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3. (SINF) JTF GTMO Assessment

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3. (SINF) JTF GTMO Assessment SECRET 20300527 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 GTMO- CG 27 May 2005 MEMORANDUMFORCommander, United States Southern Command, 3511NW Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoDControl( ) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-001002DP(S) JTF GTMO DetaineeAssessment 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: JDIMS NDRC Reference Name: AbdulMateen Aliases and Current/ True Name: Qari AbdulMateen, Mullah Shahzada, Qari AbdulMatin Shahzada Mohommad Nabi, Abdul Matin Place of Birth: Tanka Village Jowzjan Province/ Afghanistan (AF) Date of Birth: January 1965 Citizenship: Afghanistan InternmentSerial Number (ISN) : US9AF-001002DP 2. (FOUO) Health Detainee is in good health. Detainee has no travel restrictions. 3. ( SI NF) JTF GTMO Assessment : a . (S ) Recommendation : JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Retained in Control ( . b . ( SI/NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention ( TRCD ) on 29 March 2004. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Retained in DoD Control ( . CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5 (C ) DECLASSIFY ON : 20300527 SECRET//NOFORN 20300527 SECRETI // 20300527 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control( for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: -001002DP(S) For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of the Taliban intelligence network . Detainee was an assistant to the Mazar - E -Sharif Taliban Intelligence Chief, Sharifuddin ( Sharafat). During a period when Sharifuddin (Sharafat) was ill, the detainee temporarily commanded the intelligence organization inMazar- E -Sharif, AF . During this period, detainee ordered the local population to disarm , and he is accused of having the Mayor of Mazar- E -Sharif, Alam Khan, assassinated. Detainee had contacts with high -level Taliban leaders. Detainee delivered messages between Mullah Berader and Mullah Fazel, US9AF- 00007DP (ISN 007) when Fazel was in Mazar - E - Sharif prison. Additionally , detainee's former boss, Sharifuddin, has been linked to numerous attacks against coalition forces. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. ( SI/NF) Detainee Background Summary : Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements . a . (S ) Prior History: Detainee finished high school at Leesa Saheed Jamaluddin Afghani school in Peshawar, PK while he resided at the Haji Abad Hagerian refugee camp . After Detainee graduated high school, family problems that included the death ofhis father, precluded him from attending college. His friends and family moved to the Masara refugee camp. Detainee worked as a teacher at this camp . b (S ) Recruitmentand Travel: Inthe fall of 1998, detainee went to Sheberghan, to visit his father's properties. While in Shebergan, detainee congratulatedSharifuddinon beingnamed IntelligenceChief. The detainee'sfatherknew Sharifuddin'sfather, Abdullah. Sharifuddinaskedthe detainee to be his assistant, anddetaineeacceptedthis position. (S ) Training and Activities : As Sharifuddin's assistant, detainee wrote documents on various subjects. Detainee wrote capital punishment letters but now states that no murders occurred during the reign of the Taliban. Detainee has continuously denied being Sharifuddin's primary assistant. He identified Nazar Mohammed as Sharifuddin's assistant. (Analyst note: This statement contradicts the fact that he received “ pocketmoney” in the amount of 100,000 Afghanis (pre Afghan transitional government currency ), a room at the local military barracks, and free food for his services. He was Sharifuddin's friend, and he traveled with Sharifuddin on many occasions. Detainee was sent to Kabul with Sharifuddin's driver, and detainee was taken to the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence. Detainee thought he was going upstairs for tea; however he was arrested and put injail . Sharifuddin later accused detainee oftaking bribes from General Dostam’s intelligence men. ( Analyst Note: Faizualla Rahman, US9AF-000496DP (ISN 496) , reported that detainee caused serious problems for the locals during a time when Sharifuddin was sick and the detainee was incharge. ISN description of the detainees incarceration is vastly different and more plausible than 2 SECRET NOFORN 20300527 20300527 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control ( ) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: -001002DP ( S) detainee's account of the events.) Detainee was arrested and charged with being a member of the Northern Alliance . Detainee believes this was due to his close relationship with Dostam's intelligence operatives. Detainee was jailed for six months. d . ( S ) Capture Information : After his jail term , the detainee returned to the Masara camp. Detainee worked as a teacher until the collapse of the Taliban . After two or three months of the Karzai government, the detainee heard that schools were starting in Kabul. Detainee went to Kabul to look for a teaching job . Two or three days after arriving in Kabul, detainee left Kabul and went to Sheberghan to check on his father's property . He was exchanging money in the Kefayet market when a powerful explosion occurred . One hundred and fifty people were injured, including the detainee (broken leg) Detainee went to Ghulam Sakhi's house and spent several days there . He did not receive any treatment for his broken leg as the doctors were treating more seriously injured people . Ghulam Sakhi (NFI) took the detainee to a person named Saheed Kamel Kamel asked the detainee for $ 30,000 USD, or he threatened to turn the detainee over to the Americans and claim he was a Taliban or an Al Qaida member . Detainee offered Kamel $2000 USD , but Kamel wanted more money for detainee's release. A few days later, the Americans came and arrested detainee. Detainee told the Americans that he was a teacher . The Americans told the detainee that other people had said he worked for the Taliban Intelligence office . (Analyst note : Saheed Kamel is probably Sayd Kamel, a Lieutenant General in General Rashid Dostam’s army and deputy leader of the Jonbesh - E -Melli Islami, which is part of the Northern Alliance . General Dostam is the leader of the Jonbesh-E -Melli Islami and current defense minister in .) The detainee arrived at Bagram Airbase, AF on 3 April 2003 . e. (S) Transferredto JTF GTMO: 9 September 2003 f. ( SINF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO : To provide information on the following: Possible locations of High Value Target (HVT) Taliban leaders Mullah Berader in particular, Taliban communication procedures and couriers , and possible relationships between high-level Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan (TIGA ) officials and Taliban leaders Routeof Ingressinto Afghanistan Route of Egressfrom Afghanistan 3 SECRET 20300527 SECRET 20300527 JTF GTMO -CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto RetaininDoD Control( for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-001002DP(S) 5. ( SINF) Detainee Threat: a . ( S ) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b . ( SI NF Reasonsfor Detention: ( S //NF) Detainee'sname is listed among 74 other prisoners who werejailed in Sheberghanprison. The Afghan Transitional Authorities (ATA ) believes these prisoners represent a continued threat to the ATA and coalition forces. Jonbeshe-E-Melli ( part of the NorthernAlliance) intelligence officials, who were incharge ofthe prison, documented the list of prisoners. Many of the detainees on the list provided false names; however, the intelligence officials were able to determine their real names via Red Cross packages, letters, correspondence, and source reportinginside the prison. There were a total of 1086 prisoners at the prison. (S) ISN 496 identified detainee as an assistant intelligence officer to Mazar - E Sharifs' Intelligence Chief, Sharifuddin . ISN 496 also reported the detainee assumed the duties of the Intelligence Chief when Sharifuddin was ill. Detainee put out an order for the people to turn in their weapons. Because he was not satisfied with the response to his order , he had all houses searched and confiscated any weapons found. After the search , only his men were armed . When someone was caught with weapons, they were arrested, interrogated and beaten. People injail had to bribe the detainee to be released . According to ISN 496, detainee had the Mayor of Mazar - E -Sharif; Alam Khan, killed and arrested Kahn's son . When Sharifuddin resumed his duties as intelligence chief following his illness, people complained about the detainee's actions . Sharifuddin had the detainee arrested in Kabul. After a few months injail, Sharifuddin released the detainee . (Analyst note: This is a more plausible explanation as to why the detainee was arrested by Sharifuddin than what the detainee reported.) ( S //NF) Sharifuddin ( Sharafat) is listed on the US State Department TIPOFF system as a threat to US interests. Mullah Obaidullah and Mullah Berader indirectly tasked Sharifuddin to conduct ACM activities (Analyst note: Obaidullah and Berader are military deputies ofMullah Omar). MullahMujahidgave Sharifuddin $20,000 Afghanis (approximately $332USD) and 35 explosive devices. Sharifuddin kept 15 devices for himself and gave the rest to his deputy Munaf. • ( S //NF) In March2003, former Taliban
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