DOCSLIB.ORG

Early Warning Issues for March Livingstone Formula Peace And

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Early Warning Issues for March Livingstone Formula Peace And CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE Early Warning Issues for 2010 AU Post-Summit Analysis 7 March 1 Country Analysis: Nigeria’s Pending PSC Issues 2 Niger Delta 10 Country Analysis: Niger 2 Peace, Security and AFRICOM 13 Election of PSC Members 4 Important Forthcoming Dates 15 Country Analysis: Comoros 6 No. 8, March 2010 This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at www.issafrica.org. All documents referred to in this Report can also be found on the ISS website. Peace and Security Council Protocol ‘The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council’ – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union Early Warning Issues that the Supreme Council for the convened. However, tensions have Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), resurfaced linked to the outcome for March the military junta which usurped of the poll which could escalate the power, had suspended the country’s crisis situation in the country. The scheduled Rotating Chair of new constitution and dissolved all the African Union (AU) Peace state institutions. The restoration Nigeria’s Niger Delta and Security Council (PSC) for of constitutional order has to be the month of March is Zambia. closely scrutinised to ensure that In the absence of a country’s the military leadership does not On 10 February 2010, the representation at ambassadorial entrench itself in power. Chairperson of the AU Commission, level, an alternate member will chair Jean Ping, commended the initiative the Council for the month. to install Goodluck Jonathan as Comoros Nigeria’s Acting Head of State in the absence of the Country’s President, Niger On 9 May 2007, the PSC issued a Umaru Yar’Adua, due to ill health. communiqué, PSC/MIN/Comm.1 The Chairperson commended the On 29 October 2009, the PSC (LXXVII), authorising the deployment authorities and people of Nigeria issued a communiqué, PSC/AHG/ of the African Union Electoral for demonstrating a ‘respect for COMM.3(CCVII), endorsing the and Security Assistance Mission the constitution, good governance, decision on Niger adopted by the (MAES) to the Comoros. On 30 democracy and the rule of law’. At a Extraordinary Summit of Economic April 2008, the PSC communiqué, regional level, on 23 June 2008 the Community of West African States PSC/PR/COMM(CXXIV), extended ECOWAS issued communiqué ECW/ (ECOWAS) Heads of State and the mandate of the MAES to assist A/OJUN34 applauding the Nigerian Government, held on 17 October the central government undertake Government’s Amnesty Programme 2009, in Abuja, Nigeria. Niger’s post-conflict reconstruction and which it extended to armed militia in political landscape was drastically oversee the forthcoming legislative the Niger Delta. The lengthy absence altered when on 18 February 2010 elections. The Council also urged of the country’s President Yar’Adua, a group of soldiers staged a military the island State authorities to create since 23 Novermber 2009, prompted coup and detained President an environment conducive to free, concerns about a political vacuum to Mamadou Tandja as well as several fair and democratic elections. In address insecurity in the Niger Delta. cabinet ministers. The leader of December 2009, after a series of the group, Salou Djibo, declared postponements, these polls were >>page 2 Livingstone Formula ‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/ PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs. This Report is an independent publication of the Institute for Security Studies. PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org Pending PSC Issues February 2010, issued its Decision engage with regional, continental Document on the Report of the and international actors. Issues pending for the Council Peace and Security Council on its Furthermore, the promise of a include: Activities and the Situation of Peace speedy return to constitutional and Security in Africa in which order has, at least for now, resulted it noted the ongoing mediation in an optimistic atmosphere among Panel of the Wise: process being facilitated by former key stakeholders in Niger as well Nigerian President Abdulsalami as in the international community. In January 2007, the AU Abubacar and urged the inter- However, the process that will Assembly of Heads of State Nigerien parties to fully cooperate indeed lead the country to reverse and Government endorsed the with the mediator. its previous trajectory will have Chairperson of the Commission’s to be closely monitored by both recommendation for the Crisis Escalation Potential: national and international actors. appointment of five esteemed The situation will need to be African personalities to serve transformed quickly in order to Niger’s political landscape was as members of the Panel of avoid the potential frustration and drastically altered when on 18 the Wise. At its 100th meeting factionalisation in the country’s February 2010 a group of soldiers on 12 November 2007, the relatively united opposition, staged a military coup and detained PSC adopted a set of detailed especially now that the ‘common President Mamadou Tandja as Modalities for the Functioning enemy’ has been removed from well as several cabinet ministers. of the Panel of the Wise. These the scene. The crisis escalation The leader of the group, Salou Modalities state that ‘members potential in Niger remains high Djibo, declared that the Supreme of the Panel serve for a period and the current transitional period Council for the Restoration of of three years. They shall be will have to deliver tangible results Democracy (CSRD) had suspended eligible for reappointment for relatively soon to assuage fears that the country’s new constitution only one more term’. The three this might be another military take- and dissolved all state institutions. year period for the first term of over which transforms itself into the Following the coup d’état, which the Panel concluded in January entrenchment of power. 2010. The PSC and the AU reportedly unfolded without major Commission have not issued a interruptions to the country’s communiqué indicating whether daily life, several towns witnessed Key Issues and Internal the terms of the Panel members thousands of people taking to Dynamics: have been renewed, or whether the streets to demonstrate what new Panel members have been was widely regarded as support The coup came after a series of appointed. for the coup. It was reported that meetings facilitated by the ECOWAS the CSRD committed itself to the appointed mediator in the Niger involvement of political parties as Crisis, former Nigerian President well as civil society organisations in Abubakar. The meetings achieved COUNTRY ANALYSIS the drafting of a new constitution little progress reportedly due to the and in the design of a transitional intransigence of President Tandja, process after the situation had been who rejected proposals which Niger stabilised. It also stated Tandja and would compel him to hand over other senior government officials power in less than a year and who were being kept in comfortable Previous PSC Communiqués insisted on maintaining the country’s conditions in the service quarters new controversial constitution. This and Recommendations: of the Presidency where the Red constitution was adopted following a Cross was provided with access to referendum that was declared illegal On 29 October 2009, the PSC them. Several days after the putsch, by both the country’s judiciary issued a communiqué, PSC/AHG/ the CSRD appointed Mahamadou (which was subsequently dissolved COMM.3(CCVII), endorsing the Danda as Prime Minister in a by Tandja) as well as a spectrum decision on Niger adopted by the transitional government. Danda was of international partners and Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS previously Minister for Information organisations. The new constitution Heads of State and Government, in the transitional government that would have enabled President held on 17 October 2009, in Abuja, was set up after Niger’s previous Tandja to extend his reign for a Nigeria. It also requested the coup in 1999. further three years without elections Chairperson of the AU Commission after having governed for two five- to intensify his efforts towards The situation, although it involved year terms, which officially came resolving the ongoing crisis and the illegitimate capture of power, to an end on 22 December 2009. to continue working closely with appears to be relatively calm. The The new constitution also rescinded ECOWAS. The Fourteenth AU country’s new military regime has the two-term limits enshrined in Summit, held from 25 January to 2 demonstrated its willingness to the preceding 1999 constitution. PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org President Tandja’s actions sparked example by suspending Niger’s Scenario Two: protest both nationally and membership of the continental internationally. The military, which body, demonstrating its zero- The military leadership could delay had thus far appeared united and tolerance policy for unconstitutional any transition out of the current relatively neutral, appears to have changes of government, PSC/ crisis so as to extend the duration of finally decided that Tandja’s plan for PR/COMM.2(CCXVI). Both its rule. This could lead to frustration extending his rule would adversely organisations called for a swift among the country’s political affect the country, notably given restoration of constitutional actors and its armed forces could the prevalence of sanctions and the order.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Elections in Niger: Casting Ballots Or Casting Doubts?
    Elections in Niger: casting ballots or casting doubts? Given its centrality to the Sahel region, the international community needs Niger to remain a bulwark of stability. While recent data collected throughout the country shows an increase in motivation to participate in this month's election, doubts about the electoral process and concerns for longstanding development issues mar the enthusiasm. Birnin Gaouré, Dosso, December 2020 By Johannes Claes and Rida Lyammouri with Navanti staff Published in collaboration with Niger could see its first democratic transition since independence as the country heads to the polls for the presidential election on 27 December.1 Current President Mahamadou Issoufou has indicated he will respect his constitutionally mandated two-term limit of 10 years, passing the flag to his protégé, Mohamed Bazoum. Political instability looms, however, as Issoufou and Bazoum’s Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) and a coalition of opposition parties fail to agree on the rules of the game. Political inclusion and enhanced trust in the institutions governing Niger’s electoral process are key if the risk of political crisis is to be avoided. Niger’s central role in Western policymakers’ security and political agendas in the Sahel — coupled with its history of four successful coups in 1976, 1994, 1999, and 2010 — serve to caution Western governments that preserving stability through political inclusion should take top priority over clinging to a political candidate that best represents foreign interests.2 During a turbulent electoral year in the region, Western governments must focus on the long-term goals of stabilizing and legitimizing Niger’s political system as a means of ensuring an ally in security and migration matters — not the other way around.
    [Show full text]
  • LET4CAP Law Enforcement Training for Capacity Building NIGER
    Co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING FOR CAPACITY BUILDING LET4CAP Law Enforcement Training for Capacity Building NIGER Downloadable Country Booklet DL. 2.5 (Ve 1.2) Dissemination level: PU Let4Cap Grant Contract no.: HOME/ 2015/ISFP/AG/LETX/8753 Start date: 01/11/2016 Duration: 33 months Dissemination Level PU: Public X PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission) RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission) Revision history Rev. Date Author Notes 1.0 20/03/2018 SSSA Overall structure and first draft 1.1 06/05/2018 SSSA Second version after internal feedback among SSSA staff 1.2 09/05/2018 SSSA Final version version before feedback from partners LET4CAP_WorkpackageNumber 2 Deliverable_2.5 VER1.2 WorkpackageNumber 2 Deliverable Deliverable 2.5 Downloadable country booklets VER V. 1 . 2 2 NIGER Country Information Package 3 This Country Information Package has been prepared by Eric REPETTO and Claudia KNERING, under the scientific supervision of Professor Andrea de GUTTRY and Dr. Annalisa CRETA. Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy www.santannapisa.it LET4CAP, co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union, aims to contribute to more consistent and efficient assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase. © 2018 by LET4CAP All rights reserved. 4 Table of contents 1. Country Profile 1.1Country in Brief 1.2Modern and Contemporary History of Niger 1.3 Geography 1.4Territorial and Administrative Units 1.5 Population 1.6Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion 1.7Health 1.8Education and Literacy 1.9Country Economy 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?
    Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? Africa Report N°208 | 19 September 2013 Translation from French International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. The Scramble for Power: Between Civilian and Military Rule (1960-2010) ................... 3 A. Old Imbalances: The Colonial State’s Weaknesses and Violence ............................. 3 B. The Failure of the First Republic (1960-1974) .......................................................... 4 C. The “Military Politicians” (1974-1990) ...................................................................... 6 D. A Fragile and Uncertain Democratisation (1990-2000) ........................................... 8 1. Short-lived regimes: The Second, Third and Fourth Republics .......................... 8 2. The armed rebellions of the 1990s ....................................................................... 9 E. The Tandja Decade (1999-2010) ............................................................................... 11 1. The “second Tuareg rebellion” ............................................................................. 11 2. The abuses of tazartché .......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Coup D'état in Africa
    African Studies Quarterly | Volume 12, Issue 2 | Winter 2011 Debunking the Myth of the “Good” Coup d’État in Africa ANDREW C. MILLER Abstract: In response to the recent coup in Niger, which ousted the country’s president- turned-strongman Mamadou Tandja, the capital erupted in pro-coup demonstrations. Many commentators and foreign governments also showed tacit support for the junta. What is the likelihood that this coup and the other coup regimes in Africa will lead to the institutionalization of durable and stable democracies? Based on historical analysis of past African coups that brought brief democratic transitions, this article argues that it is unlikely. For the four African coups that briefly put in place democratic institutions— Sierra Leone (1968), Ghana (1978), Sudan (1985), and Niger (1999)—the juntas and proceeding civilian governments failed to address core political and economic issues, lacked durability, and did not engender long-term political stability. To further debunk the myth of the so-called ‚good‛ coup d’état in Africa, this article also demonstrates that coup regimes, which consolidate governing authority in failed states, attempt to institutionalize autocracies. Introduction The story of deposed Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja is an all too familiar one in Africa. Although elected in generally free and fair elections, Tandja attempted to tighten his grip on the presidency in a blatant violation of Niger’s constitution.1 In August 2009, after ten years in power, he pushed through a new constitution by referendum
    [Show full text]
  • Suprême Pour La Restauration De La Démocratie – CSRD) Led By
    NIGER OBSERVATORY FOR thE PROTEctiON OF humAN Rights DEFENDERS ANNUAL REPORT 2011 During the transition period that followed the coup d’état in February 2010, a new legal and institutional framework more favourable for the respect of human rights appeared, civil society was given a new lease of life and no obstruction or intimida- tion was observed. However, three defenders continued to be subjected to judicial harassment for having denounced corruption or the constitutional reform in 2009. Political context On February 18, 2010, the defence and security forces of Niger, combined within the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (Conseil suprême pour la restauration de la démocratie – CSRD) led by Lieutenant General Salou Djibo, overthrew President Mamadou Tandja who since 2009, had established a particularly repressive climate against people, including political opponents and the civil society who had denounced his anti-constitutional manoeuvring to ensure his stay in power. Mr. Tandja was placed in extra-judicial detention before being transferred to the civil prison in Kollo on January 16, 2011, in spite of the ruling on November 8, 2010, of the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), confirming the1 arbitrary nature of the arrest and detention, and calling for his release . Unexpectedly, the military junta2 subsequently succeeded with the adoption of a new Constitution , creating new institutions and organis- ing general elections that permitted the return of a civil regime. In fact, the two-round presidential elections, which took place on January 31 and March 12, 2011, resulted in the victory of the “historic” opposition leader of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (Parti nigérien pour 1 / Charged with “misappropriation of public funds” and “violation of the Constitution”, Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Confronting Complex Political Crises in West Africa
    d’Ivoire. How has it sought to implement the norms, REGIONAL NORMS ON DEMOCRACY activate mechanisms and establish structures to AND GOOD GOVERNANCE advance good governance, democracy and peace? Although ECOWAS has sometimes appeared to be Since the independence of the majority of West African overwhelmed by the numerous crises it has had to face countries in the early 1960s, the region has experienced in the region, and despite its own structural problems, numerous coups d’état, with military coups the rule in its approaches to the situations in Niger and Côte rather than the exception.3 In the post-Cold War era d’Ivoire it has engaged in initiatives that demonstrate major civil wars with devastating impact have also oc- a commitment to confl ict management and the promo- curred in four countries in the region, namely in Liberia tion of democracy. (1989−96 and 1999−2003), Sierra Leone (1991−2002), This paper argues that while ECOWAS policies on Guinea Bissau (1998) and Côte d’Ivoire (2002−2007 and issues of peace and security are works in progress, the 2010−2011). fact remains that there is a gap between the policies In the decade following its creation ECOWAS did and their implementation by member states. This can not position itself as an organisation promoting good be attributed to both an absence of political will by governance. Its main objective until the 1990s was some leaders and the weak enforcement capability of economic integration. Since then, however, there have ECOWAS. However, in the cases studied, our contention been many efforts at both the continental and regional is that there was in fact a change.
    [Show full text]
  • «Turning the Page» Hopes for Media Freedom in Niger and Guinea
    «TURNING THE PAGE» HOPES FOR MEDIA FREEDOM IN NIGER AND GUINEA AFP PHOTO / SIA KAMBOU © COPYRIGHT: RSF HOPES FOR MEDIA FREEDOM IN NIGER AND GUINEA ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 3 Investigation by Ambroise Pierre, Africa Desk. With research coordinator Gilles Lordet in Guinea and Jean-Louis Saporito, a journalist and Reporters Without Borders board member, in Niger. n Guinea, the National Transition Council (CNT) led by Reporters Without Borders, which visited Guinea from 22 Gen. Sékouba Konaté held the first free and transpa- to 27 May and Niger from 26 to 30 June, found that the rent election in the country’s history in 2010. It was democratic transition in both countries was accompanied won by long-time opposition leader, Alpha Condé. In by a marked increase in media freedom and strong hopes INiger, a military coup on 18 February 2010 ended Presi- of an improvement in the situation of the media and jour- dent Mamadou Tandja’s attempts to stay in office beyond nalists. It was these hopes that Reporters Without Borders the end of his term and opened the way for a transition wanted to evaluate. under the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Demo- cracy (CSRD). It resulted in Mahamadou Issoufou’s election in early 2011. In Conakry, the Reporters Without Borders delegation was justice minister Marou Amadou, Gen. Salou Djibo, who hea- received by officials from the ministry of communication ded the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy and ministry of territorial administration and decentraliza- (CSRD) and was president during the transition, and several tion, by justice minister Christian Sow and by government Niamey-based foreign diplomats.
    [Show full text]
  • On an Otherwise Typical Day, the President of Niger's Largest
    Excerpt from Alice J. Kang. 2015. Bargaining for Women’s Rights: Activism in an Aspiring Muslim Democracy. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. © Copyright. University of Minnesota Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. INTRODUCTION Women’s Rights in an African Muslim Democracy On an otherwise typical day, the president of Niger’s largest umbrella women’s association, the Coordination des Organisations Non Gouverne- mentales et Associations Féminines Nigériennes (CONGAFEN, Coordinating Body of Women’s NGOs and Associations of Niger), was at work when two plainclothes police ofcers came to her ofce.1 Te policemen asked to see her. Tinking that she was going to be arrested, her colleagues in the Ofce on the Advancement of Women in the Ministry of Social Development vacated the room, leaving the women’s leader and two friends behind. Te police of- cers, however, had not come to take the president of CONGAFEN into cus- tody. Instead, they had come to deliver a message. Representatives of Niger’s national women’s associations were being summoned to meet with the coun- try’s new leader at the presidential palace the following afternoon.2 Days before, on April 9, 1999, the state radio’s regularly scheduled program was interrupted with military marches—a musical signal that a coup d’état had taken place. Te prime minister announced that in an “unfortunate acci- dent,” President Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara had been shot and killed as he was about to board a helicopter.3 Commandant Daouda Malam Wanké, the osten- sible head of Baré’s personal security, became Niger’s new head of state and set up a transitional government.4 Wanké promised the Nigérien people and concerned foreign countries that he would stay in power temporarily and soon organize free and fair elections.5 When the police ofcers left her ofce, the president of CONGAFEN started thinking about her fast approaching meeting with the country’s new leader.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 3 December 2010
    United Nations S/2010/614 Security Council Distr.: General 3 December 2010 Original: English Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa I. Introduction 1. In its letter dated 21 December 2007 (S/2007/754), the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2010, and requested me to report on the implementation of the revised mandate of UNOWA every six months. The present report covers the period from 1 July to 31 December 2010. It focuses on national, cross-cutting and cross-border developments in West Africa and activities undertaken by UNOWA in preventative diplomacy, raising awareness on emerging threats and challenges, and on efforts aimed at promoting consultations and synergies at the subregional level and liaison with and assistance to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in the promotion of peace and stability. 2. While progress made in addressing these issues is encouraging, it needs to be further consolidated to make a real impact on the lives of the people in the subregion. As I underlined in my last report on UNOWA (S/2010/324), West Africa remains vulnerable to a range of internal and external destabilizing factors. Internal challenges include those related to governance and the rule of law, transparency and accountability, flawed elections, continuing difficulties with concepts like power- sharing, security sector reform, gender equity, human rights and impunity. External factors of instability that continue to affect West Africa are more regional and cross- border in nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Download (PDF)
    march 2019 Niger: sustainable stability or precarious balance ? CHRISTIAN CONNAN - HUGO SADA WWW . FRSTRATEGIE . ORG SOMMAIRE INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 5 1 – PROGRESSIVE STABILIZATION ................................................................................. 5 1.1 – A slow walk towards democracy ................................................................ 5 1.2 – The Tuareg Issue: the appeasement .......................................................... 6 1.3 – Political Consensus ..................................................................................... 7 2 – PRESIDENT ISSOUFOU’S HONORABLE RECORD ......................................................... 8 2.1 – An unfavorable regional environment ........................................................ 8 2.1.1 – A region particularly marked by poverty and instability .............................. 8 2.1.2 – “Imported” terrorism ................................................................................... 8 2.1.3 – The refugee burden ................................................................................... 9 2.2 – The action of President Issoufou and his government ............................. 9 2.2.1 – Efforts to enforce public policies ................................................................ 9 2.2.2 – Increased efficiency of security forces ....................................................... 9 2.2.3 – Economic and social policy .....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 33 Hahonou Tillabéri
    1 LASDEL Laboratoire d’études et recherches sur les dynamiques sociales et le développement local _________ BP 12901, Niamey, Niger – tél. (227) 72 37 80 BP 1383, Parakou, Bénin – tél. (229) 61 16 58 Observatoire de la décentralisation au Niger (enquête de référence 2003) Les pouvoirs locaux dans la commune de Tillabéri Eric Komlavi Hahonou enquêteurs : Salou Ali, Younoussi Issa février 05 Etudes et Travaux n° 33 Financement FICOD (KfW) 2 Sommaire Sigles et acronymes 4 1. Introduction 5 Groupes stratégiques 5 Le déroulement des enquêtes 6 La documentation existante 6 Présentation 6 2. Présentation de la commune de Tillabéri 8 Situation géographique et organisation administrative 8 Caractéristiques socio-économiques de la zone 9 Histoire du peuplement 10 Rappel sur l’histoire du pouvoir administratif local 13 3. Les acteurs de la commune urbaine de Tillabéri 15 3.1. L’administrateur délégué 15 3.2. Personnel de la commune 17 3.3. Le COTECOM 18 3.4. Les services municipaux 20 3.5. Fiscalité locale 21 4. La chefferie coutumière 27 4.1. Chefferie de canton 27 4.2. Chefferies de village 28 4.3. Chefferies de quartier 28 5. Les pouvoirs magico-religieux 30 6. Les organisations de la « société civile » 34 6.1. Les structures coopératives 34 6.2. Coopération décentralisée et structuration du milieu 37 6.3. Les autres associations 38 6.4. L’associatif informel 39 7. Les partis politiques 40 7.1. Aperçu de l’histoire politique locale récente 40 7.2. L’expérience des élections municipales de février 1999 41 8. Le pouvoir économique 48 3 9.
    [Show full text]
  • Jeremy Corbyn's
    Politics and Governance Open Access Journal | ISSN: 2183-2463 Volume 4, Issue 2 (2016) New Approaches to Political Leadership Editor Mark Bennister Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2 Thematic Issue: New Approaches to Political Leadership Published by Cogitatio Press Rua Fialho de Almeida 14, 2º Esq., 1070-129 Lisbon Portugal Guest Editor Mark Bennister, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK Editors-in-Chief Amelia Hadfield, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK Andrej J. Zwitter, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Managing Editor António Vieira, Cogitatio Press, Portugal Available online at: www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance This issue is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY). Articles may be reproduced provided that credit is given to the original and Politics and Governance is acknowledged as the original venue of publication. Table of Contents Editorial: New Approaches to Political Leadership Mark Bennister 1-4 The (Unintended) Consequences of New Labour: Party Leadership vs Party Management in the British Labour Party Emmanuelle Avril 5-14 Assessing the Performance of UK Opposition Leaders: Jeremy Corbyn’s ‘Straight Talking, Honest Politics’ Patrick Diamond 15-24 Deliberative Political Leaders: The Role of Policy Input in Political Leadership Jennifer Lees-Marshment 25-35 Explaining Japan’s Revolving Door Premiership: Applying the Leadership Capital Index Tina Burrett 36-53 Responsive to the People? Comparing the European Cognitive Maps of Dutch Political
    [Show full text]