The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48 Author(s): Melvyn P. Leffler Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 346-381 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1862556 . Accessed: 06/01/2012 04:13

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http://www.jstor.org AHR Forum The AmericanConception of NationalSecurity and the Beginningsof theCold War, 1945-48

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

IN AN INTERVIEW with Henry Kissingerin 1978 on "The Lessons of the Past," WalterLaqueur observedthat during World War II "fewif any people thought... of the structureof peace that would followthe war except perhaps in the most general termsof friendship,mutual trust,and the other noble sentimentsmen- tioned in wartimeprogrammatic speeches about the United Nations and related topics." Kissingerconcurred, noting that no statesman,except perhaps Winston Churchill,"gave any attentionto what would happen afterthe war." Americans, Kissingerstressed, "were determined that we were goingto base the postwarperiod on good faithand gettingalong witheverybody."' That two such astuteand knowledgeableobservers of internationalpolitics were so uninformedabout Americanplanning at the end of the Second World War is testimonyto the enduringmythology of Americanidealism and innocencein the worldof Realpolitik.It also reflectsthe stateof scholarshipon the interrelatedareas of strategy,economy, and diplomacy.Despite the publicationof severalexcellent overviewsof the origins of the Cold War,2despite the outpouringof incisive monographson Americanforeign policy in manyareas of the world,3and despite

Researchon thisarticle was made possibleby generoussupport from the WoodrowWilson International Center,the Councilon ForeignRelations, the HarryS. Truman Institute,and the VanderbiltUniversity ResearchCouncil. The authorwishes to expresshis gratitudefor the incisivecomments and constructive criticismof Samuel Walker,Michael Hogan, WalterLaFeber, Thomas G. Paterson,Charles Eagles, Cecilia Stiles,Eduard Mark, Robert Pollard, Rajon Menon,Ernest May, and AndrewGoodpaster. Special thanks go to David Rosenbergfor his unceasingefforts to declassifydocuments pertaining to atomicstrategy. ' Kissinger,For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 (Boston, 1980), 123-24. 2 For recentoverviews of the originsof the Cold War,which seek to go beyondthe heatedtraditionalist- revisionistcontroversies of the 1960sand early1970s, see, for example,John L. Gaddis,The United States and the Originsof the Cold War (New York, 1972); Daniel Yergin,Shattered Peace: TheOrigins of the Cold War and the NationalSecurity State (Boston, 1978); Thomas G. Paterson,On EveryFront: The Making of the Cold War (New York,1979); and RoyDouglas, From War to Cold War, 1942-48 (New York,1981). 3 For some of the mostimportant and mostrecent regional and bilateralstudies, see, forexample, Bruce Kuniholm,The Origins of the Cold War in theNear East: GreatPower Conflict and Diplomacyin Iran,Turkey, and Greece(Princeton, 1980); LawrenceS. Wittner,American Intervention in Greece (New York,1982); AaronMiller, Searchfor Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980);Michael B. Stoff,Oil, War, and American Security: The Searchfor a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-47 (New Haven,1980); TimothyIreland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, 346 TheAmerican Conception of National Security 347 some first-ratestudies on the evolution of strategicthinking and the defense establishment,4no comprehensiveaccount yet exists of how American defense officialsdefined national security interests in the aftermathof World War II. Until recently,the absence of such a studywas understandable,for scholars had limited access to records pertaining to national security,strategic thinking, and war planning.But in recentyears documents relating to the earlyyears of the Cold War have been declassifiedin massivenumbers.5

Conn., 1981); William W. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation:American Policy tozward China and Korea (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol: American Foreign Policy, t.he Cold War, and Korea, 1945-50 (Kent, Ohio, 1981); DorothyBorg and Waldo Heinrichs,eds., UncertainYears: Chinese-American Relatio , 194 7-50 (New York, 1980); Robert J. McMahon, Colonialismand Cold War: The UnitedStates and the Strugglefor IndonesianIndependence (Ithaca, N.Y., 1981); Robert M. Blum, Drawing theLine: The Origin of the AmericanContainment Policy in East Asia (New York, 1982); Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-AmericanRelations in Asia, 1945-1954 (Norman, Okla., 1981); Bruce Cumings, The Originsof the Korean War: Liberationand theEmergence of SeparateRegimes, 1945-47 (Princeton, 1982); Geir Lundestaad, America,Scandanavia, and theCold War, 1945-49 (New York, 1980); Kenneth Ray Bain, March toZion: UnitedStates Foreign Policy and theFounding of Israel (College Station, Texas, 1979); Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine:flow the U.S. Came to RecognizeIsrael (Stanford, 1979); Robert M. Hathaway, AmbiguousPartnership: Britain and America,1944-47 (New York, 1981); Ierry H. Anderson, The UnitedStates, Great Bnrtain, and theCold War, 1944-47 (Columbia, Mo., 1981); Edtard Mark, "AmericanPolicy toward Eastern Europe and the Originsof the Cold War, 1941-46: An Alternative Interpretation,"JournalofAmerican History [hereafter,JAHM, 68 (1981-82): 313-36; MichaelSchaller, "Securing the GreatCrescent: Occupied Japan and the Originsof Containmentin SoutheastAsia," ibid., 69 (1982-83): 392-414; ScottJackson, "Prologue to theMarshall Plan," ibid., 65 (1978-79): 1043-68; and MichaelJ. Hogan, "The Searchfor a 'CreativePeace': The UnitedStates, European Unity, and theOrigins of theMarshall Plan," DiplomaticHistory, 6 (1982): 267-85. 4 For recentworks on strategy,the nationalmilitary establishment, and the emergenceof the national securitybureaucracy, see, for example, Richard Haynes, The AwesomePower: HarryS. Trumanas Commanderin Chief(Baton Rouge,La., 1973); AlfredD. Sander,"Truman and the NationalSecurity Council, 1945-1947," JAH, 59 (1972-73): 369-88; Michael S. Sherry,Preparing for theNext War: AmericanPlans for PostwarDefense, 1941-45 (New Haven, 1977); Brian L. Villa,"The U.S. Army,Unconditional Surrender, and the Potsdam Declaration,"JAH,63 (1976-77): 66-92; JamesF. Schnaebel,The Historvof theJoint Chiefs of Staff: TheJoint Chiefs ofStaff and NationalPolicy, volume 1: 1945-1947 (Wilmington,Del., 1979); Kenneth W. Condit, The Historyof the JointChiefs of Staff:The JointChiefs of Staffand National Policy,volume 2: 1947-49 (Wilmington, Del., 1979); Gregg Herken, The WinningWeapon: The AtomicBomb and theCold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980); David Alan Rosenberg,"American Atomic Strategy and the HydrogenBomb Decision,"JAH, 66 (1979-80): 62-87; Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat:Strategic Air Power and Containmentbefore Korea (Westport,Conn., 1982); Mark Stoler,"From Continentalismto Globalism:General StanleyD. Embick,the JointStrategic Survey Committee,and the MilitaryView of AmericanNational Policy during the Second WorldWar," Diplomatic History,6 (1982): 303-21; WalterS. Poole,"From Conciliation to Containment:The JointChiefs of Staffand theComing of theCold War,"Military Affairs, 42 (1978): 12-16; Thomas H. Etzold,"The Far Eastin American Strategy, 1948-1951," in Etzold, ed., Aspectsof Sino-AmericanRelations since 1784 (New York, 1978), 102-26; Paolo E. Coletta, The UnitedStates Navy and DefenseUnification, 1947-1953 (East Brunswick,N.J., 1981); Douglas Kinnard,The Secretary of Defense (Lexington, Ky., 1980); Anna K. Nelson,"National SecuLrity I: Inventinga Process,1945-1960," in Hugh Heclo and Lester M. Salamon,eds., The Illusionof PresidentialGovernment (Boulder,Col., 1981),229-45; LarryD. O'Brien,"National Security and the New Warfare:Defense Policy, War Planning,and NuclearWeapons, 1945-50" (Ph.D. dissertation,Ohio State University,1981); john T. Greenwood,"The Emergenceof thePost-War Strategic Air Force,1945-1955," paper delivered at theEighth MilitaryHistory Symposium, held at the UnitedStates Air Force Academyin October1978; and RobertF. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts,Doctrine: A Historyof Basic Thinkingin theUnited States Air Force,1907-1964 (Maxwell Air ForceBase, Ala., 1971). 5 For the recordsof the JointChiefs of Staff,see Record Group 218, NationalArchives, Washington (hereafter,RG 218); forthe records of theOffice of theSecretary of Defense,see RecordGroup 330, National Archives,Washington (hereafter, RG 330); and, forthe recordsof the NationalSecurity Council, see Record Group273, Judicial, Fiscal, and SocialBranch, National Archives, Washington. (I used thisspecial collection of declassifiedNational Security Council documents prior to theirreceiving a recordgroup number within the Judicial,Fiscal, and Social Branchof the NationalArchives.) There are importantNational Security Council materialsin the HarryS. Truman Papers,President's Secretary's File, Harry S. TrumanPresidential Library, IndependenceMissouri (hereafter, HTL, HSTP, PSF), boxes 191-208. For assessmentsby the CIA, including thoseprepared for meetings of theNational Security Council (NSC), especiallysee ibid.,boxes 249-60, 203-07. For a helpfulguide to War and Armydepartment records in the NationalArchives, see Louis Galambos,ed., 348 AHR Forum

This documentationnow makes it possible to analyze in greater depth the perceptions,apprehensions, and objectivesof those defense officialsmost con- cerned withdefining and defendingthe nation'ssecurity and strategicinterests.6 This essayseeks neitherto explain the processof decisionmaking on any particular issue nor to dissectthe domesticpolitical considerations and fiscalconstraints that narrowedthe optionsavailable to policymakers. Furthermore, it does not pretend to discernthe mnotivationsand objectivesof the SovietUnion.7 Rather, the goal here is to elucidatethe fundamentalstrategic and economicconsiderations that shaped the definitionof Americannational security interests in the postwarworld. Several of these considerations-especiallyas they related to overseas bases, air transit rights,and a strategicsphere of influencein Latin America-initiallywere the logical result of technologicaldevelopments and geostrategicexperiences rather than directlyrelated to postwarSoviet behavior.8But American defense officials

The Papers ofDwight David Eisenihower,9 vols. (Baltimore, 1970-78), 9: 2262-70. Of greatestutility in studying the views of civilianiand militaryplanners in the Army and War Department are Record Group 165, Records of the Operations Division (OPD), and Records of American-BritishConversations (ABC); Record Group 319, Records of the Plans and Operations Division (P&O); Record Group 107, Records of the Officeof the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson Papers (RPPP), safe file and general decimal file,and Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretary of War, Howard C. Peterson Papers (HCPP), classifieddecimial file; and Record Group 335, Records of the Under-Secretary of the Army, Draper/Voorhees files, 1947-50. The records of the navy's StrategicPlans Division (SPD) and the Politico-MilitaryDivision (PMD) are divided into many subseries; helpful indexes are available at the Naval Historical Center (NHC). The center also contains, among many other collections,the records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO, double zero files) as well as the mantuscriptcollections of many influentialnaval officers,inicluding Chester Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Louis Denfeld, and Arthur Radford. For air force records, I tried-with only moderate success-to use the following materialsat the National Archives: Record Group 107, Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretary of War for Air, Plans, Policies, and Agreements, 1943-47; Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretary of War for Air, Establishmentof Air Fields and Air Bases, 1940-45; and Incoming and Outgoing Cablegrams, 1942-47; and Record Group 18, Records of the Officeof the Chief of Air Staff,Headquarters Army Air Forces: Officeof the Air AdjutanitGeneral, confidentialand secret decimal correspondence file, 1945-48. For the records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its successor, the State-Army-Navy-AirForce Coordinating Committee, see Record Group 353, National Archives, Washington, and, for the important records of the Committee of Three (meetings of the secretaries of state, war, and navy), see Record Group 107, RPPP, safe file. 6 I use the termn"defense officials"broadly in this essay to include civilianappointees and militaryofficers in the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in the officeof the secretaryof defense, in the armed services, in the intelligence agencies, and on the staffof the National Security Council. While purposefully avoiding a systematicanalysis of career diplomats in the Department of State, who have received much attention elsewhere, the conclusionis I draw here are based oIi a consideration of the views of high-ranking officialsin the State Department, including James F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, and Robert Lovett. For an excellent analysis of the views of career diplomats, see Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacyof Silence: The AmericanForeign Service,the Soviet Union, anld the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980). Also see, for example, Robert L. Messer, "Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternatives to Containment, 1945-1946," DiplomaticHistory, 1 (1977): 297-319; and W. W. Rostow, The Divisionof Europe after WorldWar II: 1946 (Austin, Texas, 1981). Many of the references in note 3 deal extensivelywith the views of State Department officials;see pages 346-47, above. 7For recent studies of Soviet policy during this era, see, for example, Adam Ulam, The Rivals: Americaand Russia sinceWorld War II (New York, 1971), 3-151, and Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York, 1973), 604-99; William Zimmerman, "Choices in the Postwar World, 1: Containment and the Soviet Union," in Charles Gati, ed., Caging theBear: Containmentanid the Cold War (Indianapolis, 1974), 85-108; Vojtech Mastny,Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York, 1979); William 0. McCagg, Stalin Embattled,1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978); William Taubman, Stalin's AmericanPolicy: From Ententeto Detenteto Cold War (New York, 1982); Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Policies: The Fall of Zmd anov and the Defeat of Moderation(Ithaca, N.Y., 1982); and Alvin Z. Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy since WorldWar II: Imperialand Global (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 2-70. 8 Any assessment of postwar national securitypolicy must also take note of the role of the atomic bomb in U.S. strategyand diplomacy. But, since nuclear weapons have received extensive attention elsewhere, I deal with this issuLe rather briefly; see pages 371-72, below. For excellent work on the atomic bomb, see, for TheAmerican Conception of National Security 349 also considered the preservationof a favorablebalance of power in Eurasia as fundamentalto U.S. nationalsecurity. This objectiveimpelled defense analysts and intelligenceofficers to appraise and reappraisethe intentionsand capabilitiesof the SovietUnion. Rathermodest estimates of the Soviets'ability to wage war againstthe United Statesgenerated the widespreadassumption that the Sovietswould refrain frommilitary aggression and seek to avoid war. Nevertheless,American defense officialsremained greatlypreoccupied with the geopoliticalbalance of power in Europe and Asia, because thatbalance seemed endangeredby communistexploita- tion of postwar economic dislocation and social and political unrest. Indeed, Americanassessments of the Soviet threatwere less a consequence of expanding Soviet militarycapabilities and of Soviet diplomatic demands than a result of growingapprehension about the vulnerabilityof Americanstrategic and economic interestsin a world of unprecedented turmoiland upheaval. Viewed from this perspective,the Cold War assumed many of its most enduring characteristics during 1947-48, when American officialssought to cope with an array of challengesby implementingtheir own conceptsof nationalsecurity.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS FIRST BEGAN to think seriouslyabout the nation's postwar securityduring 1943-44. Militaryplanners devised elaborateplans foran overseas base system.Many of these plans explicitlycontemplated the breakdownof the wartimecoalition. But, even when strategicplanners postulated good postwar relationsamong the Allies,their plans called foran extensivesystem of bases. These bases were defined as the nation's strategicfrontier. Beyond this frontierthe United States would be able to use force to counter any threatsor frustrateany overtacts of aggression.Within the strategicfrontier, American military predom- inance had to remain inviolate.Although plans for an overseas base systemwent throughmany revisions,they always presupposed American hegemonyover the Atlanticand Pacificoceans. These plans receivedPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt's endorsementin early 1944. Afterhis death, army and navy planners presented theirviews to PresidentHarry S. Truman, and Army Chief of StaffGeorge C. Marshalldiscussed them extensivelywith Secretary of StateJames C. Byrnes.9 example, MartinJ. Sherwin,A WorldDestroyed: The AtomicBomb and theGrand Aliance (New York, 1973); BartonJ. Bernstein,"The Quest forSecurity: American Foreign Policy and InternationalControl of AtomicEnergy, 1942-1946,"JAH,60 (1973-74): 1003-44; Herken,The Winning Weapon; and Rosenberg,"American Atomic Strategyand theHydrogen Bomb Decision."For older,but still very important accounts, see P. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War,and theBomb (New York, 1949); Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar G. Anderson, The New World:A History of the UnitedStates Atomic Energn Commission, 1939-1946 (UniversityPark, Pa., 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, AtomicShield: A Historyof theUnited States Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-52 (UniversityPark, Pa., 1969); Gar Alperovitz,Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshimna and Potsdam(New York,1965); and HerbertFeis, The AtomicBomb and theEnd of WorldWar II (Princeton, 1966). 9 Plansfor America's overseas base systemmay be foundin RG 218, CombinedChiefs of Staff(CCS) series 360 (12-9-42):Joint Strategic Survey Committee [hereafter, JSSC], "Air Routesacross the Pacificand Air Facilitiesfor International Police Force," March 15, 1943,JSSC 9/1;Joint Chiefs of StaffUCS], "UnitedStates MilitaryRequirements for Air Bases, Facilities,and OperatingRights in ForeignTerritories," November 2, 1943,JCS 570/2;Joint War Plans Committee[hereafter, JWPC], "Overall Examination of the UnitedStates Requirementsfor Military Bases," August 25, 1943,JWPC 361/4; and JWPC,"Overall Examination of United States Requirementsfor MilitaryBases," September 13, 1945, JWPC 361/5 (revised).For Roosevelt's endorsement,see Rooseveltto theDepartment of State,January 7, 1944,ibid., JWPC 361/5; for civilian-military 350 AHR Forum

Two strategicconsiderations influenced the developmentof an overseas base system.The firstwas the need for defense in depth. Since attacksagainst the United Statescould only emanate fromEurope and Asia, theJoint Chiefs of Staff concluded as early as November 1943 that the United States must encircle the WesternHemisphere with a defensivering of outlyingbases. In the Pacificthis ring had to include the Aleutians,the Philippines,Okinawa, and the formerJapanese mandates.Recognizing the magnitudeof thisstrategic frontier, Admiral William E. Leahy, chief of staffto the president,explained to Truman that the joint chiefs were not thinkingof the immediatefuture when, admittedly, no prospectivenaval power could challenge American predominancein the Pacific.Instead, theywere contemplatingthe long term,when the United Statesmight require wartime access to the resourcesof southeastAsia as wellas "a firmline of communicationsfrom the West Coast to the Asiaticmainland, plus denial of this line in time of war to any potential enemy."'0 In the Atlantic, strategic planners maintained that their minimumrequirements included a West Africanzone, withprimary bases in the Azores or Canary Islands. Leahy went even further,insisting on primarybases in West Africa itself-for example, at Dakar or Casablanca. The object of these defensivebases was to enable the United States to possess completecontrol of the Atlanticand Pacificoceans and keep hostilepowers far from American territory. "I Defense in depth was especiallyimportant in lightof the Pearl Harbor experi- ence, the advance of technology,and the development of the atomic bomb. Accordingto theJoint Chiefs of Staff,"Experience in the recentwar demonstrated conclusivelythat the defenseof a nation,if it is to be effective,must begin beyond its frontiers.The advent of the atomic bomb reemphasizesthis requirement.The fartheraway from our own vital areas we can hold our enemy through the possession of advanced bases..., the greater are our chances of surviving successfullyan attack by atomic weapons and of destroyingthe enemy which employs them against us." Believing that atomic weapons would increase the incentiveto aggressionby enhancingthe advantage of surprise,military planners never ceased to extol the utilityof forwardbases from which American aircraft could seek to interceptattacks against the United States.'2

discussionof base requirementsfollowing the president'sdeath, see OPD, "Extractof Conversation-Adm. Duncanand Gen. Lincoln,"June18, 1945,RG 165,OPD 336 (topsecret); OPD, Memorandumfor the Record, June 30, 1945, ibid.;General George A. Lincoln,"Memorandum concerning U.S. Post-WarPacific Bases," June30, 1945,ibid.; and GeorgeC. Marshallto James F. Byrnes,July 23, 1945,ibid. '? For Leahy'sexplanation, see JCS,"Strategic Areas and Trusteeshipsin thePacific," October 10, 18, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42),JCS 1619/15,19; JCS, "UnitedStates Military Requlirements for Air Bases," November2, 1943; JCS, "OverallExamination of UnitedStates Requirements for MilitaryBases and Base Rights,"October 25, 1945,ibid., JCS 570/40. "JCS, "UnitedStates Military Requirements for Air Bases,"November 2, 1943;JCS, Minutesof the 71st meeting,March 30, 1943,RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-9-42);Leahy, Memorandum for the President, November 15, 1943,ibid.; Nimitz, Memorandum, October 16, 1946,ibid., JCS 1619/16;and Joint Planning Staff [hereafter, JPS],"Basis for the Formulationof a Post-WarMilitary Policy," August 20, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5-13-45),JPS 633/6. '2JCS,"Statement of Effectof AtomicWeapons on NationalSecurity and MilitaryOrganization," March 29, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 471.6 Atom (8-17-45),JCS 477/10.Also see JCS, "Guidanceas to the Military Implicationsof a UnitedNations Commission on AtomicEnergy," January 12, 1946,ibid., JCS 1567/26;and JCS, "Over-AllEffect of AtomicBomb on Warfareand MilitaryOrganization," October 30, 1945,ibid., JCS 1477/1. TheAmerican Conception of National Security 351

The second strategicconsideration that influenced the plan fora comprehensive overseas base system was the need to project American power quickly and effectivelyagainst any potentialadversary. In conductingan overallexamination of requirementsfor base rightsin September 1945, the JointWar Plans Committee stressedthat World War II demonstratedthe futilityof a strategyof staticdefense. The United States had to be able to take "timely"offensive action against the adversary'scapacity and will to wage war. New weapons demanded thatadvance bases be establishedin "areas well removedfrom the United States,so as to project our operations,with new weapons or otherwise,nearer the enemy."Scientists, like VannevarBush, argued that,"regardless of the potentialitiesof thesenew weapons [atomic energy and guided missiles],they should not influence the number, location,or extentof strategicbases now consideredessential." The basic strategic concept underlyingall American war plans called for an air offensiveagainst a prospectiveenemy from overseas bases. Delays in the developmentof the B-36, the firstintercontinental bomber, only accentuatedthe need forthese bases.'3 In October 1945 the civilianleaders of the War and Navy departmentscarefully reviewedthe emergingstrategic concepts and base requirementsof the military planners.Secretary of the Navy James Forrestaland Secretaryof War Robert P. Pattersondiscussed them with Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,and Secretaryof State Byrnes.The civiliansecretaries fully endorsed the concept of a far-flungsystem of bases in the Atlanticand Pacificoceans thatwould enhance the offensivecapabilities of the United States.'4Having expended so much blood and effortcapturing Japanese-held islands, defense officials,like Forrestal,naturally wishedto devise a base systemin the Pacificto facilitatethe projectionof American influenceand power. The Philippineswere the key to southeastAsia, Okinawa to the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the industrialheartland of northeastAsia. Fromthese bases on America's"strategic frontier," the United Statescould preserve itsaccess to vitalraw materialsin Asia, deny theseresources to a prospectiveenemy, help preservepeace and stabilityin troubledareas, safeguardcritical sea lanes,and, if necessary,conduct an air offensiveagainst the industrialinfrastructure of any Asiaticpower, including the Soviet Union.'5

1? For the emphasis on "timely"action, see JWPC, "Overall Examination of Requirements for MilitaryBases" (revised), September 13, 1946; for the need for advance bases, see JCS, "StrategicConcept and Plan for the Employmentof United States Armed Forces," September 19, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5-13-45), JCS 1518; for Bush's view, see JWPC, "Effectof Foreseeable New Developments and Counter-Measures on a Post-War StrategicConcept and Plan," August 22, 1945, ibid.,JWPC 394/1/M.Also see, for the evolution of strategicwar plans, many of the materials in RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46). 14 For the discussions and conclusions of civilian officials,see Leahy to Patterson and Forrestal, October 9, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret); Robert Lovett to Chief of Staff,October 12, 1945, ibid.; Patterson to the Secretary of Navy, October 17, 1945, ibid.; and Forrestal to Byrnes, October 4, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42). For Forrestal's views, also see Forrestal to James K. Vardaman, September 14, 1945, Mudd Library, Princeton University,James Forrestal Papers [hereafter ML, JFP], box 100; Forrestal to Byrnes, October 4, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42); and Vincent Davis, PostwarDefense Policy and theU.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), 157-206, 259-66. 15 For the Philippines, see, for example, Strategy Section, OPD, "Post-War Base Requirements in the Philippines,"April 23, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret), and "Report on the MilitaryBase Requirements in the Philippines," October 20, 1945, ibid. For Okinawa, see JCS, "Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands," Septem- ber 10, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-942),JCS 1619/9;JCS, "Reviewof United States Control Needed over the Japanese Islands," August 26, 1947, ibid.,JCS 1619/24; and Lincoln, "Memorandum concerning U.S. Post-War Pacific Bases," June 30, 1945. 352 AHR Forum

Controlof the Atlanticand Pacificoceans throughoverseas bases was considered indispensableto the nation's securityregardless of what might happen to the wartimecoalition. So was controlover polar air routes.Admiral Leahy criticizeda JointStrategic Survey Committeereport of early 1943 that omittedIceland and Greenland as primarybase requirements.When General S. D. Embick,the senior member of that committee,continued to question the desirabilityof a base in Iceland, lest it antagonizethe Russians,he was overruledby AssistantSecretary of WarJohn McCloy.McCloy charged thatEmbick had "a ratherrestricted concept of whatis necessaryfor nationaldefense." The firstpostwar base systemapproved by both theJoint Chiefs of Staffand the civiliansecretaries in October 1945 included Iceland as a primarybase area. The JointWar Plans Committeeexplained that American bases must controlthe air in the Arctic,prevent the establishmentof enemy militaryfacilities there, and support America'sown strikingforces. Once Soviet-Americanrelations began to deteriorate,Greenland also was designatedas a primarybase for American heavy bombers and fightersbecause of its close proximityto the industrialheartland of the potentialenemy. As the United States sought rights for bases along the Polar route in 1946 and 1947, moreover, American defense officialsalso hoped to thwartSoviet effortsto acquire similar rightsat Spitzbergenand Bear Island.'6 In the immediatepostwar years American ambitions for an elaboratebase system encounteredmany problems. Budgetary constraints compelled military planners to drop plans for many secondary and subsidiarybases, particularlyin the South Pacificand Caribbean. These sacrificesmerely increased the importanceof those bases thatlay closer to a potentialadversary. By early 1948, thejoint chiefswere willingto foregobase rightsin such places as Surinam,Curacoa-Aruba, Cayenne, Nounea, and Vivi-Levu if 'joint" or "participating"rights could be acquired or preservedin Karachi,Tripoli, Algiers, Casablanca, Dharan, and Monrovia.Budget- ary constraints,then, limited the depth of the base systembut not the breadthof American ambitions.'7Furthermore, the governmentsof Panama, Iceland, Den- mark,Portugal, France, and Saudi Arabia oftenrejected or abolishedthe exclusive rightsthe United States wanted and sometimeslimited the number of American personnelon such bases. Washington,therefore, negotiated a varietyof arrange- mentsto meet the objectionsof host governments.By early 1948, forexample, the base in Iceland was operated by a civiliancompany under contractto the United

16 For Leahy'sviews, see JCS, Minutesof the 71st meeting,March 30, 1943. For the differencesbetween Embickand McCloy,see Embickto John Hickerson, June 8, 1945,RG 165,OPD 336 (topsecret); and HarrisonA. Gerhardt,Memorandum for General Hull, June16, 1945,ibid. For the utilityof Iceland and Greenlandas bases, see JWPC,"Attributes of UnitedStates Overseas Bases," November2, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42),JWPC 361/10;NSC, "Reportby the NSC on Base Rightsin Greenland,Iceland, and the Azores," November25, 1947,ibid., NSC 2/1;and AlbertC. Wedemeyerto Secretaryof Defense,March 6, 1948,RG 330, box 19,CD 6-1-44(decimal correspondence file). And, for the dilemma posed byprospective Soviet demands forsimilar base rightsat Spitzbergen,see, for example, JCS, "Foreign Policy of the United States," February 10, 1946,RG 218,ser. CCS 092 US (12-21-45),JCS1519/2; Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter,FRUS], 1947, 8 vols. (Washington,1971-73), 1: 708-12, 766-70, and 3: 657-87, 1003-18; and Lundestad, America,Scandanavia, and theCold War, 63-76. 17 See, forexample, Report of the Director,Joint Staff, March 18, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42), JointStrategic Plans Group [hereafterJSPG] 503/1. For the specialemphasis on NorthAfrican bases, see, for example,Forrestal to Truman,January 6, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 156. And, for furtherevidence regardingplans forthe developmentof the base systemin 1947-48,see notes70-71, below. TheAmerican Conception of National Security 353

States Air Force; in the Azores, the base was manned by a detachmentof Portuguese militarypersonnel operating under the Portugueseflag, but an air forcedetachment serviced the Americanaircraft using the base. In Port Lyautey, thebase was under thecommand of the Frenchnavy, but under a secretagreement an American naval team took care of American aircrafton the base. In Saudi Arabia,the Dharan air stripwas cared forby 300 U.S. personneland was capable of handling B-29s. Because these arrangementswere not altogethersatisfactory, in mid-1948 Secretaryof Defense Forrestaland Secretaryof the Army Kenneth Royall advocated using American economic and militaryassistance as levers to acquire more permanentand comprehensivebase rights,particularly in Greenland and North Africa.18 Less well knownthan the Americaneffort to establisha base system,but integral to the policymakers'conception of national security,was the attemptto secure militaryair transitand landingrights. Military planners wanted such rightsat critical locationsnot onlyin the WesternHemisphere but also in NorthAfrica, the Middle East, India, and southeast Asia. To this end they delineated a route from Casablanca through Algiers,.Tripoli, Cairo, Dharan, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Rangoon,Bangkok, and Saigon to Manila.'9 In closingout theAfrican-Middle East theater at the conclusion of the war, General H. W. Aurand, under explicit instructionsfrom the secretaryof war, made preparationsfor permanent rights at seven airfieldsin North Africaand Saudi Arabia.20According to a studyby the JointChiefs of Staff,"Military air transitrights for the United States along the NorthAfrican-Indian route were mostdesirable in order to provideaccess to and familiaritywith bases fromwhich offensive and defensiveaction might be conduct- ed in the eventof a major war, and to providean alternateroute to China and to United States Far Eastern bases." In other words, such rightswould permitthe rapid augmentationof Americanbases in wartimeas wellas therapid movementof Americanair unitsfrom the easternto the westernflank of the U.S. base system.In order to maintainthese airfieldsin a stateof readiness,the United States would have to relyon privateairlines, which had to be persuaded to locatetheir operations in areas designatedessential to militaryair transitrights. In thisway, airports "in being" outside the formalAmerican base systemwould be available for military operationsin timesof crisisand war. AssistantSecretary McCloy informed the State

18 For the situationin Iceland,the Azores,and PortLyautey, see EdmondT. Wooldridgeto the General Boardof theNavy, April 30, 1948,NHC, Recordsof theGeneral Board 425 (ser.315); forSaudi Arabia,see G. R. Cooperet al., "JointReport on PertinentObservations during Recent Trip to theMediterranean-Middle EastArea," September 25, 1948,NHC, SPD, centralfiles, 1948, A8; formore information on theDharan base, also see FRUS, 1948,5: 209-63; JamesL. Gormly,"Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia:The U.S. and the Dharan Airfield,1945-46," DiplomaticHistory, 4 (1980): 189-206; and, for aspirationsto secure more permanentand comprehensivebase rights,see Royallto Forrestal,July28, 1948,RG 330,box 1 9, CD 27-1-21; and Forrestalto Royall,August 7, 1948,ibid. The StateDepartment's concern with base rightsin Icelandand Greenlandwas evidentthroughout the exploratory talks on a securitypact; see FRUS, 1948,3: 169-351. For NorthAfrica, also see ibid.,682-715. '9JCS,"Over-All Examination of UnitedStates Requirements for Military Bases and Rights,"September 27, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-942), JCS 570/34;JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirementsfor Transit Air Bases in Foreign Countries,"January 8, 1946, ibid.,JPS 781; and JCS, "Over-AllExamination of Requirementsfor Transit Air Bases and AirBase Rightsin ForeignCountries," June 30, 1946,ibid., JCS 570/52. 20Aurand to Patterson,February 7, 1946,Dwight David EisenhowerPresidential Library, Abilene, Kansas [hereafter,DDEL], H. S. AurandPapers, box 28; Secretaryof War to Secretaryof State,March 17, 1946,ibid. 354 AHR Forum

Departmentat the beginningof 1945 that a "strongUnited States air transport system,international in scope and readilyadapted to militaryuse, is vitalto our air powerand futurenational security." Even earlier,the joint chiefshad agreed not to include South American air bases in their strategicplans so long as it was understoodthat commercial fields in thatregion would be developed witha viewto subsequentmilitary use.2' In Latin America,American requirements for effective national security went far beyondair transitrights. In a reportwritten in January1945 at AssistantSecretary McCloy's behest, the War Departmenturged American collaborationwith Latin American armed forces to insure the defense of the Panama Canal and the WesternHemisphere. Six areas withinLatin America were considered of special significanceeither for strategicreasons or for their raw materials:the Panama Canal and approaches within one thousand miles; the Straits of Magellan; northeastBrazil; Mexico; the river Plate estuary and approaches within five hundred miles; and Mollendo, Peru-Antofagusta,and Chile. These areas were so "important,"Secretary of War Pattersonexplained to Secretaryof State Marshallin early 1947, "thatthe threatof attackon any of themwould forcethe United States to come to theirdefense, even thoughit were not certainthat attack on the United Statesitself would follow."The resourcesof theseareas were essentialto the United States,because "it is imperativethat our war potentialbe enhanced... during any nationalemergency. "22 While payinglip serviceto the United Nationsand worryingabout the impactof regionalagreements in the WesternHemisphere on Soviet actionsand American influencein Europe, theJoint Chiefs of Staffinsisted that in practicenon-American forceshad to be kept out of the WesternHemisphere and the Monroe Doctrine had to be kept inviolate."The WesternHemisphere is a distinctmilitary entity, the integrityof whichis a fundamentalpostulate of our securityin the eventof another worldwar. "23 Developmentsin aviation,rockets, guided missiles,and atomicenergy had made "thesolidarity of the Hemisphereand itsunited support of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine"more importantthan before. Patterson told Marshallthat effectiveimplementation of the Monroe Doctrine now meant "that we not only refuse to tolerate foreign colonization,control, or the extension of a foreign politicalsystem to our hemisphere,but we take alarm fromthe appearance on the continentof foreignideologies, commercial exploitation, cartel arrangements,or

21JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirements for Transit Air Bases . . .," January 20, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (10-9-42), JPS 781/1; and McCloy, Memorandum to the Department of State, Jan-uary31, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret). Also see JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirements for Transit Air Bases," January 8, 1946; and, for the joint chiefs' view on South American air fields, see JCS, Minutes of the 69th meeting, March 23, 1943, RG 218, CCS 360 (12-9-42). 22 P&O, "The Strategic Importance of Inter-American MilitaryCooperation" [January 20, 1947], RG 319, 092 (top secret). Also see H. A. Craig, "Summary,"January 5, 1945, RG 107, Records of the AssistantSecretary of War for Air, Establishment of Air Fields and Air Bases, box 216 (Latin America); and War Department, "Comprehensive Statement" January 1945], ibid. 23JCS, "Foreign Policy of the United States," February 10, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 United States (12-21-45), JCS 1592/2; and JCS to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretaryof War, September 19, 1945, ibid., ser. CCS 092 (9-10-45),JCS 1507/2. ForJCS views onithe Western Hemisphere, also seeJCS to the Secretaryof the Navy and Secretary of War, February 11, 1945, ibid., ser. CCS 092 (1-18-45); JCS, "International Organization for the Enforcement of World Peace and SecuLrity,"April 14, 1945, ibid.,ser. CCS 092 (4-14-45), JCS 1311; andJCS, "Guidance as to Command and Control of the Armed Forces to be Placed at the Disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations," May 26, 1946, ibid., JCS 1670/5. TheAmerican Conception of National Security 355 other symptomsof increased non-hemisphericinfluence.... The basic consider- ation has alwaysbeen an overridingapprehension lest a base be establishedin this area by a potentiallyhostile foreign power." The United States,Patterson insisted, musthave "a stable,secure, and friendlyflank to the South,not confusedby enemy penetration,political, economic, or military."24 The need to predominatethroughout the WesternHemisphere was not a result of deterioratingSoviet-American relations but a naturalevolution of the Monroe Doctrine, accentuated by Axis aggression and new technologicalimperatives.25 Patterson,Forrestal, and ArmyChief of StaffDwight D. Eisenhowerinitially were impelledless by reportsof Soviet espionage, propaganda, and infiltrationin Latin Americathan by accountsof Britishefforts to sell cruisersand aircraftto Chile and Ecuador; Swedish sales of anti-aircraftartillery to Argentina;and Frenchoffers to build cruisersand destroyersfor both Argentinaand Brazil.26To forecloseall foreigninfluence and to insure United Statesstrategic hegemony, military officers and the civilian secretariesof the War and Navy departmentsargued for an extensivesystem of United States bases, expansion of commercialairline facilities throughoutLatin America,negotiation of a regionaldefense pact, curtailment of all foreignmilitary aid and foreignmilitary sales, trainingof Latin Americanmilitary officersin the United States,outfitting of Latin Americanarmies with U.S. military equipment,and implementationof a comprehensivemilitary assistance program.27 The militaryassistance program, as embodied in the Inter-AmericanMilitary CooperationAct, generated the mostinteragency discord. Latin Americanexperts in the State Department maintained that militaryassistance would stimulate regionalconflicts, dissipate Latin Americanfinancial resources, and divertattention fromeconomic and social issues. Before leavingoffice, Byrnes forcefully presented the State Departmentposition to Forrestaland Patterson.Instead of dwellingon the consequencesof militaryassistance for Latin America,Byrnes maintained that such a programwould be too costlyfor the United States,would focusattention on a region where American interestswere relativelyunchallenged, and would underminemore importantAmerican initiatives elsewhere on the globe. "Greece and Turkey are our outposts,"he declared.28

21 For Patterson's views, see P&O, "Strategic Importance of Inter-American MilitaryCooperation" Janut- ary 20, 1947]; and Patterson to Byrnes, December 18, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3. 25 This evaluation accords with the views of Chester J. Pach, Jr.; see his "The Containment of United States MilitaryAid to Latin America, 1944-1949," DiplomaticHisto7y, 6 (1982): 232-34. 26 For fears of foreign influence, see, for example, [no signature] "MilitaryPolitical Cooperation with the Other American Republics," June 24, 1946, RG 18, 092 (International Affairs),box 567; Patterson to the Secretary of State, July31, 1946, RG 353, SWNCC, box 76; Eisenhower to Patterson, November 26, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, general decimal file,box 1 (top secret); S. J. Chamberlin to Eisenhower,November 26, 1946, ibid.; Minutes of the meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, December 11, 1946, ibid.,RPPP, safe file, box 3; and Director of Intelligence to Director of P&O, February 26, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 091 France. For reports on Soviet espionage, see, for example, Military Intelligence Service [hereafter, MIS], "Soviet- Communist Penetration in Latin America," March 24, 1945, RG 165, OPD, 336 (top secret); and MIS, "Summary of a Study ... on Soviet-Communist Penetration in Latin America," September 27, 1945, ibid. 27 See, for example, Craig, "Summary,"January 5, 1945; JPS, "MilitaryArrangements Deriving from the Act of Chapultepec Pertaining to Bases," January14, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (9-10-45),JPS 7661/3;Patterson to Byrnes, December 18, 1946; and P&O, "Strategic Importance of Inter-American Military Cooperation" January 20, 1947]. 28 Minutes of the meetingof the Secretariesof State, War, and the Navy, December 18, 1946, April 23, May 1, 1947, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3; and M. B. Ridgway, Memorarndum for the Assistant Secretary of War, February 1947, ibid., HCPP, 092 (classified). 356 AHR Forum

The secretaryof stateclearly did not thinkthat Congress would authorizefunds for Latin America as well as for Greece and Turkey. AlthoughTruman favored militaryassistance to Latin America,competing demands for Americanresources in 1947 and 1948 forcedboth militaryplanners and U.S. senatorsto give priorityto WesternEurope and the Near East. In June 1948 the Inter-AmericanMilitary CooperationAct died in the Senate. But thissignified no diminutionin American nationalsecurity imperatives; indeed, it underscoredByrnes's statement of Decem- ber 1946 thatthe "outposts"of the nation'ssecurity lay in the heartof Eurasia.29

FROM THE CLOSING DAYS OF WORLD WAR II, Americandefense officials believed that theycould not allow any prospectiveadversary to controlthe Eurasian land mass. This was the lesson taught by two world wars. Strategicthinkers and military analystsinsisted that any power or powersattempting to dominateEurasia mustbe regarded as potentiallyhostile to the United States.30Their acute awarenessof the importanceof Eurasia made Marshall,Thomas Handy, George A. Lincoln, and other officerswary of the expansion of Soviet influencethere. Cognizant of the growthin Sovietstrength, General John Deane, head of the United Statesmilitary missionin Moscow, urged a tougher stand against Soviet demands even before World War II had ended. While acknowledgingthat the increasein Soviet power stemmedprimarily from the defeatof Germanyand Japan, postwarassessments of the JointChiefs of Staffemphasized the importanceof deterringfurther Soviet aggrandizementin Eurasia.3' Concern over the consequences of Russian domina-

29 Pach, "MilitaryAid to Latin America," 235-43. 30 This view was most explicitlypresented in an army paper examining the State Department's expostulation of U.S. foreign policy. See S. F. Giffin,"Draft of Proposed Comments for the AssistantSecretary of War on 'Foreign Policy"' [early February 1946], RG 107, HCPP 092 inter-nationalaffairs (classified). The extent to which thisconcern withEurasia shaped Americarimilitary attitudes is illustratedat greater length below. Here I should note that in March 1945 several of the nation's most prominent civilian experts (Frederick S. Dunn, Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers) prepared a study,"A Security Policy for Postwar America," in which they argued that the United States had to prevent any one power or coalition of powers fromgaining control of Eur-asia.America could not, theyinsisted, withstandattack by aniypower that had firstsubdued the whole of Eturopeor of Eurasia; see Frederick S. Dunn et al., "A Security Policy for Postwar America," NHC, SPD, ser. 14, box 194, A1-2. The postwar concept of Eurasia developed out of the revival of geopolitical thinkingin the United States, stimulated by Axis aggression and strategic decision making. See, for example, the re-issued work of Sir Halford F. Mackinder. Mackinder, DemocraticIdeals and Reality(1919; reprint edn., New York, 1942), and "The Round World and the Winning of Peace," ForeignrAffairs, 21 (1943): 598-605. Mackinder's ideas were modified and widely disseminated in the United States, especially by intellectuals such as Nicholas John Spykman. Hans W. Weigert, Robert Strausz-Hupe, and Isaiah Bowman. Spykman flatlytook exception to Mackinder's dictum, "Who controls eastern Europe rules the heartland; who rules the Heartland rules the World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the World." Instead, Spykman emphasized, "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the wvorld."Spykman, Tlhe Geographyof Peace (New York, 1944), 43. Also see Spykman, America'sStrategy itn World Politics: Thle Utited States and theBalance of Power (New York, 1942); Weigert, Generalsand Geographers:The Twilightof Geopolitics(New York, 1942); Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics:The Strqgglefor Space antdPower (New York, 1942); RtussellH. Fifield and G. Etzel Pearcy, Geopoliticsin Principleand Practice(Boston, 1944); and Alfred C. Eckes, ThleUnited States and theGlobal Strugglefor Minerals (Austin, Texas, 1979), 104-08. 31 For views of influential generals and army planners, see OPD, Memorandum, June 4, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret). Also see the plethora of documents from May and June 1945, L.S. MilitaryAcademy, West Point, New York [hereafter,USMA], George A. Lincoln Papers [hereafter,GLP], War Departmenitfiles. For Deane's advice, especiallysee Deane, "Revisionof Policywith Relation to Russia," April 16, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JCS 1313, and The StranrgeeAlliance: The Storyof Otir Efforts at lWartimeCo-operation uwithi Ru,ssia(New York, 1946), 84-86. For theJCS studies, see, forexample,JPS, "StrategicConcept and Plan for the TheAmerican Conception of National Security 357 tionof Eurasia helps explain whyin July1945 thejoint chiefsdecided to oppose a Sovietrequest for bases in the Dardanelles; whyduring March and April 1946 they supporteda firmstand againstRussia in Iran, Turkey,and Tripolitania;and why in the summerof 1946 Clark Cliffordand George Elsey,two White House aides, argued thatSoviet incorporation of any partsof WesternEurope, the Middle East, China, or Japan into a communistorbit was incompatiblewith American national security.32 Yet defenseofficials were not eager to sever the wartimecoalition. In early 1944 Admiral Leahy noted the "phenomenal development"of Soviet power but still hoped for Soviet-Americancooperation. When members of the Joint Postwar Committeemet with their colleagues on the JointPlanning Staffin April 1945, Major General G. V. Strong argued against using U.S. installationsin Alaska for stagingexpeditionary forces, lest such a move exacerbate Russo-Americanrela- tions.A few monthslater Eisenhower,Lincoln, and otherofficers advised against creatinga centraleconomic authority for Western Europe thatmight appear to be an anti-Sovietbloc.33 The American objective, after all, was to avoid Soviet hegemonyover Eurasia. By aggravatingSoviet fears, the UnitedStates might foster whatit wishedto avoid. Americanself-restraint, however, might be reciprocatedby the Soviets,providing time for WesternEurope to recoverand for the Britishto reassertsome influenceon the Continent.34Therefore, many defense officialsin 1945 hoped to avoid an open riftwith the SovietUnion. But at the same timethey were determinedto preventthe Eurasian land mass fromfalling under Sovietand communistinfluence. Studies by the JointChiefs of Staffstressed that, if Eurasia came under Soviet domination,either through military conquest or politicaland economic "assimila- tion," America's only potential adversarywould fall heir to enormous natural resources,industrial potential, and manpower. By the autumn of 1945, military plannersalready were worryingthat Soviet controlover much of Eastern Europe and its raw materialswould abet Russia's economic recovery,enhance its war- making capacity,and deny importantfoodstuffs, oil, and minerals to Western Europe. By the earlymonths of 1946, SecretaryPatterson and his subordinatesin the War Departmentbelieved thatSoviet control of the Ruhr-Rhinelandindustrial complex would constitutean extreme threat. Even more dangerous was the

Employmentof UnitedStates Armed Forces," September 14, 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 381 (5-13-45),JPS744/3; and JCS,"United States Military Policy," September 17, 1945,ibid., JCS 1496/2. 32 For the decisionon the Dardanelles,see the attachmentsto JCS, "UnitedStates Policy concerning the Dardanellesand Kiel Canal" July1945], RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (7-10-45),JCS 1418/1;for the joint chiefs' positionon Iran,Turkey, and Tripolitania,seeJCS, "U.S. SecurityInterests in theEastern Mediterranean," March1946, ibid., ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1641 series;and Lincoln,Memorandum for the Record, April16, 1946,RG 165,ser. ABC 336 Russia(8-22-43); and, forthe Clifford memorandum, see ArthurKrock, Memoirs:Sixty Years on theFiring Line (New York, 1968), 477-82. 33 Leahy,excerpt from letter, May 16, 1944,RG 59, lot54D394 (Recordsof theOffice of EuropeanAffairs), box 17. For Strong'sopinion, see JPS, Minutesof the 199thmeeting, April 25, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 334 (3-28-45);and, forthe views of Eisenhowerand Lincoln,see Lincoln,Memorandum for Hull, June 24, 1945, USMA, GLP, War Dept. files;and Leahy,Memorandum for the President[late June 1945],ibid. 34 For theemphasis on expeditingrecovery in WesternEurope, see, for example, McCloy, Memorandum for MatthewJ.Connelly, April 26, 1945,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 178; and, forthe role of Britain,see, for example, JointIntelligence Staff [hereafter, JIS], "BritishCapabilities and Intentions,"December 5, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 000.1 GreatBritain (5-10-45), JIS 161/4. 358 AHR Forum prospect of Soviet predominance over the rest of Western Europe, especially France.35Strategically, this would undermine the impact of any prospective American naval blockade and would allow Soviet militaryplanners to achieve defensein depth. The latterpossibility had enormousmilitary significance, because American war plans relied so heavilyon air power and strategicbombing, the efficacyof which mightbe reduced substantiallyif the Soviets acquired outlying bases in WesternEurope and the Middle East or ifthey "neutralized" bases in Great Britain.36 Economic considerationsalso made defense officialsdetermined to retain Americanaccess to Eurasia as well as to deny Sovietpredominance over it.Stimson, Patterson,McCloy, and AssistantSecretary Howard C. Peterson agreed with Forrestalthat long-term American prosperity required open markets,unhindered access to raw materials,and the rehabilitationof much-if not all-of Eurasia along liberal capitalistlines. In late 1944 and 1945, Stimson protestedthe prospective industrialemasculation of Germany,lest it undermine American economic well being, set back recoverythroughout Europe, and unleash forcesof anarchyand revolution.Stimson and his subordinatesin the Operations Divisionof the army also worriedthat the spread of Soviet power in northeastAsia would constrainthe functioningof the free enterprisesystem and jeopardize American economic interests.A report prepared by the staffof the Moscow embassyand revised in mid-1946by Ambassador (and formerGeneral) WalterBedell Smithemphasized that"Soviet power is by nature so jealous thatit has alreadyoperated to segregate fromworld economy almost all of the areas in whichit has been established."While Forrestaland the navy sought to containSoviet influencein the Near East and to retain American access to Middle East oil, Pattersonand the War Department focused on preventingfamine in occupied areas, forestallingcommunist revolu- tion,circumscribing Soviet influence, resuscitating trade, and preservingtraditional American markets especially in Western Europe.37 But American economic

35JointLogistic Plans Committee [hereafter, JLPC], "Russian Capabilities," November 15, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JLPC35/9/RD; Military Intelligence Division [hereafter, MID], "IntelligenceEstimate of the WorldSituation and Its MilitaryImplications," June 25, 1946,RG 319, P&O 350.05 (top secret);Joint IntelligenceCommittee [hereafter, JIC], "IntelligenceEstimate Assuming that War betweenthe Soviet Union the Non-SovietPowers Breaks Out in 1956,"November 6, 1946,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC 374/1;andJIC, "Capabilitiesand MilitaryPotential of Sovietand Non-SovietPowers in 1946,"January8, 1947, ibid.,JIC 374/2.For concernwith the Ruhr-Rhinelandindustrial complex, especially see Pattersonto the Secretaryof State,June 10, 1946,RG 107,HCPP, 091 Germany(classified); and, forthe concern with Western Europe, especiallyFrance, see, for example,JCS, "UnitedStates Assistance to Other Countriesfrom the Standpointof NationalSecurity," April 29, 1947,in FRUS, 1947, 1: 734-50, esp. 739-42. Alsosee theGeneral Board, "National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto for the Next Ten Years," Enclosure D, June 25, 1948, NHC, General Board 425 (ser. 315). 36 See, for example, JIS, "MilitaryCapabilities of Great Britain and France," November 13, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 000.1 Great Britian (5-10-45), JIS 211/1; JIS, "Areas Vital to Soviet War Effort,"February 12, 1946, ibid.,ser. CCS 092 (3-27-45),JIS226/2; andJIS, "Supplemental Information Relative to Northernand Western Europe," April 18, 1947, ibid.,JIS 275/1. 37 Moscow embassy staff,"Russia's International Position at the Close of the War with Germany," enclosed in Smith to Eisenhower, July 12, 1946, DDEL, Dwight David Eisenhower Papers, file 1652, box 101. Also see, for example, Stimson to Roosevelt, September 15, 1944, ML, JFP, box 100; Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 157; McCloy, Memorandum for Connelly, April 26, 1945, ibid., box 178; MID, "Intelligence Estimate of the World Situation," June 25, 1946; numerous memoranda, June 1945, USMA, GLP, War Dept. files; numerous documenits, 1946 and 1947, RG 107, H(C1P, 091 Germany (Classified); and Rearmament Subcommittee, Report to the Special Ad Hoc Committee,July 10, 1947, RG 165, ser. ABC TheAmerican Conception of National Security 359 interestsin Eurasia were not limitedto WesternEurope, Germany,and the Middle East. Militaryplanners and intelligenceofficers in both the army and navy expressed considerable interestin the raw materialsof southeastAsia, and, as alreadyshown, one of the purposesof the bases theywanted was to maintainaccess to those resourcesand deny them to a prospectiveenemy.38 While civilianofficials and militarystrategists feared the loss of Eurasia, theydid not expect the SovietUnion to attemptits military conquest. In the earlyCold War years,there was nearlyuniversal agreement that the Soviets,while eager to expand their influence,desired to avoid a militaryengagement. In October 1945, for example,the Joint Intelligence Staff predicted that the SovietUnion would seek to avoid war for fiveto ten years.In April 1946, whileSoviet troops still remained in Iran, General Lincoln,the army'sprincipal war planner,concurred with Byrnes's viewthat the Sovietsdid not wantwar. In May,when therewas deep concernabout a possiblecommunist uprising in France,military intelligence doubted the Kremlin would instigatea coup, lest it ignitea fullscale war. At a high-levelmeeting at the WhiteHouse in June, Eisenhowerstated that he did not thinkthe Sovietswanted war; only Forrestaldissented. In August,when the Soviet note to Turkey on the Dardanelles provoked consternationin American policy-makingcircles, General Hoyt Vandenberg, directorof central intelligence,informed President Truman thatthere were no signsof unusual Soviettroop movements or supplybuild-ups. In March 1947, while the Truman Doctrine was being discussed in Congress, the directorof army intelligencemaintained that the factorsoperating to discourage Sovietaggression continued to be decisive.In September1947, the CIA concluded that the Soviets would not seek to conquer WesternEurope for several reasons: theywould recognizetheir inability to controlhostile populations; they would fear triggeringa war with the United States that could not be won; and theywould preferto gain hegemonyby politicaland economic means. In October 1947, the JointIntelligence Staff maintained that for three years at least the Soviet Union would take no action thatwould precipitatea militaryconflict.39 Even the ominous developmentsduring the firsthalf of 1948 did not alterthese assessments.Despite his alarmistcable of March 5, designed to galvanizecongres- sional support for increased defense expenditures,General Lucius Clay, the

400.336(3-20-47). For Forrestal'sconcern with Middle Eastern oil, see, forexample, "Notes in Connectionwith Navy's'Line' on ForeiginOil" [late 1944 or early 1945], ML, JFP, box 22; Minutesof the meetingof the Secretariesof State,War, and theNavy, April 17, 1946,RG 107,RPPP, safe file, box 3; and WalterMillis, ed., The ForrestalDiaries (New York, 1951), 272, 356-58. 38 StrategySection, OPD, "Post-WarBase Requirementsin the Philippines,"April 23, 1945;JCS, "Strategic Areas and Trusteeshipsin the Pacific,"October 18, 1946; MID, "PositiveU.S. ActionRequired to Restore NormalConditions in SoutheastAsia," July 3, 1947,RG 319, P&O, 092 (topsecret); and LaurisNorstad to the Directorof Intelligence,July 10, 1947,ibid. 39JIS, "RussianMilitary Capabilities," October 25, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/10; Lincolnto M. B. Gardnerand F. F. Everest,April 10, 1946,RG 165,ser. ABC 336 Russia(8-22-43); 0. S. P., Memorandumfor Hull, May 3, 1946,ibid., ser. ABC 381 (9-145); S. W. D., Memorandumfor the Record,June 12, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);Vandenberg, Memorandum for the President,August 24, 1946, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; Chamberlin,"Reevaluation of Soviet Intentions,"March 27, 1947, RG 165, Recordsof theChief of Staff,091 Russia(top secret);CIA, "Reviewof theWorld Situation as It Relatesto the Securityof the UnitedStates," September 26, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 203; and JIC, "SovietMilitary Objectivesand Capabilities,1947-50," October 27, 1947, RG 165,ser. ABC 381 USSR (3-2-46),JIC 391/1. 360 AHR Forum

Americanmilitary governor in Germany,did not believewar imminent.A fewdays later,the CIA concluded thatthe communisttakeover in Czechoslovakiawould not increaseSoviet capabilities significantly and reflectedno alterationin Soviettactics. On March 16, the CIA reportedto the president,"The weightof logic,as well as evidence,also leads to the conclusionthat the Sovietswill not resortto militaryforce withinthe next sixtydays." While this assessmentwas far fromreassuring, army and navyintelligence experts concurred that the Sovietsstill wanted to avoid war; the questionwas whetherwar would erupt as a resultof "miscalculation"by either the United States or Russia. Aftertalking to Foreign MinisterV. M. Molotov in June, Ambassador Smithconcluded thatSoviet leaders would not resortto active hostilities.During the Berlin blockade, army intelligencereported few signs of Soviet preparationsfor war; naval intelligencemaintained that the Sovietsdesired to avoid war yetconsolidate their position in East Germany.In October 1948, the MilitaryIntelligence Division of the armyendorsed a Britishappraisal that"all the evidence available indicatesthat the Soviet Union is not preparingto go to war in the near future."In December ActingSecretary of State RobertLovett summed up the longstandingAmerican perspectivewhen he emphasized that he saw "no evidence that Soviet intentionsrun toward launchinga sudden militaryattack on the westernnations at thistime. It would not be in characterwith the traditionor mentalityof the Soviet leaders to resort to such a measure unless they felt themselveseither politically extremely weak, or militarilyextremely strong."40 AlthoughAmerican defense officialsrecognized that the Sovietshad substantial militaryassets, they remained confident that the Soviet Union did not feel extremelystrong. Militaryanalysts studying Russian capabilitiesnoted that the Sovietswere rapidlymechanizing infantry units and enhancingtheir firepower and mobility.It was estimatedduring the winterof 1946-47 that the Soviets could mobilizesix milliontroops in thirtydays and twelvemillion in six months,providing sufficientmanpower to overrunall importantparts of Eurasia. The Sovietswere also believedto be utilizingGerman scientistsand German technologicalknow-how to improve their submarine force, develop rockets and missiles,and acquire knowledgeabout the atomicbomb. During 1947 and 1948, it was reportedas well thatthe Sovietswere makingrapid progressin the developmentof high perform- ance jet fightersand already possessed several hundred intermediaterange bomberscomparable to the AmericanB-29.41

40 CIA, "SpecialEvaluation No. 27," March 16, 1948,RG 319, P&0, 350.05 (top secret);MID, "Intelligence DivisionDaily Briefing,"October 18, 1948,ibid.; and Lovettto JohnL. Sullivan,December 20, 1948,NHC, double zero files, 1948, box 2. Also seeJean Edward Smith, The Papers ofGeneral Lucius D. Clay: Germany,1945- 1949,2 vols.(Bloomington, Ind., 1974),2: 564-65,568-69, 602; CIA, "Reviewof the World Situation," March 10, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 203; R. H. Hillenkoetter,Memorandum for the President,March 16, 1948, ibid.,box 249; Chamberlin,Memorandum to the Chiefof Staff,March 14, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);Thomas B. Inglis,Memorandum of Information,March 16,September 28, 1948,NHC, SPD, central files,1948, A8 and EF30; Smithto Kennan,June 11, 1948,ML, GeorgeF. KennanPapers [hereafter, GFKP], box 28; and CarterClarke to the Chiefof Staff,August 6, 1948,RG 330, CD 2-2-2,box 4. 41 For reportson Sovietmobilization capabilities and conventionalstrength on the land,see, forexample, Chamberlin,Memorandum to the Chiefof Staff,March 14, 1948; CarterClarke, "Present Capability of the U.S.S.R. ArmedForces," September 16, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 091 Russia(top secret);and P&O, "Capabilities (Ground)and Intentionsof the USSR for OverruningNorthern and WesternEurope in 1947, 1948, and 1949,"February 28, 1947, ibid.,350.05 (top secret).The war plans of theJoint Chiefs of Staffoutline the extensiveground capabilities of Sovietforces. See especiallythe documentsin RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR TheAmerican Conception of National Security 361

Even so, Americanmilitary analysts were mostimpressed with Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities.The Soviets had no long-rangestrategic air force,no atomic bomb, and meager air defenses. Moreover, the Soviet navy was considered ineffectiveexcept for its submarineforces.42 The JointLogistic Plans Committee and the MilitaryIntelligence Division of the War Departmentestimated that the SovietUnion would requireapproximately fifteen years to overcomewartime losses in manpowerand industry,ten yearsto redressthe shortageof technicians,five to ten yearsto develop a strategicair force,fifteen to twenty-fiveyears to constructa modern navy,ten years to refurbishmilitary transport, ten years (or less) to quell resistance in occupied areas, fifteento twentyyears to establish a military infrastructurein the Far East,three to ten yearsto acquire the atomicbomb, and an unspecifiednumber of yearsto remove the vulnerabilityof the Sovietrail-net and petroleumindustry to long-rangebombing.43 For severalyears at least,the Soviet capabilityfor sustained attack against North America would be very limited.In January1946 the JointIntelligence Staff concluded that"the offensivecapabilities of the United Statesare manifestlysuperior to those of the U.S.S.R. and any war betweenthe U.S. and the USSR would be far more costlyto the SovietUnion than to the United States."44 Key American officialslike Lovett, Clifford,Eisenhower, Bedell Smith and Budget DirectorJames Webb were cognizantof prevailingSoviet weaknessesand potentialAmerican strength.Despite Soviet superiorityin manpower, General Eisenhowerand Admiral ForrestE. Sherman doubted thatRussia could mount a surprise attack, and General Lincoln, Admiral Cato Glover, and Secretaries Pattersonand Forrestalbelieved thatSoviet forces would encounteracute logistical problemsin tryingto overrun Eurasia-especially in the Near East, Spain, and Italy.Even Forrestaldoubted reportsof acceleratingSoviet air capabilities.Ameri- can expertsbelieved thatmost Soviet planes were obsolescent,that the Sovietshad insufficientairfields and aviationgas to use theirnew planes,and thatthese planes had serious problemsin theirinstrumentation and construction.45

(3-2-46);for information on Sovietuse of Germanscientists, see, forexample, JIS, "Capabilitiesand Intentions of theUSSR in the PostwarPeriod," July 9, 1946,ibid., ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/26;MID, "Ability of PotentialEnemies to Attackthe Continental United States," August 8, 1946,RG 319, P&O 381 (top secret); andJIC,"Soviet Capabilities to LaunchAir Attacks against the United Kingdom," November 29, 1946,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC 375/1.For assessmentsof the improvementsin Sovietair power,see, for example,Pattersoin to Truman,June 23, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 157; JIC, MoscowEmbassy, "Soviet Intentions,"April 1, 1948,RG 330, box 4, CD2-2-2. 42 See, forexample, JIS, "Russian Military Capabilities," October 25, 1945;JIS, "Estimateof SovietPostwar MilitaryCapabilities and Intentions,"November 8, 1945,RG 218,ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS80/14;JIS, "MilitaryCapabilities of Great Britain and France,"November 13, 1945;JWPC, "Military Position of theUnited Statesin Lightof RussianPolicy," January 8, 1946,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JWPC 416/1; anid Inglis,Memorandum of Information,January 21, 1946,ML, JFP,box 24. 43JLPC,"Russian Capabilities," November 15, 1945; and MID, "IntelligenceEstimate of the World Situation forthe Next Five Years," August 21, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret).For a contemporaryanalysis of the Soviettransport nietwork, also see Paul Wohl,"Transport in the Developmentof SovietPolicy," Foreign Affairs,24 (1946): 466-83. 44JIS, "SovietPost-War Military Policies and Capabilities,"January 15, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/24;MID, "Abilityof PotentialEnemies to Attackthe ContinentalUnited States," August 8, 1946; and P&O, "Estimateof the SituationPertaining to the NortheastApproaches to the UnitedStates," August12, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 381 (top secret). 45 For the viewsof Eisenhowerand Sherman,see S. W. D., Memorandumfor the Record,June 12, 1946; Galambos,Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 7: 1012-13, 1106-07; Sherman,"Presentation to the President," 362 AHR Forum

In general, improvementsin specificareas of the Soviet militaryestablishment did not mean thatoverall Soviet capabilities were improvingat an alarmingrate. In July 1947, the MilitaryIntelligence Division concluded, "While there has been a slightoverall improvement in the Sovietwar potential,Soviet strength for total war is not sufficientlygreat to make a militaryattack against the United Statesanything but a mosthazardous gamble."This viewprevailed in 1946 and 1947, even though the American nuclear arsenal was extremelysmall and the American strategic bombing force of limited size. In the spring of 1948 the Joint Intelligence Committeeat the Americanembassy in Moscow explained why the United States ultimatelywould emerge victoriousshould a war erupt in the immediatefuture. The Soviets could not win because of their "inabilityto carry the war to U.S. territory.After the occupationof Europe, the U.S.S.R. would be forcedto assume the defensiveand await attacksby U.S. forces which should succeed primarily because of the abilityof the U.S. to outproducethe U.S.S.R. in materialsof war."44 Awarenessof Soviet economic shortcomingsplayed a key role in the American interpretationof Soviet capabilities. Intelligence reports predicted that Soviet leaders would investa disproportionateshare of Russianresources in capitalgoods industries.But, even ifsuch Herculean effortsenjoyed some success,the Sovietsstill would not reach the pre-World War II levelsof the United Stateswithin fifteen to twentyyears. Technologically,the Soviets were behind in the criticalareas of aircraftmanufacturing, electronics, and oil refining.And, despite Russia'sconcert- ed attemptsto catch up and to surpass the United States,American intelligence expertssoon startedreporting that Soviet reconstruction was laggingbehind Soviet ambitions,especially in the electronics,transportation, aircraft, construction ma- chinery,nonferrous metals, and shippingindustries. Accordingly, throughout the years 1945-48 American militaryanalysts and intelligenceexperts believed that Soviettransportation bottlenecks, industrial shortcomings, technological backward- ness, and agriculturalproblems would discourage militaryadventurism.47

January 14, 1947, NHC, Forrest E. Sherman Papers, box 2; for the views of Lincoln, Glover, Patterson, Forrestal,and others on Soviet logistical problems, see JPS, Minutes of the 249th meeting, May 22, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); Glover to Lincoln and Kissner,June 24, 1947, NHC, SPD, ser. 4, box 86; Louis Denfeld, Memorandum, March 29, 1948, ibid., central files, 1948, A16-3 (5); and Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 272. For assessments of Soviet air power, see, for example, JIS, "Estimate of Soviet Postwar Military Capabilities and Intentions," November 8, 1945; JIC, "Soviet Capabilities to Launch Air Attacks against the United Kingdom," November 29, 1946; Office of Naval Intelligence [hereafter, ONI], "A Study of B-29 Airfieldswith a Capacity in Excess of 120,000 Pounds" [Spring 1948], NHC, General Board 425 (ser. 315); General Board, "National Security and Navy," Enclosure B, June 25, 1945, ibid., page 16; Forrestal and Clarence Cannon, Excerpt of Conversation, April 9, 1948, ML,JFP, box 48; Inglis to Op-30, December 1, 1948, NHC, SPD, central files, 1948, A8; and Robert Lovett, Diary Entry,December 16, 1947, New York Historical Society, Robert Lovett MS Diaries. For a recent assessmeiit of Soviet conventional strength,see Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," Inter tionalSecurity, 7 (1982-83): 110-38. 46 MID, "Estimate of the Possibility of War between the United States and the USSR Today from a Comparison with the Situation as It Existed in Septenmber1946," July 21, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); and JIC, Moscow Embassy, "Soviet Intentions," April 1, 1948. 47 For assessments of the interrelationshipsbetween the state of the Soviet economy and Soviet military capabilities, see, for example, JIS, "Postwar Economic Policies and Capabilities of the USSR," November 1, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JIS 80/12; JIS, "Soviet Postwar Economic Capabilities and Policies,"January 8, 1946, ibid.,JIS 80/22; JIS, "Soviet Post-War MilitaryPolicies and Capabilities,"January 15, 1946; W. B. Shockley, "Relative Technological Achievements in Weapons Characteristicsin USSR and USA," January 30, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file, box 6; MID, "Abilityof Potential Enemies to Attack the United States," August 8, 1946; U.S. MilitaryAttache (Moscow) to Chamberlin, March 21, 1947, NHC, Operations TheAmerican Conception of National Security 363

IF AMERICAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS DID NOT EXPECT a Sovietmilitary attack, why, then, were theyso fearfulof losingcontrol of Eurasia? The answerrests less in American assessmentsof Sovietmilitary capabilities and short-termmilitary intentions than in appraisalsof economicand politicalconditions throughout Europe and Asia. Army officialsin particular,because of theiroccupation roles in Germany,Japan, Austria, and Korea, were aware of the postwarplight of these areas. Key militarymen- Generals Clay, Douglas MacArthur,John Hilldring,and Oliver P. Echols and Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel-became alarmed by the prospects of famine, disease, anarchy,and revolution.They recognized that communistparties could exploitthe distressand thatthe Russianscould capitalizeupon it to spread Soviet influence.As early as June 1945, Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, the American commissionerin Italy,wrote that wartime devastation had createdfertile soil forthe growth of communism in Italy and the enlargement of the Soviet sphere. MacArthuralso feared that,if the Japanese economyremained emasculatedand reformswere not undertaken,communism would spread. Clay, too, was acutely aware thatGerman communists were depictingthemselves and theirbeliefs as their country'sonly hope of salvation.In the springof 1946 militaryplanners, working on contingencyplans for the emergencywithdrawal of American troops from Germany,should war with Russia unexpectedlyoccur, also took note of the economic turmoil and political instabilityin neighboringcountries, especially France. Sensitivityto the geopoliticaldimensions of the socioeconomiccrisis of the postwarera impelled Chief of StaffEisenhower to give high priorityin the army budget to assistancefor occupied areas.48 Civilianofficials in the War, Navy,and Statedepartments shared theseconcerns. In the autumnof 1945, McCloywarned Pattersonthat the stakesin Germanywere immenseand economicrecovery had to be expedited.During the firsthalf of 1946 SecretaryPatterson and AssistantSecretary Peterson continually pressed the State Departmentto tacklethe problemsbeleaguering occupation authorities in Germa- nyand pleaded forState Department support and assistancein gettingthe Truman administrationto provide additionalrelief to the devastatedareas of Europe. On Peterson'surging, Acheson wroteTruman in April 1946, "We have now reached the mostcritical period of the worldfood crisis.We musteither imnmediately greatly increasethe exportsof grainfrom the United Statesor expectgeneral disorder and politicalupheaval to develop in [mostof Eurasia]."49Forrestal had alreadypressed

Division, ser. 2 (secret and under), box 33, EF 6 1; JIC, "Soviet MilitaryObjectives and Capabilities," October 27, 1947; and JIC, Moscow Embassy, "Soviet Intentions," April 1, 1948. 48Stone to Admiral H. R. Stark,June 25, 1945, NHC, double zero files,1942-47, folder 23. For MacArthur's view,see J. W. Dower, Empireand Aftermath:Yoshida Shigeru and theJapanese Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 292-303; for the situation in Germany, see Patterson to Byrnes, February 25, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, general decimal file, box 8; materials in RG 165, ser. ABC 387 Germany (12-18-43), sects. 4D, 4E; Smith, Papers of GeneralLucius D. Clay, 1: 165-66, 184, 187-89, 196-98, 201-02, 207-08, 217; Galambos, Papers ofDwight David Eisenhower,7: 892; and, for the relationship betweenithe situation in France and American war planning, see, for example, JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings, May 22, 29, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46). For evolving war plans in the Pincher series, see ibid.,sects. 1, 2; also see Forrestal,"French Situation," May 6, 1946, ML, JFP, box 20; and FRUS, 1946, 5: 434-40; and, for Eisenhower's concern, see Galambos, Papers ofDwight David Eisenihower,8: 1516-20. 49 Acheson to Truman, April 30, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, general subject file, box 1. Also see McCloy to Patterson,November 24, 1945, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,box 4. For pressure on the State Department, see Patterson 364 AHR Forum for a reassessmentof occupation policies in Germanyand Japan. In May, Clay suspended reparationpayments in order to effectan accord on German economic unity.In June,Patterson began to supportthe mergerof the Americanand British zones. The man most responsiblefor thislatter undertaking was WilliamDraper, Forrestal'sformer partner in Dillon, Read, and Co., and Clay's chief economic assistant.Draper firmlybelieved that "economic collapse in either [France or Germany] with probable political break-down and rise of communism would seriouslythreaten American objectives in Europe and in the world."50 American defense officials,military analysts, and intelligenceofficers were extremelysensitive to the politicalferment, social turmoil,and economicupheaval throughoutpostwar Europe and A%ia.In their initialpostwar studies, the Joint Chiefsof Staffcarefully noted the multiplicityof problemsthat could breed conflict and provide opportunitiesfor Soviet expansion. In the spring of 1946 army planners,including General Lincoln,were keenlyaware thatconflict was mostlikely to arise fromlocal disputes (for example, in Venezia-Giulia)or fromindigenous unrest(for example, in France), perhaps even againstthe will of Moscow. A key War Departmentdocument submitted to the State-War-NavyCoordinating Com- mitteein April 1946 skirtedthe issue of Sovietmilitary capabilities and argued that the Soviet Union's strengthemanated from totalitariancontrol over its satellites, fromlocal communistparties, and fromworldwide chaotic political and economic conditions.In October 1946 theJoint Planning Staff stressed that for the next ten yearsthe major factorinfluencing world political developments would be the East- West ideologicalconflict taking place in an impoverishedand strife-tornEurope and a vacuum of indigenouspower in Asia. "The greatestdanger to the securityof the United States,"the CIA concluded in mid-1947,"is the possibilityof economic collapse in WesternEurope and the consequentaccession to power of Communist elements."51 to Byrnes, December 10, 1945, RG 165, Civil AffairsDivision [hereafter,CAD], ser. 014 Germany; Patterson to Byrnes, February 25, 1946; OPD and CAD, "Analysis of Certain Political Problems Confronting Military Occupation Authorities in Germany," April 10, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); and "Combined Food Board" file,spring 1946, ibid., HCPP, general subject file,box 1. 5() William Draper, Memorandum [early 1947], RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); and For- restal to Acheson, January 14, 1946, ML, JFP, box 68. For Clay's initiative,see Smith, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1: 203-04, 213-14, 218-23; JohniF. Gimbel, The AmericanOccupation of Germany:Politics and the Military,1945-1949 (Stanford, 1968), 35-91; John H. Backer, The Decisionto Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition(Durham, N.C., 1978), 137-48; and Bruce Kuklick, AmericanPolicy anrdthe Division of Germany:The Clash wit/iRussia overReparations (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), 205-35. For Patterson's concerns and his suppoit of Bizonia, see Patterson to Byrnes,June 11, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); Patterson to Truman, November 20, 1946, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,box 4; Minutes of the War Council meeting, December 5, 1946, ibid.,box 7; and Patterson to Palmer Hoyt, December 27, 1946, ibid.,box 4. For the merger of the zones, also see FRUS, 1946, 5: 579-659; Smith, Papers of GeneralLucius D. Clay, 1: 245, 248-49; and, for Draper's importance, also see Carolyn Eisenberg, "U.S. Social Policy in Post-War Germany: The Conservative Restoration," paper delivered at the Seventy-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, held in April 1981, in Detroit. 51 CIA, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," September 26, 1947. Also see, for example, JCS, "Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces," Appendix A, September 19, 1945; JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings; Lincoln to Wood, May 22, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 381 (9-1-45); [Giffin(?)] "U.S. Policy with Respect to Russia" [early April 1946], ibid.,ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43); JPS, "Estimate of Probable Developments in the World Political Situation up to 1956," October 31, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (10-9-46), JPS 814/1; MID, "World Political Developments Affectingthe Securityof the United States during the Next Ten Years," April 14, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret). TheAmerican Conception of National Security 365

In brief,during 1946 and 1947, defense officialswitnessed a dramaticunravel- ling of the geopoliticalfoundations and socioeconomicstructure of international affairs.Britain's economic weakness and withdrawalfrom the eastern Mediterra- nean, India's independence movement,civil war in China, nationalistinsurgencies in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, Zionistclaims to Palestineand Arab resentment,German and Japanese economic paralysis,communist inroads in France and Italy-all were ominous developments.Defense officialsrecognized thatthe Soviet Union had not created these circumstancesbut believedthat Soviet leaders would exploit them. Should communiststake power, even withoutdirect Russian intervention,the Soviet Union, it was assumed, would gain predominant controlof the resourcesof these areas because of the postulatedsubservience of communistparties everywhere to the Kremlin.Should nationalistuprisings persist, communistsseize power in underdeveloped countries,and Arabs revoltagainst American support of a Jewishstate, the petroleumand raw materialsof critical areas mightbe denied the West.The imminentpossibility existed that, even without Soviet militaryaggression, the resources of Eurasia could fall under Russian control.With these resources,the Soviet Union would be able to overcome its chroniceconomic weaknesses,achieve defense in depth, and challenge American power-perhaps even by militaryforce.52

IN THIS FRIGHTENING POSTWAR ENVIRONMENT Americanassessments of Sovietlong- termintentions were transformed.When World War II ended, militaryplanners initiallylooked upon Soviet aims in foreignaffairs as arisingfrom the Kremlin's view of power politics,Soviet strategicimperatives, historical Russian ambitions, and Soviet reactionsto moves by the United States and Great Britain.American intelligenceanalysts and strategicplanners most frequently discussed Soviet actions in EasternEurope, the Balkans,the Near East,and Manchuriaas effortsto establish an effectivesecurity system. Despite enormous Soviet gains during the war, many assessmentsnoted that,in fact,the Sovietshad not yetachieved a safe securityzone, especiallyon theirsouthern periphery.While Forrestal,Deane, and most of the planners in the army's Operations Division possessed a skeptical,perhaps even sinister,view of Sovietintentions, the stillprevailing outlook at the end of 1945 was to dismissthe role of ideologyin Sovietforeign policy yet emphasize Soviet distrust of foreigners;to stress Soviet expansionismbut acknowledge the possibilityof accommodation;to abhor Soviet dominationof Eastern Europe but discussSoviet policieselsewhere in termsof power and influence;and to dwell upon the Soviet preoccupationwith securityyet acknowledge doubt about ultimateSoviet inten- tions.53 52 See, for example,JIS, "SovietPostwar Economic Capabilities," January 8, 1946; MID, "Intelligence Estimateof theWorld Situation," June 25, 1946;JCS, "Presidential Request for Certain Facts and Information Regardingthe SovietUnion," July 25, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1696; H. D. Rileyto Op-30,February 7, 1947,NHC, SPD, ser.5, box 111,A 16-3(5); MID, "Capabilities(Ground) and Intentionsof the USSR for OverruningNorthern and WesternEurope," February28, 1947; P&O, "StrategicStudy of Westernand NorthernEurope," May 21, 1947,RG 319, P&O, 092 (topsecret); and Wooldridgeto theGeneral Board,April 30, 1948. 53 For assessmentsof Sovietintentions, see, forexample, JIC, "Estimateof SovietPost-War Capabilities and Intentions,"February 2, 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 000.1 USSR (10-2-44),JIC250/2; John S. Wiseto Hull,April 366 AHR Forum

This orientationchanged rapidlyduring 1946. In January,the Joint War Plans Committeeobserved that "the long-termobjective [of the SovietUnion] is deemed to be establishmentof predominantinfluence over the Eurasian land mass and the strategicapproaches thereto."Reports of the new militaryattache in Moscow went further,claiming that "the ultimateaim of Soviet foreignpolicy seems to be the dominanceof Sovietinfluence throughout the world"and "the finalaim ... is the destructionof the capitalistsystem." Soon thereafter,Kennan's "long telegram"was widelydistributed among defense officials,on whom it had considerableimpact. Particularlysuggestive was his view that Soviet leaders needed the theme of capitalistencirclement to justifytheir autocraticrule. Also influentialwere Ken- nan's convictionsthat the Sovietleaders aimed to shatterthe internationalauthority of the United Statesand were beyond reason and conciliation.54 During the spring and summer of 1946, defense officialsfound these notions persuasive as an interpretationof Soviet intentionsbecause of the volatile internationalsituation, the revivalof ideologicalfervor within the SovietUnion, and the domesticpolitical atmosphere and legislativeconstraints in the United States. PresidentTruman wished to stop "babyingthe Soviets,"and his predilectionfor a tougherposture probably led his subordinatesto be less inclinedto give the Soviets the benefitof any doubt when assessingRussian intentions.55 Forrestal believed the Sovietcommunist threat had become more serious than the Nazi challengeof the 1930s; GeneralJohn E. Hull, directorof the OperationsDivision, asserted that the Sovietswere "constitutionallyincapable of being conciliated";and Clark Clifford and George Elsey considered Soviet fears "absurd." A key subcommitteeof the State-War-NavyCoordinating Committee declared thatSoviet suspicions were "not susceptibleof removal,"and in July 1946 the JointChiefs of Staffdeclared the Soviet objectiveto be "world domination."By late 1946 it was commonplace for intelligencereports and militaryassessments to state,without any real analysis,that the "ultimateaim of Soviet foreignpolicy is Russian dominationof a communist

3, 1945, RG 319, P&O, 350.05, State Department red file (top secret); JSSC toJCS, April 5, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45); Deane, "Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia," April 16, 1945 (UCS 1313); Secretary of War to Secretary of State [early July 1945], RG 165, ser. ABC 093 Kiel (7-6-45); Marshall to McCloy, July 3, 1945, ibid.,OPD 336 (top secret); OPD, "Soviet Intentions,"July 6, 1945, ibid.,ser. ABC 092 USSR (11-15-44); JCS, "United States Policy concerning the Dardanelles" July 1945]; JCS, "MilitaryPosition of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," October 8, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JCS 1545; JIS, "Soviet Postwar Foreign Policy," October 25, 1945, ibid.,JIS 80/9; JIS, "Russian Military Capabilities," October 25, 1945; Ritchie, "Report of the United States Mission to Moscow, 18 October 1943 to 31 October 1945" [October 31, 1945], RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret); ONI, "Basic Factors in World Sittuation," December 1945, NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106, A8; JIS, "Capabilities and Intentionsof the USSR in the Post-War Period,"January 2, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JIS 80/20; Forrestal,Notes for remarks to the Harvard Club, January 18, 1946, JL, JFP, box 29; Inglis, Memorandum of Information,January 21, 1946; Stoler, "Continentalismto Globalism," 315-21; and Sherry,Preparing for the Next War, 159-90. 54JWPC, "Military Position of the United States in Light of Russian Policy,"January 8, 1946; and U.S. MilitaryAttache (Moscow), "Estimate of the Situation as of February 1," February 18, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 381 Germany (1-29-43). For Kennan's telegram, see FRUS, 1946, 4: 696-709; and, for the distributionof Kennan's telegram, see R. L. Vittrup,Memorandum for Craig, February 26, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 5; Vittrup to Lincoln, March 1, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 350.05, State Department red file (top secret); and Bruce Hopper to Kennan, March 29, 1946, ML, GFKP, box 28. 55 Robert L. Messer, ThleEnd of an Alliance:James F. Byrnes,Roosevelt, Truman, and theOrigins of theCold War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), 152-94, and "Paths Not Taken," 297-319. TheAmerican Conception of National Security 367

world."56There was, of course, plentifulevidence for this appraisal of Soviet ambitions-theSoviet consolidation of a sphereof influencein EasternEurope; the incendiarysituation in Venezia Giulia; Soviet violation of the agreement to withdrawtroops from Iran; Sovietrelinquishment of Japanese arms to the Chinese communists;the Soviet mode of extractingreparations from the Russian zone in Germany;Soviet diplomaticovertures for bases in the Dardanelles,Tripolitania, and the Dodecanese; Sovietrequests for a role in the occupationof Japan; and the Kremlin'srenewed emphasis on Marxist-Leninistdoctrine, the vulnerabilityof capitalisteconomies, and the inevitabilityof conflict. Yet these assessmentsdid not seriouslygrapple with contradictoryevidence. While emphasizingSoviet militarycapabilities, strategic ambitions, and diplomatic intransigence,reports like the Clifford-Elseymemorandum of September1946 and theJoint Chiefs of Staffreport 1696 (upon whichthe Clifford-Elseymemorandum heavilyrelied) disregardednumerous signs of Soviet weakness,moderation, and circumspection.During 1946 and 1947 intelligenceanalysts described the with- drawalof Russian troopsfrom northern Norway, Manchuria, Bornholm, and Iran (from the latter under pressure, of course). Numerous intelligencesources reported the reductionof Russian troops in Eastern Europe and the extensive demobilizationgoing on within the Soviet Union. In October 1947 the Joint IntelligenceCommittee forecast a Soviet army troop strengthduring 1948 and 1949 of less than two million men. Soviet militaryexpenditures appeared to moderate.Other reportsdealt withthe inadequacies of Soviet transportationand bridgingequipment for the conduct of offensiveoperations in Eastern Europe. And, as already noted, assessmentsof the Soviet economy revealed persistent problemslikely to restrictSoviet adventurism.57 Experiencesuggested that the Soviet Union was by no means uniformlyhostile

56Forrestalto ClarenceDillon, April 11, 1946,ML, JFP, box 11; Hull to TheaterCommanders, March 21, 1946,RG 165,ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43);for the Clifford-Elsey viewpoint, see Krock,Memoirs: Scxty Years on the FiringLine, 428; and SWNCC, "Resumeof SovietCapabilities and PossibleIntentions," August 29, 1946,NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106, A8. For the SWNCC estimate,see JCS, "PoliticalEstimate of SovietPolicy for Use in Connectionwith Military Studies," April 5, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1641/4;and JCS "PresidentialRequest for Certain Facts and InformationRegarding the Soviet Union," July 25, 1946.Some of themost thoughtful studies on Sovietintentions, like that of theJoint Intelligence Staff in earlyJanuary 1946 (JIS80/20), were withdrawn from consideration. See theevolution of studiesand reportsin RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),sects. 5-7. 57 For the withdrawalof Soviet troops,see, for example,MID, "SovietIntentions and Capabilitiesin Scandanaviaas of 1July 1946," April 25, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (topsecret); and [Giffin(?)] "U.S. Policy withRespect to Russia"[early April 1946]. For reportson reductionsof Russiantroops in EasternEurope and demobilizationwithin the SovietUnion, see MID, "Reviewof Europe,Russia, and the MiddleEast," Decem- ber 26, 1945, RG 165, OPD, 350.05 (top secret);Carl Espe, weeklycalculations of Soviettroops, May- September1946, NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106,A8; MID, "SovietCapabilities in Germanyand WestEurope," December26, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret);JIC, "Movementof RussianTroops Outsideof USSR exceptin the Far East,"December 31, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC Memorandumof Informationno. 237; MID, "Estimateof the Possibilityof War,"July 21, 1947; and JIC, "SovietMilitary Objectivesand Capabilities,"October 27, 1947.For referencesto Sovietmilitary expenditures, see Pattersonto JuliusAdler, November 2, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 5; and AbramBergson, "Russian Defense Expenditures,"Foreign Affairs, 26 (1948): 373-76. And,for assessments of theSoviet transport system, see R. F. Ennis,Memorandum for the P&O Division,June 24, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43);U.S. Military Attache(Moscow) to Chamberlin,March 21, 1947;Op-32 to theGeneral Board, April 28, 1948,NHC, General Board 425 (ser.315); and Wohl,"Transport in theDevelopment of SovietPolicy," 475-76, 483. 368 AHR Forum or unwillingto negotiatewith the United States.In April 1946, a fewdays aftera State-War-Navysubcommittee issued an alarmingpolitical estimate of Sovietpolicy (for use in American militaryestimates), Ambassador Smith reminded the State Departmentthat the Soviet press was not unalterablycritical of the United States, thatthe Russianshad withdrawnfrom Bornholm, that Stalin had givena moderate speech on the United Nations,and thatSoviet demobilization continued apace. The next month General Lincoln, who had accompanied Byrnes to Paris for the meetingof the councilof foreignministers, acknowledged that the Sovietshad been willingto make numerousconcessions regarding Tripolitania, the Dodecanese, and Italian reparations. In the spring of 1946, General Echols, General Clay, and Secretary Patterson again maintained that the French constitutedthe major impedimentto an agreementon united controlof Germany.At the same timethe Sovietsceased pressingfor territorial adjustments with Turkey. After the diplomat- ic exchanges over the Dardanelles in the late summerof 1946 the Sovietsdid not again ask for eithera revisionof the MontreuxConvention or the acquisitionof bases in the Dardanelles. In early 1947 centralintelligence delineated more than a half-dozeninstances of Soviet moderationor concessions.In April the Military IntelligenceDivision noted that the Soviets had limitedtheir involvement in the Middle East, diminished their ideological rhetoric,and given only moderate supportto Chinese communists.In the monthspreceding the Truman Doctrine, Sovietbehavior-as noted by Americanmilitary officials and intelligenceanalysts- hardlyjustified the inflammatoryrhetoric Acheson and Truman used to secure congressionalsupport for aid to Greece and Turkey. Perhaps thisis whyGeneral Marshall,as secretaryof state,refrained from such language himselfand preferred to focuson the socioeconomicaspects of the unfoldingcrisis.58 In their overall assessmentsof Soviet long-termintentions, however, military planners dismissed all evidence of Soviet moderation,circumspection, and re- straint.In fact,as 1946 progressed,these planners seemed to spend less time analyzingSoviet intentionsand more time estimatingSoviet capabilities.59Having accepted the notion thatthe two powers were locked in an ideologicalstruggle of

58 Forthe SWNCC estimate,seeJCS, "Political Estimate of SovietPolicy," April 5, 1946;for Smith's despatch, see Smithto theSecretary of State,April 11, 1946,RG 165,Records of theChief of Staff,091 Russia;and, for Sovietnegotiating concessions, see Lincoln,Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,May 20, 1946,USMA, GLP, WarDept. files;James F. Byrnes,Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), 129-37; PatriciaDawson Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnesand theCouncil of ForeignMinisters (Kent, Ohio, 1979), 95-102. For the situation in Germany,see OPD and CAD, "Analysisof Certain PoliticalProblems Confronting Military Occupation AuthoritiesinGermany," April 10, 1946,RG 107,HCPP, 091 Germany(classified); Patterson to Truman, June I 1, 1946,RG 165,Records of the Chiefof Staff,091 Germany.For Clay'sreferences to Frenchobstructionism, see, forexample, Smith, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay,1: 84-85, 88-89, 151-52, 189-90,212-17, 235-36; forAmerican perceptions of thesituation in Turkey,see MelvynP. Leffler,"Strategy, Diplomacy, and theCold War:The UnitedStates, Turkey, and N.A.T.O.," paperdelivered at theSeventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Organizationof American Historians, held in April1983, in Cincinnati;for overall intelligence assessments, see CentralIntelligence Group [hereafter,CIG], "RevisedSoviet Tactics in InternationalAffairs," January 6, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 254; MID, "WorldPolitical Developments Affecting the Security of the UnitedStates duringthe Next Ten Years,"April 14, 1947; and WalterE. Todd to the Directorof P&O, April25, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (topsecret); for background on theTruman Doctrine, see Josephjones, TheFifteent Wees (New York,1955), esp. 138-70; and, forMarshall's emphasis on theeconomic roots of theEuropean crisis, see ibid.,203-06, 220-24; and Charles Bohlen, The Transformationof AmericanForeign Policy (New York, 1969), 87-89. 59 Boththe quantity and thequality of JCS studieson Sovietintentions seem to havedeclined during 1946. In "MilitaryPosition of theUnited States in Lightof RussianPolicy" (January 8, 1946),strategic planners of the JointWar PlansCommittee maintained that it was moreimportant to focuson Sovietcapabilities than on Soviet TheAmerican Conception of National Securi4) 369

indefiniteduration and conscious of the rapid demobilizationof Americanforces and the constraintson Americn defense expenditures,they no longer explored waysof accommodatinga potentialadversary's legitimate strategic requirements or pondered how Americaninitiatives might influence the SovietUnion's definitionof its objectives.60Information not confirmingprevailing assumptions either was ignoredin overallassessments of Sovietintentions or was used to illustratethat the Sovietswere shiftingtactics but not alteringobjectives. Reflective of the emerging mentalitywas a reportfrom the Joint Chiefs of Staffto the presidentin July1946 thatdeleted sectionsfrom previous studies that had outlinedSoviet weaknesses. A memorandumsent by SecretaryPatterson to the presidentat the same time was designed by General Lauris Norstad,director of the War Department'sPlans and Operations Division, to answer questions about relationswith the Soviet Union "withoutambiguity." Truman, Clark Cliffordobserved many years later, liked thingsin black and white.61

DURING 1946 AND EARLY 1947, the conjunctionof Soviet ideological fervorand socioeconomicturmoil throughout Eurasia contributedto the growthof a myopic view of Soviet long-termpolicy objectives and to enormous apprehensionlest the SovietUnion gain controlof all the resourcesof Eurasia, therebyendangering the nationalsecurity of the United States. Americanassessments of Soviet short-term militaryintentions had not altered; Soviet militarycapabilities had not significantly increased,and Soviet foreignpolicy positions had not greatlyshifted. But defense officialswere acutelyaware of America'sown rapidlydiminishing capabilities, of Britain'sdeclining military strength, of the appeal of communistdoctrine to mostof the underdeveloped world, and of the opportunitiesopen to communistparties throughoutmost of Eurasia as a resultof prevailingsocioeconomic conditions. War Departmentpapers, studiesof thejoint chiefs,and intelligenceanalyses repeatedly describedthe restivenessof colonial peoples that had sapped Britishand French strength,the opportunitiesfor communistparties in France, Italy,and even Spain to capitalizeupon indigenousconditions, and the abilityof the Chinese communists to defeatthe nationalistsand make the resourcesand manpowerof Manchuriaand NorthChina availableto the SovietUnion. In thisturbulent international arena, the survivalof liberal ideals and capitalistinstitutions was anythingbut assured. "We

intentiorns.During a key discussion at the White House, Admiral Leahy also was eager to dismiss abstract evaluations of Russian psychologyand to focus on Russian capabilities; S. W. D., Memorandum for the Record, June 12, 1946. My assessment of the quality of JCS studies is based primarilyon my analysis of the materials in RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45); ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); and NHC, SPD, central files, 1946-48, A8. 60 During 1946 it became a fundamental tenet of American policy rnakersthat Soviet policy objectives were a function of developments within the Soviet Union and not related to American actions. See, for example, Kennan's "long telegram," in FRUS, 1946, 4: 696-709; JCS, "Political Estiinate of Soviet Policy,"April 5, 1946; JCS, "Presidential Request," July 25, 1946; and the Clifford/Elseymemorandum, in Krock, Memoirs,esp. 427-36. 6' For Norstad's comment, see Norstad, Memorandum, Jtly 25, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For references to shifting tactics and constant objectives, see Vandenberg, Memorandumn for the Pr-esidlenit, September 27, 1946, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; CIG, "Revised Soviet lFactics,"January 6, 1947; and, for the JCS report to the president, compare JCS 1696 withJIC 250/12. Both studies may be founidin RG 218, ser CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45). For Clifford'srecollection, Clark Clifford,HTL, oral history,170. 370 AHR Forum could point to the economic benefitsof Capitalism,"commented one important War Deprtmentpaper in April 1946, "but these benefitsare concentratedrather thanwidespread, and, at present,are genuinelysuspect throughout Europe and in manyother partsof the world."62 In thisenvironment, there was indeed no room for ambiguityor compromise. Action was imperative-actionaimed at safeguardingthose areas of Eurasia not alreadywithin the Sovietsphere. Even beforeKennan's "long telegram"arrived in Washingtonthe joint chiefsadopted the positionthat "collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop shortnot onlyof compromiseof principlebut also of expansion of Russian influencein Europe and in the Far East."63During the spring and summerof 1946, General Lincolnand AdmiralRichard L. Conolly,commander of Americannaval forcesin the easternAtlantic and Mediterranean,worked tirelessly to stiffenByrnes's views, avert American diplomaticconcessions, and put the squeeze on the Russians.64"TheUnited States,"army planners explained, "must be able to prevent,by forceif necessary,Russian domination of eitherEurope or Asia to the extentthat the resourcesof eithercontinent could be mobilizedagainst the United States." Which countriesin Eurasia were worthfighting over remained unclear during 1946. But army and navy officialsas well as the joint chiefs advocateda far-reachingprogram of foreigneconomic assistance coupled withthe refurbishmentof Americanmilitary forces.65 During late 1946 and early 1947, the Truman administrationassumed the initiativeby creatingGerman Bizonia, providingmilitary assistance to Greece and Turkey, allocating massive economic aid to Western Europe, and reassessing

62 [Giffin]"U.S. Policywith Respect to Russia" [earlyApril 1946]. Also see Giffin,Draft of Proposed Commentsfor AssistantSecretary of War on "ForeignPolicy," [early February 1946]; MID, "Intelligence Estimate,"June 25, 1946;JPS, "Estimate of ProbableDevelopments in theWorld Political Situation," October 31, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 (10-9-46),JPS 814/1;Special Ad Hoc Committeeof SWNCC, "Studyon U.S. Assistanceto France,"April 9, 1947, RG 165, ser. ABC 400.336 France(3-20-47); MID, "WorldPolitical Developments,"April 14, 1947; JWPC, "The SovietThreat againstthe IberianPeninsula and the Means Requiredto MeetIt," May 8, 1947,RG 218,ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JWPC465/1; and CIA, "Reviewof the WorldSituation," September 26, 1947.With regard to China,the Joint Chiefs of Staffstressed the importance of Sovietaid to Chinesecommunist forces in late 1945. But both naval and armyintelligence were fully cognizantof thecorruption and ineptnessof nationalistforces and of the indigenousappeal of the Chinese communistparty. The importantpoint, from the perspectiveof Americandefense officials, was thatChinese communistvictories would offer the Soviets control over critical resources and enablethem to achievegreater defensein depthin partsof AsiaticRussia. See, forexample, Patterson, Notes on CabinetMeeting, August 2, 1946,RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 2; Minutesof the meetingsof the Secretariesof State,War, and Navy, SeptemberI1, 1946,February 12, 1947,June 20, 1947,ibd., box 3; Lincoln,Proposed Memorandum for the Secretariesof War and Navy[September 1946], NHC, SPD, ser. 12, box 158, C2 (4); RichardM. Phillips. Memorandum,September 6, 1946,ibid.; Charles J. Rend,Memorandum of Information,June 3, 1947,ibid., ser.5, box 110,A8; NimitztoJCS,June 9, 1947,ibid., box 109,A1;JWPC, "Moonrise,"June 16, 1947,RG 218, ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JWPC 476/1; MID, "SovietInfluence in China,"June 16, 1947,RG 319, P&O, 350.05(top secret); and SWNCC,"United States Policy Toward China,"June 11, 1947,FRUS, 1947,7: 838-48. 63JCS, "Foreign Policy of theUnited States," February 10, 1946. 64 Lincolnto Hull [April1946], RG 59, Officeof EuropeanAffairs, box 17; Lincoln,Memorandum for the Record,April 16, 1946; Lincolnto Hull, April16, 1946,RG 165,ser. ABC 092 USSR (11-15-44);Lincoln to Cohen,June 22, 1946,ibid., ABC 381 (9-1-45);Richard L. Conolly,oral history(Columbia, 1960), 293-304; Lincoln,Memorandum for Chief of Staff,May 20, 1946; and Lincoln,Memorandum for Norstad, July 23, 1946,USMA, GLP, War Departmentfiles. 65 Giffin,"Draft of ProposedComments" [early February 1946]. Also see, forexample, JCS, "Foreign Policy of the UnitedStates," February 10, 1946; [Giffin]"U.S. Policywith Respect to Russia"[early April 19461; JCS, "PoliticalEstimate of SovietPolicy," April 5, 1946; and Sherman,Memorandum for Forrestal, March 17, 1946, ML, JFP,box 24. TheAmerican Conception of National Security 371 economic policytoward Japan. These initiativeswere aimed primarilyat tackling the internalsources of unrest upon which communistparties capitalized and at rehabilitatingthe industrial heartlands of Eurasia. American defense officials supportedthese actions and acquiesced in the decisionto give priorityto economic aid rather than rearmament. Service officersworking on foreign assistance programsof the State-War-NavyCoordinating Committee supported economic aid, showed sensitivityto the socioeconomicsources of unrest,and recognizedthat economicaid was likelyto be the mostefficacious means of preservinga favorable balance of power in Eurasia.66Because theyjudged Americanmilitary power to be superiorand war to be unlikely,Forrestal, Lovett, and Webb insistedthat military spendingnot interferewith the implementationof the MarshallPlan, rehabilitation of Germany,and revivalof Japan. "In the necessarilydelicate apportioning of our available resources,"wrote Assistant Secretary of War Peterson,"the timeelement permitspresent emphasis on strengtheningthe economicand social dikes against Sovietcommunism rather than upon preparingfor a possiblyeventual, but not yet inevitable,war."67 Yet if war should unexpectedlyoccur, the United States had to have the capabilityto inflictincalculable damage upon the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Truman shelved (after some serious consideration)proposals for international controlof atomicenergy. The Baruch Plan, as it evolvedin the springand summer of 1946, was heavilyinfluenced by defenseofficials and serviceofficers who wished to avoid any significantcompromise with the Soviet Union. They sought to perpetuateAmerica's nuclear monopolyas long as possiblein order to counterbal- ance Sovietconventional strength, deter Sovietadventurism, and bolsterAmerican negotiatingleverage. When negotiationsat the United Nations for international controlof atomicenergy languished for lack of agreementon its implementation, the way was clear for the Truman administrationgradually to adopt a strategy based on air power and atomic weapons. This strategywas initiallydesigned to destroythe adversary'swill and capabilityto wage war by annihilatingRussian industrial,petroleum, and urban centers.68After completing their studyof the

66 See, forexample, SWNCC, "Policies,Procedures, and Costsof Assistanceby the UnitedStates to Foreign Countries,"April 21, 1947,FRUS, 1947, 3: 204-20; ibid.,1: 725-34; JCS, "UnitedStates Assistance to Other Countries,"ibid., 734-50, 762-63; and Lincolnto Peterson,May 2, 1947,RG 165,ser. ABC 400.336 (3-20-47). Alsosee themany SWNCC subcommitteereports on individualcountries, ibid.: Report of theWorking Group on EconomicAid to the Special Ad Hoc Committeeof the SWNCC, "ForeignNeeds for UnitedStates EconomicAssistance during the Next Three to Five Years" [July1947], RG 353, box 134; and Reportof RearmamentSubcommittee to SpecialAd Hoc Committee,July 10, 1947,RG 165,ser. ABC 400.336(3-20-47). 67 Peterson,as quotedin Chiefof Staff,Memorandum July 1947], RG 165,ser. ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45). Alsosee, for exainple, Lovett diaries, December 16, 1947,January5, 15, 1948;Baruch to Forrestal,February 7, 1948, ML, JFP, box 78; Forrestalto Baruch,February 10, 1948,ibid.; and Excerptof Phone Conversation betweenForrestal and C. E. Wilson,April 2, 1948,ibid., box 48. 68 These generalizationsare based on the followingmaterials: Stimson, Memorandum for the President, September11, 1945,RG 107,RPPP, safe file, box 1; Forrestal,Memorandum, September 21, 1945,ML, JFP, box 48; MathiaF. Correa to Forrestal,September 27, 1945,ibid., box 28; Forrestal,Memorandum for the President,October 1; 1945,HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 158;documents in HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 199; RG 165,ser. ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45); "Brief of LettersAddressed to Mr. Baruchby Each of the Membersof theJCS" June1946], Bernard Baruch Papers [hereafter, BBP], ML, box 65; Dennison,Draft Reply to Letterfrom Mr. Baruch,June4, 1946,NHC CNO, doublezero files, folder 31; and Minutesof the meeting of the Secretaries of State,War, and Navy,January 29, 1947,RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3. For the negotiationsat the United Nations,see FRUS, 1947, 1: 327-614; also see Herken,Winning Weapon; Larry G. Gerber,"The BaruchPlan 372 AHR Forum

1946 Bikini atomic tests,the Joint Chiefs of Staffin July 1947 called for an enlargementof the nuclear arsenal. While Truman and Forrestalinsisted on limitingmilitary expenditures, government officials moved vigorouslyto solve problemsin the productionof plutonium,to improvenuclear cores and assembly devices,and to increasethe numberof aircraftcapable of deliveringatomic bombs. Aftermuch initialpostwar disorganization, the GeneralAdvisory Committee to the AtomicEnergy Commission could finallyreport to the presidentat the end of 1947 that"great progress" had been made in the atomicprogram. From June 30, 1947, to June 30, 1948, the numberof bombs in the stockpileincreased from thirteen to fifty.Although at the timeof the Berlincrisis the UnitedStates was not preparedto launch a strategicair offensiveagainst the Soviet Union, substantialprogress had been made in the developmentof the nation'sair-atomic capabilities. By the end of 1948, the United States had at least eighteennuclear-capable B-50s, four B-36s, and almostthree times as manynuclear-capable B-29s as had been availableat the end of 1947.69 During late 1947 and early 1948, the administrationalso responded to pleas of theJoint Chiefs of Staffto augmentthe overseasbase systemand to acquirebases in closerproximity to the SovietUnion. Negotiationswere conductedwith the British to gain access to bases in the Middle East and an agreementwas concluded forthe acquistionof air facilitiesin Libya. Admiral Conolly made a secretdeal withthe French to secure air and communicationrights and to stockpileoil, aviationgas, and ammunitionin North Africa.70Plans also were discussed forpostoccupation bases in Japan,and considerableprogress was made in refurbishingand construct- ing airfieldsin Turkey. During 1948 the Turks also receivedone hundred eighty F-47 fighter-bombers,thirty B-26 bombers,and eighty-oneC-47 cargo planes. The F-47s and B-26s,capable of reachingthe vitalPloesti and Baku oil fields,were more likelyto be used to slow down a Soviet advance throughTurkey or Iran, thereby and theOrigins of theCold War,"Diplomatic Histoiy, 6 (1982): 69-95; Bernstein,"Quest for Security," 1033-44; and Rosenberg,"Hydrogen Bomb Decision,"66-71. 69For the viewsof the GeneralAdvisory Committee, see RobertOppenheimer to Truman,December 31, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 200; forthe viewsof theJCS, see, forexample, JCS, "Guidanceon Military Aspectsof UnitedStates Policy to Be Adoptedin Eventof ContinuingImpasse in Acceptanceof International Controlof AtomicEnergy,"July 14, 1947,RG 165,ser. ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45),JCS 1764/1; and Leahyto theSecretaries of Warand theNavy, August 13, 1947,NHC, CNO, doublezero files, 1947, folder 13; and, for the size and qualityof the stockpileand the numberof nuclear-capableaircraft, see especiallyDavid Alan Rosenberg,"U.S. NuclearStockpile, 1945 to 1950,"Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 38 (1982); 25-30. The numberof nuclear-capableB-29s grew with great rapidityat the end of 1948. One memorandumin early 1949 enumeratedeighty-three such planes; see 0. S. Picher,Memorandum for Colonel Page, February14, 1949, RG 330, box 126, CD 33-1-4.Both Borowskiand Rosenberghave stressedthe problemsbeleaguering the StrategicAir Commanduntil the Korean War, but theirwork also illustratesthe significantchanges and improvementsthat began to occur late in 1947 and especiallyduring 1948. See Borowski,Hollow Threat; David Alan Rosenberg,"The Originsof Overkill:Nuclear Weapons and AmericanStrategy, 1945-1960," InternationalSecurity, 7 (1983): 11-27. 70 For negotiationswith the Britishover MiddleEast strategyand bases,see FRUS, 1947, 5: 485-626; and Sullivanto theActing Secretary of State,September 26, 1947,NHC, SPD, ser.5, box 110,A14; forfacilities in Libya,see, for example, Leahy to theSecretary of Defense,March 18, 1948,RG 319,P&O, 092 (topsecret); and FRUS, 1948, 3: 906-07; and, for negotiationswith the French,see Spaatz to Symington,[October 1947], RG 107,Office of theAssistant Secretary of War forAir, 1947, 090, box 187B; Symingtonto Spaatz,October 30, 1947,ibid., Wooldridge, Memorandum for Op-09, October 13, 1948,NHC, CNO, doublezero files. 1948, box 4 (29); and Wooldridge,Memorandum for Op-09, October 25, 1948,ibid., SPD, centralfiles, 1948, A14. For bases in NorthAfrica, see Forrestalto Truman,January 6, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 156; also see FRUS, 1948, 1: 603-04, 674-76. TheAmerican Conception of National Securit 373 affordingtime to activatea strategicair offensivefrom prospectivebases in the Cairo-Suez area.71 Despite these developments,the joint chiefsand militaryplanners grew increas- ingly uneasy with the budgetaryconstraints under which they operated. They realized thatAmerican initiatives, however necessary, placed the Soviet Union on the defensive,created an incendiarysituation, and made war more likely-though still improbable. In July 1947, intelligenceanalysts in the War Department maintainedthat the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had resultedin a more aggressive Soviet attitude toward the United States and had intensified tensions."These tensionshave caused a sharperline of demarcationbetween West and East tending to magnifythe significanceof conflictingpoints of view, and reducing the possibilityof agreementon any point." Intelligenceofficers under- stood thatthe Sovietswould perceiveAmerican efforts to build strategichighways, constructairfields, and transferfighter bombers to Turkey as a threatto Soviet securityand to the oilfieldsin the Caucuses. The latter,noted the directorof naval intelligence,"lie withineasy air strikingrange of countrieson her southernflank, and the Sovietleaders willbe particularlysensitive to any politicalthreat from this area, howeverremote." Intelligence analysts also recognizedthat the Sovietswould view the MarshallPlan as a threatto Sovietcontrol in Eastern Europe as well as a death-knellto communistattempts to capturepower peacefullyin WesternEurope. And defenseofficials were well aware thatthe Sovietswould reactangrily to plans forcurrency reform in German Trizonia and to preparationsfor a West German republic. "The whole Berlin crisis,"army planners informedEisenhower, "has arisen as a resultof. .. actions on the part of the WesternPowers." In sum, the Sovietclampdown in Eastern Europe and the attemptto blockade Berlin did not come as shocks to defense officials,who anticipatedhostile and defensiveSoviet reactionsto Americaninitiatives.72 The real consternationof theJoint Chiefs of Staffand otherhigh-ranking civilian and militaryofficials in the defense agencies stemmed from their growing convictionthat the United States was undertakingactions and assumingcommit- mentsthat now required greatermilitary capabilities. Recognizing that American initiatives,aimed at safeguardingEurasia fromfurther communist inroads, might

71 For references to Japanese bases, see, for example, "Discussion of Need of Obtaining Long-Term Rights for a U.S. Naval Operating Base in Japan" (approved by Nimitz) [Autumn 1947], NHC, SPD, ser. 4, box 86; Nimitz to Under Secretaryof the Navy, December 12, 1947, ibid.,ser. 5, box 110; and Denfeld, Memorandum for Schuyler, February 20, 1948, ibid.,central files, 1948, box 245, EF37; for the transferof planes to Turkey, see Report No. 29, March 12, 1949, RG 59, 867.00/5-1249; and, for the uses of militaryassistance to Turkey, see Leffler,"The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-52." 72 MID, "Estimate of the Possibilityof War," July 21, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); Op-32 to General Board, April 28, 1948, NHC, General Board 425 (serial 315); and "National MilitaryEstablishment Views on Germany" [appended to memorandum for Maddocks], June 30, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For the repercussions of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, see Chamberlin to Chief of Staff, July 9, 1947, RG 165, Records of the Chief of Staff,091 Greece; and Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the President,November 7, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; and, for a similarview in the State Department, see FRUS, 1947, 1: 770-75. For prospective Soviet reactions to American assistance to Turkey, also see General Board, "National Securityand the Navy," enclosure D,June 25, 1948; and Conolly to CNO, December 4, 1947, NHC, Operations Division, ser. 1, A4/FF7. For assessments of Soviet reactions to Westerin initiatives in Germany, also see Hillenkoetter, Memoranda for the President, March 16, 1948, and June 9, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; CIA, "Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany," April 28, 1948, ibid.,box 255; and Inglis, Memorandum of Information, April 3, 1948, NHC, Operations Division, ser. 1. box 3. 374 AHR Forum

be perceivedas endangeringSoviet interests,it was all the more importantto be readyfor any eventuality.Indeed, to the extentthat anxieties about the prospectsof war escalatedin March and April 1948, thesefears did not stemfrom estimates that the Sovietswere planningfurther aggressive action after the communistseizure of power in Czechoslovakiabut fromnapprehensions that ongoing American initiatives mightprovoke an attack.On March 14 General S. J. Chamberlin,director of army intelligence,warned the chief of staffthat "actions taken by this countryin opposition to the spread of Communism ... may decide the question of the outbreak of war and of its timing."The criticalquestion explicitlyfaced by the intelligenceagencies and by the highestpolicy makers was whetherpassage of the SelectiveService Act,or of universalmilitary training, or of additionalappropria- tions for the air force,or of a militaryassistance program to WesternEuropean countries,or of a resolutionendorsing American support for West European Union would triggera Soviet attack.Chamberlin judged, for example, that the Sovietswould not go to war just to make Europe communistbut would resortto war if theyfelt threatened. The great imponderable,of course, was what,in the Sovietview, would constitutea securitythreat justifying war.73 Recognizingthe need to move ahead withplanned initiativesbut fearingSoviet countermeasures,the newlyformed staff of the National SecurityCouncil under- took itsfirst comprehensive assessment of Americanforeign policy. During March 1948, after consultingwith representativesof the army, navy, air force, State Department,CIA, and National SecurityResources Board, the National Security Council staffproduced NSC 7, "The Positionof the United Stateswith Respect to Soviet-DominatedWorld Communism."This studybegan withthe commonplace assumptionthat the communistgoal was "worldconquest." The studythen went on to express the omnipresenttheme behind all conceptionsof American national securityin the immediatepostwar years. "Between the United Statesand the USSR thereare in Europe and Asia areas of greatpotential power whichif added to the existingstrength of the Sovietworld would enable the latterto become so superior in manpower,resources, and territorythat the prospect for the survivalof the United Statesas a free nationwould be slight."Accordingly, the studycalled, first, forthe strengtheningof the militarypotential of the United Statesand, second,for the armingof the non-Sovietworld, particularlyWestern Europe. Althoughthis staffstudy was never formallyapproved, the nationalsecurity bureaucracy worked during the spring and summer of 1948 for West European unity, military assistanceto friendlynations, currency reform in Trizonia, revitalizationof the Ruhr,and the foundingof the Federal Republic of Germany.74

73 For Chamberlin's views, see, for example, Chamberlin, Memoranidum to the Chief of Staff,March 14, 1948; and Chamberlin, Memorandum for Wedemeyer, April 14, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For the view from Moscow, sce JIC, "Soviet Intention-s,"April 1, 1948 (extracts of this report are printed in FRUS, 1948, 1: 550-57); also see, for example, Hillenkoetter,Memorandum for the President, March 16, 1948; CIA, Special Evaluation No. 27, March 16, 1948; Inglis, Memorarndum of Information, March 16, 1948; CIA, "Possibilityof Direct Soviet MilitaryAction during 1948," April 2, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; and CIA, "Review of the World Situation," April 8, 1948, ibid.,box 203. 7- For NSC 7, see FRUS, 1948, 1: 545-50; for reactions and reservationsof the State Department and the JCS, see ibid., 557-64; and, for the support of Western Union, see ibid., 3: 1-351. Also see, for example, materials in R(; 218, Leahy Papers, boxes 5, 6; ibid., ser. (,(C,S 092 Western Europe (3-12-48). For military TheAmerican Conception of National Security 375

The priorityaccorded to WesternEurope did not mean thatofficials ignored the restof Eurasia. Indeed, the sustainedeconomic rejuvenationof WesternEurope made access to Middle Eastern oil more importantthan ever. Marshall,Lovett, Forrestal,and other defense officials,including the joint chiefs, feared that Americansupport of Israel mightjeopardize relationswith Arab nationsand drive theminto the hands of the SovietUnion. AlthoughTruman acceptedthe partition of Palestineand recognized Israel, the United States maintainedan embargo on armsshipments and soughtto avoid too close an identificationwith the Zioniststate lest the flowof oil to the West be jeopardized.75At the same time,the Truman administrationmoved swiftlyin June 1948 to resuscitatethe Japanese economy. Additional funds were requested from Congress to procure imports of raw materialsfor Japanese industryso thatJapanese exportsmight also be increased. Shortlythereafter, Draper, Tracy S. Voorhees, and other army officialscame to believe that a rehabilitatedJapan would need the marketsand raw materialsof SoutheastAsia. They undertooka comprehensiveexamination of the efficacyand utilityof a Marshall Plan for Asia. IntegratingJapan and SoutheastAsia into a viable regional economy,invulnerable to communistsubversion and firmlyen- sconced in the Westerncommunity, assumed growingsignificance, especially in viewof the prospectof a communisttriumph in China.76But communistvictories in China did not dissuade policymakersfrom supporting, for strategicas well as domestic politicalconsiderations, the appropriationof hundreds of millionsof dollars in additionalaid to the Chinese nationalistsin the springof 1948. And the Americancommitment to preservethe integrityof South Korea actuallyincreased, despitethe planned withdrawalof occupationforces.77 assistance,see FRUS, 1948, 1: 585-88; also see materialsin RG 330, boxes22 and 24, CD 6-2-46and 6-2-49; RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);Lawrence S. Kaplan,A CommunityofInterests: NATO and theMilitary Assistance Program,1948-1951 (Washington,1980); Condit,History of theJCS, 2: 409-36; and ChesterJ. Pach,"Arming theFree World: The Originsof the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1949" (Ph.D. dissertation, NorthwesternUniversity, 1981). For Germany,see especiallyFRUS, 1948, 2: 1-1340; and Smith,Papers of GeneralLucius D. Clay,2: 527-969. 75See,for example, FRUS, 1948, 5: 545-54, 972-76, 1005-07, 1021-22,1380-8 1; CNO to theSecretary of theNavy, January 24, 1948,NHC, CNO, doublezero files, 1948, box 2; Leahy,Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,October 10, 1947, RG 330, box 20, CD 6-1-8;Millis, Forrestal Diaries, 344-49, 356-65, 376-77; Bain,March to Zion, 137-213; and Miller,Search for Security, 173-203. 76 For the rehabilitationof Japan, see SpecialAd Hoc Committee[of SWNCC], Country Report on Japan, August8, 1947, RG 353, box 109; Blum to Ohly,December 22, 1947, RG 330, box 9, CD 3-1-9;Blum to Forrestal,December 29, 1947,ibid.; Royall to Forrestal,April 28, 1948,ibid.; Royall, Memorandum for the Secretaryof Defense,May 18, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 182; and CIA, "StrategicImportance of Japan," May24, 1948,ibid., box 255, Also see FRUS, 1948,6: 654-56, 694-95, 712-17,733-34, 750-51, 964-65. For Japanand SoutheastAsia, see Ad Hoc Committee,"Study of a UnitedStates Aid Programfor the Far East," February16, 1949,RG 319, P&O, 092 Pacific(top secret);and Schaller,"Securing the Great Crescent," 392- 414. 77 In recentyears scholars have shownthat the limitedaid to China was not simplya consequenceof the influenceof the China lobbyand the administration'sconcern with the legislativefate of the European RecoveryProgram. Some policymakers(especially military officers) also weremotivated by fear of thestrategic and geopoliticalconsequences of a communisttakeover in China, even thoughthey fully recognized the ineptitudeof theChinese nationalists. See, forexample, John H. Feaver,"The ChinaAid Billof 1948:Limited Assistanceas a Cold War Strategy,"Diplomatic History, 5 (1981): 107-20; RussellD. Buhite,"Major Interests: AmericanPolicy toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1945-50,"Paciflc Historical Review, 47 (1978): 425-51; and ThomasG. Paterson,"If Europe,Why Not China?The ContainmentDoctrine, 1947-49," Prologe, 13 (1981): 19-38. For a fineanalysis of developmentsin bothChina and Korea,see Stueck,Road to Confrontation, 31-1 10; and, foraid to China,also see FRUS, 1948, 8: 1-269, 442-601. 376 AHR Forum

The problem withall of these undertakings,however, was thatthey cost large sums, expanded the nation'sformal and informalcommitments, and necessitated larger militarycapabilities. Yet on March 24, 1948, just as NSC 7 was being finished,Truman's Council of Economic Advisorswarned thataccelerating expen- ditures might compel the president "to set aside free market practices-and substitutea rathercomprehensive set of controls."Truman was appalled by this possibilityand carefullylimited the sums allocated for a build-up of American forces.78Key advisers,like Webb, Marshall,Lovett, and Clifford,supported this approach because theyperceived too much fatin the militarybudget, expected the Sovietsto relyon politicaltactics rather than militaryaggression, postulated latent U.S. militarysuperiority over the SovietUnion, and assumed thatthe atomicbomb constituteda decisive, if perhaps short-term,trump card. For many American policymakers, moreover, the Iranian crisisof 1946, the Greek civilwar, and the ongoing Berlin airliftseemed to demonstratethat Russia would back down when confrontedwith American determination, even if the United Statesdid not have superiorforces-in-being.79 As secretaryof defense, however, Forrestal was beleaguered by pressures emanatingfrom the armed servicesfor a build-upof Americanmilitary forces and by his own apprehensionsover prospectiveSoviet actions. He anguished over the excruciatinglydifficult choices that had to be made between the imperativesof foreigneconomic aid, overseasmilitary assistance, domestic rearmament, and fiscal orthodoxy.In May,June, and July 1948, he and his assistantscarefully pondered intelligencereports on Soviet intentionsand requesteda special State Department studyon how to plan Americandefense expenditures in viewof prospectiveSoviet policies. He also studied carefullythe conclusionsof an exhaustivestudy of the navy'scontribution to national securityundertaken by the General Board of the navy under the direct supervisionof Captain Arleigh Burke. Still not satisfied, Forrestalasked the presidentto permitthe National SecurityCouncil to conduct another comprehensive examination of American policy objectives. Forrestal clearly hoped that this reassessmentwould show that a larger proportion of resourcesshould be allocated to the militaryestablishment.80

78 Edwin G. Nourse, Leon Keyserling,and Clark to Truman, March 24, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 143; Truman to Nourse, March 25, 1948, ibid.; Statement by the President to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretariesof the Three Departments, and the Three Chiefs of Staff,May 13, 1948, ibid.,box 146; and Truman to Forrestal,July 13, 1948, RG 330, box 18, CD 5-1-20. 79 For the views of Lovett and Webb, see Lovett diaries, December 16, 1947, January 15, 1948, April 21, 1948; for Clifford's view of the importance of the atomic bomb, see Clifford,Oral History, 88; and, for Marshall's reliance on the atomic bomb, see McNarney, Memorandum for the JCS, November 2, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 114. Also see Policy Planning Staff[hereafter, PPS], "Factors Affectingthe Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies,"June 23, 1948, RG 330, box 4, CD 2-2-2; and Lovett to Forrestal,June 25, 1948, ibid. For the lessons derived from crisis decision making over Iran, Greece, and Turkey, see John R. Oneal, ForeignPolicy Making in Timesof Crises(Columbus, 1982). 80 For the conflictingpressures on Forrestal and his own uncertainties,see, for example, Excerpt of Phone Conversation between Forrestal and C. E. Wilson, April 2, 1948, ML, JFP, box 48; Excerpt of Phone Conversation between Forrestal and Cannon, April 9, 1948, ibid.; and Forrestal to Ralph Bard, November 20, 1948, ibid., box 78; for Forrestal's intense interest in the assessments of Soviet intentions,see Forrestal to Charles A. Buchanan [July1948], RG 330, box 4, CD 2-2-2; and John McCone to Forrestal, July7, 1948, ibid., for Forrestal'srequest for a State Department study,see Lovett to Forrestal,June 25, 1948; for the naval study and Forrestal's interest therein, see General Board, "National Security and Navy," June 25, 1948; Arleigh TheAmerican Conception of National Security 377

The PolicyPlanning Staff of the Departmentof State prepared the initialstudy that Forrestalrequested and Truman authorized.Extensively redrafted it reap- peared in November1948 as NSC 20/4and was adopted as the definitivestatement of American foreignpolicy. Significantly,this paper reiteratedthe longstanding estimatethat the SovietUnion was notlikely to resortto war to achieveits objectives. But war could eruptas a resultof "Sovietmiscalculation of the determinationof the UnitedStates to use all the means at itscommand to safeguardits security, through Soviet misinterpretationof our intentions,and through U.S. miscalculationof Soviet reactionsto measures which we mighttake." Immediatelyfollowing this appraisal of the prospects of war, the National SecurityCouncil restated its conception of American national security:"Soviet dominationof the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by politicaland subversivemeans, would be strategicallyand politicallyunacceptable to the United States."8' Yet NSC 20/4did not call fora largermilitary budget. With no expectationthat war was imminent,the report emphasized the importanceof safeguardingthe domesticeconomy and leftunresolved the extentto which resourcesshould be devoted to militarypreparations. NSC 20/4 also stressed "that Soviet political warfaremight seriously weaken the relativeposition of the United States,enhance Sovietstrength and eitherlead to our ultimatedefeat short of war,or forceus into war under dangerouslyunfavorable conditions." Accordingly, the NationalSecuri- ty Council vaguelybut stridentlypropounded the importanceof reducingSoviet powerand influenceon the peripheryof the Russianhomeland and of strengthen- ing the pro-Americanorientation of non-Sovietnations.82 Language of thissort, which did not defineclear prioritiesand whichprojected Americaninterests almost everywhereon the globe, exasperatedthe joint chiefs and othermilitary officers. They, too, believedthat the United Statesshould resist communistaggression everywhere, "an overall commitmentwhich in itselfis all- inclusive."But to undertakethis goal in a responsibleand effectivefashion it was necessary"to bringour militarystrength to a level commensuratewith the distinct possibilityof global warfare."The JointChiefs of Staffstill did not thinkthe Soviets wantedwar. But, giventhe long-termintentions attributed to the SovietUnion and givenAmerica's own aims,the chances forwar, though still small, were growing.83 Particularlyworrisome were studies during 1948 suggestingthat, should war

Burke,Oral History,NHC, 2: 30; and, forForrestal's request and fora comprehensivestudy of American policyand Truman'sresponses, see Trumanto Forrestal,July13, 1948,RG 330,box 18,CD 5-1-20;Truman to Forrestal,July 15, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 150; and FRUS, 1948, 1: 589-93. 81 NCS 20/1and 20/4may be foundin Gaddisand Etzold,Containment, 173-211 (thequotations appear on page 208). Also see FRUS, 1948, 1: 589-93, 599-601, 609-11, 615-24, 662-69. 82 Gaddisand Etzold,Containment, 209-10. 83 NSC 35, "ExistingInternational Commitments Involving the PossibleUse of ArmedForces," November 17, 1948,FRUS, 1948, 1: 656-62. For assessmentsof Sovietintentions and the prospectsof war,see the citationsin note 74, pages 374-75, above; also see CIA, "Possibilityof DirectSoviet Military Action during 1948-49," September16, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; CIA, "Threatsto the Securityof the United States,"September 28, 1948, ibid.,box 256; COMNAVFORGER, IntelligenceReport, September 30, 1948, NHC, SPD, centralfiles, 1948, box 245, EF61; JSPC, "RevisedBrief of Short-RangeEmergency Plan: Fleetwood,"October 14, 1948,RG 218,ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JSPC877/23; and FRUS, 1948, 1: 648-50, and 5: 942-47. 378 AHR Forum occur, the United States would have difficultyimplementing basic strategic undertakings.Although the armed servicesfought bitterly over the division of funds, they coincurredfully on one subject-the $15 billion ceiling on military spending set by Truman was inadequate. In November 1948, militaryplanners argued that the $14.4 billion budget would jeopardize American militaryopera- tions by constrictingthe speed and magnitude of the strategicair offensive, curtailingconventional bombing operations against the Soviet Union, reducing America'sability to provide naval assistanceto Mediterraneanallies, undermining the nation's abilityto control Middle East oil at the onset of a conflict,and weakeninginitial overall offensivecapabilities. On November 9, the joint chiefs informedthe secretaryof defense that the existingbudget for fiscal 1950 was "insufficientto implementnational policy in any probablewar situationthat can be foreseen."84 From the viewpointof the national militaryestablishment, the deficiencyof forces-in-beingwas just one of severalproblems. Forrestal told Marshallthat he was more concerned about the absence of sufficientstrength to support international negotiationsthan he was about the availabilityof forcesto combat overt acts of aggression,which were unlikelyin any case. During 1948, thejoint chiefsalso grew increasinglyagitated over the wideninggap betweenAmerican commitments and interestson the one hand and American militarycapabilities on the other. In Novemnber,the JointChiefs of Staffsubmitted to the National SecurityCouncil a comprehensivelist of the formaland informalcommitments that already had been incurredby the United States government.According to thejoint chiefs,"current United States commitmentsinvolving the use or distinctlypossible use of armed forcesare verygreatly in excess of our presentability to fulfillthem either promptly or effectively."Limited capabilitiesmeant that the use of American forcesin any specificsituation-for example, in Greece, Berlin, or Palestine-threatened to emasculatethe nation'sability to respond elsewhere.85

HAVING CONCEIVED OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY in termsof Westerncontrol and of American access to the resources of Eurasia outside the Soviet sphere, American defense officialsnow considered it imperativeto develop American militarycapabilities to meet a host of contingenciesthat might emanate from

84JCS, Denfeld, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, November 8, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 370 (8-19-45), JCS 1800/14. For the impact of the $14.4 billion budget on strategicplans, see JCS, "Allocation of Forces and Funds for the FY 1950 Budget," November 22, 1948, RG 330, box 16, "Draper: BuLdgetFile," JCS, 1800/18; for overall problems facing strategic plan-ners,see the voluminous studies in RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); and, for a few examples of the problems in implementing strategicplans, see JLPG, "Quick FeasibilityTest of JSPG 496/4," March 19, 1948, ibid.,jLPG 84/5; ICS, "Ihe Logistic Feasibilityof Doublestar," August 12, 1948, ibid.,JCS 1844/15; JLPG, "SuLpplyPriorities, for Fleetwood," October 15, 1948, ibid.,JLPG 84/31; and JLPC, "The Correction of Deficiencies Revealed by the LimnitedFeasibility test of ABC 101," December 23, 1948, ibid., JLPC 416/36. In late 1948 and 1949 the navy challenged fundamental aspects of the strategic air offensive. See the studies in ibid., ser. CCS 373 (10-23-48); also see Rosenberg, "HydrogeniBomb Decision," 71-75. For service rivalriesarid the budgetary process, see, for example, Warner R. Schillinig,"The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling et al., Strategp,Politics, anid Defense Budgets(New York, 1962), 5-266. 85 For the position of the JCS, see NSC 35, "Existing International Commitments," November 17, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 1: 656-62. For Forrestal's view, see ibid., 644-46. For background, see William A. Knowlton, TheAmenican Conception of National Security 379 furtherSoviet encroachments or fromindigenous communist unrest. Such contin- gencieswere sure to arise because Americanstrategy depended so heavilyon the rebuildingof Germanyand Japan, Russia's traditionalenemies, as well as on air power, atomic weapons, and bases on the Soviet periphery.86Such contingencies also were predictable because American strategydepended so heavily on the restorationof stabilityin Eurasia, a situationincreasingly unlikely in an era of nationalistturmoil, social unrest,and risingeconomic expectations.87 Although the desire of the national militaryestablishment for large incrementsin defense expendituresdid not prevailin the tightbudgetary environment and presidential electionyear of 1948, the mode of thinkingabout nationalsecurity that subsequent- ly acceleratedthe arms race and precipitatedmilitary interventionismi in Asia was alreadywidespread among defense officials. Indeed, the dynamicsof the Cold War after1948 are easierto comprehendwhen one grasps the breadth of the Americanconception of nationalsecurity that had emergedbetween 1945 and 1948.88 This conceptionincluded a strategicsphere of influencewithin the WesternHemisphere, domination of the Atlanticand Pacific oceans, an extensivesystem of outlyingbases to enlarge the strategicfrontier and projectAmerican power, an even more extensivesystem of transitrights to facilitate the conversionof commercialair bases to militaryuse, access to the resourcesand marketsof mostof Eurasia, denial of those resourcesto a prospectiveenemy, and the maintenanceof nuclear superiority.Not everyone of theseingredients, it must be emphasized, was considered vital. Hence, American officialscould acquiesce, howevergrudgingly, to a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe and could avoid direct interventionin China. But cumulativechallenges to these concepts of national securitywere certainto provokea firmAmerican response. This occurredinitially in 1947-48 when decisionswere made in favorof the Truman Doctrine,Marshall Plan, militaryassistance, Atlantic alliance, and Germanand Japanese rehabilitation. Soon thereafter,the "loss"of China, the Sovietdetonation of an atomicbomb, and the North Korean attackon South Korea intensifiedthe perceptionof threatto prevailingconcepts of national security.The Truman administrationresponded withmilitary assistance to southeastAsia, a decision to build the hydrogenbomib, directmilitary intervention in Korea, a commitmentto stationtroops permanently in Europe, expansion of the Americanalliance system,and a massiverearmament program in the United States. Postulatinga long-termSoviet intentionto gain

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,October 21, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret); for the reference to Greece, see JCS, "'The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," April 13, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 Greece (12-30-47), JCS 1826/8. 86 See, for example, the citations in notes 72-73, pages 373-74, above. 87 See, for example, CIA, "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for U.S. Security," September 3, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; CIA, "Review of the World Situation," Septemiber 16, 1948; and Inglis, Memorandurrmof Information, February 16, 1949, NHC, SPD, central files, 1949, box 249, All. 88 The view presented here of the expansive Arnerican conception of national securityconflicts in part with the one presented by John L. Gaddis's Strategiesof Containment:A CriticalAppraisal of Postwar American National SecurityPolicy (New York, 1981), 3-88. Gaddis's argument is thoughtf'uland insightfulbut relies too heavily on the recommendations of Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff. Indeed, the adoption of NSC 68 and the massive militarybuild-up that accompanied the Korean War are miucheasier to undeistand( if one grasps the expansive conception of national securitythat was pervasive in defense circles after WorldlWar II. 380 AHR Forum worlddomination, the Americanconception of nationalsecurity, based on geopolit- ical and economic imperatives,could not allow for additional losses in Eurasia, could not risk a challenge to its nuclear supremacy,and could not permit any infringementon its abilityto defend in depth or to projectAmerican force from areas in close proximityto the Soviet homeland. To say this is neither to exculpate the Soviet governmentfor its inhumane treatmentof its own citizensnor to suggestthat Soviet foreignpolicy was idle or benign. Indeed, Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe was often deplorable; the Soviets sought opportunitiesin the Dardanelles, northernIran, and Manchuria; the Sovietshoped to orientGermany and Austriatoward the East; and the Soviets sometimesendeavored to use communistparties to expand Soviet influencein areas beyond the peripheryof Russian militarypower. But, then again, the Soviet Union had lost twentymillion dead during the war, had experienced the destructionof seventeen hundred towns,thirty-one thousand factories,and one hundred thousandcollective farms, and had witnessedthe devastationof the rural economywith the Nazi slaughterof twentymillion hogs and seventeenmillion head of cattle.What is remarkableis thatafter 1946 thesemonumental losses received so littleattention when Americandefense analystsstudied the motivesand intentions of Sovietpolicy; indeed, defenseofficials did littleto analyzethe threatperceived by the Soviets. Yet these same officialshad absolutelyno doubt that the wartime experiencesand sacrificesof the United States,though much less devastatingthan thoseof SovietRussia, demonstrated the need forand entitledthe United Statesto oversee the resuscitationof the industrialheartlands of Germany and Japan, establisha viablebalance of power in Eurasia, and militarilydominate the Eurasian rimlands,thereby safeguarding American access to raw materialsand controlover all sea and air approaches to North America.89 To suggesta double standardis importantonly insofaras it raises fundamental questions about the conceptualizationand implementationof American national securitypolicy. If Soviet policywas aggressive,bellicose, and ideological,perhaps America'sreliance on overseasbases, air power,atomic weapons, military alliances, and the rehabilitationof Germanyand Japan was the best course to follow,even if the effectmay have been to exacerbate Soviet anxietiesand suspicions.But even when one attributesthe worstintentions to the Soviet Union, one mightstill ask whether American presuppositionsand apprehensions about the benefitsthat would accrue to the SovietUnion as a resultof communist(and even revolutionary nationalist)gains anywherein Eurasia tended to simplifyinternational realities, magnifythe breadth of American interests,engender commitmentsbeyond American capabilities,and dissipate the nation's strengthand credibility.And,

89 For Soviet losses, see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky,A Historyof Russia (3d edn., New York, 1977), 584-85. While Russian dead totaled almost twentymillion and while approximately 25 percent of the reproducible wealth of the Soviet Union was destroyed, American battlefieldcasualties were three hundred thousand dead, the index of industrial production in the United States rose from 100 to 196, and the gross national product increased from $91 billion to $166 billion. See Gordon Wright,The Ordeal of Total War (New York, 1968), 264-65. For an analysis of Soviet threat perception in the aftermathof World War II, see Michael McGwire, "The T hreat to Russia: An Estimate of Soviet MilitaryRequirements" (manuscript in preparation at the Brookings Institution [titletentative]). TheAmerican Conception of National Secuiity 381 perhaps even more importantly,if Sovietforeign policies tended to be opportunist, reactive,nationalistic, and contradictory,as some recentwriters have claimedand as some contemporaryanalysts suggested, then one might also wonder whether American capabilities,and dissipate the nation's strengthand credibility.And, engender anxieties and to provoke countermeasuresfrom a proud, suspicious, insecure,and cruel governmentthat was at the same timelegitimately apprehensive about the long-termimplications arising from the rehabilitationof traditional enemies and the development of foreignbases on the peripheryof the Soviet homeland. To raise such issues anew seems essentialin the 1980s, when a correct understandingof an adversary'sintentions, a shrewd grasp of an adversary's perceptionsof vital interests,and a sound assessmentof America'sown national securityimperatives seem to be indispensableprerequisites for the avoidance of nuclearwar and the establishmentof a saferclimate for great power competition.