A Commentary on the February 2012 Afghanistan Operational Guidance Note
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THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. 27th March 2012 A Commentary on the February 2012 Afghanistan Operational Guidance Note This commentary identifies what the ‘Still Human Still Here’ coalition considers to be the main inconsistencies and omissions between the currently available country of origin information (COI) and case law on Afghanistan and the conclusions reached in the February 2012 Afghanistan Operational Guidance Note (OGN), issued by the UK Border Agency. Where we believe inconsistencies have been identified, the relevant section of the OGN is highlighted in blue. This commentary is a guide for legal practitioners and decision-makers in respect of the relevant COI, by reference to the sections of the Operational Guidance Note on Afghanistan issued in February 2012. To access the complete OGN on Afghanistan go to: http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns/ The document should be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. This document should not be submitted as evidence to the UK Border Agency, the Tribunal or other decision makers in asylum applications or appeals. However, legal representatives are welcome to submit the COI referred to in this document to decision makers (including judges) to help in the accurate determination of an asylum claim or appeal. The COI referred to in this document is not exhaustive and should always be complemented by case-specific COI research. Contents Main categories of claims 3.6 General security situation p. 2 Security situation in Kabul p. 3 3.7 Fear of the Taliban or other anti-government groups p. 7 4.3 Minors claiming in their own right p. 10 Blood feuds p. 36 2.3 Actors of Protection p. 42 2.4 Internal relocation p. 58 Reasonableness Analysis p. 59 Mental health treatment and psychological support p. 73 Index of Sources p. 83 APPENDIX 1. Useful sources to consult on the security situation in Afghanistan p. 93 2. Useful sources to consult on the situation for internally displaced persons in p. 96 Afghanistan 1 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. Main categories of claims 3.6 Security situation Excerpt from February 2012 Afghanistan OGN 3.6.2 Treatment. During the first nine months of 2010 the security situation deteriorated in many parts of Afghanistan. Precise figures vary between organisations but all agree that the human cost escalated. Between 01 January and 30 June 2010, UNAMA recorded a 69% increase in security incidents compared to the same period in 2009. This resulted in a 31% increase in civilian casualties to a total of 3,268, including 1,271 deaths and 1,997 injuries. Women and children made up a greater proportion of those killed than in 2009. Anti-government elements were, according to the UN, responsible for the deaths and injuries of 76 per cent of the total number of civilian casualties for this period. Suicide and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks caused the most civilian casualties attributed to anti-government elements, including 557 deaths and 1,137 injuries.18 [...] 3.6.5 UNAMA documented 1,462 civilian deaths in the first six months of 2011; an increase of 15 percent over the same period in 2010.The main trends that led to rising civilian casualties in early 2011 were increased and widespread use of improvised explosive devices, more complex suicide attacks, an intensified campaign of targeted killings increased ground fighting, and a rise in civilian deaths from air strikes, particularly by Apache helicopters. In total, 80 percent of all civilian deaths in the first half of 2011 were attributed to anti- government elements (up 28 percent from the same period in 2010), 14 percent were attributed to pro-government forces (down nine percent from the same period in 2010) and six percent were unattributed. The first half of 2011 saw the highest number of security incidents recorded by United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) since 2003 when security incidents were first recorded, with 11,826 incidents reported. This compared with 8,242 during the same period in 2010 and 5,095 in the same period in 2009. The southern and south-eastern regions accounted for 64 percent of all incidents, nearly two-thirds. However, the monthly growth rate of incidents was highest in the western region at 35 percent. Armed clashes and IEDs accounted for 71 percent of all security incidents recorded. UNDSS recorded the highest number of security incidents ever for a one month period in June 2011. 24 At the end of 2010, UNHCR considered that the worsening security environment and increasing number of civilian casualties was such that the situation in Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, and parts of Ghazni and Khost provinces could be characterized as one of generalized violence.25 Paragraphs 3.6.2 and 3.6.5 refer to civilian casualty figures for the first half-year of 2010 and 2011, as provided by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in their mid-year reports for 2010 and 2011. For more recent figures and analysis on civilian casualties in Afghanistan covering the whole of 2011, please consult the most recent UNAMA annual report as follows: UNAMA, AFGHANISTAN ANNUAL REPORT 2011 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT, February 2012 *…+ Executive Summary *…+ A decade after it began, the armed conflict in Afghanistan again incurred a greater human cost in 2011 than in previous years. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011, an increase of eight percent over 2010 (2,790 civilian deaths) and a 25 percent increase from 2009 (2,412 civilian deaths).21 *…+ 21 2011 marked the fifth consecutive year in which UNAMA documented an increase in civilian casualties in Afghanistan. 11,864 civilians have been killed in the conflict since 2007. *…+ Anti-Government Elements caused 2,332 conflict-related deaths of Afghan civilians in 2011, up14 percent from 2010. 77 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths in 2011 were attributed to Anti- Government elements. 2 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. 410 civilian deaths resulted from the operations of Pro-Government Forces, down four percent from 2010.22 14 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths were attributed to Pro-Government Forces in 2011. A further 279 civilian deaths, or nine percent of the total, could not be attributed to a particular party to the conflict. *…+ The record loss of the lives of Afghan children, women and men resulted from changes in the tactics of Anti-Government Elements and changes in the effects of tactics of parties to the conflict. Anti- Government Elements used improvised explosive devices more frequently and more widely across the country, conducted deadlier suicide attacks yielding greater numbers of victims, and increased the unlawful and targeted killing of civilians. Civilian deaths from aerial attacks by Pro-Government Forces increased in 2011, in spite of a decrease in the number of aerial attacks and an overall decline in civilian deaths attributed to Pro-Government Forces.23 Excerpt from February 2012 Afghanistan OGN 3.6.7 Kabul has remained largely insulated from the worst violence over the last decade. While insurgent violence has expanded steadily throughout the country, Kabul has remained relatively quiet, although there are isolated incidents, some of them serious. The U.S. military and Afghan security officials claimed to have killed or captured hundreds of would-be assailants around Kabul during 2010, significantly blunting the effectiveness of insurgent forces looking to target the capital. A series of checkpoints known as the „Ring of Steel‟ has been erected around Kabul‟s perimeter to provide the capital with an extra layer of protection.27 The ICG report of 27 June 2011 added: ” Although the number of attacks on Kabul has recently declined, insurgent networks have been able to reinforce their gains in provinces and districts close to the city, launching smaller attacks on soft targets. Outmanned and outgunned by the thousands of foreign and Afghan security forces in and around Kabul, Taliban attacks inside the capital are not aimed at controlling it physically but to capture it psychologically. Once that objective is achieved, the political and financial cost of doing business for foreign forces and diplomatic missions located in Kabul will be too high to sustain for the long haul.”28 Source [27] cited in the highlighted sentence dates from October 2010.1 This news article describes the increase in police personnel stationed in Kabul and reports that the last large scale attack had taken place in May 2010. This could be read to imply that the increased protection measures have improved security in the capital since May 2010. However, the COI detailed below indicates that despite the cited increased protection measures, high profile attacks are still occurring. A database of useful sources to consult on the security situation in a particular region of Afghanistan has also been included in the Appendix. Non-exhaustive security incidents in Kabul since summer 2011 BBC News, Nato pulls out of Afghan ministries after Kabul attack, 25/02/2012 Nato has withdrawn all its personnel from Afghan ministries after two senior US officers were shot dead in the interior ministry building in Kabul.