Peelites Tony Little examines the part played by the renegade Conservatives – the Peelites – in the creation of the Liberal Party. ‘‘HisHis FriendsFriends SatSat onon thethe BenchesBenches Opposite’Opposite’
In the Journal’s special issue on defectors (Journal of Although Lord Palmerston had been a part of the Liberal Democrat History , winter –), one Aberdeen coalition, his semi-detached position and group significant to the development of the modern pugnacious character made him the inevitable war Liberal Party was omitted – the Peelites. Here, by leader and he was the prime beneficiary of the pe- way of a review of Professor Angus Hawkins’ book, tering out of the war shortly after he had acceded to Parliament, Party and the Art of Politics in Britain, – the premiership. However, Palmerston had only (Macmillan, ), I aim to show the part played been able to form his government by treading on by these renegade Conservatives in the creation of the toes of oversensitive Peelites such as Gladstone, the modern Liberal Party. and without resolving a long-running quarrel with The formation of the Liberal Party is often dated Lord John Russell. to the meeting in Willis’s Rooms on June . It is at this point that Hawkins takes up the story. This meeting brought together Whigs, Liberals, The problem he poses is that, while, in Kitson’s Radicals and Peelites to defeat Lord Derby. It ush- words, it is not ‘very easy to say what specific opin- ered in a Liberal government under Lord ions were uniquely organised in the middle of the Palmerston which served until Palmerston’s death in century by the Conservative Party’, the forces that and paved the way for Gladstone’s great re- came together to oppose Derby suffered from a su- forming government of –. In retrospect the perfluity of leadership. For an idea of the complexity outcome was obvious but Professor Hawkins’ book of the position it is important to recognise that there shows just how difficult the obvious was to achieve. were four former or current prime ministers still in In , the first modern Conservative govern- active politics in , and among those of the next ment, under Sir Robert Peel, split asunder over agri- generation fighting for position were two who be- cultural protection. Peel and the bulk of the ministe- came the greatest Victorian premiers, Disraeli and rial talent of the party reformed the Corn Laws but Gladstone. Of these six significant politicians, only were then forced to resign. Peel and his associates kept one, Lord John Russell, was clearly identified with a a minority Whig government in power but Peel’s single party – the Whigs – and he was often thought death in a horse-riding accident did not lead to a rec- to be more of a Radical. Palmerston had been a onciliation between his followers, the Peelites, and the member of Lord Liverpool’s Tory government and bulk of the Tory party. Following the general election had switched sides at the end of the s. Derby, of , Lord Derby headed a short-lived minority now leader of the Conservatives, had started life as a To ry administration until driven from office by the Whig. Disraeli had originally thought of himself as a onslaught on Disraeli’s budget led by Gladstone. The radical and was still treated with suspicion, and as too Queen had tried the Whigs, she had tried the Tories – clever by half, by the more Tory members of the what was left? Lord Aberdeen, leader of the Peelites, Conservative Party. Aberdeen and Gladstone had put together a coalition with the Whigs. In essence, broken with the Conservatives over the Corn Laws this combination prefigured , but could not and, while Gladstone was still searching for a way withstand the strains of the Crimean War with back, Aberdeen was probably more associated with an administrative system which had not been mod- Lord John than with the more conservative ernised since Waterloo. Palmerston. In December , Russell had forced
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 30 Spring 2001 15 are considered as to how they fur- to support a government – a back- thered the ambitions of the rivals handed compliment to their ministerial rather than for their intrinsic interest. talents. The Peelites had charged a high Consequently a degree of knowledge tariff in terms of ministerial posts for is required and the frame of reference coalition in – posts that could is not much wider than the Palace of only be awarded at the expense of loyal Westminster, the clubs of St James and Whig supporters. Who would pay in the various great houses. Within this any future ministry? focus, this is a detailed work with wonderfully well-chosen quotations ‘We have slung the stone to substantiate its case. Palmerston’s strategy after was which brought him to keep foreign affairs to the forefront down’ as a means of doing nothing about elec- Palmerston’s bluff worked for two years, toral reform. This may have reflected a and ironically it was the foreign issue of deep-felt belief – Palmerston always British arrogance in China which Palmerston was Russell's foreign secretary until sacked in 1851. Shortly afterwards acted to defer reform when in power – brought him down, as the Radicals and Palmerston was instrumental in bringing but it also had distinct political advan- Peelites united with the Conservatives down Lord John's government – his Tit for tages. Foreign policy was his strength, to teach him a lesson. Ostensibly, the Tat. The Punch caption read: 'I'm very sorry, not Lord John’s, and it brought him at ensuing general election was a tri- Palmerston, that you can't agree with your least tacit support from the Tories, his umph for Palmerston – popular back- fellow servants, but as I don't feel inclined to part with John – you must go of course.' friends on the benches opposite. Re- ing for his John Bull style of politics. form, always associated with Lord John, The leading Radicals such as Bright divided his own supporters – as Lord and Cobden were defeated, the Peelites Palmerston from the Foreign Office and, John and Gladstone were to prove after suffered and the Conservatives made in the following February, Palmerston’s Palmerston’s death. only four gains. In reality the new Lib- ‘Tit for Tat’ had brought down Russell’s Lord John Russell had the harder eral members were more in favour of government. Aberdeen and Palmerston task. He had lost support from his own reform and other domestic activity had opposed each other’s foreign poli- party in his premiership (–) and than the old House had been. But again cies from onwards. needed an issue on which to rebuild it. foreign affairs betrayed Palmerston. He offered the best link to the Radicals Then as now, Britain was a haven but each step towards them further al- for political asylum seekers, some of ‘The House of Commons ienated the type of Whig most likely to whom plotted assassination against the 2 is as unstable as water’ support Palmerston. Although ‘Johnnie’ French government. Palmerston, Although the term ‘Liberal’ was being knew that reform would buy him weakened by the Indian Mutiny and more widely applied to those opposed Radical support he also knew its cost. misled by half-hearted Conservative to the Conservatives, this grouping The Peelites, who as much as anyone support, gave way to French demands covered not just Whigs and a distinct held the balance of power, were them- for legislative action, only to be met group of Radicals, who tended to be selves divided. Some were willing to with defeat for his kow-towing to Na- as suspicious of the Whigs as they were join Lord John; others, including poleon III. Some eighty-nine of his of the Tories, but also the Irish brigade. Gladstone, were unwilling to relinquish nominal supporters, led by Lord John Nominally Whigs or Liberals, the Irish their Conservative roots but were even and Radicals such as Milner Gibson brigade had their own distinctive more unwilling to make themselves and Roebuck, joined the majority agenda relating to Irish land problems subservient to Disraeli, not only the To- against the government. Palmerston and the religious disadvantages of ry’s leading spokesman in the Com- resigned but was in no position to call Catholics. The remaining Peelites were mons but Peel’s sarcastic tormentor in a fresh election only months after his little admired by any of the other . The Peelites, and Gladstone espe- last ‘victory’. As John Bright observed, groups: ‘they are a sect – entre nous, cially, had an antipathy to ‘Pam’ that de- ‘Palmerston has been our greatest en- Prigs. There is a snobbism that runs rived from the old rivalry between emy and we have slung the stone from their deceased head all down Palmerston and Aberdeen but was in- which has brought him down’. thro’ his tail’. tensified by Pam’s acceptance of Once more the Queen faced a di- The cessation of international hos- Roebuck’s inquiry into the conduct of lemma. Palmerston would not advise tilities in the Crimea in brought the Crimean War, with its implied criti- Victoria but his explanation of the state about a return to normal political war- cism of the Peelite War Office minister of the parties – ‘Derby at the head of [a] fare in Britain. Hawkins’ book is a the Duke of Newcastle. The Peelites large party in both Houses’, ‘Russell work of haut politque focusing on the were disliked for their unwillingness to with scarcely any’ – was both accurate strategies of the various contestants for fit the mould of two-party politics and and self-serving. A spell under Derby the premiership. Events and policies because it was necessary to attract them might serve to reunite his followers.
16 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 30 Spring 2001 Derby was well aware of the trap and low the gangway, with the Radicals and was very cautious in accepting the ‘independent Liberals’. Queen’s commission. If Palmerston assumed that Derby’s If Hawkins’ book has a hero amongst minority administration was doomed the plotters, it is the Conservative to a short life he was mistaken. At first it leader, Lord Derby. In contrast to his was thought that Conservative efforts flashy, romantic lieutenant, Disraeli, to reform the government of India Derby is almost forgotten, but Hawkins would provide an early opportunity to argues that it was Derby rather than turn out the Tories. Whatever the un- Disraeli who made the survival and ul- derlying merits of the bill, opposition timate success of the Conservative to it served only to illustrate the Liberal Party possible. Derby provided aristo- quandary. The Peelites would not put cratic solidity and respectability after Derby out merely to bring back the debacle of in a manner to Palmerston, and Russell could not act which the younger Disraeli could not while the late Liberal cabinet remained hope to aspire. In , Derby made it united behind Palmerston. Indian ad- possible for the party to throw off the ministration proved similarly barren Palmerston sells some slightly used policies to Disraeli, following his defeat in albatross of Protection. In – he ground, when facts did not support the 1857. Note that one of the garments is helped built the foundations for future motion of censure which the Whigs marked India. recovery. In spite of Disraeli’s activist had tabled. Conscious of his vulnerabil- tendencies, Derby’s strategy during ity, Derby again reached out to the cen- self-interest. Derby was as alive to the Palmerston’s government was to lie low tral ground. In reorganising his cabinet opportunities of ‘dishing the Whigs’ in and encourage its conservatism. Com- in May he once more approached as he was in , when he and fortable with the thrust of Palmerston- Gladstone, who again failed to grasp Disraeli carried the Second Reform ian policy, Derby’s quiescent opposition the opportunity. Act, but he was even more sharply created the vacuum into which the Over the autumn, Lord John sought aware of the potential for a Reform bill fractious factions of Liberalism were to to revive Reform as the means of Der- to split his own party. He avoided the be sucked. by’s overthrow and his own resurrec- problem largely by avoiding a cabinet His policy, when asked to form a tion. Derby had promised to grasp this discussion of the details of his proposed government in , was an extension nettle but Lord John needed the result bill, presenting his colleagues with a fait of his strategy in opposition. A moder- to rebuild his credit rather than Derby’s. accompli – a model imitated by Mrs ate, even slightly progressive, approach Bright’s efforts to assist, calmly moder- Thatcher and Mr Blair. offered the best hope of drawing pe- ate by today’s standards, were deemed Gossip reaching the Conservatives ripheral Peelites back to their old alle- so outré by the ruling elites that many suggested that ‘Pam and his friends… giance and winning over the more moderate Whigs began to see the at- hope to support the government reform worried Whigs. Indeed, Derby unsuc- traction of leaving the Tories in office. It bill if it comes to a second reading; but cessfully offered posts to Newcastle and is hard, in a short review, to convey the Pam and his friends look to the F.O. as Gladstone and to the dissident Whig, complexities of the mid-Victorian Re- the means of an overthrow before the re- Lord Grey. Gladstone’s refusal was made form debate to today’s democrats. The form bill can be brought on’. only with hesitation on his side but was problems were two-fold. Firstly, apart Palmerston’s hope lay with the devel- greeted with some relief among the less from a few Radicals, no-one was advo- oping crisis in Italy, where the desire of subtle Conservatives. cating universal manhood (let alone fe- Italians to throw off Austrian suzerainty male) suffrage but there were almost as was exploited by Napoleon in the hope many views about the stopping point as of enlarging French territory. At this ‘On the sunny side of the there were MPs. A controlled change stage, the government’s slightly pro- 6 House’ would give advantage to the party writ- Austrian neutrality did not provide the To Russell’s frustration, Derby suc- ing the Bill. The consequences of a leverage required. ceeded in constructing a purely Con- large bill were beyond the statistical re- Pam’s disappointment was Johnnie’s servative administration. When the sources of the time, but MPs feared the opportunity. A suitable motion was ta- House met in March , the Tories temptations that could be placed in the bled to head off a potential Tory success were joined on the sunny side by way of a poor, uneducated electorate at in the second reading debate of the Re- Peelites Graham, Gladstone and a time when electoral bribery was form Bill but when this was carried Herbert and a rump of the Irish bri- commonplace (to say nothing of the Derby responded by calling a general gade, sitting below the gangway. implications for campaign expenses, election. Derby gambled that his mod- Palmerston assumed the seat of the largely met by the candidates them- erate stance on Reform would play Leader of the Opposition while selves). Secondly, any significant reform well with the unreformed electorate. Russell, after some hesitation, took a implied a redistribution of seats, a mat- His ploy was spoiled by developments seat on the opposition front bench, be- ter in which MPs always took a keen in Italy where Austria’s mistaken ag-
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 30 Spring 2001 17 gression gave Peelites and Liberals of all the Exchequer. He had not voted to sary to create majorities by appealing to persuasions the opportunity to castigate bring down Derby but, recognising a mass electorate. Gladstone and the government for its incompetence. the undertow, had made his peace Disraeli had the skills to exploit the Nevertheless Derby gained the modest with the Liberal leadership over Italy. new environment, although both were reward of an advance of around thirty His frustration at missing office over products of the old. The expectation of seats – still not enough to give him a his prime years was finally assuaged; he the most experienced politicians in the majority but enough to soldier on. Ap- had scrambled back from isolation just period – was that either Derby parently, nothing had been resolved. in time. or Palmerston would create a centrist With the benefit of hindsight we party combining the largest elements of 9 know that this fragile first modern the Whig, Peelite and Conservative par- ‘A rope of sand’? Liberal government survived until ties. That natural majority would have Hawkins gives no evidence that the Palmerston’s death. It left a strong forced the extreme wings of both sides Liberals realised that a golden opportu- record, particularly in the financial and – the more agricultural Tories, and the nity had opened up or that they ac- commercial sphere led by Gladstone – urban Radicals – to form separate par- cepted that their agreements were the free trade agreement with France, ties. Instead Westminster had built a greater than their differences or even the budgets and the abolition of the broadly two-party system, Liberal and that their sense of frustration was suffi- paper tax – but true to form, Palmer- Conservative, which needed to com- cient to overcome these differences. ston never did resolve the Reform is- pete for the central ground of the elec- But something extraordinary hap- sue. However, as Hawkins makes torate to achieve power. pened. Inspired by a letter from the abundantly clear, this outcome was not Peelite Sidney Herbert on May preordained. At the beginning of its Tony Little is the new Chair of the Liberal , Russell wrote to Palmerston. Two life Derby thought that ‘it would be Democrat History Group, and writes mainly days later, Palmerston visited Russell at easy to get a majority against the on nineteenth century Liberal history. Pembroke Lodge. Bridges were being present government’, while Stanley built but would they prove to be ‘patch- of Alderley wrote, ‘if the session had ing the quarrels of years’ with a rope of lasted three months the government Further reading sand? Certainly the manoeuvres did might have been in trouble’. The in- •John Vincent, The Formation of the not cease – both leaders expected the clusion of all the major Liberal fac- British Liberal Party – (Pelican). situation to work to their advantage – tions diminished the risk of internal What was happening back in the but enough progress was made to jus- dissension while the (mistaken) expec- constituencies, the sociological tify the famous party meeting on tation that Palmerston, in his mid-sev- grounding of the party and the role June. Two hundred and eighty attended, enties, would not remain active for of leadership. from all sections of the Liberals. Sym- long, left open the hope of succession •B. Conacher, The Peelites and the Party bolically, Palmerston helped Lord John to both Russell and Derby. System – (David & Charles). up on to the platform. Each pledged to Hawkins is a master of his sources •W. White, The Inner Life of the House serve in a government formed by the but contents himself with the over- of Commons (reprinted by the Rich- other. Representatives of the different whelming demonstration that the out- mond Pub. Co.). Parliamentary factions, Herbert, Ellice, Milner Gibson come was not pre-ordained. In also sketches by a well informed source and Bright, promised co-operation. demonstrating how close Russell came between and . A motion was tabled in the Com- to achieving his ambition he reminds us mons under the name of new MP Lord that circumstance, as much as con- 1K Clark The Making of Victorian England 1965 Hartington and, after three days of de- spiracy or destiny, dictates history. The 2 Russell to Minto 22 July 1855. Cited in Hawkins 3Parkes to Ellice, 30 December 1852. Cited in bate and three days of worry by the events of – were the confusing Hawkins whips, carried. But even at this stage climax of a political world in transition. 4 Bright to his wife 20 February 1858. Cited in there was a complication. The Queen, The Great Reform Act of was Hawkins 5Palmerston Diary 20 February 1858. Cited in anxious to avoid the ‘two terrible old coming to be seen as an interim, not a Hawkins men’, sent for Lord Granville to form a final, settlement. The aristocratic con- 6W. White The Inner Life of the House of Com- government. Palmerston agreed to trol of the Commons had deteriorated mons 1897 7 Hawkins p117 serve under Granville but Russell made but had not been swept away. Politicians 8Lennox to Disraeli February 1859 Hughenden impossible conditions. In the light of were elected in response to local condi- Mss. Cited in Hawkins this, Granville returned his commission tions but were free, by and large, to ar- 9Lytton 22 March 1859, House of Commons. and Pam got his chance. Russell was ac- range parties and governments to suit Cited in Hawkins 10 ibid. commodated with his choice of office themselves. Indeed one of the surprises 11 Broughton Diary 21 June 1869. Cited in and the presence of Milner Gibson in of Hawkins’ book is how little electoral Hawkins the cabinet. considerations played in the strategies 12 Stanley of Alderly to Panmure 30 July, Dalhousie Mss. Cited in Hawkins Extraordinarily, Gladstone was also of any of the leaders. After the Second offered his choice of office and chose Reform Act of , it became neces-
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