DOCSLIB.ORG

Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance William C

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance William C American University Law Review Volume 50 | Issue 1 Article 2 2000 Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance William C. Banks M. E. Bowman Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Banks, William C., and M.E. Bowman. "Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance." American University Law Review 50, no.1 (2000): 1-130. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol50/iss1/2 BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001 11:33 AM ARTICLES EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE * WILLIAM C. BANKS ** M.E. BOWMAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction............................................................................................ 2 I. National Security Surveillance: The Early Years ...................... 10 II. The Components of Modern National Security Law................ 19 A. Awakening to the Modern World....................................... 19 B. Assigning Responsibility for Domestic Intelligence........... 26 C. Legislative and Regulatory Change in the 1970s ............... 31 D. The Evolving Judicial Role.................................................. 35 1. The conceptual bases for privacy .................................. 36 2. The development of privacy as property ...................... 38 3. From property to persons.............................................. 43 4. The Keith decision.......................................................... 49 5. Case law after Keith—electronic surveillance................ 53 6. Case law after Keith—physical searches......................... 57 7. A summary of the evolving judicial role ....................... 65 E. Executive Branch Regulation ............................................. 68 F. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ................................ 74 1. The constitutional parameters for regulation.............. 74 2. Categories of surveillance.............................................. 76 3. Surveillance target ......................................................... 80 4. Surveillance trigger........................................................ 83 5. Surveillance purpose...................................................... 84 6. FISA surveillance of First Amendment activities .......... 86 7. Minimization and other application requirements...... 88 8. Emergency surveillance ................................................. 89 9. The constitutionality of the FISC.................................. 90 * Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. ** Associate General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The authors wish to thank Jennifer Morris for her excellent research assistance. 1 BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001 11:33 AM 2AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 III. National Security Surveillance Today: Investigation of Terrorist Threats ........................................................................ 92 A. The Investigators and Their Authority............................... 95 B. Terror in the Heartland: Bombings of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City Federal Building................................................................................ 97 1. The bombing of the World Trade Center.................... 97 2. The Oklahoma City bombing.......................................100 3. Similarities and differences ..........................................102 4. Lingering questions ......................................................103 C. Recent Antiterrorism Reforms...........................................107 D. Fitting “Primary Purpose” to Current Needs ....................111 E. A Case Study: Palestinian Activists and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) ...................114 1. The story........................................................................114 2. Applying the legal authorities ......................................119 Conclusions..........................................................................................125 INTRODUCTION It may have been only an after thought, but the Bill of Rights more directly affects the personal lives of Americans than any other aspect of our law.1 We cherish our right to speak, assemble and worship as we please.2 We also cherish our privacy, one aspect of which stems from the Fourth Amendment,3 our constitutional remedy for a perceived evil of British law—the general warrant. The British general warrant was a search tool employed without limitation on location, and without any necessity to precisely describe the object or person sought.4 British authorities were simply given license to “break into any shop or place suspected” wherever they 1. See MARJORIE G. FRIBOURG, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 10 (1967) (calling the Bill of Rights America’s “most prized possession” for the personal rights it protects). 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) (a magistrate “shall issue a warrant identifying the property to be seized and naming or describing the person or place to be searched”). 4. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 16 (1970) (describing the general warrant). BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001 11:33 AM 2000] NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 3 chose.5 With that kind of unfettered discretion, the general warrant 6 could be, and often was, used to intimidate. General warrants executed during the reign of Charles I sought to intimidate dissidents, authors, and printers of seditious material by ransacking homes and seizing personal papers.7 In 1765, the courts declared general warrants illegal, and Parliament followed a year later.8 In the colonies, complaints that royal officials were violating the privacy of colonists through the use of writs of assistance, equivalent to general warrants, grew.9 Because English law did not, as yet, recognize a right of personal privacy, the crown’s abuses in the colonies were not remediable at law.10 It was thus no surprise that the new American Constitution and the government it created would respect a series of individual freedoms. James Madison authored what would become the Fourth 11 Amendment and proposed it to the Congress on June 8, 1789. For the new nation, warrants would require specificity to physically invade the privacy of its citizenry.12 Today, that same specificity is required to authorize electronic and physical invasions of privacy.13 Although the Fourth Amendment eliminated the abuses of general warrants, its commands remain unclear, especially in the face of technological progress.14 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against overreaching in investigations of criminal enterprises.15 Investigations of politically motivated threats to our 5. See William Cuddihy & Carmon B. Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY QTLY. 371, 381 (July 1980) (quoting a 1621 Privy Council general warrant). 6. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979) (describing the intimidation motives of the general warrant). 7. See id. (describing the motives for Charles I’s use of general warrants). 8. See Entrick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (K.B. 1765) (calling the general warrant “fatal to liberty”); see also O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 38 (delineating the end of British general warrants). 9. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 38-39 (noting the colonists disdain for writs for assisting); see also LASSON, supra note 4, at 28-29 (describing the historical emergency of the writ of assistance). 10. See LASSON, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that the many years of arbitrary and unrestricted powers of English government was one of the factors elevating reasonable search and seizure to constitutional significance in the United States). 11. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 39 (quoting James Madison’s initial draft of the Fourth Amendment). 12. See id. (noting Madison’s initial demand for a particular description of the place to be searched). 13. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967) (upholding the “narrow and particularized” warrant requirement for electronic surveillance of conversations in a public telephone booth). 14. See generally James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap
Load more

Recommended publications
  • No. 19-5331 in the UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS for the DISTRICT of COLUMBIA C
    USCA Case #19-5331 Document #1871493 Filed: 11/16/2020 Page 1 of 87 [ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 23, 2021] No. 19-5331 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD F. MCGAHN, II, Defendant-Appellant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia EN BANC BRIEF FOR APPELLANT JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK Acting Assistant Attorney General SOPAN JOSHI Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General MARK R. FREEMAN MICHAEL S. RAAB COURTNEY L. DIXON DENNIS FAN Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7243 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-8189 USCA Case #19-5331 Document #1871493 Filed: 11/16/2020 Page 2 of 87 CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), the undersigned counsel certifies: A. Parties and Amici The defendant-appellant is Donald F. McGahn, II. The plaintiff-appellee is the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives. Amici curiae in this Court are: Republican legal experts, former government officials, and former members of Congress (Steve Bartlett, Jack Buechner, Tom Coleman, George Conway III, Mickey Edwards, Stuart Gerson, Gordon Humphrey, Bob Inglis, James Kolbe, Steven Kuykendall, Jim Leach, Mike Parker, Thomas Petri, Trevor Potter, Reid Ribble, Jonathan Rose, Paul Rosenzweig, Peter Smith, J.W. Verret, Dick Zimmer); James Murray; former members of Congress and former Executive Branch officials (Thomas Andrews, William Baer, Brian Baird, Michael Barnes, John Barrow, Douglas Bereuter, Howard Berman, Rick Boucher, Barbara Boxer, Bruce Braley, Carol Mosley Braun, Roland Burria, Lois Cappa, Jean Carnahan, Robert Carr, Rod Chandler, Linda Chavez, Bill Cohen, James Cole, Jerry Costello, Mark S.
    [Show full text]
  • Sources and Bibliography
    Sources and Bibliography AMERICAN EDEN David Hosack, Botany, and Medicine in the Garden of the Early Republic Victoria Johnson Liveright | W. W. Norton & Co., 2018 Note: The titles and dates of the historical newspapers and periodicals I have consulted regarding particular events and people appear in the endnotes to AMERICAN EDEN. Manuscript Collections Consulted American Philosophical Society Barton-Delafield Papers Caspar Wistar Papers Catharine Wistar Bache Papers Bache Family Papers David Hosack Correspondence David Hosack Letters and Papers Peale Family Papers Archives nationales de France (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine) Muséum d’histoire naturelle, Série AJ/15 Bristol (England) Archives Sharples Family Papers Columbia University, A.C. Long Health Sciences Center, Archives and Special Collections Trustees’ Minutes, College of Physicians and Surgeons Student Notes on Hosack Lectures, 1815-1828 Columbia University, Rare Book and Manuscript Library Papers of Aaron Burr (27 microfilm reels) Columbia College Records (1750-1861) Buildings and Grounds Collection DeWitt Clinton Papers John Church Hamilton Papers Historical Photograph Collections, Series VII: Buildings and Grounds Trustees’ Minutes, Columbia College 1 Duke University, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library David Hosack Papers Harvard University, Botany Libraries Jane Loring Gray Autograph Collection Historical Society of Pennsylvania Rush Family Papers, Series I: Benjamin Rush Papers Gratz Collection Library of Congress, Washington, DC Thomas Law Papers James Thacher
    [Show full text]
  • The Breadth of Congress' Authority to Access Information in Our Scheme
    H H H H H H H H H H H 5. The Breadth of Congress’s Authority to Access Information in Our Scheme of Separated Powers Overview Congress’s broad investigatory powers are constrained both by the structural limitations imposed by our constitutional system of separated and balanced powers and by the individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Thus, the president, subordinate officials, and individuals called as witnesses can assert various privileges, which enable them to resist or limit the scope of congressional inquiries. These privileges, however, are also limited. The Supreme Court has recognized the president’s constitutionally based privilege to protect the confidentiality of documents or other information that reflects presidential decision-making and deliberations. This presidential executive privilege, however, is qualified. Congress and other appropriate investigative entities may overcome the privilege by a sufficient showing of need and the inability to obtain the information elsewhere. Moreover, neither the Constitution nor the courts have provided a special exemption protecting the confidentiality of national security or foreign affairs information. But self-imposed congressional constraints on information access in these sensitive areas have raised serious institutional and practical concerns as to the current effectiveness of oversight of executive actions in these areas. With regard to individual rights, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals subject to congressional inquiries are protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, though in many important respects those rights may be qualified by Congress’s constitutionally rooted investigatory authority. A. Executive Privilege Executive privilege is a doctrine that enables the president to withhold certain information from disclosure to the public or even Congress.
    [Show full text]
  • Congress's Authority to Influence and Control Executive
    Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies Updated December 19, 2018 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45442 SUMMARY R45442 Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control December 19, 2018 Executive Branch Agencies Todd Garvey The Constitution neither establishes administrative agencies nor explicitly prescribes the manner Legislative Attorney by which they may be created. Even so, the Supreme Court has generally recognized that Congress has broad constitutional authority to establish and shape the federal bureaucracy. Daniel J. Sheffner Congress may use its Article I lawmaking powers to create federal agencies and individual Legislative Attorney offices within those agencies, design agencies’ basic structures and operations, and prescribe, subject to certain constitutional limitations, how those holding agency offices are appointed and removed. Congress also may enumerate the powers, duties, and functions to be exercised by agencies, as well as directly counteract, through later legislation, certain agency actions implementing delegated authority. The most potent tools of congressional control over agencies, including those addressing the structuring, empowering, regulating, and funding of agencies, typically require enactment of legislation. Such legislation must comport with constitutional requirements related to bicameralism (i.e., it must be approved by both houses of Congress) and presentment (i.e., it must be presented to the President for signature). The constitutional process to enact effective legislation requires the support of the House, Senate, and the President, unless the support in both houses is sufficient to override the President’s veto. There also are many non-statutory tools (i.e., tools not requiring legislative enactment to exercise) that may be used by the House, Senate, congressional committees, or individual Members of Congress to influence and control agency action.
    [Show full text]
  • Contempt of Courts? President Trump's
    CONTEMPT OF COURTS? PRESIDENT TRUMP’S TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUDICIARY Brendan Williams* Faced with a letter from the American Bar Association (ABA) assessing him as “arrogant, lazy, an ideologue, and lacking in knowledge of the day-to-day practice,” Lawrence VanDyke, nominated by President Trump to serve on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, cried during an October 2019 confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.1 Republican senators dutifully attacked the ABA as liberally-biased.2 In a Wall Street Journal column, a defender of VanDyke assailed what he called a “smear campaign” and wrote that “[t]he ABA’s aggressive politicization is especially frustrating for someone like me, an active member of the ABA[.]”3 VanDyke was confirmed anyway.4 Contrary to Republican protestations, the ABA has deemed 97% of President Trump’s nominees to be “well qualified” or “qualified.”5 Indeed, in the most polarizing judicial nomination of the Trump Administration, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh’s defenders pointed to the ABA having rated him “well qualified” despite the association having once, in 2006, dropped his rating to “qualified” due to concerns about his temperament.6 *Attorney Brendan Williams is the author of over 30 law review articles, predominantly on civil rights and health care issues. A former Washington Supreme Court judicial clerk, Brendan is a New Hampshire long-term care advocate. This article is dedicated to his father Wayne Williams, admitted to the Washington bar in 1970. 1Hannah Knowles, Trump Judicial Nominee Cries over Scathing Letter from the American Bar Association, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2015). 2Id.
    [Show full text]
  • When Congress Comes Calling: a Study on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry When Congress
    When Congress Comes Calling: A Study on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry of Legislative on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics A Study When Congress 1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036 Comes Calling 202.580.6920 Email: [email protected] A Study on the www.constitutionproject.org Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry Morton Rosenberg Constitution Project Fellow WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A Study on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry © 2017 The Constitution Project All Rights Reserved. Requests for permission to reproduce selections from this book should be sent to: The Constitution Project, 1200 18th Street NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20036; or by e-mail to [email protected] The Constitution Project’s mission is to safeguard constitutional rights and values when they are threatened by our government’s criminal justice and national security practices, and to strengthen our system of checks and balances. The views expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect the views of individual members of The Constitution Project’s Board of Directors. For information about this report, or any other work of The Constitution Project, please visit our website at www.constitutionproject.org or e-mail us at [email protected]. Book design by Keane Design & Communications, Inc., keanedesign.com. Contents Preface Part I: Principles, Practices and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry Chapter 1 – Introduction: Updating the Study of Legislative Inquiry and Adapting it to the Changed Climate of Congressional Oversight ............................................................................. 1 Chapter 2 – The Institutional Framework of Congressional Oversight: Purposes, Powers, Limitations and Practicalities ................................................................................................... 5 A.
    [Show full text]
  • Congress's Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure
    Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney May 12, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34097 Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas Summary Congress’s contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, to punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in recent times the contempt power has most often been employed in response to non- compliance with a duly issued congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to appear before a committee for purposes of providing testimony, or a refusal to produce requested documents. Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat non-compliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena.
    [Show full text]
  • 3. the Powers and Tools Available to Congress for Conducting Investigative Oversight A
    H H H H H H H H H H H 3. The Powers and Tools Available to Congress for Conducting Investigative Oversight A. Congress’s Power to Investigate 1. The Breadth of the Investigatory Power Congress possesses broad and encompassing powers to engage in oversight and conduct investigations reaching all sources of information necessary to carry out its legislative functions. In the absence of a countervailing constitutional privilege or a self-imposed restriction upon its authority, Congress and its committees have virtually plenary power to compel production of information needed to discharge their legislative functions. This applies whether the information is sought from executive agencies, private persons, or organizations. Within certain constraints, the information so obtained may be made public. These powers have been recognized in numerous Supreme Court cases, and the broad legislative authority to seek information and enforce demands was unequivocally established in two Supreme Court rulings arising out of the 1920s Teapot Dome scandal. In McGrain v. Daugherty,1 which considered a Senate investigation of the Justice Department, the Supreme Court described the power of inquiry, with accompanying process to enforce it, as “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” The court explained: A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not possess the requisite
    [Show full text]
  • Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the Independent Counsel Act
    Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions made Under the Independent Counsel Act With one narrow exception, the Attorney General may not disclose to Congress the contents of any application or report filed with the court pursuant to the Independent Counsel Act unless the court agrees. All congressional requests for information about a decision regarding the appointment of an independent counsel must be supported by a legitimate legislative purpose. In addition, before such disclosures are made other considerations, such as whether or not to assert executive privilege, whether the information is covered by the attomey-client privilege, and whether the information must be kept confidential to preserve the integrity of the prosecutorial function, must be reviewed. Congress may not, as a matter of statutory or constitutional law, invoke the criminal contempt of Congress procedure against the head of an Executive agency acting on the President’s instructions to assert executive privilege in response to a congressional subpoena. An assertion of executive privilege must be based upon an evaluation of the Executive Branch’s interest in keeping the requested information confidential, the strength of Congress’ need for the information, and whether those needs can be accommodated in some other way. April 28, 1986 M e m o r a n d u m O p i n i o n f o r t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l I. Introduction and Summary You have asked this Office to review the legal principles that should inform the Department’s response to congressional inquiries about any decision re­ garding appointment of an independent counsel under the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • Congress's Contempt Power: a Sketch
    Order Code RL34114 Congress’s Contempt Power: A Sketch August 1, 2007 Morton Rosenberg Specialist in American Public Law American Law Division Todd B. Tatelman Legislative Attorney American Law Division Congress’s Contempt Power: A Sketch Summary Congress’s contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance (inherent contempt), punish the contemnor (criminal contempt), and/or to remove the obstruction (civil contempt). Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in the last seventy years the contempt power (primarily through the criminal contempt process) has generally been employed only in instances of refusals of witnesses to appear before committees, to respond to questions, or to produce documents. This report outlines the source of the contempt power, reviews major developments in the case law, and analyzes the procedures associated with each of the three different types of contempt proceedings. A more fully developed and detailed version, complete with sources and references, can be found in CRS Report RL34097, Congress’s Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, by Morton Rosenberg and Todd B. Tatelman. Contents Congress’s Power to Investigate ..................................1 Early History of Congressional Contempt...........................3 Inherent Contempt.............................................5
    [Show full text]
  • A General Catalogue of the Officers and Graduates of Rutgers College
    HIBRARY OF CONGRESS.! t ! .^A^^ ii..r5 t I — ^ UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. ! / GENERAL CATALOGUE OP THE #icers m^ irakate OF RUTGERS COLLEGE, IN NEW-BRUNSWICK, N. J., t^ROM 1770 TO 1855. Pi-' '' ^0l jttstilme d otdbtnfem illnsfra/ ^^"%/ - N E W Y R K : PUBLISHED BY ORDER OP THE ASSOCIATION OP THE ALUMNI OP RUTCERS COLLEGE. 1855. ^J)4 1 1 &"S" JOHN A. GRAY, PRINTER, 95 and 91 Cliff Street, N. Y. INTRODUCTORY SKETCH. The Reformed Protestant Dutch Utiurcti in JNorth-America is the oldest offspring of the Reformed Church of Holland, which was one of the earliest children of Protestantism. That Church adopted its " Confession of Faith" in 1561, just one year before the first "Articles of Religion" were set forth as the standards of the Church of England under Queen Elizabeth. While the Protestants in the Netherlands were thus establishing the religious sentiments of John Calvin, they took good care to carry out his views in regard to the instruction of the people ; for, eminent as he was as a theologian, Calvin, beyond dis- pute, was also " the father of popular education, the inventor of the system of free schools." Accordingly, we find that neither the perils ; of war, nor the pursuit of gain, nor the excitement of political strife ever caused the Calvinistic Hollanders to neglect the duty of educating their offspring to enjoy that freedom for which their fathers had fought. Schools were everywhere provided, with good schoolmasters to instruct the children of all classes in the usual branches of education, as well as in the catechism and doctrines of the Church ; and the several con- sistories were bound " to use their best endeavors that a sufficient number of students in theology should be constantly maintained at the public expense." In 1574.
    [Show full text]
  • Sovereignty, Property, and Law in the US Territories
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2016 The Adjudicatory State: Sovereignty, Property, and Law in the U.S. Territories, 1783-1802 Gregory Ablavsky Ablavsky University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Indigenous Studies Commons, Law Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Ablavsky, Gregory Ablavsky, "The Adjudicatory State: Sovereignty, Property, and Law in the U.S. Territories, 1783-1802" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1571. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1571 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1571 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Adjudicatory State: Sovereignty, Property, and Law in the U.S. Territories, 1783-1802 Abstract “The Adjudicatory State” traces the collision between the federal legal vision for the early American West and the preexisting laws and customs that governed the region. To administer the vast region it obtained in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the United States created the territorial system, under which federal officials would temporarily govern western “territories” until they achieved statehood. The federal government would also survey and sell the public domain to private purchasers. But these grand plans ran afoul of territorial realities. Both the Northwest Territory, encompassing much of the present-day Midwest, and the Southwest Territory, encompassing present-day Tennessee, were borderlands, places where Native peoples, French settlers, Anglo-American intruders, and land companies contended for sovereignty and property. Instead of crafting a new legal order, federal officials found themselves barraged with preexisting claims.
    [Show full text]