360 Dastrup Chapter 14 Conclusion: Artillery as a Result of World War I Boyd Dastrup Although the artillery was undergoing significant technological changes dur- ing the early years of the 20th century, World War One formed an important watershed. During the war, European armies abandoned direct fire that had been the dominant form of fire direction for centuries, in favor of indirect fire. They also decreased their reliance on light and heavy field artillery and shrap- nel, in favor of heavy artillery and high explosives to destroy the complex trench networks, and turned to motor traction, including the railroad, to give their heavy artillery mobility and to pull heavier artillery than pre-war designs. Notwithstanding the importance of these and other developments, motor traction and indirect fire led the way in forging a new artillery system that was more sophisticated than its pre-war ancestor. In short, the challenges of the war forced armies to modernize their artillery. Changing Weapons and Projectiles Given their emphasis on recently developed flat-trajectory quick-fire field guns (approximately 2,200 pounds) with on-carriage recoil systems – that made older light field artillery without on-carriage recoil systems and heavy field pieces (approximately 4,400 pounds) without on-carriage recoil systems obso- lete – European and American armies envisioned a mobile battlefield on the eve of World War One. Masses of infantry would maneuver with support from light and heavy field artillery with prevailing doctrines emphasizing flanking, enveloping, and annihilating. The French contended that their revolutionary quick-fire M1897 75mm field gun with its high volume of fire rendered light and heavy field artillery outdated and would guarantee unparalleled mobility. The British, meanwhile, relied upon their quick-fire 18-pounder field gun. Unlike the French and British, the Germans, even though they had a quick-fire 77mm field gun, balanced it with light 105mm field howitzers and heavy 155mm howit- zers for counter battery fire.1 1 B.L. Dastrup, The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 44; I.V. Hogg, Allied Artillery of World War One (Ramsbury, Marlborough, UK: The Crowood Press Ltd, 1999), pp. 7–13; M.D. Grice, On Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004307285_015 Conclusion: Artillery as a Result of World War I 361 Generally, European armies started the battle with a field artillery duel and employed their heavy artillery if required. Armies sited their light and heavy field pieces hub-to-hub in defilade for protection from small arms and field artillery fire, and employed observed indirect fire. The winner of the duel would then advance its infantry under the protective cover of shrapnel fire. To help press home the infantry attack, commanders would push their field artil- lery within small arms’ range for direct fire engagements with the enemy. This demonstrated their reluctance to abandon direct fire, a proven fire direction method, for indirect fire, a new fire direction method. If a fortification blocked the advance, European armies would drag their heavy siege artillery, 120mm to 155mm flat-trajectory cannons and 150mm to 210mm curved-trajectory howitzers, forward to batter it into submission. Unlike their contemporaries, the Germans and Austrians had even heavier siege artillery. While the Austrians had a 305mm howitzer, commonly referred to as the ‘Skoda’, the Germans equipped their army with 420mm mortars, 280mm Krupp siege howitzers, and 210mm siege how- itzers for destroying stubborn fortifications.2 Modern technology quickly crushed the dream of a mobile battlefield and altered the role of light and heavy field artillery and heavy artillery. Following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan with its stress upon flanking, enveloping, and annihilating, and the subsequent rush to the sea, the lethality of modern small arms, including machine guns, and light and heavy field artillery, terminated the mobile battlefield and led to trench warfare to protect the armies. This situ- ation forced armies to discard their passion for rifle fire, infantry maneuver, and light and heavy field artillery, and direct fire. In their place they substituted the fire power of heavy artillery, machine guns, tanks, aircraft, and indirect fire to break through the defensive works, with the hopes of restoring mobility.3 As quickly as possible, the French, British, and Germans adapted to the new conditions. Needing heavier artillery than their flat-trajectory 120mm and 150mm siege artillery, the French stripped heavy, cumbersome, and immobile cannons from their fortresses and coastal batteries for employment in the trenches, and even dredged up old black powder heavy artillery from the 1880s. Equally pres- Artillery from the American Civil War to the Dawn of the 21st Century (Charleston, SC: Book- surge Publishing, 2009), pp. 37–40; J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), pp. 211–239, 240–243; B.I. Gudmundsson, On Artillery (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993) pp. 4–7, 12, 17–27; S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire- Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 9–10; P. Strong and S. Marble, Artillery in the Great War (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Military, 2011), pp. 4–6. 2 See footnote 1. 3 J.B.A Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 240–243. .