Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios

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AFGHAN NARCOTRAFFICKING Post-2014 Scenarios Copyright © 2015 EastWest Institute ISBN: 978-0-9861751-1-4 On the cover: Scraped poppy capsule (photo by David Mansfield). Photos: Reporters/AP, U.S. Marine Corps, Flickr, David Mansfield, Alcis Ltd.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the position of the EastWest Institute, its Board of Directors or staff. _

The EastWest Institute seeks to make the world a safer place by addressing the seemingly intractable problems that threaten regional and global stability. Founded in 1980, EWI is an international, non-partisan organization with offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow and Washington. EWI’s track record has made it a global go-to place for building trust, influencing policies and delivering solutions. _

The EastWest Institute 11 East 26th Street, 20th Floor New York, NY 10010 U.S.A. +1-212-824-4100 _ [email protected] www.ewi.info AFGHAN NARCOTRAFFICKING Post-2014 Scenarios

Joint U.S. - Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking

February 2015 Principal Author:

Austin Long, Assistant Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

Contributors:

George Gavrilis, Visiting Scholar, Institute for Religion, Culture and Public Life (IRCPL), Columbia University; Author of The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries

Vladimir Ivanov, Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Marlene Laruelle, Research Professor of International Affairs, The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs; Director, Central Asia Program, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs

David Mansfield, Independent Consultant

Ivan Safranchuk, Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO); Editor in Chief, Great Game: Politics, Business, Security in Central Asia

Konstantin Sorokin, Adviser, Department of Education and Science, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM); Adviser, State Civil Service of the Russian Federation, Third Class

Ekaterina Stepanova, Head, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

Project Director:

David Firestein, Perot Fellow and Vice President, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy, EastWest Institute

Expert Group Coordinators:

Vladimir Ivanov, Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Euhwa Tran, Program Associate, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, EastWest Institute

Acknowledgements:

The EastWest Institute would like to extend special thanks to two working group members for their s invaluable early contributions to this report: Ilnur Batyrshin, Head, Research Center, Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN); and Kimberly Marten, Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University. We also want to express our heartfelt appreciation to every working group member—each of whom generously gave his/her time and expertise to make significant contributions to the project—and to the many other experts and officials in both Russia and the United States who took the time to offer their thoughts and feedback on our work. t-201

s This report would not have been possible without the significant support of our financial sponsors. We would like to convey our sincere thanks to the John B. Hurford Rapid Response Fund and the Kathryn Davis Peace Po 4 Scenario Initiative for their financial sponsorship of this report. And finally, our deepest gratitude goes to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, whose generous support enabled not only this report but also the entire project. 4 Note:

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and contributors. Po st-2014 Scenarios 5 8 6 17 14 21 12 12 25 22 24 33 28 26 20 nts e cont Stable Stalemate Ground Losing Together Holding Warlords the of Return Security in Afghanistan in Security Afghanistan in Politics Economy Afghan The Conclusion Endnotes & Definitions Acronyms Future Scenarios for Afghanistan for Scenarios Future Introduction The Last Goodbye: The Withdrawal and Transition in Afghanistan 1985-1992 Afghanistan in Transition and Withdrawal The Goodbye: The Last Afghanistan in Environment The Current Introduction

The future of Afghan narcotrafficking is one of the major shared interests of both the Rus- sian Federation and the United States. It remains so even in the current political cli- arly 2015 is a momentous time for Af- In conjunction with a robust counternarcot- ghanistan, with deep uncertainty about ics campaign, these circumstances could at mate. Ethe post-2014 environment. The man- least limit a post-2014 expansion in Afghan date of the International Security Assistance narcotrafficking. Force (ISAF) has come to an end even as political transition from the administration of The future of Afghan narcotrafficking is one President Hamid Karzai is perhaps only part- of the major shared interests of both the Rus- ly resolved. The Taliban insurgency remains sian Federation and the United States. It re- strong enough to pose a significant challenge mains so even in the current political climate. to the Afghan government, and a negotiated Since 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI) has end to the ongoing conflict seems unlikely in organized and hosted meetings of the Joint the very near term. Economic growth, heavily U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Nar- fueled by ISAF spending in addition to devel- cotrafficking to discuss ways to constructive- opment assistance, may suffer significantly ly and jointly enhance bilateral and multilat- as those external sources of funding decline. eral efforts against narcotics.

s Narcotics, a significant portion of the Af- ghan economy for the past decade, could be Joint efforts between the Russian Federation poised to assume even greater importance and the United States to assess and shape in these circumstances, with major conse- the post-2014 environment may be particu- quences for Afghanistan, the region and the larly fruitful given the prior Soviet experience rest of the world. with Afghanistan withdrawal and transition. Indeed, many senior Russian policymakers Despite these concerns, post-2014 Afghani- have personal experience with this process, t-201

s stan may not be a catastrophe. The political which was much more successful than many

Po 4 Scenario transition may yet result in a more broadly analysts anticipated. Lessons from the pre- inclusive government that could help limit vious withdrawal and transition are useful 6 ethnic and regional tensions. Combined with for the current context. As this report notes, significant reduction in the number of foreign political cohesion and external support were troops, successful political transition might critical to both the surprising longevity and, weaken the appeal of the Taliban and ulti- subsequently, the equally surprising demise mately allow a negotiated settlement in the of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan medium term. Reduced conflict could allow (DRA). modest but sustainable economic growth. Po st-2014 Scenarios 7 Poppy fields Poppy near Jalalabad. near eration eration despite ongoing differences on other issues. Together with regional partners and international organizations, renewed hope best the presents cooperation sian-U.S. Rus- future. a brighter for Although the high levels of uncertainty garding the re- post-2014 environment make it impossible to offerdefinitive predictions, it is nonetheless possible to sketch likely scenarios. This report proceeds in three parts. First, it brieflyreviews theSoviet experience in and the transition 1980s late withdrawal of in order to illustrate both previous and potential it Second, lessons pitfalls. offers acon- cise summary of the security, political and economic environment in Afghanistan as of late Third, 2014. using the firsttwo sections as a baseline, it describes several post-2014 possible scenarios based on different as- sumptions about key variables, such as the these how and transition political of outcome various post-2014 environments would impact narcotrafficking.These scenarios can then inform policymakers in both the and the United sian States on Federation key Rus- areas of cooperation in order to shape post-2014 the environment and to mitigate the expansion of the shared threat from Afghan narcotrafficking. , , Afghan concluded: As a result, the future of efforts 1 Joint Threat Assessment The working group is and the Russian inform to reports consensus working to produce as governments well as regional Afghan, U.S. and international stakeholders. In “The effectiveness of any development and enforcement strategies against illicit drugs is likely to hinge on That, improved security. in turn, may require tangible progress on a Af- in conflict the ongoing to solution political ghanistan.” This firstfollow-up report has a broadfocus Afghanistan in environment post-2014 the on with an emphasis on how that environment will affect the challenge narcotrafficking. of The the working group outlined comprehensively the threats that Afghan heroin poses to the Russian Federation, the United States and the broader international community. A se- on will specific focus reports follow-up of ries and narcotrafficking, Afghan to related issues series. in this is the first this report to to counter isnarcotrafficking intimately con- nected to these broader developments. securi- and political As the discusses, report this could Afghanistan become in ty environment much after with worse 2014 a corresponding This threat. of the worsening narcotrafficking need the Russian for imperative underscores will political the find to policymakers U.S. and to resume and perhaps even increase coop- Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment The Last Goodbye: Withdrawal and Although the war in Afghani- stan in the Transition in Afghanistan 1980s is significantly dif- 1985-1992 ferent from the war in Afghani- stan in the 2000s, there are some striking similarities. he post-2014 transition in Afghanistan government in Kabul, there is still consider- is not unprecedented in recent his- able concern for the future and even for the Ttory. A major international intervention survival of the current government.4 Given in Afghanistan came to an end just over 20 these similarities, it is worth examining the years ago. Many of the participants in that Soviet experience of withdrawal and transi- conflict are participants in the current con- tion from Afghanistan. First, this experience flict (though old allies are now enemies and helps provide a framework for thinking about vice versa). It is thus instructive to explore the post-2014 scenarios. Second, it also high- Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to help lights that the direst predictions about post- frame the possible outcomes of the end of 2014 can at least potentially be prevented by the ISAF mission. international efforts, including Russian and U.S. cooperation. Although the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s is significantly different from the war Beginning in 1986, the Soviet leadership be- in Afghanistan in the 2000s, there are some gan quietly planning its exit from Afghanistan, striking similarities. Most notably, the So- where it had combat troops supporting the viet government, like the United States and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since

s ISAF, were confronted with the challenge of the end of 1979. In December 1986, the So- extricating itself from a long-running conflict viets informed Afghan leader Mohammad while ensuring at least some stability for the Najibullah that Soviet troops would be with- government in Kabul. In both cases, the gov- drawn in 18 to 24 months. In July of 1987, he ernment in Kabul was divided along regional, was informed that the withdrawal would be as ethnic and political lines. In both cases, the early as a year later.5 As this withdrawal and economy of Afghanistan was highly depen- transition began, the security, political and dent on foreign aid, though to varying de- economic environments were all challenging. t-201

s grees, and the insurgents confronting the

Po 4 Scenario government relied on some level of sanctuary The security environment was marked by and support from outside actors.2 government security forces that had im- 8 proved but were still far from perfect. By Most importantly, the post-withdrawal and 1987, the Afghan army was still beset by de- transition prospects for Afghanistan were sertions, and recruitment remained challeng- grim in both cases. Many analysts antici- ing. But overall, the force had stabilized and pated rapid collapse in Kabul following with- developed some competence. One Soviet drawal in 1989.3 While analysts are not quite military adviser commented that by 1987, “… as dour on the post-2014 prospects for the the Afghan army had been more or less fully Po st-2014 Scenarios 9 In terms of the of In terms en- economic the vironment, gov- Afghan ernment was highly dependent on foreign maintain aid to the economy and particu- for pay larly to forces. security Soviet troops troops Soviet begin their from withdrawal Afghanistan, 1988. 9 11 10 As As withdrawal concluded in early 1989, the insurgency launched a major assault on the eastern city of Jalalabad. However, the ex- pectation of a rapid victory was dashed mujahideen limitations as in conventional combat were exposed and the cohesion and fire- In May 1988, Najibullah named a non-PDPA consid- threw and minister prime as member a seem him make to trying into support erable Yet viable part of the non-communist regime. includ- in appear the to regime, began cracks thwarted Najibullah as forces, security the ing a coup attempt in late 1988 by Khalqi army promi- other exiled subsequently and officers nent Khalqis. In terms of the economic environment, the on dependent highly was government Afghan and par- maintain the economy aid to foreign ticularly to pay for security forces. Tellingly, society, Afghan of nature agrarian the despite more than half of Afghanistan’s food supply was imported. While governments in Kabul had been dependent on foreign aid since at least the the eighteenth scale century, of de- pendence by 1988 was much than greater at time. previous any (People) (People) faction and the Parcham (Banner) These factions had both political and faction. ethnic differences, withParcham more Ta- jik and Khalq more These Pashtun. divisions were deep and had led various points. at conflict to fratricidal party The Af- 7 6 8 ghan intelligence service, known the by acro- ghan service, intelligence much improved. also was KhAD, nym In terms of the political environment, Najibul- environment, political the of terms In with lah the faced was of maintain- challenge ing control of a factionalized party while at the same time seeking to the expand base of support for the The regime. People’s Demo- deep- was (PDPA) Afghanistan of Party cratic ly divided between two factions: the Khalq Overall, Overall, the result of these improvements in government security forces and militias re- sulted in a stalemate-security environment. As withdrawal began, the unable to insurgency seize any key was terrain, such as the provincial capitals. Yet the government was unable out to the drive of insurgency its rural strongholds. At At the same time, the Afghan and its government allies worked to create militias or to bribe existing armed groups to support the There were a government. variety of local allies in this category, including “border militias” and “regional/territorial These forces.” varied in size and competence from dozen a gunmen to few thousands of well-armed These local allies were and troops. motivated frequently better paid than their state coun- contin- transition and withdrawal As terparts. ued, these militias took on greater security responsibility. reconstructed” and that “[t]heir officers were were officers “[t]heir that and reconstructed” not bad and they were well armed.” Following the attempted coup of Au- gust 1991, the Soviet Union power of forces loyal to the Democratic Re- tion. In addition to buying support, he shifted abruptly shift- public of Afghanistan (DRA) proved decisive. his stance on insurgency, offering to create The victory at Jalalabad also helped boost a national reconciliation government, which ed its position the morale of government forces.12 This pe- would transition to elections. He even offered on aid to Af- riod was, according to some observers, abso- to give some security powers to the commis- lutely critical, as the psychological impact of sion that would oversee the elections. The re- ghanistan and withdrawal on the government and security sult was yet more stalemate, though Najibul- agreed to cut forces was very serious.13 A defeat at Jalala- lah’s regime did lose one provincial capital, bad would likely have spelled the end of the Tarin Kot in Uruzgan province, as many of the aid to Kabul regime. security forces there surrendered without a if the United fight to the insurgents. Najibullah began to maneuver politically after States would the withdrawal, purging his government of all At the beginning of 1991, the stalemate con- cut aid to the non-PDPA personnel. At the same time, he tinued, but major changes were coming. In made a series of diplomatic overtures to the April, a coordinated attack on the provin- insurgents. United States and offered the insurgents lo- cial capital of Khost, led by Hekmatyar and cal autonomy in exchange for an end to the Haqqani and supported by Pakistan, was the war. Najibullah also began to play up both his first successful conventional operation by the Islamic faith and his Afghan nationalism.14 mujahideen, using both tanks and artillery.15 Soviet external support continued through- Najibullah’s response to the fall of Khost and out 1989, and the result was, to the surprise rebel assaults on other cities was to continue of many, a stalemate rather than the collapse attempting to refashion his regime to make it of Najibullah’s government. an acceptable partner in a transition government. He renamed the PDPA the “Homeland The situation in 1990 remained broadly Party” and further embraced Islam. The alli- similar to that of 1989, with some notable ances with local militias also remained vital to developments. First, there was yet another regime survival.16 Informal or local reconcilia- coup attempt, which highlighted the ongoing tion continued during this period. Parcham-Khalq split in the PDPA. Though it failed to oust Najibullah, it was nonetheless The biggest change in 1991 was in terms of s serious, as it included the defection of the de- external support. External aid for Najibullah fense minister to the insurgency. began to decrease as the Soviet economy faced its own troubles. Fuel deliveries fell, External aid to the Najibullah regime from the which helped ground significant portions of Soviet Union continued at a rate estimated the air force. Following the attempted coup at over $300 million a month. A major com- of August 1991, the Soviet Union abruptly ponent of external aid was oil and petroleum shifted its position on aid to Afghanistan and t-201

s products, which enabled the security ser- agreed to cut aid to Kabul if the United States vices to maintain aviation and other mobile would cut aid to the insurgents. Po 4 Scenario operations, providing a major advantage over the insurgents. Najibullah continued to use At the beginning of 1992, the prospects for a 10 aid to buy loyalty and/or neutrality from mili- relatively peaceful transition to a post-com- tias and to reward the security services such munist regime were good. In March 1992, as KhAD. This often took the form of “infor- Najibullah made a final concession that many mal reconciliation,” where former insurgents insurgents had been waiting for: he agreed to stopped fighting against the regime without step down from power. With this concession, making a formal declaration of reconcilia- reconciliation and peace seemed at hand. Po st-2014 Scenarios 11 A final lesson final lesson A Soviet the from is withdrawal that impact the such a rapid can collapse on nar- have produc- cotics tion. Avoiding a similar outcome (to the (to outcome similar a Avoiding Yet at the same time, the post-1989 post-1989 the time, same the at Yet 20 19 extent extent possible) after 2014 must be a major policy goal of both Russia States. and the United experience also illustrates that initial success success initial that illustrates also experience in withdrawal and transition is no guarantee of future stability. Najibullah’s regime lasted much longer than anticipated, but collapsed quickly. very A finallesson from the Soviet withdrawal is the impact that such a have rapid on narcotics collapse production. By can late 1992, one assessment bleakly noted booming that drug “[t]he trade has become major source of for revenue the the war-ravaged only country.” supplied, supplied, particularly with fuel. Likewise, the Afghan economy, though battered by continued to function with inputs large of war, external support as and aid supplies. However, began to shrink and then ultimately ended, environment economic and security the both falter. to began These two factors are obviously intimately related. Although the decline of external aid did not cause the fissures inside Najibullah’s regime, reduced resources meant there was both less available with which to buy loyalty and less fuel for the government’s aviation also assets. resources Fewer meant that the insurgent’s chance of victory, dim after 1989, the in forces Najibullah’s of successes early defection and began to therefore look better, appealing. more became Afghanistan will Although be post-2014 vast- ly different inmany ways thanAf- post-1989 to central be will factors two these ghanistan, experi- post-1989 the Moreover, scenarios. all at manag- efforts that highlights careful ence ing withdrawal and transition after 2014 can Grau Les analyst U.S. As effects. positive have “the notes, Soviet effortto withdraw ingood order was well executed and can serve as a similar from disengagements other for model nations.” Najibullah was forced 17 18 to to resign by his Unable own to party. flee the he country, sought asylum in the United Na- tions compound. The second key factor is the importance of The support external Na- for survival. regime jibullah regime and its security fought forces much better than expected in the early bat- tles of 1989, in part because they were well The end of Najibullah’s regime The highlights end regime two of Najibullah’s key factors that will likely be critical to scenario outcomes in post-2014 The first Afghanistan. is the importanceof politicalcohe- sion inside the regime and particularly in the security forces. The internal fighting, coup attempts and, finally,defection forces security of were far more dangerous to the gime than re- the direct threat posed by the in- In surgents. more than two years of fighting, the insurgents had only seized two Mu- of while remote the defection capitals, provincial min and Dostum led to the collapse regime’s weeks. of in a matter The rapid collapse began with a of wave military defections from the regime. Even as he agreed to step down, Najibullah shore sought up to the government’s position by ac- celerating an effort to emplace his loyalists One moves of these positions. security in key was an attempt to commander replace of Abdul the Khairiton Mumin, garrison the near Soviet (later Uzbek) border and an ethnic with Tajik, a more loyal Pashtun. Mumin militia to turned and replaced being at balked leader Abdul Rashid Dostum for aid. Dostum defected from the government to join with Tajik mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, and within weeks, the north of Af- ghanistan was under rebel control. Militias began to defect at an increasing pace, and by April, Kabul had fallen and the Najibullah regime was finished. Then things fell apart. In less than a month, Najibullah’s regime would be militarily over- thrown. The Current Environment in Afghanistan

The security situation in Af- he current security, political and eco- mote understanding between ANSF and ISAF ghanistan has nomic environments in Afghanistan are personnel. While a U.S. two-star general was worsened sig- Tshaky but far from catastrophic. This killed in an insider attack in August 2014, the section assesses these environments and overall threat has been greatly reduced over nificantly over discusses possible post-2014 scenarios. the past 18 months.24 the course of Security in Afghanistan However, these bright spots in ANSF per- 2014 in several formance are offset by setbacks during the summer fighting season. Across the coun- The security situation in Afghanistan has categories. try, the Taliban have been able to push ANSF worsened significantly over the course of out of various key positions. Though these 2014 in several categories. First, the perfor- losses are often temporary, they highlight mance of Afghan National Security Forces continuing limitations in ANSF capability. In (ANSF) has been mediocre at best. On a the northern province of Faryab, for example, positive note, ANSF—the broad category that the Taliban were able to seize key parts of includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), the strategic Qaysar district for three weeks the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Na- in April and continued to threaten the over- tional Directorate of Security (NDS)—have stretched ANSF over the summer.25 Similar decisively taken responsibility for fighting the offensives in eastern Afghanistan were ongo- Taliban, an important step. According to the ing throughout the summer, particularly in most recent official U.S. government figures, the vital province of Nangarhar.26 the ANSF are fighting without ISAF involve- ment roughly 90 percent of the time.21

s Most worrisome from a counternarcotics perspective has been the heavy fighting in key In addition, ANSF were able to secure the first opium-producing regions. Even according to and second rounds of the 2014 presidential the latest U.S. military data, six of the ten dis- election. Although there was significant vio- tricts with the most Taliban-initiated violence lence on the day of first-round voting in April, are in Helmand and Kandahar. According to it did not substantially disrupt the election, the same report, fully 17 percent of the re- and turnout was reasonably high.22 The same corded Taliban-initiated violence nationwide t-201 was generally true of the second round of vot- 27 s was in just four districts in Helmand. ing in June, though in both cases some ana- Po 4 Scenario lysts believe the Taliban deliberately chose By early September 2014, media reports in- not to launch major attacks.23 12 dicated that Taliban offensives in two of those districts in Helmand, Sangin and Musa Qala, ANSF, in conjunction with ISAF, have also had come close to pushing the ANSF out. been able to limit (though not eliminate) the These are significant opium-production ar- threat posed by insider attacks. This joint ef- eas, and the Taliban have allegedly been aided fort required significant counterintelligence in the fighting by narcotics traffickers. In ad- and vetting efforts as well as efforts to pro- dition, Taliban spokesmen have candidly not- Po st-2014 Scenarios 13 Without effec- Without logistics tive and mainte- the nance, will sim- ANSF ply not be able the resist to Taliban. 33 37 36 35 Combined with the with Combined 34 existing existing weakness in ANSF intelligence, this targeting of NDS could result in a significant shortfall. post-2014 al- are ANSF shortfalls, specific these Beyond dependent most entirely on support external for funding. Maintaining the current force ANSF level and structure $6 requires billion annually, with roughly Afghanistan able to perhaps provide $500 The million each year. sup- external by provided be must remainder porters, who are reluctant to continue such indefinitely. support levels Finally, Finally, corruption, patronage and politiciza- politi- Although ANSF. plague to continue tion cal issues are discussed in more detail in the in the reflected are issues these section, next The result is that ANSF leaders are of- ANSF. their to pay ability for much more ten chosen bribes and garner patronage than for As with the combat their earlier effectiveness. Na- jibullah regime, these issues are intertwined with the ethnic divide between the country’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, and the and Hazara. Uzbeks Tajiks, minority All of these general ANSF issues affect the capabilities of cotics Afghanistan’s Police. Most notably, even before Counternar- the summer fighting season and heavy fighting in Helmand, the level of narcotics tion interdic- had already dropped significantly in the This south. was in part due to the drawdown of ISAF forces that enable counternarcotics but also simply due to the poor security environment. It is most likely that interdiction the summer. further over even dropped In addition ANSF to will logistics, continue to have limited intelligence capability. At present, ISAF is able to mitigate this shortfall as well, primarily through technical intelligence. difficult more be will this logistics, with as But sharing be- intelligence Moreover, after 2014. tween ANA, ANP and NDS is still limited by bureaucratic issues. Thus, even when component one of ANSF gains intelligence, the exploited. not be properly may intelligence The have Taliban also made targeting ANSF intelligence capabilities a priority in the 2014 fighting season. This has been evident particularly in attacks on the NDS, which is cused on fo- intelligence collection. In less than two weeks in late August and early Septem- launched major attacks Taliban the ber 2014, on NDS provincial headquarters in Nangar- Ghazni. and Wardak har,

31 29 28 32 This figure has likely increased over over increased likely has figure This 30 From From the ministries down to the tactical level, GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] faced a major challenge inte- in an developing effective, grated logistics and sustainment system for the ANSF. A lack of trained maintenance technicians combined with a gistics system that struggled lo- to resupply units in the fieldevery affected adversely ANSF. the of component ed that due to the greatly decreased risk of ISAF they airstrikes, have been able to mass for ground assaults, a worrisome admission environment. the post-2014 for Moreover, the official figures for attrition may for attrition figures the official Moreover, understate the problem. con- the highlighted have ANSF of sessments Independent as- tinuing problem personnel—secu- of “ghost” but payroll the on are who members force rity either do not exist or never report for duty. the course of the summer fighting season, as season, fighting summer the of course the the ANA (and other components San- around fighting the of in hit hard been ANSF) have Qala. gin and Musa Although ISAF has been able to mitigate some some mitigate to able been has ISAF Although of these logistics and maintenance such will mitigation be issues, much difficultmore in effective Without environment. post-2014 the sim- will ANSF the maintenance, and logistics Taliban. the resist ply not be able to In addition to the burden of heavy fighting, the ANSF remain underdeveloped in several critical functions. most Perhaps critical is logistics and maintenance, leading a mili- U.S. bluntly note: to April 2014 in tary report Although the scale of this phenomenon is dif- is phenomenon this of scale the Although ficultto itestimate, probably means that the actual number of personnel in some units is lower than the number on Therefore, paper. although the absolute level of attrition may be accurate, this attrition may represent the actual force. of percentage larger a Again, this trend is most pronounced in some some in pronounced most is trend this Again, attri- official The areas. opium-production key tion for the ANA 215th which Corps, is based in Helmand, was 4.1 percent in March 2014, well before the fightingseason was fully un- derway. The heavy fightinghas contributedto significant attrition in the ANSF as both casualties and ANSF personnel becoming absent with- force. the on toll their take (AWOL) leave out Several key leaders of the ANSF are also alleged to have ties specifically to opium production or smuggling.38 Most notably, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, General Abdul Raziq, has been alleged to have significant and long-standing ties to opium smuggling. Similar accusations were leveled at the police chief of Uruzgan.39 Although these alle- gations have never been proven, it highlights the continuing challenge of using ANSF for narcotics interdiction and eradication.

As challenging Beyond the ANSF, the security environment as the security has worsened considerably for the civilian population. Civilian casualties are up sig- environment nificantly through mid-2014, according to in Afghanistan the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The source of casu- has become in alties has also changed, with more resulting 2014, the po- from civilians caught in the crossfire between ANSF and the Taliban and fewer resulting litical environ- from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).40 ment is at least This underscores the improved Taliban ability to mass and conduct military operations as troubling. instead of (or in addition to) relying on the harassment of lines of supply and movement.

Finally, transition will have significant implications for the variety of private and semi- private security providers that have prolifer- ated in Afghanistan since 2001. Estimates in 2012 put the number of such private security providers at 30,000 to 70,000. As ISAF de- parts, many of these contractors are or will be unemployed. This creates the potential for banditry, predation or recruitment into the insurgency. At a minimum, it ensures that there will be no shortage of armed men willing to provide “muscle” for narcotraffickers.41

s Politics in Afghanistan

As challenging as the security environment in Afghanistan has become in 2014, the political environment is at least as troubling. The presidential election was intended to usher in the post-Karzai era, which at least some hoped

t-201 would reduce simmering tensions both within s Afghanistan and between the Afghan govern- Po 4 Scenario Member of Af- ment and the West. Instead, it has provoked a ghan National crisis that could undermine the viability of the 14 Security Forces post-Taliban political order. in Helmand province. The central feature of the crisis is the con- frontation between two coalitions that have coalesced around candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah is the Po st-2014 Scenarios 15 presidential candidate most closely asso- ANSF, after 2014.44 In addition to the BSA, ciated with the Northern Alliance and par- the Afghan government has signed a parallel ticularly the Panjshiri Tajiks. In addition to agreement with NATO to provide roughly an- his own supporters, Abdullah has appointed other 5,000 international troops, though at Engineer Mohammad Khan, a Pashtun from present those forces will not be participating According to the Islamic Party, and Mohammad Mohaqiq, in combat operations. some analysts, a Hazara with longstanding ties to the North- ern Alliance.42 This coalition did well in the According to some analysts, this division this division first round of presidential voting but fell short over political candidates reflects an increase over political of the threshold to avoid a run-off. In the sec- in tension between Tajiks and Pashtuns. Al- ond round, Abdullah picked up additional en- though this tension is not new, it may have candidates dorsements from some of those who did not reached a new high for the post-2001 era. Pa- reflects an make the second round, including the candi- shtun nationalism in particular is singled out date believed to have the strongest backing by some as having experienced an awaken- increase in from Karzai, the former Foreign Minister Zal- ing or rebirth that helped propel Ghani to the the tension mai Rassoul. presidency. This broader tension will limit the room for political maneuver, particularly for between Tajiks Ghani’s coalition includes supporters of Gen- Ghani. If he fails to satisfy his Pashtun con- and Pashtuns. eral Abdul Rashid Dostum, who retains for- stituents, he may soon be deeply unpopular. midable political support among the Uzbeks, Although this and Sarwar Danish, a Hazara from the central In addition to the turmoil surrounding the tension is not province of Daykundi. Although not perform- election results, there have been other sig- ing quite as well as Abdullah’s coalition in nificant political events in 2014 that have new, it may the first round, Ghani’s coalition also picked contributed to instability. Perhaps foremost have reached up supporters from some of the candidates among them was the death (from diabetes) that did not make the second round. Most no- of Marshal Mohammed Qasim Fahim, one of a new high for table among these was Ahmad Zia Massoud, Karzai’s vice presidents. Fahim, a Panjshiri the post-2001 a Panjshiri Tajik who had been one of Zalmai Tajik, was widely viewed as the enforcer of Rassoul’s vice presidential candidates in the discipline, through both carrots and sticks, era. first round. among the sometimes fractious components of the Northern Alliance. In particular, he was The second round of presidential voting was believed to be important in keeping the pow- closely contested, with accusations of fraud erful governor of the key northern province coming from both camps but most loudly of Balkh, Atta Mohammad Noor, in check. He from the Abdullah coalition. An arduous re- was also a longstanding link between the gov- count led to an agreement that would make ernment and the Northern Alliance.45 His ab- Ghani the president while appointing Abdul- sence as both enforcer and mediator makes lah to a new “chief executive” position. This the current political crisis more troubling and power-sharing arrangement is still tenuous harder to resolve. but could potentially resolve the conflict between supporters of the two candidates. Both These divides highlight one difference be- s men were sworn in at the end of September tween the Soviet and ISAF experiences with 2014.43 withdrawal and transition. The Soviets had a partner who was, according to some, charis- The two quickly signed the crucial Bilateral matic and strong-willed even if he confronted Security Agreement (BSA) with the United similar divides between the Parcham and States, a key element in maintaining some Khalq factions. His strong base in KhAD fur- level of post-2014 international support, in- ther reinforced his position. In contrast, Ghani t-201

s cluding nearly 10,000 troops. The BSA is faces a political environment that is at least open-ended in terms of the roles and num- as factionalized and may or may not have the Po 4 Scenario bers of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It does level of charisma, ruthless will and security- prohibit U.S. forces from undertaking combat service support that Najibullah enjoyed.46 16 operations except by mutual agreement with the Afghan government. However, in Novem- The linkage between political factions and el- ber 2014, the Obama administration decided ements of the ANSF makes the political cri- that, at Afghan request, U.S. forces would sis deeper, as it raises the possibility of ANSF continue to conduct some combat opera- fragmentation or even an attempted coup. tions, especially providing air support to the In August 2014, the Afghan government ex- Po st-2014 Scenarios 17 Politics below below Politics the national reflects level the divisions but at the top with additional and rivalries stem- conflicts lo- ming from conditions. cal It is 56 At present, the 54 conomy According to the World 55 E A similar divide was noted 52 53 Not surprisingly, many of the field commanders, disillusioned by the constant in-fighting among the leadership, asserted have their autonomy and their pursued own ambitions, either by with the fighting government forces or by enter- ing into secret deals with Kabul. In many the field areas “liberated” of the so-called commanders have established their re- levying tax- of “spheres control”, spective es on trucks passengers, and buses that pass through their territories, funding infrequently their and bands of muja- not hidin through the lucrative cultivation of marijuana. in the in insurgency the 1980s and may have contributed to the chaos after 1992. Indeed, 1991 soon could quotation from the following be applicable today (albeit perhaps with ref- than marijuana): rather opium to erence Bank in 2013, consumer and investor confi- uncer- to due contracting already were dence environment. tainty the over post-2014 periphery challenges the central government government the periphery central challenges have Analysts Taliban. the confront also faces leadership, senior the between divide a noted and the fieldcommanders in based Pakistan, in Afghanistan. unlikely unlikely that this confidence has increased significantly given the security and political this year. experienced problems Indeed, a July 2014 survey of businesses by the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and worse In- was business that found (ACCI) dustry than business owners had anticipated three months In earlier. addition, the report noted: Taliban appears to have sufficient cohesion to cohesion sufficient have to appears Taliban draws 2014 as even attacks significant mount of loss further of possibility the but close, a to real. remains cohesion These These divides may mean that af- the Taliban ter 2014 will be less rather than more formi- dable, as internecine struggles may come to David Indeed, Mans- the with gone. fore ISAF field argues that in many areas, it is already difficult—if not impossible—to speak of “the as Taliban” a single entity. The Afghan The Afghan economy has not done 2014, well which has in compounded the need for external support as government have revenues contracted. 50 Tal- 51 Although 47 The New York The New York Times 49 48 reporting. pelled pelled a reporter from Political Political divisions are not the exclusive prov- of variety a are There government. the of ince factions within the perhaps broader Taliban, notably most the Haqqani semi-autonomous center- of sort same the addition, In Network. iban have certainly gained popularity in some some in popularity gained certainly have iban areas of Badakhshan eradication. by blocking opium it is impossible to verify coup rumors, they have not been confinedto just Power Power in Badakhshan is fragmented, with a group associated with Tajik Defense Minis- ter Bismillah Khan confronting those loyal to Parliamentarian and local strongman Zalmei “Such is thecompeti- Mansfield notes: Khan. tion and antipathy between these two forces that the incursion of insurgent groups in the are province in part attributed to the actions of both sides as they attempt to undermine the patronage networks of their rival.” These political issues, like security, are linked linked are security, like political issues, These to opium production. In Balkh suc- province, cessful poppy eradication heavily on has its importance to depended Governor Atta, who has persisted in effortsdespite seeing little in terms of outside support. His efforts to limit poppy have been overall concentration bolstered of power by and the his relatively robust health of the provincial economy. Fighting poppy is both within his power and interest. In in contrast, neighboring Badakhshan, field research by David Mansfield finds state the unable to extend its writ, and poppy cation eradi- varied widely by geographic area. Politics Politics below the national level reflects the divisions at the top but with additional rival- condi- local from stemming conflicts and ries though Balkh, of governor the noted, As tions. aligned with Abdullah, has his own agenda. These intra-ethnic divisions are present all in the major groups in Afghanistan to varying Thus, degrees. even if the power-sharing arrangement holds at the national would not all resolve level, political issues. Center- it recurring, a are clashes and divides periphery almost theme continuous, in Afghan political history, and the post-2014 period is unlikely different. any be to for for allegedly falsely reporting intimations rumors by some and Afghan officials about the possibility of a coup attempt. Times’ “A considerable number of companies reported to be closed or downsized. At least 9.9 percent of the employees of the surveyed companies had lost their jobs in a most favorable season of the year, which is unprecedented in our sur- A significant veys.”57 portion of A significant portion of Afghanistan’s gross do- Afghanistan’s mestic product (GDP) is reliant on international assistance, both from foreign governments gross domestic and non-governmental organizations.58 This in- product (GDP) cludes spending on ANSF, which indirectly ben- efits the economy through both ANSF salaries is reliant on in- and local acquisition of goods like food. It also ternational as- includes ISAF spending in Afghanistan for local acquisition, facilities rental, transportation and sistance, both the like. The result is an economic bubble that from foreign could burst if international aid shrinks significantly in the post-2014 environment. governments and non- This potential bubble collapse is compounded by rising Afghan expectations. Some analysts governmental have observed a seemingly genuine belief by organizations. some Afghans that Afghanistan will be a rich country within a few years. This has been driven by both international and local rhetoric about Afghan mineral resources, as symbolized by the Aynak copper mine near Kabul. Yet this mine, like the broader possibility for Afghan mineral development, is likely to be more image than substance in at least the near-term future.59 The gap between expectations and reality is dangerous because it has the potential to fuel dissatis- faction with the government.

Although these broader trends affect the entire Afghan economy, there is substantial regional variation. The economy of the north, centered on Mazar-e Sharif, and the west, centered on Herat, have access to international markets (Central Asia and Iran respectively) that has s made them somewhat more dynamic and less aid-dependent than other regions. Combined with a better security environment in those regions, these regional economies will likely out- perform the other regional centers (Kabul, Kan- dahar and Jalalabad) after 2014. t-201

s Unfortunately, the one area of Afghanistan’s economy that seems to be doing well is opium Po 4 Scenario Aerial view of production.60 According to some reports, 2014 poppy fields is set to be a record-breaking year.61 Although 18 in Nangarhar province (photo close observers note that there is variation in by Alcis Ltd.). the expansion of opium and therefore some cause for hope after 2014, at present the trend is negative.62 Po st-2014 Scenarios 19 Future Scenarios for Afghanistan

A stable stalemate is defined as one in which neither the government nor the Taliban has a prospect of achieving a rapid and/or decisive victory but both sides are suffering some level of attri- rawing on both the Soviet experience ate support presumes that the international and the foregoing discussion of the cur- community continues to provide significant tion. Drent baseline, it is possible to identify financial support to ANSF and Afghan eco- four major possible scenarios for post-2014 nomic development, along with a continued Afghanistan. The key variables are the inter- but much smaller presence of international nal political cohesion of the country (high or troops to provide training, advice and assis- low) and the level of external support (mod- tance to ANSF. Low (or no) support presumes erate or low). that the international community after 2014 provides significantly fewer resources and In this context, political cohesion means little or no international troop presence.

s principally that at the national level, the ac- cord reached between the Ghani and Abdul- The interaction of these two variables thus lah camps (or some equivalent) holds to- yields four theoretically possible scenarios as gether. Realistically, this does not mean the described in the table on the right (see Figure two camps embrace one another with great 1). warmth but rather that they can agree to a distribution of political and economic re- Each of these scenarios is briefly discussed sources that both can live with. At the same in the remainder of this section. The focus t-201

s time, cohesion means intra-ethnic divisions is less on detailed description of the many

Po 4 Scenario do not become unmanageable. In contrast, possible variations within each scenario and low cohesion presumes that the national ac- more on the likely implications for policymak- 20 cord does not endure for long after end of ers, with an emphasis on counternarcotics, 2014 and/or that intra-ethnic divides become for each scenario. The intent is to provide more severe. policymakers with a structured mechanism to evaluate possible futures and to determine External support in this context means con- where Russia-U.S. cooperation is most likely tinued support from the international com- to be effective in reducing the shared threat munity for the Afghan government. Moder- of narcotics. Po st-2014 Scenarios 21 Losing Stable Taliban the Taliban Ground to the Stalemate with with Stalemate High Political CohesionHigh Political 64 Figure 1: Table of Possible Scenarios Possible of Table 1: Figure though its details may vary might (e.g. step Abdullah down from his current within political frame- but the remain current position work). Both sides would be able some of level to discipline within their networks ensure to limit intra-government clashes province Jowzjan (e.g. in factions between fighting the June 2013). in Significant but nonetheless limited external support would also continue. This would allow the government to maintain the as a significantstabilizing ANSF force, the security ANSF costs are environment (current roughly $6 billion annually). At the same time, the “aid bubble” in the economy would deflate more slowly, reducing the immediate nomic impact. eco- Despite the similarity to the current environ- key some have still would this scenario ment, differences. The contours control of ter- of ritory would likely be different than the cur- depend would much though distribution, rent on the continued level of external support. If maintains external sufficient the government support to support the ANSF at the significant a present hold to able be likely would it size, a Divided Resurgence Afghanistan Return of the of Return 63

Holding Together Holding Together Low Political Cohesion Political Low

Warlords / Taliban / Taliban Warlords

Low Support Low Moderate Support Moderate Stable stalemate is the post-2014 scenario that most resembles the ment. current environ- The political Ghani by President represented the interests compromise between and Chief Executive Abdullah would endure, A stable A stalemate is defined as one in which neither the government nor the Taliban has a prospect of achieving a rapid deci- and/or some suffering are sides both but victory sive level of attrition. Stalemate could potentially allow a successful negotiated settlement, as both sides conclude that outright victory is Some impossible. hypothesize that a “mutu- ally hurting stalemate” is one of the such a resolution. for tions necessary condi- The best possible outcome for a post-2014 Afghanistan is a stable stalemate Although an and Taliban. between the the government outright government victory would be bet- it ter, seems unlikely given the current environment and future trends. However, continued with political cohesion support, and government forces external could at a stalemate. achieve least Stable Stalemate portion of the country against the Taliban. Ar- troops that can provide some level of logistics eas that are lost to the Taliban would likely be and intelligence support), then the likelihood Yet, even in those that are remote or peripheral (though is much lower. this relatively these may also be important areas for opium production). However, the ANSF would likely Even as the ANSF contract, the Afghan promising be able to control key lines of communication economy would also shrink in this scenar- scenario, inter- between all major cities and many provincial io. Although continued aid would allow the capitals. “aid bubble” to deflate relatively slowly, the dictions and economy would still feel the impact as well eradication If the level of external support shrinks mod- as some continued uncertainty. This decline, estly and the ANSF are forced to contract combined with ANSF loss of some key opi- are likely to more quickly (e.g. from the current level of um-producing areas (e.g. parts of Helmand), decrease even 352,000 to something closer to the 2012 would likely drive some short-term expansion NATO Chicago Summit level of 228,000), of the opium economy. from current more significant losses of territory are likely.65 levels. Policy- This might include remote provincial capitals Despite these challenges, this stalemate such as Parun in Nuristan or Tarin Kot in Uru- offers some hope for counternarcotics. Al- makers should zgan. Although these losses would probably though this stalemate promises little to no emphasize not prevent the establishment of a stable short-term progress, it does raise the possi- stalemate, it would be on terms less favorable bility of significant progress in the medium-to- other tools to to the ANSF, which would reduce the Afghan long-term through a negotiated settlement. A mitigate these government’s leverage in any negotiations. successful negotiated end to the conflict in Under these conditions, the Taliban might Afghanistan would not in and of itself solve shortfalls. also be slower to conclude that a stalemate the opium problem, but it offers the possi- was actually stable and thus that negotia- bility of refocusing resources from counter- tions were necessary. insurgency to counternarcotics as well as a general expansion of the government’s reach From a policy perspective, achieving stable into key opium-producing areas. stalemate will require two types of effort. The first is to ensure that the preconditions Yet, even in this relatively promising scenario, in terms of external support and political co- interdictions and eradication are likely to de- hesion are met. This will be challenging, given crease even from current levels. Policymak- donor fatigue in terms of external support ers should emphasize other tools to mitigate and unresolved tension in the new Afghan these shortfalls. Some examples of these government. tools will be provided in the forthcoming report by the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group The second effort is more operational and on Afghan Narcotrafficking on border secu- focuses on reducing or ameliorating some rity around Afghanistan, the second in the se-

s of the key weaknesses in the ANSF. Most no- ries of follow-up reports focusing on specific tably, these include the limitations in intel- issues related to Afghan narcotrafficking. ligence and logistics as well as politicization and corruption in the ANSF. The recent collapse of Iraqi forces around Mosul demon- Losing Ground strates that even forces that have external A less promising scenario for post-2014 Af- support can be vulnerable to rapid and unex- ghanistan is one in which the new Afghan gov- pected collapse when they lack logistics and t-201 ernment maintains political cohesion but be- s intelligence and suffer from politicization and 66 gins to lose external support. In this scenario,

Po 4 Scenario corruption. While Iraq may not be perfectly the government would not collapse overnight analogous, the South Vietnamese military but would be forced to prioritize very limited suffered from similar weaknesses in 1975 and 22 resources and would lose significant portions also experienced an unexpected collapse.67 of the country to the Taliban. Ultimately, the The possibility that the ANSF could suffer government would at best hold onto key parts similar collapses even when receiving exter- of the west and north of the country as the nal support cannot be discounted. However, Taliban take the south and east. At worst, the if external support is structured to ameliorate ANSF would collapse due to lack of funding. these weaknesses (e.g. by retaining foreign Po st-2014 Scenarios 23 This combina- declin- tion of ing government control and economic contraction likely would in signifi- result expansion cant the opium of with economy no suc- little to inter- cessful diction inside Afghanistan. 70 When compounded with a rapidly 71 Given that attempting to hold just these cities cities these just hold to attempting that Given without holding any lines of communication would be pointless, it is clear that the minimum number of ANSF to have any prospect of holding even the most vital terrain would be Ifsignificantly one larger. assumes that it (ap- personnel the double roughly take would proximately 140,000 ANSF) to secure lines of communication and there are no changes in how the ANSF pays and equips its forces, then paying for this will force roughly require $2.4 billion annually (40 percent of the current cost of $6 billion), of which Afghanistan can pay, as noted at earlier, most $500 million in the near term. Thus, if donor funding an- billion $2 roughly below falls ANSF the for unlikely highly is it term, medium the in nually survive. can government that the current Support that is above this rough threshold but below the Chicago Summit funding level of the ANSF ($4.1 billion annually) might be abil- its but cities, key other some hold to able of operations counternarcotics conduct to ity any significancewould bevirtually nil. Many of the key opium-producing regions, especially in the south, would control. government likely be outside like- would bubble” “aid the time, same the At ly burst rapidly and painfully in this scenario. If aid dropped by half in this one would year, lead to a decline Afghan in GDP of at least 10 percent. worsening worsening security situation, the fall would likely be greater as investment dried up and currency flightto safer havens likeDubai increased. This combination of declining like- would contraction economic and control government opium the of expansion significant in result ly economy with little to no interdic- successful tion inside Afghanistan. continued However, political cohesion at least offers the possibility for continued cooperation by the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federa- tion (FSKN) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with Afghan counter- pos- some offers least at This units. narcotics sible avenues for intelligence-sharing Afghanistan. outside interdiction allow could that of of the then current police that force, mission personnel. ANSF 70,000 roughly requires It is thus 69 Although there is hope that 68 Some Some of these concerns have already been publicly reported in 2013 during the Karzai administration. Perception Perception of the Afghan likely government play will a significant role external support. inIf donors maintaining view the government as then unworthy, support would likely decline rapidly. For example, a among donors perception that Afghanistan is not supporting rule of law and human rights aid. international in decline significant to lead could The same is true if donors that perceive cor- rather worse getting is Afghanistan in ruption than better. This scenario assumes, like the previous one, one, the previous like assumes, This scenario that the current political coalition between the Ghani and Abdullah camps will hold, but that presumes it scenario, previous the unlike external support drops 2014 in terms significantly of both foreign troops and re- after Agree- Security Bilateral a with Even sources. ment, the United States and other international partners are weary after more than a fiscal austeritydecade has of Moreover, war. tightened Western defense combination budgets. makes it This entirely possible that even though support will likely continue into thereafter. rapidly wane to begin it may 2015, Ghani and Abdullah will make fightingruption cor- a priority, both men have extensive after that will be patronage seeking networks supporting them in the elections. This scenario is perilous for the government in two First, a ways. rapid and significantde- crease in international troops below the current post-2014 plan of roughly 10,000 U.S. troops with additional NATO forces hamper would the continued development of This is ANSF. the particularly important as a de- jeopardize could ANSF the for funding in cline the security of even key regions of Afghani- stan (particularly Kandahar city and Lashkar Gah in Helmand). Based on pro- estimates from ANSF, the of assessment independent an tecting the five largest cities Afghanistan in alone would require maintaining an army at If one. current the of size the percent 20 least one assumes a roughly comparable fraction possible that despite their intentions, corrup- intentions, their despite that possible tion, human rights and the like will to worsen the point of significant donorreduction after Indeed, 2014. the price of maintaining politi- patronage. be increased could cohesion cal Holding Together From a counternarcotics perspective, this scenario is potentially worse than the previ- This scenario presumes the opposite of the ous scenario. It is at least as bad in terms of previous scenario, with political cohesion interdiction, as the political will to interdict failing but external support continuing. It is and the security environment to enable inter- distinct from a scenario in which Abdullah va- diction would both decline from the present cates the position of chief executive but con- level. The opium economy would be roughly tinues to participate in the political process as bad, as the overall economy would suf- and is able to maintain discipline among his fer from political division and eroding secu- supporters. It is also significantly worse for rity even though continued international aid Afghanistan generally and counternarcotics would prevent or at least ameliorate rapid specifically than the preceding two scenarios. decline. A joint Russia- In the absence of political cohesion, external U.S. position support is likely to be less effective and hard- However, the loss of political cohesion could er to maintain. make cooperation with the ANSF, including on the need for military advising and intelligence-sharing, more complicated. Intra-ANSF sharing and unity would be In this scenario, the current coalition between the Ghani and Abdullah camps fails relatively cooperation, including on counternarcot- very useful to quickly after 2014. Some observers believe ics, would be limited. Military advisers, along with FSKN and DEA personnel, would have to reinforce the that the two camps could collapse in six months.72 Although this may be pessimistic, deal with counterparts that were, at best, not conditions for it is very plausible that competition for re- cooperating, and at worst, hostile to one another. aid. sources and/or another bloody fighting season in 2015 could drive the two camps apart early in the post-2014 period. This problem The policy emphasis in this scenario would would be compounded by potential difficulty be using conditionality of external support in maintaining discipline in both camps, with to force the government to hold together de- powerful figures like Dostum and Atta poten- spite political differences. Yet, there are real tially acting according to their own agendas limits to the impact of conditionality. Con- in ways that further undermine political cohe- vincing actors in these environments that sion. conditionality is serious can be challenging. Even if that is successful, some Afghan ac- The result of this loss of political cohesion is tors may believe that they could benefit more difficult to predict, but at best, it would lead from defecting from the government even if to suboptimal resource allocation. Many in that meant losing some aid. They may also the Abdullah camp and their extended net- believe that suspended Western aid could be works inside the government and ANSF replaced by others, including regional actors. would likely overemphasize defending territory in the north (e.g. Balkh and Badakhshan) A joint Russia-U.S. position on the need for rather than in the south (e.g. Kandahar and unity would be very useful to reinforce the conditions for aid. It would help dispel any s Helmand). This would leave even very important regions vulnerable to the Taliban in the ideas that the two could be played against south and east. one another. In this scenario, it may be in- sufficient to maintain full political cohesion, The Ghani camp could attempt to prevent this but it could be sufficient to prevent the ANSF reallocation by changing some of the leaders from breaking apart. in the ANSF, shifting leadership towards their supporters. However, as the Najibullah case Yet, convincing weary donors to continue t-201

s underscores, this could further alienate the supporting Afghanistan, even conditionally, would be challenging. This is especially true

Po 4 Scenario Abdullah camp and begin the unraveling of the ANSF. The worst case in this scenario is if, as seems likely, current fiscal constraints for many donors continue for the medium 24 the breakdown of the ANSF along ethnic and political lines, with the Taliban then well posi- term. The result could be a downward spiral, tioned to exploit this breakdown and signifi- where donors begin to withdraw aid as politi- cantly increase its territory. cal cohesion declines, which in turn reduces incentives for the coalition to hold together, and so aid is further reduced. Po st-2014 Scenarios 25 The counter- im- narcotics of plications this scenario be to likely are catastrophic. Interdiction essen- would tially end along the with all of Afghan current counternarcot- apparatus. ics the Taliban from across almost duplicating the entire as country, it did in its advance 1990s. the late The counternarcotics implications scenario of are likely to be this catastrophic. Inter- end along diction essentially with would all of appara- counternarcotics Afghan the current Without significantforeign aidtus. and in the middle of renewed large-scale civil war, the opium economy would be one of the only re- liable sources of revenue for many warlords. Tal- that the to believe reason is strong There iban would not act to curtail opium production, at least in the near term. Taliban the 2001, before power their of height Even at the was circumspect about how fast and hard to push limitations on opium production. Apart from working to prevent this scenario the policy occurring, from emphasis must be as the with of other some sce- First, two-fold. narios, Russia and the United States would to mit- efforts coordinating from both benefit igate the expansion of opium. This includes control to efforts strengthening notably most regional borders, as will be discussed in the working forthcoming borders group’s report. this However, is politically sensitive, particularly in Central Asia, and so the extent of co- be limited. may operation Second, in considering support to anti-Tal- iban elements, Russia and the United States would benefitfrom some level coordina- of tion. This is again politically very but collaboration might sensitive, allow Russia and the regional other how influence to States United attempt to intervene and international states posi- coordinated a Moreover, Afghanistan. in tion would give Russia and the United States on contingent aid any make to leverage some limiting growth of the opium economy in re- assistance. seeking those by controlled gions Ultimately, the best policy for both and the Russia United States, particularly in terms of is counternarcotics, to avoid this scenario Although it entirely. is not likely in the immediate post-2014 period, the decline in external support and/or political cohesion time could over steadily push Afghanistan in this and that The the Russia more Unit- direction. ed States can cooperate to this prevent drift from the beginning, the less likely this cata- be realized. will ever scenario strophic The result would be an increase in 73 As As with the post-Najibullah-regime environment, various strongmen would likely vie for control of regions in a shifting pattern of alliances. The end result of either of the two ing preced- scenarios (holding together and ground) losing could ultimately be the nario. In this both scenario, external support final sce- This nil. even or low are cohesion political and the post- resemble likely very would scenario 1992 period in Afghanistan, though with two differences. key Return of the Warlords of the Return Yet, Yet, the other main difference between the post-2014 period and the early 1990s is the continued interest of both regional and ternational in- actors in counterterrorism in Af- re- to actors some cause may This ghanistan. post-2014 the in Afghanistan in involved main period (at least covertly) to a much greater extent than in the 1990s. This could prevent One One of the main Afghani- in 1990s the and scenario post-2014 differences between this of a national stan is shadow the preexistence government in the form of the Taliban. It is possible that many of those defecting from in ANSF the the south and could east choose to align with the Taliban, as the might alternative be to fight atwo-frontwar against the and north the in ANSF former the and Taliban fo- to the ability have would Taliban The west. cus province resources, by province, to deal with those unwilling to align with the Taliban, potentially defeating one warlords, by one. It Tal- the that scenario this in likely very thus is iban would dominate much of the south and quickly. relatively east At At best, each of the main men might regional eventually control strong- his area without seeking to expand (e.g. Dostum control would the Uzbek region province). This around Jowzjan might achieve but nonetheless a stable and relatively peace- fractured ful Yet balance between competing warlords. of terms in and economic both incentives, the eliminating potential enemies, may push the even and continued towards alliances various conflict. expanded violence violence as the ANSF broke apart along ethnic and political lines. Some of these defec- tors would likely side with factions, insurgent including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Party. Islamic Conclusion

The problem of Afghan narcotics will likewise continue to threaten Rus- sia, the United States and he working group’s central conclusion is that the the rest of the post-2014 security, political and economic environ- Tments will not be good under almost all conceiv- world. The able circumstances. The problem of Afghan narcotics will Afghan state likewise continue to threaten Russia, the United States and the rest of the world. The Afghan state has too many has too many weaknesses, the Taliban is too strong, and the incentives weaknesses, to expand the opium economy are too high for the environment to improve in the short term. Policymakers the Taliban is must be prepared for this reality. too strong, However, the possibility of a sustainable and stable stale- and the incen- mate should give policymakers hope. It offers a potential tives to expand pathway to a negotiated settlement that could eventually begin to reduce the threat from Afghan narcotrafficking. the opium At the same time, the possibility of a return to warlord- economy are ism, though unlikely at present, should draw attention to the possible future perils. too high for the environment to Policymakers in Russia and the United States should therefore focus effort along two tracks. First, both coun- improve in the tries should explore all possible joint efforts that increase short term. the probability of a stalemate that leads to negotiations. One clear means is to work together to ensure continued political cohesion in Afghanistan. This will require diplomatic coordination so that all major political factions receive the same message to remain unified from both s Russia and the United States.

Second, Russia and the United States must also coor- dinate efforts to mitigate the negative impacts if stable stalemate is unachievable. These efforts will also help limit the impact of the inevitable short-term challenges in any post-2014 scenario. The recommendations in the t-201

s forthcoming EWI working group’s borders report fall into this category of effort. In addition, future EWI working Po 4 Scenario Harvested poppy group reports will focus on possible joint efforts to attack the illicit mechanisms narcotraffickers use to launder 26 crops near Kandahar. and transfer money and strategies for alternative liveli- hoods. In the absence of security preconditions, however, it is likely that recommendations in this latter area would need to be left to future generations of leaders. Po st-2014 Scenarios 27 endnotes

1 Ekaterina Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment. Joint U.S.- Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking (New York: EastWest Institute, 2013), 45.

2 For an overview of the literature in English on this period, see: Lester Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics In Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996); Lester Grau and Michael Gress, The Soviet War: How A Superpower Fought and Lost, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Antonio Giustozzi, War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan 1978–1992 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000); Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Artemy M. Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); and Olga Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011). For the view of senior Soviet commanders in Russian, see Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragediya i Doblest Afgana (Moscow: Iskona, 1995) and Boris Gromov, Organichenniy Kontingent (Moscow: Progress, 1994).

3 See, for example, the contemporaneous view in Richard Cronin, “Afghanistan 1988: Year of Decision,” Asian Survey 29, no. 2 (1989) and Theodore Eliot, “Afghanistan in 1989: Stalemate,” Asian Survey 30, no. 2 (1990).

4 For a centrist Russian perspective on post-2014 Afghanistan, see Ekaterina Stepanova, Af- ghanistan after 2014: The Way Forward for Russia, (Paris: IFRI, 2013). For a centrist U.S. perspective on post-2014 Afghanistan, see Seth Jones and Keith Crane, Afghanistan After the Drawdown (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). s 5 See Lester W. Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 2 (2007) and Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye.

6 Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89, (London: Profile Books, 2011), 138. See also Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime. t-201

s 7 Giustozzi, War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan 1978–1992, (Washington, D.C.: George- town University Press, 2000), 98–99 and 266. Po 4 Scenario

8 Austin Long et al., Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces in Af- 28 ghanistan and Beyond, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), chapter 8; and Giustozzi, War, Poli- tics, and Society, 206 and 222–223.

9 David Edwards, Before the Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley, CA: Univer- sity of California Press, 2002). Po st-2014 Scenarios 29 Los , July , 8, TheWash- , , March 26, Los Angeles 33, no. 2 (Feb- 2 no. 33, , March 11, 1989; Tim- 1989; 11, March , 32, no. 2 (1992). no. 32, Asian Survey The Washington Post . , April 7, 1991. April 7, , The Washington Post Asian Survey Los Angeles Times , June 14, 2014. June 14, , Economic Development in Afghanistan During The New York Times Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani- The New York Times , April 17, 1992. 1992. April 17, , efore the Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad , April 14, 2014. April 14, , , March 15, 1992; and Mark Fineman, “Afghan Leader Forced Out by Army, Rebels,” Rebels,” Out Army, by Forced Leader 1992; , March 15, and “Afghan Mark Fineman, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), 10. 2014), Office, Printing Government D.C.: (Washington, 10 Edwards, B Edwards, 10 stan othy Weaver, “Afghan “Afghan Guerilla Assault on othy Weaver, Jalalabad Stalls,” Times ington Post 1989; and James Rupert, “Afghanistan Rebels Lose Key Battle,” Battle,” Key Rebels Lose “Afghanistan 1989; and James Rupert, 12 “Rebel Cabinet Holds 1st Session in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan,” Cabinet in Holds “Rebel 1st Session 12 (Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada, 2007). R&D Canada, Defence (Ottawa: 22 Joshua Partlow, “Violence data show spike during Afghan presidential election,” election,” presidential Afghan during spike show data “Violence Partlow, Joshua 22 15 “Afghan Rebels Torn by New Quarrel,” Quarrel,” New by Torn Rebels “Afghan 15 14 See Eliot, “Afghanistan in 1989.” in 1989.” “Afghanistan Eliot, See 14 13 Comment from former Russian military officer, November 2014. November military officer, Russian former from Comment 13 1989. 1989. 23 Azam Ahmed and Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghans, Looking Ahead to U.S. Withdrawal, Vote Vote Withdrawal, Ahead Looking to U.S. “Afghans, 23 Ahmed Azam and Matthew Rosenberg, Optimism,” Guarded With 20 Shah Tarzi, “Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature,” Nature,” of State Hobbesian A 1992: in “Afghanistan Tarzi, Shah 20 19 Grau, “Breaking Contact.” “Breaking 19 Grau, Angeles Times 25 Obaid “Security Ali, Spread Thin: Forces An Af- update from contested province,” Faryab 2014. June 11, Network, Analysts ghan 24 24 See Austin Long, “The Insider Threat in Afghanistan: A and Sciences). Arts First of Academy American Look the from (forthcoming at Lessons Learned,” 16 Shah Tarzi, “Afghanistan in 1991: A Glimmer of Hope,” Hope,” Glimmer of A in 1991: “Afghanistan Tarzi, Shah 16 11 See Anton Minkov and Gregory Smolynec, the Soviet Period, 1979–1989: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan 18 Mark Fineman, “Powerful Militia Unit in Open Against Revolt Kabul Regime,” 17 See Kalinovsky, 206-208. Kalinovsky, See 17 21 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense, 21 U.S. ruary 1993): 174. ruary 1993): 26 Fabrizio Foschini, “Footsloggers, Turncoats and Enforcers: The fight along the eastern border,” Afghan Analysts Network, August 18, 2014.

27 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani- stan, 11.

28 Rod Nordland and Taimoor Shah, “Afghans Say Taliban Are Nearing Control of Key District,” The New York Times, September 6, 2014; and Erin Cunningham, “Taliban offensive in southern Afghan district ‘worst fighting’ in years,”The Washington Post, August 23, 2014.

29 AWOL includes any unauthorized absence, which can range from desertion to simply coming home late from authorized leave.

30 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani- stan, 36.

31 See Letter from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to Com- manding General, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, February 19, 2014, online at http://www.sigar.mil and Jonathan Schroeden, et al., Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2014), 94.

32 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani- stan, 2.

33 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani- stan, 2 and 25.

34 Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amir, “Taliban Attacks in Ghazni Kill at Least 20,” The Wall Street Journal, September 4, 2014; Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amir, “Six Killed in Suicide Attack At Afghanistan Intelligence Compound,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2014; and Nathan Hodge and Ehsanullah Amir, “Taliban Attack Afghan Intelligence Service Fa- cility,” The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2014.

35 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. RL30588). (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 29.

36 See Jones and Crane, Afghanistan After the Drawdown, 7; and U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 72.

37 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani- stan, 81–82. s

38 Matthieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak,” Harper’s Magazine, December 2009.

39 David Zuchinno, “America’s go-to man in Afghanistan’s Oruzgan province,” Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2013.

40 UNAMA, 2014 Mid-Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul: United t-201

s Nations, 2014). Po 4 Scenario 41 Matthieu Aikins, Contracting the Commanders: Transition and the Political Economy of Af- ghanistan’s Private Security Industry (New York: New York University, 2012), 5. 30 42 Engineer Mohammed Khan is from the formally registered Islamic Party of Afghanistan, which is separate from but linked to the Islamic Party of Guldbuddin Hekmatyar. At the time of writing, the two were divided on political candidates. See Thomas Ruttig, “Bomb and Bal- lot: The many strands and tactics of Hezb-e Islami,” Afghan Analysts Network, February 2014. Po st-2014 Scenarios 31 The The , , Septem- (October 2014). (October , July 17, 2014. The 2014. 17, July , (Princeton, NJ: Princ- , vol. 47, , no. vol. 2 47, (February Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint The NewYorker The World Today Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty , August 18, 2014. For reporting on Rosenberg’s on reporting Rosenberg’s For 2014. August 18, , The Cairo Review of Global Affairs , March 20, 2014. 20, March , Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History The New York Times , August 20, 2014. 20, August , , November 21, 2014. 21, November , . , April 15, 2014. April 15, , , July 10, 2013. July 10, , The Guardian South China Morning Post Threat Assessment The New York Times 52 Zahid Hussain, “The Taliban Question,” Question,” Taliban “The Hussain, Zahid 52 51 David Mansfield, field research notes, 2014. notes, research field Mansfield, 51 David 50 David Mansfield, “Our Friends in the North: Contrasting Images of Power and Poppy in the Poppy and Power of Images Friends in theContrasting North: “Our Mansfield, 50 David 2014. April 8, Badakhshan,” Balkh and of Provinces eton University Press, 2010). Press, University eton 59 On Aynak and its troubles, see Lynne O’Donnell, “Chinese firm“Chinese turnsAfghanback mine on O’Donnell, see Lynne and its Aynak 59 troubles, On deal,” 43 “Ghani Inaugurated As New Afghan President,” As Afghan “Ghani New President,” Inaugurated 43 58 Some observers argue that aid accounts for over 90 percent of Afghan GDP, but that con- GDP, Afghan of 90 percent that over argue for aid accounts 58 Some observers flatestotal spendingAfghanistan on with money actually spent Nonetheless, Afghanistan. in even a more conservative calculation suggests that aid accounts for roughly 25 percent of See GDP. Borany “Understanding Penh, the Aid to GDP Relation: Not a Piece of Cake,” 57 ACCI Business Tendency Survey 57 Afghanistan ACCI Report, Business Chamber Tendency of Commerce and Indus- Kanda- Balkh, Kabul, cities: with the largest the regions covered The survey 1. July 2014, tries, and Herat. Nangarhar har, 56 “The World Bank: Afghanistan Overview,” The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/ Bank, World The Overview,” Afghanistan Bank: World “The 56 country/afghanistan/overview#1. 44 Mark Mazetti and Eric “In Schmitt, a Shift, Obama Extends Role U.S. in Afghan Combat,” ber 29, 2014. ber 29, 47 The original story is Matthew Rosenberg, “Amid Election Impasse, Calls for Afghanistan in Election Impasse, “Amid The original 47 story is Matthew Rosenberg, an Interim Government,” 46 Comment from former Russian military officer, November 2014. November military officer, Russian former from 46 Comment 45 Fabrizio Foschini, “The Other Transfer of Power: Fahim’s death and Massud’s succession,” death and succession,” Massud’s Fahim’s of Power: “The Other Transfer Foschini, 45 Fabrizio 2014. May Network, Analysts Afghan 48 Steve Coll, “Dodging a Coup Attempt in Kabul, For Now,” Now,” For Kabul, in Attempt Coup a “Dodging Coll, Steve 48 deportation, see May Jeong, “Afghanistan orders New York Times reporter to leave over ‘coup’ ‘coup’ over leave to reporter Times York New orders “Afghanistan Jeong, May see deportation, article,” 55 Kevin Sieff“Afghan and economy JoshuafacingPartlow, serious revenue shortage,” 54 David Bad “‘From Mansfield, They MadeWorse’: It The concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict in (Kabul:Afghanistan Research the of provinces Helmand and Nangarhar,” June 2014). Unit, and Evaluation 1991): 25. 49 See Thomas Barfield, outlines of Coll’s story were supported by August 2014 conversations with Western observers observers Western with conversations 2014 August by supported were story Coll’s of outlines in Kabul. 60 For more detailed assessment, see Stepanova et al., Huffington Post Washington Post 53 Gowher Rizwi, “The Endgame in Afghanistan,” 61 Alice Speri, “Afghanistan’s Opium Economy Is Booming Like Never Before,” VICE News, May 22, 2014.

62 Paul Fishstein and David Mansfield, “Despair or Hope? Opium Poppy Cultivation in post- 2014 Afghanistan,” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2014).

63 William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, ed. by Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2000).

64 Rod Nordland, “After Gunfire, Politicians in Afghanistan Trade Accusations,” The New York Times, June 17, 2013.

65 See Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 29.

66 Keren Fraiman, Austin Long and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why the Iraqi Army collapsed (and what can be done about it),” The Washington Post, June 13, 2014.

67 George Veith, Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75 (New York: Encounter Books, 2012).

68 Rod Nordland, “Donors Are Likely to Ask Karzai to Rethink Rights Panel Choices,” The New York Times, July 2, 2013.

69 Paul Shinkman, “Afghanistan’s New Leaders Face Plenty of Problems,” U.S. News and World Report, September 22, 2014.

70 Schroeden, et al., Independent Assessment, 120-122. s

71 See endnote 48.

72 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Afghanistan Presidential Rivals Sign Power-Sharing Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2014.

73 For a discussion of these alliance patterns in Afghanistan during the 1990s, see Fotini Chris-

t-201 tia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). s Po 4 Scenario

32 Po st-2014 Scenarios 33 initions f & De ms y cron A Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in Mission Assistance orate of Security of orate ecurity Assistance Force in Afghanistan in Force Assistance ecurity atic Republic of Afghanistan of atic Republic erm referring to those engaged in “jihad” (holy struggle or war). or war). (holy struggle “jihad” in engaged those to erm referring s Democratic Party of Afghanistan of Party s Democratic nforcement Administration, USA Administration, nforcement al Security Agreement al Security vised Explosive Device Explosive vised al Service for Control on Narcotics Circulation, Russian Federation Russian Circulation, Narcotics on Control for al Service t closely identified with guerilla groups fighting Democratic Republic of Republic Democratic fighting identified with guerilla groups t closely ernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan of the Islamic Republic ernment of ent Without Leave Without ent ss Domestic Product Domestic ss 9 to 1989. 9 to ghan Intelligence Service ghan Intelligence from Afghanistan in war during the Soviet forces and Soviet ghanistan ghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries and Commerce ghan Chamber of Army ghan National ghan National Police Forces ghan National Security National Direct People’ Nations United Arabic t Arabic Mos Af 197 Gov Impro S International Af Democr Feder Gro Abs Bilater E Drug Af Af Af Af

NDS PDPA UNAMA mujahideen GIRoA IED ISAF KhAD DEA FSKN BSA DRA GDP ANA ANP ANSF AWOL ACCI EastWest Institute Board of Directors

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