DOCSLIB.ORG

Conclusion: Artillery As a Result of World War I

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conclusion: Artillery As a Result of World War I 360 Dastrup Chapter 14 Conclusion: Artillery as a Result of World War I Boyd Dastrup Although the artillery was undergoing significant technological changes dur- ing the early years of the 20th century, World War One formed an important watershed. During the war, European armies abandoned direct fire that had been the dominant form of fire direction for centuries, in favor of indirect fire. They also decreased their reliance on light and heavy field artillery and shrap- nel, in favor of heavy artillery and high explosives to destroy the complex trench networks, and turned to motor traction, including the railroad, to give their heavy artillery mobility and to pull heavier artillery than pre-war designs. Notwithstanding the importance of these and other developments, motor traction and indirect fire led the way in forging a new artillery system that was more sophisticated than its pre-war ancestor. In short, the challenges of the war forced armies to modernize their artillery. Changing Weapons and Projectiles Given their emphasis on recently developed flat-trajectory quick-fire field guns (approximately 2,200 pounds) with on-carriage recoil systems – that made older light field artillery without on-carriage recoil systems and heavy field pieces (approximately 4,400 pounds) without on-carriage recoil systems obso- lete – European and American armies envisioned a mobile battlefield on the eve of World War One. Masses of infantry would maneuver with support from light and heavy field artillery with prevailing doctrines emphasizing flanking, enveloping, and annihilating. The French contended that their revolutionary quick-fire M1897 75mm field gun with its high volume of fire rendered light and heavy field artillery outdated and would guarantee unparalleled mobility. The British, meanwhile, relied upon their quick-fire 18-pounder field gun. Unlike the French and British, the Germans, even though they had a quick-fire 77mm field gun, balanced it with light 105mm field howitzers and heavy 155mm howit- zers for counter battery fire.1 1 B.L. Dastrup, The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 44; I.V. Hogg, Allied Artillery of World War One (Ramsbury, Marlborough, UK: The Crowood Press Ltd, 1999), pp. 7–13; M.D. Grice, On Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004307285_015 Conclusion: Artillery as a Result of World War I 361 Generally, European armies started the battle with a field artillery duel and employed their heavy artillery if required. Armies sited their light and heavy field pieces hub-to-hub in defilade for protection from small arms and field artillery fire, and employed observed indirect fire. The winner of the duel would then advance its infantry under the protective cover of shrapnel fire. To help press home the infantry attack, commanders would push their field artil- lery within small arms’ range for direct fire engagements with the enemy. This demonstrated their reluctance to abandon direct fire, a proven fire direction method, for indirect fire, a new fire direction method. If a fortification blocked the advance, European armies would drag their heavy siege artillery, 120mm to 155mm flat-trajectory cannons and 150mm to 210mm curved-trajectory howitzers, forward to batter it into submission. Unlike their contemporaries, the Germans and Austrians had even heavier siege artillery. While the Austrians had a 305mm howitzer, commonly referred to as the ‘Skoda’, the Germans equipped their army with 420mm mortars, 280mm Krupp siege howitzers, and 210mm siege how- itzers for destroying stubborn fortifications.2 Modern technology quickly crushed the dream of a mobile battlefield and altered the role of light and heavy field artillery and heavy artillery. Following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan with its stress upon flanking, enveloping, and annihilating, and the subsequent rush to the sea, the lethality of modern small arms, including machine guns, and light and heavy field artillery, terminated the mobile battlefield and led to trench warfare to protect the armies. This situ- ation forced armies to discard their passion for rifle fire, infantry maneuver, and light and heavy field artillery, and direct fire. In their place they substituted the fire power of heavy artillery, machine guns, tanks, aircraft, and indirect fire to break through the defensive works, with the hopes of restoring mobility.3 As quickly as possible, the French, British, and Germans adapted to the new conditions. Needing heavier artillery than their flat-trajectory 120mm and 150mm siege artillery, the French stripped heavy, cumbersome, and immobile cannons from their fortresses and coastal batteries for employment in the trenches, and even dredged up old black powder heavy artillery from the 1880s. Equally pres- Artillery from the American Civil War to the Dawn of the 21st Century (Charleston, SC: Book- surge Publishing, 2009), pp. 37–40; J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), pp. 211–239, 240–243; B.I. Gudmundsson, On Artillery (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993) pp. 4–7, 12, 17–27; S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire- Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 9–10; P. Strong and S. Marble, Artillery in the Great War (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Military, 2011), pp. 4–6. 2 See footnote 1. 3 J.B.A Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 240–243. .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 16Th Infantry Division 47Th Field Artillery Camp Kearny, California Private John Leslie Banner
    16th Infantry Division 47th Field Artillery Camp Kearny, California Private John Leslie Banner John Leslie Banner, a son of Samuel Banner and Ellen Radford Banner, was born on November 5, 1896 in Upton, Utah. He was the tenth of eleven children in the family of seven girls and four boys. He entered the army on September 3, 1918 and was assigned to Camp Kearny, California where he was training in the field artillery. While training, he became ill with influenza and developed pneumonia. The military contacted his Mother and she traveled to Camp Kearny to be at his side when he died. Just before he died, he told his mother, “Tell the folks not to feel bad. I am one out of thousands”. He died on December 6, 1918. A military funeral was held at Camp Kearny before his body was shipped home. Funeral services were held at the Coalville, Utah cemetery and he was buried there. At the time of his death, he was survived by his parents, four sisters and two brothers: Mary Ellen, Elizabeth Ann, Lydia, Cora Leone, Samuel, and William Henry. He was preceded in death by three sisters and one brother: Frances Alice, Lydia May, Mabel, and Benjamin. During World War I, the 16th Division was renamed the 37th Infantry Division. The formation of another division designated as the 16th Division occurred in 1918 and was stationed at Camp Kearny, California. It never went overseas and it was one of several divisions in WWI that did not select an insignia. The Army has not designated a new division as the 16th since it was demobilized in March 1919..
    [Show full text]
  • Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020 3
    SIPRI Fact Sheet March 2021 TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL KEY FACTS w The volume of international ARMS TRANSFERS, 2020 transfers of major arms in 2016–20 was 0.5 per cent lower than in 2011–15 and 12 per cent pieter d. wezeman, alexandra kuimova and higher than in 2006–10. siemon t. wezeman w The five largest arms exporters in 2016–20 were the The volume of international transfers of major arms in 2016–20 was United States, Russia, France, 0.5 per cent lower than in 2011–15 and 12 per cent higher than in 2006–10 Germany and China. Together, they accounted for 76 per cent of (see figure 1).1 The five largest arms exporters in 2016–20 were the United all exports of major arms in States, Russia, France, Germany and China (see table 1). The five largest 2016–20. arms importers were Saudi Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia and China w In 2016–20 US arms exports (see table 2). Between 2011–15 and 2016–20 there were increases in arms accounted for 37 per cent of the transfers to the Middle East (25 per cent) and to Europe (12 per cent), while global total and were 15 per cent there were decreases in the transfers to Africa (–13 per cent), the Americas higher than in 2011–15. (–43 per cent), and Asia and Oceania (–8.3 per cent). w Russian arms exports From 15 March 2021 SIPRI’s open-access Arms Transfers Database decreased by 22 per cent includes updated data on transfers of major arms for 1950–2020, which between 2011–15 and 2016–20.
    [Show full text]
  • The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2Nd December 1917
    Centre for First World War Studies A Moonlight Massacre: The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd December 1917 by Michael Stephen LoCicero Thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts & Law June 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The Third Battle of Ypres was officially terminated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig with the opening of the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Nevertheless, a comparatively unknown set-piece attack – the only large-scale night operation carried out on the Flanders front during the campaign – was launched twelve days later on 2 December. This thesis, a necessary corrective to published campaign narratives of what has become popularly known as „Passchendaele‟, examines the course of events from the mid-November decision to sanction further offensive activity in the vicinity of Passchendaele village to the barren operational outcome that forced British GHQ to halt the attack within ten hours of Zero. A litany of unfortunate decisions and circumstances contributed to the profitless result.
    [Show full text]
  • The Early Effects of Gunpowder on Fortress Design: a Lasting Impact
    The Early Effects of Gunpowder on Fortress Design: A Lasting Impact MATTHEW BAILEY COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS The introduction of gunpowder did not immediately transform the battlefields of Europe. Designers of fortifications only had to respond to the destructive threats of siege warfare, and witnessing the technical failures of early gunpowder weaponry would hardly have convinced a European magnate to bolster his defenses. This essay follows the advancement of gunpowder tactics in late medieval and early Renaissance Europe. In particular, it focuses on Edward III’s employment of primitive ordnance during the Hundred Years’ War, the role of artillery in the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, and the organizational challenges of effectively implementing gunpowder as late as the end of the fifteenth century. This essay also seeks to illustrate the nature of the development of fortification in response to the emerging threat of gunpowder siege weaponry, including the architectural theories of the early Renaissance Italians, Henry VIII’s English artillery forts of the mid-sixteenth century, and the evolution of the angle bastion. The article concludes with a short discussion of the longevity and lasting relevance of the fortification technologies developed during the late medieval and early Renaissance eras. The castle was an inseparable component of medieval warfare. Since Duke William of Normandy’s 1066 conquest of Anglo-Saxon England, the construction of castles had become the earmark of medieval territorial expansion. These fortifications were not simply stone squares with round towers adorning the corners. Edward I’s massive castle building program in Wales, for example, resulted in fortifications so visually disparate that one might assume they were from different time periods.1 Medieval engineers had built upon castle technology for centuries by 1500, and the introduction of gunpowder weaponry to the battlefields of Europe foreshadowed a revision of the basics of fortress design.
    [Show full text]
  • Gloucestershire Castles
    Gloucestershire Archives Take One Castle Gloucestershire Castles The first castles in Gloucestershire were built soon after the Norman invasion of 1066. After the Battle of Hastings, the Normans had an urgent need to consolidate the land they had conquered and at the same time provide a secure political and military base to control the country. Castles were an ideal way to do this as not only did they secure newly won lands in military terms (acting as bases for troops and supply bases), they also served as a visible reminder to the local population of the ever-present power and threat of force of their new overlords. Early castles were usually one of three types; a ringwork, a motte or a motte & bailey; A Ringwork was a simple oval or circular earthwork formed of a ditch and bank. A motte was an artificially raised earthwork (made by piling up turf and soil) with a flat top on which was built a wooden tower or ‘keep’ and a protective palisade. A motte & bailey was a combination of a motte with a bailey or walled enclosure that usually but not always enclosed the motte. The keep was the strongest and securest part of a castle and was usually the main place of residence of the lord of the castle, although this changed over time. The name has a complex origin and stems from the Middle English term ‘kype’, meaning basket or cask, after the structure of the early keeps (which resembled tubes). The name ‘keep’ was only used from the 1500s onwards and the contemporary medieval term was ‘donjon’ (an apparent French corruption of the Latin dominarium) although turris, turris castri or magna turris (tower, castle tower and great tower respectively) were also used.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theatricality of the Baroque City: M
    THE THEATRICALITY OF THE BAROQUE CITY: M. D. PÖPPELMANN’S ZWINGER AT DRESDEN FOR AUGUSTUS THE STRONG OF SAXONNY PATRICK LYNCH TRINITY HALL CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 1996 MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY DISSERTATION THE HISTORY AND PHILSOPHY OF ARCHITECTURE 1 CONTENTS: Acknowledgements. Preface. 1 Introduction to the topic of theatricality as an aspect of the baroque. i.i The problem of the term baroque. i.ii The problem of theatricality in the histories of baroque architecture: i.ii.a The theatricality of the Frame. i.ii.b The theatricality of Festival. ii The hermeneutics of theatricality: ii.i Hans-Georg Gadamer's formulation of play, symbol and festival as an interpretation of baroque theatricality. 2 The historical situation of the development of the Zwinger. i The European context. ii The local context. 3 The urban situation of the Zwinger. i Barockstadt Dresden. ii Barockstaat Sachsen. 4 A description of the development of the Zwinger. Conclusion: i Festival and the baroque city. A description of the Zwinger in use as it was inaugurated during the wedding celebrations of Augustus III and Marie Josepha von Habsburg, September 1719. ii Theatricality and the city. Bibliography. Illustrations: Volume 2 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I would like to thank D.V. for supervising me in his inimitable way, and Dr. Christopher Padfield (and Trinity Hall) for generous financial support. This dissertation is dedicated to my family and friends, absent or otherwise and to C.M. in particular for first showing me the Zwinger and without whose care this document would not exist. PATRICK LYNCH 09/96 3 'Als ich nach der Augustusbrücke kam, die ich schon so gut aus Kupferstichen und Gemälden kannte, kam es mir vor, als ob ich schon früher einmal in Traum hier gewesen wäre.' (As I came upon the Augustusbrücke, which I knew so well from engravings and paintings, it seemed to me as if I had been here once before, in a dream.) Hans Christian Andersen 'This luscious and impeccable fruit of life Falls, it appears, of its own weight to earth.
    [Show full text]
  • American Armies and Battlefields in Europe
    Chapter v1 THE AMERICAN BATTLEFIELDS NORTH OF PARIS chapter gives brief accounts of areas and to all of the American ceme- all American fighting whi ch oc- teries and monuments. This route is Thiscurred on the battle front north of recommended for those who desire to Paris and complete information concern- make an extended automobile tour in the ing the American military cemeteries and region. Starting from Paris, it can be monuments in that general region. The completely covered in four days, allowing military operations which are treated are plenty of time to stop on the way. those of the American lst, 27th, 30th, The accounts of the different operations 33d, 37th, 80th and 91st Divisions and and the descriptions of the American the 6th and 11 th Engineer Regiments. cemeteries and monuments are given in Because of the great distances apart of the order they are reached when following So uthern Encr ance to cb e St. Quentin Can al Tunnel, Near Bellicourc, October 1, 1918 the areas where this fighting occurred no the suggested route. For tbis reason they itinerary is given. Every operation is do not appear in chronological order. described, however, by a brief account Many American units otber tban those illustrated by a sketch. The account and mentioned in this chapter, sucb as avia- sketch together give sufficient information tion, tank, medical, engineer and infantry, to enable the tourist to plan a trip through served behind this part of the front. Their any particular American combat area. services have not been recorded, however, The general map on the next page as the space limitations of tbis chapter indicates a route wbich takes the tourist required that it be limited to those Amer- either int o or cl ose to all of tbese combat ican organizations which actually engaged (371) 372 THE AMERICAN B ATTLEFIELD S NO R TH O F PARIS Suggested Tour of American Battlefields North of Paris __ Miles Ghent ( î 37th and 91st Divisions, Ypres-Lys '"offensive, October 30-November 11, 1918 \ ( N \ 1 80th Division, Somme 1918 Albert 33d Division.
    [Show full text]
  • Social-Property Relations, Class-Conflict and The
    Historical Materialism 19.4 (2011) 129–168 brill.nl/hima Social-Property Relations, Class-Conflict and the Origins of the US Civil War: Towards a New Social Interpretation* Charles Post City University of New York [email protected] Abstract The origins of the US Civil War have long been a central topic of debate among historians, both Marxist and non-Marxist. John Ashworth’s Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic is a major Marxian contribution to a social interpretation of the US Civil War. However, Ashworth’s claim that the War was the result of sharpening political and ideological – but not social and economic – contradictions and conflicts between slavery and capitalism rests on problematic claims about the rôle of slave-resistance in the dynamics of plantation-slavery, the attitude of Northern manufacturers, artisans, professionals and farmers toward wage-labour, and economic restructuring in the 1840s and 1850s. An alternative social explanation of the US Civil War, rooted in an analysis of the specific path to capitalist social-property relations in the US, locates the War in the growing contradiction between the social requirements of the expanded reproduction of slavery and capitalism in the two decades before the War. Keywords origins of capitalism, US Civil War, bourgeois revolutions, plantation-slavery, agrarian petty- commodity production, independent-household production, merchant-capital, industrial capital The Civil War in the United States has been a major topic of historical debate for almost over 150 years. Three factors have fuelled scholarly fascination with the causes and consequences of the War. First, the Civil War ‘cuts a bloody gash across the whole record’ of ‘the American .
    [Show full text]
  • The Utilization of Artillery and Mortars As Infantry Support Weapons in the Chaco War
    Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 6-1965 The Utilization of Artillery and Mortars as Infantry Support Weapons in the Chaco War Charles John Goodall Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Goodall, Charles John, "The Utilization of Artillery and Mortars as Infantry Support Weapons in the Chaco War" (1965). Master's Theses. 3907. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3907 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE UTILIZATION OF ARTILLERY AND MORTARS AS INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS IN THE CHACO WAR by Charles John Goodall A thesis presented to the Faculty of the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arts Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan June, 1965 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to express his appreciation for the co-operation of the following agencies and research facilities in gathering materials and providing technical advice in the production of this thesis: The University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas. The University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The University of Florida Library, Gainesville, Florida. Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. The University of California Library, Los Angeles, California The United States Army War College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. The United States Army Ordnance School, Ft.
    [Show full text]
  • Dominant Land Forces for 21St Century Warfare
    No. 73 SEPTEMBER 2009 Dominant Land Forces for 21st Century Warfare Edmund J. Degen A National Security Affairs aperP published on occasion by THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY Arlington, Virginia Dominant Land Forces for 21st Century Warfare by Edmund J. Degen The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper, but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 73, September 2009 Dominant Land Forces for 21st Century Warfare by Edmund J. Degen Colonel Edmund J. Degen recently completed the senior service college at the Joint Forces Staff College and moved to the Republic of Korea, where he served as the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) J35, Chief of Future Operations. He is presently the Commander of the 3d Battlefield Coordination Detachment–Korea. He previously served as Special Assistant to General William S.
    [Show full text]
  • Law of Armed Conflict
    Lesson 1 THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Basic knowledge International Committee of the Red Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 19 Avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57 E-mail: [email protected] www.icrc.org Original: English – June 2002 INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT BASIC KNOWLEDGE LESSON 1 [ Slide 2] AIM [ Slide 3] The aim of this lesson is to introduce the topic to the class, covering the following main points: 1. Background: setting the scene. 2. The need for compliance. 3. How the law evolved and its main components. 4. When does the law apply? 5. The basic principles of the law. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE SCENE Today we begin a series of lectures on the law of armed conflict, which is also known as the law of war, international humanitarian law, or simply IHL. To begin, I’d like to take a guess at what you’re thinking right now. Some of you are probably thinking that this is an ideal opportunity to catch up on some well-earned rest. “Thank goodness I’m not on the assault course or on manoeuvres. This is absolutely marvellous. I can switch off and let this instructor ramble on for 45 minutes. I know all about the Geneva Conventions anyway – the law is part of my culture and our military traditions. I really don't need to listen to all this legal ‘mumbo jumbo’.” The more sceptical and cynical among you might well be thinking along the lines of a very famous orator of ancient Rome – Cicero.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain Peter Dombrowski
    Naval War College Review Volume 67 Article 7 Number 2 Spring 2014 Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain Peter Dombrowski Chris C. Demchak Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Dombrowski, Peter and Demchak, Chris C. (2014) "Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 2 , Article 7. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dombrowski and Demchak: Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain CYBER WAR, CYBERED CONFLICT, AND THE MARITIME DOMAIN Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak t has been well over a decade since the first “prophets” of information warfare proclaimed a new age of conflict fought not just on air, sea, and land but with 1 Ielectrons in what came to be known as “cyberspace�” Since these early predic- tions, many incidents have confirmed that criminals, random hackers, and government-sanctioned specialists can wreak havoc on governments, military communications systems, and corporations� The Stuxnet worm alone helped delay—by months, perhaps years—the long-standing efforts of Iran to acquire sufficient nuclear material to build nuclear weapons�2 Recent
    [Show full text]