing party rather than by taking significant. The Lib Dem lead- Benn in the Labour Cabinet of Liberal decisions to an ongoing ership started this process with 1977, mirrored by Cyril Smith Joint Consultative Committee. their ‘business card’ of achieve- and • Lib Dem MPs are more numer- ments circulated at their Spring in the Liberals; David Davis ous and more vulnerable to 2011 conference in Sheffield, but or Christopher Chope in the party support swings, than in voters will need more. Conservatives of 2010 or Charles the 1970s. The ratio of Labour • There has to be the possibil- Kennedy and Adrian Sanders in MPs to Liberal MPs during most ity of departure by the Liberal the Lib Dems). Most MPs and of the pact was 24 to 1; between Democrats, or else the deal loses activists hover between the two, the parliamentary parties of its underpinning parliamentary and most are capable of moving the coalition it is a less uneven logic. Not only does that pos- along the spectrum when they 5.4 to 1. There is now competi- sibility strengthen one leader’s feel loyalty to the leadership has tion for Lib Dem frontbench hand against the other’s, but it been stretched and party identity positions, whereas Steel had strengthens each leader’s hand is under threat. to draft peers into his Shadow against his own dissidents, as • The Liberal Democrats are suf- Administration to make up the both Benn and Steel acknowl- fering at the polls just as the numbers rather than to represent edged Callaghan did in muting

62 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition

his left wing20 and Cameron’s to do this because of the features of was defeated in the Lords in April, when Labour peers bold move to push the 1922 the situation – distance from gov- voted against. committee to accept a referen- ernment, a clean break before the 15 David Steel, press release, 25 May 1978, dum on AV.21 An exit strategy is election and the independent politi- Steel papers File A/3/1. Party Chair- therefore essential to staying in cal bases of its MPs – which are no man Geoff Tordoff’s own statement successfully. longer so clearly in evidence. It is read: ‘we now look forward to being • Liberal Democrat MPs will changing the ‘differences’ above to able to present to the country a clear come under unfamiliar intense ‘similarities’ which will make the and independent Liberal programme.’ 16 P. Norris, British By-elections: the Vola- pressure at the next election and difference. tile Electorate (Clarendon 1990), Appen- will therefore need to rely upon dix. In fairness it should be pointed out personal and constituency appeal Matt Cole is a Visiting Fellow of the that in no by-election of the October more than ever. MacAllister, Hansard Society and the author of 1974 parliament did any Liberal can- Fieldhouse and Russell22 have Richard Wainwright, the Liberals didate match the party’s performance observed that this remains part and Liberal Democrats (Manchester at the preceding general election, but the decline became much more marked of their appeal, although it is less University Press, 2011). after April 1977. Only in one of the universal than Butler remarked previous contests had the drop in the was previously the case,23 and the 1 The Times, 21 April 2010. vote edged past 10 per cent. See also results bore this out in 1979. The 2 D. Steel, ‘Why we must make this A. King (ed.), British Political Opinion local election losses of 2011 were coalition work’, The Guardian, 15 May 1937–2000 (Politico’s, 2001), pp. 11–13 2010. less brutal than those of 1977, on Gallup’s monthly poll ratings. 3 David Steel papers, LSE, file A/3/1. 17 Cited in M. Oaten, Coalitions (Har- but they are a reminder that 4 P. Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall: riman House, 2007), p. 193. each MP’s own strengths will Britain in the Seventies (Michael Joseph, 18 This is the view of the talks empha- determine both their individual 1985), pp. 259–60. sised in D. Laws, 22 Days in May: the fates and the size of the Lib Dem 5 A. Penhaligon, Pe nh aligo n birth of the Lib Dem–Conservative coali- group after 2015. (Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 161–62. tion (Biteback, 2010). 6 Liberal Party Organisation press 19 Sunday Express, 19 Sept. 2010. The Lib–Lab pact was elector- release, 27 June 1977, Steel papers, file ally damaging and brought few 20 T. Benn, Tony Benn’s Diaries (Hutchin- A/3/1. son, 1995), pp. 407–9; Whitehead, The policy victories, and commenta- 7 Undated note in Liberal Party Papers, Writing on the Wall, p. 261. 24 tors such as Michie and Hoggart file 19/3 21 R. Wilson, Five Days to Power: the Jour- and Whitehead25 scoffed at its sig- 8 Lords Byers, Gladwyn, Wigoder and ney to Coalition Britain (Biteback, 2010), nificance. Even some of the senior Baroness Seear to David Steel, 21 July pp. 217–22. Liberal MPs who remained loyal to 1977. 22 I. MacAllister, E. A. Fieldhouse, A. 9 Sir George Schuster to David Steel, Russell, ‘Yellow Fever? The Political Steel at the time of the pact voiced 16 June 1977. Schuster had been a 26 Geography of Liberal Voting in Great scepticism afterwards. Many of Liberal candidate before World War Britain’, Political Geography, 21/4 (2002), the same doubts could be expressed One, Liberal National MP for Walsall pp. 421–47. about the impact of the coali- from 1938 to 1945, and a close friend of 23 D. Butler (ed.), Coalitions in British Poli- tion upon the Liberal Democrats. Asquith and . tics (Macmillan, 1978), p. 110. Nonetheless, the pact avoided the 10 D. Steel, Against Goliath: David Steel’s 24 A. Michie and S. Hoggart, The Pact: Story (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), worse immediate fate of a renewed the inside story of the Lib–Lab government, p. 134. 1977–78 (Quartet Books, 1978). electoral contest, and changed pub- 11 Liberator, December 1977–January 25 Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall, pp. lic perceptions of the Liberal Party 1978. 258–75. and its role in such a way that when 12 Liberator, February–March 1978. 26 J. Grimond, Memoirs (Heinemann, the election came it was less damag- 13 The Times, 23 Jan. 1978. 1979), pp. 249–55; Penhaligon, Penha- ing than most had feared it would 14 Johnston to David Steel, 16 March ligon, pp. 160–77. 1978, Steel papers File A/3/1. PR in the be. The party was, however, able Liberal History 300 years of party history in 24 pages The Liberal Democrat History Group’s pamphlet, Liberal History: A concise history of the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats, has been revised and updated to include the 2010 election and the formation of the coalition.

Liberal History is available to Journal of Liberal History subscribers for the special price of £2.00 (normal price £2.50) with free p&p. To order, please send a cheque for £2.00 (made out to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) to LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 63 The history of the ‘triple lock’ where it came from, how it worked and its future

Fears over ’s talks with Labour in the late 1990s triggered the Liberal Democrats to introduce the so-called ‘triple lock’ arrangement to stop Ashdown bouncing the party into a controversial decision on its future. Though never used under his leadership, the process technically stayed in force. It was used for the first time to confirm, ironically, a deal with the Conservative Party in May 2010. The party has since voted to review its working, but with a view to making minor changes rather than to abolish it. iven the triple lock’s in 1988, Paddy Ashdown’s prior- After its first outing in later use to con- ity in the early years of his lead- firm a deal with the ership was to ensure the party’s anger, the triple lock is Conservative Party, survival. Stories of how close the it is ironic that its taxman came to closing down the firmly here to stay. Its Gorigins, in 1997–98, lay in fears of national party over unpaid bills, origins and continuing what the then party leader, Paddy and of opinion poll results show- Ashdown, might want to get up to ing the party so close to zero as relevance are examined with the Labour Party. Winner of to be within the statistical mar- 1 the first leadership election for the gin of error, have been frequently by Mark Pack. newly formed Liberal Democrats retold by Ashdown and his senior

64 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 The history of the ‘triple lock’ where it came from, how it worked and its future

colleagues ever since. However, clearly positioning the party as at the start of conference which by the mid-1990s the threats to the being anti-Conservative and drop- said, ‘Liberal Democrat leaders will party’s very existence had been ping the earlier policy of equidis- tell activists this week that the party seen off, whilst the national politi- tance between the Conservatives will form coalitions with Labour in cal picture had changed markedly. and Labour. In addition, nego- the event of electoral reform for the The Conservative Party was sunk tiations were held between Labour House of Commons and devolved in long-term unpopularity and and the Liberal Democrats to assemblies. Paddy Ashdown will Labour was looking to successfully agree a programme of constitu- brush aside critics … His call for reinvent itself. Against this back- tional reforms. These became cooperation with Labour is backed ground, Paddy Ashdown set off on known as the Cook–Maclennan by Liberal Democrat peer Lord an audacious political strategy – to talks, after the lead negotiators for Jenkins who, in today’s inter- attempt to forge a ‘progressive alli- each party, and Bob view with , urges the ance’ on the centre-left, united Maclennan. The programme they party to “stop being frightened against the Conservatives and seek- agreed received widespread support of coalitions”.’ Those reports had ing to remedy the historical split (as within the Liberal Democrat Party. been fuelled by an interview that he and close advisors such as Roy But subsequent further moves – Paddy Ashdown gave to the New Jenkins saw it) which had fractured including the creation of a Joint Statesman, in which he talked about anti-Conservative forces early in Consultative Committee after the the possibilities of coalition with the twentieth century, making 1997 general election – and repeated Labour. He recorded in his dia- it a century then dominated by speculation about Ashdown’s inten- ries that ‘my intention was to get Conservative political success. tions, left many party members the Party thinking about what is This was a far from uncontrover- nervous or even hostile to where he on the horizon. I also wanted to sial view amongst Liberal Democrat was leading the party. gauge where the opposition is com- grassroots members. Some objected Symptomatic of this was a lit- ing from … Much consternation because they saw Labour as the local tle-noticed debate one morning from the usual quarters, especially political adversary and did not want at the Liberal Democrat autumn Conrad Russell and Lembit Opik the national party to be cosying up conference of 1997 in Eastbourne, … My second intention in all this is to their opponents. Others agreed in which a councillor tried to to push Blair. If I get a furious reac- in principle about centre-left sym- overturn the Federal Conference tion from the Party at conference, it pathies but feared how far Paddy Committee’s (FCC) decision to will strengthen my hand when we Ashdown was willing to take coop- exclude his submission from the start to negotiate seriously.’3 eration. In fact, as Paddy Ashdown’s conference agenda. Cllr David During conference week there diaries and other accounts have Howarth’s appeal to suspend stand- were headlines such as ‘Ashdown since revealed, Ashdown at least ing orders so that conference could faces fight on Labour links’ speculated about going much fur- debate an emergency motion ruling (Financial Times), ‘Ashdown told not ther with Labour than many of his out coalition with Labour was eas- Left: Paddy to cosy up to Blair’ (The Guardian) critics ever feared at the time – even ily rejected in a sparse debate.2 Ashdown, leader and ‘Ashdown coalition hint splits as far as merger. However, Howarth’s move fol- of the Liberal Lib Dems’ (The Times). The sense In public, there was some suc- lowed pre-conference reports such Democrats of Labour and Liberal Democrats cessful cooperation, with Ashdown as that in the Observer on the Sunday 1988–99 manoeuvring around their possible

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 65 the history of the ‘triple lock’: where it came from, how it worked and its future future relationship was heightened expectation that it will take place in Mindful of motion,8 which meant that the real by the presence of a Labour minis- spring.’ debate would be over any amend- ter – Alistair Darling – speaking at As a result of these widespread how the ments tabled to the latter. one of the conference fringe meet- expectations, between the autumn Several amendments were sub- ings. The attempts of Howarth 1997 and spring 1998 confer- party lead- mitted which touched on the issue and others to get the issue onto the ences an informal group of people of coalitions and relations with agenda, however, fell foul of pro- worked together, searching for a ership had Labour, but Federal Conference cedural problems, with the result compromise wording that would Committee took for debate a that, rather than a high-profile both deal with David Howarth’s handled Gordon Lishman text (in the name debate advertised in advance on (and their own) concerns and also of Burnley Liberal Democrats9) the agenda, the only debate was the be acceptable to Paddy Ashdown. the Lib–Lab which set out what became known failed attempt to suspend standing This group included Gordon pact, the as the triple lock.10 When deciding orders which took place both with- Lishman, the eventual author of to take the Lishman amendment, out advance notice and in a sparsely the triple lock and a member of wording of the FCC debated whether or not it attended conference hall. the Federal Executive (FE), former was in order, as it sets down rules The reasons for the FCC’s rejec- SDP leader and still-MP Bob the Lishman that the parliamentary party and tion not only of Howarth’s motion Maclennan, popular peer Conrad leadership should follow, yet the but of others on the same topic were Russell, and new MP . amend- party’s constitution states that par- predominantly nothing to do with Donnachadh McCarthy, a regular liamentarians cannot be mandated. the committee members’ views critic of the party leadership and ment was The contrary argument, that the on Ashdown’s strategy. Instead, then on the Federal Executive was constitution only protects individu- they were concerned with how to also involved, as was the party’s motivated als from being mandated and that run conference in the most orderly Chief Executive, Chris Rennard, conference is sovereign, was suffi- fashion. An ongoing strategy con- who was motivated by a desire to by a desire to ciently persuasive for FCC to rule sultation was under way, with a ensure that a form of words was the amendment in order. motion and debate due at the next found which would keep all the avoid, in his Mindful of how the party lead- party conference. In addition, the main players in the party happy, ership had handled the Lib–Lab emergency motion procedure is not including both Paddy Ashdown and own words, pact, the wording of the Lishman well suited to controversial top- Conrad Russell.6 amendment was motivated by a ics requiring lengthy debate, due One problem in achieving this the party desire to avoid, in his own words, to both the short notice periods was that, as the nature of Paddy the party being ‘needlessly riven involved and the absence of options Ashdown’s talks with being ‘need- and split’.11 Lishman also wanted to amend the motion.4 Those, how- became more public, so doubts lessly riven to be sure that the party had a say ever, were reasons for putting off about his strategy spread through in any decision, particularly as such a debate until the party’s spring the party and trust in him was also and split’. the folk history of the party at the conference, rather than for avoid- weakened. Ashdown had been time was that the (Liberal) party’s ing it completely. Moreover, the heard to dismiss previous concerns national leadership had a bad track autumn conference did see criticism as those of ‘conspiracy theorists’. record of negotiating with other of Paddy Ashdown’s line on the While he didn’t actually say the parties – not just over the Lib–Lab fringe and in the strategy consulta- concerns were untrue, the strict pact but also in talks such as the tion session,5 reinforcing the expec- meaning of his words was very dif- formation of the Alliance. By way tation that there would be a major ferent from the likely inference peo- of contrast, many council group debate on the topic at the following ple would take from his phrasing. leaders had experience – often suc- spring conference. This very specific choice of words cessful – of negotiating with other Between the autumn 1997 allowed him to avoid direct deceit; parties in hung councils around conference and the one in spring however, it also meant that as more the country.12 The key part of the 1998 there was a great deal of came to light about what had actu- Lishman amendment read: behind-the-scenes debating and ally been happening, this sophistry Conference agrees that: positioning, and the Conference damaged people’s views of him. (i) in the event of any substantial Communication Group’s (CCG) When it came to the spring con- proposal which could affect the minutes from November 1997 ference, three business motions on Party’s independence of politi- rather acerbically commented that the topic were submitted. One was cal action, the consent will be ‘It was noted that Paddy Ashdown’s from the Federal Executive, ini- required of a majority of mem- interview in New Statesman threw tially as a holding motion, on the bers of the Parliamentary Party our [conference] media message outcome of the party’s strategy con- in the House of Commons and the off course. It was agreed that in sultation, and the other two were Federal Executive; and, future the Ashdown Office will from David Howarth (in the form of (ii) unless there is a three-quarters work more closely with the Press Cambridge Liberal Democrats) and majority of each group in favour Team and the CCG to coordinate his ally Conrad Russell (in the form of the proposals, the consent of messages effectively.’ The minutes of Brent Liberal Democrats). Both the majority of those present and went on to say, of David Howarth’s of these rejected outright a coalition voting at a Special Conference initiative, ‘Although the FCC han- with Labour not only in the present convened under clause 6.6 of the dled attempts to suspend standing but also, given the conditions they Constitution; and, orders and force a strategy debate attached, for the foreseeable future.7 (iii) unless there is a two-thirds well, there is a demand within the Unsurprisingly, both were rejected majority of those present and party for a future debate and an because of the presence of the FE’s

66 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 the history of the ‘triple lock’: where it came from, how it worked and its future

voting at that Conference in itself – and the cause of the one vote arose. Not all party officers remem- favour of the proposals, the con- that needed to be counted due to its bered its existence or that it was still sent of a majority of all members closeness – was on whether to have applicable.19 However, the expecta- of the Party voting in the ballot ‘preferably STV’ or simply ‘STV’ tion rapidly spread that it should be called pursuant to clause 6.11 or 13 in the main strategy motion. At the used and, as with the original argu- 8.6 of the Constitution. same time as voting through the tri- ments over its legality, there was a ple lock, conference voted (by 478 pragmatic acceptance of the need to The text was therefore not so much to 343) to retain the word ‘prefer- abide by it. anti-coalition as against Paddy ably’ and thus to have a pragmatic Early on in the negotiations after Ashdown trying to bounce the approach to the concessions that the the 2010 general election, it was also party into one. In particular, the party might be able to wring from decided to proceed with a special placing of an all-member ballot in others over electoral reform. conference regardless of whether the final stage meant that, although With Paddy Ashdown’s further or not that part of the triple lock nominally it gave the party leader a attempts to move the party closer to procedure was actually triggered.20 chance to appeal ‘above the heads’ Labour running into regular oppo- This was both to enable the party’s of the party’s committees and par- sition in the following nine months, leadership to be seen to be in control liamentarians, it more importantly which played a significant part in of events and also to ensure there prevented him invoking a threat his subsequent decision to stand was a widespread party buy-in to to do so at an earlier stage. The down,16 the triple lock then faded the decisions being made. Any deci- proposal can also be seen as the into procedural obscurity for many sion not to call a special conference culmination of a long series of ini- years, although it was briefly talked could have been overturned by a tially Liberal Party reforms aimed about during the expansion of the demand from the grassroots of the at giving ordinary party members Joint Consultative Committee in party, and such a scenario would greater power, such as party mem- autumn 1998. Ashdown did not have put the party’s leadership on bers electing the party leader, the follow the triple lock process for the back foot. Moreover, as one of appointment of the party treasurer this, arguing that it did not apply – Nick Clegg’s advisors subsequently being removed from the leader, and which resulted in an internal party said, ‘Thanks to the special con- strengthening the role of the party battle whereby some members of ference no one in the party can say committees in drawing up the gen- the FE (including Donnachadh they didn’t have a chance to have eral election manifesto. McCarthy) threatened to call a spe- their say.’21 Ashdown himself was keen to cial conference. Ashdown in turn An oddity of the triple-lock have a debate and decision that kept threatened to call an all-member process, however, was that it ended his own options open. By his own ballot, and peace only broke out up being used to pass judgement on account, he was reassured by oth- when Ashdown announced his a coalition agreement heavy on pol- ers that this amendment did just plans to retire. icy, but the process did not formally that, but when he read it himself The triple lock was not com- involve the party’s Federal Policy at 4.30 a.m. (sic) on the day it was pletely forgotten, however, and the Committee (FPC). The inclusion due to be debated, his initial reac- Federal Conference Committee’s of a role for the Federal Executive, tion was far more negative, verging officers, in particular, kept under but not for the FPC, in large part on depressed. Over the course of review the practical implications of dates back to the make-up of the the day, he was half won round by having to organise a special confer- committees in 1997/98, as the FPC, advisors to the view that he should ence under the triple lock arrange- which included both Howarth and neither flat-out oppose it nor view ments,17 discussing them with the Russell, was considerably more hos- its probable passage as signalling the party leadership several times in tile to Paddy Ashdown’s plans. end of his strategy for relations with intervening years and produc- Also technically excluded Labour. ing several documents setting out were the members of the parlia- When it came to the debate, the ways of implementing it. A par- mentary party in the House of amendment itself was relatively ticular problem for the FCC was Lords, although in practice they uncontroversial in the hall.14 Shirley The text was that, because the triple lock process were involved in the meetings Williams was lined up by Paddy was originally passed to deal with a that discussed and then agreed the Ashdown to oppose it, but hers was therefore not possible coalition agreement mid- coalition. Amongst the active par- the only forceful speech against. parliament, many of its supporters ticipants in those meetings was Objections as to its constitutional- so much anti- had not considered in detail how Paddy Ashdown who, despite his ity were raised by Willie Goodhart it might work in the more rushed original strategy of cooperation and Alan Leaman (not long out of coalition timetable after a general election.18 with Labour, spoke strongly in the post of Director of Strategy and as against Over the years, however, the poten- favour of the Conservative Party very close to Paddy Ashdown), but tial timescale for calling a special deal, saying he had been predis- conference representatives reacted Paddy Ash- conference was increasingly refined, posed to being unhappy with it but with a mixture of disagreement and by 2010 the likely election date was won over by its contents. and a belief that, even if techni- down trying was sufficiently clear for it to be pos- The involvement of the Lords cally the amendment could not bind sible to make discreet provisional and the triggering of the special the leader and MPs, the politics of to bounce arrangements ahead of the elec- conference – both technically the situation meant that passing it tion. Moreover, by then Ros Scott beyond the bounds of the triple lock would do so in practice.15 the party was party president and she was – illustrated the extent to which the Unexpectedly, the main bone keen to ensure that the triple lock triple lock had become a synonym of contention during the debate into one. was used if relevant circumstances for ‘involve the party widely’ rather

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 67 the history of the ‘triple lock’: where it came from, how it worked and its future

and unhelpful’ phrase; Leices- with some people openly saying many MPs had almost no advance than a legalistic process to fol- ter South (‘Conference resolves that I was proposing to sacrifice notice. This suggested that, unless low to the letter. That broader, to reject all notions of a coali- the Party for a Cabinet seat. If it significant action was taken, more flexible interpretation tion with Labour’); Oldham goes on like this I will lose and Ashdown would not consult in helped ensure its continuing East and Saddleworth, featuring lose badly. I begin to think it is advance on future similar such relevance as a process that could the ‘unnecessary and unhelpful’ impossible to lead the Party to decisions. work in circumstances very phrase and calling for a policy of where I think it has to go.’ (Ash- 13 The three numbered paragraphs down, Diaries: Volume 2, entry for gave rise to the term ‘triple lock’, different from those that gave ‘vigorously opposing on the many issues where we have real disa- 21 September 1997, p. 94). though journalist Brendan Carlin birth to it. However, the need greements with Labour’; and from 6 Conrad Russell’s status in the initially christened it the ‘quadru- for this flexibility also indicated Cambridge City (the Howarth party had been rising over pre- ple lock’ due to the two parts of a case for changing the techni- motion), which read: vious years as his parliamen- the first stage. cal wording, especially to cover Coalition with the Labour tary activities, writing and very 14 Despite being an amendment to a any future situations in which Party well-received speeches to party motion from the Federal Execu- there is no similar broad con- Conference notes the revival conference won him a large fol- tive, the FE ended up not oppos- of speculation about coa- lowing amongst grassroots activ- ing the amendment. sensus about the desirability of lition at national level ists, reflected in very high votes 15 A similar view was taken by the wide consultation. with the Labour Party. in internal party elections. That, Federal Executive at its first meet- The party conference in Conference welcomes coop- combined with the status and ing after the 2010 general election, spring 2011 therefore agreed, eration with other parties where access to publicity granted to him when Philip Goldenberg argued as part of a strategy debate, policy goals coincide and where by virtue of being a parliamentar- that the triple lock was not con- to review of the triple lock it is necessary for good govern- ian, made him a vocal and effec- stitutionally binding. In 1998 ment, whether at local, national tive advocate for the positions he there was a late attempt to derail over the summer of 2011. That or European level. decided to take up. the amendment for being uncon- review is due to come to the Conference notes, however, 7 David Howarth’s primary con- stitutional at an FE meeting after autumn 2011 conference with 1. That Labour’s command- cern was with a coalition with a conference. Tom McNally moved its recommendations for any ing majority in the House of Labour Party that had on its own a motion calling on the party changes to the process. But the Commons means that a coali- an overall majority in the House president to seek legal advice on fact that the review centres tion is not necessary for stable of Commons. However, the extra its constitutionality. The motion conditions called for went beyond was defeated fifteen to one. around modifying the triple government 2. That Labour has shown that. 16 Interview with Chris Rennard, lock, if necessary, shows that insufficient commitment to 8 When the FE was drawing up 2010. Ashdown had told his wife the triple lock is here to stay and funding the public services, its motion for the spring 1998 before the 1997 election that that the role of internal democ- protecting the environment, conference, a proposal to rule he would not continue as party racy in the Liberal Democrats safeguarding civil liber- out coalitions during the whole leader all the way through the continues to be very different ties and reforming the elec- parliament was rejected over- 1997 parliament. However, the whelmingly (with only two votes from that in both the Labour toral system for the House of failure of his political strategy Commons in favour). However, this was in both brought forward and con- and Conservative parties, nei- 3. That coalition would tend to large part due to it being a very firmed these plans. ther of which during the 2010 stifle debate and prevent legit- broad amendment that bundled 17 This included, on one occasion, coalition talks had any process imate and constructive criti- up many different issues within it. looking at the timescales and similar to the triple lock. cism of the Government 9 The local party had previously practicalities in response to a Conference therefore believes that agreed that Gordon Lishman request from the then chief whip, Dr Mark Pack worked at Liberal coalition with the Labour party at could submit on its behalf, so the Paul Burstow, who was in charge national level should be ruled out local party did not actually dis- of planning how the party might Democrat party HQ in 2000–07 for the rest of this Parliament. cuss or agree the text before it was handle a hung parliament. and has contributed as an author or 3 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown submitted. 18 David Howarth was an excep- editor to eighteen books spanning Diaries: Volume 2 1997–1999 (Allen 10 Amongst the other rejected tion to this. He did not see the history, politics and technology. His Lane, 2001), entry for 11 Septem- amendments was one from David number of steps involved as pos- doctorate is in 19th century English ber 1997, p. 89. Howarth which had a simpler ing a problem if a general election elections, and he is Co-Editor of the 4 Ashdown records in his diaries: lock mechanism, but explicitly resulted in a hung parliament, as ‘A long discussion [at the Par- applied it to any extension of the he believed that the formation of most widely read Liberal Democrat liamentary Party Meeting] on current cooperation with Labour. a government could, and should, blog, Lib Dem Voice (www. [Howarth’s motion]. It was finally The Lishman amendment put in be slowed down to accommodate LibDemVoice.org). agreed that we would try to stop more controls but reserved them the process. See David Howarth, the motion going ahead. But, to for larger decisions. Howarth ‘A Coalition is Born’, Journal of 1 Thank you to Liz Barker, Duncan my horror, almost everyone said ended up happy to see his amend- Liberal History 70 (spring 2011), pp. Brack, David Howarth, Gordon that if the Howarth motion does ment dropped in return for the 40–45. Lishman, Chris Rennard and oth- get put down, they would vote party leadership not opposing 19 Hence one phone call from a party ers for being interviewed for this for it. I managed to persuade them the Lishman amendment. Many officer to the author asking if the research. The views in the paper this would be silly. Far better to in Paddy Ashdown’s team also triple lock still applied and if he reflect my own conclusions and do keep our options open. Although were willing to see this trade- could be sent a copy. not necessarily reflect those of any I agreed to have a full debate on off as they feared that Howarth’s 20 The extent to which the triple other individual. party strategy in the spring.’ (Ash- amendment would be passed. lock had become the default way 2 Emergency motions were sub- down, Diaries: Volume 2, entry for 11 Interview with Gordon Lishman, of doing things was also shown in mitted by East Staffordshire, 24 September 1997, p. 94). The 2010. the lack of reaction to a ruling by which described talk of coalition parliamentary party and Ash- 12 Moreover, the creation of the the Federal Appeals Panel in 2010 with Labour as ‘unnecessary and down’s office only had a small rep- Joint Cabinet Committee after that the triple lock was unconsti- unhelpful’ and called for it to resentation on the FCC, and their the 1997 general election was seen tutional. That ruling may result ‘cease’; South Derbyshire, which views were often not followed, so by many in the party as an exam- in constitutional changes ahead also used the ‘unnecessary and this decision to oppose taking the ple of Paddy Ashdown bouncing of the 2015 general election, but it unhelpful’ phrase and made ref- motion was not in itself key to the the party, because the previously has not caused any desire to aban- erence to ‘the many issues where FCC’s subsequent decision. agreed FRED phone-tree process don the process. we have real disagreements with 5 Ashdown records in his diaries (Fast Reaction, Early Decision), 21 Conversation with the author, Labour policies’; Derby City, that, at the consultation session, designed in the case of a hung autumn 2010. again with the ‘unnecessary ‘I was again strongly criticised, parliament, was not invoked and

68 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 book’s dust cover notes describe Prime Minister Callaghan fighting reviews honourably as Labour drifted to inevitable defeat in the 1979 elec- tion. If Prime Minister Callaghan had had today’s borrowing powers Consolation government? he might have traded himself out of political trouble. Bernard Donoughue, Downing Street Diary Volume Two: Bernard Donoughue adds With James Callaghan in Number 10 (Jonathan Cape, 2008) something new to the totality of Reviewed by Archy Kirkwood human knowledge with an intel- ligent portrait of James Callaghan as a person as well as a politician. From today’s perspective, service his book – and it is a second a police car from the local police in the navy rather than attend- volume – weighs 2lbs 4oz in station to race (siren blaring?) to his ance at posh schools or universities Told money in the hardback holiday cottage to ask him to return would be a doubtful qualification edition; it also sports a title that to work one weekend. for the highest political office. Yet fails to titillate. So, maybe not one Interwoven through the text is James Callaghan had the unique for the beach then, but it is a volume an intriguing (and significant) pro- experience of previously seeing that everyone should buy if only cedural wrangle between Bernard service as head of every major ‘pour encourager les autres’. Donoughue, wearing his Policy government department before Call Bernard Donoughue old- Unit hat, and the big cheeses of entering Number 10. No one from fashioned, but he has done the hon- the senior civil service. Access, 1979 would have believed it likely ourable thing by staying the presses influence and information are that a total stranger to ministerial until a long time after the principal fought over daily. Indeed the book office could lead a political party players have left the active political paints a picture of the civil serv- never mind a government. Even stage or gone to the great parlia- ice’s studied disregard of Cabinet Margaret Thatcher, considered a ment in the sky – or the House members’ wishes when it thought parvenu when she became Tory of Lords which James Callaghan it knew better. Treasury mandarins leader had done a brief spell of once famously characterised as are arraigned as serial offenders ministerial milk-snatching in the ‘the waiting room’. And, although – no change there then! But the Heath government before entering Donoughue is clearly financially Donoughue-led Policy Unit did Number 10. poorer for the wait, the passage of some really important early work more than thirty years provides a establishing the legitimate role of powerful longitudinal perspective political advisers in the strategic on how politics is practised in this policy-making process at Cabinet country. He is also able to tell the level. Again the surprise is the unvarnished truth in a way that is meagre political adviser resource in marked contrast to most contem- available to the Callaghan Cabinet, porary examples of the genre. ranged against the combined might What kept me turning the pages of Whitehall. was the staggering differences in But there are limits. Bernard pace, scale and reach of government Donoughue tellingly (and batheti- in the late 1970s compared with cally) goes home early one day to today. It takes James Callaghan sell his Ford Cortina because he is nine working days merely to so poorly remunerated – an inter- reform an existing administra- esting comparison with the pay tion. The 2010 coalition did it all, rates of around £85,000 for special including a completely new pro- advisers today. Strategic politi- gramme for government, in less cal advice to ministers is essential than half that time. Prime Minister to modern government, but the Callaghan thought it was better to process is in danger of getting out be well rested than well briefed, of hand when the advisers start so had a lie down before PMQs. acquiring personal assistants to help Universities charged students £650 them through their busy days. per annum – £2,780 at 2009/10 The extent to which modern prices. Every page of this book government is many layered and all causes the reader to stop and won- pervasive would strike time trav- der at how the process of govern- ellers from 1978/79 as surprising ment has exploded since 1978/79. I (and worrying?). And the present yearn for the days when, for exam- level of indebtedness at all levels of ple, Bernard Donoughue was sum- people’s personal, commercial and moned to the presence of the prime political life would amaze observ- minister by Number 10 dispatching ers from the Callaghan era. The

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 69 reviews

Bernard Donoughue’s One year on The problem for the Liberal the world that he would take every Callaghan is portrayed as being a Party in the Lib–Lab pact was that opportunity where the circum- thoroughly decent man who was from the it was seen as providing an unpopu- stances merited it of proclaiming driven by values rather than ideas. lar Labour government with politi- Lib Dem achievements within gov- His values were ingrained; his election of cal cover for the last part of the ernment with enthusiasm: Liberal ideas were lifted from other peo- 1974–79 parliament. The problem Democrats aspire to more than con- ple, some from the book’s author. 2010, it is for Liberal Democrats in the 2010 solation government. Intellectually everyone is aware of coalition is that they are likely to This is a book that everyone the internal battles with the radi- instructive be seen as providing cover for an must buy. Even if you don’t get cal left wing of the Labour move- unpopular Conservative party for round to reading it, the royalties ment. But the amount of prime to remem- the five years to 2015. The coalition paid will encourage impecunious ministerial time spent coping with ber that the is a consolation prize for the Liberal political diarists in future to eschew the brothers and sisters is clearly Democrats. David Cameron gets mere potboilers in favour serious reflected in the diaries. Although provenance to lead the UK delegation to the books that make people look back James Callaghan is a lot tougher G8 Deauville summit, while Nick and wonder. than in handling of the coali- Clegg gets tickets for Wembley and the Labour left, Callaghan is still the European Cup Final. Archy Kirkwood was the Liberal and ultimately defeated by apparent tion deal was Maybe the principal lesson for Liberal Democrat MP for Roxburgh political impotence. Nick Clegg from the Lib–Lab pact & Berwickshire from 1983 to 2005, The section of these diaries the mutual is that, instead of launching the and is now a member of the House of that holds perhaps the most inter- coalition in the perfect choreog- Lords. He worked for David Steel, est is the period dealing with failure by raphy of the joint Rose Garden then leader of the Liberal Party, during the Lib–Lab pact. Both James appearance, he should have held his the Lib-Lab Pact and the 1979 election Callaghan and David Steel, from David Cam- own press conference and warned campaign. their different perspectives, were looking to shore up their respec- eron and tive political positions. The agreement did have mutually Nick Clegg to beneficial advantages and both co-signatories needed something measure up to get them to the next election Evolving the constitution in better shape. One year on from to political the election of 2010, it is instruc- expectations Vernon Bogdanor, The Coalition and the Constitution (Hart tive to remember that the prove- Publishing, 2011) nance of the coalition deal was the against a mutual failure by David Cameron Reviewed by Dr Julie Smith and Nick Clegg to measure up to very unpopu- political expectations against a riting after more than constitutional reform in light very unpopular outgoing Labour lar outgo- a decade of constitu- of historical experience in the government. Wtional reform under New UK and other countries, both However, there are few useful ing Labour Labour, Vernon Bogdanor said that Commonwealth and European. lessons that can be learned from the The New British Constitution was ‘not Thus he looks forward to the likely understanding that was reached government. intended as a history of the future. impact of the Liberal Democrat– between James Callaghan and But it is perhaps the essential pro- Conservative coalition formed on David Steel in 1979 and the coali- logue to such a history.’1 Just two 11 May 2010 on the British con- tion partners in 2011. David Steel’s years later, following the creation stitution, considering the effects intention was more about staying of the first peacetime coalition gov- of the creation of the coalition in in the political game at a time when ernment in the UK since the 1930s, itself and its effect on government the Liberal Party was in a weak Bogdanor has produced that succes- as well as the likely ramifications of position in parliament. He also had sor volume; the stated aim of The the deliberate moves towards con- a completely different personal Coalition and the Constitution being stitutional reform being promoted relationship with James Callaghan: ‘to chart the future of a constitu- by the government. The result is although built on mutual respect, it tion whose fabled adaptability and an interesting volume reflecting was clearly more Uncle Jim and the flexibility are likely to be severely the author’s interests in the British Boy David than the cosy familiar- tested in the years ahead.’2 Such constitution, British political his- ity of Dave and Nick. David Steel challenges will be especially true if tory and comparative politics. The also secured the freedom within Bogdanor is correct in his assump- title, though, is almost misleading: the pact to trumpet the minor but tion that hung parliaments – and it might more accurately be called nonetheless significant ‘conces- with them peacetime coalitions ‘Coalitions and the Constitution’ sions’ as Liberal Party ‘successes’. – may in future be the norm rather as Bogdanor harks back to previ- The Lib–Lab pact was sold to the than an ‘aberration’ as has been the ous periods of coalition and indeed public as the grit in the government case to date (see Chapter 7). to previous hung parliaments and oyster; the 2010 coalition was sold Bogdanor’s own description resignation moments over the last as Lib Dem eggs being fried into of his most recent book is apt. eighty years, focusing particularly the Tory omelette – we were all in He seeks to enlighten the reader on the 1930s and 1970s, rather than it together. about the potential impact of exclusively focusing on recent

70 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 reviews experience. While this approach be enacted. The key question is provides some fascinating insights, whether they will come about. it does render the structure within Electoral reform is already individual chapters a little cumber- off the agenda, and reform of the some in places. House of Lords, not discussed in The early chapters, in particular, great detail in this volume, is a contain some material that will highly sensitive issue with Lords be very familiar to those who on all sides, including Liberal were involved with the creation of Democrat peers, reluctant to the 2010 coalition, coupled with endorse moves to an elected cham- insights into the thinking of earlier ber. By contrast, although legisla- prime ministers. They evoke very tion has already been approved for clearly the dilemmas facing many fixed-term parliaments, Bogdanor Liberal Democrats at the time the expresses considerable reservations 2010 coalition was negotiated, and about this. He offers particularly the challenges that have faced the interesting reflections on the likely coalition since then. Where was impact of fixed-term parliaments, the mandate for the coalition’s whether and how they can be policies, he wonders. After all, made to work in practice and their this coalition was agreed after the inherent merits (or otherwise). general election, whereas previ- Looking to the model of fixed- ous coalitions had been formed term parliaments used in Norway, ahead of the general election and Bogdanor questions the case for thus subject to popular endorse- fixed-term parliaments without ment.3 While a majority of electors electoral reform, and even then is voted for the Conservatives and not convinced of their desirabil- Liberal Democrats combined on 6 ity,5 although he acknowledges the May 2010, it is far from clear that political expediency for the current they would all have done so had coalition of a fixed five-year term. they anticipated that a Lib Dem– One difficulty with the book, Conservative coalition would which in many respects deserves a the coalition conform to expected result from it, especially since long shelf life, is that having been constitutional norms, and how many Labour-inclined voters sup- written in response to a rapidly far the government has altered or ported the Liberal Democrats in changing set of events, the volume seeks to alter the constitution. His an attempt to keep the Tories out has already been overtaken by conclusions are somewhat bleak: of office. Yet, since the formation events in one important area. A key in 2009 he concluded that consti- of the coalition, the Programme plank of the coalition agreement tutional reform was disbursing for Government, a document that was the pledge to hold a referen- power, albeit ‘sideways’ rather than inevitably entailed a great deal dum on the Alternative Vote (AV), downwards; in 2011 he concludes, of compromise, has been seen by which Bogdanor loses no opportu- ‘The constitutional reforms pro- parliamentarians as trumping both nity to remind readers was in nei- posed by the coalition will do little Conservative and Liberal Democrat ther the Liberal Democrat nor the to remedy the deficiencies of the manifestos, even though some of Conservative manifesto, the former Blair reforms’.7 The British consti- the policies had appeared in neither arguing for proportional repre- tution remains a work in progress, manifesto. As Bogdanor suggests, sentation and the latter opposed to so Bognador’s work is not yet com- ‘This raises anew the question of electoral reform at all. He goes on plete. A third volume by way of the role of the mandate in British to elaborate in considerable detail Epilogue must surely follow – per- politics, its relevance and limits.’4 the ways in which AV works, look- haps in 2015. Some of the most significant ing at examples from Australia aspects of the coalition agreement and outlining how AV might Dr Julie Smith is Senior Lecturer in relate to constitutional reform and, have affected results in the UK. International Relations at Cambridge as Bogdanor makes clear, the gov- However, while it might be some University and Fellow in Politics at ernment’s agenda could potentially comfort to Evan Harris to know Robinson College, Cambridge. She is have a far greater impact on the that he would probably have held also a member of the Liberal Democrats’ British constitution than twelve his Oxford West and Abingdon Federal Policy Committee. years of reform under Labour. seat under AV,6 the fact that AV Indeed, there is a paradox between was rejected by the voters on 5 May 1 Vernon Bogdanor, The New British the relatively limited impact of 2011 renders that chapter somewhat Constitution (Hart Publishing 2009), p. Labour’s constitutional reforms academic, neither a history of the xiii. 2 Vernon Bogdanor, The Coalition and the and the possible effect of a govern- past or the future, despite its intrin- Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2011), p. ment led by Conservatives, whom sic interest for students of political xiii. one might have expected to be science. 3 Ibid., p. 63. wedded to the status quo. Electoral Overall, this book offers many 4 Ibid., p. xi. reform, fixed-term parliaments and interesting insights into the work- 5 Ibid., p. 109. reform of the House of Lords all ings of the British constitution, 6 Ibid., pp. 95–96. 7 Ibid., p. 137. suggest major changes should they how far the negotiations to create

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 71 A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting peace, reform and liberation Peace, Reform and Liberation is a comprehensive history of Liberal politics in Britain. Drawing on the most recent scholarly research, the Liberal Democrat History Group’s new book examines the roots of Liberal thinking in the revolutionary tumult of the seventeenth century, the history of Whig politics, how the Liberal Party was formed in the mid-nineteenth century, the reasons for the party’s calamitous decline after the First World War, and the factors underlying the party’s unexpected revival in the second half of the twentieth century, culminating in the formation of the Liberal Democrats and the party’s entry into government in 2010. Edited by Robert Ingham and Duncan Brack; chapter authors include Michael Freeden, Eugenio Biagini, Martin Pugh, David Dutton and Philip Cowley.

Join Paddy Ashdown, Shirley Williams and Julian Glover (The Guardian) for the launch of Peace, Reform and Liberation at the Liberal Democrat conference. Copies will be on sale at the meeting!

8.00pm Monday 19 September Suite 107/109/111, Jurys Inn, Birmingham

Liberal Democrat History Group at Lib Dem conference Visit the History Group’s stand in the exhibition in the Birmingham International Conference Centre – stand R21 in the Upper Foyer, just next to the entrance to the auditorium. There you can:

• Buy a copy of our latest book, Peace, Reform and Liberation: £24 to Journal subscribers, £30 to everyone else. • Take part in our annual Liberal history quiz. Exciting prizes to be won! • Buy our pamphlet, Liberal History: A concise history of the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats. 300 years of party history in 24 pages – £2.00 to Journal subscribers, £2.50 to others. • Buy our pamphlets on Liberal leaders, Liberal Leaders of the 19th Century (£3.50 to Journal sub- scribers / £4 others) and Liberal Leaders since 1900 (£5 to Journal subscribers / £6 others). Ordering Peace, Reform and Liberation • Buy a copy the Dictionary of Liberal Thought: £28 For those not attending conference, Peace, Reform and Liberation will to Journal subscribers, £35 to everyone else. be available to Journal of Liberal History subscribers for the special price of £24.00 (normal price £30.00) plus £4.00 p&p. • Renew your Journal subscription – all subs are To order, please send a cheque for £28.00 (made out to ‘Liberal now due for renewal (unless you subscribe by Democrat History Group’) to LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London standing order). SW12 0EN. Orders will be fulfilled from 26 September.