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Confronts : Two Competing Societal Projects Searching for Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 2021

Alain-G. Gagnon McGill University Guy Lachapelle

Forced centralist policies, made possible by the utilization of 's spending, taxation powers, and frequent of>position to Quebec's policy preferences led a large number of Quebecers to favor greater . The federal government's attempts to reduce to junior governments in the have backfired in Quebec's case, and led to the of a modern, liberal, pluralistic, and territorial nationalist project. Meanwhile, Quebecers continue to shape a vision of themselves lhal is marked by sharp differences with the political project of undifferentiated citizens and that erects instead a communitarian model inspired by social democratic values.

Un 30 1995, Quebecers came within a whisker of forcing a reform of the Canadian federation and taking Canada closer to a Maas- tricht type political and economic arrangement. An impressive turnout of 93.48 percent confirmed the deep concern of Quebecers from all linguistic groups, political allegiances, and with this decision.1 In the end, only 52,448 votes in favor of the status quo demarcated the two options. Opposition to the sovereignty-partnership project was registered within nonfrancophone communities, with the exception of the Latino-Quebecers who were more inclined to support the nationalist project.2 Youth, low and middle income earners, unemployed, people on welfare, francophones, and intellectuals gave their overwhelming support to the nationalist cause.3 Changes advanced by the Quebec government, under the leadership of the Parti Quebecois ', the Bloc Quebecois Official Opposition 'See Guy Lachapelle, "Les raisons du vote massif des Quebecois au ," Bulletin d'histoire polUiqueA ( 1996): 23-26. 2See Clement Trudel, "Des centaines de Latino-Americains bataillent pour le OUI," , 21-22 October 1995, A7; , "Post-referendum Reflections," Canada Watch 4 (- 1995): 42, states that 44 percent of -American voters backed the sovereignty-partnership project. The dominant traits of Quebec's nationalist project are clearly liberal as it stresses the protection of individual rights through the entrenchment of the Quebec Charter of Rights and through the recognition of Quebec as a formed of Francophone Quebecers, eleven Aboriginal and a historic Anglophone minority. Charles made this point particularly clear when he argued that Quebecers are strong supporters of both individual and collective rights. See Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian and Nationalism (: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).

© Publius: The Journal of Federalism 26:3 ( 1996) 177 178 Publius/Summer 1996 in Ottawa, led by , and by the Action democratique du Quebec, an offshoot of Quebec , led by , had a firm liberal orientation. These changes, for example, stressed the entrenchment of a Quebec Charter of (more encompassing than the Canadian

Charter), a clear of powers to the regions of Quebec, the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 elaboration of a societal project more sensitive to the needs of the people and, among other aspects, the maintenance and consolidation of trade within America. Pro-Canada political forces would have had difficulty challenging such proposals, because Quebecers tend to favor left-oriented policies, entrenched rights in the provincial of government, , and decentralization of powers to regions. For most of the referendum campaign, there were no forward-looking propositions initiated by the NO side, sure as it was that Quebecers would not endorse the nationalist cause. forces, led by Jean Chretien and Daniel Johnson, waited until the very end of the campaign as polls started to confirm that the side could win the referendum before pointing to the possibility of administrative change to existing institutions (e.g., decentralization of powers to Quebec, increasing number of Canada-Quebec agreements in the of , and work force training) and suggesting that Quebecers are better protected in a larger country. The push for independence of the last thirty , after a brief relapse in the mid- due to an expressed federal will to recognize Quebec specificity, known as the Meech proposals, had never been as high as it was in late 1995. Polls following the referendum of October 1995, suggested that the federal strategy (i.e., partition, legal battles, and ethnic and linguistic divisions) led to an increase in sovereignty support bringing it to 56 percent, a seven-point gain.4 Figures from 1980 and October 1995 reveal a significant increase in favor of sovereignty (Table 1). When compared with the referendum results of 20 , the 30 October 1995 results showed a significant increase of YES support in most ridings. In 1980, only 22 ridings out of 110 ridings supported the sovereignty-association option. This was an alternative that only granted a mandate to negotiate a new political arrange- ment between the federal government (Ottawa) and Quebec. In 1995, the mood in Quebec was different. No less than 80 ridings out of 125 ridings backed the stronger option of a declaration of sovereignty, accompanied by a proposition of economic partnership with the rest of Canada. Most regions of Quebec were more favorable to the sovereignist option than to the federalist one, with the exception of the , ridings of Western Montreal containing a high concentration of nonfrancophones, and ridings along the American, , or (Table 2).

^Centre de Recherche sur l'opinion publique (CROP), "Partition: les Quebecois disent NON," VAclualitt.1\ (May 1996): 37-42. Quebec Confronts Canada 179

Table 1 Quebec Referendum Results, 1980 and 1995 Referendum 20 May 1980 30 October 1995 Registered voters 4,367,584 5,087,009

Participation rate (%) 85.61 93.48 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 YES (% of valid votes) 40.44 49.42 NO (% of valid votes) 59.56 50.58 Spoiled ballots (% of valid votes) 1.74 1.82 Majority NO vote 19.12 (702,230 votes) 1.16 (52,448 votes) Source: Quebec, Chief Electoral Officer, Rapport preliminaire des resullats du depouiUement des votes le soir du scrutin: Referendum du 30 Octobre 1995 (Quebec: Bibliotheque Nationale du Quebec, 1995).

The breakdown, in the Montreal region, reveals a deep division between the western end of the metropole, which is 41.9 percent francophone, and the city's eastern side, which is 83.0 percent francophone. It was confirmed, through an ecological analysis, that only 22.1 percent of voters in western Montreal and 55.3 percent in eastern Montreal backed the Quebec government's option. When aggregated along the French-English cleavage, the data suggest that francophones favored the sovereignty option at a of 52.6 percent in the western part of Montreal and 66.7 percent in eastern Montreal. The latter represents the second largest regional support of the sovereignist option by the francophone population after Saguenay/Lac Jean.5 RECOGNITION OF QUEBECERS AS A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE How can one account for the rapid progress experienced by the nationalist cause in Quebec? For the most part, the political conflict between Quebec and the rest of Canada can be reduced to a quest for recognition. During die last forty years, the Quebec government has been demanding that cultural dualism be formally recognized as the key founding principle of the Canadian state.6 Since the tabling in 1956 of the Report of the Royal Com- of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, known as the Tremblay Commission, most Quebec political leaders have pursued the goal of obtaining the recognition of Quebec as a "," while others have demanded that it be granted a "special status" within the Canadian federation, or that Quebec be recognized as a "" (the Gerin- Lajoie Report in 1967). The claim that Quebecers form a nation has been voiced several times by Quebec's provincial political parties, and has been

5Pierre Drouilly, "An Exemplar)'Referendum," Canada Watch A (November/December 1995): 26; Pierre Drouilly, "Un referendum exemplaire," La Presse, 7 November 1995, B3. 6DanieI Latouche, "Problem of Constitutional Design in Canada: Quebec and the Issue of Bicommunalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Spring 1988): 131-146. 180 Publius/Summer 1996 reaffirmed several times by the Bloc Quebecois since becoming the Official Opposition in the House of Commons in October 1993.

Table 2 Quebec's Referendum Results, by Regions, 30 October 1995 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 No. of Partici- Franco- YES electoral1 No. of pation YES phone franco Region voters % % % phone % Lower-St-Lawrence/Gaspe/ 10 303,242 90.2 60.3 94.0 64.2 Saguenay/Lac-Saint-Jean 5 206,300 92.7 69.6 98.8 70.4 Quebec 11 480,958 93.5 54.4 96.6 56.3 Chaudiere-Appalachians 8 287,487 92.2 50.7 98.8 51.3 /Bois-Francs 8 316,526 93.0 57.2 98.0 58.3 Eastern 8 315,120 93.4 49.6 89.4 55.5 Monteregie/Montreal 18 797,679 94.7 53.7 86.5 62.2 Lauren tians/Lanaudiere 13 567,581 93.8 61.6 93.6 65.8

Outaouais 5 214,362 93.8 27.5 81.1 33.8

Northwest 4 129,834 89.8 55.8 87.4 63.9 Laval 5 236,117 95.3 46.7 78.4 59.6 Montreal Island 30 1,231,774 93.9 34.5 56.3 61.3 Total 125 5,086,980 93.5 49.4 82.4 60.0 Source: Pierre Drouilly, "Un referendum exemplaire," La Presse, 7 November 1995, B3.

Such a recognition has been viewed as having important ramifications. It would have allowed Quebec to enact more encompassing political legis- lation in the areas of culture, immigration, , and telecommunica- tions, as well as economic and social policies, which would have helped to secure its precarious position as a French-speaking state in .7 From the English-Canadian's viewpoint, there is a tendency, since the of the Constitution from in 1982, to view Quebec as one among ten provinces and to consider any deviation from this position as a threat to Canada's political stability. Opposition to such an interpretation has been registered in some important intellectual circles outside of Quebec as negating the original pact between French- and English-Canadians that led to the creation of the Canadian federation in 1867.8 During the last thirty years, Canada has moved toward a unitary

'For an account of the key issues of the 1995 Referendum, see Guy Lachapelle, Pierre P. Tremblay, and John E. Trent, eds. L'impact referendaire (Sainte-Foy, QUE: Les Presses de 1'Universite du Quebec, 1995). 8See, for example, Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds. Negotiating With a Sovereign Quebec (: James Lorimer, 1992). Quebec Confronts Canada 181 system (1) by reducing communal dualism to institutional bilingualism in federal institutions, (2) by merging multicultural policies with bilingual- ism, (3) by establishing a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that supersedes the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and (4) by imposing the equality-of-provinces principle through the establishment Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 of the amending formula in the Constitution Act of 1982.9 Induced centralizing policies, made possible by the use of Ottawa's spending and taxation powers and frequent opposition to Quebec's policy preferences, have led a large number of Quebecers to favor greater sover- eignty for the province.10 The federal government's attempts to reduce provinces to junior governments in the federation have backfired in the case of Quebec, and have encouraged the consolidation of a modern, demo- cratic, liberal, pluralistic, and territorial nationalist project.11 Since the patriation of the Canadian Constitution from Great Britain in 1982, Quebecers have continued to shape a vision of themselves that is marked by sharp differences with the Canadian political project of undif- ferentiated citizens. Based on a communitarian liberal model, Quebec na- tionalists have tended to propose a societal project that aims toward ajust and caring society, while most Anglophone provinces and the federal gov- ernment are gradually adopting a neoliberal project that tends to under- mine collective rights.12 The referendum of 30 October 1995 saw two societal projects competing with one another. Supporters of the YES side tended to back a social democratic vision of Quebec's society that favored the maintenance and universality of social programs, and that called upon the Quebec state to humanize capitalist initiatives. Advocates of the NO cause tended to undermine discussions of this sort and argued for an unreformed Canada. They assumed that no substantial change was necessary, and that nationalist forces would, in the end, lose the referendum by a significant margin. TWO COMPETING POLITICAL AND SOCIETAL PROJECTS The return of the Parti Quebecois at the helm of the Quebec provincial government in September 1994, after a period of ten years out of power,

', Trudeau and the End of the Canadian Dream (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995). fait.je repondrai 'OUI,'" L'Action Nalionalt86 ( 1996): 143-258. "Donald Lenihan, Gordon Robertson, and Roger Tasse, R/daiming the Middle Ground (Montreal: In- stitute of Research for Public Policy, 1994), pp. 105-125. "Daniel Drache and Andrew Ranachan, eds. Warm Heart, Cold Country: Fiscal and Reform in Canada (Ottawa and Toronto: Caledon Institute of Social Policy and Robarts Centre for Canadian Stud- ies, 1995). It should be noted, however, that following its referendum defeat, the Quebec government's 1996 budget revealed the extent to which it is difficult to escape global trends as it carried out some neo- liberal measures to control its deficit and to secure markets' confidence. 182 Publius/Summer 1996 suggested a desire among Quebecers to redress past injustices, as well as to promote a more progressive government. Several elected members, associated with the social democratic wing of the Parti Quebecois, were appointed to the . Their purpose was to pursue particular objectives, such as promoting greater equity between citizens and demonstrating to Quebecers Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 the social advantages of sovereignty. Even Parizeau, known for his more conservative approach to , started speaking in favor of a new societal project.13 Federal {Bloc Quebecois) and Quebec {Parti Quebecois) nationalist forces have constituted a common front in fighting the dismantlement of the social by Ottawa. This trend led a Canadian observer to comment: What is our national [Canadian] project, the thing that binds our 30 million souls to a single, uplifting idea? Surely it isn't the quest to get by with 20 percent fewer beds, or the effort to boost productivity ratios, or clever ways to cut spending on social programs. That is an 's dream of national , and it shouldn't be any surprise that it appeals only to other .14 Nationalist arguments stressed that sovereignty could make a significant difference because in this debate, the Quebec government could set its own priorities. Fewer subsidies to large corporations and more assistance to people in need were said to be policy initiatives conceivable in a sovereign Quebec. Quebecers started to believe that it was possible to be governed differently, to share common political and social goals, and to give a human face to economics. The referendum of 30 October 1995 saw two visions of society confronting one another. It became obvious during the preceding hearings of both the regional and the national commissions struck to study the political future of Quebec, which two models were clashing with one another. On one side, the Quebec government and most spokespersons backing the nationalist project were proposing a social democratic image of society. On the other side, Quebec and Canadian tended to advance a neoliberal project, and argued that the constitutional status quo was the utmost cultural, eco- nomic, and political guarantees that Quebecers could aspire to obtain. Quebec sovereignists were particularly inspired by Bloc Quebecois representatives in Ottawa, who brought to the floor of the House of Commons issues of equity and were demanding that social programs be protected against repeated attacks. It can be added that Bloc Quebecois mem- bers, with the near eradication of the at the last federal

"One should remember the warm reception Parizeau gave to the Commission nationale sur l'avenir du Quebec's report in which solidarity and equity were two key pillars of Quebec's national project. See Report (Quebec: Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec, 1995). "David Olive, "Listening to Quebec," Report on Business Magazine 12 ( 1996): 14. Quebec Confronts Canada 183 elections, have become Canada's social conscience. This is quite ironic considering that the Bloc Quebecois wants to take Quebec out of the Canadian federal system. Federal Liberals, under the leadership of Jean Chretien, have proposed a neoliberal agenda for Canada, contrary to their platform during the elec- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 toral campaign of 1993. This objective is being achieved by the promotion of a pro-business agenda, cutting transfer payments to the provinces in the area of social programs, proposing constraints on some programs such as insurance, and among other things, questioning some as- pects of the universality of income security programs.15 During the last decade, federal government policies have tended to sup- the dismantlement of pan-Canadian institutions that had given a mean- ing to being Canadian. The undermining of the old-age , unemployment insurance, university education, research and production centers (e.g., National Film Board, , and Canadian Broad- casting Corporation), the privatization of railways and airports, and the elimination of the government's arm-length agencies, such as the Economic Council, have all contributed to a crisis of identity. Such moves have led many Quebecers to believe that Canada has outlived its useful existence. A Thatcherite vision has taken hold in Canada. The federal government, led by Jean Chretien, and the premiers of Ontario, , New Brunswick, and , have imposed a series of regressive social measures with a view to control deficits and to reverse the expansion of the public debt. The is under serious threat, and all indications suggest that a concerted effort by Ottawa and a majority of provinces will be made to pursue this objective. The 1996 federal budget, released in early , confirmed all these apprehensions.16 Contrary to the case of the 20 May 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association, at which time Ottawa stressed its role as a bulwark against attacks on the safety net, the referendum held on 30 October 1995 saw a complete reversal of these positions. This shift of policy led many older citizens and women in Quebec, not natural supporters of the nationalists, to rally behind the secessionist/part- nership cause (Table 3). To quote the former federal leader of the New Democratic party and former president of the Montreal-based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, :

15AJain-G. Gagnon, "Du pietinement constitutionnel au recul social," Possibles 20 (Summer 1996): 19-36. l6The May 1996 Quebec budget, though less drastic, pointed in the same direction as the finance minister, Landry, argued that doing otherwise would not be viewed as being responsible by inter- national creditors. 184 Publius/Summer 1996

Table 3 Francophone Support for the YES and the NO Vote October 1995 YES NO DK/NA Variables %(N) %(N) %(N) Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 Age 18-24 58.7 (69) 31.0 (36) 10.2 (12) 25-34 66.7 (116) 25.5 (44) 7.8(14) 35^14 58.2 (136) 29.9 (70) 12.0 (28) 45-54 59.4 (109) 28.0 (51) 12.7 (23) 55-64 41.3 (31) 44.8 (33) 13.9 (10) 65 + 39.3 (37) 46.5 (44) 14.1 (13) Education 0-7 44.1 (34) ' 40.7 (31) 15.1 (12) 8-12 56.6 (207) 30.9 (113) 12.5 (46) 13-15 56.7 (138) 34.1 (83) 9.2 (22) 16 + 61.6 (121) 28.1 (55) 10.3 (20) Occupation Professionals 60.6 (42) 25.6 (18) 13.9 (10) Administrators 59.6 (72) 29.7 (36) 10.7 (13) Technicians 60.9 (15) 34.7 (9) 4.4(1) Office employees 52.9 (59) 32.5 (36) 14.5 (16) Specialized workers 72.2 (67) 22.6 (21) 5.2 (5) Nonspecialized workers 59.7 (94) 29.2 (46) 11.2 (18) Type of job Full time job 59.1 (274) 30.0 (139) 10.9 (51) Part-time job 64.2 (75) 26.5 (31) 9.3 (11) Searchingjob 66.4 (18) 24.1 (7) 9.6 (3) 61.4 (48) 23.4(18) 15.2 (12) Housekeeping 43.9 (29) 42.6 (28) 13.5 (9) Retired 39.7 (46) 49.3 (57) 11.0 (13) Income 0 - 9,999 58.1 (21) 30.4(11) 11.5(4) 10,000-19,999 46.3 (50) 42.9 (46) 10.9 (12) 20,000 - 29,999 60.1 (88) 32.6 (48) 7.3(11) 30,000 - 39,999 55.8 (78) 33.7 (47) 10.5 (15) 40,000 - 49,999 66.5 (81) 25.8 (31) 7.7 (9) 50,000 - 59,999 67.9 (55) 24.6 (20) 7.5 (6) 60,000 + 57.4 (89) 33.3 (52) 9.2 (14) Men 60.9 (268) 28.6 (126) 10.5 (46) Women 52.2 (232) 35.3 (157) 12.4 (55) Attending religious services Regularly 47.8 (100) 38.7 (81) 13.4 (28) Sometimes 57.1 (243) 32.2(137) 10.7 (46) Never 62.9 (155) 25.9 (64) 11.2 (28) Question: Ace moment-ci de lacampagne referendaire, voteriez-vous «oui» ou «non» acette question? Source: SONDAGEM-Le Devoir, 21-25 October 1995. N = 1068. Quebec Confronts Canada 185

Increasing numbers of senior citizens came to think their benefits would more likely remain with a YES vote than if they relied on an Ottawa preoccupied with cutbacks. And Quebecois women, like other women voters all over the , caring more for a

fair society than for macho politics, moved in increasing numbers Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 to the YES side with its emphasis on a more caring government.17 Generally, one can argue that two visions of society opposed one another. Class politics entered the political fray to a considerable extent. It was easier to mobilize women's organizations, unions, and popular groups behind a nationalist project of the left, willing to speak for a just and more caring society and not just for independence in and of itself. Contrary to the "critical" YES that labor organizations had given to the nationalist cause in May 1980, this time their support was unconditional. In addition, the Quebec Federation of Women challenged women from all walks of life to support the sovereignist project. An important group of nuns also gave support to the nationalist project, stressing that it was the only one that took to heart issues of social .18 THE REALM OF CLASS POLITICS Federalists attracted strong support from big-business spokespersons and high income earners, to the point that a Globe and Mail reporter wrote: "Referendum a battlefield for big business versus social democrats."19 Speeches made by prominent Quebec business leaders such as of Bombardier, who said on 4 October 1995, that companies would leave Quebec if the YES won on 30 October, created a great malaise between workers and employers.20 Several business people were also unhappy with Beaudoin's statements, and decided to create their own group in favor of the YES option. Beaudoin retracted his comments a few weeks later, on 25 October, by confirming that Bombardier would stay in Quebec regardless of the out- come of the referendum. He accused Bouchard and Parizeau of trans- forming the constitutional debate into a class struggle. As of the des Syndicate Nationaux, Gerald Larose, wrote to the mem- bers of the union on the day after the referendum: "From the middle of the first week of the referendum campaign, the debate was exposed as opposing wealthy capitalists in favor of federalism, a system that serves their interests,

17Ed Broadbent, "Why Bouchard succeeds, and Where the Federalists Failed," , 19 January 1996, B3. "Stephane Baillargeon, "Les Religieuses Repondenta I'appel du OUI. Une Reaction a 1'effritement des politiquessociales au Canada," Le Devoir, 23 October 1995, A3. "Rheal Seguin, 1995, "Referendum a Battlefield for Big Business Versus Social Democrats: Yes, and the move to the left," The Globe and Mail, 20 October 1995, p. Dl and D5. "Caroline Montpetit, "Des groupes populaires pour le OUI. Manifestation chez Bombardier," Le Devoir, 11 October 1995, A4. 186 Publius/Summer 1996 against the workers and the majority of the Quebec population, in favor of change, who want to assume their own destiny and responsibilities."21 Historically, Quebec electoral studies had been unable to distinguish a clear relationship between politics and class voting.22 Several studies, however, especially research conducted by Hubert Guindon, suggested that Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 the central role played by the Quebec state (the emergence of the new bureaucratic class), the secularization of its institutions, and the democra- tization of its political process are three key factors that led to a new class relationship in Quebec society.23 Seymour M. Lipset noted more than three decades ago that if in most industrialized countries' working-class voters had a greater tendency to support left-wing political parties, in Quebec working class voters were more likely to support nationalist political parties.24 The sovereignist movement at that time was perceived by many observers as "regional." However, the Lesage government had launched a new social and nationalistic project as early as the .

The Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Electorate The language divide remains central. Francophones tended to vote to a greater extent in favor of sovereignty-partnership, while nonfrancophones were generally opposed to it. The YES side made significant progress among francophones, jumping from 49 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1995. Our data20 suggest that the largest support for the YES side came from francophone specialized workers, 72.2 percent supporting the YES side. Nonspecialized francophone workers and professionals/administrators supported the YES side at 60 percent (Table 4). Among the anglophone

""Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux," from Gerald Larose, 22 November 1995. "Raymond Hudon, "Les etudes electorates au Quebec - Frincipales orientations et quelques debats," Recherches sociographiques \1 (1976): 283-322. See also, Hamilton and Maurice Pinard, "The Bases of the Parti Quebecois Support in Recent Quebec Elections," Canadian Journal of Political Science. 9 (1976): 3-36. Serge Carlos and Daniel Latouche, "Le choix des electeurs en 1973: Caracteristiques Sociales et Orientation Nationale," Daniel Latouche, Guy , and Jean-Guy Vaillancourt eds. Le Processus electoral au Quebec: Les elections provinciates de 1970 et 1973, (Montreal: Editions Hurtubise HMH): 213-234; Daniel Latouche, "The Independence Option: Ideological and Empirical Elements," Dale Thomson ed. Quebec Society and Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973). "Hubert Guindon, Quebec Society, Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood (Toronto: Press, 1988); Hubert Guindon, "The Modernization of Quebec and the Legitimacy of the Canadian State"; Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, and Allan Turowetz, eds. Modernization and the Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 212-246; Hubert Guindon, "Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, Class, and Ethnic Tension," Richard H. Leach ed. Contemporary Canada (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 33-59; Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureau- cratic Revolution," Queen's Quarterlyll (Summer 1964): 150-162. "Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981 (1959)). BData were collected through telephone interviews preceding the referendum number between 21-25 October of 30 October 1995. A total of 1,068 telephone interviews were completed out of a maximun of 1728. The response rate for the survey was 61.8 percent. The poll was conducted bySONDAGEM for Le Devoir, and supervised by Guy Lachapelle (Concordia University) and Pierre Noreau (University of Quebec, Abitibi-Temiscamingue). The sample was built around five clusters (three for the Montreal region, one for the region of Quebec, and a fifth one for the rest of the province). The margin of error for this type of poll is +-3.2 percent in nineteen cases out of twenty cases. See Pierre O'Neill, "Le referendum a rendu les Quebecois plus Revendicateurs quejamais," Le Devoir, 11-12 November 1995, A1-A14. Quebec Confronts Canada 187

voters, we observed the same phenomenon, even if our sample is small; 27.8 percent of the nonspecialized anglophone workers voted for the YES (Table 5). NO supporters were essentially middle-class voters. Therefore, even if we can observe an important language cleavage, YES societal project

seems to have also attracted several lower-class anglophone voters. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021

Table 4 Social Class and Voting Intention Among Francophone Voters October 1995 Middle Class Working Class Professionals & Technicians & Specialized Nonspecialized administrators office employees workers workers Total % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) YES 60.0 54.4 72.8 59.5 60.6 (114) (74) (67) (94) (349) NO 28.4 33.1 22.8 29.1 28.8 (54) (45) (21) (46) (166) Don't know 11.6 12.5 5.4 11.4 10.6 (22) (17) (5) (18) (61) Total 33.0 23.6 16.0 27.4 100.0 (190) (136) (92) (158) (576) Question: Quel travail faites-vous principalement dans votre emploi? This categorization of occupations is based on , Census 1971, and has been applied by Maurice Pinard, "Classes sociales et comportement electoral," Vincent Lemieux, ed. Quatre elections provinciates au Quebec, 1965-1966 (Quebec: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1969). Source: SONDAGEM-Le Devoir, 21-25 October 1995. N = 1068.

The support for the YES option among francophone voters attracted citizens from different backgrounds. Cohorts of people between the age 18 and age 54 supported the YES alternative, while people over age 55 voted more for the NO (Table 3). The higher the education level, the higher the support for the YES option; the inverse holds true for the NO vote. The YES support among francophone voters came essentially from specialized workers and less from office employees. People searching for a job heavily supported the YES side; housekeepers were highly divided and retired people generally supported the NO cause. Although the YES side domi- nated in all income categories, the difference between the options is the least pronounced in the $10,000 to $19,999 category. Both men and women highly supported sovereignty. Finally, the data proves that support for the YES option was inversely related to attendance of religious services of the voter. 188 Publius/Summer 1996

Table 5 Social Class and Voting Intention Among Anglophone Voters October 1995 Middle Class Working Class Professionals & Technicians & Specialized Nonspecialized administrators office employees workers workers Total Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021

YES 8.9 10.0 8.3 27.8 12.1 (5) (3) (1) (5) (14) NO 80.1 73.3 68.7 66.7 75.0 (45) (22) (8) (12) (87) Don't know 11.0 16.7 25.0 5.5 12.9 (6) (5) (3) (1) (15) Total 48.3 25.9 10.3 15.5 100.0 (56) (30) (12) (18) (116) Question: Quel travail faites-vous principalement dans votre emploi? This categorization of occupations is based on Statistics Canada, Census 1971, and has been applied by Maurice Pinard, Classes sociales et comportement electoral," Vincent Lemieux, ed. Quatre elections frrovinciales au Quebec, 1956-1966 (Quebec: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1969), pp. 141-178. Source: SONDAGEM-Le Devoir, 21-25 October 1995. N = 1068.

In terms of party support, during the period of the referendum campaign, the Parti Quebecois maintained a good part of the support of the working-class people. Leading up to the referendum, specialized workers supported the Parti Quebecois at 69.9 percent, while nonspecialized workers did so at 56.8 percent. The social status of respondents was inversely related to support for the Parti Quebecois (Table 6). In the opposite camp, the obtained its support essentially from the upper middle class. The support of the Action democratique du Quebec came from administrators, 17.1 percent of whom voted ADQ, technicians, 14.2 percent of whom did so. The support for other parties came essentially from specialized workers as well as 4.7 percent of whom supported a party other than the three ones listed.

Top Concerns During the Referendum Campaign When we look to the concerns of Quebecers during the referendum period (Table 7), we see that remained the key issue. Contrary to what the NO strategists thought during the referendum campaign, however, this issue surfaced primarily due to the major change to proposed by the federal government. The unem- ployment rate remained high in Quebec throughout 1995, but unemployed and seasonally unemployed workers (e.g., fishermen) were quite disap- pointed by the federal proposal. Ottawa postponed its reform until after the referendum because of its concern of losing votes due to an unpopular Quebec Confronts Canada 189 policy. Other economic issues, such as care reforms and the increase cost of living, were among the top concerns of the electorate. Eco- nomic factors and the downturn of the economy seemed to have advantaged the YES side, because the neoliberal federal agenda left very few hopes for

the Quebec middle classes and lower classes. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021

Table 6 Party Support Among Francophone Voters by Occupation October 1995 Action Parti liberal democratique Don't know/ Occupation Parti Quebecois du Quebec du Quebec Others refusal Professionals 46.3 24.3 8.9 1.5 19.0 (32) (17) (6) (1) (13) Administrators 47.1 19.6 17.1 16.2 (57) (24) (21) (-) (20) Technicians 50.5 20.7 14.2 14.6 (13) (5) (4) (-) (4) Office employees 53.7 21.7 10.2 2.7 11.7 (60) (24) (11) (3) (13) Specialized workers 69.9 11.7 10.2 4.7 3.5 (65) (11) (9) (4) (3) Nonspecialized workers 56.8 15.5 11.8 1.8 14.1 (90) (25) (19) (3) (22) Total 55.2 18.0 12.0 1.9 12.9 (322) (105) (70) (11) (75) Question: S'il y avait des elections provinciates au Quebec aujourd'hui, pour lequel des partis politiques suivants voteriez-vous? Source: SONDAGEM-Le Devoir, 21-25 October 1995. N = 1068.

Social issues also favored the YES side, such as (1) education (increase in tuition fees for postsecondary ), (2) social security reforms ( plans for older citizens), and (3) the overall mismanagement by the federal government of public finance (higher taxation). The language issue played a secondary role throughout the referendum campaign, with most public opinion polls suggesting that Quebecers were satisfied with the Quebec government's policy in this field. The election of the Parti Quebecois in September 1994 reassured the Quebec population that Montreal will remain a francophone city, and that efforts would be made in that direction.25 Economic issues were more prevalent in 1995 than in 1980. Finally, concerns about the low birth rate of the francophone population were down-played during the referendum campaign.

MFor an account of thel2 September 1994 Quebec provincial elections, cf. Alain-G. Gagnon, "The Quebec General Elections of 12 September 1994," Regional and Federal Studies 5 (Spring 1995): 95-102. 190 Publius/Summer 1996

Contrary to the 1980 referendum, in which the language and cultural issues were at the forefront, in 1995 the YES success can be attributed to the fact that it responded to economic concerns, attracting support from all social classes.

Table 7 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 Concerns of Quebecers during the Referendum Campaign October 1995 Very Somewhat Not very Not at all %(N) %(N) %(N) %(N) Employment 78.2 14.7 4.6 2.5 (834) (157) (49) (26) 72.6 20.3 6.1 1.0 (775) (217) (66) (11) Cost-of-living 70.8 20.9 6.8 1.6 (755) (223) (73) (17) Education 64.6 20.7 10.0 4.7 (689) (221) (107) (51) Governments' debt 63.5 18.4 14.3 3.9 (675) (195) (152) (41) Social Security 52.0 29.0 14.8 4.2 (553) (308) (157) (44) Language policy 46.2 23.0 20.0 10.9 (493) (245) (213) (116) Cultural policy 40.3 29.3 24.6 5.8 (428) (312) (261) (62)

Low Birth Rate 25.6 26.2 29.8 18.4 (271) (277) (316) (195) Questions: Pourriez-vous me dire si les sujets suivants vous preoccupent beaucoup, assez, un peu ou pas du tout? Source: SONDAGEM-Le Devoir, 21-25 October 1995. N = 1068.

Overall, the success of the sovereignty-partnership campaign can be explained in good part by the fact that people were more easily convinced in 1995 that an independent Quebec would be more inclined to protect social programs than is the case in the current federal regime. In addition, the Quebec government and the YES coalition forces were not afraid to discuss economic issues. It is therefore not a coincidence that during the referendum campaign, more Quebecers than previously believed that Quebec would be economically viable (Quebec has the economic importance of ) and would be prosperous after a short period of transition. Quebec Confronts Canada 191

CONCLUSION Several profound changes to the original compact27 between Quebec and the rest of Canada have contributed to and continue to feed the present .28 These trends include attempts to set up a standardizing vision of Canada, and to remove key references to the founding experience Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 of 1867. Such efforts have been viewed by most Quebecers as a series of initiatives to prevent the Quebec nation from intervening in its capacity as a founding partner of the Canadian federation, and have served instead to empower the federal government with such responsibilities. Canada has entered a period of unprecedented political uncertainty fol- lowing (1) the failure of the in 1990 to accommo- date Quebec, (2) the collapse of die Accord in October 1992, (3) the election of a majority of nationalist Bloc Quebecois candidates to rep- resent Quebec interests in the House of Commons in October 1993, (4) the election of a majority government in Quebec under the banner of the Parti Quebecoism September 1994, and (5) the razor-thin victory for the NO forces in the referendum of October 1995. Whatever the future of Quebec with or without Canada, public support for the Quebec state as a key player in the economic and social realms has not diminished, in spite of the rise of the election of downsizing govern- ments in most Canadian provinces in last few years. The Quebec govern- ment may be giving indications at the present time that it will be following the same trend, but such a goal will be difficult to pursue considering that progressive forces (e.g., labor organizations, popular groups, and women's organizations) supporting the national project want to establish a more equitable economic system and maintain an interventionist state. The stakes around the sovereignty-partnership project clearly reveal that Quebecers are willing to consider their future without the rest of Canada if this means that there would be a societal project with a heart and a political project that builds on civic and democratic values. Our findings make clear that language is not the single factor mobiliz- ing nationalist forces in Quebec. An analysis of social classes is central to understanding gains made by sovereigntists since the referendum of May 1980. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is important to note the growth of nationalist aspirations among all francophone strata and the nonspecial- ized anglophone workers, who are gradually adhering to the nationalist project. Gains have also been made among cultural communities. In sum- mary, there is no doubt that the pursuit of a social democratic project, coupled with economic factors and trust in government, will be central factors in the referendum. ^On the compact theory, one may refer to Robert C. Vipond, Liberty and Community: and the Failure of the Constitution (: State University of New York Press, 1991) and Richard Ares, s.j. La confederation: pacte ou loi? (Montreal: Beliarmin, 1967). MFor convergent historical accounts, see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Ageof Diversity (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and John Conway, Debts to Pay: and Quebec. From the Conquest to the Referendum (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1992). Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021