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Zambia, a 'Christian Nation'

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Zambia, a 'Christian Nation' International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 6, No. 7; July 2016 Zambia, a ‘Christian nation’ in Post Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) Era, 2011-2016 Austin M. Cheyeka Department of Religious Studies University of Zambia P. O. Box 32379, Lusaka Zambia Abstract The declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation in 1991 has become a field of research because of its many faces, the interpretations it has accrued which generate debate and things it has spawned; numerous Pentecostal churches and political parties with the ‘Christian’ name tag. What is more, it has given birth to organizations such as ‘Christian Nation Coalition’, ‘Christian Nation Foundation’ and most significant, a national chapel (House of Prayer for All Nations Tabernacle) yet to be constructed in the capital city next to State house where the declaration occurred. In this article I extend my research on the Christian nation rhetoric beyond Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) era, by examining its status during the Patriotic Front rule from 2011 to 2016, before the August 11, 2016 general elections. In 2011 the party of the president who declared Zambia a Christian nation lost power to a new party of Mr. Michael Chilufya Sata, a staunch Catholic, who, after his demise, was succeeded by Edgar Chagwa Lungu of unknown religious or denominational affiliation. I argue in the article that while Sata hardly used the Christian nation rhetoric, Lungu made the most of it during his campaign thereby revitalizing the Christian nation fervor and prompting some Pentecostal big men and women to rally around him. My stark conclusion is that: Lung perceptively reconfigured the Christian nation rhetoric for political mileage. His main opponent in the 2016 presidential race was rumored to be a Satanist – a most dreaded being among Christians, especially Pentecostals in Zambia. Key Words: Michael Sata, Edgar Lungu, Christian nation, Patriotic Front, Pentecostals, Pentecostal big men, Movement for Multiparty Democracy, Levy Mwanawasa, Rupiah Banda, and Frederick Chiluba Introduction The declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation remains a topical issue; it is not sterile yet. Just as one is led backward in time in search of its origins, so one may follow its subsequent developments. Consequently, the declaration has interested a number of researchers within and outside Zambia because, to borrow Paul Freston’s characterization, “Zambia is a laboratory for studying some typical tendencies in a certain kind of evangelical politics in action in highly favorable circumstances” (Freston, 2001: 154). This article is an outgrowth of my earlier works on the declaration in which I have addressed it as part of the bigger project of the Pentecostalisation of the Zambian citizenry and the politics of the nation. My intention in this particular article is to shed light on the post MMD era, 2011-2016, by providing an understanding of how the Patriotic Front (PF) that took power off the MMD in 2011 election interacted with the declaration and how the two PF heads of state related with Pentecostal big men to whom the declaration had come to symbolize some form of theocracy. There is a very strong personal and subjective aspect to my essay, as there is, perhaps, for all those who have engaged the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation. In my case, I am influenced by the social teaching of the Catholic Church to which I belong. I agree with Paul Gifford, an authority on African Christianity, the view that Christianity in Africa has to make social justice a priority. Christian nation rhetoric enslaves and there are examples of this now and in the past on the continent. I give some attention to this scenario in the next section of the article. 159 ISSN 2220-8488 (Print), 2221-0989 (Online) ©Center for Promoting Ideas, USA www.ijhssnet.com Christian Nation Rhetoric The starting point for this article can be no other than a retracing of the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation and contextualizing ‘Christian nation’ rhetoric. How Zambia became a ‘Christian nation’ is not nearly as important as what Zambia became. As a result of the State House covenant, the Zambian people became God’s immediate subjects and constituted a unique nation in the world –“a nation in which both population and government, including the President, is under full submission to the Lord Jesus Christ. A country that God could use to influence the world in a mighty way” (Schoots, 1995). However, impression should not have been and should not be created that Zambia is the first country to have been proclaimed ‘Christian nation’ in Africa, because, Liberia declared its Christian status from its creation as a settlement of former slaves, although, according to Jenkins (2011: 188), the religion was used to justify the gross corruption of the nation’s political elite, and the oppression of the native country people. In post-William Tolbert’s rule when Samuel Doe ruled Liberia (1986-1990), Christianity was equally abused for selfish ends. In his book on Samuel Doe, Gifford (1993: 145)argued that Liberian Christianity, became a veritable tool of domination, dehumanization and inequality because: Liberia’s evangelical Christianity served to divert attention from the social system which so dehumanized Liberians. This Christianity left Doe totally unchallenged in his greed, criminal negligence and mismanagement. It ignored injustice, paid no attention to abuses, and undermined any commitment to transform society. Moreover, it openly denounced as a perversion any form of Christianity that tried to address Liberia’s iniquitous social system (Gifford, 1993: 145).In 1991, in Southern Africa, the second Republican President of Zambia, Mr. Frederick Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian nation and made it part of the Constitution in 1996. Hitherto, because of the complex religious make up of Zambia, the first President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda (1964- 1991), son of a Presbyterian, had been cautious about speaking of Zambia explicitly as a Christian society. He often repeated that Zambia was home to different religions and he would not declare one of them as a state religion. One conclusion about Chiluba’s declaration is that it was a ploy to persuade Zambians to be obedient to the self- proclaimed messiah, Chiluba himself, in line with the thirteenth chapter of Paul’s letter to the Romans (Cheyeka, 2014b). In Chiluba’s design, the Church nation instituted at State House was meant to rid the nation of corruption and prosper the country (Cheyeka, 2002) and to that effect, Vice President then, Brigadier General Miyanda urged citizens to “have a Christian orientation in all fields, at all levels” (Jenkins, 2011: 187). The proposed ‘orientation’ also meant submission to the Christian state, which, according to Jenkins (2011: 187) had the potential to easily turn into willful refusal to acknowledge the flaws of the regime, and to connive at official corruption. When Pentecostal big men kept a resounding silence over Chiluba’s corrupt practices, Pastor Nevers Mumba decided to break that silence in 1997 by berating lack of morality and integrity in politics and went on to form a political party to challenge the Chiluba’s regime which had become palpably corrupt. Mumba’s claim that he aimed at bringing morality and integrity to politics did not and has not gone unchallenged. Freston (2001) called it a ploy to succeed Chilubain 2001, by which year he would have served his two terms. This was after efforts to earn co- option into government by issuing statements and writing in private newspapers about corruption in the country failed (Cheyeka, 2014a).It is now common knowledge in Zambia that despite championing democracy through the MMD and removing Kenneth Kaunda and his one party participatory democracy, Chiluba did not necessarily share the concern for democracy, constitutionalism, and Christian ethics. This became clearly manifest when he became one of the first presidents to open a new era of “Third Term” democracy in Africa.I will immediately turn to the end of the MMD era only briefly though, to set the scene for the entry of the PF. The end of the MMD era The untimely death of President Levy Mwanawasa on 19 August 2008 left the MMD saddled by an unpopular man, Rupiah Bwezani Banda (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2009). Although he narrowly won the 2008 election, he was defeated by Satain 2011.Following the developmental projects of Sata that almost bankrupted the country, ordinary Zambians asked: ‘what did the MMD do in the 20 years it was in power?’ Andrew Sardanis made a damning summary of Chiluba’s reign in the following statement: “One can only conclude that the Chiluba administration from 1991 to 2001 was a wasted decade. …” (Sardanis, 2014: 147). This Zambianist view should not blithely be dismissed. Zambians immensely experienced the negative effects of privatization, obscene corruption, and decay of infrastructure in the two decades of the MMD. 160 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 6, No. 7; July 2016 As a Thatcherite (as he claimed), Chiluba liberalized the economy, privatized state owned companies and actually killed the middle class, and sold local councils’ houses to sitting tenants. He is therefore credited for having re- introduced Capitalism in the country and providing homes to some citizens. His policies and actions also unleashed a spirit of entrepreneurship in the citizens. Unfortunately, Chiluba ended up being tried in courts of Law for plundering of Zambian resources. See, e.g., Jan Kees van Donge, (2009: 69-90) and Scott D. Taylor, (2006, 281-301)for what Chiluba still stands accused of having done even in his death. That should be adequate on Chiluba. I turn to the man who took over power from the party,Sata. I jump the period of Mr.
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