Ethnic and Religious Intergenerational Mobility in Africa∗

Ethnic and Religious Intergenerational Mobility in Africa∗ Alberto Alesina Sebastian Hohmann Harvard University, CEPR and NBER London Business School Stelios Michalopoulos Elias Papaioannou Brown University, CEPR and NBER London Business School and CEPR September 27, 2018 Abstract We investigate the evolution of inequality and intergenerational mobility in educational attainment across ethnic and religious lines in Africa. Using census data covering more than 70 million people in 19 countries we document the following regularities. (1) There are large differences in intergenerational mobility both across and within countries across cultural groups. Most broadly, Christians are more mobile than Muslims who are more mobile than people following traditional religions. (2) The average country-wide education level of the group in the generation of individuals' parents is a strong predictor of group- level mobility in that more mobile groups also were previously more educated. This holds both across religions and ethnicities, within ethnicities controlling for religion and vice versa, as well as for two individuals from different groups growing up in the same region within a country. (3) Considering a range of variables, we find some evidence that mobility correlates negatively with discrimination in the political arena post indepdence, and that mobility is higher for groups that historically derived most of their subsistence from agriculture as opposed to pastoralism. Keywords: Africa, Development, Education, Inequality, Intergenerational Mobility. JEL Numbers. N00, N9, O10, O43, O55 ∗Alberto Alesina Harvard Univerity and IGIER Bocconi, Sebatian Hohmnn , London Busienss Schoiol, Stelios Michalopoulos. Brown University, Elias Papaioannou. London Business School. We thank Remi Jedwab and Adam Storeygard for sharing their data on colonial roads and railroads in Africa, Julia Cagéand Valeria Rueda for sharing their data on protestant missions, and Nathan Nunn for sharing his data on Catholic and Protestant missions. We would like to thank for their comments conference participants at the university of Zurich and Oriana Bandiera for her insightful discussion. 1 1 Introduction Many argue that Africa's poor post-independence performance is due to the salience of ethnicity (Bates (2005), Dowden (2009)). A plethora of case-studies suggest that African politics are characterized by ethnic patronage and favoritism (e.g., Posner (2005). Many ethnic groups face repression and exclusion from national politics and most of Africa's civil wars have an explicit ethnic dimension Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009)). Ethnic tensions also arise because small minorities exert significant influence on the economy and have sizable power on national politics (Chua (2004) and Robinson (2001)). In an influential study, Easterly and Levine (1997) argued that ethno-linguistic fractionalization can explain African miserable economic performance in its initial post-independence decades. At the same time, religious differences { that often follow ethnic lines { seem to be large leading to widespread religious tensions. Politics in the Sahel (Nigeria, Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger) are centered around predominantly Muslim Northern regions and mostly Christian Southern areas. Religious differences seem to also play a role in North Africa (Egypt, Morocco), as well as in Ethiopia and parts of East Africa. In this paper, we move beyond case studies and anecdotal evidence and provide the first comprehensive analysis of ethnic and religious differences in education { a variable that cap- tures both individual living standards and public goods. Using census data from 19 countries comprising close to 70 million individual records from all parts of the continent, we provide new statistics of intergenerational mobility in educational attainment. The analysis reveals large differences in social mobility across ethnic and religious lines both across and within countries. We then explore the correlates of the large gaps in educational opportunity across ethnic and religious groups, showing that initial differences in education correlate strongly with social mobility, though there is notable cross-country heterogeneity on inertia. 1.1 Results Overview In the first part of the paper (Section 3), we use census data from 18 and 14 African countries { the two numbers refer to the number of countries for which we have religion and ethnicity data respectively { and construct measures of educational opportunity across 171 ethnic groups and the main religions (Islam, traditional African religions, Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christians). Building on recent works in the United States (Chetty et al. (2014), Chetty and Hendren (2018a), Chetty and Hendren (2018b), Card, Domnisoru, and Taylor (2018), we measure opportunity as the likelihood that children whose parents do not have any formal education manage to complete at least primary education (intergenerational mobility in education). We also draw distinctions by gender and rural-urban household status. The descriptive patterns reveal stark differences in social mobility across ethnic and religious groups. For example, in Ghana the likelihood that children from illiterate parents will manage to complete at least primary schooling is on average 62.5%; for the Akan (Ashante) that dominate national politics the likelihood is 76.5%, while the for the Gurma it is only 45.5%. In Sierra Leone, 60% of Krio (Creole) children, whose parents do not have any schooling, 2 manage to complete primary education (or higher), but the analogous likelihood for the Ko- ranko is just 18%. Religious differences in educational opportunity appear also pervasive. In almost all countries, educational opportunity for Christians is higher than of Muslims and for Africans of traditional faiths. The differences are large. For example in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, the likelihood that children of parents without any education manage to complete at least primary schooling is around 75% for Christians and juts 18% for those adhering to traditional religions. In Senegal, educational intergenerational mobility is 43% for Catholics and just 15.6% for Muslims. In the second part (Section 4), we establish a strong positive association between the share the old generation with at least primary schooling (we refer informally to these individuals as \literate" throughout the paper) and upward mobility across ethnic and religious lines. Children of relatively more educated ethnicities and religions have a higher likelihood of ex- iting family illiteracy. Moreover, children whose parents have completed primary (or higher) schooling face a lower likelihood of downward intergenerational mobility (not complete primary schooling) if they come from relatively more educated ethnic and religious groups. These patterns apply for both urban and rural households, though the ethnicity-religion education and social mobility nexus is stronger among rural households. These associations are also present for boys and girls. There is, however, non-negligible variation on the link between ethnic (and religious) education (of the \old") and social mobility (of the young). On the one hand, in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali, there are strong ethnic and religious inertia. Children of illiterate parents of ethnic groups without much education face a much lower chance to complete primary schooling compared to children of illiterate parents who come from more educated ethnic and religious groups. On the other hand, in South Africa and in Botswana the association between ethnic-religious literacy of the old and the likelihood that kids of parents without any education manage to complete primary schooling is much attenuated or non-existent. In the third part (Section 5), we explore the correlates of educational intergenerational mobility across ethnicities in an effort to document some stylized facts. We start our corre- lational analysis with the Ethnic Power Relations database (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009)), that provides proxies of ethnicities' role in national politics based on experts' subjective assessments. Educational mobility correlates significantly (negatively) with ethnic discrimination and appears higher for ethnicities that dominate national politics. However, the associations are often weak, suggesting that more quantitative work (like ours) needs to complement subjective proxies. We then examine the role of deeply-rooted ethnic features that earlier works suggest may influence development (see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2018) for an overview of recent research on the historical origins of African development); among others, we examine the correlation of educational intergenerational mobility with polygyny (Fenske (2015)), political centralization (Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013)), the subsistence level of precolonial economies (Michalopoulos, Putter- man, and Weil (2016)), slavery (Nunn (2008)), and ethnic partitioning (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016)). The analysis shows that social mobility is higher for ethnicities that 3 derived a larger share of their subsistence from agriculture in the pre-colonial era and lower for mostly pastoralist groups. Interestingly, this result applies not only for rural but also for urban households. When we distinguish by gender we also uncover that educational intergenerational mobility is significantly higher in patrilineal societies and ethnicities that practice bride price.

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